Bernard Williams on Ethical Theory

A Study of Bernard Williams' Critique of Ethical Theory

and its Implications for doing Moral Philosophy

Ivo R. Kreft

A thesis submitted to the Department of Philosophy

in conformity with the requirements for

the degree of Master of Arts

Queen's University

Kingston, Ontario, Canada

January 1998

copyright 8 Ivo R. Kreft, 1998

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Abstract

This thesis will evaluate the effect Bernard Williams' critique of

ethical theory has on moral philosophy, and defend the view that although

Williams has shown the inadequacies of theory, moral philosophy cm still

enquire into the nature of ethics and produce substantive results. In his

ethical writings Williams develops a picture of ethical life which makes us

aware that the very nature of ethics makes theory an impossible enterprise.

But even if theory is inadequate as a descriptive and prescriptive device to

deal with ethical life, this need not be the end of moral enquiry and moral

philosophy. One still can enquire into the nature of ethical life and come

up with answers which can both be informative and guiding.

Briefly put, Williams' position is that of a theory agnostic: he is

sceptical about theory, but does not reject it outright. As he

programrnatically says: "... 1 want to Say that we can think in ethics, and in

al1 sorts of ways, unless Our histoncal and cultural cirumstances have made

it impossible - but that philosophy can do little to determine how we

should do so" (Ethics and the Limits of Philosophv, p. 74). Williams'

ethical thought shows that one thing that moral philosophy can certainly not

do is to give a defensible ethical theory.

1 want to argue that even though Williams has shown ethical theory

to be inadequate, it is still legitimate and worthwhile to enquire into the

nature of ethical life. In fact, Williams' characterization of ethical life is

not merely negative: on the one hand he shows that ethical theory cannot

do justice to ethical life. At the same time, he makes positive statements

about the ethical. These make us aware of what rnatters in ethics, and from

this we cm draw a general framework for proceeding in ethical thinking,

evaluating and acting. 1 will conclude that Williams' picture of ethics gives

us an outline of what the ethical is about and thereby gives us a framework

for ethical thought and practice.

Grau, teurer Freund, i s t alle Theorie,

und grün des Lebens goldner Baum.

J.W. von Goethe

Acknowledgements

Queen's was superb, since here 1 found a perfectly open, tolerant, diversified, and supportive academic environment, which made for two fruitful, enriching, and enjoyable academic sessions. The rest of my Canadian experience was rather diverse, as it must be

the case when for two years one lives in a society with different values, social conventions and dynamics, historical experiences, and gender relations - in other words,

in a society with a different world perspective.

There have k e n far too many people who were part of rny life during the production of this thesis, and who dl, in their own way, meant support and inspiration. To do justice to them would take the space of an M.A. thesis on its own. Below, I want to thank those who to a

particular extent helped me to produce this piece and contributed to my thinking and king during this time.

Special thanks to:

Dad, for his wisdom, for letting me do what I needed to do, and much else,

my mother, for providing the material ground for my philosophy studies,

my sister, for al1 her pieces of practical wisdom,

Prof. Leighton. for his untiring support, willingness to supervise a thesis even under adverse circumstances, his encouragement, his calm and wise counsel, and his

philosophical inspiration,

Prof. Macleod, for king a patient second reader, and his abiiity to see what matters,

Prof. Bakhurst, for his encouragement and practical guidance,

Simone, for king a good friend,

Caro,

Alex, for the odd game of pool,

Hen Baier, for putthg me into gear at the right moment,

Hem Bischoff of the ïngenieurbüro Herbert Bischoff & Partner, for smoothing my way into the 'practical worfd' (which non-philosophers, though not he,

tend to cal1 the 'real worfd'),

Matthias Guterl, Anch Nuetz, and Werner Mourek for general moral support, and for teaching me what 1 needed to survive.

Tu Lyn

Table of Contents

1 . Introduction

2. Positions defined

3. Williams' 'Style' of Critique

4. Williams' Critique

5. The End of Theory

6. Moral Philosophy Thereafter

Summary and Conclusion

B ibliography

Vita

1. Introduction

This thesis is about Bernard Williams' critique of ethical theory, and

the room it has left for moral philosophy. More specifically, it is about

certain observations which Williams makes about ethical life and which

imply a criticism of or limitation of theory. 1 want to argue that although

Williams' critique has made theory an unfeasible endeavour, moral

philosophy can legitimately enquire into the nature of ethical thought and

practice and corne up with substantial statements which may facilitate

deliberation, aid argumentation and guide action. Even after the demise of

theory, philosophical enquiries into ethical life not only are legitirnate,

worthwhile and useful, but also can give us a framework for proceeding in

ethical deliberation and action.

In developing Williams' view of the ethical and critique of theory, 1

will draw from Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (henceforth ELP),

where the most extensive critique is to be found, and some of his ideas in

other works, notably his essays M o r a l i t y (M) and

A Critique of Utilitarianism (U), and his collection of articles in

Moral Luck (ML).

The thesis develops as follows. In the second chapter 1 will

introduce Wiliiams' position and contrast it with the view 1 want to defend.

As an appendage to this (and a preparation to the following chapters), I

will comment on Williams' peculiar style of criticizing theory. In the

2. Positions defined

Bernard Williams' Position "... 1 want to Say that we can think in ethics, and in d l sorts of ways,

unless Our historical and cultural circumstances have made it impossible -

but that philosophy can do little to determine how we should do so"

(ELP: 74). This claim is at the heart of Bernard Williams' book Ethics

and the Limits of Philoso~hv. Bernard Williams shows philosophy its

limits: one place philosophy ends is where ethics begins. The reservations

which Williams voices against ethical theory, and the picture of the ethical

which Williams develops imply that no universal perspective in moral

philosophy exists which could tell us what is rîght or wrong, good or bad,

or which could discem moral values for us or arrive at ethical judgements.

A certain kind of truth has no place in moral philosophy: those which

transcend time and cultures when it concems the question of how to reason

mordly, e.g. the question of what are legitimate or illegitimate moral

reasons, what is a good or bad moral argument, how moral dispute or

dilemmas could be solved or in what foundations (if there are any) moral

reasons could be grounded. Taken thus far, Williams' analysis of ethics

implies that the mord philosopher has nothing to Say in Our quest for an

invariable boundary between right and wrong.

At first, this standpoint might appeal (except to those who get

womed about their salary in moral philosophy departments). Why should

cold rational thought have the power to te11 us what is right or wrong,

good or bad? In Morality Bernard Williams expresses similar concerns,

when he writes:

If there were such an activity as deducing substantial moral conclusions from a priori premises, trained philosophers might reasonably be expected to be rather specially good at it; but there is not, and the fact that if there were, then professional philosophers would stand a specially good chance of being informed about morality, is itself one of the good reasons for thinking that there could not be such an activity. (emphasis his, M: x-xi)

Leaving the explicit mention of "a priori premises" aside, and

interpreted in a more general way, which blends in with the rest of

Bernard Williams' thought, this passage expresses scepticism about the idea

that philosophy could Say anything substantial about ethics; because if that

were the case, then philosophers would be in a privileged position to make

substantial moral judgements - a daunting prospect.

On the other hand, Williams does emphasize two aspects which fonn

a natural part of Our ethical life: confîict and reflectioni. But if there is

conflict, we seek to resolve it; and if there is reflection, it has a certain

kind of structure rather than another, and a specific conclusion rather than

another. It would be obvious to ask, then, which kinds of considerations

would be ethical and thus legitimate to appeal to when searching for a

solution to conflict or when engaging in reflection. Can argument and

[cf. M, p. iv: "...moral conllict is a basic fact of morality". As to refiection: In a way, the whole book of Ethics and the Limits of Philosophv arises out of the fact that reflection is part of our ethicai iife, and the desire to show it its appropriate place within ethicai iife. See esp. ELP, ch. 1.

reflection have any results which stretch beyond the particular situation

they refer to? These questions could be answered by a theory. I t seems

that Williams abandons us halfway through the desert. By denying moral

theory as an adequate device to arrive at moral solutions, and by only

acknowledging conflict and refîectioti as natural aspects of our ethical life,

then without fuller development, we have no direction where conflict-

resolving and reflection may (morally) lead to.

Definitions of Ethical Theory In order to gain a better understanding of why Williams is critical of

ethical theory, we must become clearer what the object of his attack is.

Williams forms his concept of what an ethical theory is in various passages.

Most broadly conceived, ethical theories are

philosophical undertakings and commit themselves to the view that philosophy can determine, either positively or negatively, how we should think in ethics ... (ELP: 74)

Less vaguely, he further elucidates:

A theory that combines views on what ethical thought is and how it should be conducted, with substantive consequences of conducting it in that way, is a positive ethical theory. (ELP: 73f.)

'Substantive consequences' of ethical thought determined by theory

can take the shape of a general test, as the following passage elucidates:

An ethical theory is a theoretical account of what ethical thought and practice are, which account either implies a general test for the correctness of basic ethical beliefs and principles or else implies that there cannot be such a test. (ELP: 72)

The most specific definition of ethical theory, however, we find in

an earlier work. In the preface of Moral Luck Williams defines theory

thus (and rejects it in the sarne move):

There cannot be any very interesting. tidy or self-contained theory of what morality is, nor, despite the vigorous activities of some present practitioners, can there be an ethical theory, in the sense of a philosophical structure which, together with some degree of empincal fact, will yield a decision procedure for moral reasoning. (emphasis added, pp. ix-x)

These various definitions of ethical theory differ in their precision,

in that 'can determine' and 'substantive consequences' are broader than

committing ethical theory to delivering 'a general test for ... basic ethical

beliefs and principles' or even 'a decision procedure for moral reasoning'.

What al1 definitions of ethical theory have in common, however, is that

ethical theory implies, some way or other, that "philosophy can

determine ... how we should think in ethics." In other words, an ethical

theory claims to be able to tell us what is right, what is wrong, and what

we ought to do. The 'general test' conception of ethical theory implies that

a "positive ethical theory" would provide a test to evaluate (basic) moral

beliefs, judgements, rules, principles, practices, institutions, actions, and

characters as right or wrong, good or bad, just as Kantianism,

utilitarianism and contractudism do.

We should note Williams' distinction between a "positive"z and a

"negative" kind of ethical theory. A "positive ethical theory" "combines

views on what ethical thought is and how it should be conducted, with

substantive consequences of conducting it in that way" (ELP: 74). A

"negative ethical theory", in contrast, would deny the possibility of such a

test. About negative ethical theory Williams wntes:

Some views about the content and nature of ethics, however, imply that there are no tests. The most extreme of these views says that holding an ethical position simply consists of choosing one and sticking to it. There seems to me good reason to cal1 that an ethical theory too, a negative one. (ELP: 74)

And further:

It is this negative option that philosophers usually had in mind when in the past they said that philosophy could not determine how we should think in ethics. (ELP: 74)

According to common usage, Williams' 'positive ethical theory' is

referred to as 'ethical theory' (or 'moral theory') simpliciter, whereas

'negative ethical theory', i.e. a theory on the nature of ethical thought

which implies that philosophy has no Say in determining right and wrong,

is comrnonly referred to as 'anti-theory'.

Bernard Williams' position is of a third kind, namely

When I use this qualification ("positive") in the foilowing, so this is only to maintain consistency with Bernard Williams' use, and to make clear which kind of 'ethical theory' is under consideration. If 1 Say "ethical theory" or "moral theory" (simpliciter) 1 mean "positive etbical theory" in Williams' sense.

a theory about the nature of ethical thought that leaves open the question whether there could be such tests. One may be fairly convinced and definite about the account to be given of the ethical, and remain sceptical about the chances of there being these tests ... That is the kind of account 1 give in this book, and there is point in not calling it an ethical theory. (emphasis his, ELP: 74)

In other words, Williams supports neither positive nor negative

ethical theories which either supply or categorically deny moral tests, but

he leaves the question open as to the possibility of such tests. He is sceptical

about their possibility but does not reject it outright. He prefers this

position not to be called an 'ethical theory'. In a different terminology,

Williams is neither a moral theorist nor an anti-theorist.

Bernard Williams takes a 'third way' (and one may be forgiven for

seeing this as one of 'sitting on the fence'). He does not endorse the view

that philosophy could determine how we should think in ethics, nor does he

go along with the view that "philosophy could not determine how we

should think in ethics" (emphasis added, ELP: 74).3 His third way is one

of maintaining that "philosophy can do little to determine how we should

do so [Le. think in ethics]" (emphasis added, ELP: 74).

Given this position, we must ask two questions. First, why is it that

philosophy can only do little to determine how we should think in ethics?

This query points us to Williams' critique of ethical theory. And second,

what is it that philosophy can Say about "how we should think in ethics",

even if it is oniy "little" that it can Say about this subject matter? Williams

does not answer these questions in any structured way, but he occasionally

3This position as formulated in Ethics and the Limits of Philosopb is more cautionary than the one which Williams voiced in Moralitv, where he expresses one-sided scepticism about the possibility of moral theory: "There is no reason why moral philosophy, or again something slightiy broader, slightly narrower, called 'value theory', should yield any interesting self-contained theory at dl." (M: xüi)

drops a few hints and signposts about what he thinks ethics is about (more

about this in chapter 6, but see also above-given references).

My Position 1 am in agreement with Williams that ethical theory no longer is a

defensible project. His observations about ethical life generally and the

deficiencies of ethical theory specifically leave ethical theory not enough

ground (this conclusion will be reached in chapter 5). However, this does

not imply that moral philosophy cannot contribute anything to our ethical

discourse. 1 want to argue that despite Williams' critique there will be

legitimate philosophical enquiries into the ethical which will conclude in

statements which will give some structure to the ethical discourse.

It is true that ethical life is more complex than any ethical theory

could ever accommodate, and features many phenomena which have not

been adequately described by any theory proposed so far. Up to this point,

I am in agreement with Williams. However, conflict and reflection (as

Williams points out) are part of our ethical life. That is, sometimes we

engage in reflection (by Our own choosing) and wonder what is the right

thing to do, and why. At other times, we are in disagreement as to what is

the right thing to do and try to give support to Our own view, e.g. by

drawing cornparisons to similar situations or appealing to certain sorts of

considerations ("this will hurt her"). In these sons of situations we are

looking for a structure in ethical thought and practice. We are asking for

some guideline, some general principles, even if only rough-and-ready

ones. Once these have been distilled, they could help to distinguish

legitimate and illegitimate moral reasons, and likewise good from bad

moral arguments, moral reasons from prejudice.

What we can leam frorn Williams' critique is that because of the

complexity of ethical life, ethical theory, as defined by Williams, is

inadequate to answer these questions. Anything one can Say about the

ethical must lirnit itself to dealing with this subject matter 'in general and in

outline' (as Aristotle envisages the right kind of approach to ethics, cf.

Nicornachean Ethics, 1094a25, 1094b20). The most we can expect is to

give a framework of the ethical, to Say in general and in outline what the

ethical is about. Within these confines, it may be possible to Say what

usually is right or wrong, in what foundations moral reasons, generally,

can be grounded, and to give an outline of what is foundational to moral

thought and talk. In fact, 1 would go as far as to Say that what Williams

says about the ethical (scattered across various places) suffices to draw a

picture of the ethical which will give some structure to ethical reflection

(which does not stand in contradiction to his objections to ethical theory;

more about this in chapter 6). His observations on the ethical not only

imply a critique of ethical theory, but also tell us, by virtue of

philosophical analysis, what matters in ethicai life. From this we can draw

when we reflect on ethical reasons, right and wrong, and even can extract a

rough outline of the ethical.

3. Williams' 'Stvle' of Critiaue

Before getting to Williams' critique itself, 1 want to comment on

Williams' 'style' of criticizing ethical theory (and, incidentally, of

describing the ethical), which not only is unusual in itself, but also telling

about his general misgivings concerning theory. One strategy of criticizing

ethical theory characteristic of Williams is his arguments from the

situations of decision-makers. By this 1 mean his acute observations and

very fine descriptions of specific experiences and aspects of ethical life,

especially from the viewpoint of the agent involved in the situation. He is

an expert in recognizing people's sophisticated ethical sentiments and

reactions, in pinpointing what is ethically relevant to us, for instance, as he

puts the spotlight on integrity, grounding projects, or the ethically

unthinkable.

Having characterized these, theory is put to test. Since the

phenomena Williams has portrayed are ethically important to us in some

way, theory has to measure up to them: "How does theory relate to this?

Does theory (any theory we know so far) accommodate this phenomenon?

Can it be squared with theory or does is run contrary to it?" In this way

Williams shows that most ethical theories offered so far (utilitarianism,

Kantianism, contractualism) do not adequately deal with the depicted

phenomenon.

For example, Williams tells a story about a pacifist who is

confronted with a situation in which he can avert some greater evil by

killing one person. This case is meant to illustrate the importance of

'grounding projects' (in this case: the cornmitment to not killing) in our

lives, something which allegedly utilitarianism cannot accommodate. At

another point we are introduced to a lorry driver who accidentally runs

over a child. Although the ciriver bears no moral fault for this incident, he

feels qualms and compunction. This kind of guilt, however, is alleged to

be something that Kantianism cannot account for. (Williams' observations

on ethical life and their implication for particular ethical theories will be

andyzed in more detail in the following chapter.)

One of the consequences of this peculiar style of showing the

shortcomings of ethical theory is that it is impossible to summarize

Williams' 'argument' against ethical theory: there is no self-contained

argument, just various distinct observations and insights, loosely centred

around the idea of agency. Williams raises several concems and objections

against ethical theory; he offers this or that observation to the reader for

consideration, and spells out which implications it would have to the

possibility and meaningfulness of ethical theory . Williams' style of criticizing theory and portraying ethical life is

only a natural consequence of the nature of his subject matter: ethics. In a

way, Williams' 'style' is a correlate to the nature of ethics. He works very

hard to appreciate and bring forward the complexity of ethical life.

Whatever issue he picks (internalism. integrity, the ethical unthinkable, ...),

it is only one glimpse of the entirety of ethics, only one tiny part of the

whole issue. Ethical life has a multiplicity of aspects, which are different

from one another, but still interrelated. Williams' way of describing

ethical life corresponds to its very nature: a web of different thoughts,

related to one another, which are part and parcel of the same thing, like

reflecting the different facets of one and the sarne object.

In the following section we will have a close look at some of these

Williamesque observations on ethical life and realize how they set standards

for theory, and how they show theory to be insufficient.

. Williams' Critiaue

Introduction In this chapter we will have a look at those key-ideas of Williams'

ethical thought which are most relevant to the issue of ethical theory. Why

and how they are relevant to ethical theory will become clear during the

discussion of each element. The ideas will be presented fairly separate

from each other, for two reasons. First, there is Williams' style of writing

about ethics, as 1 observed in the previous section. As has just been pointed

out, he does not have 'a critique' or 'one argument' against theory. Rather,

his misgivings about theory are a loose collection of ideas and observations

on ethical life (the impartial point of view, internalism, the ethically

unthinkable, ...), each of which poses a new problem to the 'standard fare'

of ethicai theory (utilitarianism, Kantianism, contractualism). Second, the

interconnectedness of the various ideas is not relevant for the issue at hand.

Williams' ideas on ethics set certain demands on theory - the relation

between these ideas is not important in this respect. However, there is one

central insight in Williams' ethical thought which is reflected by al1 of these

ideas, separate though they seern. It was mentioned before, and it will be

developed at the end of this chapter, namely that Williams makes us

repeatedly aware that the ethical point of view cannot ignore the point of

view of the individual person. Williams reminds us that the unique

position the agent occupies has moral importance.

The object of this part of the thesis is mainly expository. It is not the

aim of this thesis to analyze and evaluate Williams' points critical of ethical

theory in themselves, or rather his observations on ethics which imply a

critique. These observations, e.g. the ethically unthinkable, 1 will accept

without criticisrn on my part. On the whole, they seem valid to me. The

object of the thesis is to analyze the implications which Williams'

observations - as a whole - have for ethical theory, whether or not they

leave ground for ethical theory, and what kind of thinking will be possible

for moral philosophy thereafter. 1 will take the picture which Williams

draws of ethical life to be defensible, and have a look at the consequences it

has for ethical theory and moral philosophy.

Grounding Projects We will start with a concept of Williams which he formulates as

early as in his 'Critique of Utilitarianism': grounding projects. The

grounding projects of an agent are of such importance to his life that they

corne prior to most other ethical demands. Grounding projects ("first-

order", or "lower-order projects" in Williams' terminology) can be, for

example,

obvious kinds of desires for things for oneself, one's family, one's friends, including basic necessities of life, and in more relaxed circumstances, objects of taste. Or they may be pursuits and interests of an intellectual, cultural or creative character. (U: 1 10)

What specifically in each case a grounding project is, depends

entirely on what the agent is comrnitted to, and can include commitments to

people, activities, things or special causes. Fairly common examples of

these would be a comrnitment to one's partner, friends, and one's children;

to a political, social, religious, or humanitarian cause; to the creation of

works of art, or the pursuit of certain enquiries; to a career, or the

serious execution of one's profession. Since grounding projects entirely

depend on what is most important to the agent, they c m also comprise

more exotic commitments, such as a cornmitment to one's pets or the

guarding of a holy shrine. Essential to al1 these various foundational

persona1 projects is that they are central to the agent's lifel, forming part

of its meaning and essence, constituting part of his identity. In Bernard

Williams' words, actions stemrning from persona1 projects are actions the

agent "is identified with ... as flowing from projects and attitudes which in

some cases he takes seriously at the deepest level, as what his life is about"

(U: 116).

Since grounding projects are very much what a person's life is about,

they corne prior to any ethical demand. On Williams' view, ethics cannot

sensibly require us to sacrifice these basic commitments, because to do so

would be to undermine the possibility of leading a meaningful life, and

without a meaningful life we also would have no reason to be ethical. In

other words, grounding projects are part of leading a meaningful life, and

leading a meaningful life is a prerequisite of having any reason to do

anything at all, including to act ethically. If ethics were to run counter to

grounding projects, it would take away its own foundation, thus

lit should become clear that in this context 'having a life' or 'leading a life' is meant in a specific, loaded sense, which goes beyond the mere Living of a biological life.

annihilating itself. Therefore, grounding projects corne pior to ethics, and

ethics must give them their due weight. Any ethicai demand requiring the

agent to forego her grounding projects would at the same time take away

any reason for the agent to follow the demand. No matter how you tum it,

ethical requirements cannot go against the foundational commitments of the

agent; rather, the ethical must fit in with those commitments.

As a corollary of this conclusion, it follows that ethics cannot include

general obligations which, depending on the specific circumstances, issue

specific obligations for the agent to fulfil. If that were the case, if ever-

present general obligations plus specific circumstances lead to particular

obligations, then we would be constantly under the demand of those general

obligations, and again, the possibility of a life of Our own to lead would be

taken away. But giving up tak about obligations in general does not mean

that we have to abandon completely the concept of obligation. There is still

room for specifc obligations arising from the particular circumstances -

and just that. These need not be (and for the reasons given cannot be)

supported by underlying general obligations. And they would still leave

the possibility of a meaningful life, which grounds the following of any

obligations at al1 (ELP: ch. 10, esp. pp. 180-82).

The Unthinkable The concept of grounding projects is closely linked to Our next

consideration about the ethical: considerations regarding 'the morally

unthinkable', about which Bernard Williams writes in 'A Critique of

Utilitarianism':

It could be a feature of a man's moral outlook that he regarded certain courses of action as unthinkable, in the sense that he would not entertain the idea of doing them ... further, he might equally find it unacceptable to consider what to do in certain conceivable situations. (U: 92)

If, for example, in a situation in which two of one's closest relatives

are fatally trapped, one could rescue at most one of them by sacrificing the

other, this kind of situation would ask one to decide and do the

'unthinkable'. Again, some situations and decisions might be unthinkable

for some people but not for others. Whether a specific scenario is

unthinkable or not depends on the outlook of the agent. Very often, the

unthinkable would involve going against, or foregoing one's grounding

projects. Unthinkable situations have in common, however, that

they are situations which so transcend in enormity the human business of moral deliberation that from a moral point of view it cannot matter any more what happens. (loc. cit.)

Not only will it 'not matter any more what happens' in the situation,

but also thereafter. A person having gone through, having been forced to

decide upon the unthinkable will probably be crushed. His life will have

gone to pieces, any meaning from it vanished. Having had to decide, for

example, which one of one's parents or children to sacrifice, does not leave

much to live for. Just as having to go against one's grounding project, so a

life shattered by the unthinkable rnight no longer leave any purpose, any

direction in the person's life: he no longer could 'go on'.

The unthidcable places limits on what morality can demand from an

agent, and also puts limits on the sphere of moral reasoning from an

agent's point of view. An ethics having an answer to each and every

conceivable situation, disregarding what might be unthinkable for the agent

(as utilitarianism and Kantianism, for example, do) would be, in Williams'

words, "insane". It therefore has to take the agent's point of view into

account, and this is just another aspect in which morality has to give center

stage to the individual agent.

The Impartial Point of View The two previous facets reflecting how the individual viewpoint of

the agent matters to morality recur in and support the next theme: there is

no impartial point of view in moral matters. As the previous

considerations (grounding projects and the unthinkable) have made

apparent, ethical reasoning from an impartial, universal, impersonalized

vantage point would not leave enough room for, would not satisfactorily

account for, the individual agent. Thus the moral point of view is not the

impartial point of view. The absurdity of an impartial viewpoint in moral

matters cm be developed through a number of steps and several passages in

Williams' writings.

In Ethics and the Limits of Philosophv (pp. 108- 1 1 1) Williams

rnakes the point that there is an unbridgeable gap between the impartial and

the individual moral point of view. Moral dispositions (for example,

cornmitment to one's friends and farnily, seeing certain actions as right or

wrong, and many of our moral experiences, such as a feeling of

obligation, guilt, compunction, horror, etc.,) as "seen from outside" are

simply not the same as they "seem from the inside" (ELP: 108). From an

extemal point of view, such as utilitarianism or contractualism adopt, these

dispositions have merely an instrumental value: they "are seen as devices

for generating certain actions" (ELP: 108). The owner of these

dispositions, by contrast, does not see them instrumentally in any way, but

rather they fonn part of, or even structure, her view of the world. To

her, these dispositions are valuable in and of themselves, and not merely as

devices for bringing about certain other states of affairs.

For the impartial theorist, however, utilitarian justifications for non-

utilitarian dispositions are possible, and so there opens an "uneasy gap ... between the spint of the theory itself and the spirit it supposedly justifies"

(ELP: 108). Ethical accounts assuming the impartial point of view use

certain artificial constnicts to support moral evaluations which from the

inside point of view stand on their own. For example, utilitarianism would

employ the happiness-maximizing formula, and contractualism certain

hypotheticai situations leading to contracts between individuals, to anive at

moral conclusions such as that murder is wrong, rape is abhorrent, or

inflicting pain for the fun of it is loathsome. From the inside point of view

it is obvious that these kinds of acts are morally wrong; from this

perspective, rational and impartial considerations, as they are employed by

impersonalized accounts of morality, are not needed, and are very alien

indeed.

Hence, the inside and the outside point of view are not just different

perspectives on the same thing, or two different sides of the same coin, but

are totally and utterly different. And so it is "artifkial to suppose that a

thorough commitment to the values of friendship and so on can merely

alternate, on a timetable prescribed by calm or activity, with an alien set of

reflections" (ELP: 109).

Williams goes further than that: not only is the gap between the

'insidet and the 'outside' point of view unbridgeable, but the 'outside' point

of view on moral matters is simply not possible. The idea that ethical

concems could be constructed from the ground up, from an impersonal

point of view separated from the lived life, is mistaken. Even "theoretical

reasoning of the cool hour" is always informed by "a sense of the moral

shape of the world." Without such a given 'sense', without grasping from

the 'inside' point of view the truth of moral values as immediately given,

theoretical reasoning has nowhere to start from, nothing to reflect upon.

More fully,

The belief that you can look cntically at al1 your dispositions from the outside, from the point of view of the universe, assumes that you could understand your own and other people's dispositions from that point of view without tacitly taking for granted a picture of the world more locally familiar than any that would be available from there; but neither the psychology nor the history of ethical reflection gives much reason to believe that the theoretical reasonings of the cool hour can do without a sense of the moral shape of the world, of the kind given in the everyday dispositions. (emphasis added, ELP: 1 10)

In sum, the impartial point of view is mistaken not just because it

does not leave enough room for the individuality of the agent, or because it

cannot capture the very essence of moral dispositions and is irreconcilably

divorced from the 'inside' point of view, but the whole idea of the

possibility of such a view is mistaken, because impartial reflection always

has to take ethical concerns as given, before it can start to reflect upon

Reductionism Bernard Williams criticizes two different types of reductionism, for

two different reasons. Reductionism is the attempt by theories to reduce

the plurality of considerations we normally employ to some one principle

which explains all. For instance, contractualism argues that the wealth of

ethical considerations we use (like well-being, honesty, faithfulness,

charity) al1 stem from a common source: hypothetical contracts agreed

upon by the parties under certain, ideal conditions. There are two types of

reductionism, descriptive and theoretical. Descriptive reductionism tries to

show that we actually take the various concepts we use to be equivalent

(ELP: 16). Theoretical reductionism tries to show that the various

concepts we use stem from a common - if only underlying - source

(ELP: 17).

Reductive projects trying to give a descriptive account of ethics are

misguided, because

We use a variety of different ethical considerations, which are genuinely different from one another, and this is what one would expect to find, if only because we are heirs to a long and complex ethical tradition, with many different religious and other social strands. (ELP: 16)

Reductionism aiming to provide a theory of ethics, on the other

hand, is equally rnisguided, if only for the obvious reason that "if there is

such a thing as the tmth about the subject matter of ethics ... why is there

any expectation that it should be simple?" (ELP: 17) The attractiveness of

reductionism will further be broken if one understands that the motivation

behind it rests on a mistaken assumption. Our cirive towards reductionism

is so strong because we want to be able to weigh different ethical

considerations against one another, for example

than betraying loyalty, and we assume that

whether lying is worse

these different ethical

considerations can only be compared and weighed against one another if

they can be derived €rom (be reduced to) one cornmon, underlying

principle. This assumption, however, is completely misguided, as, for

example, "aesthetic considerations can be weighed against economic ones"

and likewise one can compare a "job, holiday, or companion with another"

without refemng to a common standard (ELP: 17). Therefore, different

ethical standards can be incommensurable without it being impossible to

weigh them against one another: there is no need for such standards to be

'reduced' to a single more basic standard.

Instead of striving for reduction, we should acknowledge the

complexity of ethical life, and hence, philosophy's task would be to

understand that complexity without simplifying or reducing it; and in

doing so, "perhaps we need as many concepts to descnbe it as we find we

need, and no fewer" (ELP: 17).

Interna1 and External Reasons Williams' internalism is important to ethical theory, though it is not

necessarily a criticism of ethical theory. Internalism is not aimed at

undermining ethical theory (is not the kind of objection which points at the

impossibility of ethical theory) as such, but only restricts ethical theory;

Le., it implies what we can legitimately expect of an ethical theory, what

kind of ethical theory makes sense, what sort of requirements an ethical

theory has to fulfil. If ethical theory aims to offer reasons for action, then

it has to recognize the distinction between internal and extemal reason

statements and realize that only internal reasons can make a valid claim on

an agent. Thus we must understand what the difference is between intemal

and external reason statements, why only internal reason statements can be

valid, and what implications this has for theory.

In "Intemal and External Reasons" (in Moral Luck, pp. 101-1 13)

Bernard Williams analyzes reason statements of the form 'A has a reason to

phi' or 'There is a reason for A to phi', which have two different sorts of

interpretation. On the 'internal' interpretation, "the truth of the sentence

implies, roughly, that A has some motive which will be served or furthered

by his phi-ing" (ML: 101). On the 'external' interpretation, "there is no

such condition, and the reason-sentence will not be falsified by the absence

of an appropriate motive" (ML: 101). The terms 'internal reasons' and

'external reasons' are only meant as short-foms for these two different

types of reason statements.

"The simplest model for the internal interpretation would be this: A

has a reason to phi iff A has some desire the satisfaction of which will be

served by his phi-ing" (ML: 101). More generally speaking, "any model

for the internal interpretation must display a relativity of the reason

statement to the agent's subjective motivational set, which 1 shall cal1 the

agent's S" (ML: 102). The elements in S are not restricted to simple

desires, but also include "such things as dispositions of evaluation, patterns

of emotional reaction, persona1 loyalties, and various projects, as they may

be abstractly called, embodying commitments of the agent" (ML: 105).

Extemal reason statements are distinct from internal reason

statements, because "they can be true independently of the agent's

motivations" (ML: 107). Independently of what the agent's existing

motivations are, the extemal reason statement makes the claim that there is

a reason for the agent to phi. On Williams' view, this is why the external

reason theonst runs into a special problem here, because "nothing can

explain an agent's (intentional) actions except something that motivates him

so to act" (ML: 107). Therefore a connection must be found between an

external reason statement and the agent being motivated to act in

accordance with the reason statement, if the reason is to have an effect, Le.

bring about a change in the activity of the agent. In the interna1 case, the

connection between the reason statement and the agent's motivation is

straightforward: the reason is related to the agent's subjective motivational

set (his existing motivations). But it is the very nature of an external

reason statement that it does not connect to the agent's existing motivations.

Since an external reason statement alone cannot explain the agent's

action, something must be found to explain how the agent cornes to be

motivated to follow the reason statement. Something would be needed to

connect an external reason statement to the agent's motivation to act in

accordance with that statement. Williams surnmarizes this dilemma and

offers a solution thus:

So something else is needed besides the truth of the external reason statement to explain action, some psychological link; and that psychological link would seem to be belief. A's believing an extemal reason statement about himself may help to explain his action. (ML: 107a)

The extemal reason theorist thus must affirrn that coming to believe the

reason statement also induces in the agent the motivation to act in

accordance with it. Therefore, the external reason theonst is committed to

the following set of conditions under which the agent comes to have the

motivation:

[Tlhat he should deliberate correctly; and the extemal reasons statement itself will have to be taken as roughly equivalent to, or at least as entailing, the claim that if the agent rationally deliberated, then, whatever motivations he originally had, he would corne to be motivated to phi. (ML: 109)

If so, the extemal reason theorist is comrnitted to the claim that, given

correct deliberation, the agent will acknowledge the tmth of the extemal

reason staternent, and by the same token acquire the motivation to act

accordingly, no matter what his original motivations were.

This is where Williams sees the fundamental weakness of external

reason statements,

[flor, ex hypothesi, there is no motivation for the agent to deliberate from, to reach this new motivation. Given the agent's earlier existing motivations, and this new motivation, what has to hold for external reason statements to be true, on this line of interpretation, is that the new motivation could be in some way rationally arrived at, granted the earlier motivations. (ML: 109)

But if the new motivation would bear a rational relation to the

earlier motivations, then "an intemal reason statement would have been

true in the first place" (ML: 109). Therefore, Williams concludes, "al1

external reason statemtents are false" (loc. cit.), and "the only real claims

about reasons for action will be internal claims" (ML: 11 1). In the

extemal case, the agent has no reason to phi, no amount of deliberation

could estabiish a reason for him to phi, and it is not irrational for him not

to phi. Thus, "the only rationality of action is the rationality of internal

reasons" (ML: 11 1).

The final conclusion of al1 this is that there is no such thing as a

'reason for action, period'. It is wrong, or at least misleading, to talk

about 'a reason to act', because if it is a reason at all, then it is only because

it is a 'reason for this particular person to act'. In short, there are no

'reasons tout court', but only 'reasons relative to an agent'.

What significance does internalism have for ethical theory? One of

the aspirations of ethical theory is to be action-guiding, i.e. to tell us what

we ought to do. Typically, an ethical theory offers reasons for its

prescriptive statements: for example, an 'ought' is prescribed because it

maximizes happiness, or pleases God, or would be part of a contract

reached under conditions of uncoerced and informed consensus. Reasons

offered to ground an 'ought' nccd not be restricted to a single one, for

example an action could be proscribed because it would involve both

murder and treason. But whether one or several reasons are offered in

defense of an ought, the relation remains essentially the same: it is bi-

directional, i.e. if 1 question either the ought or the reason, 1 will also

question the other.

Important for Our examination is the case where one questions the

reason offered for the 'ought', which implicitly undermines the ought-

statement. Of course, 1 could have a different reason backing the same

ought-statement - but having another reason would be a pure coincidence

and would do nothing to uphold the theory whose reason offered for the

ought was questioned. For instance, if pleasing God is not a reason for me

to help the poor and underprivileged, then either 1 happen to have another

reason to do it, or else 1 simply have no reason to help the poor and

consequently won't do it.

In the case where my acting diverges from the theory's

prescriptions, the reason offered by the ethical theory is not a reason for

me to do phi, and I'm not motivated to do phi on account of that reason.

This illustrates how ethical theory is prone to the strictures of intemalism.

The conclusion of the analysis of interna1 and extemal reason statements

was that a given reason is only a reason for me to act if it makes contact

with my subjective motivational set, i.e. my existing motivations. If the

reason provided by the ethical theory to back up the ought bears no

connection to my existing motivations, then (unless 1 accidentally have a

different reason to act in accordance with the ought-statement) 1 have no

reason to follow the ought-statement. No amount of deliberation (that does

not connect to my existing motivations) can establish that 1 should follow

the ought nonetheless, and there is no other force which could reinstate the

ought.

The critical point for any ethical theory is that 'reasons for action'

are never 'reasons tout court', but only 'reasons relative to an agent'. If

the ought-statements issued by an ethical theory are to have any force at d l ,

then there must be a reason for the agent to follow the prescriptions. In

other words, for an agent to have a reason to follow an ethical theory, this

theory must appeal to his existing motivations. Otherwise the 'ought'

prescribed by an ethical theory loses its force and the agent has no reason

at ail to act in accordance with the theory. This shows what ethical theory

can and cannot do. If an agent has reason to follow an ethical theory, this

is only because he is already suitably motivated to follow it; more

s p e ~ ~ c a l l y , there are elements in his subjective motivational set to which

the theory can comect and which lead him to follow it. Ethical theory, to

be of any relevance for a given agent, is dependent on what kind of

motivations this agent already has. Ethical theory cannot draw anyone

within its concerns. If the reasons offered by an ethical theory do not

already speak to the agent's subjective motivational set, then there is no

argument or kind of deliberation which one (or the theory) could offer to

make the theory relevant for the agent.

To sum up. Williams' analysis of interna1 and external reason

statements does not undermine the possibility of ethical theory, but draws

further limits within which - if possible at al1 - ethicai theory can work.

It makes clearer what ethical theory can and cannot do, what we reasonably

can expect of ethical theory.

Even in cases where the person already is concerned to do the

morally right thing (and deliberates rationaily), the reasons offered by an

ethical theory to support its prescriptions might fail to convince him. As

we have seen, this is not a shortcoming or peculiarity of ethical theory, but

a matter of the nature of reasons - more specifically, of what counts as a

reason for a given person. The statement 'X is a reason for him to phi' can

only be true if X indeed is a reason for him to phi, i.e. he sees, recognizes,

finds X to be a sufficient reason to be motivated to phi. This presupposes

that there is something about X which appeals to him, which he can relate

to, which rnakes contact with his subjective motivational set. X can only

count as a reason for him to phi, because he already is appropriately

motivated, because he cares about something which X stands for. Whether

X is a reason for him to phi essentially depends on what he brings into the

equation, whether there is something in h i s existing motivations, concems,

and commitments that X can connect to.

Deliberation, or argumentation, can terminate in a reason for action

only insofar it establishes a Link between the given reason X and the agent's

subjective motivational set. Argumentation cannot make a (supposed)

reason weigh for an agent if it cannot Iink that reason to the agent's

existing motivations. He cannot be argued into caring about X if X is not

already part of his universe of wants and concems. If X is not a reason for

him this need not be a failure of Our argument or of his rationality, but is

simply a failure of X relating to what is important to him.

Al1 this is a limitation for ethical theory as much as it is a relief.

Limitation and relief are the two sides of the same coin: the impossibility

of finding universal reasons, i.e. reasons which would persuade every

rational person, regardless of his motivational set, to follow the theory's

precepts. No ethical theory could offer such reasons, and thus it cannot be

a test for ethicai theory whether it has found such reasons. An ethical

theory can be a guide and standard only to those in whose subjective

motivational set there already are concerns which relate to the reasons the

theory appeals to in support of its guidelines. Whether an ethical theory is

convincing is not simply a matter of rationdity untouched by motives. It is

neither a failure of an ethical theory nor of the rationality of the agent if

the theory fails to persuade him. The explanation may simply be that the

theory does not offer reasons to which the agent can relate.

The Ethical vs. The Moral The ethical versus the moral is a distinction important to Bernard

Williams' understanding of moral philosophy and theorizing. Williams

observes that there are two domains of Our ethical thought and talk which

we refer to when we talk about the ethical and the moral respectively,

whereby the moral domain is only part of the ethical domain. This

observation implies that "moral philosophy" - if it makes the claim of

dealing with ethical life as a whole, and being able to give guidance on

what to do - has its proper domain in the ethicai, and perhaps should be

renarned as 'ethical philosophy'. If theory, as a product of philosophizing,

makes the claim to being conceived in the light of ethical life as a whole,

and to answer the question "What ought 1 to do?", then, theory, too, has to

be answerable to the ethical, not the moral. Independently from the issue

of theory, the distinction ethicaVmora1 gives us a more complete

understanding of the picture which Williams draws of the ethical and the

peculiar emphasis it puts on the perspective of the individual. For these

reasons we now have a look at how this distinction is drawn, and what it

implies.

In his works before Ethics and the Limits of Philoso~hv, Williams

uses 'moral' and 'ethical' as roughly equivalent terms. For example,

Moralitv is an essay on the nature of morality and ethics together without

distinguishing the two. In the Limits, however, Williams starts to

recognize and formulate a difference between these two terms. The

difference between the moral and the ethical finds its most explicit

formulation in the following passage:

Here and earlier 1 have mentioned "moral" considerations, using that word in a general way, which corresponds to what is, irremovably, one name for the subject: moral philosophy. But there is another name for the subject, "ethics", and corresponding to that is the notion of an ethical consideration. By origin, the difference between the two terms is that between Latin and Greek, each relating to a word meaning disposition or custom. One difference is that the Latin term from which "moral" cornes emphasizes rather more the sense

of social expectation, while the Greek favors that of individual character. But the word "morality" has by now taken on a more distinctive content, and 1 am going to suggest that morality should be understood as a particular development of the ethical, one that has a special significance in modem Westem culture .... From now on, therefore, 1 shall for the most part use "ethical" as the broad term to stand for what this subject is certainly about, and "moral" and "morality" for the narrower system, the peculiarities of which will concern us later on.

1 shall not try to define what exactly counts as an ethical consideration, but 1 shall Say something about what goes into the notion of the ethical. It does no harm that the notion is vague. It is in fact rnorality, the special system, that demands a sharp boundary for itself (in demanding "moral" and "nonmoral" senses for words, for instance). This is a function of its special presuppositions. Without them, we can admit that there is a range of considerations that falls under the notion of the ethical, and we can also see why the range is not clearly delimited. (ELP: pp. 6f.)

Though this passage presents us the clearest formulation of the

ethicallmoral-distinction which can be found in the Limits, it still falls

short of an explicit definition of these two terms. The one is "broad" and

"vague", the other is "narrower" and "demands a sharp boundary for

itself'. 1 shall try, with the help of other passages in Williams' writings

and my own examples, to show how the distinction is motivated, what the

distinction is, and why it is appropriate. 1 shall then explain what relevance

it has for ethical theory, and why it supports the maxim that the ethical

viewpoint cannot ignore the viewpoint of the individual human agent.

Williams introduces the ethicallmoral distinction in response to two

strands of thought and concerns in Our ethical life. 'The moral' is

identified with a certain strand of ethical thought which is particularly

predominant in modem Western culture. It is narrower than, and only a

subsystem of, 'the ethical', which is much ncher, and includes many more

aspects of Our ethical thinking, feeling and practice than the mord system

acknowledges. 'Broad' and 'narrow' do not give us an exact definition, but

rather an idea of the difference between the two realms. My reading of

'broader' is that the ethical is more inclusive than the moral, which means

that the ethical includes the moral and much else beyond the mord. Both

the ethical and the moral claim to represent our ethical life, ethical thought

and talk, reflection and practice, but the moral in fact includes only a

limited section of Our ethical life. This has two consequences: First, the

moral can be mistaken to represent al1 of ethical life, and when so

conceived it is dangerously misleading. Second, it is far easier to draw a

line between what is 'inside' or 'outside' of the moral (Williams reminds

us that there are 'moral' and 'nonmoral' senses for words). In contrast, the

ethical is erhical life as a whole, and as such cannot demand "a sharp

boundary for itself '.

This is in line with what Williams says in Moralitv about this subject

matter, namely that it has no proper territory, and that it is impossible to

draw a line between what still belongs to it and what no longer belongs to

it. (There, while he made the clairn about the lack of a naturd territory,

he did not distinguish yet between the ethical and the moral. From what

Williams says about morality in Moralit~ we can gather that its equivalent

is the ethical, and not the moral, as characterized in the Limits. - More

about the idea concerning a 'natural territory' later on in this chapter.)

The moral cuts only a limited section out of ethical life. In

particular, it focuses on notions of duty and obligation (ELP: 7);

acknowledges only a 'universal concem' (ELP: 14); and emphasizes social

expectation as one of the forces behind the mord (ELP: 6). The following

three examples will make clear that our ethical thought, language, and

practices are far more rich and complex than the moral acknowledges.

They also illustrate that it is difficult to draw a neat boundary around the

ethical, defining what is part of it and what is no longer part of it. The

first example is given by Williams himself with direct reference to the

ethicallmoral distinction; the second example is meant to illustrate two

types of concerns which Williams associates with the ethical and the moral,

namely local loyalties and universal concem respectively; the last exarnple

illustrates when a person's feelings leave the moral, and enter the ethical

plane.

In "Interna1 Reasons and the Obscurity of Blame" (Logos 10,

1989: 1-1 1) Williams notes a difference between the ethical and the moral.

For example, one partner to the bank robbery may min it by an idiotic mistake and be blarned by his companion for the fact that they are in jail. His companion is not invoking the system of morality and does not think that this was an offense against moral canons. Nevertheless, there is something in the idea that the failure that is being blamed has some kind of ethical dimension to it. When the failure is explained, it seems that for blame to be appropriate, there must be some generally reprehensible characteristic involved in the explanation: the agent must have been careless or lazy or self-sewing or something of the sort. (Logos 10, 1989: p. 6)

Williams observes that the "ethical dimension" of blame is not

restncted to "moral canons" or the "system of morality". 'Ethical blame',

or blame which alludes to ethics, goes beyond moral blame. In this

example, for the blame to have an ethical dimension, it is enougb if the

action were "careless or lazy or self-serving", i.e. had some "generally

reprehensible characteristic" to it. Ethical blame can be appropriate even

if it has no moral grounding, and it can be voiced by non-moralizing

people, which again is an instance where the ethical is broader, more

inclusive, than the moral.

The second illustration relates to a passage in which Williams draws

the contrast between the ethical and the moral in terms of the scope of

concem they allow for: how wide the circle is of people that are included

in one's considerations.

1 have touched on considerations of egoism and on considerations that go outside the self - of benevolence, for instance, or faimess. But there is a question that has proved very important to ethics of how far outside the self such considerations should range. Will it count as an ethical consideration if you consider the interests and needs only of your family or of your community or of the nation? Certainly such local loyalties have provided the fabric of people's lives and the forum, it seems right to Say, of ethical life. However, there are some ethical demands that seem to be satisfied only by a universal concern, one that extends to al1 human beings and perhaps beyond the human race. This concern is particularly cultivated by the subsystem morality, to the extent that it is often thought that no concern is truly moral unless it is marked by this universality.

For morality, the ethical constituency is always the sarne: the universal constituency. An allegiance to a smaller group, the loyalties to family or country, would have to be justified from the outside inward, by an argument that explained how it was a good thing that people should have allegiances that were less than universal. ... At a more everyday level (a less reflective one, the moral critic would say), the location of the ethical can move from one side to another of a given contrast. (ELP: 14)

An exarnple will make clear how local and universal types of

concems are related to the ethical and the moral respectively. Parents

naturally feel a higher concem for their own children than for the children

of their friends, neighbours, or those of anybody else, and consequently

wili focus their tirne, energy and resources on the well-being of their own

children. Typically, they will rather pay $100,000 for the education of

their own child and thereby enhance its opportunities and chances of

personal fulfilment, than put the money into a fund which could pay the

food, shelter, basic medical care and essential education for several

children in Bangladesh from infancy to adulthood. If they put the money

into their own child's education, then they were guided by a 'local loydty';

if they would raîher divide the money and distribute it such that many

other children too get an education (and their own child a less high-quality

one), then they would give primacy to a 'universal concern'.

The ethical, according to Williams, allows for such local loyalties

and sees them as justified in their own right. Local loyalties are

independent of, just as important as, and just as much a part of Our ethical

life as universal concems. The two types of concem are two complements

of Our ethical concerns for other fellow human beings. The comrnitment

to one's own children, and the desire to do good for other children, will

both be present in an ethically receptive person, and might be difficult to

harmonize at times, but neither is derivable from the other. Yet the moral

does not allow for this ambivalence. From the vantage point of the moral,

the universal concern is primary, and local loyalties are only derivable

from it. For utilitarianism, for instance, everybody's interests weigh the

same - indiscrirninately - and the aim is to maximize the happiness of the

greatest number of people. If any comrnitments to family or friends, i.e.

local loyalties, are acceptable within the utilitarian framework, then they

are so only because the general happiness is greater if we have these

loyalties than if we dont. From the moral point of view, the direction is

one-way: local loyalties are justified on grounds of a universal concem -

rather than bidirectional: the ethical viewpoint can move from one side to

another.

In 'Moral Luck' Williams introduces us to the "lorry driver who,

through no fault of his, runs over a child" (p. 28). The sentiments of this

driver are of an ethical nature because rnorality cannot account for them.

Morally, he has done no wrong and is blameless, provided he has kept the

speed limit, driven carefully, kept his eyes on the road, etc. We cannot Say

"You ought to have acted differently", and there is no nom, convention or

any mores that he has broken. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that this will be

the end of the matter for him and that he will have no after-thoughts.

Naturally, he will be concerned about the incident, not just in the way of

feeling sony for the parents, but aiso in tenns of his own involvement in

the calarnity. We would try to reassure this man of his blamelessness, but

at the same time would feel uncornfortable if he did not need this

reassurance and took the accident lightly. There appears to be a paradox:

this man has not broken any canons of morality, and yet he will feel badly

(and be expected to feel badly) about his involvement in the accident.

Williams' answer to this apparent paradox is that this sentiment is not the

result of a demand of the moral system, and cannot be cashed out in moral

terms. The concerns of this man are of an ethical nature.

Al1 these cases exemplify the contrast between the ethical and the

moral, in that they highlight an aspect of our ethical life that the moral

system does not account for: the persona1 commitments of parents to their

children are alien to the moral, universal point of view; the compunction

felt by the lorry driver is of an ethical nature, because he is free of any

mord fault; the cornplaint of the bank robber shows that blame can have

an ethical dimension though it is non-moralizing. From this we have to

conclude that the ethical is broader, more inclusive than the moral.

Outside of the moral system (if we take utilitarianism, Kantianism, or

contractualism to be typical representatives) there are ethical concerns,

actions, and sentiments which morality cannot tie into its system, yet which

are an integral part of Our ethical life.

Ethical theory, to make an adequate claim on describing ethical life

and being able to give guidance, must be careful not to restnct itself to the

moral. Since the moral cuts only a limited section out of the ethical

material of our life, 'ethical' theory which would be modelled according to

the moral, would equally be limited (and better be called 'moral theory').

For instance, utilitarianism has placed prime weight to the universal

concem, and Kantianism bas taken duty and obligation to trurnp al1 other

ethical concerns and inclinations. Any ethical theory which would

sirnilarly bracket off local concerns or inclinations (and other ethical

concerns and sentiments) as ethically relevant features in their own right,

would equally fail to be able to give adequate guidance. Thus in shaping

theory, one must be careful not to limit oneself (though it is tempting) to

the moral material or give it more weight than the ethical, but pay attention

to the richness of ethical life.

How is al1 of this related to the idea that the ethical viewpoint cannot

be independent of the viewpoint of the individuai human agent? Let us

start with the contrast between local loyalties and universai concems. The

moral sees a universal concern as the right attitude towards Our fellow

human beings, and persona1 commitments only as a derivative of this

universal concem. The ethical allows for local loyalties side-by-side with

universal concems. To acknowledge local loyalties as ethicaiiy relevant is

to acknowledge that the point of view of the individual, who feels these

loyalties, is ethically relevant; in other words, that the ethical viewpoint is

inherently intertwined with the viewpoint of the individual human being.

Two of the three illustrations concerning the ethical/moral

distinction dwell on the contrast between how an agent who is involved

(intentionally or not) in the doings and outcome might feel about the

situation, and how an uninvolved outsider might feel. Parents feel more

strongly that their money ought to be used for their children's benefit than

an outside, impartial administrator does. The lorry driver whose truck ran

over a child occupies a standpoint different from that of anybody else not

causally involved in the accident. The ethical concerns and sentiments these

people have are tied to the peculiar standpoint they occupy.

To that extent, these examples of the ethical/moral-distinction once

more support the claim that the ethical viewpoint cannot ignore the

viewpoint of the individual hurnan being. A full understanding of the

ethical thoughts and emotions of the people involved in those situations has

to give due consideration to the particular standpoint they occupy. Because

of their position, their sentiments and the ethical demands they impose

upon themselves are different from those of anybody else. To recognize

this is peculiar to an ethical (as opposed to a moral) perception of the

situation. Thus, shifting between an ethical and a moral perspective on the

situation once again makes us aware that the ethical viewpoint is inherently

intertwined with the viewpoint of the individual agent.

That Morality has no Natural Territory One of the central tenets of the essay Morality is the clairn that

morality has no natural territory. It follows from this that one cannot

constmct a moral theory by trying to delimit what the ethical is about.

Further, any self-contained moral theory (whether it is derived from a

clear and limited conception of the ethical or not) will be inadequate since

it assumes that morality has such limits.

One could offer a general argument to arrive at a denial of any

definite territory of morality; something like the following. It is a

tautology to Say that ethical thought is concemed with the Good.2 It is thus

a vacuous statement, as long as 'the Good' is not specified. And filling out

this placeholder is, indeed, a problem.

At first sight, what can fa11 under the conception of the Good seems

without boundaries. What people value can Vary widely. They might be

concemed (morally) with happiness, well-being, a virtuous life, pleasing

God, self-realization, tmthfulness, authenticity ... there is almost no end.

To give another example: Williams includes a Protestant outlook as a

"moral outlook", even though its "aim is rather that life should mirror, in

suffering and obedience, man's deplorable condition" (M: 84). He fùrther

notes that "men do ... find value in such things as submission, trust,

uncertainty, risk, even despair and suffering" (M: 87). So the ethical is

concerned with the pursuit of the Good, but what can fa11 under the Good

has a broad spectrum; therefore there are no strict boundaries to what the

ethical can be about.

2It is a tautology because to Say that "Evil, thou shalt be my good" is not to turn ethicai thought up-side-down, but o d y the specific content of what one considers to be good - and that is, in this case, the opposite of what is commonly considered as such.

Apart from this general argument, there are more direct attacks by

Williams on any project to delimit the moral. In chapter seven of Morality

the failure to circumscribe the ethical is illustrated with a concrete

example: Afistotelianism, as it tries to found morality on considerations

about the 'distinguishing mark of man'. On Williams' reading of Aristotle,

reason is distinctive of human nature, and since this is essential to being

human, the good life for man is considered to consist in the development of

this high and distinctive power. Williams criticizes the attempt thus to

delimit the temtory of morality and to derive substantial moral directives

€rom considerations about the distinctive characteristics of human nature

on several grounds, notably by pointing out that a considerable degree of

evaluation has already flown into the selection of what counts as

characteristic of human beings. The Aristotelian enterprise (in this

version) thus begs the question.

In chapter nine of Morality, Bernard Williams then scrutinizes the

view which takes "a reference to human well-being as a mark of a moral

position" (M: 80). This project to draw a boundary around the moral,

again, fails, because there are moral outlooks (such as a Protestant or a

Romantic one) intelligible to us which make no reference to well-being

whatsoever. What people can find value in is too broad, too complex, to be

confmed between any determinate Lirnits.

On the whole, then, morality has no natural, no definite territory.

By the same token, this rules out that there could be a self-contained moral

theory, or even any framework of moral thought.

Agent-Centredness of Williams' Ethical Thought It has been mentioned before that Williams' observations and

descriptions, objections and concems, ideas and insights are loosely centred

around the idea of agency, and so is the previous collection of Williams'

ideas on ethics. 1 want to expand this idea a bit more.

One may Say that Williams puts the agent back on centre-stage in

ethics. Ethical life, ethical evaluation and ethical action are intertwined

with, start from, and cannot get off the ground without the agent's very

own individual sentiments and valuations. It seems obvious to Say this,

especially after studying Williams' observations on ethical life (in

particular grounding projects, the ethically unthinkable, internalism), but

utilitarianism and Kantianism have ignored it. Utilitarianism, as standardly

understood, claims that there cm be a universal perspective, not dependent

on any particular person's point of view, a sort of 'view from nowhere',

from which moral evaluation is possible. Indeed, utilitarians claim that it

is the very essence of a moral perspective not to be tied to anybody's

idiosyncratic point of view, to be impartial, to see things from a standpoint

well above and looking down on the action. It is the point and aim of

utilitarian evaluation not to be agent-contingent. Kantians, likewise, aim to

make moral judgement independent of any particular agent's perspective.

Moral evaluation and advice hinge upon a rationalist maxim, which can be

comprehended by every rational person, issues the same moral imperatives

to every person and must be followed by every moral being.

Williams' 'program' for ethics stands in direct contrast to this. His

analysis of the ethical implies again and again that the individual person, as

evaluator and agent, plays a central role in ethical life. More specifically,

it means that the individual's peculiar position, social relations, grounding

projects, aspirations, desires, interests, loyalties (generally: the agent's

subjective motivational set - as discussed before) have moral importance

and flow into - or rather, in part constitute - ethical evaluation.

Grounding projects make us aware that moral imperatives may not stand in

opposition to what is most important to a person, that moral imperatives

become non-sensical if they contradict what is most important to a person

in his life. The ethically unthinkable shows that moral contemplation

cannot stretch beyond the horizon of human sanity, that moral options and

choice are limited by what the individual - both as a human being

generally, and as a particular person - can sanely contemplate. The

irnmediate implication of Williams' analysis of internal and extemal reason

statements is that ethical reasons, to move anybody at ail and count as

reasons at all, must hook on to the agent's existing motivations. Reasons,

including ethical ones, cannot exist independently of anybody's motivations.

Again, the ethicai is tied to the individual's sentiments and concems.

Ali of this implies that the ethical is not independent of the individual

agent who evaluates and acts. Even more than that: the ethical is

intertwined with the individual person, it cannot get off the ground without

the ethically concerned person. Ethics starts from the agent, cannot be

described independently of the agent, and consequently ethical evaluations

and imperatives must take the individual, whom they concem, into account.

In this regard, Williams puts the agent back on centre stage in ethics.

5. The End of Theorv

Williams' Critique makes Ethical Theory unfeasible Considering these elements of ethical life, it seems Williams has

indeed buried ethical theory for good. An ethical theory, as defined by

Williams, simply is incompatible with the above-given insights and

observations. As we saw earlier (in chapter 2), Bernard Williams'

position in Ethics and the Limits of Philosophv is one which endorses

a theory about the nature of ethical thought that leaves open the question whether there could be such tests [Le., general tests for the correctness of basic ethical beliefs and principles]. One may be fairly convinced and definite about the account to be given of the ethical, and remain sceptical about the chances of there being these tests. ... That is the kind of account 1 give in this book, and there is point in not calling it an ethical theory. (emphasis his, ELP: 74)

And later on he says,

I want to Say that we cm think in ethics, and in al1 sorts of ways, unless Our historical and cultural circumstances have made it impossible - but that philosophy can do little to determine how we should do so. (ELP: 74)

We can now see that Bernard Wiliiams, in fact, does not leave open

the possibility of there being any positive ethical theory. The position he

acnially occupies is stronger than the one he oficially declares.

In the course of searching for and analysing some of the central ideas

which Bernard Williams puts forward against ethical theory we became

clear about the demands which any account of ethics would have to answer

- and these demands, in effect, make any "positive" moral theory

impossible. Any account of the ethical would have to give the individuality

of the agent a central position. Specifically, grounding projects and the

'unthinkable' would limit the demands which morality sensibly can make.

An account of ethics cannot possibly be given from the impartial, or

universal point of view. It would have to capture, or at least leave room

for, al1 the complexity of ethicd life; so any simplifications or misguided

reductions would disqualify an ethical account immediately. Further, it

may not be Iimited to the merely 'moral' sphere of our ethical life, and, to

have any impact on the agent at all, it must connect to his existing

motivations. Finally, since 'the ethical' occupies no definite territory, any

account of it must be careful not to impose artificial limitations on it.

In chapter 2 we had a look at what Williams understands an 'ethical

theory' to be. According to the broadest conception, an ethical theory

implies that " philosophy cm detemine.. . how we should think in ethics"

(ELP: 74), or "combines views on what ethical thought is and how it

should be conducted, with substantive consequences of conducting it in that

way" (ELP: 73f.). The two most substantial definitions demanded of an

ethical theory imply "a generai test for the correctness of basic ethical

beliefs and principles" (ELP: 72) or even "a decision procedure for moral

reasoning" (M: ix-x).

Asking for a 'decision procedure for moral reasoning' is the most

exacting demand one can make on an ethical theory, since it means

something like an algorithm: a description of the situation, together with

the theory, will exactly determine what one ought to do. Since this

definition of ethical theory was taken from the preface of Moral Luck, one

of Williams' earlier works, perhaps for Our purpose we should maybe take

the conception of ethical theory, as forwarded in the Limits, to be binding.

For Williams' conception of theory in the Limits will have developed and

matured, and theory is a central issue in the Limits in a way in which it is

not in Moral Luck.

The two conceptions of theory first mentioned are more vague than

the definition making a 'general test' the deciding criterion for theory.

Requiring an ethical theory to deliver a 'general test for the correctness of

basic ethical beliefs and principles' is more precise, more demanding than

just requiring it 'to determine how we should think in ethics' or requiring

it to imply 'substantive consequences of conducting ethical thinking'. Since

the 'general testt-conception of ethical theory is more precise and more

demanding than the other two, and includes them, 1 will make it the

decisive definition of e thical theory. Moreover, Williams himself

emphasizes the availability of a 'test' to be crucial to theory. On page 74

in the Limits he repeatedly couches his scepticism concerning philosophical

ethics in terms of the possibility of tests (see above-given quote).

Therefore 1 assume the availability of a 'general test' to be crucial for

theory . Supposing that a "general test for the correctness of basic ethical

beliefs and principles" (ELP: 72) is crucial for a "positive" ethical theory,

then the requirements for ethical theory summarized above make any such

test, and hence theory, impossible. The reasons for this are as follows.

Any 'general' test cannot give special attention to the idiosyncrasies of the

agent, including his very own subjective motivational set. The point of

having a 'general test' would be to make it independent from the subjective

point of view of the individual. And it is difficult to imagine a 'test',

giving clear-cut criteria for right and wrong, which could capture the

complexity of Our existing ethical life, with al1 its diverse,

incommensurable, and sometimes conflicting moral standards and

evaluations. Thus, "positive" moral theory is 'out'. Bernard Williams has

in effect taken away the ground for any such project, and has not left it

anywhere to start.

Does that mean that moral philosophy has nothing to contribute to

ethical discourse, and that philosophy has nothing to Say in answer to Our

question 'What ought I to do?' ? That we in no way can attempt any

systematic account of the ethical? Before answering this question we must

locate Bernard Williamst 'new' position more precisely and evaluate its

strengths and weaknesses.

Locating Williamst Position Anew In chapter 2 we noted that Williams distinguishes between 'positive'

and 'negative' ethical theory, where the distinction hinges upon the

availability of a general test. A positive ethical theory would be "a

theoretical account of what ethical thought and practice are, which

account ... implies a general test for the correctness of basic ethical beliefs

and principles ..." (ELP: 72). If the feasibility of such a general test is

being denied, the ethical theory becomes 'negative'. Williams then

purponed not to take sides and to leave the availability of such tests an

open question, and claimed that such an account of the ethical could not be

labelled a 'theory' (ELP: 74).

We now are in a position to see that Williams' thoughts on the

subject matter of ethics have in effect undermined the possibility of giving

a "general test for the correctness of basic ethical beliefs and principles",

and hence undermined the possibility of "positive" ethical theory. His

account of the ethical thus effectively implies the same as a "negative"

ethical theory would do (though Bernard Williams' account of ethics

differs from a "negative" ethical theory in that he does not give "a

theoretical account of what ethical thought and practice are", cf. ELP: 72),

namely the impossibility of such a test. This makes Bernard Williams - contrary to this overt declarations - an 'anti-theorist', and instead of

'leaving open' the issue of "positive" versus "negative" ethical theory and

comfortably sitting on the fence between the two, he has maneuvered

himself into one position and thereby excluded the other.

One could charge him with some inconsistency in this respect. Even

so, one is immediately inclined to forgive this flaw since he has offered us

such insightful, sophisticated, observant ideas about the subject matter of

ethics. Moreover, the inconsistency of purporting not to take sides but

turning out to belong to the opposition is not as bad as purporting to belong

to one party but tuming out to belong to the opposition. At any rate, this

inconsistency does not contaminate the rest of Williams' thoughts about

ethics.

If we go dong with dl or most of his thoughts about the ethical, for

example the importance of giving the agent a central position in evaluation,

and the impossibility of a 'view from nowhere' in ethics, then the

undermining of "positive" moral theory and 'general tests' is a strength of

any account of the ethical, rather than a weakness: the ethical, by its very

nature, makes such projects impossible.

6. Moral Philoso~hv Thereafter

Does this mean that moral philosophy has nothing to Say in our quest

to distinguish right from wrong, and that absolutely no substantial

statements can be made about the ethical which could be the outcome of an

activity which could be labelled 'philosophizing'? Are there no enquiries

left that moral philosophy can still legitimately pursue after Williams'

critique? Before we arrive at such an uncornpromising conclusion we

should have another careful look at the things which Williams says about

the ethical, and in particular the positive things he says about the ethicaî.

He not only voices criticisms and misgivings conceming theory, or draws

the limits within which theory - if it were possible at al1 - could work,

but also shares with us insights and observations about the ethical which

make a positive contribution to Our understanding of the subject matter.

After dl, one of the central points in Ethics and the Limits of Philosoph~

was to establish that

we can think in ethics, and in al1 sorts of ways, unless Our histofical and cultural circumstances have made it impossible - but that philosophy cm do little to detennine how we should do so. (p. 74)

In this sentence, at least, he does not entirely shut philosophy out

from ethical discourse. He does not categoricdly Say "philosophy has no

place in ethical thinking and argument", but adds the proviso "philosophy

can do little to determine how we should do so." It is time now to become

clear what this 'little' amounts to, that philosophy can contribute to our

thinking in ethics.

Williams' Positive Statements about the Ethical In the process of attacking inadequate accounts of morality, Bernard

Williams gives a number of indications regarding what is important to, or

part of, the ethical. For instance, he says that "sympathetic concern for

others is a necessary condition of being in the world of morality" (M: Il),

though it would be impossible to undertake l'a construction of the whole of

morality from the possibility of sympathy and the extensions of sympathyt'

(M: 11) He further concedes that "considerations about human nature"

can "help to delimit the possible content of what could be regarded as a

morality" (emphasis added, M: 66), though they cannot found a

comprehensive account of morality (as Aristotelianism tries to do

(M: ch. 7)). Further, he does not reject (though he is sceptical about) the

suggestion that the moral is delimited by a concern for men's (and

women's) well-being, where 'well-being' is broadly construed as "what

men, in fact find value in, or need, or want" (M: 87).

In Ethics and the Limits of Philoso~hv he even goes as far as to

concede - though again, he is sceptical about the success of this project - that ethical life could possibly be grounded in considerations about human

nature and the need to share a social world (ELP: 153f.)'. And one

["The project of giving to ethical life an objective and determinate grounding in considerations about human nature is not, in my view, very likely to succeed. But it is at

chapter later on he says that "practical convergence on a shared way of

[ethical] life ... would need to be explained in terms of basic desires or

interests [of human beings]" (ELP: 171). Such a convergence, should it

corne about, would amount to an "objective foundation of ethical life"

(ELP: 171).

To this could be added the importance of grounding projects in a

person's life. We discussed grounding projects in the context of criticizing

ethical theory, Le. they were one aspect which some ethical theories,

notably utilitarianism, had not taken care of. On the other hanci, grounding

projects make us aware of an aspect of human nature that every acceptable

account of the ethical has to take into consideration. They set positive

values.

With these statements Williams makes fairly substantial clairns about

what is part of, or important to, the ethical. He just throws these elements

at us without pursuing them any further along the direction in which they

point. In sum, however, one could Say that they do not just point out a few

isolated aspects of ethical life, but that they give a more systematic picture

of the ethical. What these statements imply, how they can be explored by

philosophical reflection, and the picture of the ethical which develops from

this, will be discussed in this chapter.

any rate a comprehensible project, and 1 believe it represents the oniy intelligible form of ethical objectivity at the reflective level." (ELP: 153) For no obvious reasons, Bernard Williams does not pursue this project any M e r .

The Contribution Moral Philosophy Can Make What does al1 of this amount to? Where do the positive statements

about the ethical, which Williams makes, leave moral philosophy? What

room for maneuvering is there left for moral philosophy? What is it that

moral philosophy can still legitimately do? What kind of questions can it

sensibly raise, and what kind of answers can it legitimately give? On the

one hand, we have established that Williams' critique buries ethical theory

for good. Thus, ethical theory is a kind of project which moral philosophy

can no longer embrace. This, however, does not imply that we also have to

relinquish moral philosophy, unless moral philosophy never had any aim

other than producing ethical theory. If there are ethical enquiries whose

goal it is not to produce theory, and which are not threatened by Williams'

critique, then moral philosophy has something to offer even after Williams.

1 want to argue that there are two sorts of post-Williamsian enquiries,

yielding substantial answers, which moral philosophy can legitimately

embrace: the first one is sketching a general frarnework for proceeding in

moral philosophy, Le. establishing what the ethical, by and large, is about.

The second one is to came out in more detail, but less systematically, what

matters in ethics. 1 will discuss these two in turn.

Williams' remarks concerning what the ethical is about can give us a

general framework for proceeding in ethical enquiries, or at least such a

framework can be given which is compatible with Williams' positive

statements and his critique.

One such framework would be the Aristotelian 'living and doing

well'. Williams' suggestions concerning what the ethicai - at its root - is

about, point ai eudaemonism as a feasible bracket of ethical We. At least,

Williams' suggestions do not run counter to eudaernonisrn, and neither does

his critique run contrary to it. In fact, in World. Mind. and Ethics

Williams says that he conceives of the Aristotelian enterprise to be "the

only colourable attempt to provide a foundation for ethics" (p. 201).

Altematively one could bring out the point of the ethical by saying that the

ethical is concemed with 'leading a meaningful human life'. But this would

perhaps arnount to the same as 'living and doing well', since one can hardly

claim to live and do well and not lead a meaningful human life; and

likewise, someone who leads a meaningful life will also live and do well.

In essence, then, it is possible to name a framework of the ethical,

i.e. to Say what the ethical, generally, is about, which is hinted at, or at

least compatible with, Williams' suggestions conceming the foundations of

ethics. I will discuss below what kind of evaluations we can make on

grounds of this insight.

Secondly, apart from giving a general framework for proceeding,

moral philosophy can carve out what matters in ethics. By this 1 mean the

following. What matters in ethics is, for example, well-being, or mutual

agreement, or rational will, or universalizability of the maxims of one's

actions. Utilitarianism, contractualism and Kantianism have been right in

that each of them has been aware of one aspect important to ethical

decision-making and actions. They have been wrong, however, in that they

gave this one factor universal importance to the exclusion of al1 other

aspects which might have to be taken into account in ethical decisions.

Thus, philosophical enqujr has helped us to become aware of what

kind of factors are relevant to ethical decisions and actions. Theorists, alas,

have only made the categorical mistake of taking one such factor to have

paramount importance over all others, or of presuming that all others can

be reduced to this one kind. But we do not have to follow their lead. One

can just as well acknowledge that what matters in ethics is people's well-

being, and universalizability, etc. and that there are many other things to be

taken into account. Moreover, we can acknowledge, unlike the theorists,

that the many ethically relevant considerations cannot be reduced to one

another, and that they may be incompatible and at times conflict with one

another. As we became aware while discussing reductionism (chapter 4):

"Perhaps we need as many concepts to describe it as we find we need, and

no fewer" (ELP: 17).

We may not expect, however, that these various values can be given

a priority index. Or that the list can ever be deemed comprehensive. Or

that an algorithm can be found which would tell us in which situations to

give weight to which values. Philosophical contemplation can at best make

us aware of the many values there are and the many things to be taken into

consideration when making ethical decisions. In the end it is we who must

decide which considerations are relevant in a particular situation and what

weight to give to them. Philosophical contemplation cm only make us

aware of the many ethical considerations there might be; it cannot give us

a decision-procedure. It is not futile, however, since it can sharpen our

sensibility for the many values there are, and the intricate ways in which

they can be weighed against each other.

Kinds of Evaluations What kinds of evaluations can be made within this framework?

What kinds of evaluations and practical guidance can be reached on

grounds that we have a 'general framework for proceeding' and some

other, largely unconnected, collection of concepts and ideas about what

matters in ethics? 1 want to argue that given this material what we can

evaluate is people's long-term endeavours. What is no longer up for

evaluation on grounds of this material, however, are singular actions or

prac tices.

What can be evaluated on grounds of a 'general framework for

proceeding' are people's long-term endeavours. By this I mean any project

one pursues with respect to a long-term time-frame. These could be one's

profession, life-long goals, grounding projects, and even relationships. Al1

of these would need to be compatible with human flourishing or leading a

meaningful life, one's own and others'. Although there cannot be a clear-

cut line between 'ethical' and 'unethical' projects, some of them may be

ruled out from the start. Dmg-dealing, being a SS-officer, highly

promiscuous behaviour (in the age of HIV) al1 are opposed to human

flourishing, and therefore can be deemed unethical. Other vocations, such

as bringing up children, committing oneself to a charitable organization,

and most reputable professions, would further human flourishing, and thus

be ethical.

Certainly, apart from these long-term pursuits, some singular actions

or patterns of behaviour could also be evaluated, in so far as they stand in a

direct relationship to human flourishing. Possible examples could be

taking drugs, inducing sorneone to take drugs, murder and rape at the one

end of the spectrum, and, at the other end, rescuing a drowning person and

giving money to the needy.

But, on the whole, the possibility has been lost to evaluate singular

actions or practices. Certainly, it is a (morally) good thing to keep one's

promises, to pay one's debts, fulfil contracts, help old ladies over the Street

and not beat one's children. But why? The connection to 'living and doing

well' will at most be very indirect. And although these actions could be

grounded in a rational will, contractual agreements and the maximization

of happiness respectively, we have leamed that such reductive agreement is

a mere coincidence. If individual actions cannot be grounded in human

flourishing, then the only thing left is that they are grounded in what we

called 'what matters in ethics', Le. well-being, hypothetical contracts,

rational will, etc. But we have learned that there cannot be a pattern of

when and to what extent these factors matter in ethical evaluation. They

just are ethically relevant factors; which factor matters, and to what

extent, differs from situation to situation. Therefore, although we can

evaluate actions, practices and institutions, moral philosophy will usually

not be able to analyze why one thing is good rather than another.

Why this i s not an Ethical Theory Have we not given yet another theory? A 'general framework for

proceeding' together with some details about what matters in ethics - does

this not amount to an ethical theory? Given how ethical theory was defined

(chapter 2), the answer must be 'no'. We have assembled some material to

evaluate long-term projects and (to a limited extent) to think about

individual actions. This does not suffice, however, to have a "decision

procedure for moral reasoning" (Moral Luck, p. ix-x), which is a demand

on moral theory according to one definition of it. Neither have we gained

a "general test for the correctness of basic ethical beliefs and principles"

(ELP, p. 72), which was required of an ethical theory on the conception

central to the Limits. And neither have we derived any 'substantive

consequences' about how ethical thought should be conducted. In

conclusion, what we have said about the ethical, and the kinds of

evaluations which can be made on grounds of this, does not fulfil the

requirements of an ethical theory .

Compatibility with Williams' Critical Thought 1s this framework of the ethical also compatible with the

requirements which any account of the ethical has to fulfil, as Bernard

Williams defines them, and as we discussed hem in chapter four?

'Living and doing wellt includes grounding projects. From this

follows, as argued before, that doing 'the unthinkablet cannot be morally

required of the agent. No impartial or universal viewpoint in ethical

matters has been endorsed, since much room is given to what is most

important for the individuai. We have not given a reductive account, since

a diversity of values is allowed for, as part of 'living and doing well' and

outside of it. Furthermore it is postulated that there may be ethical

concerns that fall outside Uiis scheme.

To what extent is the search for and naming of the roots of the

ethical compatible or incompatible with the thesis that morality has no

natural temtory? To Say that ethics is grounded in a 'sympathetic concem

for others', 'considerations about human nature', 'well-being', 'the need to

share a social world', or 'basic desires or interests' seems akin to naming a

natural temtory of ethics. It is here that Williams' positive account of the

ethical runs contrary to his critical thought. A couple of points will make

clear which of these two claims has to lose out. First of dl, the framework

we drew around the ethical is not a restrictive one, since it is acknowledged

that there are values beyond its boundaries. Secondly, the ethical accounts

which Williams referred to to support his thesis that morality has no

natural territory, were accounts which drew very restrictive (far more

narrow) boundaries around the ethical. He has thus not given enough

support for his thesis that not even a broad territory can be outlined for

morality. Thirdly, in so far as we are trying to give an outline of the

ethical, we have to breach the thesis that there is no framework of

morality: these two are diametncally opposed. The kind of account given,

however, was directly based upon Williams' comments, and this maybe

indicates some slight inconsistency in his thought. Given the support we

have for the account of ethics - it is in harmony with al1 the other

elements of Bernard Williams' ethical thought, and derives from many of

his comments - we should maybe decide against the thesis that morality

has no natural temtory. Maybe ethics cannot be squeezed between any

sharp and narrow boundaries, but it can be given some vague and

transgressable outline.

Moreover, there is a stronger and a weaker version of how to read

the 'no natural territory of morality' thesis. Is seems that Bernard

Williams wishes to establish the stronger version, while his arguments only

support a weaker version, which is also compatible with the account of the

ethical given. The strong stance would be to maintain that what the ethical

is concemed with is so broad and complex and without lirnits, that it is

impossible even to draw any vague and transgressable outline around it.

The weaker version acknowledges that the ethicai is broad and complex and

without determinate limits; nonetheless, some of its concerns are more

central than others, so that it is possible to draw a vague outline around it,

as long as one bears in mind that this outline is transgressable (i.e. there are

ethical concems outside of it). This second reading is coherent with al1 of

Bernard Williams' ethical thought discussed so far, is what his arguments

actually establish, and is also compatible with what we said about the

ethical.

In conclusion, then, giving a framework of the ethical is in

contradiction to the strong thesis that the ethical has no natural territory;

but this thesis of Williams is one which we better drop in light of Our

discussion.

Summarv and Conclusion

In the course of this thesis 1 have done three things: 1 have selected

and discussed those ideas of Williams which pose a difficulty to ethical

theory. 1 have argued that, given this picture of ethical life, theory is

unfeasible and that - contrary to his overt declarations - Williams is a

theory sceptic rather than an agnostic. And finally, 1 have shown the

window that opens up in Williams' account of the ethical for doing moral

philosophy (or 'ethical philosophy'); Williams' picture of the ethical is not

merely negative (in that it undermines ethical theory), but also positive, in

that it points out what matters in ethics. Building on that we can discern a

framework of the ethical and make evaluations, even if only very coarse-

cut ones, about right and wrong.

We can conclude from this that moral philosophy is still possible,

despite the downfall of ethical theory. The result of the process of carving

out what matters in ethics is a framework of the ethical, which is

informative and action-guiding. In light of this framework we can make

some kind of evaluation of human conduct. It was argued that - having

leamed from Williams' critique of ethical theory and since the framework

offered is very coarse-cut - what we can evaluate on this basis are not

primarily individual actions or practices, but rather long-tem endeavours,

life projects, and life styles. At the same time, this framework neither fits

any of the criteria which Williams uses to define ethical theory, nor is it

subject to any of the criticisms which Williams targets at theory. In short,

Williams' picture of the ethical allows us to carve out a general framework

of the ethical, which allows us to make some types of evaluation, but

neither is an ethical theory, nor subject to the critical elements of Williams'

thought.

At first, we located Williams' position: where he stands in relation

to theory and what contribution moral philosophy may make to ethical

discourse. We recognized that Williams wants to leave the question open

whether we can produce ethical theory, the availability of 'general tests'

being an important criterion for theory. Thus he does not take a definite

stand on the defensibility of theory, though he is very sceptical about it.

Characteristic of Williams is his style of writing about the ethical and

of formulating a critique. In his writings we cannot find 'one' argument

against theory, in the sense of a close argument, culminating in the

conclusion that theory is impossible. Rather, he is an expert at presenting

various, distinct ethical observations, each one depicted with much detail

and subtlety. He then continues to discuss the implications of the

phenomenùn, showing how and why it poses a difficulty for theory. The

phenomena of ethical life he depicts together form a picture of the ethical

which makes theory difficult, if not impossible.

In the main part of the thesis I discussed several such Williamsian

oberservations on ethical life. First, 1 looked at grounding projects which

form a central, meaning-giving part of a person's life. Grounding projects

posed a particular problem for utilitarianism, since they are also

fundamental to leading an ethical life; utilitarianism, however, would

under certain circumstances dernand that we forego these projects if a

higher utility warrants it. Closely related to grounding projects is the idea

of the ethically unthinkable. To be forced to forego a grounding project,

because the situation demands it, can mean to make such a big sacrifice

that afterwards one cannot continue a sane, meaningful life. More

generally, to be confronted with the unthinkable means to be stuck in a

situation so abnormal (and fortunately so rare), that we are forced to do

something which normally we would never contemplate, and doing it robs

us of any meaning to go on living.

To take an impartial point of view on ethical matters, as

utilitarianism and contractualism do, means to introduce a split between the

'outside' point of view from which ethical dispositions and sentiments are

justified, and the 'inside' point of view from which these dispositions and

sentiments are actually experienced. Williams notes that there opens an

"uneasy gap" between these two different points of view, because from the

outside ethical sentiments and dispositions are viewed as instrumental,

which from the inside stand on their own. More than that: the impartial

point of view tries to justify ethical sentiments from the outside, when in

tmth reflecting on the ethical shape of the world presupposes having ethical

concerns. In other words, the impartial point of view presupposes what it

allegedly justifies.

Reductionisrn, as a descriptive or theoretical enterprise, is misguided

because it tries to reduce to one kind ethical concepts which are genuinely

different from each other. Moreover, it is often motivated by the mistaken

assumption that different ethical considerations can be weighed against one

another only if they have an underlying common standard. Instead, we

should accept the complexity of ethical life and the multiplicity of concepts

which are incommensurable and irreducible and which can nevertheless be

weighed against one another.

We found that internalism does not speak against the possibility of

theory, but further restricts what we can (at most) expect of theory. No

theory can offer reasons which speak to every agent, but in order to move

an agent, to count as a reason for him, reasons must be offered which

appeal to motivations he already has. Through his arguments Williams has

conclusively shown the absurdity of external reasons, i.e. reasons which

count as reasons for every agent, independently of what already is in his

subjective motivational set. A reason would be 'external' if it would move

everybody to follow it, independently of one's pre-existing motives. But

such a concept is non-sensical. In order to act, one must be motivated, and

in order to be motivating, a reason must appeal to one's existing

motivations. In other words, to count as a reason for a given agent, a

reason depends on what already is in his existing motivational set. The

same is tme for ethical reasons. Consequently, we cannot expect a theory

to offer universal reasons, capable of moving everybody to follow its

precepts. To have authority, a theory depends on the universe of wants and

concems of the agent.

The distinction between the ethical and the moral is important for

understanding Williams' ethical thought as a whole, and also to ethical

theory. In brief, those two tems try to distinguish between a 'broader'

and a 'narrower' domain of ethical life. The ethical refers to the whole

richness and complexity of ethical life. The moral includes only a limited

segment of the whole spectrum. Therefore, for theory to make a

legitimate claim to be able to describe ethical life and give guidance, it has

to do justice to the ethical, not just the moral.

In Moralitv Williams defends the thesis that morality (or 'the

ethical', in his later terminology) has no natural temitory. In that essay, he

dernolishes every ethical theory which tries to delimit such a natural

territory: Aristotelianism, Kantianism, Utilitarianism, and an account of

the ethicd on the basis of well-being. Williams' thesis implies that one

cannot have a self-contained theory about morality, since its subject matter

is not a self-contained field in itself. In fact, it means that no framework

for proceeding in the ethical domain can be given, since morality simply

has no boundaries around which one could construct such a framework.

The denial of such a framework is the exact opposite of the proposition 1

want to defend. In the final evaluation 1 concluded that this last claim of

Williams should better be dropped, in light of the overwhelming support

one can draw from his writings in favour of such a framework.

In his picture of ethical life Bernard Williams gives a peculiar

emphasis to the individual agent. The previously described aspects, and

especially grounding projects, the ethically unthinkable, and internalism,

imply that the individual person, as evaluator and agent, plays a central

role in ethical life. The importance of grounding projects in a person's life

implies that grounding projects corne before and over ethical demands, that

one has reason to act ethically only as long as one's grounding projects

remain uncompromised. The ethically unthinkable extends this line of

thought: there are limits to what one can sanely contemplate as ethical

options, and these Vary from one person to another. Intemalism, finally,

implies that the force of ethical reasons is contingent upon the agent's very

own subjective motivational set. Al1 this means that ethical evaluation and

prescription have to take account of the individual's concerns and

perspective, with which, indeed, they are intertwined.

Al1 of the above - that is, the critical elements in Williams' ethicai

thought - made us conclude that ethical theory no longer can have a

grounding. At the outset, Williams was quoted as being 'sceptical' about

the possibility of ethical theory, but we now can see that in fact he must

deny this possibility. The availability of a 'general test' was a crucial

element of ethical theory according to Williams' understanding of that

concept, and it is such tests which Williams' conception of ethical life has

made impossible. His critique therefore is more exclusive than he

acknowledges.

The question then is what contribution moral philosophy can make

even after the demise of theory - whether moral philosophy can give us

some guidance in our ethical thinking. Especially conflict and reflection,

which Williams sees as an integral part of ethical life, demand some kind of

structuring of ethical thought and practice. 1 have argued that even after

the downfall of theory it is still possible to give some kind of structure to

the ethical. In fact, Williams himself provides such a stmcture. 1 have

shown how his statements about the ethical provide a kind of framework

for the ethical. This leaves a project for moral philosophy: it can airn at

carving out what matters in ethics, and thereby give a general framework

for proceeding. 1 have emphasized that the kinds of evaluations possible on

these grounds can only aim at assessing long-term endeavours, rather than

aspiring to evaluate singular actions or practices. Given these possibilities

and limitations of a 'framework', it becomes clear that such a construct is

not yet again another type of theory. Theory, as Williams' understands it,

gives us a "decision procedure for moral reasoning" (ML: ix-x) or a

"general test for the correctness of basic ethical beliefs and principles"

(ELP: 72). A framework of the ethical, however, does not provide any of

these.

I have argued that the framework of the ethical which has been

developed is not only based on Williams' positive account of the ethical but

is also in line with Williams' critical ethical thought, i.e. those parts of

Williams' ethical thought which present an obstacle to theory. The only

contradiction 1 have found is between the giving of an outline of the ethical

and Williams' denial of a natural temtory of morality (at least on a strong

reading of this denial). However, 1 have concluded that given the overall

support we find for such a framework in Williams' ethical thinking, we

better forego the claim that there cannot be a natural temtory of morality.

Williams, Bernard: Moralit~: An Introduction to Ethics,

first published 1972, Cambridge University Press 1976.

--- : 'A Critique of Utilitarianism', in J.J.C. Smart & Bernard Williams:

Utilitarianism: For and A~ainst, Cambridge University Press 1973.

---: Moral Luck, Cambridge University Press 198 1.

--_ : 'Moral luck', in: Moral Luck.

--- : 'Interna1 and extemal reasons', in: Moral Luck.

O--: Ethics and the Limits of Philoso~hy, London: Fontana 1985.

O-- : 'Intemal Reasons an the Obscurity of Blarne', LQeps 10, 1989,

Santa Clara University: 1- 1 1.

Altham, J.E.J., and Harrison Ross, eds.: World. Mind. and Ethics,

Essays on the ethical philosophy of Bernard Williams,

Cambridge University Press 1995.

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