Behind the Public Prospect of War with Iraq · 1 Behind the Prospect of War with Iraq: The New U.S. National Security Strategy 1 Nuclear Security Legislative Update 2 Leaving a Legacy

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Journal of the Federat ion of American Scient ists

IN THIS ISSUE

1 Behind the Prospect of Warwith Iraq: The New U.S. National Security Strategy

1 Nuclear Security LegislativeUpdate

2 Leaving a Legacy of Peace

2 FAS Mailing Mystery Solved

6 FAS Staff News

6 You Are Invited

9 Fire in the Hole

13 Non-Lethal Chemical and Biological Weapons

Behind theProspect of War

with Iraq:The New U.S.

National SecurityStrategy1

Carl Kaysen, John D. Steinbruner, Martin B. Malin

On September 17, 2002, the White House, under cover of a letter from PresidentBush, issued a thirty-page document entitled “The National Security Strategy of theUnited States.” Its “Overview” states:

The U.S. national security strategy will be based on a distinctly American inter-nationalism that reflects the union of our values and our national interests. The aimof this strategy is to help make the world not just safer but better. Our goals on thepath to progress are clear: political and economic freedom, peaceful relations withother states, and respect for human dignity. . . .

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Volume 55, Number 5September / October 2002

Nuclear Security Legislative Update Jaime Yassif

The past year has seen a flurry of congressional action on nonproliferation pro-grams. Funds appropriated this fall as part of the 2002 Emergency SupplementalAppropriations Bill will help secure dangerous radiological materials domestically,while the 2003 Defense Authorization Bill will address international nuclear andradiological materials security issues, as well as the US nuclear posture.

2003 Defense Authorization BillOn November 13, both Houses of Congress passed the 2003 Defense

Authorization Bill, authorizing funds for the Defense Department and forDepartment of Energy’s nuclear weapons projects. The conference report reconcil-

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FASPublic

InterestReport

www.fas.org

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FAS Public Interest Report / September/October 2002

Leaving a Legacy of PeaceThe Federation of American Scientists hopes to continue efforts to advance sound

science in public policy for generations to come. We’d like your help in accomplish-ing this goal.

As we move to the end of 2002, you, like many others, may be reviewing yourlong-term estate and financial plan. Please remember that your will, life insurancepolicies, retirement accounts and other planned giving vehicles may offer exception-al opportunities for leaving the lasting legacy of peace.

It is easy to provide a bequest to the Federation of American Scientists:

You may leave the Federation of American Scientists a specific amount ofcash or specific property. Sample wording, “I give the sum of $250,000 to theFederation of American Scientists,” or I give 10,000 shares of ABC Corporation to theFederation of American Scientists.

You may leave the Federation of American Scientists a fixed percentage ofyour estate. Sample wording, “I give 30 percent of the residue of my estate to theFederation of American Scientists.”

You may leave the Federation of American Scientists all or part of the residueof the estate after bequests to other beneficiaries have been made. Sample word-ing, “I give the residue of my real and personal estate to the Federation of AmericanScientists.”

Whichever methods you choose, if properly structured, your bequest will be fullydeductible from your estate, thus decreasing any tax liabilities. The estate tax chari-table deduction is unlimited.

We at the Federation of American Scientists would be please to help you and yourfinancial advisor choose a way to support the Federation of American Scientists’simportant work that best fits your personal philanthropic goals. For more informationabout the advantages of considering the Federation of American Scientists in yourestate planning, please contact Sharon Gleason at [email protected] or 202.454.4680.

FAS Mailing Mystery Solved!Beginning in April 2002, FAS’ business reply envelopes were mistakenly held for

a significant amount of time, and/or returned to senders marked as ‘unclaimed.’

The glitch was finally identified and resolved, and there is no longer a problemusing the envelopes we provide. Our sincerest apologies for any inconveniences thismay have caused you. As always, we appreciate your continued support.

About FASThe Federation of AmericanScientists (FAS), founded October31, 1945 as the Federation ofAtomic Scientists by ManhattenProject scientists, works to ensurethat advances in science are used to build a secure, rewarding, environmentally sustainable futurefor all people by conductingresearch and advocacy on sciencepublic policy issues. Currentweapons nonproliferation issuesrange from nuclear disarmament tobiological and chemical weaponscontrol to monitoring conventionalarms sales; related issues includedrug policy and space policy. FASalso promotes learning technologiesand limits on government secrecy.FAS is a tax-exempt, tax-deductible501(c)3 organization.

* Sidney Altman Biology* Philip W. Anderson Physics* Kenneth J. Arrow Economics* Julius Axelrod Biochemistry* David Baltimore Biochemistry

Paul Beeson Medicine* Baruoj Benacerraf Immunology* Hans A. Bethe Physics* J. Michael Bishop Biology* Nicolaas Bloembergen Physics* Norman Borlaug Agriculture* Paul Boyer Chemistry

Anne Pitts Carter Economics* Owen Chamberlain Physics

Morris Cohen Engineering* Stanley Cohen Biochemistry

Mildred Cohn Biochemistry* Leon N. Cooper Physics* E. J. Corey Chemistry

Paul B. Cornely Medicine* James Cronin Physics* Johann Deisenhofer Biology

Carl Djerassi ChemistryAnn Druyan Writer/Producer

* Renato Dulbecco MicrobiologyJohn T. Edsall BiologyPaul R. Ehrlich BiologyGeorge Field Astrophysics

* Val L. Fitch PhysicsJerome D. Frank Psychology

* Jerome I. Friedman PhysicsJohn Kenneth Galbraith Economics

* Walter Gilbert Biochemistry* Donald Glaser Physics-Biology* Sheldon L. Glashow Physics

Marvin L. Goldberger Physics* Joseph L. Goldstein Medicine* Roger C. L. Guillemin Physiology* Herbert A. Hauptman Chemistry* Dudley R. Herschbach Physics

Frank von Hippel Physics* Roald Hoffmann Chemistry

John P. Holdren Public Policy* David H. Hubel Medicine* Jerome Karle Physical Chemistry

Nathan Keyfitz Demography* H. Gobind Khorana Biochemistry* Arthur Komberg Biochemistry* Edwin G. Krebs Pharmacology

* William E. Lamb Physics* Leon Lederman Physics* Edward Lewis Medicine* William N. Lipscomb Chemistry

Jessica T. Mathews Public PolicyRoy Menninger PsychiatryRobert Merton SociologyMatthew Meselson Biochemistry*Neal E. Miller Psychology

* Franco Modigliani Economics* Mario Molina Chemistry

Philip Morrison PhysicsStephen S. Morse Virology

* Joseph E. Murray MedicineFrank A. Neva Medicine

* Marshall Nirenberg Biochemistry* Douglas D. Osheroff Physics* Arno A. Penzias Astronomy* Martin L. Perl Physics

Gerard Piel PublisherPaul Portney EconomicsMark Ptashne Molecular BiologyGeorge Rathjens Political Science

* Burton Richter PhysicsDavid Riesman, Jr. Sociology

* Richard J. Roberts BiologyVernon Ruttan AgricultureJeffrey Sachs Economics

* J. Robert Schrieffer PhysicsAndrew M. Sessler Physics

* Phillip A. Sharp BiologyStanley K. Sheinbaum EconomicsGeorge A. Silver Medicine

* Herbert A. Simon Psychology* Richard E. Smalley Chemistry

Neil Smelser Sociology* Robert M. Solow Economics* Jack Steinberger Physics* Henry Taube Chemistry* Charles H. Townes Physics

Myron E. Wegman MedicineRobert A. Weinberg Biology

* Steven Weinberg Biology* Torsten N. Wiesel Medicine

Alfred Yankauer MedicineHerbert F. York Physics

* Nobel Laureate

BOARD OF SPONSORS

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To achieve these goals, the UnitedStates will:

• champion aspirations for human dignity;

• strengthen alliances to defeat global terrorism and work to prevent attacks against us and our friends;

• work with others to defuse regional conflicts;

• prevent our enemies from threat-ening us, our allies, and our friends, with weapons of mass destruction;

• ignite a new era of global economic growth through free markets and free trade;

• expand the circle of development by opening societies and buildingthe infrastructure of democracy;

• develop agendas for cooperative action with other main centers of global power; and

• transform America’s national security institutions to meet the challenges and opportunities of the twenty-first century.

These goals are admirable. Many ofthe means proposed for achieving them– each of which is developed in a sepa-rate chapter of the document – havebeen features of U.S. policy for the pasthalf-century or more.2

New Policies, NewRealities

The new National Security Strategyis not, however, merely a continuation ofpast policies. Two relatively novel fea-tures of the contemporary internationalscene and the United States’ place in itcorrespond to the two most significantnew elements in the policy. These

deserve more attention than they are cur-rently receiving.

Preponderant U.S. MilitaryPower

First is the United States’ over-whelming preponderance of militarypower over any other nation or any plau-sible combination of nations that mightoppose us. The reach and the strikingpower of U.S. forces far outmatch thoseof any others. The United States cantoday strike with speed and accuracythat was unheard of only a decade ago.A crude indicator of U.S. dominance:the U.S. defense budget is today largerthan the combined defense expendituresof the next twenty-five largest mili-taries.3

Because of this condition of U.S.superiority, two questions will deter-mine in large degree the character of theinternational order in the comingdecades: In what manner will the UnitedStates use its military force? And forwhat purposes? On the question of man-ner, the central issue iswhether U.S. force deploy-ments will be attempted inaccordance with interna-tional law and with authori-zation from the UN SecurityCouncil, or in defiance oflegitimate internationalobjection and in violation oflegal procedure. On thequestion of purpose, theissue will turn on whethermilitary force is used toserve broad national andinternational concerns, or toadvance a parochial interestin maintaining U.S. global dominanceregardless of the consequences for others.

The National Security Strategy doc-ument does not say explicitly that it isthe policy of the United States to dowhatever is necessary to sustain its glob-al dominance. What it does say, in thefinal section on transforming American


national security institutions, is that theUnited States intends to build and main-tain its defenses “beyond challenge.”The president had previously set thisindefinite and operationally ambiguousstandard in an address to the graduatingclass of West Point in June 2002 whenhe declared: “America has, and intendsto keep, military strengths beyond chal-lenge.”4 The United States will retain, asit has in the past, the capability to deterthreats to its vital interests and to defeatan adversary should deterrence fail. Buta new criterion has been added. It is that

the U.S. military be “strong enough todissuade potential adversaries from pur-suing a military build-up in hopes of sur-passing, or equaling, the power of theUnited States.”5

The concept of fielding a militaryforce so dominating that it prevents

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adversaries from contemplating resist-ance raises troubling questions. Is it jus-tified on legitimate grounds of self-defense? Russian and Chinese officialshave asked this question in response toU.S. plans for deploying a national mis-sile defense system and aspirations forplacing strike weapons in space. Chinahas asked repeatedly that the UnitedStates negotiate at the UN Conferenceon Disarmament at Geneva new rules toprevent the competitive and unrestraineddeployment of weapons in space.Following the U.S. withdrawal from the1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty, Chinawas joined in its request by Russia. TheUnited States, seeking a standard ofdominance that is beyond challenge, hasrefused to consider the Chinese andRussian proposal for negotiatedrestraints.

The concept of building weaponssystems that are so advanced that theycause opponents to throw up their handsand forgo defiance should also be ques-tioned on grounds of effectiveness. Nopotential adversary hopes to match U.S.military might head on, in symmetricalfashion. Rather, those who would harmthe United States seek cheap and easyways of exploiting U.S. vulnerabilities.Those points of leverage grow morenumerous as the United States labors toextend its military superiority abroad.And the motivation of U.S. enemies toact grows with their resentment of per-

ceived intimidation. By aspiring to astandard of dominance that would dis-suade others from attempting a directmilitary challenge, the United Statesmay in fact stimulate adversaries towork ever harder to exploit any numberof vulnerabilities.

Weapons of MassDestruction and Terrorism

A second novel feature of the inter-national environment is the developmentof international networks of terroristswith a demonstrated willingness toundertake violence on a massive scale.These networks flourish within andbetween states whose political agendasoverlap with those of the terrorists, and

in countries where there is no authoritycapable of preventing terrorist groupsfrom using the territories as bases, stag-ing areas, and refuges. A grave and validconcern of the new National SecurityStrategy is that a terrorist group willacquire nuclear, biological, or chemicalweapons and wreak catastrophic harm.

The weapons themselves are notnew (though the development of newand more deadly biological weapons isparticularly worrisome). Almost as soonas they were developed, the UnitedStates recognized the dangers inherentin the existence of nuclear weapons andparticipated in international efforts tolimit their possession. Political and mil-itary leaders have shared the concerns ofscientists and scholars that nuclearweapons are not simply more efficientexplosives but rather a threat of anentirely different magnitude. Their dan-gers to civilians had to be weighed heav-ily in the reckoning of their usability.Similarly, biological and chemicalweapons have been recognized as pre-senting special dangers, and internation-al efforts to control their possession andforbid their use by law embodied intreaties had the support of the UnitedStates.

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The corresponding policy in the newNational Security Strategy is what thedocument calls “preemption” – usingforce in anticipation of a danger to pre-vent hostile states from acquiringweapons of mass destruction or harbor-ing terrorists. The United States hasbeen preparing in recent months toimplement this policy against Iraq. Inthis particular case, “preemption,” as itis commonly understood, is a mischar-acterization, since that term usually istaken to mean striking the first blowwhen war appears to be imminent andunavoidable. What the United States isproposing is more properly character-ized as “preventive war,” that is, a warof choice to prevent the emergence of athreat further in the future. U.S. militaryadvisors have contemplated preventivewar before, notably against the SovietUnion at various points during theTruman and Eisenhower administra-tions. But such thinking was consistent-ly rejected at the political level on bothmoral and strategic grounds.6 Today, bycontrast, it is our declared policy tomaintain the capability to wage preven-tive war against those who may threatenus with weapons of mass destruction.

Law vs. ForceAn additional and striking novelty

of the National Security Strategy docu-ment is what it omits. The internationalrule of law as an overarching goal ofpolicy is nowhere mentioned. Neither isthe Charter of the United Nations, atreaty that is largely of the UnitedStates’ own making and to which theUnited States is bound. The UnitedNations itself receives only a few per-functory mentions: the most substantiveone is in the penultimate paragraph ofthe president’s introductory letter, whereit is listed with the OAS, the WTO, andNATO as examples of multilateral insti-tutions that can “multiply the strength offreedom-loving nations.” There is anadditional mention of the UnitedNations in the chapter on strengthening

alliances to defeat global terrorism,where it is mentioned as an example ofinternational organizations “we willcontinue to work with” in rebuildingAfghanistan.

The aim of the UN Charter was tosubstitute law and diplomacy for forceas the primary regulators of relationsamong nations. The primacy of law overforce has been a major thread inAmerican foreign policy since the end ofWorld War II. From the United Nationsto the World Trade Organization, theUnited States has led in the creation ofinternational organizations that extendthe reach of law, and seek to constrainthe powerful as well as to give the weaka voice. It has all but disappeared fromthe fabric of national security that theadministration now presents.

Indeed, the Bush administration hasconducted an assault on major elementsof the international legal framework thathas been developed to regulate securitypolicies and force deployments. In addi-tion to abrogating rather than renegotiat-ing the ABM treaty, it has forced termi-nation of efforts to negotiate a compli-ance protocol for the BiologicalWeapons Convention. It has repeatedlydenigrated and has refused to ratify theComprehensive Test Ban Treaty, despiteinternational consensus that a ban onnuclear testing is necessary to preservethe Nonproliferation Treaty. Senior offi-cials have recently questioned the secu-rity assurances endorsed by all previousadministrations in support of the lattertreaty.

The National Security Strategydeparts sharply from previous U.S. prac-tices, and in so doing can be comparedto NSC 68, the once classified nationalsecurity policy statement promulgatedby President Truman in 1950. Releasedin the wake of the North Korean attackon South Korea (though drafted earlier),that document provided a blueprint for

the conduct of the Cold War and initiat-ed a vast U.S. military buildup, especial-ly of nuclear weapons. The Bush admin-istration’s National Security Strategyprovides a blueprint for a perpetualseries of hot wars and preventive strikes,initiated whenever it is determined thatanother state is accumulating threaten-ing weapons or harboring terrorists. Isthe administration’s apparent confidencein the utility of military force and ourcapacity to use it without unnecessarilyprovoking “asymmetric” retaliation,from terrorists and hostile states, justi-fied? And has the administration ade-quately assessed the potential indirectcosts of the strategy, in the form of alien-ation and even isolation from the rest ofthe world?

If one could directly ask all citizensof the United States to identify their corepolitical values, freedom would proba-bly be the most frequently mentionedword. Certainly those who seek to rep-resent the American electorate regularlyevoke it. Images of enslavement rundeep in the national consciousness. Themore thoughtful answers, however, andthe ones best informed about historicaltraditions would cite the rule of law.Government by consensually formulat-ed law is the defining feature ofAmerican democracy, and as a practicalmatter the threat to freedom has muchmore to do with the possible defects inthe internal rule of law than with theactions of any external aggressor.Although they might not volunteer thatlatter thought, a solid majority ofAmericans would probably acknowl-edge it.

Curiously, however, and ominously,one cannot be as confident of the answerif the question is posed about politicalvalues in international relations. There isa substantial strand of opinion thatbelieves the international order to befundamentally anarchic and concludes


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that freedom and other core interests can be protected only bythe exercise of military power. That has long been a minorityview, but it is an intense minority with disproportionate influ-ence that adheres to it. In the wake of last year’s terroristattacks that view has acquired ascendancy in American policy.Most of the implications are yet to unfold, but the possibilitiesare quite apparent. The traditional balance between militarypreparation and international legal restraint has already beensharply shifted by repudiating a number of treaties that theUnited States itself originally sponsored. The most recentstatement of policy suggests that the United States reserves theright to initiate war for reasons of its own choosing.

Based on the recent U.S. election returns, some wouldargue that this policy appeals to more voters than it dismays.Further, the 15–0 vote in the UN Security Council for the finalU.S.-U.K. draft of the resolution on Iraq’s obligations to end itsprogram for acquiring nuclear, biological, and chemicalweapons – though it does not provide, as the United States hadsought, automatic authorization for the use of force if Iraq isfound to be uncooperative – arguably reflects the weight ofU.S. power. The United States appears to be the beneficiary ofthe occasional if commonly fleeting response to the amassingand exercise of power in the international arena, that of jump-ing on the bandwagon of the most powerful.

StaffNews:FAS welcomes Sharon Gleason, a Development Director who has raised monies for one of the nation’s largestNational Cancer Institute Centers located in Los Angeles. Sharon comes to FAS with over 6 years in developmentand 10 years in communications and business development. She did her undergraduate work at the Johns HopkinsUniversity, worked at the Johns Hopkins School of Public Health and Harvard Medical School. Her graduatedegrees are from Harvard University and London School of Economics. Please feel free to contact her anytime ifyou would like to get more involved with the Federation of American Scientists. 202.454.4680 [email protected]


In a longer-term perspective, however, can the pursuit ofever more intimidating military forces, their use in preven-tive wars, and the neglect of international law and coopera-tion be the path toward our goals of a more democratic andopen world of governments more responsive to their citizensand more concerned to promote their prosperity and liberty?

Before implementing the new National Security Strategyby going to war with Iraq, a clear accounting of the costs,consequences, and alternatives to that action is urgentlyneeded.

1 This article is reprinted with permission by the American Academy of Science,excerpted from “War with Iraq: Cost, Consequences and Alternatives.”2 The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September 2002,pp. 1–2, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html>.3 Christopher Hellman, “Last of the Big Time Spenders: U.S. Military Budget Still theWorld’s Largest, and Growing,” Center for Defense Information (4 February 2002).<http://www.cdi.org/issues/wme/ spendersFY03.html>.4 <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020601-3.html>.5 The National Security Strategy of the United States, 30.6 Marc Trachtenberg, “A ‘Wasting Asset’: American Strategy and the Shifting NuclearBalance, 1949–1954,” in Trachtenberg, History and Strategy (Princeton: PrincetonUniversity Press, 1991), 100–152.

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ing the House and Senate versions of thebill will enhance cooperative interna-tional programs to secure nuclear andradiological materials and will affect USnuclear weapons development and testreadiness posture.

Nuclear and RadiologicalMaterials Security

The conference report includesmany of the nuclear and radiologicalmaterials security provisions adoptedpreviously by the Senate. Several ofthese provisions implement recommen-dations made by FAS researchers instudies on radiological weapons andhighly-enriched uranium.

The Senate had authorized $40 mil-lion for the accelerated blend-down ofhighly enriched uranium (HEU) to amore proliferation-resistant form—below twenty percent U-235. (See“Closing the Gaps” by Robert Civiak, arecent FAS report on HEU security.)The final version of the bill authorizes$10 million, which can be used to estab-lish new blending facilities and central-ized secure storage facilities in Russia.This provides a precedent for expandingthe 1993 HEU deal, the cooperativeagreement between the US and Russiawhich initiated the blend-down of 500metric tons of Russian HEU. The accel-erated HEU disposition provision adopt-ed in conference will facilitate theblend-down of additional materials inRussia’s 1000-ton stockpile of excessHEU, without disrupting the original1993 agreement.

The conference report includes theSenate provision authorizing $15 mil-lion for research and development oftechnologies that could reduce the likeli-hood of a radiological attack or mitigatethe impact should one occur. The goalof this program is to develop technolo-gies for detection, identification, andcontrol of vulnerable radiological mate-rials, as well as for their disposition.

These technologies may includeimproved radiation detectors that couldidentify potentially dangerous materialsas they pass through key points in thetransportation system, such as borders,commercial harbors and airports. (Formore information on related technolo-gies, see “Weapons of Mass Disruption”by FAS’ Michael Levi and Henry Kelly,in the November 2002 issue of ScientificAmerican.)

The conference committee alsoadopted the Senate’s provision to estab-lish a Radiological Dispersal DeviceMaterials Protection, Control andAccounting (RDDPC&A) program, andauthorized the full $5 million proposedby the Senate. The RDDPC&A programwill work internationally to identify andenhance the security of materials thatcould be used in a radiological attack.

The conferees partially adopted theSenate’s proposal to expand theMaterials Protection Control andAccounting (MPC&A) program outsidethe Russian Federation; the plan isdesigned to enhance the security of HEUstored at civilian nuclear facilities out-side Russia and to accelerate the returnof these materials to Russia. Instead ofauthorizing funds this year, the confer-ence report requires the DOE to developa plan that would be subject to approvalduring the next round of authorizationsin 2003. The plan will include the pro-jected costs and a proposed timeline forhelping facility operators transport theirHEU back to Russia and for providingthese facilities with MPC&A securityupgrades in the meantime.

The conferees partially adopted theSenate’s provisions to strengthen inter-national safeguards for nuclear materialsand operations. Of the $35 millionauthorized by the Senate, $15 millionwas authorized in conference. Ten mil-lion dollars were designated for thedevelopment of proliferation-resistantnuclear energy technologies in coopera-

tion with the Russian Ministry ofAtomic Energy. Some of the funds willsupport the development of high densityLEU fuels and feasibility studies forreactor conversion to this proliferation-resistant fuel. (See “Closing the Gaps”for more information on reactor conver-sion.)

The remaining $5 million author-ized for international nuclear safeguardswill be used to strengthen export controlprograms in the Former Soviet Unionand other regions of concern to USnational security. The DOE can usethese funds to provide assistance withdomestic export controls on materials,technologies and expertise that could beused in the construction of a radiologicalor nuclear device.

US Nuclear PostureThe House and Senate diverged on

the controversial issues of new nuclearweapons development and shortenedtest readiness time.

The House version of the DefenseAuthorization Bill contained a provisionthat would have weakened Congress’1993 ban on the development of low-yield nuclear weapons, also known as“mini-nukes”, and would have allowedresearch to begin on their development.Opponents of “mini-nuke” developmentclaim that their low yield—below 5 kilo-tons—would make them more “useable”and would therefore blur the crucial dis-tinction between conventional andnuclear arms. Ultimately, the conferencecommittee rejected the House version,thereby upholding the prohibition onthese weapons.

The final bill did, however, author-ize a feasibility study on another pro-posed nuclear weapon system, theRobust Nuclear Earth Penetrator(RNEP), also known as the “bunkerbuster.” The stated purpose of this sys-

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Nuclear Security Legislative Update-Continued from Page 1

A summary of this piece appears in thisedition of the PIR, beginning on p. 9.)

The House and Senate also battledover shortening nuclear test readinesstime. The House bill required the DOEto submit to congress a plan for achiev-ing a one-year test readiness posture, butthe final version of the bill calls forplans for test readiness within six,twelve, eighteen and twenty-fourmonths.

$10 Million in EmergencySupplemental to OSRP

On September 1st, the Off-SiteSource Recovery Project (OSRP), runby the Department of Energy, was grant-ed $10 million as part of the 2002 con-gressional emergency appropriation forhomeland security. This program recov-ers commercial radioactive sources thatmight otherwise be abandoned bylicensees who have no other means ofdisposal. The OSRP has recovered over3,000 sources containing Americium-241 and Plutonium-238, but until recent-ly has had difficulty sustaining opera-tions due to repeated budget cuts. Thenew funds will ensure the continuationof the program and facilitate the recov-ery of an additional 5,000 sources with-in the next 18 months.

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tem is to destroy bunkers buried deepunderground and protected by thick con-crete walls or thick layers of solid rock.The administration requested $15 mil-lion to fund the first year of a three-yearstudy on the RNEP, but the Senate cutthe funds from their version of the bill.The final version authorizes funds forthe feasibility study, but with severalrestrictions. The feasibility study cannotbe initiated until 30 days after the sub-mission of a joint Defense and EnergyDepartment report on: 1) the militaryrequirements for the nuclear earth pene-trator; 2) the nuclear weapons employ-ment policy for the weapon; 3) the typesof targets that it is designed for; and 4)an assessment of conventional alterna-tives that could be used to destroy thesame types of targets.

The National Academy of Scienceswill also conduct a study addressing theshort and long-term effects on civilianpopulations if a nuclear weapon wereused to destroy an underground WMDstorage facility; the report will alsoassess the potential for conventionalweapons for these purposes. (See “Firein the Hole” by FAS’s Michael Levi, arecent Carnegie Endowment WorkingPaper on nuclear options for counterpro-liferation and conventional alternatives.

Nuclear Security Legislative Update-Continued from Page 7

Strategic OffensiveReductions Treaty

On May 24th Presidents Bush andPutin signed the Moscow Treaty onStrategic Offensive Reductions (SORT).They committed to reducing the U.S.and Russian deployed strategic nucleararsenals to 1,700-2,200 warheads withinthe next ten years. The three page treatyleaves the 1991 START treaty in placeand gives each side the right to withdrawupon three months written notice to theother party.

Before it can enter into force, theSORT treaty must first be approved byboth chambers of Russia’s FederalAssembly and ratified by the U.S.Senate. On December 7th, PresidentPutin submitted the SORT treaty to theDuma, one month after Russian DeputyForeign Minister Georgi Mamedovannounced that the treaty would be rati-fied by the Russian Duma by the end ofthe year. The U.S. Undersecretary ofState, John Bolton, issued a statementin November maintaining that the Bushadministration would like the Senate tofollow suit as soon as possible.

The Department of Defense statedin this year’s Nuclear Posture Review(NPR) that it intends to initiate SORTreductions by retiring all 50 of itsPeacekeeper ICBMs and by convertingfour Trident submarines from nuclear toconventional weapons.

Members of the arms control com-munity have argued that the treaty is notsufficiently binding, citing the lack ofverification provisions and the absenceof requirements for warhead destruction.They have also criticized the treaty’sfailure to address non-operational andtactical nuclear weapons. On the right,some critics have questioned the needfor an arms reduction treaty in the firstplace.

OSR

PThe Off Site Source Recovery Program (OSRP) recovers and secures radioactivesources from licensees who have no other means of disposal. In this operation, theOSRP recovered an americium/beryllium source that had been used to facilitate oilwell logging at a drill site in Texas.

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Fire in the HoleMichael Levi

Editor’s Note: The following is adapted from Strategic Security Project Director Michael Levi’s working paper, “Fire in the Hole:Nuclear and Non-Nuclear Options for Counterproliferation”. The complete paper can be accessed on the web at<http://www.ceip.org/files/Publications/wp31.asp>. For an earlier FAS take on the issue, see Robert Nelson’s “Low-Yield Earth-Penetrating Nuclear Weapons” in the Public Interest Report, 54:Jan./Feb. 2001.

Introduction and SummaryAt the end of the Gulf War, many military thinkers

began to argue that precision guided munitions hadmade tactical nuclear weapons obsolete. Televisionimages of bombs threaded through chimney pipes madegraphic the revolutionary advance in guidance technol-ogy. With weapons able to explode within meters oftheir targets, the massive destructive radii of nuclearweapons were apparently unnecessary.

That argument didn’t last long before the counterat-tack. Reacting to America’s military revolution, Iraqand others began to build underground, where theirfacilities became easier to conceal and much harder todestroy. The proliferation of chemical and biologicalweapons, often built in what looked like typical indus-trial facilities, presented new challenges in finding tar-gets and avoiding collateral damage during attacks.These requirements were identified by nuclear weaponsdesigners as potential missions for new nuclearweapons.

In March 2002, portions of the U.S. Nuclear PostureReview leaked to the public revealed a renewed interestin developing a range of specialized nuclear weapons.The review identified capabilities shortfalls in attackinghardened and deeply buried targets, and facilities con-taining weapons of mass destruction, and suggestedthat nuclear weapons might have unique capabilities toaddress these threats. It revealed a new program tobuild a Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator, a modifiednuclear weapon designed to destroy deeply buried tar-gets. But it went further, noting “Nuclear weaponscould be employed against targets able to withstandnon-nuclear attack, (for example, deep undergroundbunkers or bio-weapon facilities).”

Ultimately, however, the posture review was non-committal, leaving open a crucial question: Do the mil-itary advantages gained by development of new nuclearweapons offset the massive political liabilities (domes-tic and international) of their development or use? Tohelp answer that question, we explore the military abil-ities development of new nuclear weapons might deliv-er, and compare them with what might be obtained byaggressive pursuit of non-nuclear capabilities. [See theworking paper for this discussion.]

With a toolkit of potential weapons, we turn to casestudies of three potential targets. We evaluate thepotential of nuclear and non-nuclear weapons in attack-ing a shallow but hardened bunker containing biologi-cal weapons, a chemical weapons production plant tun-neled several stories underground, and a nuclear facili-ty tunneled beneath hundreds of meters of granite.

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Case 1 - The TarhunahChemical WeaponsComplex

In a recent article in Jane’sIntelligence Review, Geoffrey Fordendescribed the Tarhunah ChemicalWeapons Complex:

“In the mid-1990s, the USA allegedthat Libya had constructed an under-ground nerve-agent production plant,buried under at least 18m of earth, 60kmsoutheast of Tripoli. The main difficultywith attacking this facility would not beits depth, which appears well within thereach of even sub-kiloton weapons, but uncertainty about its undergroundlocation.”

Forden argues that a five kilotonground-penetrating nuclear weaponcould be used to destroy the facility. Henotes one caveat:

“Other geologic formations in thearea could significantly reduce the effectiveness of such a nuclear weapon.For instance, deep crevasses, if they laybetween the explosion and the under-ground facility, would effectively neutralize the destructive power of thebomb.”

Another factor weighing against useof nuclear weapons for destruction ofthis facility would be the fallout pro-duced. The precise nature of the falloutwould depend on whether the weaponwas detonated inside the facility or inthe surrounding earth, but to be conser-vative, military planners would have toassume the latter. Based on our calcula-tions, this would result in one-hundredpercent lethality over approximately fif-teen square kilometers. Though thiszone would not reach Tripoli, falloutconcerns would require medical moni-toring for civilians up to twenty kilome-ters downwind from the blast. IfAmerican troops were in this area, theywould have to halt operations or take the

risk of being exposed to fallout. Troopscould not enter the immediate facilityarea to inspect damage or collect intelli-gence, even with protective gear.

Many non-nuclear approachesmight also be used to destroy or neutral-ize the complex:

• A single earth penetrating conven-tional bomb could reach the facil-ity if the target’s location was pre-cisely known. If the facility was operating, seismic sensing methodsmight be used to detect the loca-tions of active machinery. An earth penetrating missile thelength of the current GBU-28 pen-etrator, modified to impact theearth at twice the GBU-28’s cur-rent impact speed, could penetratethe eighteen meter cover of softrock and reinforced concrete and destroy the facility using conventional explosives.

• If the facility is not able to be pre-cisely localized (and this seems tobe the likely case), several pene-trator missiles used simultaneous-ly could mimic the area effect of a small nuclear weapon. Extending the small diameter bomb conceptto missiles the length of the GBU-28 would allow up to twenty-four penetrating missiles to be deliv-ered simultaneously; several would be expected to penetrate the facility. Alternatively, multiplesorties could be used to cover theentire suspected facility area.

• If it were determined that no avail-able bombs could penetrate thefacility, cruise missiles could beused to temporarily block itsentrances. This would not, how-ever, keep personnel and equipment out of the facility an extend-ed period.

• A no-personnel or no-vehicle zone

could be established around thefacility. A range of American intelligence assets would betrained on a designated area sur-rounding the complex, and anyattempt to move material to or from the facility would be stopped. While the facility itself might continue to produceweapons, those weapons could not be removed and used on the battlefield.

• If the facility were operating, con-ventional electromagnetic pulseweapons might be applied to destroy or disable equipment inside. Because the pulse can eas-ily travel down a bunker’s powerand ventilation ducts, equipment inside would be vulnerable toattack. Such a weapon could bedelivered by cruise missile.

In each case of applying conven-tional weapons, collateral damage due tochemical dispersal would be minimaloutside the facility. Inside, chemicalagents would be dispersed, but U.S.troops inspecting the area could mitigatethe dangers from these by wearing pro-tective gear.

Case 2-Iraqi SurfaceBunker ContainingAnthrax

Iraq is suspected of retaining stock-piles of weaponized anthrax and isknown to use hardened bunkers exten-sively. Here, we consider a hypotheticalcut-and-cover bunker built with 5-meter-thick walls and a roof of rein-forced concrete, buried under an addi-tional 5 meters of earth. The facility, 5kilometers south of Baghdad, covers anarea measuring 400 square meters and is20 meters high. Built during the absenceof United Nations weapons inspections,the bunker’s existence became known toAmerican intelligence through satelliteimagery captured during its construc-

Fire in the Hole-Continued from Page 9


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tion. It is believed to contain several tonsof anthrax in storage barrels, though, inthe absence of a continuing ground pres-ence, this cannot be confirmed.

Early in a campaign against Iraq,military planners ask whether it wouldbe possible to destroy the bunker’s con-tents. A review of available penetratingweapons shows that conventionalweapons can easily breach the facility,but military and political leaders areconcerned that an attack would simplyspread anthrax about the countryside.They ask for a review of options thatwould minimize collateral damage, andare presented with the following:

• If it were developed, a 20-ton pen-etrating nuclear weapon, detonatedat the floor of the facility, could incinerate the bunker’s contents, preventing the dispersal ofanthrax. It would, however, spreadnuclear fallout. Deaths from acute radiation poisoning would beexpected as far as 1 kilometerdownwind. People nearer than 4 kilometers downwind would, ifthey were not evacuated quickly, receive a radiation dose greaterthan that received by a nuclearworker over a single year.

• If the stress of bomb impact caused the nuclear weapon to mal-function, the conventional explo-sives might detonate, but with nonuclear yield and, althoughunlikely, anthrax could be dis-persed from the bunker without being neutralized. Alternatively, the nuclear bomb might detonate, but at its “natural” yield of 10kilotons, in which case radioactive fallout would then kill people as far downwind as 30 kilometers,perhaps including many in Baghdad.

• A penetrating bomb carrying afragmenting warhead and incendi-

ary materials could be used. The fragmenting warhead would breakthe anthrax out of exposed con-tainers, and the heat from the incendiary materials would neu-tralize the anthrax. If containers were heavily shielded, they would not break open and, while theanthrax would not be destroyed,neither would it be released. The bunker would remain intact.

• A penetrating bomb carrying sub-munitions and neutralizing chemi-cals could be used. The submuni-tions would spread throughout thebunker and break the anthrax out of its containers, even if it werestored behind barriers, but theneutralizing chemicals would ren-der the anthrax inert. The bunker would probably remain intact, butit could be breached if it had beenpoorly constructed.

• A watch could be placed on thefacility using satellite imagery coupled with armed unmanned aerial vehicles. Anything attempt-ing to enter or leave the bunker would be destroyed, making theanthrax inside unusable.

Case 3-North KoreanNuclear WeaponsComplex at Kumchangri

In a recent Congressional ResearchService report, Larry Niksch describesthe North Korean Kumchangri under-ground complex, built in the side of amountain:

“U.S. intelligence agencies report-edly became aware of the Kumchangriunderground facility in the second halfof 1996. The Defense IntelligenceAgency (DIA) reportedly prepared aclassified report at the end of 1997,which concluded that the facility, locat-ed about 25 miles north of Yongbyon [50kilometers north of Pyongyang], “possi-

bly could be a nuclear weapons-relatedfacility by 2003.” The report stated that:“The function of this site has not beendetermined, but it could be intended as anuclear production and/or storagesite…” The Clinton Administrationresponded to the disclosure by pressur-ing North Korea to allow the UnitedStates access to the Kumchangri facility.An agreement was reached on March16, 1999, providing for multiple inspec-tions of the site in return for at least500,000 tons of new U.S. food aid forNorth Korea. . . . Administration offi-cials declared that no evidence ofnuclear activity was found. However,previous reports indicated that NorthKorea had removed equipment from thefacility.”

Had the United States or NorthKorea rejected a diplomatic solution,and had the United States concluded thatthe facility was being used to buildnuclear weapons, what military choiceswould have been available for destruc-tion or neutralization of the facility?The depth of the facility is not publiclyknown, but given it is tunneled into theside of a mountain, the main facilitycould quite possibly be deeper than 200meters, putting it out of the range ofeven megaton-sized, earth-penetratingnuclear weapons. Even if the facilitywere only 150 meters underground, a 1-megaton penetrating nuclear weaponwould be required to destroy it, and theresulting nuclear fallout would haveenormous consequences:

• If the wind were blowing south-west, residents of Pyongyang, 80miles away, would have to be evacuated within hours of detona-tion to prevent the death of more than 50 percent from radiation poisoning.

• If the wind were blowing north or northwest, residents of several



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large cities in China would have tobe evacuated within hours of det-

onation to avoid numerous radia-tion deaths.

• If the wind were blowing south,residents of several large cities inSouth Korea would have to be evacuated within hours of detona-tion to avoid numerous radiationdeaths, and U.S. troops stationed in the DMZ would have to be evacuated.

These consequences would almostcertainly deter any U.S. leader fromlaunching such an attack. Instead, mili-tary planners might seek to disable,rather than to destroy, the facility. Thefollowing options might be considered:

• A nuclear weapon might be used to deposit radioactive contamina-tion at the entrances to the com-plex and thus to isolate the facility. However, a weapon small enoughnot to entail fallout problems would be unlikely to keep workersout of the facility for more than aperiod of weeks, especially since workers would be exposed onlywhen outside the facility-once

inside, the surrounding rock would shield them from radiation.

• Cruise missiles could be used to collapse entrances to the bunker. The entrances might be reopened quickly, and as with radiological area denial, the effect would likelybe brief.

• Thermobaric weapons could be used to send high-pressure shock waves down the tunnels, possibly destroying equipment inside the facility.

Again, these options are unlikely tobe satisfactory. If a military solutionwere still desired, the information-umbrella-type approach could beapplied. The United States, possiblytogether with allies, would declare thatno North Korean vehicles would beallowed to come near the facility, andwould use land mines and train surveil-lance assets in the Kumchangri area tomonitor this curfew. Any vehicleattempting to enter or leave the facilitywould be destroyed.

There are non-nuclear solutions tomost military problems for which

nuclear weapons are hyped. Still, wefind that excessive constraints on currentnon-nuclear programs for addressingHDBT and WMD problems could leadto otherwise avoidable shortfalls inimportant capabilities. We recommendthat planners:

1. Invest in Intelligence: Sinceadversaries can dig deeply and can hideWMD activities in industrial settings,simple pursuit of powerful weapons willnever solve the HTBT and Agent Defeatproblems. The ability to locate andcharacterize threat facilities is the foun-dation of any efforts in this area, andmust be our first priority.

2. Use the Flexibility Provided byAir Superiority: The original driver forenemies’ pursuit of HDBT and WMDcapabilities is American airpower domi-nance. Yet constraining requirementssuch as the ability for all weapons to bedeliverable by tactical fighter jet, or fortarget destruction to be accomplished ina single aircraft pass, are driven by thebelief that air superiority will not exist.If enemies’ actions are driven by our airsuperiority, we should use that sameadvantage in countering these actions.


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Non-LethalChemical andBiologicalWeapons1

November 2002

Barbara Hatch Rosenberg

Biomedical sciences and the phar-maceutical industry are in the midst of arevolution in the science and technologyof drug discovery that will significantlycomplicate the control of chemical andbiological weapons (CBW). TheChemical Weapons Convention (CWC),the Biological and Toxin WeaponsConvention (BWC) and the GenevaProtocol are thus challenged by thesetechnological developments. Scientistscontributing to this revolution need tounderstand the implications of theirwork, and arms controllers must recog-nize that there are profound changesunderway that will affect the technicallandscape of CBW control.

The drivers of this revolution arenew methodologies that make theprocess of drug discovery less empiricaland more rational, and therefore muchfaster—a trend that will accelerate asour physiological understanding deep-ens. These developments likewise speedthe identification and development ofnew potential CBW agents, most ofwhich, like drugs, are physiologicallyactive agents. The new methods areopening up entirely new areas for inves-tigation, including new physiologicaltargets for CBW agents.

The new technologies include com-binatorial chemistry, genomics, microar-rays, proteomics, toxicogenomics, and

database mining. These technologies aresupported by an immensely sophisticat-ed and rapidly growing micro-scaleinstrumentation andcomputational base.Computer-controlled production andanalytical devices are critical compo-nents, and all the laboratory technolo-gies depend on computers for the collec-tion and analysis of data. Bioinformaticscan hardly keep up with the flood ofgenomic and proteomic data that threat-ens to overwhelm the capacity to inte-grate and understand it.

An immense amount of time andmoney are being invested in work usingthese methodologies. The intellectualmomentum is immense and clearlyunstoppable. Thus, a very large numberof new, highly toxic compounds withprecisely understood and controllablephysiological effects will soon be dis-covered. Many of these will enter pro-duction as drugs or as research agents.The range of known, potential CBWagents will thus broaden by a very largefactor in a very short period of time.Most of them will be synthesized fromprecursors that are not currently regulat-ed under the CWC.

For a review of the technologies andtheir relevance to CBW control, see theoriginal article by Mark Wheelis onwhich this commentary is based.

The Problem of Non-Lethal Agents

The CWC prohibits developmentand possession of chemical agents that“can cause death, temporary incapacita-tion or permanent harm to humans oranimals,” except where intended forpurposes not prohibited under theConvention. “Purposes not prohib-itedare specified and include only onepurpose that may involve combat: “lawenforcement including domestic riotcontrol.” However, riot control agents,defined as chemicals that rapidly


3. Focus on Biological overChemical Agents: Our currentapproach seeks a single weapon that canneutralize both chemical and biologicalagents. But while biological agents aremuch more strategically important tar-gets, chemical agents are much harder todestroy. Our present approach leads toshortfalls in our ability to neutralize bio-logical agents because the requirementthat the same technology be able todestroy chemical agents unnecessarilyconstrains it.

4. Evaluate Weapons in aBattlefield Context: While conven-tional weapons are tested in war-gamesand vetted with military chiefs, nuclearweapons are judged mainly by theirpolitical implications. The taboo againstthe use of nuclear weapons perverselyshields these weapons from the samescrutiny during their development thatall other weapons receive. If civilianleaders decide to consider pursuit of newnuclear weapons, uniformed militarymust confront these weapons conceptswith the same scrutiny they apply toother weapons systems.

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completely the possibility of the use ofchemical weapons by preventing statesfrom entering a war with a stockpile ofCW whose use is proscribed, but whichmight nevertheless be employed underpressure of military necessity.

A variety of new “non-lethal” agentsis on the horizon. Neuropharmacology isone of the areas in rapid expansion; thetoll of mental illness, and the growingpromise of chemical treatment, make itcertain that a wide range of new psy-choactive chemicals will be discovered.In the near future, agents will be devel-oped that affect perception, sensation,cognition, emotion, mood, volition, bod-ily control, and alertness. Further, theInternational Committee of the RedCross has just issued an Appeal onBiotechnology, Weapons and Humanitywhich cites the possibility of ethnic tar-geting and of covertly-spread agents thatwould alter consciousness, behavior,fertility and heredity. Given the greatpotential for such agents to be abused, itwould be foolish, even suicidal, not toanalyze carefully their long-term impli-cations before deciding whether to per-mit the exploitation of non-lethal agentsby the military establishments of theworld.

For agents that fall under bothConventions, the BWC closes the loop-hole in the CWC that permits chemicalagents for law enforcement. There isgeneral agreement that “other biologicalagents, or toxins” in Article I of theBWC covers all the biochemical prod-ucts of living organisms that in abnor-mal doses could be used as toxins,including bioregulators, neurotransmit-ters, and hormones, as well as theiranalogs and synthetic derivatives. Allthe types of potential non-lethal agentsdiscussed here are analogs of naturally-occurring biochemicals, because theirphysiological activity depends on theirability to bind at the same sites as thenatural biochemicals do. The term “bio-chemical weapon agent” can be used for

all the toxic agents covered by bothConventions.

The BWC also prohibits develop-ment or possession of means of agentdelivery designed to be used for hostilepurposes, which is a broader categorythan armed conflict or warfare andwould include many counterterrorism,peacekeeping and law enforcementactivities. Thus, there are several rea-sons for concluding that the non-lethalagents discussed here are definitivelyprohibited by the BWC.

Conclusion

The interest of some States Partiesin the development of non-lethal CBWfor purposes they classify as lawenforcement threatens to undermineboth the Chemical and the BiologicalWeapons Conventions. Given the newtechnologies that are promoting therapid emergence of non-lethal agentswith a horrendous potential for abuse, itwould be a wise human move to nip thedevelopment of these weapons in thebud. States Parties need to affirm deci-sively that both Conventions prohibit allmilitary use of so-called non-lethalagents, except perhaps for tightly-speci-fied agents and purposes. The use ofnational intelligence, coupled with astrengthened BWC and a willingness toemploy challenge inspections, couldserve as a deterrent. In the end, howev-er, the only effective long-term solutionis a universal norm against CBW, whichcan only be reached via sustained effortsfor universality of the Conventions,transparency in chemical and biologicaldefense activities, and public under-standing of the stakes.

1 Based on an article entitled “Biotechnology andBiochemical Weapons” by Mark Wheelis in TheNonproliferation Review, Spring 2002.

Non-Lethal Chemical and Biological Weapons-Continued from Page 13

produce physical effects which disap-pear within a short time followingexposure, cannot be used as a methodof warfare.

Some CWC States Parties are inter-preting the Convention’s wording aslimiting the prohibition of non-lethalagents to interstate armed conflict, andare consequently pursuing their develop-ment and the development of munitionsto deliver them. These actions raiseurgent questions: will there be anattempt to justify the use of non-lethalagents in attacking Iraq? Should the useof riot control agents in military opera-tions that may involve armed conflict,such as counterterrorism, peacekeeping,monitoring and the like, be permissibleas “law enforcement?” The ambiguitiesthat arise are illustrated by the recent useof fentanyl to subdue hostage-takers in aMoscow theater. Was it law enforce-ment, counterterrorism, or interstateconflict? Is fentanyl, or similar agents,permissible for law enforcement? It isnot a “riot control agent,” since itseffects do not disappear within a shorttime and it is demonstrably not “non-lethal.” Unless the States Parties to theCWC can reach consensus on the natureand limits of the Convention’s prohibi-tions, there is certain to be uncontrolleddevelopment of semi-lethal weapons.

In fact, a categorical distinctionbetween lethal and non-lethal agents isnot scientifically feasible. Not only arecertain individuals more susceptible tosome agents, but synergy between twodifferent non-lethal agents may maketheir combination highly lethal to every-one. Rational strategies to discover suchsynergistic pairs will soon be available.

Thus, the development of multiplenon-lethal agents may provide a lethalCW capability, in clear violation of theConvention. Even without synergism,stockpiles of non-lethal weapons andmunitions would defeat a fundamentalgoal of the Convention, to exclude

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Documents

Behind the Public Prospect of War with Iraq · 1 Behind the Prospect of War with Iraq: The New U.S. National Security Strategy 1 Nuclear Security Legislative Update 2 Leaving a Legacy