Bernholz Supreme Values as the Basis for Terror

www.elsevier.com/locate/econbase

European Journal of Political Economy

Vol. 20 (2004) 317–333

Supreme values as the basis for terror

Peter Bernholz

Centre for Economics and Business (WWZ), University of Basel, CH-4003 Basel, Switzerland

Received 1 March 2003; received in revised form 24 February 2004; accepted 25 February 2004

Available online 20 April 2004

Abstract

Supreme values, being absolutely true to believers, have to be preferred to all else, and can

require acts of terror in which terrorists are willing to take the lives of others and also give up their

own lives to further the sought objectives. It is therefore difficult to prevent terrorism based on

supreme values. A model shows how supreme-value terrorism increases with resources available to

terrorists and changes with other parameters. The model is used to consider how supreme-value

terror can be fought. Solutions include decentralization and isolation of terrorists from free society,

including through selective immigration. Because the supreme values contradict the values of a free

society, the spiritual fight is crucial, which requires preventing domestic dissemination of the

supreme values by controlling the education process. The solutions are difficult for a free society.

D 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

JEL classification: H56; F22; I28

Keywords: Terror; Supreme values; Immigration; Education

1. The meaning of supreme values

Supreme values refer to an aim or a bundle of aims preferred by people holding the

values to all other aims. The idea is expressed through a preference function in which the

aims that are included in the supreme values are lexicographically preferred to all others.

Resources are therefore spent on other aims only insofar as the resources are not needed to

accomplish the goals designated by the supreme values. That is, everything and everybody

has to be sacrificed if this is necessary to implement the supreme values. Supreme values

are typically part of a comprehensive ideology, or of a Weltanschauung.

0176-2680/$ - see front matter D 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

doi:10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2004.02.006

E-mail address: [email protected] (P. Bernholz).

P. Bernholz / European Journal of Political Economy Vol. 20 (2004) 317–333318

Evolution has endowed human beings with the capability for not only corporal but also

spiritual vision. People are able to create in their mind images of the objective world, and

to visualise possible futures, and thus to preview in their minds the consequences of their

own imagined actions and of the actions of others. In the words of Karl Popper, the

existence of this ‘second world’ of imagination enables man and woman to let ideas

vicariously ‘die’ instead of risking possessions, health, or possibly life, in a direct

encounter with the real ‘first world’ (Popper, 1972).

This admirable capability of man and woman also has grave dangers. People can

form a wrong picture of reality. This danger is greater the further removed are the

targets of people’s imagination from their day-to-day experiences are. It is, then, not

surprising, that

From the dawn of the historically observable development of ideas to the present,

certain schemes of thinking can be found that explain the universe according to

the pattern of the immediate environment of man, but especially according to that

of his feeling and decision-making. . . .This world-view (Weltauffassung) removes

strangeness and awe from objects, satisfies the need of understanding and makes

life meaningful and safe. It can also appear as a force binding the community

together. . . (Topitsch, 1958, author’s translation, as also subsequent texts translated

from German)

The historical evidence shows that such ideologies or Weltanschauungen are

often far removed from reality, or are metaphysical in the sense that they can, on

principle, not be refuted by empirical evidence. In addition, the ideologies can be

dangerous if they comprise supreme values that a whole society should believe and

according to which the society should act. For if such worldviews embody either a

wrong view of reality or are in no way related to reality, the uncompromising

pursuit of the prescriptions of supreme values as absolute truths is likely to end in

harm and death for people unwilling or incapable of converting to the ‘right’

belief.1

Adherents have to consider supreme values as self-evident and not as subject to

question. Otherwise, the status of the supreme values would be in doubt. Anybody who

doubts the absolute truth is a sinner, a heretic, and anybody outside is an ignorant or

hateful enemy, a pagan.

It follows that at least any potential member of the movement to be formed

should have the right belief, and should adhere to the absolute truth and become

a believer. A proletarian should become a communist, and an Aryan should be-

come a National Socialist. Otherwise, the proletarian or the Aryan has a ‘wrong

consciousness’.

Religions are also worldviews that usually contain supreme values. This implies that

religions may also justify all means to convert unbelievers and to suppress, to punish or be

rid of pagans and sinners.

1 For example, Jews were incapable of becoming Aryans, bourgeois of becoming proletarians.

P. Bernholz / European Journal of Political Economy Vol. 20 (2004) 317–333 319

2. A typical development of an ideological movement

An ideology with a Weltanschauung comprising supreme values is typically founded or

revived by a charismatic leader or leadership, with a small group of possibly also

charismatic followers (apostles, or an old guard). To reach a mass of potential believers,

the worldview and its aims have to appeal to many people and seemingly to solve these

people’s problems. Otherwise, the ideology would not be widely accepted in its

competition with other creeds. The newly founded ideological movement is driven by

the urgent need felt by believers to realize the supreme values that are preferred to all other

aims and contain promises of a better life in this or in the world to come. If the goals can

only be reached by turning all people into believers, or by using their services or goods,

the ideological movement has to strive for secular power, to force its will on people who

resist. To succeed in this endeavor, a strong leadership, having a monopoly right to

interpret the creed, and an organization are necessary. In addition, gaining control of

government may require an economic or political crisis that leaves broad segments of the

population deeply dissatisfied and looking to new solutions for their plight.

After spiritual and secular power have been combined, an ideocracy will be established.

This may be a mature ideocracy or a totalitarian regime. A totalitarian regime is a regime

that has not yet reached the aims implied by its ideology. It has, thus, to use all means,

including government force and terror, to convert potential believers, and to defeat, to

drive into exile or to eliminate enemies and opponents who are not prepared to convert or

who by definition are incapable of being converted. If the aims contained in the supreme

values call for global conversion or subjugation of people, a holy war has to be waged

against other people and nations, whenever there seems to be a chance of success.

A mature ideology, on the other hand, is established whenever the ideological

movement has reached its aims, for instance in one nation. For then, no further efforts

are necessary to convert or to remove people who are not convertible. Examples are the

Puritans in Massachusetts (Morgan, 1958) and the Jesuit State in Paraguay (Ezran, 1989).

3. Terrorism to accomplish the aims of supreme values

American black militant Robert Williams has written:

The old method of guerilla warfare, as carried out from the hills and countryside, would

be ineffective in a powerful country like the USA. . .The new concept [of revolution] is

to huddle as close to the enemy as possible to neutralize his modern and fierce

weapons. The new concept creates conditions that involve the total community,

whether they want to be involved or not. . . (February 1964 issue of William’s

publication The Crusader, quoted from Sobel, 1975, p. 4)

From the Brazilian revolutionary Carlos Marighella, we have:

Terrorism is an action, usually involving the placement of a bomb or fire explosion of

great destructive power, which is capable of effecting irreparable loss against the

enemy. . . (in his 1967 Minimanual of the Urban Guerilla, quoted from Sobel, 1975, p. 5)


Hoffman (1998, p. 43 seq.) proposes a more general definition of terrorism, after a

discussion comprising a chapter:

All terrorist acts involve violence or the threat of violence. Terrorism is specifically

designed to have far-reaching psychological effects. . . It is meant to instill fear within,

and thereby intimidate, a wider ‘target audience’ that might include a rival ethnic or

religious group, an entire country, a national government or political party, or public

opinion in general. Terrorism is designed to create power where there is none or to

consolidate power where there is very little.

What happens to ideological movements that do not succeed in obtaining secular

power? Or to those that do not accomplish their goals, or lose secular power? Previously

(Bernholz, 1997), I pointed out that:

First, some may turn to armed resistance, intimidation of the population or to

terrorism, especially if they are suppressed or persecuted by government(s). They

may do so either just to preserve their existence or in the hope of conquering

government power later on. . .Second, especially if armed resistance, intimidation and terrorism prove unsuccessful

or/and if the societal environment is more beneficial, the ideological movement may

change or reinterpret some of its values so that it is tolerated. . .Third, the ideological community may decide to emigrate to more favorable

environments if they see no end to suppression and persecution in their homeland. . .

In the self-understanding of the ideological movement, acts branded by the outside

world as acts of terror are altruistic deeds to serve the aims implied by the supreme values.

It follows that true believers do not see themselves as criminals but as self-denying

idealistic or holy men or women sacrificing a comfortable life, a career or even their lives

in the service of the most valuable and truthful goals. The reward will be reaped either in

the world beyond or consists in the knowledge that they contribute to a future better world.

An individual following the supreme goals of an ideocratic movement is therefore often

considered to be an idealist, or even a saint. Most outsiders, in particular as victims, will

however regard adherence to the goals as sinful and/or following the lexicographic

preference ordering for the supreme values as irrational or insane.

Terrorism based on an ideology with supreme values usually leads into deep,

fundamental conflict. For the true believer is fighting not just some other human beings

but the embodied forces of evil who are bent to resist or even to obliterate the true creed

and its beneficial consequences promised by the ideology. The true believer tries to

prevent the victory of these forces, to overcome them, and to establish the supreme values

embodied in the ideology.

The worldview contained in the ideology depicts an image of the outside world that

may be strongly at odds with scientific perception and also with the understanding of the

common people who are not believers of the creed. And if two or more ideologies vie with

each other, they may all have a distorted view of each other, which more embitters the

conflict between the different movements and often makes reconciliation impossible.


The distorted worldview of the ideological movement may also lead to an exaggerated

vision of its capabilities of overcoming the forces of organized states and of achieving the

ideological aims. This increases willingness to use terror and leads to extended resistance

by the true believers before the intended victims can wipe them out.

The use of terror by ideological movements oriented by supreme values is not a new

phenomenon. The assassins, a Shiite Muslim sect, who fought the Seljuq Empire and the

Christian Crusaders, were an early example. The same is true for the thugs, an Indian sect

sacrificing human beings to the goddess Kali, who were finally suppressed by the British

in India in the first half of the 19th century. The Jewish Zealots and Sicarii should also be

mentioned, because they adhered to supreme values, although they do not seem to have

committed terrorist acts against nonbelievers. They played leading roles in the insurrection

against the Romans that ended with the Roman occupation of Jerusalem and the fall of

Masada after the Jewish defenders had committed suicide (for an excellent description of

these sects, their religious motivation and methods see Rapoport, 1984).

The Red Army Fraction in Germany and the Red Brigades in Italy are more recent

examples. In contemporary times, Maoists are fighting the government in Nepal, Islamic

fundamentalists oppose the governments of Algiers and Egypt, and Islamic terror is being

used in various locations.

Several writers have described the use of terror based on religious beliefs (Rapoport,

1984; Hoffman, 1998 Chapter 4; Hubback, 1997). These authors do not, however, offer a

general theory of terrorism, ideocracies, and totalitarianism as all based on secular and

nonsecular ideologies with supreme values. Hoffman even differentiates between reli-

giously and ideologically motivated terrorism (p. 90). Hubback mentions Communism and

Nazism only just in passing:

In the 20th century, political ideology adopted the language of doomsday religion with

catastrophic results around the world. (p. 2)

Rapoport (1984, p. 658 seq.) rightly rejects the view that terrorism is a modern

phenomenon caused by the developments of technology ‘‘since weapons are cheaper,

more destructive, easier to obtain and to conceal’’. He also realizes that

Since doctrine, rather than technology, is the ultimate source of terror, the analysis of

modern forms must begin with the French, rather the Industrial Revolution. (p. 672)

However, in spite of these insights, Rapoport, like the other political scientists mentioned

above, does not see the relationship between totalitarianism (or more generally ideoc-

racies) and terrorism as both being based on ideologies with supreme values, although he

mentions that the assassins were supported by a kind of state they had created. Not

surprisingly, these scholars have no idea of a lexicographic preference ordering demanded

by the respective religious or secular creeds.

Historically, there have been terrorist or guerilla activities after the defeat of a

totalitarian regime, e.g., by a branch of the Anabaptists after the Muenster kingdom had

been routed (Stayer, 1976, chapters 12 and 13), and more recently by the Khmer Rouge

in Cambodia, the defeated Taliban in Afghanistan, and in Iraq after the defeat of the


regime of Saddam Hussein. Quite independently of ideological movements with

supreme values, an increase of terrorist activities has to be expected, for another

reason. The effectiveness of modern weapons limits warfare opportunities,2 and

terrorists hide for protection among the general population. It was a mistake of the

Taliban government that it committed itself to the protection of Osama bin Laden,

although it had no nuclear weapons available and dominated a country that could be the

target of modern weapons.

4. Islamic fundamentalism as a source of terror

Until the 1970s, it was true that

Although terrorists are found among adherents of almost every brand of left-wing or

right-wing ideology, the overwhelming majority of today’s terrorists can be described

as leftist. Most have a New Left or Trotskyist character. (Sobel, 1975, p. 6)

This changed. Hoffman (1998, p. 90 seq.) states that

. . .while the reemergence of modern religious terrorism was initially closely associated

with the Islamic revolution in Iran, within a decade of that event none of the world’s

major religions could claim to be immune to the same volatile mixture of faith,

fanaticism and violence. . .Significantly, during the 1990s the growth in the number of religious terrorist groups as

a proportion of all active international terrorist organizations has not only continued but

increased appreciably. In 1994, for example, a third (sixteen) of the forty-nine

identifiable international terrorist groups active that year could be classified as religious

in character and/ or motivation; and in 1995, the most recent year for which complete

statistics are available, their number grew yet again, to account for nearly half (twenty-

six, or 46 per cent) of the fifty-six known, active international groups.3

Today, many people especially fear terrorist attacks based on Islamic ideology.

Islam has seen several revivals of fundamentalism during history, in which its

supreme values were reinterpreted as demanding a holy war against pagans, and

even against the Jewish and Christian book religions. It is, however, important to

stress that this is not a specific trait of Islam, as is evidenced by the sarin nerve gas

attack by the Aum sect in the Tokyo subway system in 1994 (the Aum sect was

2 Nuclear weapons can only be used if the attacker cannot be wiped out after using them himself (Bernholz,

1985, p. 200 seq.), which was the basis of the Cold War stalemate and absence of overt war between the Soviet

Union and the United States.3 The empirical evidence seems to show that the number of terrorist acts in the period from 1968 to 2002

moved cyclically (Sandler and Enders, 2004, Table 1, with figures provided by the US State Department), but the

local maxima of the number of deaths caused by terrorist acts increased with the passage of time up to 2001 (311

in 1974, 697 in 1979, 2272 in 1987, and more than 3000 in 2001).


founded in 1988 and combines Buddhist and Hindu beliefs; see Hubback, 1997, p.

19 seq.). Christianity has seen similar fundamentalist revivals during its long history,

which led to the persecution of pagans after the Roman emperors had been

converted, to the crusades, to the persecution of the Cathars, and to the bloody

religious wars among different Christian denominations, as between Catholics and

Huguenots in 16th century France and the Thirty Years War between Catholics and

Protestants, and the Spanish inquisition. A quotation from the famous speech of Pope

Urban II to crusaders at the Council of Clermont in 1095 reveals the aims implied by

the respective interpretation of the supreme Christian values:

Let the deeds of your ancestors move you. . .and of your other kings, who have

destroyed the kingdoms of the pagans, and have extended in these lands the territory

of the holy church. Let the holy sepulchre of the Lord of our Saviour, which is

possessed by unclean nations, especially incite you, and the holy places which are

now treated with ignominy and irreverently polluted with their filthiness. . .But if you are hindered by love of children, parents and wives, remember what the

Lord says in the Gospel, ‘He that loveth father or mother more than me, is not

worthy of me’. . . Enter upon the road to the Holy Sepulchre; wrest land from the

wicked race, and subject it to yourselves. . . .undertake this journey for the remission

of your sins, with the assurance of the imperishable glory of the kingdom of heaven.

(quoted from Weber 1972, p. 248 seq.)

Not only religious ideologies call for a holy war against infidels and opponents and for the

application of terror, if necessary.

In the case of an ideology with nonmetaphysical supreme values such as Communism,

it is interesting that Lenin called for acts of terrorism after the Communist revolution in

Russia of 1905 had failed:

[I]t horrifies me to find that there has been talk about bombs for over six months, yet

not one has been made! . . . Form fighting squads at once everywhere, among the

students, and especially among the workers, etc, etc. Let groups be at once organized

at three, ten, thirty, etc., persons. Let them arm themselves at once at best they can,

be it with a revolver, a knife, a rag soaked in kerosene for starting fires. . .Some may

at once undertake to kill a spy or blow up a police station, others to raid a bank to

confiscate funds for the insurrection, others again may drill or prepare plans of

localities, etc. (Letter of October 5, 1905, to the St. Petersburg Committee)

With regard to Islam, we have a classical statement by the famous scholar Ibn Khaldun,

who lived around 1400:

In the Muslim community, the holy war is a religious duty, because of the universalism

of the (Muslim) mission and (the obligation to) convert everybody to Islam either by

persuasion or by force. Therefore, caliphate and royal authority are united in (Islam), so

that the person in charge can devote the available strength to both of them at the same

time. (Ibn Khaldun, 1967, vol. 1, p. 473)


This interpretation of the supreme values of Islam has been sharpened by other scholars,

including modern ones. Let us first quote the scholar Ibn Tamiyya, who lived from 1263 to

1328, when the mongols under Timur attacked Damascus:

The command to participate in jihad and the mention of its merits occur innumerable

times in the Koran and the Sunna. Therefore it is the best voluntary [religious] act that

man can perform. . .Jihad implies all kinds of worship,. . .Since lawful warfare is

essentially jihad and since its aim is that the religion is God’s entirely and God’s word is

uppermost, therefore according to all Muslims, those who stand in the way of this aim

must be fought. (Quoted in Peters, 1996, pp. 47–49)

The Indian Islamist Mawdudi (1903–1979) expressed his interpretation as follows:

Islam. . .wants and requires the entire inhabited world. It does not want this in order that

one nation dominates the earth and monopolizes its sources of wealth, after having taken

them away from one or more other nations. No, Islam wants and requires the earth in

order that the human race altogether can enjoy the concept and practical program of

human happiness, by means of which God has honoured Islam and put it above the other

religions and laws. In order to realize this lofty desire, Islam wants to employ all forces

and means that can be employed for bringing about a universal all-embracing

revolution. . . .This far-reaching struggle that continuously exhausts all forces and this

employment of all possible means are called jihad. (Quoted by Peters, 1996, p. 128)

We finally quote Sayyid Qutb (1906–1966), an Egyptian and a member of the Muslim

Brotherhood, who was a prominent Islamic figure, and was tortured and executed by

Nasser’s regime:

If we look at the sources and foundations of modern ways of living, it becomes clear that

the whole world is steeped in Jahiliyya (pagan ignorance of divine guidance), and all the

marvellous material comforts and high-level inventions do not diminish this ignorance.

This Jahiliyya is based on rebellion against God’s sovereignty on earth: It transfers to

man one of the greatest attributes of God, namely sovereignty, andmakes somemen lords

over others. It. . .takes the form of claiming that the right to create values, to legislate rules

of collective behavior, and to choose any way of life rests with men, without regard to

what God has prescribed. . . .The Islamic civilization can take various forms. . ., but theprinciples and values on which it is based are eternal. . .the worship of God alone,. . .thesupremacy of the humanity of man over material things,. . .and the control of animalistic

desires, respect for the family, the assumption of the vice-regency of God on earth

according to His guidance and instruction,. . .the rule of God’s law [al-Shari’a]. . .

Given these interpretations of the Islamic creed, the following statement by Osama bin

Laden should not come as a surprise:

In the name of Allah Most Gracious Most Merciful, Sunday, 6 Rajab 1422 (Sep. 23,

2001). . . .To our Muslim brothers in Pakistan: Peace be upon you and the mercy of


Allah and his blessings; I received with great Sorrow the news of the murder of some of

our Muslim brothers in Karachi while they were expressing their opposition to the

American crusade forces and their allies. . . We ask Allah to accept them as martyrs and

include them with prophets, their followers, martyrs,. . .It is no wonder that the Muslim

nation in Pakistan would rush to defend its Islam, since it is considered the first line of

defence for Islam in this area, just like Afghanistan was the first line of defence for

itself and for Pakistan before the Russian invasion.

We hope that these brothers are among the first martyrs in Islam’s battle in this era

against the new Christian–Jewish crusade led by the big crusader Bush under the flag

of the Cross, this battle is considered one of Islam’s battles,. . .The Prophet, Peace Be Upon Him, said: ‘Whoever did not fight, or prepare a fighter, or

take good care of a fighter’s family, Allah will strike him with a catastrophe before

Judgment Day’.

I announce to you the good news. . .that we are steadfast on the path of Jihad for the

sake of Allah,. . .with the heroic faithful Afghan people, under the leadership of our

fighter emir, who is proud of his religion, the prince of the faithful. Mullah Mohammed

Omar. We ask Allah to make him victorious over the forces of infidels and tyranny, and

to crush the new Christian–Jewish crusade on the land of Pakistan and Afghanistan. If

Allah makes you victorious, none will defeat you and if He fails you, who after Him

will make you victorious and on Allah the faithful shall trust.

Your brother In Islam, Osama bin Mohammad bin Laden. (From the Wall Street Journal

Europe, September 25, 2001. Provided to Qatar’s El-Jazeera satellite channel Monday,

September 24, 2002)

Several points in this statement merit attention:

1. There is a Jewish–Christian crusade that is taking place under President Bush under the

flag of the cross against Afghanistan and Pakistan.

2. Even the adherents of the book religions, i.e., Jews and Christians, are called infidels.

3. The jihad has to be fought against them and all faithful dying in this fight are martyrs

for the sake of Allah.

4. The phrase ‘If Allah makes you victorious, none will defeat you’ shows a certain

unrealistic evaluation of the relative power of the parties involved in the Afghan war.

5. Terrorism and supreme values

The presence of ideologies with supreme values greatly increases the danger of

terrorism for several reasons:

First, true believers are prepared to sacrifice not only the lives of others but also their

own lives in following the demands of their creed. This makes it very difficult to protect

targeted objects or persons against terror attacks.

Second, true believers are idealists and experience no guilt feelings when planning to

commit terrorist acts. The absence of guilt makes them more determined to execute their or

their leaders’ designs.


Third, true believers are convinced that their good cause will eventually win

because the supreme values of their ideology are superior to anything else and

absolutely true.

Fourth, they believe that ‘innocent victims’ are pagans or heretics, for the victims are so

defined through the supreme values of their ideology. Thus, they feel no qualms in killing

their victims.

Fifth, the evidence is clear from recorded interviews that the families of true believers

are pleased that their children have had the opportunity for martyrdom, and that mothers

offer other children as candidates for achieving the same glory.

Sixth, the core of the true believers and their intellectual leaders come mostly from

middle class or wealthy families. They have studied, know the ways of the opponents, and

have the economic and technical means to prepare efficiently their terrorist acts. It is

therefore not poverty that breeds the ideologies4, their inventors and innovators, and their

leading personalities. A crisis stemming from increasing poverty may, however, attract a

mass following for the ideology.

Finally, the way of life of nonbelievers often contradicts the demands of the true

creed. The secular nature of Western countries, their materialism, the taking of interest,

the viewed immoral behavior of women through mode of dress and open interaction

with men through conversation and personal meetings, and other unwarranted freedoms

given to women, and the toleration of homosexual practices are for instance anathema to

Islam.

Democratic rule is only tolerable if used by true believers to fulfill divine commands.

Otherwise, it implies (Qutb, 2001, p. 31):

Jahiliyyah (which is the Islamic term for any system not based on Divine revelation).

For

Jahiliyyah means that people are ruled by people, because this signifies that they submit

to one another. They refuse to submit to God alone and reject His Godhead,

acknowledging instead that some human beings have qualities of Godhead and hence

they submit to their authority’. (Qutb, 2001, p. 133)

And now, the West, with its superior economic and military strength, its domination of

the mass media, is even invading the earlier strongholds of Islam and corrupting its

adherents. Moreover, many rulers of Islamic countries are not following the commands of

the shariah, and have introduced secular law. It follows that true believers have not only

the right and the duty to fight the infidels, but also their own heretic governments.

The tasks to be accomplished are thus extensive. Not only heretic governments have to

be overthrown and their supporters killed. Besides that, the Western powers have to be

broken, their economies to be wrecked, and their governments to be revealed as impotent

to protect their citizens, with the aim to turn them into true believers.

4 Compare the empirical study by Krueger and Maleckova (2003).


All this asks for decisive terrorist acts, against important symbols of the enemy and

against the very centres of their political, military and economic strength. All attacks that

are highly visible and covered by the mass media are very attractive.

6. An economic model of ideologically based terrorism

An economic model allows certain characteristics of supreme-value terrorism and its

consequences to be deduced. Several economists have presented contributions on

terrorism, its consequences and problems, and to possible defensive measures against it

(for contributions and further references see, e.g., Frey and Luechinger, 2003; Sandler and

Enders, 2004). Not surprisingly, my model will replicate some of their conclusions. I do

not go into strategic game-theoretic aspects of the interplay between terrorists and

defenders. My model draws attention to the importance of supreme ideological values

and to the commonly neglected spiritual battle. In contrast to other economic models, my

model includes a utility function of a representative believer that takes into account the

aims of terrorists to change society. This means that we assume that all believers have

identical preferences and are potential terrorists. Lexicographic preferences as well as

utility have been widely discussed in the literature (Fishburn, 1974; Martinez-Legaz,

1998). In the approach adopted here, a Cobb–Douglas utility function is used to approach

the lexicographic ordering postulated by a supreme value. As documented above, Islamic

supreme values, like (formerly) Christian or Communist ideologies, demand that all people

on earth be converted to the right creed or that people who cannot be converted be

subjugated or removed. As a consequence, the ideology aims at increasing the share of

believers in the total population, which we may call y and define as B/N, where B is the

number of believers and N is the total population. Alternatively, y can describe the

probability of attaining secular power and establishing an ideocracy.

The size of y depends on the application of terrorist acts committed with two different

kinds of instruments, whose quantities are denoted by T1 and T2. The two instruments allow

the consideration of substitution possibilities. Two production functions describe technical

relationships and efficiency in influencing y through the instruments. For simplicity, we call

the application of the quantities of the instruments the number of the corresponding terrorist

acts committed. The terror instruments T1 and T2 are produced using capital Ci and labour Li(i= 1, 2) and the instruments can be bought in markets at prices p1, p2. The prices of capital

and labour are denoted by r and w, respectively. The costs K of buying the terrorist

instruments have to be borne by the B believers out of their identical incomes v, out of which

they have also to buy the only consumption good x at the normalized price 1. The costsK are

financed by applying a voluntary contribution rate t. Perfect competition is assumed for

markets. From these assumptions, we can formulate the following model.

The utility function of representative believer to be maximized is:

U ¼ Ax1�byb: ð1ÞThe expenditure of a believer on the consumption good is:

x ¼ ð1� tÞv: ð2Þ


Expenditures by all B believers on buying terrorist instruments in quantities T1, T2 are:

K ¼ Btv: ð3Þ

Costs of buying terrorist instruments (equal to expenditures of believers) are:

K ¼ p1T1 þ p2T2: ð4Þ

Influence on ideological aims by applying the first terrorist instrument is:

y1 ¼ ð1þ T e1Þb ð5Þ

and for the second terrorist instrument:

y2 ¼ ð1þ Tl2 Þb: ð6Þ

The two instruments determine the size of

y ¼ y1 þ y2: ð7Þ

With y =B/N, the share of believers in the population after the terrorist acts have been

performed, b is the share B(0)/N(0) of believers in the population before the acts are taken.

This share remains constant if no terrorist acts are implemented. The production functions

for the terrorist instruments are:

Ti ¼ kiL1�ai Ca

i ði ¼ 1; 2Þ: ð8Þ

Expenditure on labour and capital is:

Ei ¼ wLi þ rCi ði ¼ 1; 2Þ: ð9Þ

Profit functions to be maximized are:

Gi ¼ piTi � Ei ði ¼ 1; 2Þ: ð10Þ

This system of equations establishes demand and supply curves for the consumption

good and the ideological aim, and also for the terrorist instruments (or acts). Comparative

statics allow the influence of the intensity of ideological beliefs and the efficiency of the

terrorist instruments (for instance, because of defensive measures) to be deduced.

Let us first examine how the intensity of ideological beliefs influences demand for the

ideological good and for the consumption good of the representative believer. We do this

by increasing b in Eq. (1) and by consolidating restriction Eqs. (2)–(7) into a budget

constraint. As b!1, we approach a lexicographic preference ordering for the supreme

value y. For if b = 1, a zero amount of the consumption good is demanded, which can be

interpreted as believers’ willingness to sacrifice their lives in terrorist acts.

Fig. 1 shows the corresponding relationships. y is depicted on the vertical, x on the

horizontal axis. The second value after the x in the j functions denotes the value of b. With

increasing values for b, the demand for y increases and that for x falls. An indifference

curve is sketched for b = 0.999, a value that closely approximates a lexicographic

Fig. 1. Demand by representative believer depending on intensity of belief.


preference function. The believer is prepared to sacrifice his life in this case, because he

foregoes any amount of the consumption good to further the ideological objective.

Besides the intensity of ideological belief, the demand for the terrorist instruments

depends on the prices of the instruments. The latter is also the case for their supplies

derived from Eqs. (8)–(10). The number of terrorist instruments demanded and supplied,

and the number of terrorist acts committed, increases with the intensity of ideological

belief. The demand for terrorist acts using an instrument decreases with an increasing price

of the instrument even for high intensities of the ideological belief.

In Fig. 2, demand is seen to increase with terrorists’ income for both the consumption

good and the ideological aim. The values after the x in the g function denote the size of

individual income. With increasing demand for the ideological good, the demand and

therefore the equilibrium values for the terrorist instruments (acts) increase as well. This

contrasts starkly with an assumption that terrorism is the result of poverty or not having

income. In addition, while the self-imposed ‘‘tax rate’’ remains constant with rising

income, it increases with the intensity of belief b.Three types of defensive measures can be identified.

(1) Defensive measures can be directed against the efficiency of terrorist acts bymaking the

targets less vulnerable, by better guarding the targets, and by reducing the psychological

effect by reducing the coverage terrorist acts obtain through the mass media.

(2) Defensive measures can also be aimed at reducing the availability of terrorist

instruments, for instance, by controlling their production or by export controls.

(3) Efforts can be made to change preferences and to reduce capabilities to win converts

to the ideology.

The first set of defensive measures can be analyzed by decreasing e and l in Eqs. (5)

and (6). The number of terrorist instruments bought and applied decreases with reduced

Fig. 2. Demand depending on the size of income.


efficiency or rising difficulty of their application, as measured by lowering e and l. Inaddition, an important cause of the number of terrorist acts is income. That is, a reduction

of income would decrease the demand for terrorist acts. From this result, it follows that

one of the reasons for the increase in religiously motivated acts could be the huge oil

income of recent decades. It is probably not by chance that many of the terrorists have

come from Saudi Arabia, where high oil revenues are combined with a strong fundamen-

talist Islamic creed of the Wahhabite observation.

The second type of defensive measures reduces the availability of the instruments of

terror. In the model, this is reflected in a lower value of ki (i = 1, 2) in Eq. (8). The

equilibrium value of the number of instruments bought and thus of terrorist acts using each

instrument decreases as ki declines, i.e., when the supply or production of the good is made

more difficult. Through substitution effects, when the price of one instrument rises, the

terrorist acts committed with the other instrument increase. That is, a successful effort to

reduce terrorism of one kind will lead to increasing terrorism of the second kind.

The third way of fighting terror may be the most important in the long run. It consists of

winning the spiritual battle by influencing present and especially potential future adherents

to the ideology, and by preventing an increase in the number of believers. The first way to

do so in the model is to exert effort to decrease the intensity of the belief b to reduce the

number of terrorist acts committed as shown by Figs. 1 and 2. Another way is to reduce or

at least to prevent an increase of B/N. Over time, this requires two things. First,

immigration of fundamental believers has to be prevented as far as possible (immigration

has not been included in the model). Second, because old fundamental believers die, it is

important to educate the next generation in a way that they do not become (strong)

fundamental believers. We can reinterpret the production function for one of the terrorist


instruments as a production function for educating new fundamentalist believers. If this is

the second instrument, the second of the functions given by Eq. (8) becomes:

Bb

Bt¼ k2L

a2C

1�a2 � a: ð8aÞ

Deducting a>0 is necessary, because just keeping constant the present number of believers

in the ideology requires efforts as a consequence of natural mortality. The task of the

defensive measures has thus to be to keep the first expression on the left-hand side of the

equation smaller than the second. This may, for instance, be done by requiring that all

students attend secular schools where they learn the principles of a free society, with

religious instruction controlled to prevent fundamentalist inculcation.5

7. Conclusions

Because it is a ‘holy’ duty of true believers fighting in good faith against the ‘devilish’

forces of darkness to spare nothing and nobody, even their own lives, for the good cause

dominating all other aims, good or bad, it is difficult to prevent supreme value terrorism.

The danger from terror does not so much arise directly from the military and political

potential of states, which have an interest in hiding their support and involvement.

However, the leaders of these states have to follow widely the prescriptions of the

ideology, which are at odds with favourable economic development and the freedom of a

pluralistic system. Thus, their societies cannot keep up with developed nations and remain

inferior in economic and military capabilities.

This implies that a main danger for Western and ‘Westernized’ countries arises from

immigrant believers. The true believers who have the chance to study to become informed

about the Western way of living and to acquire the necessary technical expertise are able to

commit the most conspicuous terrorist acts. It follows that much can be done by limiting

the influx of strong believers.

Where strong believers are already present, terror can be contained by preventing them

from winning proselytes under the mantel of religious tolerance. An early screening of the

respective movements and their adherents can help much to limit the possibility of terrorist

acts.

In addition, the attention and the reports of mass media about the successful acts of

terrorists not only spread the news of terrorists’ successes but contribute to their fame and

so attract new believers as potential imitators. It should thus be examined whether a case

might exist for restricting sensationalist reporting by the mass media, a delicate task in a

free society.

Centralized technical and economic facilities are bound to attract devastating attacks. If

financial and other activities concentrated in the two towers of the World Trade Center had

been decentralized, which could have been the case given modern computers and

5 Eq. (8a) changes the model into a dynamic system. It is not the intention to discuss the further results of this

change in the present paper.


information networks, the damage would, of course, have been much smaller. Decentral-

ization is therefore part of the solution. In addition, a decentralized federal political system

is less vulnerable than a highly centralized one (see also Frey and Luechinger, 2004).

To overcome the threat posed by supreme value movements, the war about spiritual

values has to be won. At the moment, the West has scarcely entered this fight, and is even

immobilised by a dogma of favouring a ‘multicultural society’. Indeed, the Western

position in this conflict seems to be rather weak because secularization has left no

substantive supreme values that could be opposed to those of other ideologies, especially if

they are based on the ‘absolute truth’ revealed by God. The adherence to Christian beliefs

is waning, and some of its doctrines appear to be inferior to the rational mind to the strict

monotheism of Islam.

It is not obvious how a confrontation among systems with conflicting substantive

supreme values believed to be absolutely true by the adherents can be resolved by

argument and discussion. If it is acknowledged that the Quran is the definitive word of

God, then it is difficult, if not impossible, to contradict the conclusions deduced by

thinkers like Sayyid Qutb. In this case, there can only be a discussion about interpretations.

The argument can then no longer be accepted that everybody should have the right to take

his or her own decisions as long as no one violates the same right of others. For a person’s

decisions might be contrary to the commands of God. Another approach therefore has to

be taken.

An alternative approach is based on the observation that different movements or groups

of people may believe in different ideologies (including religions) with conflicting

supreme values and that this will lead to hatred and violence if they try to win proselytes

by more or less pressure, by threats, or by force. The only way to finally prevent such

developments is provided if all such movements or groups agree that no pressure or force,

but only peaceful missionary work, be allowed to convert others (Bernholz, 1995). This

implies, insofar as the commandments of the different supreme values are in conflict, that

secular law has to be established and to be acknowledged, although only where action by

the state is inescapable. It also implies that secular law has to be promoted by a legislature,

executed by an administration, and monitored by a judicial system, and not be based on

one of the supreme-value systems. Moreover, the legislature and the government have to

be elected by free citizens, with no one excluded from participation because of his creed. A

constitution has to provide for the protection of minorities and the right of everybody to

select his or her own creed or convictions. A free society implies the formal supreme value

that everybody has the right to take his or her own decisions.

This is what can be done, given the situation in western democracies. The very values

of western democracies contradict the supreme values of Islam, including the idea of a

secular, nontheocratic democracy itself, and the freedom of women to participate equally

in a society. This fundamental conflict cannot be prevented by separating the world into

different territories, each dominated by only one ideology. For this does not provide a

solution as long as the supreme values of Islam imply a universal mission.

Moreover, the West also has formal supreme values expressed in the right of individual

freedom of everybody, and of women as equals to men and not in a state of subordination.

The values are formal because they allow each individual to have his or her own

substantive supreme values, provided that they are not forced on others.


To conclude, a means available to Islamic and to other fundamentalist ideological

movements to accomplish supreme values is terror. The options for ending terror based on

supreme values are rather limited. A first option is to contain the damage by technological,

economic and political decentralization. A second option is military preemption of terror

or its prevention by intelligence and police actions, both difficult tasks because terrorists

hide in the general population. Moreover, some of the latter measures may restrict the very

freedoms they should protect. A third option is to ensure that children are taught values of

tolerance and self-improvement rather than supreme values that demand sacrifice of

oneself and the lives of others, and that promise glory and future rewards for doing so.

How the third option can be achieved in several non-Western or non-Westernized countries

is another question.

References

Bernholz, P., 1985. The International Game of Power. Mouton, Berlin.

Bernholz, P., 1995. Supreme values, tolerance and the constitution of liberty. In: Radnitzky, G., Bouillon, H.

(Eds.), Values and the Social Order. Values and Society, vol. 1. Avebury Publishing, Brookfield, Vermont, pp.

235–250.

Bernholz, P., 1997. Ideology, sects, state and totalitarianism: a general theory. Forum fur osteuropaische Ideen

und Zeitgeschichte 1, 51–84. Appeared also in: Maier, H., Schaefer, M. (Eds.), Totalitarismus und politische

Religionen: Konzepte des Diktaturvergleichs, vol. II. Ferdinand Schoeningh, Paderborn, pp. 271–298.

Ezran, M., 1989. Une colonisation douce: Les missions du Paraguay. Editions L’Harmattan, Paris.

Fishburn, P.C., 1974. Lexicographic orders, utilities and decision rules: a survey. Management Science 20,

1442–1471.

Frey, B.S., Luechinger, S., 2003. How to fight terrorism: alternatives to deterrence. Defense and Peace Econo-

mics 14, 237–249.

Frey, B.S., Luechinger, S., 2004. Decentralization as a disincentive for terror. European Journal of Political

Economy 20, 509–515 (this issue).

Hoffman, B., 1998. Inside Terrorism. Columbia Univ. Press, New York.

Hubback, A., 1997 (June). Apocalypse when?: the global threat of religious cults. Conflict Studies 300. 23 pp.

Ibn Khaldun, 1967. The Mugaddimah. An Introduction to History. Three volumes, translated from the Arabic by

F. Rosenthal, 2nd ed. Princeton University Press, Princeton.

Krueger, A.B., Maleckova, J., 2003. Education, poverty, and terrorism: is there a causal connection? Journal of

Economic Perspectives 17, 119–144.

Martinez-Legaz, J.E., 1998. Lexicographic utility and orderings. In: Barbera, S., Hammond, P.J., Seidl, C. (Eds.),

Handbook of Utility Theory. Kluwer Academic Publishing, Dordrecht, pp. 345–369.

Morgan, E.S., 1958. The Puritan Dilemma: The Story of John Winthrop. Harper Collins, New York.

Peters, R., 1996. Jihad in Classical and Modern Islam. Markus Wiener, Princeton, N.J.

Popper, Sir K., 1972. Objective knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach. Clarendon Press, Oxford.

Qutb, S., 2001. In the Shade of the Quran. In: Salahi, A., Markfield, S.A. (Eds.), Surah 5, vol. IV. The Islamic

Foundation, Leicester.

Rapoport, D.C., 1984. Fear and trembling: terrorism in three religious traditions. American Political Science

Review 78, 658–677.

Sandler, T., Enders, W., 2004. An economic perspective on transnational terrorism. European Journal of Political

Economy 20, 301–316 (this issue).

Sobel, L.A., 1975. Political Terrorism. Clio Press, Oxford.

Stayer, J.M., 1976. Anabaptists and the Sword. Colorado Press, Lawrence, Kansas.

Topitsch, E., 1958. Vom Ursprung und Ende der Metaphysik. Eine Studie zur Weltanschauungkritik, Wien.

Weber, E., 1972. The Western Tradition. Lexington (Mass.) and Toronto.

Documents

Bernholz Supreme Values as the Basis for Terror