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conceal their merchandise in locations physically remote from the suspects by con- cealment in the ground. Recently, there has been particularly strong evidence of the stick-on and leave method of concealment, as the following case reveals for example: A phone call is made by the client to the vendor (pusher) to fix a particular place (for the payment side of the transaction). The client leaves the consideration (sum of money paid for the merchandise) at the agreed location. The client will then make a second phone call to the vendor to fix a place for the delivery side of the transaction by defining a vending machine or a public phone booth. The client will go to the agreed location to pick up the drug merchandise affixed to the vending machine or public phone. This form of transaction is known as the stick-on and leave method. This method has the advantage that the purchaser and vendor have no opportu- nity to meet face to face and that it is easy to elude police control by varying the stick-on and leave location from time to time. Organization defense on the part of the drug-vending organization, including Boryokudan, is not only was achieved by the increasing sophistication of the above vending methods, it also includes measures to counter police inquiries. This may take the form of a consistent denial tactics. Apart from the only too natural denial of gainful business, offenders will even deny intention and knowledge of drug pos- session when an arrest is made on the ground of drug possession. Offenders may also remain completely silent about the import source and purchase. Through these tactics, offenders will thwart any proper police investigation. Similarly, the Boryokudan protect themselves as an organized cohesive group through elaborate anti-police measures by paying living expenses to the families of gang members who have been arrested or by paying huge rewards at the time of participation. TABLE 3-2: NUMBER OF MEMBERS OF BORYOKUDAN ARRESTED IN RELATION TO THE TOTAL RATE OF STIMULANT DRUG OFFENCES (1991-95) Year '91 '92 '93 '94 '95 Arrests Made 16,093 15,062 15,252 14,636 17,101 Boryokudan 6,886 6,627 6,401 6,329 7,377 Percentage (%) 42.8 44.0 42.0 43.2 43.1 [...] Mark Craig, "Best Practice in Intelligence Management with Respect to Chinese Organised Crime," Winston Churchill Memorial Fellowship, 1996: 1-70. Sergeant Craig is a member of the Asian Task Force, Queensland Police Service, Australia. Introduction [...] Given the magnitude of global Chinese organised crime the potential to destabilise local economies is enormous. To contemplate such potential, one must 62 TRENDS IN ORGANIZEDCRIME [ WINTER 1997

Best practice in intelligence management with respect to chinese organised crime

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conceal their merchandise in locations physically remote from the suspects by con- cealment in the ground.

Recently, there has been particularly strong evidence of the stick-on and leave method of concealment, as the following case reveals for example:

A phone call is made by the client to the vendor (pusher) to fix a particular place (for the payment side of the transaction). The client leaves the consideration (sum of money paid for the merchandise) at the agreed location. The client will then make a second phone call to the vendor to fix a place for the delivery side of the transaction by defining a vending machine or a public phone booth. The client will go to the agreed location to pick up the drug merchandise affixed to the vending machine or public phone. This form of transaction is known as the stick-on and leave method.

This method has the advantage that the purchaser and vendor have no opportu- nity to meet face to face and that it is easy to elude police control by varying the stick-on and leave location from time to time.

Organization defense on the part of the drug-vending organization, including Boryokudan, is not only was achieved by the increasing sophistication of the above vending methods, it also includes measures to counter police inquiries. This may take the form of a consistent denial tactics. Apart from the only too natural denial of gainful business, offenders will even deny intention and knowledge of drug pos- session when an arrest is made on the ground of drug possession. Offenders may also remain completely silent about the import source and purchase. Through these tactics, offenders will thwart any proper police investigation. Similarly, the Boryokudan protect themselves as an organized cohesive group through elaborate anti-police measures by paying living expenses to the families of gang members who have been arrested or by paying huge rewards at the time of participation.

TABLE 3-2: NUMBER OF MEMBERS OF BORYOKUDAN ARRESTED IN RELATION TO THE TOTAL RATE OF STIMULANT DRUG OFFENCES (1991-95)

Year '91 '92 '93 '94 '95

Arrests Made 16,093 15,062 15,252 14,636 17,101 Boryokudan 6,886 6,627 6,401 6,329 7,377 Percentage (%) 42.8 44.0 42.0 43.2 43.1

[...]

Mark Craig, "Best Practice in Intelligence Management with Respect to Chinese Organised Crime," Winston Churchill Memorial Fellowship, 1996: 1-70.

Sergeant Craig is a member of the Asian Task Force, Queensland Police Service, Australia.

Introduction [...] Given the magnitude of global Chinese organised crime the potential to destabilise local economies is enormous. To contemplate such potential, one must

62 TRENDS IN ORGANIZED CRIME [ WINTER 1997

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appreciate the Chinese diaspora over the past two centuries has given rise to large international Chinese communities. Some 60 million Overseas Chinese, including substantial communities in the western world within and upon which, Chinese organised crime groups and syndicates thrive and flourish in a parasiti- cal and malignant manner. The Overseas Chinese community is a borderless na- tion, united by ties of family, clan, language and motherland. Its influence, power and wealth are disproportionate to its size. For example, within Southeast Asia, in the Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore, ethnic Chinese control from 60%--80% of national assets. The Overseas Chinese community has one of the world's largest pools of liquid capital, amounting to approximately $US 2 trillion. Their GNP is estimated to be one quarter larger than Mainland China's, that is, approximately $US 450 billion. Bank deposits alone in Taiwan exceed $US 300 billion. This is a staggering amount considering Japan, with a population double that of Overseas Chinese, had only $US 3 trillion in assets in 1990. 3 [...]

Powerful Chinese organized crime syndicates, like some multinational corpora- tions, have the potential to undermine economies. Borders are meaningless within the global spectrum of Chinese organised crime, therefore it is foreseeable weaker economies could find themselves enveloped by a conglomeration of Chinese organised crime syndicates. While cooperation does not always exist within rules- based structures much as nation States, there are predictable activities centring around powerful criminal associations? The United Nations has estimated that glo- bal profits realised by organised crime in general amounted to more than the indi- vidual budgets of many developed countries. As a result, organised crime threatens political and economic structures of many States, placing them in danger of be- coming more economically dependent on organised crime? [...]

Rather than forming a Mafia-style pyramid, they are set out of networks of spe- cialist associations established temporarily to carrying out particular criminal en- terprises or negotiate more appropriate arrangements for long term criminal enterprises. Each organisation exists for a particular type of crime and is arranged as a business looking to create relationships with others in order to make a profit. This is what makes them so dangerous and difficult to control. They engage in any activity for profit, for example, in addition to trafficking heroin and smuggling illegal immigrants syndicates also smuggle weapons from China and Vietnam, and conspire with other international crime syndicates. In Russia, Chinese crime syndi- cates trade heroin for abandoned Soviet weapons and in the United States act as local muscle for Russian organised crime groups. They have also moved into high- tech areas such as computer chip theft, cellular phone fraud, credit card fraud and counterfeiting. These syndicates use extreme violence in the pursuit of profit through international kidnappings, extortions, and murders.

This paper argues that the Chinese crime syndicates will dominate the organised criminal world because Chinese organised crime syndicates will continue to merge with legitimate businesses, and distort the reality of commercial practices. This will lead to an environment for sophisticated industrial espionage practices and hostile intelligence activities. [...]

NEw CRIMINAL GROUPS 63

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Overview of Chinese Organised Crime in North America The principal centres for Chinese organised crime in North America are those cit- ies with large Chinese communities. On the West Coast, these include Los Angeles, San Francisco and Vancouver and on the East Coast, Toronto, Boston, and New York City. Other key cities include Washington D.C., Chicago, Houston, and Montreal. Of course numerous other cities are home to Chinese organised crime in one form or another, however it is within the large Chinatown communities that Chinese organised crime flourishes. [...]

With extortions, Chinese street gangs have demanded payments of $US 108.00 or more commonly $US 1,080.00. Typically, representatives of a triad will enter a restaurant and ask the owner to help pay the $1,080.00 medical bill of one of their brothers. Nothing more need be said. A number of years ago a member of Boston's On Leong tong, Lee Hon-tow, opened up his own gambling casino, probably with- out paying the proper triad. He was found the next morning in his car with a bullet in his head and an IOU note in his pocket for $10,800.00. This was not a clue for the Boston police but for those who might emulate Lee Hon-tow. 34

To appreciate the magnitude of such extortions, restaurant owner and former Tung On president, Kwok Fu Lai, aged 62 years, is a good example. Recently con- victed of murder-conspiracy and racketeering, he extorted money from virtually every business in New York City's Chinatown, charging as much as $US 100,000.00 for restaurants to open, and collecting as much as $US 20,000.00 a week for allow- ing gambling parlours to function. Lai, was a respectable businessman; an advisor to the Governor of New York, and had direct access to the Mayor of New York City through his private telephone number. His son is also a Manhattan Assistant Dis- trict Attorney. Lai was also in control of the Tung On gang and was one of the biggest crime figures in Chinatown, responsible for rival San Yee On triad murders. Another former Tung On president, Clifford Wong, had previously been arrested and charged with murder and racketeering and is currently serving life in prison. However, the biggest crime figure in Chinatown, Benny Ong Kai-sui, died at age 87 years, before he could be brought to justice. His influence, as "advisor for life" to the Hip Sing tong, extended much further than the 40 block Chinatown. His funeral was in the traditional gangland style and lasted three days. Chinese organised crime figures and triad members attended from all over the world. 35 [...]

The ATF reports many successful undercover operations have been conducted by non-Asian investigators. This dispels the myth that Asian criminals will only work with other Asians. 38 They are in the business of making money and will do it any way they can. For example, it is known that Chinese in New York City deal with Dominican and Italian organised crime groups for the trafficking and supply of heroin.

On the west coast of the United States, San Francisco and Los Angeles appear to be the dominant areas for Chinese organised crime activity. Although some differ- ent gangs, tongs and triads are represented. The major differences appear to be that the East Coast, specifically New York City, is currently under an extensive Fukienese influence whilst the West Coast, particularly San Francisco, appears to be influ- enced more by Hong Kong triads with greater gan problems. 39 These differences

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are noticeable in the languages spoken within the Chinatowns. Ten years ago in New York City the predominant Chinese language was the Cantonese dialect, now Mandarin and the Fukienese dialect predominate. On the West Coast, Cantonese is still predominant. The linguistic change poses further problems for law enforce- ment, particularly regarding Fukienese speakers. There is a lack of proficient and trustworthy interpreters and translators.

Law enforcement authorities in Southern California and particularly the San Francisco bay area are increasingly encountering Fukienese gang members involved in extortion, prostitution, immigration smuggling, and kidnapping for ransom. 4~ However, more sophisticated crimes are also emerging. For example, Chinese organised crime group members have identified an illicit, untapped money making market in the field of counterfeiting complete Microsoft computer packages. Being the first to commit this crime, competition from opposing or rival groups is mini- mal. And, experience and knowledge within law enforcement in this area of crimi- nal activity is also very limited. Chinese organised crime groups have already moved into counterfeiting compact disks and have realised tremendous profits. Other high- tech areas in which they are involved include counterfeit credit cards, counterfeit currency, and stolen computer chips. 41 With stolen computer chips worth more than gold, the FBI reports criminal operations are carried out with almost military preci- sion. Surveillance is conducted on the owners of potential target companies by the criminals for months. These owners are kidnapped and taken to their offices where other staff are tied up. Operations utilise state of the art equipment and much train- ing and preparation goes into each operation. The groups who commit such crimes do not identify themselves by name, that is, they most probably belong to various organisations but come together to commit these particular acts. They are located in cells throughout North America and are highly mobile. They use high powered weapons such as AK-47's, are fearless in their approach and will not hesitate to commit violence. To obtain the intelligence required, members infiltrate the tar- geted companies. Profits from the overseas sale of the stolen chips are used to finance large heroin importations. 42 [...]

Currently the biggest threat in San Francisco is emanating from Mainland Chi- nese, many of whom come via Canada, where they are acclimatised and "trained" over a five or six year period for their activities. Although these are mainly in counterfeit credit cards and narcotics importations, computer chip theft and armed robbery are on the increase/9 They are extremely surveillance conscious and com- municate, as do the gang members, by numerical codes on telephone pagers. For example, each member of the gang or group is assigned a three digit identifier, such as--Wong = 888. The complicated codes which must be learnt by members are extremely practical. [...]

This is standard operating procedure throughout North America by gangs, triads and Chinese organised crime groups in general. The recording of telephone pager numbers during intercepts, raids or arrests by police for intelligence purposes is absolutely vital. This information has been responsible for solving many serious cases, particularly by the NYPD Major Case Squad. It has been found that even if Chinese or Viemamese criminals are in hiding they will continue to communicate

Nrw CRIMINAL GROUPS 65

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via telephone pagers. Similarly, mobile telephones are frequently interchanged amongst Chinese and Vietnamese criminals. However, the major difficulty with these phones is cloning. This activity is presenting a huge challenge to law enforce- ment. Cloning fraud is the counterfeit duplication of a legitimate subscribers elec- tronic serial number/mobile identification number combination, so that the bona fide subscriber is billed for all calls placed by the clone. 5~ Cloning has become so sophisticated that phones have been programed with up to 100 legitimate subscriber numbers which are randomly selected with each call placed. [...]

A five year cycle between the West Coast of America and Australia has been predicted by the California Department of Justice with respect to Chinese organised criminal activity. They believe over the next two years Australia will experience a dramatic upturn in highly technical and sophisticated crimes committed by Chi- nese organised crime groups. They expect the illicit market for computer chips to exceed the legitimate market within 10 years? 7 [...]

Notes 3. Figures provided by Peter Lurid, a senior analyst with the Canadian Security Intelligence Service. Inter-

view with author 22 May 1996, Ottawa. And, Seagrave, Stirling, (1995), Lords of the Rim, Putnam's Sons, New York, p.3.

8. For further analysis see Craig, M and Ivory, P., Australia's Unpreparedness To Meet The Rising Threat Of Chinese Organised Crime, forthcoming paper prepared for the Internationalizing Communities Con- ference: Australia, Asia and the World, 26-30 November, 1996, University of Southern Queensland.

9. Report of the Ninth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offend- ers, 12 May, 1995, p. 50.

34. Harkin G., Chinese Triads, paper delivered at a law enforcement conference, Seattle, Washington, 16 February, 1996.

35. Interviews with Detective Ming Li, NYPD, 5th Precinct; Detective Thomas Ong, Organized Crime Investigative Division, Asian Organized Crime Section, NYPD; and, Detective Agnes Chan, Gang Unit, Intelligence Division, NYPD, by author in March and May, 1996, New York City. Photograph No. 12 and photograph No. 13 were taken at the funeral of Benny Ong Kai-sui.

38. Overview of Asian Crime in the United States, Department of Treasury, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, Office of Enforcement, Criminal Enforcement Programs, Intelligence Division, Tactical In- telligence Branch, March, 1995, Washington D.C., p. 37.

39. The greater gang problem on the West Coast is understandable given the fact that Chinese gangs first appeared in San Francisco in the late 1950's. The first juvenile gang was known as the "bugs" and was formed by American-born Chinese. Their main activity was burglary. In 1964, young immigrants organised the first foreign-born Chinese gang. the Wah Ching, and their main activity was to protect their members from American-born Chinese. For further information see, Loo, Christopher K., The Emergence of San Francisco Chinese Juvenile Gangs From the 1950s to Present, M.A. Thesis, San Jose State University, 1976.

40. Interviews with California Department of Justice, personnel John Whitmer, Criminal Intelligence Spe- cialist and Bob Morehouse, Administrator, by author on 23 April, 1996, Sacramento.

41. Interviews with California Department of Justice, personnel John Whitmer, Criminal Intelligence Spe- cialist and Bob Morehouse, Administrator, by author on 23 April, 1996, Sacramento.

42. Interview with Supervisory Special Agent Kingman Wong, Federal Bureau of Investigation, by author on 18 April, 1996, San Francisco.

49. Interview with Sergeant Dan Foley, Gang Task Force, San Francisco Police Department, by author on 17 April, 1996, San Francisco.

51. Waiters, Dennis H., Cellular Fraud Investigations Training, Cellular Telecommunications Industry Association, Washington D.C., 1994, pp. 13-14.

57. Interviews with California Department of Justice, personnel John Whitmer, Criminal Intelligence Spe- cialist and Bob Morehouse, Administrator, by author on 23 April, 1996, Sacramento.

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Reprinted with permission. Portions of this paper also appeared in Australian Po- lice Journal, Vol. 51, No. 2, June 1997.

A. L. Repetskaya, "Types of Organized Crime in East Siberia, Russia." Presented at the conference on "Global Organized Crime and International Security: Balancing Societal Needs and Human Rights," Onati International Institute for the Sociology of Law, Onati, Spain, June 3-5, 1997: 1-4.

Ms. Repetskaya is director of the Center of Study of Organized Crime at Irkutsk State University, Russia.

Peculiarities of dynamics of the present state and structure of criminality in Russia are closely related to changes in economical and political spheres of governmental activity and the state of the legal and moral conscience of our society. The process of regionalization developing on the basis of these changes have forced criminal organizations to focus their attention not only on large cities (Moscow, St. Peters- burg), but on territories of separate regions of the Russian Federation.

East Siberia is one of them. It is situated in the center of Russia, therefore it is the crossroads of major transport routes going, on the one hand, from the Far East, North and South Eastern Asia and on the other, from the Central part of Russia and Middle Asia. Enormous reserves of strategic and raw materials are confined to this region. First of all: coal, gas, wood, fur, as well as commercial gold mining, alumi- num and electric power industries. Consequently, there are large processing and sales enterprises, some of them being joint ventures. All this together with an abun- dance of banks, tourism business related in the first place to Baikal attracts the attention of criminal structures to the region.

In the recent past the existence of some dozens of penal institutions has resulted in increased crirninalization of this territory because each third of discharged pris- oners settled in this area. The creation of joint stock companies and privatization processes which are not always rational, unstable economic development and de- pression of economies have led to unemployment both patent and latent, and an increased level of population anxiety.

In this connection it is not surprising that criminality in the region grows accord- ing to absolute and relative indexes. Unfortunately, the tendency towards the in- crease of recidive, group crimes, including organized crime, remains unchanged. At the same time, the state of organized crime is not the same in different regions and territories of East Siberia. Besides, a clearly defined tendency is observed here-- the more industrial development, the higher indexes of organized crime.

Thus, if we compare the indexes of recorded crimes committed by organized crime groups in different parts of the region we will find that in 1996 this value was 569 in Irkutsk Region; 369 in Krasnoyarsk Territory; 191 in Buryatia; 256 in the Chita Region; 72 in Tuva; 156 in Khakassia. The greatest number of crimes com- mitted by organized criminal groups (OCG) has been discovered in large industrial centers of the region.

NEW CRIMINAL GRouPs 67