Behrend - THE UNEVENNESS OF DEMOCRACY AT THE SUBNATIONAL LEVEL

8/6/2019 Behrend - THE UNEVENNESS OF DEMOCRACY AT THE SUBNATIONAL LEVEL

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Latin American Research Review, Vol. 46, No. 1. 2011 by the Latin American Studies Association.

T H E U N E V E N N E S S O F D E M O C R A C Y

AT T H E S U B N AT I O N A L L E V E LProvincial Closed Games in Argentina

Jacqueline BehrendUniversidad Nacional de San Martn and Consejo Nacional

de Investigaciones Cientfcas y Tcnicas

Abstract: Democratization studies initially ocused on processes at the nationallevel, but in recent years, there has been a growing interest in the spatially unevennature o democracy at the subnational level. This article draws on examples rom Argentina and develops an analytical ramework o closed games to analyze theunctioning o subnational democracy. It argues that the less democratic provincesor states o nationally democratic countries are not necessarily authoritarian andthat the concept o subnational authoritarianism prevents us rom seeing politicaldynamics that may arise in the context o a reasonably well-unctioning electoraldemocracy and may result in subnational closed games. The article takes into ac-count the role o political amilies, media ownership, control o access to businessopportunities, and control o the provincial state.

INTRODUCTION

In 1983, Argentina held elections that heralded the end o seven yearso military dictatorship. Democracy was reestablished, and a president,governors, legislators, mayors, and councilors were elected across allprovinces. Yet the way politics was organized and practiced across thecountry varied greatly, and in many provinces, continuity was more re-quent than change. Members o the amilies that had controlled provincialpolitics or much o the twentieth century returned to the governorship inseveral provinces.

This article is based on my doctoral dissertation at the University o Oxord (2008). It is alsopart o a broader research project on subnational democratization in comparative perspec-tive unded by a MellonLatin American Studies Association grant. I am very grateul toLaurence Whitehead or his encouragement, support, and insightul comments. Earlier ver-sions o this article were presented at the International Political Science Association Con-gress in Santiago, Chile, July 1216, 2009, and at the seminar Nuevos estudios sobre el ed-eralismo argentino, Buenos Aires, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella, November 2009, where Ireceived very helpul comments. I thank Andr Borges, Marcelo Leiras, Lorena Moscovich,Catalina Smulovitz, and Juan Carlos Torre or comments on earlier versions, and the threeanonymous LARR reviewers or their helpul eedback.

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THEUNEVENNESSOFDEMOCRACYATTHESUBNATIONALLEVEL 151

Democratization studies initially ocused on processes at the nationallevel, but in recent years, there has been a growing interest in the re-markable variation and the spatially uneven nature o democracy at thesubnational level (one o the frst to point to the regional variation o de-mocratization was ODonnell 1993). The importance o scaling down (Sny-der 2001) has become more evident in the democratization literature, anda growing number o scholars have turned their attention to the persis-tence o less democratic, authoritarian, or semiauthoritarian subnationalunits in nationally democratic countries (Behrend 2008; Benton, orth-coming; Cornelius 1999; Durazo Herrmann 2009; Gervasoni 2010; Gibson2005, 2009; Giraudy 2009; Hagopian 1996; Montero 2007). Yet, with ewexceptions, most scholars have analyzed problems o subnational democ-

ratization through the lens o subnational authoritarianism (Corneliuset al. 1999; Gibson 2005, 2009). This article argues that the less democraticprovinces or states o a nationally democratic country are not necessarilyauthoritarian and that the concept o subnational authoritarianism pre-vents us rom seeing political dynamics that may arise in the context oa reasonably well-unctioning electoral democracy. The article builds ona growing literature on subnational politics by developing the concept oclosed game (game is used here as a metaphor and does not reer to gametheory) and building an analytical ramework that explains the persis-tence o relatively closed and less democratic subnational regimes in na-tionally democratic countries (Behrend 2008). The ramework takes intoaccount the role o political amilies, media ownership, control o accessto business opportunities and control o the provincial state. In closedgames, the elite has subtler orms o control grounded in socioeconomicpractices that enable it to reproduce itsel over time.

Studies o subnational politics have explained the persistence o lessdemocratic or hybrid subnational regimes as a result o ederal dynam-ics (Gibson 2005; Giraudy 2009), electoral rules (Calvo and Escolar 2005;Calvo and Micozzi 2005), and rentierism (Gervasoni 2010) but have largelyignored the endogenous dynamics that give rise to closed games andenable their reproduction. The analytical ramework o the closed game

contributes to the existing literature on subnational democratization byocusing on the logic o continuity o less competitive subnational regimesand explaining how provincial elites are able to remain in power with theconsent and support o the population. This does not mean that national-provincial dynamics do not play an important role in sustaining thesegames. Closed games do not necessarily unction in opposition to the na-tional political regime, but they may be unctional to it and important incoalition building (Gibson and Calvo 2000).

The article is organized as ollows. I frst review the literature on hybridregimes and contextualize closed games as a type o hybrid regime (Beh-rend 2008). I then present the ramework o the closed game in the second

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152 Latin American Research Review

section. In the third section, I use original empirical research to apply theramework to two Argentine provinces: Corrientes and San Luis. Then,I look at national-provincial relations. I conclude by analyzing possiblepaths or subnational democratization.

HYBRIDREGIMESANDTHEUNEVENNESSOFDEMOCRATIZATION

Democratic regimes may develop in dierent and varied ways, and thisis also true at the subnational level. Yet the dierent ways subnational de-mocracy unolds do not necessarily mean that the least democratic prov-inces in a country are authoritarian (Behrend 2008; Gervasoni 2010). Inthis article, I use ODonnell and Schmitters (1986) defnition o political

democracy, which encompasses ree and air elections, universal surage,and broad protections o political and civil liberties.The category o subnational authoritarianism has been used to describe

provinces or states in which governors exert tight control over the statelegislature, the law enorcement system, and the media, usually throughcoercive means (Cornelius 1999; Gibson 2005). This literature stresses theways subnational democratization or lack thereo may eectively constrainnational democratization processes. However, national politics also unc-tions as a constraint on subnational politics. The subnational regimes thisarticle deals with are embedded in nationally democratic regimes, whichlimits what subnational rulers can and cannot do. It means that local rul-ers cannot govern in isolation rom the national democratic polity and thatthey cannot sustain conventionally authoritarian regimes.

Even i the press is controlled at the local level, there is national media.Moreover, there are geographical constraints: people can move rom oneprovince to another and are in contact with other provincial regimes andwith the national political regime, and they are not orced to remain in theirprovinces. The rules that govern the nation as a whole also constrain sub-national politics (Behrend 2008; Gervasoni 2010). All o this puts a limit tolocal elites attempts to maintain politics in their provinces insulated romthe national polity. Subnational leaders may not want to keep their regional

bastions isolated, because governors oten have national political ambi-tions. In a context o national democracy, it is thereore unlikely that sub-national units will be authoritarian in a conventional way. The emergenceo hybrid subnational regimes is a more likely possibility (Behrend 2008).

The category o hybrid regimes has been used to describe regimesthat are mixed and contain both democratic and authoritarian elements(Collier and Levitsky 1997; Diamond 2002; Karl 1995; Morlino 2009). Thenotion o hybridity illustrates the act that democratization is not a cut-and-dried one step shit to a new equilibrium (Whitehead 2002, 246).

Even i there are occasional episodes o repression or outbreaks oviolence, it is air to say that all Argentine provinces have reasonably

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democratic regimes according to the defnition outlined previously: theyhold regular and clean elections; there is universal adult surage, ree-dom o speech, and reedom to organize public protests; there are op-position parties that win legislative seats or municipalities; no politicalparties are banned; and the media is not subject to censorship or totalitar-ian control. Winning elections, and winning them airly, is important inthese regimes, and the local elites legitimacy at the provincial level andits leverage at the national level hinges on this (Behrend 2008). Electionsare ar rom being a arce, and these regimes are not examples o electoralor competitive authoritarianism, where electoral results may be manipu-lated, the opposition harassed, threatened, arrested, and even assaulted(Levitsky and Way 2002; Schedler 2006). Aside rom exceptional cases, this

is not common practice in most Argentine provinces.

THECLOSEDGAMEOFPROVINCIALPOLITICS: AFRAMEWORKFORANALYSIS

Closed games are subnational political regimes in which a amily, ora reduced group o amilies, dominates politics in a province, controllingaccess to top government positions, the provincial state, the media, andbusiness opportunities. The ramework o the closed game includes theollowing dimensions, which occur in a context o national democracy:

1. Free, air and regular elections

2. Family politics: control o access to top government positions

3. Control o the media

4. Control o the provincial state, distribution o public resources, andclientelism

5. Control o business opportunities

6. Control o the judiciary

In closed games, institutional rules are obeyed. Family politics takesplace in an institutional setting and in established political parties. Closedgames are strongly based on popular electoral preerences: elections are

not subject to manipulation nor a arce but reect the support the eliteelicits through other orms o control grounded in cultural practices andeconomic processes. Voters vote or the amilies because it makes senseto do so: provinces with closed games tend not to have a strong eco-nomic structure, and voters know through experience that the ruling elitedeliverseven i what it delivers is not all that muchand they cannot becertain that the opposition will do the same. The elite has oten reormedelectoral legislation or provincial constitutions to make it easier to remainin power (Calvo and Escolar 2005) but generally has done so through legalmeans. Fundamentally, it has remained in power with the consent o thepopulation.

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I use the concept o closed games and not neopatrimonialism becausethe latter involves the coexistence o two distinct legitimacy logics: tradi-tional and legal rational (Eisenstadt 1973; Hartlyn 1994). In closed games,amilies do not persist in power or traditional reasons, but becausewell-organized political systems with stable institutions, highly struc-tured political practices, newspapers, voters, and a judicial system sustainthem (or a classifcation o Argentine provinces as neopatrimonial or bu-reaucratic, see Giraudy 2009).

Political amilies are important because o the structure o control theydevelop. Family is understood here in broad terms, as a political and not alegal construct. These are amilies with social prestige, political author-ity, and economic power, although their economic resources may be quite

heterogeneous (Balmori, Voss, and Wortman 1984; Vilas 1992). Althoughkinship relations tend to predominate, the amily network may includeriends and business associates with business or media interests in theprovince. These members enjoy the ull trust o the predominant amilyand unction as extended amily; the condition o their permanence inthe game is loyalty to the governor. Members o the amily network maybelong to dierent political parties and may be in the ruling group, theopposition, or dierent actions. Family structures vary across dierentclosed games. In some provinces, there are amilies that have exercisedpolitical and economic control over several decades (Corrientes until 1999,San Luis and Neuqun until the present, Catamarca until 1991 and to alesser extent thereater, and Santiago del Estero until 2004); in some cases,new amily networks developed in party structures ater the transition todemocracy (the Kirchners in Santa Cruz); in other cases, a amily replacedthe predominant amily ollowing a ederal intervention (Corrientes ater2001; Catamarca ater 1991). Being governor o a province may enable amember o these amilies to aspire to the largest prize o all: running orpresident.

Closed games usually arise in provinces with a limited economic struc-ture, a small population, and limited business opportunities. The politicalelites amilies use the state to promote their economic interests and con-

trol access to business opportunities (companies owned by the politicalelite beneft rom state contracts, its newspapers receive state advertise-ment, members o the economic elite hold government positions and con-trol which industries receive tax benefts, subsidies, industrial promotionschemes or avorable loans rom the provincial bank).

Control o the media tends not to be coercive. The political amiliesown the most important provincial media and control the public televi-sion channel. But state advertising is usually discretional. Control o thejudiciary is related to the act that provincial judges are amily membersor belong to the elite, although in extreme cases, the governor may harassjudges until they resign and fll the vacancies with amily or riends.

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Although participation outside elections is low, there are occasionaloutbursts o social protest. The protests at times become relevant, as thecase studies here show. Political crises may ensue, and even i in the endthe elite succeeds in recomposing the game, the protests show that controlo the closed game is never absolute.

Yet not all closed games are the same; the dierences lie in how theelite controls each dimension. Structural conditions, solvency o the pro-vincial state, dependence on ederal unding, the strength o political par-ties and actionalism, and political history also explain variation. Table 1illustrates the dierent mechanisms provincial elites use to control eachdimension o the closed game and the dierent possible outcomes.

The closure o the game operates on two levels. The frst and most im-

portant is that the game is closed with regard to who can realistically as-pire to holding political ofce in a province. It reers to the concentration opolitical, economic, media, and symbolic power in the hands o a ew ami-lies. The second type o closure, which also constitutes a limit to the closedgame, lies in national politics. Governors engage in boundary control(Gibson 2005, 108) to maintain the political game in their provinces closedand insulated rom national politics, and to strengthen control o their geo-graphical domain. This is possible because governors have a great deal opolitical and, to a lesser extent, fnancial autonomy. Governors are usuallythe head o their party at the provincial level and control the design o elec-toral lists; i their party is a national party, they have inuence in nationalparties. They also have loyal voters. However, national and provincial poli-tics interact continuously. As Gibson and Surez Cao (orthcoming) argue,Argentina has a ederalized party system, in which subnational party sys-tems shape power in local politics and aect outcomes in national partypolitics. Governors support is needed to approve legislation in Congress,implement ederal policies, and deliver votes in presidential elections.Smaller provinces, which are overrepresented in Congress, are oten parto government coalitions (Gibson and Calvo 2000; Jones and Hwang 2005).The institutional characteristics o Argentine ederalism mean that thegovernor o a province with a small population and scarce participation

in national gross domestic product (GDP) can become president. Indeed,most presidents since 1983 have been ormer provincial governors. Closedgames thereore have an impact on national democracy.

The ocus on amilies does not mean that political parties are not impor-tant. Closed games may develop in provinces with a predominant party,as the case o San Luis illustrates, or in provinces where, at frst glance,there is limited pluralism (Sartori 1976), as the case o Corrientes illus-trates. Political parties have weight because they enable provincial elitesto have national leverage and resolve actional disputes. Greater actional-ism may result in greater competition within the elite, but the particularityo the closed game is not merely the existence o political amilies but the

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Table 1 The Framework o the Closed Game

Closed Game

Dimensions Mechanisms Outcomes

Free, air, andregular elections

No direct intererence inthe electoral process.

Not contested:opposition sees nopoint in participating.

Low contestation: morethan one candidate, butonly one has realchance o winning.

Highly contested: morethan one candidate haschance o winning.

Family politics:Control o accessto top governmentpositions

Only members o amiliesare nominated or topgovernment positions.

Governor always belongsto same amily.

Governor belongs to agroup o notableamilies.

Alternation betweenparties, dominated byew amilies.

Predominant party withalternation betweenamilies belonging to

the same party.Non-amily members arenominated or designatedon condition o loyalty topolitical amilies butcannot realistically aspireto be governor.

Non-amily membersbecome cabinetmembers, mayors,legislators, but are notallowed to escalate.

Non-amily membersdevelop politicalambitions and apolitical crisis ensues.

Control o the

media

Newspaper ownership. There is only one

newspaper and theelite owns it.There is more than one

newspaper, butpolitical amiliesown them all.

Ownership/control otelevision channels.

Elite controls the publictelevision channel.

Elite owns cabletelevision channel.

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Closed Game

Dimensions Mechanisms Outcomes

Control o themedia Withholding stateadvertisement. Small independentnewspapers existbut receive no stateadvertising.

There is at least oneindependent cabletelevision channel,but it receives no stateadvertising.

Small independent radiostations exist, butreceive no state

advertising.Journalists are harassed. Independent journalists

are araid to publish/air critical news items.

Control o theprovincial state,distribution opublic resources,and clientelism

Distribution o public-sector jobs.

Clientelist networks.

Distribution o subsidizedhousing plans.

Politics is personalized.

Distribution ounemployment plans.

Distribution o social

assistance.Discretional application o

social policy.Discretional allocation o

public pensions.Handouts.

Control o businessopportunities

Allocation o statecontracts.

Elites companies beneftrom state contracts(e.g., construction,printing, services).

Businessmen and/orbusiness elite holdgovernment positions.

Subsidies awarded toindustries linked tothe elite.

Corruption, bribes, etc.

Control o thejudiciary

Judges are members othe amily network.

Friendly courts.

Designation o judges. Judges/prosecutors are

harassed.Resignation o

independent judges,leaving vacancies ornew designations.

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structure o control that these amilies develop. Even i there is alternationbetween parties, the main political parties in the province reproduce thedynamics o the closed game when they reach power.

TWOPROVINCIALCLOSEDGAMES: CORRIENTESANDSANLUIS

In 1983, Jos Antonio Pocho Romero Feris was elected governor o thenortheastern province o Corrientes. Ten years later, his younger brotherRal (known as Tato) was elected. Tato had been mayor o the provin-cial capital rom 1987 to 1991 and was elected mayor again ater his termas governor ended. The Romero Feris brothers, who belonged to the pro-vincial Partido Autonomista, came rom a amily that had been active in

politics in Corrientes since the mid-twentieth century.In San Luis, the Peronist Adolo Rodrguez Sa was elected governor

in 1983. His amily had been involved in provincial politics since the nine-teenth century. Rodrguez Sa was uninterruptedly governor o San Luisor a record nineteen years until he resigned in 2001 to become presidento Argentina or seven days (ater President Fernando de la Ra resignedamid protests and a political crisis). His brother Alberto was elected gov-ernor in 2003 and reelected in 2007 while Adolo was elected to the LowerHouse.

The Romero Ferises and the Rodrguez Sas are examples o provincialpolitical amilies that developed closed games. They are exemplary butnot unique in Argentine politics. The selection o these two cases is basedon criteria o similarities and dierences. Families that achieved political,media, and economic control, albeit varying, governed both provinces.The main dierences lie in the provincial party system, socioeconomiccharacteristics, and fscal solvency o the provincial state. Corrientes wastraditionally governed by provincial parties (but since 2001 has beengoverned by a coalition o parties headed by the Unin Cvica Radical[UCR]), is heavily dependent on ederal transers, and has a limited eco-nomic structure. San Luis is governed by a national party, the Partido Jus-ticialista (PJ, also known as the Peronist Party), has fscal autonomy, and

underwent an important process o state-led industrialization.

CONTROLLEDALTERNATION: THECLOSEDGAMEINCORRIENTES1

Throughout most o the twentieth century, the Autonomista and theLiberal Parties, which alternated in power, ruled Corrientes, and ater1961, the Autonomista-Liberal Pact (the Pact), an alliance whereby the two

1. This section is based on extensive feldwork in the province o Corrientes carried out in2003 and on more than thirty personal interviews with provincial politicians rom all majorparties, union leaders, civil society organizations, protesters, and supporters o the regime.

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parties shared power. The parties, which are heirs to the two national con-servative parties created in the nineteenth century (Partido Autonomista

Nacional and Partido Liberal), subsisted as provincial parties in Corrien-tes despite their disappearance in the rest o the country. Until 2001, Cor-rientes was one o the ew Argentine provinces where, ater 1983, theprovincial instead o the national parties continued to dominate the pro-vincial political system.

From the outside, Corrientes appeared to have a party system o al-ternation. Yet power alternated between two parties that were part o analliance and dominated by a reduced group o political amilies, with thepredominance o the Romero Feris amily. In 1992, ater a stalemate in theelectoral college over the election o governor and an ensuing politicalcrisis, the ederal government intervened in the province. However, theclosed game proved resilient.

Free, Fair, and Regular Elections

Politics in Corrientes unctioned smoothly during the frst decade a-ter national democratization. The elite created a stable political regime inwhich members o certain amilies and the two parties in the Pact peace-ully alternated in power until the mid-1990s. The Pact won every electionwithout major challenges. In 1995, Governor Ral Romero Feris createda new political party, the Partido Nuevo (PaNu), an ospring o the Pact

and the result o a actional dispute with his brother and an alliance withPresident Carlos Menem. Hereater, the PaNu began to win elections inthe province. As table 3 shows, ater 1983, the Pact was the strongest elec-toral orce until the appearance o the PaNu.

Family Politics: Control o Access to Top Government Positions

The Romero Feris amily was the dominant political amily withinthe provincial amily network rom the early 1970s until the turn o thetwenty-frst century; three governors and one deputy governor electedater 1973 (there was no reelection in Corrientes until 2007) belonged to

Table 2 Corrientes: Socioeconomic Indicators

Population (2001) 930,991Population below the poverty line (2001) 57.8%Unemployment (2001) 16.6%Employed population in the public sector (2001) 26.8%Participation in national GDP (1998) 1.2%

Source: 2001 National Census; UNDP 2005; 1994 National Economic Census; InstitutoNacional de Estadstica y Censos.

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Table3Corrientes:Ele

ctoralResultsforGovernorandProvincialDeputies,

19832007(%

ofvotes)

19

83

1985

1987

1989

1991

1993

1995

Gov.

Leg.

Leg.

Gov.

Leg.

Leg.

Gov.

Leg.

Gov.

Leg.

Leg.

PAL

46.61

45.56

49.81

44.35

44.21

40.49

43.86

43.74

47.73

47.13

41.80

PJ

22.94

23.10

18.87

18.44

18.60

32.75

33.97

33.03

37.62

36.74

31.69

UCR

20.70

21.01

24.04

24.85

24.83

23.32

17.84

14.77

11.61

12.61

13.94

Other

9.74

10.33

7.28

12.36

10.85

3.44

4.33

8.27

3.04

3.52

12.77

1997

1999

G

ov.

Leg.

Leg.

1st

round

2nd

round

PANU

48.49

70.34

47.44

28.06

PAL

19.67

29.66

19.91

20.65

PJ

18.23

18.11

19.25

UCR

13.27

14.18

23.75*

Other

0.34

0.36

8.30

2001

Gov.

Leg.

1st

round

2nd

round

UCR/Lib.

40.94

51.23

37.83

PANU/PJ

43.04

48.77

43.53

Auton./allies

10.50

11.26

Other

5.51

6.45

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2003

Leg.

UCR/Lib/PJ/other

52.03

PaNu

23.49

Auton.

5.19

Other

19.27

2005

Gov.

Leg.

UCR/PJ/other

60.56

63.50

PaNu/Lib./Auton./o

ther

32.43

18.20

Other

7.02

18.29

2007

Leg.

UCR**/PJ/Lib./Auton./other

37.88

UCR***/other

27.88

PaNu/other

10.75

Other

23.51

Source:InteriorMinistry.

*UCR/Frepasoalliance

.

**TheUCRfactionthat

supportedGovernorArturoColom

bi.

***TheUCRfactiontha

tsupportedformergovernorRicardoColombi.

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provincially and perceived as a beneft rom the provincial government.The number o benefciaries o ederally unded unemployment plans in-creased rom 2,750 in 1994 to 58,731 in 1998 in a province with a popula-tion o 930,991 (Universidad Nacional del Nordeste 2000).

Provincial governments built cheap subsidized homes with ederalunding rom the Fondo Nacional para la Vivienda (FONAVI) hous-ing program. The ormer governor J. A. Romero Feris said his govern-ment (19831987) built around twenty-our thousand housing units withFONAVI unds.3 Between 1992 and 1998, 34,889 housing units were built(Ministerio de Economa, Direccin de Gastos Sociales Consolidados2000).

Control o Business Opportunities

Control o access to business opportunities played a central role in Cor-rientes, which has very little industry. In 2001, there were only our largefrms in the province and orty-three small and medium-sized businesses(UNDP 2005). Most o the provincial political amilies belong to a landedoligarchy and own agribusinesses. But the Romero Feris amily set upcompanies and began to do business with the provincial state.

The Romero Feris amilys construction company, EACSA, undertookstate contracts. In 1993, the ederal intervention initiated lawsuits againstEACSA or raud against the provincial housing institute in the construc-tion o FONAVI housing and or raud against the provincial water com-pany or construction work the company undertook. Former directors othe provincial bank were also accused o raudulent management and oallegedly giving easy loans to companies the political elite owned. Law-suits were fled against the provincial energy body and the provincialroad-building institution, all o which involved members o the RomeroFeris amily (El Litoral 1992).

In addition, the newspaper owned by the Romero Feris amily receivedstate advertising, and most o its large-scale advertising came rom theprovincial state (based on an analysis o El Litoral in 1992, 1993, and 1999).

Control o the Judiciary

The 1992 ederal intervention accused the provincial Supreme Courto responding to the political interests o the ruling amilies (El Litoral1992, my translation).

There was no evidence o direct attempts by the elite to control the courtsor orce the resignation o judges through intimidation or other maneuversin Corrientes. However, this was probably because o the provinces social

3. Interview with J. A. Romero Feris.

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structure: many judges were members o the provincial amily networkand were inclined to sympathize with their relatives and riends.

Crisis, Protest, Intervention, and a New Family Politics

In 1999, there were mobilizations in the provincial capital. The provin-cial state was in paralysis and unable to ulfll its basic unctions or payits employees; there was also an intraelite crisis. The protest, which lastednine months, and the political crisis that ensued had little national mediacoverage until December 1999, when, less than a week ater taking ofce,President de la Ra ordered its brutal repression (the gendarmera killedtwo people and injured twenty-fve). In the context o the protest, the gov-

ernor and the mayor o the provincial capital were impeached. The ederalintervention lasted two years, and in 2001, a new amily, the Colombi am-ily, rom another party, the UCR (the presidents party), was elected. Thedynamics o amily politics, elite agreements, and actionalism, however,continued ater the election o Governor Ricardo Colombi. His cousin Ar-turo Colombi succeeded him as governor in 2005. The Colombi amilydoes not own any print media, but Arturo Colombis extended amilycreated an Internet news agency that transmitted the governors view-point and controlled the distribution o state advertising. In 2009, the twocousins competed or the governorship, and Ricardo won the elections.A dierent Romero Feris brother backed each Colombi, which evidencesthe amilys continuing political weight (Arturo Colombi allied with TatoRomero Feris and Ricardo Colombi with J. A. Romero Feris; Perfl 2009).The party in power had changed, but yet another amily had reachedpower and was renewing the provincial tradition o amily politics, elitesettlements, and actional disputes.

THEALL-POWERFULFAMILY: THECLOSEDGAMEINSANLUIS

Members o the Rodrguez Sa amily enrolled in the Peronist Partyhave governed the province o San Luis since 1983. The Rodrguez Sa

amily created one o the most closed provincial political regimes in Ar-gentina, where in a period o twenty-six years, alternation occurred only between two brothers. Their use o a provincial industrial promotionscheme and sound fnancial management o provincial accounts enabledthem to achieve economic independence rom the ederal governmentand to have greater scope or political maneuvers.

4. This section is based on extensive feldwork carried out in San Luis in 2005 and morethan thirty personal interviews with local politicians, opposition leaders, university lectur-ers, union leaders, church hierarchy, civil society organisations, protesters, and provincialresidents.

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Free, Fair, and Regular Elections

When Adolo Rodrguez Sa was elected governor in 1983, he wonwith only a handul more votes (3,873 according to the Interior Ministry)than his main contender rom the UCR. But by the early 1990s, he waswinning elections with an ever-increasing majority o votes. Adolo, andater 2003, his brother Alberto Rodrguez Sa, consistently won electionsin the province; by 2003, the brothers were winning elections with 90 per-cent o votes (see table 5). A 1987 constitutional reorm enabled the indef-nite reelection o governors, allowing Adolo to run or fve consecutiveterms.

Family Politics: Control o Access to Top Government Positions

The Rodrguez Sa amily was not new to politics in San Luis; its in-volvement can be traced back to the independence wars o the nineteenthcentury. Members o the amily were among the ounders o the local UCRin the late nineteenth century and in the provincial Liberal Party. Therewere a remarkable number o Rodrguez Sa amily members in highpositionsincluding eight governorsater 1860 and until the rise o Pe-ronism in the mid-1940s (I include direct relations who share the surnameand relatives on their maternal side; see Nez 1980). From then on, the

amily appeared only sporadically in politics and returned with Adoloand Alberto Rodrguez Sas conversion to Peronism in the early 1970s.

In his youth, Adolo Rodrguez Sa had been a member o the LiberalParty and a virulent anti-Peronist. But when he and his brother returnedto San Luis ater earning law degrees in Buenos Aires in 1971, they be-came members o the provincial Peronist Party and quickly escalatedin the party ranks. The constitutional reorms o 1987 ensured the am-ilys continuity in power. Adolo sought to curb the political ambitions omany o his collaborators and was successul to a great extent, except inthe capital city o San Luis, where Peronist mayors increasingly distancedthemselves rom his control toward the end o the 1990s.

Table 4 San Luis: Socioeconomic Indicators

Population 367,933Population below the poverty line 40.2%Unemployment (2003) 15.6%Employed population in the public sector 24.7%Contribution to national GDP 0.9%

Source: 2001 National Census; UNDP 2005; 1994 National Economic Census; InstitutoNacional de Estadstica y Censos.

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Table5SanLuis:Ele

ctoralResultsforGovernorandProvincialDeputies,

19832007(%

ofvotes)

1983

1985

1987

1989

1991

1993

1995

Gov.

Leg.

Leg.

Gov.

L

eg.

Leg.

Gov.

Leg.

Leg.

Gov.

Leg.

PJ

40.48

40.00

45.50

52.13

44.16

41.94

51.78

n/a

44.76

71.62

52.26

UCR

37.27

37.29

49.08

32.87

33.73

37.27

36.95

n/a

28.69

17.00

27.09

Other

22.25

22.70

5.42

15.00

22.10

20.80

11.27

n/a

26.55

11.38

20.65

1997

1999

2001

2003

Leg.

Gov.

Leg.

Leg.

Gov.

Leg.

PJ

44.24

54.32

n/a

63.57

90.08

53.19

UCR

32.49*

44.99*

n/a

12.87

14.82

Other

23.28

0.69

n/a

23.57

9.92

34.86

2005

2007

Leg.

Gov.

Leg.

PJ

36.05

86.26

42.70

PJ/FV**

16.48

6.12

PUL

14.22

11.62

UCR

8.44

22.12

Other

24.81

13.74

17.44

Source:InteriorMinis

try.

Notes:PULisAlberto

RodrguezSasPartidoUninyLibertad.

*InalliancewithFrep

aso.

**DissidentPeronists

alliedwithPresidentKirchner.

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Control o the Media

In the beginning o the 1980s, San Luis had two newspapers: El Diariode San Luis, a morning daily with the highest circulation, and La Opin-in. In 1984, close collaborators o the governor purchased El Diario de SanLuis (many properties that allegedly belong to the Rodrguez Sa am-ily are registered under the names o ront men; Wiazki 2002). A ewyears later, Rodrguez Sas collaborators acquired La Opinin, which wasmanaged by a relative and shut down in 2004. Allegations o raudulentmaneuvers, including withdrawal o state advertisement, surrounded thepurchase o the two newspapers (Wiazki 2002). Ater 1984, the directorso El Diario de San Luis were people who had occupied or would occupykey government positions; since 1996, the director o the newspaper hasbeen the Rodrguez Sa brothers sister, Zulema Rodrguez Sa de Divizia(Arias 1998). Democratization in San Luis, ar rom meaning pluralismand open debate in the media, involved the creation o a media conglom-erate owned by the amily that controlled politics.

Apart rom the structure o media ownership, what made the bound-aries between the state and private business interests unclear was theamilys use o the newspaper. El Diario de la Repblica, as it came to becalled, achieved a monopoly o state advertising, a source o income thatshould not be underestimated or any media, particularly in a prov-ince with ew large-scale advertisers. Similarly, television ownership

also shows a remarkable degree o concentration in the Rodrguez Saamily and extended amily. The provincial government runs the pro-vincial open-air channel. The provincial cable television channel wasindependent until 1991, when the owner decided to sell, allegedlybecause o government pressure. A close collaborator o Rodrguez Sabought it.5 Alberto Rodrguez Sas ormer wie is the director o a radiostation.

Control o the Provincial State, Distribution o Public Resources,and Clientelism

As governor, Adolo Rodrguez Sa developed the image o someonewho delivered: a governor who industrialized the province, providedemployment opportunities linked to industrialization, undertook publicworks, and built cheap housing with FONAVI ederal unds.

The regime developed a clientele that was urther strengthened a-ter 2003 with the creation o the provincial Social Inclusion Plan, whichinitially benefted around orty-eight thousand unemployed adults over

5. Authors interview with a San Luis journalist.

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age eighteen (roughly 31 percent o the economically active popula-tion).6 Twenty-fve percent o the provincial budget was allocated to thisprogram.7

Control o Business Opportunities

Ater 1983, San Luis underwent a process o rapid industrialization withthe aid o an industrial promotion law, which awarded tax cuts to indus-tries that settled in the province. The exemptions and deerrals were orederal taxes, so the province had everything to gain rom the scheme andnothing to lose. Adolo Rodrguez Sa created a populist, yet modernizingregime (Guiaz 2003). He used provincial revenue astutely, maintained

fscal discipline, and built inrastructure to promote the settlement o in-dustries in San Luis. At the same time, the brothers began to do businesswith the provincial state. Companies owned by the amily or ront menwere given construction and printing contracts. Because the application othe industrial promotion scheme was in the hands o provincial and notnational authorities, Rodrguez Sa was able to eectively control accessto business opportunities in the province by deciding which companieswould receive tax benefts (Guiaz 2003). Many companies denouncedhaving been asked or bribes in exchange or tax benefts.

Industrial promotion dramatically changed the province o San Luis inmore than one respect. First, it changed its economic and social structure:in 1980, the industrial sector accounted or 21.8 percent o provincial grossregional product (GRP); by 1997, it accounted or 57.76 percent. Second,industrial promotion gave Adolo Rodrguez Sa control over materialand symbolic resources that enabled him to expand his power base, bereelected or fve consecutive terms, project himsel at the national level,and become hegemonic in his province. He came to be seen as the manwho had industrialized San Luis.

Control o the Judiciary

In San Luis, the Rodrguez Sa amily began to exert greater controlover the courts and interere with the judiciarys independence rom 1995onward, when a series o laws aimed at controlling the judiciary wereenacted (Cieza, Menndez, and Aragn 2005). The laws sought to under-

6. Ofcial statistics about the plans benefciaries are not publicly available. Ofcials gavenumbers ranging rom orty thousand to orty-eight thousand benefciaries; however, au-thorities claimed that between thirty thousand and thirty-fve thousand remained in theplan in 2005.

7. Authors interview with Deputy Minister or Work Culture Vilma Carossia, July 14,2005.

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mine judicial independence, limit the judiciarys control over other statepowers, impose obedience to the executive, expel those who were reluc-tant to comply with the executive, and incorporate docile judges (Cen-tro de Estudios Legales y Sociales [CELS] 2002; Bill Chvez 2003; Trocello2008). The approval o this legislation was accompanied by a ferce slandercampaign against judges in El Diario de la Repblica, which ended with theresignation en masse o all provincial Supreme Court justices except onein December 1996. This enabled the provincial government to designatenew judges with close links to the government, many o whom had heldkey positions in the executive or legislative branch (CELS 2002).

Crisis, Protest, and Recomposition

In 2004, a series o protests broke out in the provincial capital aterthe government intervened in church-run institutes or minors and stateschools. Weekly multitudinous marches began to be held. Opposition alsoarose in the local Peronist Party: the elite was divided and two dier-ent persons claimed to be the legitimate mayor o the capital. In addition,two prosecutors and judges rom San Luis denounced that they had beenorced to sign resignation letters beore accepting their positions.

The national government contemplated the possibility o a ederalintervention, but President Nstor Kirchners recent experience with anintervention in Santiago del Estero had shown him that the electoral out-come might not beneft the national government. Despite opposition inthe provincial capital, the Rodrguez Sa brothers had a large constitu-ency; they had been winning elections with an overwhelming majorityor years, and it was likely that they would continue winning electionsater an intervention. The national government thereore chose an elec-toral strategy. Kirchner put his weight behind the municipal governmentand encouraged the mayor to run or the Senate. Peronism was electorallydivided in the province and the dissident Peronists won a Senate seat andrepresentation in the Lower House.

The Rodrguez Sa brothers let the conicts die out and negotiated sep-

arately with each sector, thus dividing the movement. Ater a while, theregime recomposed itsel and the brothers continued winning elections:Alberto Rodrguez Sa was reelected in 2007 with more than 80 percent othe vote, and the protest movement became a story o the past.

NATIONAL-PROVINCIALRELATIONSANDTHEPERSISTENCEOFCLOSEDGAMES

This article has ocused on the internal dynamics o closed games toexplain how the closure o provincial politics is maintained. But, as men-tioned earlier, political elites seek to keep the game o politics in theirprovinces closed in two respects: internally, in terms o who can access

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power and how power is exercised; and externally, through boundarycontrol. This is not always possible because national and provincial poli-tics are inextricably linked and mutually inuence each other. Moreover,ederal governments oten contribute to the persistence and reproduc-tion o closed games. At times, nonintervention or active support by thenational government enabled the ruling amilies in Corrientes and SanLuis to maintain the closure o the game. At other times, the closed gamepersisted despite national government involvement. The persistence andreproduction o closed games is not explained by a single variable, but bya combination o internal and external dynamics o both local politics andederal strategies.

In general, i provincial governments are not openly authoritarian or

agrantly violate human rights, the national government is not concernedwith the level o democracy in provinces with closed games and does notget involved. It will mostly ocus on securing support or elections, policyimplementation, and the approval o legislation. Closed games are lessdemocratic than the national political regime, but they play an importantpart in national representative politics, and presidents need the supporto political elites that run provincial closed games because o malappor-tionment and the overrepresentation o peripheral provinces in Congress(Gibson and Calvo 2000; Jones and Hwang 2005). How much leverage prov-inces have when negotiating with the national government depends ontheir economic structure, fscal situation, and electoral weight. Provinceswith debts and a limited economic structure, like Corrientes, rely heavilyon discretional and non-discretional ederal transers. The result is usu-ally the exchange o congressional support or discretional transers, taxcuts or industries, and so on. Provinces with a more solvent state, like SanLuis, tend to have greater independence rom the national government andare able to keep their closed games more insulated. As long as alliancesbetween national and provincial governments unction smoothly, the na-tional government will tend not to get involved in provincial aairs.

But it may get involved i a governor opposes the national governmentor conronts the presidentor example, by seeking to run or president

or pursuing national party leadership. In this case, the province will aceincreasing hostility rom the national government. The national govern-ment may also get involved in elections in which it stands to lose provin-cial support or that the rest o the country considers a test. Finally, it mayget involved i there is a political crisis that the local elite is incapable ohandling smoothly.

Situations o local mobilization and political conict provide a windowinto the dynamics o interaction between local and national politics. Whenconronted with local challenges, the provincial elite will seek to encein (an expression used by Adolo Rodrguez Sa)and keep the conict lo-calized. Nationalization o conict evidences a fssure in the closed game

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and is likely to avor the provincial opposition (Gibson 2009). Two actorsmay interere with the elites boundary control strategy: national mediaattention and national government involvement. National media attentionwill bring a local conict to the national arena and may put pressure onthe national government to act at the local level (Behrend 2006, 2008). Thenational government may get involved through: party politics (e.g., sup-porting rival actions or opposition parties), fscal mechanisms, (e.g., with-holding or increasing discretionary transers; Giraudy 2009), and ederalintervention.

The most extreme orm o national involvement is a ederal interven-tion, when ederal authorities replace provincial authorities. Federal in-terventions are, however, exceptional. In some cases, interventions suc-

ceeded in democratizing local politics, but in others, they were unableto put an end to the closed game. The two cases presented here provideinsights in this regard. Corrientes suered two ederal interventions dur-ing the 1990s. In the frst, the national government explicitly sought to putan end to amily politics and achieve the election o a candidate rom thesame political party as the president. Despite the ow o ederal unds andreorm o electoral rules, a member o the Romero Feris amily was againelected ollowing the intervention. In the 1999 intervention, the politicalelite was divided and in crisis. Ater a two-year intervention, the nationalgovernment achieved its implicit objective o overseeing the election oa governor rom the same party as the president. Alternation occurred,but the logic o the closed game proved resilient. The experience o otherprovinces with ederal interventions is also ambiguous. In Santiago delEstero, ater an intervention in 1991, the same amily was voted back topower. But ater a second intervention, the game began to open in 2005,when the national governments strategy to maximize its hegemony ailedand the candidate it supported lost the elections (Ortiz de Rozas 2009). InCatamarca, the Saadi amily lost elections ater the 1991 intervention, butwas replaced by the Castillo amily, which remained in power or threeconsecutive terms. It is too early to tell whether the current governor,Eduardo Brizuela del Moral, elected in 2003 and reelected until 2011, will

ollow a similar pattern o closing the game.In San Luis, the national government decided against intervening be-

cause polls showed that the Rodrguez Sa amily would continue win-ning elections ater a ederal intervention. Many presidents are ormergovernors who ran provincial bastions o their own, and they are unlikelyto eel inclined to dismantle other governors closed games. Dismantlinga closed game may also prove a challenging task. National governmentstend to intervene in provincial aairs only when they are certain thatthe outcome will beneft them or help an ally reach power. Even then,their motives might not be entirely democratic or result in provincialdemocratization.

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SUBNATIONALDEMOCRATIZATION

This article has aimed to conceptualize one type o hybrid subnationalregime and to take a step in the direction o urthering our understandingo the unevenness o democracy across a national territory through casestudies o two Argentine provinces.

The analytical ramework o the closed game does not explain poli-tics in all Argentine provinces. Subnational democracy in Argentina isvaried, and dierent provinces have various degrees o closure or open-ness, amily politics, contestation, alternation, checks and balances, pressreedom, and economic diversifcation (Behrend 2008; Gervasoni 2009;Giraudy 2009). About one-third o provinces have dierent versions o

closed games (Corrientes, San Luis, Santiago del Estero, Catamarca, Neu-qun, and La Rioja, to name a ew). In provinces like Santa Cruz, amilieshave become important in recent years, and closed games appear to be de-veloping. Other provinces show little alternation among parties but do notexhibit closed games (e.g., Ro Negro). In contrast, provinces like BuenosAires, the Federal Capital, Crdoba, Mendoza, and Santa Fe have moreopen and competitive regimes, alternation, economic diversifcation, andelite circulation, and amilies do not play an important role.

Although I do not consider closed games openly undemocratic or au-thoritarian, i we adopt a broader conception o democracy than the oneoutlined at the beginning o this article and consider democracy not onlya political regime but also a particular mode o relationship betweenstates and citizens (ODonnell 1999, 321), then closed games have seriousdemocratic ailings. This raises questions about how urther subnationaldemocratization may be achieved, particularly when ormal democraticinstitutions are already in place and elections are reasonably clean andair. As Gibson (2009) argues, the interaction between dierent levels ogovernment makes subnational democratization ar more complex thannational democratization.

The examples o Corrientes and San Luis show that closed games maydevelop in provinces with hegemonic party rule and in provinces with

slightly more competitive party systems, in provinces with a stronger andmore solvent provincial state, and in provinces that are fscally dependenton the national government. The ramework o the closed game puts theocus on the various mechanisms provincial amilies use to eectivelyclose the game o politics and maintain power, but it also emphasizes therelationship o the provincial regimes to national politics and points to theneed to look at the interaction between dierent dynamicsinternal andexternalin the analysis o subnational democracy.

Interaction with national politics and the support traded between na-tional and provincial governments plays an important role in the pres-ervation o subnational closed games. How can urther democratization

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thereore occur at the provincial level? Gibson (2009) identifes two likelypaths o democratic transition at the subnational level: party-led transi-tions and center-led transitions. In the ormer, democratization occurs viaparty competition in the existing local rules o the game; in the latter, de-mocratization is initiated by intervention rom national authorities, whichtransorms the local rules o the game. Both paths award a signifcantrole to national actors. In the party-led transition, the local opposition isstrengthened by its alliance with national party authorities; in the center-led transition, national actors directly intervene in the process.

The evidence rom the two case studies presented in this article posessome problems to how ar this interpretation may be applied. The frstis that the election o an opposition party does not guarantee democra-

tization, as the case o Corrientes shows. The local political oppositionis not necessarily more democratic than the incumbents. It may simplywant to be where the incumbents are. The logic o the closed game is sostrong that it is reproduced in both the ruling party and the opposition.The second point is that national government intervention is not necessar-ily democratizing. It may simply aim to achieve the election o a politicalally. Although change may in some cases occur rom above, it is importantto bear in mind that, in their intervention in provincial politics, nationalgovernments have partisan interests. In Argentina, the incentives are notthere or nonpartisan change rom above. The incentives and history leadto partisan thinking that maximizes the hegemony o the national rul-ing party. Moreover, the practice o ederal intervention, albeit legal andconstitutionally grounded, has been much abused, and there is an argu-ment to be made that the removal o elected provincial authorities by thenational government is not altogether democratic. Finally, i the local pop-ulation overwhelmingly votes or these amilies, as occurs in San Luis,why would national government intervention be more democratic thanthe popular vote? For a center-led transition to take place, we would haveto imagine a national government with no partisan thinking underlyingits involvement or a scenario in which the centers strategies to maximizehegemony ail. The question is also whether local inormal institutions

can be dismantled using national leverage.In a context o national democracy where democratic institutions are in

place, the type o national intervention that is most likely to lead to sub-national democratization is one that erodes the economic base o the localelites power and makes the electorate less dependent on the provincialgovernment or its subsistence. That is, ederal policies that create condi-tions in which a dierent kind o politics may arise or in which votersare persuaded that a dierent kind o politics will also beneft them. TheBrazilian case shows that one possibility or achieving this is through ed-eral social policies that create vertical competition between national andstate-level governments (Borges 2007; Souza 2009) or through economic

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transormations that have an impact on a states population (Montero2007, 2009). In closed games, the population votes or the incumbent ami-lies because it makes sense or them to do so. For change to occur, therehas to be an alternative that is not part o the closed game. Voters need tosee that there are reasons not to vote or the incumbent elite and that thepolitical opposition is not simply another amily that wishes to install itsown version o the closed game.

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Behrend - THE UNEVENNESS OF DEMOCRACY AT THE SUBNATIONAL LEVEL