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Copyright © 2012 Splunk Inc. Paul Pang Chief Security Strategist, APAC & Japan Best Practices for Scoping Infections & Disrupting Breaches

Best Practicesfor Scoping Infections& Disrupting …18 THE*OVERALL*SOLUTION Online* Services Web* Services Servers Security* GPS* Locaon* Storage* Desktops* Networks* Packaged* Applicaons*

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Page 1: Best Practicesfor Scoping Infections& Disrupting …18 THE*OVERALL*SOLUTION Online* Services Web* Services Servers Security* GPS* Locaon* Storage* Desktops* Networks* Packaged* Applicaons*

Copyright  ©  2012  Splunk  Inc.  

Paul  Pang  Chief  Security  Strategist,  APAC  &  Japan

Best  Practices  for  Scoping  Infections  &  Disrupting  Breaches

Page 2: Best Practicesfor Scoping Infections& Disrupting …18 THE*OVERALL*SOLUTION Online* Services Web* Services Servers Security* GPS* Locaon* Storage* Desktops* Networks* Packaged* Applicaons*

Expecta;on  VS  Reality  

How  to  be  a  successful  CISO  without  a  'real'  cybersecurity  budget  

hFp://www.csoonline.com/ar;cle/2977609/data-­‐protec;on/how-­‐to-­‐be-­‐a-­‐successful-­‐ciso-­‐without-­‐a-­‐real-­‐cybersecurity-­‐budget.html  

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Top  3  Sugges;ons  to  you  

3  

1.  Stop  figh;ng  the  malware  game.  Learn  to  co-­‐exist  in  a  malware-­‐infested  environment  with  a  zero-­‐trust  model.  Time  to  treat  the  internal  network  as  if  it  were  the  Internet.  

2.  Stop  focusing  on  the  latest  and  greatest  tools  from  the  hoFest  vendors;  because  more  tools  are  not  stopping  security  breaches,  they  only  slow  them  down.  

3.  Focus  on  the  cri;cal  systems  that  maFer  for  data  protec;on  (systems  with  PII  data,  Social  Security  number  data,  and  credit  cards,  intellectual  property,  etc.).  Do  your  best  with  the  rest  of  the  company  environment,  but  don’t  put  your  career  on  the  line  with  baFles  that  don’t  maFer.  

hFp://www.csoonline.com/ar;cle/2977609/data-­‐protec;on/how-­‐to-­‐be-­‐a-­‐successful-­‐ciso-­‐without-­‐a-­‐real-­‐cybersecurity-­‐budget.html  

Page 4: Best Practicesfor Scoping Infections& Disrupting …18 THE*OVERALL*SOLUTION Online* Services Web* Services Servers Security* GPS* Locaon* Storage* Desktops* Networks* Packaged* Applicaons*

New  Types  of  Security  Guru  

4  

Mul$ple  roles  with  different  background,  skills,  pay  levels,  personali$es  

SOC  Manager  

SOC  Admin  &  Architect  

Project  Manager  

Tier  1  Analyst  

Tier  2  Analyst  

Forensics  Specialist  

Malware  Engineer  

Counter-­‐Intel  

"  On-­‐the-­‐job  training  and  mentoring,  and  external  training  &  cer;fica;ons  "  Opera;ng  hours  and  SOC  scope  play  key  role  in  driving  headcount  "   Tier3  Analyst  focus  on  NG  SOC  technology  such  as  Risk-­‐based  analy;cs,  APT  Hun;ng,  Threat  Intelligence  …  

Tier  3  Analyst  (CSIRT)  Key  APT  Hunter  

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SIGNATURES  

RULES   HUMAN    ANALYSIS  

Behavioral  Analy$cs  

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BIG  DATA    DRIVEN  

SECURITY  ANALYTICS  

MACHINE  LEARNING  

A  NEW  PARADIGM  

DATA-­‐SCIENCE    DRIVEN  BEHAVIORAL  ANALYTICS  

SIGNATURES  

RULES   HUMAN    ANALYSIS  

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All  Data  is  Security  Relevant  =  Big  Data  

7  

Security  Relevant  Data  All  Security  Relevant  Data  

•  “Non-­‐security”  user  and  machine  generated  data  behind  creden;als.  Includes  “Unknown”  threats.    

•  AD,  OS,  DNS,  DHCP,  email,  proxy,  badge,  industrial  control  systems,  etc.  

 

•  “Security”  data,  or  alerts  from  point  security  products.  “Known”  threats.  

•  Firewall,  an;-­‐malware,  IDS,  DLP,  vulnerability  scan  

Tradi;onal  SIEM  

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Real  ;me  sta;s;cal  analy;cs  example  "   Counting  “User_̲Agent”  Length

8  

Mozilla/4.0  (compatible;  MSIE  6.0;  Windows  NT  5.1;  SV1;  .NET  CLR  1.1.4322)

Characters  count:74

UserAgent  content  inside  logs PatternLength Count

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A  lot  of  web-­‐based  aFack  are  using  VERY  long  URL  

9  

Mean  URL  length  for  128  Byte  looks    Normal    But  for  Max  URL  length  for  9KB  size,  it    looks  suspicious.    We  found  a  lot  of  LONG  URLs  which  is  trying  to  access  the  external  site  :    “hFp://103.7.28.187/pingd?type-­‐1&dm=  www.discouss.com.hk  …  “    Aner  verified  with  hFp://urlquery.net/report.php?id=2182484,  they  are  Tencent  QQ/wechat  Message.  The  long  hFp  packages  are  encrypted  SMS.    

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Visualize  the  Pattern  in  Real  time

10  

件数

Count

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Fraud Detection

Insider Threat

Advanced Threat

Detection

Security & Compliance Reporting

Incident Analysis &

Investigations

Real-time Monitoring & Alerting

Security Intelligence Use Cases

Splunk provides solutions that address SIEM use cases and more

Tradi;onal  SIEM  (Security  Log  Focus)   Next  Gen  SOC  (All  machine  data)  

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•  Tier  1  Event  Analysis  group    •  Tier  2  Event  Analysis  group  •  Tier  3  Incident  Response  team  (Global)  

Cisco:The  CSIRT  Team  The Computer Security Incident Response Team (CSIRT) reduces the risk of loss as a result of security incidents for Cisco-owned business. CSIRT regularly engages in proactive threat assessment, mitigation planning, incident trending with analysis, security architecture, incident detection and response.

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Proac;ve  Security  Monitoring  and  Forensics  

13  

Splunk  allows  us  to  quickly  consolidate  and  correlate  disparate  log  sources,  enabling  previously  imprac;cal  monitoring  and  response  scenarios.  

“  

”  "  Enabled  proac;ve  threat  assessment,  mi;ga;on  planning,  incident  trending  with  analysis,  security  architecture,  incident  detec;on  and  response  

"  Delivered  a  centralized  view  into  user  ac;vi;es  and  in-­‐scope  systems  

Dave  Schwartzburg  Computer  Security  Incident    Response  Team  

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14  

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0-­‐day  detec;on  :  Real  ;me  Anomalty  Detec;on  (Machine  Learning  -­‐  Protected  by  Maths)  

15  

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CSIRT  Logging  Deployment  

16  

•  25 indexers / 7 clusters •  HA, load balanced, & scalable

•  Index up to multi-TB/day

•  Hundreds of TB storage

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17  

Next-­‐Gen  SOC  Architecture  Best-­‐of-­‐Breed  Management  Systems  

Early  Detec$on  System  

Situa$on  Awareness  &  Incident  Management  System  

Real  $me  Machine  Data    Asset  &  Provisioning  Management  

Security  Intelligence  PlaPorm  

Advanced  Data  Analy$cs  System  

Page 18: Best Practicesfor Scoping Infections& Disrupting …18 THE*OVERALL*SOLUTION Online* Services Web* Services Servers Security* GPS* Locaon* Storage* Desktops* Networks* Packaged* Applicaons*

18  

THE  OVERALL  SOLUTION  

Online  Services  

Web  Services  

Servers  

Security  GPS  

Loca;on  

Storage  

Desktops   Networks  

Packaged  Applica;ons  

Custom  Applica;ons  

Messaging  

Telecoms  Online  

Shopping  Cart  

Web  Clickstreams  

Databases  

Energy  Meters  

Call  Detail  Records  

Smartphones  and  Devices  

RFID  

   Real-­‐Time  

Machine  Data  

DEVELOPER  PLATFORM  REPORT  &  ANALYZE   CUSTOM  DASHBOARDS  MONITOR  &  ALERT  AD  HOC    SEARCH  

MACHINE  LEARNING  

BEHAVIOR  ANALYTICS  

ANOMALY  DETECTION  

THREAT  DETECTION  

SECURITY  ANALYTICS  

UBA  

Page 19: Best Practicesfor Scoping Infections& Disrupting …18 THE*OVERALL*SOLUTION Online* Services Web* Services Servers Security* GPS* Locaon* Storage* Desktops* Networks* Packaged* Applicaons*

Threat  intelligence  

Auth  -­‐  User  Roles  

Host    Ac$vity/Security  

Network    Ac$vity/Security  

19  

(Kill-­‐Chain)  Advanced  Threat  Detec;on  and  Response  

WEB  

Conduct  Business  

Create  addi$onal  environment  

Gain  Access    to  system  Transac$on  

MAIL  

.pdf   Svchost.exe  Calc.exe  

Events  that    contain  link  to  file  

Proxy  log  C2  communica;on    to  blacklist  

How  was    process  started?  

What  created  the  program/process?  

Process  making  C2  traffic  

Web  Portal  .pdf  

Page 20: Best Practicesfor Scoping Infections& Disrupting …18 THE*OVERALL*SOLUTION Online* Services Web* Services Servers Security* GPS* Locaon* Storage* Desktops* Networks* Packaged* Applicaons*

Connect  the  “Data-­‐Dots”  to  See  the  Whole  Story  Persist,  Repeat  

20  

Delivery,  Exploit  Installa$on  

Gain  Trusted  Access  

Exfiltra$on  Data  Gathering  Upgrade  (Escalate)  Lateral  Movement  

Persist,  Repeat    

Threat  Pa)ern  

Threat  Intelligence  

AFacker,  know  C2  sites,  infected  sites,  IOC,  aFack/campaign  intent  and  aFribu;on  

•  External  threat  intel  •  Internal  threat  intel  •  Indicators  of  compromise  

Network    Ac$vity/Security  

Where  they  went  to,  who  talked  to  whom,  aFack  transmiFed,  abnormal  traffic,  malware  download  

•  Malware  sandbox  •  Web  proxy  •  NetFlow  

•  Firewall  •  IDS  /  IPS  •  Vulnerability  scanner  

Endpoint    Ac$vity/Security  

What  process  is  running  (malicious,  abnormal,  etc.)  Process  owner,  registry  mods,  aFack/malware  ar;facts,  patching  level,  aFack  suscep;bility  

•  DHCP  •  DNS  •  Patch  mgmt  

•  Endpoint  (AV/IPS/FW)  •  ETDR  •  OS  logs  

Authoriza$on  –  User/Roles  

Access  level,  privileged  users,  likelihood  of  infec;on,  where  they  might  be  in  kill  chain    

•  Ac;ve  Directory  •  LDAP  •  CMDB  

•  Opera;ng  System  •  Database  •  VPN,  AAA,  SSO  

Page 21: Best Practicesfor Scoping Infections& Disrupting …18 THE*OVERALL*SOLUTION Online* Services Web* Services Servers Security* GPS* Locaon* Storage* Desktops* Networks* Packaged* Applicaons*

Subject:  new  commission  report  breakdown  From:  Jose  Dave  <[email protected]>  To:  <[email protected]>  Content-­‐type:  mul;part/mixed;  Content-­‐type:  applica;on/pdf;  name=”Q2_commission.pdf"  

dest_ip  cmdb_bu_owner  cmdb_applica;on_name  cmdb_system_owner  cmdb_app_lifecycle  cmdb_s_ox  cmdb_GLBA  cmdb_app_uses_ssn  cmdb_credit_card_data  cmdb_priority  cmdb_server_sonware  cmdb_supported_by  cmdb_server_phase  cmdb_db_server  cmdb_db_name  cmdb_PCI  cmdb_PII  cmdb_safe_harbor  192.168.56.102  Sales  Laptop  [email protected]  Produc;on  No  No  No  No  Tier  3  Windows7  Internal  Deployed  N  N/A  No    No    No  172.20.12.224  Marke;ng  Laptop  [email protected]  Produc;on  No  No  No  No  Tier  3  Windows7  Internal  Deployed  N  N/A  No    No    No  172.20.10.217  eCommerce  Laptop  [email protected]  Staging  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  Tier  1  Windows7  Internal  Deployed  Y  Oracle  Yes  Yes  Yes  172.20.15.229  eCommerce  Laptop  [email protected]  Staging  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  Tier  1  Windows7  Internal  Deployed  Y  Oracle  Yes  Yes  Yes    

21  

From  a  Log  Analysis  Perspec;ve  bad_ip,threat_intel_source  115.29.46.99/32,zeus_c2s  61.155.30.0/24,cymru_hFp  

Asset  and  Iden$ty  

Network  

Threat  Intel  

54.211.114.134  -­‐  -­‐  [05/May/2014:22:40:54  -­‐0400]  "POST  /portal/wp-­‐login.php  HTTP/1.1"  200  4395  "-­‐”  54.211.114.134  -­‐  -­‐  [06/May/2014:00:05:47  -­‐0400]  "GET  /tech/wp-­‐content/uploads/2014/05/Q2_commission.pdf  HTTP/1.1"  206  2475168  "-­‐”  {"ac;on":  "create",  "path":  ”…\Content.Outlook\Q2_commission.pdf”,  "process_guid":  “-­‐7751687”}  {"domain":  "115.29.46.99",  "protocol":  6,  "ipv4":  "115.29.46.99",  "process_guid":  “3259531”,  "port":  443}    

Endpoint  

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Threat  intelligence  

Auth  -­‐  User  Roles  

Host    Ac$vity/Security  

Network    Ac$vity/Security  

Kill  Chain  Analysis  

22  

115.29.46.99/32,zeus_c2s  61.155.30.0/24,cymru_hFp  

{"domain":  "115.29.46.99",    "protocol":  6,    "ipv4":  "115.29.46.99",    "process_guid":  “3259531”,    "port":  443}  

dest_ip  cmdb_bu_owner  cmdb_applica;on_name  cmdb_system_owner  cmdb_app_lifecycle  cmdb_s_ox  cmdb_GLBA  cmdb_app_uses_ssn  cmdb_credit_card_data  cmdb_priority  cmdb_server_sonware  cmdb_supported_by  cmdb_server_phase  cmdb_db_server  cmdb_db_name  cmdb_PCI  cmdb_PII  cmdb_safe_harbor  192.168.56.102  Sales  Laptop  [email protected]  Produc;on  No  No  No  No  Tier  3  Windows7  Internal  Deployed  N  N/A  No    No    No  172.20.12.224  Marke;ng  Laptop  [email protected]  Produc;on  No  No  No  No  Tier  3  Windows7  Internal  Deployed  N  N/A  No    No    No  172.20.10.217  eCommerce  Laptop  [email protected]  Staging  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  Tier  1  Windows7  Internal  Deployed  Y  Oracle  Yes  Yes  Yes  172.20.15.229  eCommerce  Laptop  [email protected]  Staging  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  Tier  1  Windows7  Internal  Deployed  Y  Oracle  Yes  Yes  Yes    

{"ac;on":  "create",    "path":  ”…\Content.Outlook\Q2_commission.pdf”,  "process_guid":  “-­‐7751687”}  

Subject:  new  commission  report  breakdown  From:  Jose  Dave  <[email protected]>  To:  <[email protected]>  Content-­‐type:  mul;part/mixed;  Content-­‐type:  applica;on/pdf;  name=”Q2_commission.pdf"  

115.29.46.99  

115.29.46.99  

Q2_commission.pdf”  

”  Q2_commission.pdf”  

[email protected]  192.168.56.102  

[email protected]  

"process_guid":  “3259531”  "process_guid":  “-­‐7751687”  

"ac$on":  "create”    

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SPLUNK  UBA  (User  Behavior  Analy$cs)  

MACHINE  LEARNING  

BEHAVIOR  ANALYTICS  

ANOMALY  DETECTION  

THREAT  DETECTION  

SECURITY  ANALYTICS  

23  

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Thank  You

[email protected]

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