Benjamin Constant

5/21/2018 Benjamin Constant

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Benjamin Constant on Modern Freedoms:

Political Liberty and the Role

of a Representative System

Valentino LumowaCentre for Ethics, Social and Political Philosophy

Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Belgium

ETHICAL PERSPECTIVES 17, no. 3(2010): 389-414.

2010 by European Centre for Ethics, K.U.Leuven. All rights reserved. doi: 10.2143/EP.17.3.2053889

ABSTRACT. This essay concerns Constants classic text The Liberty of the Ancients

Compared with that of the Moderns. Although this is a frequently quoted text, whatmakes reading it still something of an effort is that it contains a baffling shiftfrom the complete exaltation of modern liberty in its first part to the recognitionof the significance of political participation in safeguarding modern liberty in itsfinal part. The text is also replete with additional treasures, including Constantsfamous distinction between the liberty of the ancients and that of the modernsand his turn to the basic human capacity of self-development to support hisstubborn insistence on the irreducibility of political participation. With regardto the aforementioned shift in the 1819 text, some have argued that in order toreveal the richness of the text we must be aware that its two parts were written

under different historical circumstances. Accepting this claim, I argue that thebasic tone of the text is Constants attempt to combine modern liberty andpolitical participation and that deciphering the argumentative thrust inherent inthe text helps reveal its richness. I focus on the centrality of the representativesystem, which, I argue, plays an important role in Constants endeavour to unifythe liberty of the moderns and political liberty throughout the text. To see howhe defends both the enjoyment of individual interests and the practice of polit-ical liberty, it is necessary to recognize the nature of representative assembliesin Constants constitutionalism and to characterize his appeal to self-develop-ment as a justification of the practice of political liberty.1

KEYWORDS. Benjamin Constant, ancient and modern liberty, representativesystem, political liberty, self-development

I. INTRODUCTION

M

any authors have emphasized Benjamin Constants prominent role

in articulating the characteristic features of French liberalism and,


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390 Ethical Perspectives17 (2010) 3

ETHICALPERSPECTIVES SEPTEMBER2010

through his works, revealing the peculiarity of French liberalism as

occupying the middle ground between counterrevolutionaries and radical,progressive republicans.2While the former firmly promoted the spirit of

the conservative Right, intent on renewing the glorification of the Ancien

Rgime, the latter unstintingly condemned the restoration of French mon-

archy and thus represented the force of the turbulent left-wing in French

politics. In their ambitious efforts to preside over the vacuum left by the

dethroned king, neither was successful in securing either political stability

or incorrupt popular sovereignty. Both, instead, were trapped in their own

atrophy: the revolutionary Left in violent anarchy and the classical French

monarchy in political despotism. Against these extremes, Constant con-

sistently focuses on the establishment of a government that can effec-

tively hinder the impudent violation of sovereignty and the ignorant

absorption of civil liberty. As he is faithful to his strategic goal to create

a substitute institution to replace the failed classical monarchy, Constant

carefully investigates various experiments of political structure throughout

his political odyssey (Kalyvas and Katznelson 2008, 146-147). In other

words, although his proposed solutions to late eighteenth and early nine-

teenth century French political turmoil changed several times, his over-

riding concern continued to be arbitration between individual political

liberty and the sovereignty of government.3

The speech delivered in 1819 at the Athne Royal in Paris and

entitled The Liberty of the Ancients Compared with that of the Mod-

erns (1988b, 308-328) illustrates the complexities and richness of his

understanding of modern liberalism and its constitutive elements. Giventhat this lecture was written after his 1815 Principles of Politics Applicable to

All Representative Governments, which contains the complex statements of

his political constitutionalism, the 1819 lecture eloquently expresses

Constants principled middle path, which rescues liberalism from the

inebriation of revolutionary movements and the illusionary exaltation of

classical authority (1988a, 169-305). Although this 1819 text is often

quoted, what makes reading the text still something of an effort is that


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LUMOWA POLITICALLIBERTYANDTHEREPRESENTIVE SYSTEM

there is an abrupt shift in his elaboration of the fundamental distinction

between the freedom exercised by the ancients and that which is enjoyedby the moderns. As indicated by Helena Rosenblatt, the text has attracted

different readings (2008, 163). Isaiah Berlin read Constants elaboration

of the two types of liberty as a clear expression of negative liberty (2003a;

2008, 209).4Others have focussed on Constants insistence on the impor-

tance of political participation and civic involvement to limit governmen-

tal sovereignty and to secure civil liberty and individual enjoyments

(Rosenblatt 2008, 163, n. 23; Holmes 1984). The goal of the present

paper is to combine the two readings by arguing that the central plank in

the 1819 text is Constants determined effort to balance his preference

for modern liberty and the irreducibility of political participation, and that

in order to reveal the richness of the text we must be aware that its two

parts were written under different historical circumstances, while at the

same time deciphering the argumentative drive inherent in the text. I will

start by contextualizing the two parts of the text following Stephen

Holmes reconstruction. After revealing the historical background against

which it was written, I will then go on to reveal the thrust of the texts

argumentation. At this juncture I hope to summarize the difference

between the liberty of the ancients and that of the moderns, and, follow-

ing Holmes, argue that Constants conscious decision to connect his

pessimism and optimism with regard to civic participation has to be seen

as a well-constructed argument. Against Holmes, however, who appears

to overlook the centrality of a representative system, I contend that such

a system plays an important role in Constants efforts to unify the libertyof the moderns and political liberty throughout the text. I will endeavour

to explain how Constant justifies the indispensability of political liberty

in human life with his appeal to self development. I hope to make clear

in the process that the unity of the text is revealed when we read it against

the aforementioned historical backgrounds while at the same time follow-

ing closely the dynamics of Constants arguments with respect to the

representative system and self-development. Crucial in this endeavour is


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to carefully trace the three different layers that constitute the body of the

text, namely the distinction between ancient and modern liberty, the roleof representative assemblies, and Constants appeal to self-development.

II. HISTORICALCONTEXTUALIZATIONOFTHE1819 LECTURE

Constants 1819 text is an endeavour to elaborate the intractable difference

between the liberty expressed by the ancients in the exercise of collective

political power and modern liberty expressed in individual privacy and

independence, the primacy of law, peace, and commercial prosperity. After

establishing the difference between the two perspectives, he dedicates a

considerable part of the text to championing modern liberty and empha-

sizing individual independence as the first requirement of modern liberty

and its true nature. As the text comes to a close, however, he also insists

on the importance of political participation as both the guarantee of indi-

vidual enjoyments and the expression of modern civil liberty.

Having read Constants fervent endorsement of modern individual con-

finement in the peaceful pursuit of personal prosperity, which constitutes

more than half of the work, the reader may be perplexed as he or she

encounters the altered course of the argument in the final part of the text.

As suggested by Holmes, however, this perplexity can be addressed by

properly situating the text in its historical context (1984, 33-34). Many

have argued that Constants political philosophy profoundly echoed his

own political experiences (Rosenblatt 2008, 124). Marcel Gauchet inparticular has contended that the Revolutions swerve preoccupied Con-

stants thought and this swerve was even complicated by the two faces of

tyranny: Napoleons despotism and the Jacobins dictatorship (2009, 24).

Instead of being written in a single period in history, the 1819 lecture

is a palimpsest that was written in response to exceptionally different

political events in France. The first part, in which Constant distinguishes

the liberty of the ancients from that of the moderns in order to underscore


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individual liberty as the nature of modern liberty, was written in colla-

boration with Mme. Germaine de Stal around 1798 (Gauchet 2009, 34;Vincent 2000, 619-620). During this period, the revolutionary govern-

ment was engaged in major conflicts with several European states as it

expanded its fevered campaign of revolutionary fervour against absolut-

ism. With the establishment of the Directory, particularly from 1795-

1799, the social and political constellation of France mainly consisted of

citizens who were weary of heated revolutionary wars. The numbers of

those who supported the restoration of the Bourbon monarchy, the ultra-

Royalists, and those who believed that a radical republic was the most

appropriate form of government, the Jacobins, significantly decreased.

Although the threat of foreign interference was temporarily fended off

by the victorious campaign of Napoleon Bonapartes army against the

first coalition, French citizens were constantly menaced by internal wars

between conflicting parties, which were intentionally maintained by the

Directory. Consequently, active participation in French politics at the time

meant aligning oneself with one of the said parties and thereby fuelling

the hatred each side felt for the other. Given this political tumult, the

original version of the 1819 speech was intended to encourage the Direc-

tory to attract the mind of the war-weary nation by encouraging its self-

immersion in the domain of private affairs. As such, the manuscript was

not a diabolically manipulative scheme by which any despotic intentions

on the part of the Directory were upheld, but rather a scheme that sug-

gested individual liberty as the appropriate choice of political life (Holmes

1984, 34-35).The final part of Constants speech, on the other hand, was written

around 1819 when France was under the Bourbon Restoration. During

this period, the French monarchy was restored and the ultra-Royalists

dominated the legislature. Opposed to Louis XVIIIs constitutional mon-

archy, which effectively limited the sovereignty of the king, the ultra-

Royalists persistently insisted on the reinstallation of the absolute power

of the sovereign. Although the turbulent activities of the Jacobins had


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already disappeared, French politics was still exasperated by the ambitious

enthusiasm of the ultras. Wary of the emergence of such monarchicalenthusiasm, Constant employed his earlier understanding of ancient and

modern liberty both to deplore the absolute sovereignty of the king and

to demonstrate the dangers of individual emancipation from politics.

Having elaborated the problem and the historical context of the 1819

text, how do we understand the theoretical content of the 1819 lecture and

the argumentative drive Constant developed as he combined the two sec-

tions together? I would suggest that to reveal the logic and argumentation

of the text we should trace the three different layers that constitute its

body, namely the distinction between ancient and modern liberty, the role

of representative assemblies, and Constants appeal to self-development.

III. ANCIENTANDMODERNLIBERTY

Constant opens the 1819 lecture by making a distinction between the

nature of ancient liberty and modern liberty (2003d).5He speaks of the

former as being the kind of liberty the exerciseof which was so dear to

the ancient peoples, and the latter as the kind of liberty the enjoymentof

which is especially precious to the modern nations (1988b, 309). Con-

stant then draws his audiences attention to the broad domain in which

both the exerciseof the ancients and the enjoymentof the moderns were in

fact articulated. The authentic expression of the ancients participatory

exercises was in society collective power, whereas the locus of enjoy-ment so precious to the moderns was associated with the private domain

(1988b, 316). It is evident from this differentiation that there is a hedo-

nistic slide from exercise to enjoy, a shift that will be clear as other

features that characterize the difference between ancient and modern lib-

erty are specified (Holmes 1984, 31).

The liberty of the ancients was an active and participatory freedom,

which was expressed in their efforts to collectively and directly take part


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in political deliberation on war and peace, legal judgement, ratification,

and punishment. Constant thus associated the liberty of the ancients withpolitical liberty (Miller 1991, 7). This active and direct participation

accordingly required the subjugation of private life, particularly in relation

to individual liberty or private activities, to the realm of political citizen-

ship. Given such subjugation, the ancients needed ordinary subordinates

to take care of their domestic and productive affairs, leaving them an

enormous amount of freedom to dedicate their lives to politics and the

administration of the state (Constant 1988b, 313). Moreover, the inclina-

tion to war became inevitable because the ancient republics were in fact

confined to a narrow geographical region (Constant 1988b, 312). They

tended to attack their neighbours and consequently each nation had to

defend itself and safeguard its independence and security. In a way, war

also answered their need for ordinary subordinates because they treated

their fallen neighbours as subordinate household subjects. Moreover, the

ancients were limited demographically and were thereby able to gather in

public with ease and convenience in order to perform their political activ-

ities as free men (Constant 1988b, 314).

The moderns, by contrast, were focused on their private indepen-

dence, the legitimacy and rule of law, and the peaceful enjoyment of

commercial affluence. Unlike the ancients, direct participation and active

citizenship were impossible for the moderns because of the size of the

modern state, its inevitable involvement in commerce instead of war, and

the total abolition of slavery (Constant 1988b, 313-315). Experiencing

such participation as arduous and burdensome, the moderns resorted tothe use of representatives, charging them to engage in political affairs on

behalf of the nation. By doing so, modern individuals were thus able to

avoid compulsory commitment to such political involvement (Constant

1988b, 325).

Moreover, Constant rejected Napoleons campaign during the French

Revolutionary Wars as anachronistic and reversing the universal propen-

sity of modern nations. Instead of war, which was naturally unavoidable


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in the case of the ancient republics, Constant argued that commerce had

taken the place of war in modern times in engaging the interests of othermodern states (1988b, 313). As engagement in virtuous and patriotic war

in ancient times increasingly became unfavourable and embarrassing to

modern states, they gradually turned to commerce to secure tranquillity

and agreeable comfort. According to Constant, this is what inspires in

men a vivid love of individual independence (1988b, 315).

As an inevitable result of the complete subordination of ancient indi-

viduals to political involvement, however, their private lives came under

total surveillance by the state. The moderns, on the other hand, did not

have enough power to influence the course of politics, even in democratic

states. The complication of these predicaments was that both the ancients

and the moderns were kept in their own dogmatic slumber: the former

sacrificed their individual affluence and freedom for the exaltation of polit-

ical liberty and the latters self-immersion in the enjoyment of private inde-

pendence and prosperity hindered their political participation.

Building upon his distinction between ancient and modern liberty,

Constant establishes his first claim, which considers modern liberty to be

the first need of the moderns and the true modern liberty (1988b,

321-323). Constants adherence to this liberty, which empowers individual

freedom and participation in economics, clearly exposes his keen aware-

ness of the complexity of the French political condition. At that time, the

state had witnessed seemingly endless revolutionary wars and republican

political tyranny. Having seen the catastrophes of the republican revolu-

tion for himself, Constant came to believe that civic involvement in pol-itics would be pointless since it would only inflate the revolutionists

unbridled desire for war and the still open wound of hatred between the

Jacobins and the ultra-Royalists. While acknowledging the admiration

held by the republicans for the notion of ancient liberty, Constant rebuffs

the restoration thereof because it was historically anachronistic and tacitly

subverted the moderns private domain. With this argument, Constant

aims at wiping away the illusionary dream of the ancient republic adored


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by Robespierre, the republican revolutionist, whose fascination with the

ancient spirit was partly shaped by Rousseau, a classical republican theo-rist. Robespierre believed both that dedication to civic virtues would

invigorate republican fervour and that giving up individual rights to the

general will would maintain both the states authority and the individuals

freedom (Constant 1988b, 318-320). Against these classical republican

features, which are prone to political tyranny and arbitrary power, Con-

stant argues unremittingly in favour of individual liberty, the rule of law,

and sovereign government. Since we live in modern times, I want a

liberty suited to modern times, Constant proclaims (1988b, 323).

IV. LIMITED POLITICAL SOVEREIGNTY, MODERN FREEDOMSANDTHE

ROLEOFTHEREPRESENTATIVESYSTEM

The last part of Constants 1819 speech includes his call for popular

involvement in the course of a modern states politics. Given Constants

earlier insistence on individual liberty, this part appears to be a surprising

shift, although it is not as conflicting as it might seem at the first sight.

Holmes correctly argues that Constants conscious decision to connect

his pessimism and optimism with regard to civic participation has to be

seen as a well-constructed argument (1984, 43-46). Holmes explains Con-

stants pessimism concerning civic participation by referring to the social

and political constellation of France during the establishment of the

Directory. France was then a war-weary nation and active participation inFrench politics would have meant supporting one of the conflicting

parties, particularly the ultra-Royalists and the Jacobins, and thereby

augmenting the unrelenting tension between the two opposing parties.

During the Bourbon Restoration, however, the resurgence of the French

monarchy unveiled the inherent danger within the citizens entrenchment

in private affairs. Constant then exposed the severe predicament modern

individuals would encounter if they overlooked the potential political


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tyranny inherent in both the overemphasis on individual freedoms and

the blind endorsement of civil liberty. Instead of indulging themselvescompletely in the fulfilment of individual needs, he insisted, citizens

should exercise political participation, which would prevent the ultra-

Royalists from reinstating the absolute power of the sovereign.

Holmes elaboration of Constants pessimism and optimism with

regard to political participation captures the spirit of Constants work.

Holmes is correct in suggesting, moreover, that Constant did not want to

follow the path taken by the revolutionists. Instead, he cautiously appro-

priates the republican element of proper political participation that

balances the modern demand for private enjoyment. However, Holmes

undermines the centrality of the role of the representative system, which

is mentioned earlier in the 1819 text, in upholding the balance between

political and civil liberty. Had Holmes taken this into his account, he

might have strengthened his argument for the unity of Constants text,

instead he is forced to abandon one of his declared projects, namely to

do justice to the theoretical content of the lecture (1984, 43). To clarify

this point, it is necessary to understand the nature of the

representative system in Constants constitutionalism.

From the beginning of the 1819 text, Constant declares that he wants

to explore the nature of the representative system in terms of the distinc-

tion between ancient and modern liberty. However, to understand the

nature of this system or procedure, one must bear in mind the basic

principles Constant eagerly championed in hisPrinciples of Politics Appli-

cable to All Governments(1806-1810) and Principles of Politics Applicable to AllRepresentative Governments(1815). In both works, Constant articulated his

liberal convictions. In Principles of Politics Applicable to All Governments(1806-

1810), he dismissed the idea of arbitrary or absolute power in his political

system in favour of individual freedoms, civil liberty, and legal safeguards.

Obliterating Rousseaus idea of absolute popular sovereignty, Constant

argues that [w]hen no limit to political authority is acknow-ledged, the

peoples leaders, in a popular government, are not defenders of freedom,


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but aspiring tyrants, aiming not to break, but rather to assume the bound-

less power which presses on the citizens (2003b). Here, the core prin-ciple of Constants liberalism is clear: political power has to be limited so

that the freedom of the people can be secured. Rosenblatt correctly

regards this principle as Constants two-pronged argument, which

echoes throughout the book: his refutation of absolute political sover-

eignty or arbitrary power and his defence of the liberty of modern people

(2008, 123-124). By limiting political power, this does not mean that

Constant refuses the notion of popular sovereignty, the principle of which

is the supremacy of the general will over any particular will. On the

contrary, he argues that all authority undoubtedly needs the will of the

people to be considered legitimate. This means that no individual or

group can assume sovereignty as long as the body of all citizens has not

yet vested any individual or group with the exercise of its sovereignty. For

Constant, however, it does not follow that such sovereignty can be used

by its holder to dispose of individual lives or freedoms. He clearly states

that the nature of sovereignty is by no means arbitrary; it must not

encroach upon individual affairs.

There is a part of human existence which necessarily remains indi-vidual and independent, and by right beyond all political jurisdictions.Sovereignty exists only in a limited and relative way. The jurisdictionof this sovereignty stops where independent, individual existencebegins (2003c).

It is clear that, for Constant, political power regardless of its holder (anindividual or a group) is circumscribed by the limits of individual freedom

and civil liberty. The exercise of this principle itself, however, cannot guar-

antee that the holder of political sovereignty will not encroach upon the

private lives of its citizens. One might ask how the activities of such a

government can be confined in practical terms within its jurisdiction, or

how such governments can be prevented from transgressing the parameters

of human existence, which are necessarily independent and remain indi-


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vidual? One might argue that political power can be limited by dividing it

into several balanced or opposite powers. Constant, however, immediatelyforesees the weakness of this argument, namely that it does not guarantee

that the total sum of those powers is not unlimited. For him, the answer

cannot be found in the organization of government while leaving political

power unlimited, because he believes that determining the nature and

extension of political power comes prior to its organization (1988a, 182).

Thus, there has to be a system that can procedurally limit political sover-

eignty. Constant systematically developed such a system in Principles of Poli-

tics Applicable to All Representative Governments (1815), which is a shortened

version of his Principles of PoliticsApplicable to All Governments (1806-1810).

The Principle of Politics of 1815, published during the Hundred Days, was

intended as a companion to the new constitution Constant prepared at the

request of Napoleon Bonaparte (Rosenblatt 2008, 156).

The leitmotif of both works is the same, namely the two-fold argu-

ment concerning the absence of arbitrary power and the promotion of

individual liberty, freedom of the press, and respect for the freedom of

all. In the Principles of Politicsof 1815, and against the royalists who wanted

to rebuild the Ancien Rgime, Constant clearly articulates his position on

the issue by endorsing popular sovereignty. In order to distinguish his

position from that of the Jacobins who were infatuated with Rousseaus

idea of absolute sovereignty, however, Constant immediately states that

no authority exercises unlimited power over its people, and he draws its

boundaries using the principles of individual affairs and freedoms (Rosen-

blatt 2008, 156). He writes, [s]overeignty has only a limited and relativeexistence. At the point where independence and individual existence

begin, the jurisdiction of sovereignty ends (1988a, 177).

In addition, Constant tries to elaborate a system that curtails the

extent of political sovereignty. In his system of constitutionalism, Con-

stant speaks of five different powers, namely royal power that lies in

the hands of the head of state, executive power in the hands of the min-

isters, representative power of long duration that resides in the hereditary


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assembly, representative power of public opinion in the elective assembly,

and judicial power that is entrusted to the tribunals (1988a, 184-185). Inthis system, the royal power assigned to the head of state is a neutral

power. By neutral power, Constant means a power that is above and

external to the other four powers, preserving the balance between them

and restoring their authorities to their own jurisdiction when these com-

petences cross and hinder one another (1988a, 184). The neutrality of the

head of state is expressed also in its inability to intervene within the affairs

of the other powers. Overstepping the boundaries drawn by the executive,

legislative, and judicial powers is an unconstitutional act and thus invali-

dates the neutrality of its power and ultimately disturbs the balance of

power. It is worth noting that this power division does not concern only

the organization of government but, first and foremost, the circumscrip-

tion of royal power. As a restorative power, however, royal power has the

authority that cannot condemn, imprison, despoil or proscribe, but limits

itself to depriving of their authority those members of the assemblies who

can no longer retain it without danger (Constant 1988a, 188).

In Constants constitutionalism, the powers of the ministers, the

hereditary assembly, the elective assembly, and the tribunals are also con-

stitutionally confined within their own jurisdiction. The ministers deal with

the general execution of the laws that are enacted and promulgated by the

two representative powers. The judicial assembly applies the laws in more

particular cases (Constant 1988a, 185). Whereas the royal power is regarded

as a neutral power that safeguards and restores the balance between all the

powers, the executive, legislative, and judicial authorities are considered tobe the active powers. They are active because they take care of all the

governmental, political affairs in cooperation with one another and within

their own domain. According to Constant, the difference between the

royal power as a neutral power and the active powers needs to be clarified

and perfectly maintained, since the result of failing to establish the neutral

power or vesting one of the active powers with the total sum of power

would be catastrophic. Whenever the representative assemblies hold such


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absolute power, they are prone to create arbitrary laws that are extended

to everything, including individual affairs. Whenever this amount of poweris invested in the executive power, it inevitably turns itself into a despot

(Constant 1988a, 185-186).

Thus, the dominant and recurring ideas in Constants political con-

siderations are his deep concern to promote and secure individual liberty

and the enjoyment of private affairs, and his obstinate insistence on the

absence of absolute power assigned to an individual or a group. His strat-

egy is to prevent the sovereignty of the people, regardless of its holder,

from becoming unlimited. Aware that such a principle can never stand

alone, Constant then establishes a system that constitutionally structures

political authority into two different powers, neutral power and active

power, and confines each of them to its own domain. By this systematic

strategy, Constant supports his basic claim of limited sovereignty with the

organization of governmental institutions. For Constant, the neutrality of

power and the organisation of government served to guarantee modern

interests in individual enjoyments and civil liberty. Thus, by the time he

wrote the 1819 text, Constant already had a complex system that estab-

lished the limited power of government over its citizens for the sake of

their private freedoms.

In the 1819 text, Constant argues that the enjoyment of individual

liberty requires modern citizens to exercise their political liberty, although

in a markedly different manner than the ancients (1988b, 323). Here,

Constant insists that the modern exercise of political liberty involves

modern citizens delegating their political tasks to their representatives ina representative system, with the representative system being an organi-

zation by means of which a nation charges a few individuals to do what

it cannot or does not wish to do herself (1988b, 325). It is a proxy

given to a certain number of men by the mass of the people who wish

their interests to be defended and who nevertheless do not have time to

defend them themselves (1988b, 326). It is clear from these statements

that Constant sets out to combine the modern demand of individual

enjoyments with the practices of political liberty, which guarantee the


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fulfilment of this demand by securing individual lives from arbitrary

power. He refuses, however, to succumb to Rousseaus demand of abso-lute political participation. Instead, Constant endorses a new way of exer-

cising political liberty, namely by entrusting it to a representative system.

The importance of this representative system consists in the fact that it

exercises the tasks of politics on behalf of the citizens, thus giving them

more time to enjoy their civil liberty and pursue happiness (Constant

1988b, 325).

As we have seen in Constants constitutionalism, besides the royal

power that is neutral, there are four active powers that deal with the gov-

ernmental affairs. One might ask, however, why Constant did not assign

the authority to act on behalf of the peoples political liberty to the other

two active powers, the executive (the ministries) and the judicial (the

tribunals). One possible reason for this is that the representative institu-

tion is responsible for enacting legislation, which means that such an

institution has direct access to preventing the promulgation of any laws

that overstep the boundaries of individual affairs. According to Constant,

the legislative institution can be expected to proliferate the number of the

laws to such an extent that they will ultimately encroach upon the private

lives of the citizens. Realizing this danger, Constant invokes the royal

power to prevent such imprudent proliferation with its authority to veto

or dissolve the institution (1988a, 194-195). Another reason for the

appointment of the representative institution to act on behalf of the

citizens is that its source is a popular election and thus its members are

supposed to represent the opinions of the citizens in a more or lessfaithful way (Constant 1988a, 201). Citizens, moreover, have the right

to petition, by which they can address their formal request to their

representatives.6 It is worth noting, nevertheless, that there are two

representative assemblies in Constants constitutionalism, namely the

hereditary and the elective assemblies. Although only the latter is elected,

both assemblies share the same basic legislative tasks and as a legislative

institution, their dissolution prevents them from exercising the imprudent

multiplication of the laws.


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Constant immediately realizes the disadvantages of surrendering all

the aspects of political liberty into the hands of the representative assem-blies. He foresees the possible encroachment of individual freedoms and

enjoyments in the tendency of the legislative assemblies to irresponsibly

proliferate the laws. But, as we have seen, he answers the problem by

invoking the dissolution of the said assemblies. There is, however, another

more serious danger. As such, this system could silently entice modern

individuals into locking themselves into their own private domains, while

at the same time gradually promoting the tyranny of the peoples elected

representatives.7According to Constant, modern individuals are prone

to falling into this potential pitfall because they are embedded in com-

merce and the pursuit of private welfare. They need this system of

representation to guarantee their right to pursue such individual happi-

ness and to protect them from the abuse of a despotic government. How-

ever, by rendering this system as an instrumental authority, it has the

potential to grow wildly into another despotic regime that would certainly

jeopardize modern individuals interests if its power is not restrained or

confined within its own jurisdiction.8

To combat these latent dangers, Constant adeptly demands that indi-

viduals keep a keen eye on the representative system. Understanding the

modern preference for economic affairs, he strategically endeavours to

capture the modern readers attention by referring to a financial example.

A rich man may employ a manager to take care of his finance in order to

save time for himself to do other things in life. But he will not let his

manager work unsupervised unless he is careless and stupid. Similarly, asthey have recourse to the representative system, modern individuals have

to constantly supervise this system so as to determine if the representa-

tives are executing the proxies bestowed on them by the people honestly

and justly. Moreover, Constant suggests that they have to reserve for

themselves, at times which should not be separated by too lengthy

intervals, the right to discard them [the representatives] if they betray their

trust, and to revoke the powers which they might have abused (1988b,


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326). Thus, while arguing in favour of the representative system in place

of ancient absolutism and republican arbitrariness, Constant consistentlyappeals to civic participation to exercise constant surveillance over the

system. According to him, the regular exercise of civic participation keeps

alive a vivid sense of political life among the citizens, while at the same

time keeping them away from being absorbed into the realm of political

apathy (1988a, 239).

Constants arguments can be summed up as follows: first, he endorses

modern liberty and to protect this liberty from arbitrary power, the latter

should be constitutionally limited. Second, he wants to unify the demand

for modern enjoyments and political liberty because he believes that the

private domain of modern individuals is secured by their exercise of polit-

ical liberty within the political domains. Third, modern individuals need

to delegate their political tasks to a representative institution to give them

more time to enjoy of their private interests. Fourth, given the potential

vices of the legislative assemblies, Constant insists on an active and inces-

sant control.

Going through these arguments, it is obvious that Constant is con-

sistent in his demand for the absence of absolute power, individual enjoy-

ments, and civil liberty. He is also clear in arguing for the indispensability

of political liberty practiced both by the members of the representative

assemblies and through civic participation to ensure the careful surveil-

lance of the said members. For Constant, the combination of the liberty

of the moderns and political liberty is essential because [i]ndividual

liberty is [] the true modern liberty. Political liberty is its guarantee,consequently political liberty is indispensable (1988b, 323). The role of

the representative assemblies is central in this combination, because their

members exercise most of the practices of political liberty, particularly

making laws and balancing the active powers of the executive and the

judicial authorities.

In his 1819 lecture, Constant proclaims at the outset that his investiga-

tion into the distinction between the liberty of the ancients and that of the


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moderns leads him to an interesting discovery, namely that this form of

representative system escaped the attention of the ancients.9Throughoutthe lecture, he maintains his admiration for individual liberty and the

absence of arbitrariness, declaring the guarantee of such liberty to be polit-

ical liberty. But his understanding of political liberty differs from that of

the ancients. For the ancients, freedom consists in the practice of political

liberty. The more time and energy man dedicated to the exercise of his

political rights, the freer he thought himself (Constant 1988b, 325). On

the contrary, Constant insists on the delegation of political affairs to a

representative institution so that the citizens are able to enjoy their privacy.

This does not mean that they are deprived of their political tasks. Instead,

Constant exhorts them to participate in political affairs by placing the

representative institution under constant surveillance.

The fact that Constant has claimed the centrality of this representa-

tive institution from the outset in his elaboration suggests that, for him,

the argument for balancing political and individual liberty is the spirit that

invigorates the unity of the text. Accordingly, the justification of the two

seemingly contradictory parts of the text as constitutive of the overriding

argument of the text does not exclusively depend upon the historical

approach. It is true, as argued by Holmes, that the historical approach

enlightens Constants motivation in championing modern individual

liberty in the first part of the text and Constants awareness of the danger

of individual emancipation from politics in its final part. But the unity of

the text is even more exposed to us if we see it as clarifying Constants

proposal to balance the demands of political and individual liberty throughthe system of representation.

V. BEYONDMODERNFREEDOMSANDSELF-INTEREST

Reflecting upon the rise of Napoleon as the First Consul, his becoming

the first French emperor in 1804, and on the ultra-Royalists influence in


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the legislature during the reign of Louis XVIII, Constant correctly suspects

that these absolute monarchies tended to absolutize their power and extendtheir prerogatives to private domains (Vincent 2000, 608). The people of

France readily surrendered their own freedom for an unguaranteed stabil-

ity and a despotic hand at the reins of government, because they had

grown weary of internal political turmoil and revolutionary war. Both the

military and the people fell into the hands of Napoleon as the latter gained

absolute power after his 1799 coup. By suppressing his critics, such as

Benjamin Constant and Madame de Stal, Napoleon established an empire

that was animated for the most part by the spirit of the Ancien Rgime.

Invoking the same spirit, the ultra-Royalists then gained majority power

during the reign of Louis XVIII and unstintingly disagreed with his con-

stitutionally mitigated monarchy. These monarchies ultimately abrogated

both political liberty and individual freedoms as they all focused on the

expansion of their absolute power and the relegation of their critics and

political oppositions to the margins. While abhorring these governmental

abuses against the people of France, Constant never allowed himself the

chaotic and violent path left by the excesses of the Terror.

Constant argued for modern self-interest against Rousseau and

Robespierre, who claimed that in the name of the good of society and

the general will people had to forfeit their personal gains and particular

will for a citizenship inspired by civic virtues. Realizing, however, that the

inertia of self-interest would invite egocentrism and, as a consequence,

absolute monarchy, Constant called for civic enthusiasm in political

affairs. Aware that this enthusiasm would be fragile and could be witheredaway either by passivism conditioned by absolutism, or by the excess of

self-interest10, Constant justifies his call for civic participation in political

affairs by appealing to another human basic characteristic beyond self-

interest, namely self-development.

Before elaborating on this sentiment, it is helpful to note that Con-

stants argument for political participation in government has two levels.11

Constant first claims that civic participation and the political liberty of the


20/26



people would guarantee individual freedom, private welfare, and personal

security from absorption into a despotic realm. In this way, politicalinvolvement is seen simply as a means to an end, namely the secure estab-

lishment of individual enjoyments and civil liberty. Constant writes,

Individual liberty, I repeat, is the true modern liberty. Political libertyis its guarantee, consequently political liberty is indispensable As yousee, Gentlemen, my observations do not in the least tend to diminishthe value of political liberty It is not security which we must weaken;it is enjoyment which we must extend. It is not political liberty which

I wish to renounce; it is civil liberty which I claim, along with otherforms of political liberty (1988b, 323-324).

In what follows, Constant was aware that the pull to the liberty of the

moderns at that time was much stronger than the pull of the idea of exer-

cising collective freedom in politics. This was due to the progress of civi-

lization, the achievements of modern industry, significant changes in the

nature of commerce, the circulation of commodities and money. These

dramatic changes in the life of the moderns overturned the political pow-ers that were at the centre of the ancients spirit, thus leaving wealth as a

power which is more readily available in all circumstances, more readily

applicable to all interests, and consequently more real and better obeyed

(Constant 1988b, 325). Referring to the absolutism of Napoleon and the

Bourbon Restoration, however, Constant identifies the critical risk inher-

ent in the modern fascination for personal freedom and individual welfare.

As the moderns let themselves be captivated by such a fascination, a per-

son or a group would insistently encourage the modern fascination for

personal wealth and liberty and would thereby slowly gain the political

power needed to serve their despotic desire (Constant 1988b, 326). This

despotic regime would in turn endanger individual freedom and wealth.

To consolidate its power, a despot has to lure modern individuals into the

trap of self-interest because an individual captured in the pursuit of private

enjoyment will be more attracted to the immediate commercial gains than


21/26



the ideal of politics. As a result, from the perspective of such an individual,

political involvement or participation becomes unimportant and dispens-able. In order to circumvent the rise of a dictatorship, therefore, Constant

insists on civic participation in political affairs as a guarantee for securing

private happiness and enjoyment.

However, Constant immediately realizes the weakness of his instru-

mental argument for civic activism, namely that it cannot singlehandedly

awaken modern individuals from their civic slumber, overwhelmed as

they were by their fascination for modern economics. He then resorts to

questioning the purpose of human life. Indeed, he admits that people

need and enjoy prosperity, but this alone cannot articulate the whole

definition of being human. If people do not look beyond private enjoy-

ment, they run the risk of undermining morality, renouncing civic activi-

ties, and setting noble desires aside.

I bear witness to the better part of our nature, that noble disquietwhich pursues and torments us, that desire to broaden our knowledge

and develop our faculties. It is not to happiness alone, it is to self-development that our destiny calls us; and political liberty is the mostpowerful, the most effective means of self-development that heavenhas given us. Political liberty, by submitting to all the citizens, without exception,the care and assessment of their most sacred interests, enlarges theirspirit, ennobles their thoughts, and establishes among them a kind ofintellectual equality which forms the glory and power of a people(Constant 1988b, 327).

Appealing to self-development as the elevated aim of human life, Con-

stant then combines his first instrumental argument of political liberty

with his more constitutive argument of its nature. In the latter, political

liberty is not only a political means to protect private wealth. Constant

seems to suggest that political liberty is part of our being human. Holmes

sees this as Constants appropriation of the Aristotelian idea of individuals

being political animals (1984, 42). Although Constant does not elaborate


22/26



further on the issue in the 1819 text, it is interesting to see how he tries

to formulate a more solid argument for justifying the significance of polit-ical liberty. By constituting political liberty as part of being human,

Constant makes clear his intention to balance the demand of individual

freedoms and that of political participation. For him, both are constitutive

of the lives of individuals. Exercising political liberty and enjoying indi-

vidual freedoms properly lead citizens to the establishment of their own

dignity. This constitutive argument for political involvement justifies its

indispensability in the course of human life. In this way, Constant appro-

priates this particular element of the ancients liberty, not as an instrumen-

tal supplement to the liberty of the moderns, but as a constitutive part of

being human as well as citizens.

From the discussion above, Constant seems to suggest that both

individual freedoms and political liberty are essentially related to two fun-

damental characteristics of individuals, namely self-interest and self-devel-

opment. For Constant, individual freedoms and enjoyments are the

expressions of the individual need for self-interest. Acknowledging their

significance for individuals self-preservation, Constant immediately sees

that they can be abused by arbitrary power. To prevent this abuse,

Constant appeals to the exercise of political liberty and finds his justifica-

tion for it in another human basic character or sentiment, namely self-

development. K. Steven Vincent regards Constants appeal to self-devel-

opment in the final part of the 1819 text as his turn to the romantic

sentiment, which had already preoccupied Constant in his early writings

(2000, 625-637). Some have suggested that Constants idea of self-devel-opment has its root in his works on religion.12More specifically, Tzvetan

Todorov demonstrates that, according to Constant, religious sentiment is

one of the expressions of the human capacity to transcend oneself. With

this self-transcendence, humans are able to go beyond their pursuit of

self-interest, to develop themselves in search of meaningfulness (2009,

280, 283-284). Bryan Garsten further claims that Constants work on

ancient religion indicates the insufficiency of self-interest to articulate the


23/26



nature of human goodness and thus insists on individuals self-develop-

ment, which inspires them to defend their liberty (2009, 289-290). Garstenmentions three ways in which religious sentiment, which is related to the

human quest for self-development, suits modern liberal politics: it defies

the hierarchical status of priests; it censures intolerance; and, it ensures

the weakness of the obstinate pursuit of self-interest (2009, 302). In these

three ways, Garsten sums up what Constant tries to emphasize, namely,

the security of individuals private sphere and the insufficiency of self-

preservation. Given the centrality of self-development in Constants

works on religion and politics, it is obvious that while defending the

practice of civil liberty and the enjoyment of individual wealth, he never

surrenders the exercise of political liberty and civic participation, the

justification of which he finds in the very nature of human sentiment, that

is, self-development.

VI. CONCLUSION

This paper has argued that understanding the 1819 text from a historical

perspective is useful but cannot explain the complexity of Constants

arguments. The elaboration of the historical backgrounds against which

the two parts of the text were written demonstrates in fact that Constants

1819 text emerges from his concern for and reflection on French political

conditions as he experienced them. Although such an elaboration testifies

to Constants acute perceptiveness in relation to the political context inwhich he lived, it does not uncover the thrust of his argumentation in

defending modern freedoms, while keeping individuals away from the

dangers of political apathy. Constants adamant insistence on the balance

between the liberty of the ancients and that of the moderns, between the

enjoyment of individual freedoms and political liberty, is the leitmotif that

characterizes the unity of the two seemingly contradictory parts of the

text. To see how he defends both the enjoyment of individual interests


24/26



and the practice of political liberty, it is necessary to recognize the nature

of the representative assemblies in Constants constitutionalism and tocharacterize his appeal to self-development as the justification of the

practice of political liberty.

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dic/Politics/Republique/Constitution/1815-Acte%20additionnel.htm [accessedMarch 28, 2010].Berlin, Isaiah. 2003. Freedom and Its Betrayal: Six Enemies of Human Liberty. Edited by

Henry Hardy. London: Pimlico.Berlin, Isaiah. 2008a. Introduction. In Isaiah Berlin: Liberty. Edited by Henry Hardy,

3-54. New York: Oxford University Press.Berlin, Isaiah. 2008b. Two Concepts of Liberty. In Isaiah Berlin: Liberty. Edited by

Henry Hardy, 166-217. New York: Oxford University Press.Constant, Benjamin. 1988a. Principles of Politics Applicable to All Representative

Governments. InPolitical Writings. Translated and edited by Biancamaria Fontana,170-305. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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328. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Constant, Benjamin. 1988c. The Spirits of Conquest and Usurpation and Their Relation

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Capaldi. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund. On Received Ideas About the Scope of Polit-ical Authority. http://oll.libertyfund.org/title/861/108853 [accessed March 25,2010].

Constant, Benjamin. 2003c. Principles of Politics Applicable to All Governments.Translated byDennis OKeeffe. Edited by Etienne Hofmann. Introduction by Nicholas Capaldi.Indianapolis: Liberty Fund. On the Principles to Replace Received Ideas on theExtent of Political Authority. http://oll.libertyfund.org/title/861/108873[accessed March 25, 2010].


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Dennis OKeeffe. Edited by Etienne Hofmann. Introduction by Nicholas Capaldi.Indianapolis: Liberty Fund. On Political Authority in the Ancient World. http://

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Moderns. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Miller, David. 1991. Introduction. In Liberty. Edited by David Miller, 1-20. New York:

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NOTES

1. I would like to express my gratitude to the three reviewers of this text for reading andoffering their critical comments and suggestions. I am also grateful for input from the participants

in the International Colloquium In Search of a Lost Liberalism, at the Institute of Philosophy,

Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Belgium.

2. For example, Kalyvas and Katznelson 2008, 146; Vincent 2000, 636-637; and Berlin

2003, 51.

3. More specifically, Helena Rosenblatt argues that Constant did not change his political

beliefs after 1795. She writes: Constant denounced arbitrary government and defended the main

accomplishments of the early phase of the Revolution: civil, equality, representative government,

and legal safeguards protecting the rights of the individual (2008, 122).


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4. However, Berlins reading of Constant, which considers him as the one who prized

negative liberty beyond any modern writer, is mainly based on Constants Principles of Politics

Applicable to All Governments, in which he championed the limited government ideal while repeat-

edly endorsing civil liberty, individual freedoms and enjoyment in the text (Berlin 2008a, 38;

Berlin 2008b, 209-211; Galles 2005, 104). In his review, Galles seems to be in agreement with

Nicholas Capaldi that the centre of Constants elaboration in Principles of Politicsis articulating and

securing liberty (Galles 2005, 103; Constant 2003a, Introduction).

5. In his Principles of Politics Applicable to All Governments(1806-1810), Constant had already

begun his elaboration of the difference between the liberty of the ancients and that of the moderns

(Constant 2003d, On Political Authority in the Ancient World). He makes further allusion to this

differentiation in a shortened version in The Spirits of Conquest and Usurpation and Their Relation to

European Civilization (1814), particularly from chapter 6 to chapter 9 (Constant 1988c, 43-167).

Holmes indicates this in his n. 1 (Holmes 1984, 270).

6. Cf.Acte additionnel aux constitutions de lEmpire de 1815, Art. 65.

7. These are Constants own words quoted in Kalyvas and Katznelson 2008, 154.

8. In his Principles of Politics of 1815, Constant lists the vices of assemblies when they are not

kept within the limits they cannot transgress (Constant 1988a, 195-196).

9. Constant observes that there are writers who, according to him, wrongly claim that the

Lacedaemonian government and the regime of the Gauls had already practiced a system of

representation. In the former, the ephors, who were elected by the people and supposed to defend

their interests, turned out to be an insufferable tyranny. By the same token, the regime of the

Gauls privileged the priests, the military class, and aristocracy over the people, leaving them

completely vulnerable to exploitation and malicious oppression. Constant admits, however, thatthere were feeble traces of a representative system in Rome with the establishment of the

tribunes of the plebs, which granted the people the opportunity to exercise most of their political

tasks directly (Constant 1988b, 309-310).

10. Constant wrote, [c]haracters are still too small for the spirits, they are worn down, as

the body, by the habit of inaction or by the excess of pleasure. Quoted in Vincent 2000, 627.

11. This point is suggested by Holmes and I am simply following his reconstruction. See

Holmes 1984, 40-43.

12. For example, Garsten 2009, 286-312; Garsten 2010, 4-33; and Todorov 2009, 275-285.

However, it needs to be mentioned that Helena Rosenblatts Liberal Values: Benjamin Constant and

the Politics of Religiongives Constants works on religion their deserved attention.

Documents

Benjamin Constant