Best Value Chem Pvt Ltd Risk Assessment Report

Prepared By EHS Department

M/s. BEST VALUE CHEM PVT. LTD. Page-1

M/s. BEST VALUE CHEM PVT. LTD.

437, 438 & 439, ECPL Channel Road, Village: Karakhadi, Tal.Padra, Dist: Vadodara, Gujarat, India

RISK ASSESSMENT STUDY

PREPARED BY

VAIBHU SAFETY CONSULTANTS B-31, Citizen Society,

Atmajyoti Ashram Road, Ellorapark, Vadodara-390 023

Phone: 9825756467/9427838021 (M)



M/s. BEST VALUE CHEM PVT. LTD.

437, 438 & 439, ECPL Channel Road, Village: Karakhadi, Tal.Padra, Dist: Vadodara, Gujarat, India

RISK ASSESSMENT STUDY

PREPARED BY:

Vaibhu Safety Consultants D. M. Chanchad (B.sc., PDIS) B-31, Citizen Soc., Atmajyoti Ashram road, Ellorapark, Vadodara –23 Phone: 0265-2395798 9825756467 (M)

CHECKED & VERIFIED BY:

Mr. Shailesh A Deshmukh Plant Manager

APPROVED BY:

Mr. Shaju C. O. Chief Operating Officer



CERTIFICATE

We are pleased to certify that this Risk Assessment Report of Company has been conducted by us. This is the first Risk Assessment report of this company and it will be carried out during the month of November- 2009. Risk Assessment is a legal requirement u/r 12-c & 68-O of the Gujarat Factories Rules. The recommendations are based on information supplied to us by the company and our plant visits. The Executive Summary is given in the beginning to highlight the important summary of our report and methodology of the risk assessment carried out. We are thankful to the Mr. Shaju C. O. (Chief Operating Officer) and Mr. Shailesh A Deshmukh (Plant Manager) for their all co-operation to prepared this report. FOR VAIBHU SAFETY CONSULTANT

Authorized Signatory



Index

Section no.

Contents

Page No.

1 Executive Summary 6 2 Objectives, Philosophy and methodology of

Risk assessment 8

3 Introduction of the unit 9 3.1 Company Introduction 3.2 Details of Unit 10 3.3 Project setting 13 3.4 Organizational setup 16 3.5 List Of product 3.6 Details of storage of Hazardous Materials in

Bulk and control measures provided 17

3.7 Hazardous Properties Of The Chemicals, Compatibilities And Special Hazard

18

3.8 List Of Raw Material Required 18 3.9 Facilities / System for process safety,

transportation, fire fighting system and emergency capabilities to be adopted

19

3.10 Brief Description of Process. 26 3.11 Facilities / System for process safety,

transportation, fire fighting system and emergency capabilities to be adopted

58

4 Hazard identification 62 4.0 Introduction 4.1 DOW’s Fire and Explosion Index 4.2 Failure Frequencies 65 4.3 Identification of Hazardous area 66 5 Risk Assessment 71 5.1 Effects of Release of Hazardous Substances 5.2 Identification of High Risk Areas 73 5.3 Modes of Failure 5.4 Damage Criteria for heat radiation 74 6 Consequence Analysis 77 6.1 Consequence Analysis 6.2 Risk Estimation 87 6.3 Comments 7 Risk Reduction Measures 88 7.1 Design



7.2 Safety Devices 7.3 Operation and Maintenance 89 7.4 Recommendations 8 Disaster Management plan 91 8.1 On site emergency Plan (OSEP) 8.2 Scope of OSEP 92 8.3 Elements of OSEP 8.4 Methodology 8.5 Emergencies Identified 8.6 Others 8.7 Emergency Organization 93 8.8 Emergency Facilities 8.9 Emergency Escapes 94 8.10 Assembly points 8.11 Wind sock 8.12 Emergency transportation 8.13 Emergency communication 95 8.14 Warning Alarm/ Communication of Emergency 8.15 Emergency responsibilities 8.16 Mutual Aids 8.17 Mock Drill Appendix 96



SECTION I

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1.0 Executive Summary 1.1 M/s. Best Value Chem Pvt Ltd retained the services of Vaibhu Safety

Consultants for carrying out Risk Assessment Studies for their proposed site located at Plot No. Best 439,438,437 ECPL Channel Road, Village: Karakhadi, Tal. Padra, Dist:Vadodara, Gujarat, India

1.2 Experts from M/s Vaibhu Safety Consultants visited the site on 24th November, 2009 for inspection of the existing facilities, the environs and collection of relevant information about the installation and the operations will be carried out in the plant. They also held detailed discussions and observed various aspects including chemical handling; storage and process control measures will be taken care of plant process safety and emergency preparedness with the officers of the company.

1.3 Flammable and hazardous chemicals will be received through road tanker and

drums which will be stored in tank farm or godown as per petroleum Act and Rules.

1.4 Based on the data furnished and the study of the installation, certain hazards

have been identified and their consequences are modeled mathematically using HAMSGAP software.

1.5 The study indicates that possible hazards associated with the plant are

confined to (a) under ground B class storage tanks area and various flammable nature raw materials in drum storage area. Various hazard scenarios have been identified for Risk Assessment and the consequences modeled. The results of the analysis have been summarized in the table appended



1.6 It is observed from the summary that the consequences of hazards associated with any possible spills / leaks release scenarios would be of a relatively small in nature and confined up to factory premises, would be taken care of with the emergency facilities and the manpower deployed at the plant.

1.7 The possibility of occurrence of such hazards and their effects could be

further reduced by implementing the suggestions made in this report. 1.8 However considering the potential for major hazards, however remote they

may be, associated with storage area, some suggestions are made in the subsequent chapters for further improvement in the areas of safety, environmental impact, Emergency facilities and emergency preparedness plan.

1.9 Conclusion Based on the

1) Risk Analysis study and information regarding the layout plan and safety systems.

2) Discussions with company officials. 3) Observation of Operations.



SECTION II

OBJECTIVE, PHILOSOPHY AND METHODOLOGY OF RISK ASSESSMENT

3.1 Objective :

The principle objective of this study was to identify major risks in the manufacture of Chemicals & to evaluate on-site & off-site consequences of identified hazard scenarios. Pointers are then given for effective mitigation of hazards in terms of suggestions for effective disaster management, suggesting minimum preventive and protective measures & change of practices to ensure safety.

3.2 PHILOSOPHY :

This report is limited to the following:

Identification of major risk areas. Hazard identification/Identification of failure cases Consequential analysis of probable risks / failure cases

o Evaluation of heat radiation & pressure wave profiles for identified failure cases

o Risk assessment on the basic of the above evaluation & risk acceptability o Minimum preventive & protective measures to be taken to minimize risks to

maximum possible extent. Giving pointers for effective disaster management Suggesting other measures to further lower the probability of risk

3.3 Methodology

Design data, built in safety systems are studied. Discussions are held with officials. Safety related individual system is discussed. Hazard identification exercise is conducted taking into consideration of materials, material handling methods, operating procedures, built in safety in reactors, operating parameters and safety measures to be taken in proposed plant. Few areas like process building, storage of hazardous chemicals, to evaluate safety systems in the event of any abnormalities occurring. Containment failure scenario related to storage area is considered for hazard Analysis and consequences of such containment failures are considered in detail. Thus, this study is mainly oriented towards actual risks rather than chronic risks. Based on the data furnished and the study of the installation, certain hazards have been identified and their consequences are modeled mathematically using HAMSGAP software.



SECTION III

INTRODUCTION OF THE UNIT

3.1 COMPANY INTRODUCTION

Introduction: M/s Best Value Chem Pvt Ltd., situated at 439,438,437- ECPL Road, Village Karkhadi, Taluka Padra, Dist Vadodara, Dist Vadodara, Gujarat. The unit was started in the year 2000 and is primarily involved in the manufacturing perfumery chemicals. The unit is operational since April, 2000 and holds valid Consolidated Consent and Authorization from Gujarat Pollution Control Board. The demand for the product has promise and hence, the unit now intends to expand its manufacturing activities for the perfumery products already manufactured along with addition of new products Salient Features: Some of the Salient Features of the project are highlighted in the subsequent sections. The expansion activities will be carried out in the plots 437,438 & 439. The total area of the plot available is 3.2 hectares with a built up area of only 0.375 hectares. For the expansion project, additional construction will be conducted. The existing setup will also be utilized for the expansion activities. With the increasing demand of its existing and related products, the company proposes to expand production capacity for 11 of its existing product viz., Amyl Salicylate – 150 MT/Month; Benzyl Acetone – 100MT/Month; Benzyl Salicylate - 50MT/Month; Citra Ether – 50 MT/Month, Citronellyl Acetate – 10MT/Month; Hycol (Hydroxy Citronellol) – 5 MT/Month ,Iso Amyl Salicylate – 25 MT/Month; Terpinyl Acetate – 75 MT/Month; Undecavertol – 75 MT/Month; Verdyl Acetate – 650 MT/Month; Verdyl Propionate – 166 MT/Month, and introduce 5 new products viz. Caryophyllene Acetate – 5MT/Month, Dimettol 100MT/Month, Melonal – 30MT/Month, Hexyl Salicylate 175MT/Month and Verdyl Isobutyrate 150MT/Month. The list of salable byproducts generated from different products are listed separately The total investment on the expansion project is about Rs. 10 Crores. The source of water will be existing borewell. The total water consumption will change from existing CC& A consumption of 24.7m3/day to 37.7m3/day. The waste water generation will also change from existing 14.2m3/day to 17.5m3/day basically due to increase in industrial waste water 15m3/day and domestic effluent 2.5m3/day. The domestic effluent 2.5 m3/day will be taken to the soak pit. The process effluent 15m3/day will be treated in the tertiary effluent treatment plant and treated waste water will be discharged in to the Effluent Channel Projects Ltd conveying system as per the inlet norms. The Company is already a Member of the Effluent Channel Projects Ltd. With the proposal for a new boiler of 5MT for steam generation and Thermic Fuid Heater. The presently used Boiler and TF will be used as standby. There will be increase in fuel consumption which is 19.7 MT/day- Agricultural Waste/8.2MT- Furnace Oil/10.5 N m3



Gas based on availability. The present fuel as per the present CC&A is furnace oil. There are no other process emissions. The power maximum demand requirement will increase from the existing maximum demand of 120 HP to 500HP, which is being supplied by GEB. The existing DG set will be utilized during power failure and emergencies. Hazardous waste will be generated in form of ETP Sludge, Distillation residue, used oil and discarded containers. The distillation residue is expected to increase only by 870 kgs/Month. The waste will sent to the Common Incinerator of Nandesari Environmental Control Ltd. ETP sludge (1MT) will be sent to the Common TSDF on NECL, Nandesari. (Membership already available). Waste oil and grease will be sold to approve recycler. Hazardous waste will be generated in form of ETP Sludge, Distillation residue, used oil and discarded containers. The distillation residue is expected to increase only by 870kgs/Month. The waste will sent to the Common Incinerator of Nandesari Environmental Control Ltd. ETP sludge (1MT) will be sent to the Common TSDF on NECL, Nandesari. (Membership already available). Waste oil and grease will be sold to approve recycler. Though the raw materials like Methanol, Tetra Hydro Furan, and Toluene are very highly flammable liquids and fall under MSIHC rules, the quantities are very low then the threshold quantities specified and stored in drums. However, very high level of safety precautions are taken in the plant viz. Flame Arrestor at the end of the vent pipe of the tank, Flame Proof Pumps and Motors, individual double static earthing to reactors, proposed location of tank farm is away from the process area and Boiler house, fencing of the area, provision for flexible Earthing for tanker unloading purpose, provision of Spark Arrestor/Muffler at the security gate to each vehicle is already in practice and the will be implemented for tankers/Vehicles which comes in to the tank farm for unloading, use of Non Sparking Tools in the tank farm area, provision of Copper Flange Jumpers to prevent any accumulation of Static Electricity during pumping or draining, provision of Nitrogen Blanketing with safety valves at both the storage Tanks. All the Plant Personnel are provided with Personal Protection Equipments to protect against any adverse health effect during operations, leakage, spillages or splash. PPE like Helmets, Safety Shoes, Safety Glasses, Acid-Alkali Proof Gloves etc. are provided to the employees with periodic training in safety. Periodic Process Safety and Fire Safety Audits are conducted by Third Party on Annual Basis. The Unit holds a valid CC&A issued by Gujarat Pollution Control Board. Around 450 plus trees have been planted in the periphery area of the plot. Viz. mango, chiku, lemon grass, ashoka, neem, bamboo, nagchampa, rubber, plantain & various assorted flowering plants etc.

3.2 DETAILS OF UNITS

Sr. No. Particulars

2 Full Name & Address of Unit : M/s Best Value Chem Pvt Ltd., 437, 438 & 439, ECPL Road, Village Karakhadi, Taluka Padra, Dist Vadodara, Dist Vadodara, Gujarat.

3 Telephone No. : 02622-273606,273328, Fax : 02662-273607



4 Month & Year of Establishment

: 2000

5 Full name & Address of the occupier

: Shaju C. O. ( Chief Operating Officer), M/s Best Value Chem Pvt Ltd., 437, 438 & 439 ECPL Road, Village Karakhadi, Taluka Padra, Dist Vadodara, Dist Vadodara, Gujarat.

6 Full name & Address of the Plant Manager

: Shailesh A Deshmukh, Flat No Aabhushan Apt, Behind Narmada Guest House, Ellora Park, Race Course Circle Road, Vadodara, Gujarat, India.

7 Man Power

: Present : 23 Proposed: 50

8 No. Of shift & Shift timing : General from 09.00 to 17.00 1st Shift from 08.00 to 16.00 2nd Shift from 16.00 to 23.00 3rd Shift from 23.00 to 08.00

9 Environs (Nearest Facilities) 1. Railway Station, Kural : 9 km 2. Police Station, Padra : 15 km 3. Fire Station- Ekalbara

Vadodara IPCL, GSFC, Refinery(CCR)

:::

8 km 32 km 25 to 28 km

4. Hospitals Shree Pramukh Swami Hospital, Atladra, Vadodara

: 22 km

5. Metrological Data

Latitude 220 11’44”N Longitude 720 52’52” E

Temperature

Maximum 44º C Minimum 12.0 º C

Near by factories

North- West side Transmetal Ltd, North east Philoden Dye Chem Pvt

Ltd, Effluent Channel Projects Ltd Canal.

South west Sterling Biotech Ltd, Solaris Ltd, Alembic Ltd, Sun Pharmaceuticals Ltd, Ashai Songwan Ltd, Mayur Dye Chem, Newton Engg & Chemicals Ltd

South east ECPL Channel



10 Total Land at Plant 3.202 hectare

11 Power connection Presently 120 HP will increase to 200HP

12 DG Set 125 KVA DG Set Caterpillar Make & Kirloskar alternator

13 Water 200 mm bore with 80m depth & submersible pump.

14 Boiler 0.6 MT/hr Thermax’ make boiler at 10.0 Kgs/cm2, Small Industrial boiler with RO Water plant, FO fired.

15 Chilled water plant 3 T.R. at 5 c with tank and with 7.5 H.P. Pump.

16 Cooling Tower 305 m3/h- 32oC with 5o C fall, 200 m3 storage capacity - 35 meter. 200 m3/hr at 320C with 50C fall.331 TR Capacity

17 Effluent treatment Plant Tertiary Treatment Plant.

18 Total Builtup area at the Factory 0.3752hectares.

BUILDING AND CIVIL CONSTRUCTION

Sr.No. Purpose TYPE OF BUILDING Area (M2)

19 Production Plant Gr +2 MS Structure Floors

Closed with walls and covered by ACC Sheets 225.0 M2

20 All utilities block MS Structure with A.C.C. roof 49.47 M2

21 Administrative building and Secured office, Laboratory & Canteen R.C.C. 1461.53 M2

22 Proposed Plant Closed with walls and covered by ACC Sheets 30284.00M2

License & Approval:---

23 Factory Inspectorate

All plans are duly approved by F.I. and license is valid. License No.002788 Valid 22.10.2011.

24 Electrical Inspector

All plans are approved

25 GPCB

Valid Consents & Authorization order No.33338

26 Solid waste Disposal

Member of Solid Waste disposal site on Nandesari Environment Control Ltd. (NECL) Member of Incinerator of Nandesari Environment Control Ltd. (NECL)



WATER

27 8” dia bore well with pump for 30m high, 1 lac lit OH tank on main plant building.

----- Nayan & Co.

DG SET

28 125 kva dg Set with manual charge over for GEB power Caterpillar Diesel tank & panel. Caterpillar & Kirloskar Engine.

----- GMMCO Ltd

EFFLUENT TREATMENT

29 Tertiary Treatment Plant.

1 15.0m3 capacity per day

3.3 PROJECT SETTING:

Produce company will be located at 720 54’46.42” East longitudes & 220 11’54.23” North latitude in Village: Karakhadi, Ta: Padra, Vadodara district in Gujarat State. The area is classified as an approved Industrial area.

Village: Karkhadi, Ta: Padra area is located at a distance of 35 km to the North East of Vadodara District, about 6.80 km off State Highway SH-6. A located map showing various features in 10 km radius form the proposal site is shown as figure 1.1.

Manufacturing site of the company is located on Village: Karkhadi, Padra, Plot plan is shown in figure 1.2. In general, the area is industrial zone and. The rainfall is low (@ 1000 mm per year) occurring in the months of July – August. Summer temperatures are high; minimum temperature in the region of 26 – 270C & maximum of about 40 – 420C. Relative Humidity in summer season ranges form 30 – 80%.



Aerial View of 5km

Figure-3.1



Figure-3.2



3.4 ORGANISATIONAL SET UP

3.5 LIST OF PRODUCTS Total List of Products Manufactured, Proposed, Increase in Quantities to Be Manufactured. We would like to highlight the fact that all the products listed below will not be manufactured all together at any given instant. At any moment, a maximum of 2 to 3 products will be manufactured.

No. Product Name Existing Qty (MT/Month)

Proposed Qty (MT/Month)

Remarks

1. Alpha Ionone 0.50 0 To be Discontinued2. Amyl Salicylate 8.33 150.00 Expansion3. Benzyl Acetone (Jastone) 1.00 100.00 Expansion4. Benzyl Salicylate 1.25 50.00 Expansion5. Beta De Hydro Cyclo Central 2.08 0 To be Discontinued6 C-11 Aldehyde 0.25 0 To be Discontinued7 Citra Ether 1.00 50.00 Expansion8 Citronellyl Acetate 1.66 10.00 Expansion9 Eugenol 2.44 0 To be Discontinued

10 Fold Orange Oil 0.50 0 To be Discontinued11 Geranyl Acetate 5.00 0 To be Discontinued12 Geranyl Nitrile 2.08 0 To be Discontinued.13 Hycol (Hydroxy Citronellol) 0.33 5.00 Expansion14 Iso Amyl Salicylate 3.33 25.00 Expansion15 Iso Eugenol 1.25 0 To be Discontinued16 Rectified Clove Leaf Oil 2.00 0 To be Discontinued17 Rhodinol Ex Geranium 0.17 0 To be Discontinued18 Methyl Ionone 0.5 0 To be Discontinued19 Terpinyl Acetate 25.00 75.00 Expansion20 Undecavertol (Kakdinol) 0.25 75.00 Expansion21 Verdyl Acetate 50.00 650.00 Expansion22 Verdyl Propionate 20.83 166.00 Expansion23 Melonal 00.00 30.00 New Product24 Caryophyllene Acetate 00.00 5.00 New Product25 Dimettol 00.00 100.00 New Product26 Hexyl Salicylate 00.00 175.00 New Product27 Verdyl Isobutyrate 00.00 150.00 New Product



3.6 PROPOSED CONSUMPTION OF RAW MATERIALS ON SINGLE PRODUCT MANUFACTURING BASIS We would like to highlight the fact that all the raw products listed below will not be required at the same instance. Only a few materials will be required for manufacture of 2 to 3 Products at any given instance. List of raw materials required for proposed products considering Single product manufacturing.



3.7 DETAILS OF STORAGE OF HAZARDOUS MATERIALS IN BULK AND CONTROL MEASURES PROVIDED

Sr. no.

Description KL MOC TYPE Width in meters

Length in

meters

Total area in

m2

Qty. CONTROL MEASURE PROVIDED

1 DCPD Storage Tanks 50 KL; 2 nos,Underground

50 MS Under Ground

8.0 5.5 44.00 2

2 Pentanol Mixture Tanks 50 KL; 2 nos.Underground

50 MS Under Ground

8.0 5.5 44.00 2

3 Acetic Acid Storage Tank 1No,Above Ground

10 SS 316

Above Ground

2.5 2.8 7.00 1

4 Finished product Storage VA 20 KL, 3 nos

20 SS304 Above Ground

4.0 3.0 12.00 2

5 Finished product Storage AS 10 KL, 2 nos


3.0 2.0 6.00 2

6 Finished Products Storage VP 20KL, 1 nos


4.0 3.0 12.00 1

7 Finished Products Storage Spare 20KL ; 2 nos


4.0 3.0 12.00 2

Flame-proof light fittings will be provided.

Nitrogen blanketing will be provided for all storage tanks.

Work permit system followed Lightening arrestor provided Fire fighting equipment will be

provided as per fire load calculation.(list is provided)

PPE will be used at the time of material handling.

02 nos. Safety shower, eye wash provided and 02 nos. Will be provided in proposed plant.

Earthing-bonding provided for static charge.

Drum handling trolley will be used for drum handling.

Identification Labels and symbols are provided on drums.

NFPA labels will be provided on tank farm.

Caution note provided. Dyke wall provided for above

ground storage tank. Level gauge provided. Double drain valve provided Scba sets available. Tanker unloading procedure.



3.8 LIST OF PRODUCTS & RAW MATERIALS WITH STORAGE DETAILS: On Page No 18

Sr. No.

Raw Material Quantity in MT/Month Storage At a time in MT/M

Physical form

Stored In MOC

1. Acetic Acid 234 10 Liquid Tank SS304 2. Acetic Anhydride 70.46 8 Liquid Drums HDPE 3. Acid Catalyst 27.45 2 Liquid Carboy HDPE 4. Aldehyde 47.17 2.5 Liquid Drums HDPE 5. Caryophellene 4.00 1 Liquid Drums GI 6. Phase transfer Catalyst 1.10 0.1 Liquid Drum HDPE 7. Caustic lye 1.04 1 Liquid Carboy HDPE 8. Citronellol 17.03 2 Liquid Drums MS Epoxy 9. Benzylledene Acetone 80 6 Liquid Drums GI

10. D’limonene/Orange Terpenes 47.94 4 Liquid Drums MS Epoxy 11. Di Ethanol Amine 0.43 0.22 Liquid Drums MS Epoxy 12. Dicyclopentadiene (underground) 783.33 40 Liquid Tank SS304 13. Ethyl Chloro Acetate 22.05 1.5 Liquid Drums HDPE 14. Benzyl chloride 27.6 2.5 Liquid Drums HDPE 15. Halide (Pentyl Bromide/Chloride) 75.47 5 Liquid Drums HDPE 16. HCL 45% 0.16 0.5 Liquid Carboys HDPE 17. Iodine 0.18 0.09 Solid Can GI 18. Iso Amyl Alcohol 12.86 3 Liquid Drums HDPE 19. Isobutyric Acid 72.50 2 Liquid Drums HDPE 20. Methanol 47.94 KL 3 Liquid Drums MS 21. Methyl Heptanone 98.97 3.5 Liquid Drums HDPE 22. Methyl Magnesium Bromide / Chloride 31.61 2.5 Liquid Drums MS 23. Hexyl Alcohol 112 2.8 Liquid Drums MS Epoxy 24. Mg Turnings 12.74 1 Solid Bags PP 25. Pentanol mixture (Under Ground Storage) 77.14 20 Liquid Tanks MS 26. Propionic Acid 80.23 3 Liquid Drums HDPE 27. Salicylic Acid 265 8 Solid Bags PP 28. Soda Ash 12.24 1 Solid Bags PP 29. Sodium Acetate 21.30 1.2 Solid Bags PP 30. Sodium Methoxide 22.05 2 Solid Can GI 31. Sulphuric Acid 31.98 1.2 Liquid Carboys HDPE 32. Terpineol 68.18 5 Liquid Drums GI 33. Tetra hydro Furon 235.85 KL 6 Liquid Drums MS 34. Toluene 28.03 3 Liquid Drums MS 35. Sodium salicylate 35.7 3.5 Solid Containers HDPE 36. Zn Chloride 0.52 0.1 Solid Can GI

Sr. No. Products Quantity in MT/ Month

Storage At a

time in MT/ Month

Physical form

Stored In MOC

1. Amyl Salicylate 150 20.00 Liquid Storage Tank & Drums SS316 2. Benzyl Acetone (Jastone) 100 5.00 Liquid Drums HDPE / GI 3. Benzyl Salicylate 50 3.00 Liquid Drums HDPE / GI 4. Citra Ether 50 2.00 Liquid Drums HDPE / GI 5. Citronellyl Acetate 10 2.00 Liquid Drums HDPE / GI 6. Hycol (Hydroxy Citronellol) 5 1.00 Liquid Drums HDPE / GI 7. Iso Amyl Salicylate 25 2.00 Liquid Drums HDPE / GI 8. Terpinyl Acetate 75 5.00 Liquid Drums HDPE / GI 9. Undecavertol (Kakdinol) 75 5.00 Liquid Drums HDPE / GI 10. Verdyl Acetate 650 20.00 Liquid Tank & Drums SS316,HDPE & GI 11. Verdyl Propionate 166 20.00 Liquid Tank & Drums SS316,HDPE & GI 12. Melonal 30 2.00 Liquid Drums HDPE / GI 13. Caryophyllene Acetate 5 0.50 Liquid Drums HDPE / GI 14. Dimettol 100 2.00 Liquid Drums HDPE / GI 15. Hexyl Salicylate 175 10.00 Liquid Drums HDPE / GI 16. Verdyl Isobutyrate 150 10.00 Liquid Drums HDPE / GI



3.8 HAZARDOUS PROPERTIES OF THE CHEMICALS, COMPATIBILITIES AND SPECIAL HAZARD



F = FIRE T = TOXIC E = EXPLOSIVE R = REACTIVE BP = BOILING POINT LEL = LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT UEL = UPPER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT SP.GR = SPECIFIC GRAVITY VD = VAPOUR DENSITY ER = EVAPORATION RATE H = HEALTH HAZARD CLASS F = FIRE HAZARD CLASS R = REACTIVE HAZARD TLV = THRESHOLD LIMIT VALUE PPM = PARTS PER MILLION STEL = SHORT TERM EXPOSURE LIMIT NFPA =NATIONAL FIRE PROTECTION ASSOCIATION-USA ACGIH =AMERICAN CONFERENCE OF GOVERNMENTAL INDUSTRIAL HYGIENISTS NA = NOT AVAILABLE N.A. = NOT APPLICABLE RM: RAW MATERIALS P : PRODUCTS



3.9 BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF PROCESS.

3.9.1 THE DETAILS OF MANUFACTURING PROCESS IS MENTIONED BELOW: 1) AMYL SALICYLATE:

Name Quantity (MT/Month) Product AMYL SALICYLATE 150 Raw material consumption per month:

Material Quantity (MT/Month) Salicylic Acid 107.14 Pentanol mixture 77.14 Acid Catalyst 5.36 Toluene Make Up & Recycled 23.57 KL Soda Ash 0.71

Brief process: Amyl Salicylate will be prepared by Azeotropic Esterification reaction, i.e. heating Pentanol and Salicylic acid in presence of a solvent & catalyst. The reactant mass will be then cooled, washed and neutralized with soda ash. After settling the aqueous layer will be taken to effluent treatment plant. The crude Amyl Salicylate will be taken for distillation to separate Low boilers & fractions of Amyl Salicylate. Chemical Reaction:

Flow Chart:

Fractions of Amyl

Salicylate

Low Purity

Fractions

Glass Lined Reactor

Salicylic Acid

Pentanol MixtureAcid Catalyst

Toluene

Crude Amyl Salicylate

Reboiler

Aqueous Layer to ETP for Treatment

Receiver

Soda Ash

Toluene RecoveredRecycled to Reactions

Water from ReactionUsed for Neutralization



2) BENZYL ACETONE (JASTONE):

Name Quantity (MT/Month) Product BENZYL ACETONE (JASTONE) 100 Raw material consumption per month:

Material Quantity (MT/Month) Benzylledene Acetone 118.00

Brief process: Benzyllendene Acetone will be taken for selective hydrogenation at job workers premises. The crude Benzyl Acetone thus obtained will be taken for separation of low boilers & main product by distillation. Chemical Reaction:

Flow Chart:

Crude BCA

ReboilerLow purity

fractions recycled

Fractions of Jastone

3) BENZYL SALICYLATE:

Name Quantity (MT/Month) Product BENZYL SALICYLATE 50.00 Raw material consumption per month:

Material Quantity (MT/Month) Benzyl Chloride 27.6 Sodium Salicylate 35.7 Phase Transfer Catalyst 1.10

Brief process: Benzyl Salicylate is prepared by reacting a mixture of Sodium Salicylate and Benzyl Chloride. On completion of reaction the reaction mass is washed and the aqueous layer is sent to effluent treatment. Crude Benzyl Salicylate is then taken for fractionation for separation of low purity and high purity fractions.



Chemical Reaction: C6H5 CH2 CL + Na C7H O3 C14 H12O3 + NaCl Benzyl Chloride Sodium Salicylate Benzyl Salicylate Sodium Chloride Flow Chart:

Fractions of Benzyl

Salicylate

Low Purity

Fractions

Glass Lined Reactor

Benzyl chloride

Sodium Salicylate

Phase Transfer Catalyst

Crude Benzyl Salicylate

Reboiler


Receiver

4) CITRA ETHER (METHYL TERPENYL ETHER):

Name Quantity (MT/Month) Product CITRA ETHER (METHYL TERPENYL ETHER) 50 Raw material consumption per month:

Material Quantity (MT/Month) D’limonene/Orange Terpenes 47.94 Acid Catalyst 0.48 Methanol make up & Recycled 47.94 KL Di Ethanol Amine 0.16

Brief process: Citra Ether will be prepared by refluxing mixture of Methanol and D’limonene/Orange Terpenes in presence of a strong acid. After the completion of reaction, the mass will be cooled, neutralized and excess Methanol will be recovered. The reaction mass will be washed by water and aqueous layer will be sent to ETP. The organic layer will be taken for distillation whereby Low purity fraction, mains and high purity fraction will be separated. Chemical Reaction:



Flow Chart:

Glass Lined Reactor

D'limonene/Orange TerpenesAcid Catalyst

MethanolDi Ethanol Amine

Crude Citra Ether

Reboiler


Water

Receiver

Low Purity Fractions Recycled

Fractions of Citra Ether

Recovered Methanol Recycled to reactions

5) CITRONELLYL ACETATE:

Name Quantity (MT/Month) Product CITRONELLYL ACETATE 10.00 Raw material consumption per month:

Material Quantity (MT/Month) Citronellol 8.70 Acetic Anhydride 6.52 Sodium Acetate 0.43 Soda Ash 0.14

Brief process: Citronellyl Acetate will be manufactured by hot esterification of Citronellol with Acetic anhydride in the presence of a catalyst. The reaction mass will be cooled and washed with water. After settling, the spent acetic acid will be separated and stored separately in drums as a salable by product. Further the mass will be neutralized with soda Ash solution. After settling the aqueous layer will be taken to effluent treatment plant. The crude Citronellyl acetate will be taken for distillation for separation of Low boilers and final product. Chemical Reaction:

OH

CITRONELLOL

(CH3CO)2OOCOCH3

ACETIC ANHYDRIDE CITRONELLYL ACETATE ACETIC ACID



Flow Chart:

Glass Lined Reactor

CitronellolAcetic AnhydrideSodium Acetate

Soda ash solution

Crude Citronellyl Acetate

Reboiler

Effluent to ETP for Treatment

Receiver


Fractions of Citronellyl

Acetate

Spent Acetic Acid 30% By product for sale

6) HYCOL (HYDROXY CITRONELLOL):

Name Quantity (MT/Month) Product HYCOL (HYDROXY CITRONELLOL) 5 Raw material consumption per month:

Material Quantity (MT/Month) Citronellol 8.33 Sulphuric Acid 8.33 Caustic Lye 10% 1.04 Di Ethanol Amine 0.10 Toluene 10.42 KL

Brief process: Hycol (Hydroxy Citronellol) will be prepared by acid hydration of Citronellol with Sulphuric acid followed by distillation. Citronellol will be hydrated under cold conditions using aqueous acid, neutralized and the fractionated to obtain various fractions of low purity, mains and high impurity. Chemical Reaction:

OH

DIL H2SO4

OH

OH

CITRONELLOL HYCOL



Flow Chart:

Glass Lined Reactor

CitronellolAcid catalyst

TolueneWater

Crude Hycol

Reboiler


Receiver

Low Purity Fractions

Recycled to Reaction

Fractions of Hycol

Caustic Lye 10%

Di Ethanol Amine

Toluene Recovered

7) ISO AMYL SALICYLATE:

Name Quantity (MT/Month) Product ISO AMYL SALICYLATE 25.00 Raw material consumption per month:

Material Quantity (MT/Month) Salicylic Acid 17.86 Iso Amyl Alcohol 12.86 Acid Catalyst 0.71 Toluene makeup & Recycled 4.46 KL/Month Soda Ash 0.27

Brief process: Iso Amyl salicylate will be prepared by Azeotropic Esterification reaction i.e. heating Iso Amyl Alcohol and Salicylic Acid in presence of a solvent & catalyst. The reaction mass will be then cooled and washed. After settling the aqueous layer will be taken for effluent treatment. The crude Iso Amyl salicylate will taken for distillation to separate Low boilers & fractions of Iso Amyl Salicylate. Chemical Reaction:



Flow Chart:

Glass Lined Reactor

Salicylic Acid

Iso Amyl AlcoholAcid catalyst

Toluene

Crude Iso Amyl Salicylate

Reboiler

Aqueous layer to ETP for treatment

Receiver


Fractions of Iso Amyl Salicylate

Soda ash solution

Water from reaction used for

neutralisation

Recovered Toluene recycled

8) TERPINYL ACETATE:

Name Quantity (MT/Month) Product TERPINYL ACETATE 75.00 Raw material consumption per month:

Material Quantity (MT/Month) Terpineol 68.18 Acetic Anhydride 57.95 Acid Catalyst 0.03 Soda Ash 0.43

Brief process: Terpinyl Acetate is manufactured by cold acetylation of Terpineol with Acetic Anhydride in the presence of a acid catalyst. The reaction mass will be washed with water and spent acetic acid will be collected separately as saleable by product. The mass will be further neutralized by soda ash solution and the aqueous layer will be taken for effluent treatment. The organic layer will be taken for distillation for separation of low boilers and final product. Chemical Reaction:



Flow Chart:

Glass Lined Reactor

TerpineolAcetic Anhydride

Acid Catalystwater

Crude Terpinyl Acetate

Reboiler


Receiver


Fractions of Terpinyl Acetate

Spent Acetic Acid By product for sale

Soda ash solution

Recycled to distillation 9) UNDERCAVERTOL:

Name Quantity (MT/Month) Product UNDERCAVERTOL 75.00 Raw material consumption per month:

Material Quantity (MT/Month) Mg Turnings 12.74 Halide (Pentyl Bromide/Chloride) 75.47 Aldehyde 47.17 Iodine 0.09 Tetra hydro Furon (Fresh & Recycled) 235.85 KL Sulphuric Acid 98% 7.67 Soda Ash 0.24 Di Ethanol Amine 0.12

Brief process: Undercavertol will be prepared by Grignard Reaction with THF, Methyl Pentenal & Pentyl Bromide/Chloride as main raw materials. THF Solvent is recovered for recycling on completion of the reaction. The reactant mass will be washed. The aqueous layer will be taken for further THF recovery and effluent treatment; the organic layer will be taken for obtaining final product by fractional distillation. Chemical Reaction:



Flow Chart

Glass Lined Reactor

Mg TurningsHalide

AldehydeIodine

Crude Undecavertol

Reboiler


Receiver


Recycled to Distillation

Fractions of Undecavertol

Recovered Tetra hydro furon Recycled to

Reaction

Tetra Hydro Furonrecycled

Sulphuric acid 98%Soda ash

Di Ethanol amine

10) VERDYL ACETATE:

Name Quantity (MT/Month) Product VERDYL ACETATE 650.00 Raw material consumption per month:

Material Quantity (MT/Month) Dicylopentadiene 520 Acetic Acid 234 Acid Catalyst 15.6 Sodium Acetate 15.6 Acetic Anhydride 2.6

Brief process: Verdyl Acetate is prepared by esterification by addition of organic acid Acetic acid across double bond Dicylopentadiene in presence of acid catalyst. After completion of the reaction. Washing is conducted by removal of Spent Acetic Acid. After settling the aqueous layer separated and stored as spent Acetic acid a byproduct and the organic layer is taken for fractional distillation for separation low boilers and Verdyl Acetate fractions. Chemical Reaction:



Flow Chart:

Glass Lined Reactor

Dicylopentadiene

Crude Verdyl Acetate

Reboiler


Receiver


Fractions of Verdyl Acetate

Acetic Acid RecoveryRecycled to Reaction

Acetic Anhydride

Acetic Acid

Acid catalystSodium Acetate

Non Distillable Fraction

10) VERDYL PROPIONATE:

Name Quantity (MT/Month) Product VERDYL PROPIONATE 166 Raw material consumption per month:

Material Quantity (MT/Month) Dicyclopentadiene 138.33 Propionic Acid 80.23 Acid Catalyst 2.77 Sodium Acetate 2.77

Brief process: Verdyl Propionate will be prepared by esterification, by addition of organic acid e-Propionic acid across double bond and Dicyclopentadiene in presence of acid catalyst. After the reaction completes, reaction mass will be cooled. Water is added for removal of spent proponic acid and stored as by product, and the organic layer will be taken for fractional distillation for separation of low purity fractions and Verdyl Propionate fractions. Chemical Reaction:



Flow Chart:

Fractions of Verdyl

Propionate



Glass Lined Reactor

Dicylopentdiene

Propionic Acid

Acid Catalyst

Sodium Acetate

Crude Verdyl Propionate

Reboiler


Receiver


11) MELONAL:

Name Quantity (MT/Month) Product MELONAL 30.00 Raw material consumption per month:

Material Quantity (MT/Month) Methyl Heptanone 46.28 Sodium Methoxide 22.05 Ethyl Chloro Acetate 22.05 Soda Ash 5.55 HCL 45% 0.16

Brief process: Melonal will be prepared by Darzen’s Glysidic Ester Condensation between Methyl Heptanone and Ethyl Chloro. Acetate in presence of strong base catalyst followed by alkaline hydrolysis will undergo Flash Distillation, Decarboxylation and followed by Fractional Distillation. Chemical Reaction:

O

CH2COOC2H5

NaCLO

COOC2H5

CHO

6-Methyl-5-Hepten-2-One

Ethyl Chloro AcetateGlycidic Ester Decarboxylation

Hydrolysis

2,6 Dimethyl-5-Heptenal(Melonal)



Flow Chart:

Glass Lined Reactor

Methyl Heptanone

Alkaline CatalystEthyl chloro Acetate

Soda ash

Glycidic Ester

Reboiler

Effluent to ETP

Receiver

Methyl Heptatone Recycled

Distilled Glysidic Ester

HCl 45%

SS 316 unit

Crude Melonal

Recycled

Reboiler

Receiver


Fractions of Melonal

12) CARYOPHYLLENE ACETATE:

Name Quantity (MT/Month) Product CARYOPHYLLENE ACETATE 5.00 Raw material consumption per month:

Material Quantity (MT/Month) Caryophyellene 4 Zn Chloride 0.52 Acetic Anhydride 3.39 Toluene Recovered & Recycled 1 KL Soda Ash 0.10

Brief process: Caryophellene Acetate will be manufactured by reacting Caryophellene with Acetic Anhydride in the presence of a catalyst. The reaction mass will be washed with water and spent acetic acid collected will be separated as saleable by product. The mass will be further neutralized and the aqueous layer will be taken to effluent treatment plant. The organic layer will be taken for separation of low and pure fractions of final product. Chemical Reaction:



Flow Chart:

Glass Lined Reactor

CaryophelleneZn Chloride

Acetic AnhydrideToluene

Crude Caryophyllene Acetate

Reboiler


Soda ash

Water

Spent Acetic Acid saleable By

Product

Receiver

Toluene Low Purity Fractions

Fractions of Caryophyllene

Acetate 13) DIMETTOL:

Name Quantity (MT/Month) Product DIMETTOL 100.00 Raw material consumption per month:

Material Quantity (MT/Month) Methyl Magnesium Bromide/Chloride 31.61 Methyl Heptanone 52.69 Iodine 0.09 Tetra Hydro Furon (Make up & Recycled) 212.45KL Sulphuric Acid 98% 13.88 Soda Ash 3.40 Di Ethanol Amine 0.05

Brief process: Dimettol, a secondary alcohol, often finds application as fragrance ingredients in the formulation of industrial perfumes. Due to its exceptional stability, it is used in enhanced concentration in detergent fragrances. Dimettol is essentially prepared by prepared of Methyl Heptenone to Methyl Magnesium Chloride/ Bromide in inert conditions. Further Dimethyl Heptenol thus obtained is selective hydrogenated (this is conducted at Job worker’s end) to obtain crude Dimettol which is further purified by Fractional distillation. Chemical Reaction:



Flow Chart:

Glass Lined Reactor

Mg TurningsMethyl Magnesium Chloride/BromideMethyl Heptanone

IodineTetra Hydro Furon

Sulphuric AcidSoda Ash

Di Ethanol Amine

Recovered Tetra Hydro Furon Recycled to

Reaction

Crude Dimethyl Heptenol

Effluent to ETP Treatment

Reboiler

Receiver



Fractions of Dimethyl Heptenol

Reboiler

Receiver

Approved Fractions of Dimethyl Heptenol



Fractions of Dimettol

Hydrogenated Crude Dimettol

From Job worker

14) HEXYL SALICYLATE:

Name Quantity (MT/Month) Product HEXYL SALICYLATE 175.00 Raw material consumption per month:

Material Quantity (MT/Month) Salicylic Acid 140 Hexyl Alcohol 112 Sulphuric Acid 2.10 Toluene Make up & Recycled 35 KL Soda Ash 1.40

Brief process: Hexyl Salicylate is prepared by Azetropic Esterification reaction i.e. heating Hexyl Alcohol and Salicylic Acid in presence of a solvent & acid catalyst. The reactant mass will then cooled and washed. After settling the aqueous layer



will taken for effluent treatment. The crude Hexyl Salicylate will be taken for distillation to separate Low Boilers & fractions of Hexyl Salicylate. Chemical Reaction:

Flow Chart:

Glass Lined Reactor

Salicylic AcidHexyl Alcohol

Acid CatalystToluene

Soda Ash Solution

Crude Hexyl Salicylate

Reboiler


Receiver


Fractions of Hexyl

Salicylate

Recovered Toluene Recycled

Water From ReactionUsed for Neutralisation

16) VERDYL ISOBUTYRATE:

Name Quantity (MT/Month) Product VERDYL ISOBUTYRATE 150.00 Raw material consumption per month:

Material Quantity (MT/Month) Dicyclopentadiene 125 Isobutyric Acid 72.50 Acid Catalyst 2.50 Sodium Acetate 2.50

Brief process: Verdyl Isobutyrate is prepared by esterification by addition of organic acid Isobutyric Acid across double bond Dicyclopentadiene in presence of acid catalyst. After completion of the reaction mass will be cooled. Washing will be



conducted. After settling the spent acid will be separated and stored as a byproduct for sale. The organic layer is taken for distillation for separation low boilers and Verdyl Isobutyrate fractions. Chemical Reaction:

Flow Chart:

Glass Lined Reactor

DicyclopentadieneIsobutyric Acid

Acid CatalystSodium Acetate

Crude Verdyl Isobutyrate

Reboiler

Spent Acid

Receiver



Fractions of Verdyl

Isobutyrate




3.10 Facilities / System for process safety, transportation, Fire Fighting System and Emergency capabilities to be adopted

Following facilities and system that exist and that will be installed / implemented. Process Safety: Safety Precautions at Reaction Vessels and Distillation Units: 1. The reactions for the present & proposed products are at atmospheric pressure with

vents open to atmosphere through water cooled/ chilled water vapor condensers hence the pressure development in the reaction vessels does not arise.

2. The reaction carried by heating, here the heat energy is conducted vide steam through Jackets/Limpet Coils. Low Pressure Steam Line is connected to these vessels with jackets /Limpet coils appropriately insulated. The vessels are also fitted with safety valve to open at 3kg pressure and pressure indicator for visual periodic checks. The safety valves are examined, tested and certified vide form no 11 for relevant vessels.

3. Free Fall of any flammable material in the vessel is avoided. 4. Any reaction upsets will be confined to the reaction vessel itself as defined quantity

of charges of raw materials is issued to the reaction vessel/Day tank by metering pumps.

5. All emergency valves and switches are easily assessable. 6. All Distillations carried out are high vacuum fractionation distillations. Hence the

pressure development within the unit will not occur. However since the distillations are carried out well above the flash point of the mass, vacuum failure fail alarm are provided and non return valves are incorporated on the main vacuum lines to curb vacuum failure in the system.

7. Any carry over of low boiling components to the ejector systems is crubbed by the Barometric Leg provided to each ejector system as well as water cooled vapor traps incorporated between the equipment and the ejector system cooling towers. The same are periodically drained after every batch and stored separately for further recycle in to the process.

8. Further all the vessels are examined periodically by a recognized competent person under the Gujarat Factory Rules 1963-Rule 61(1).

9. All the vessels and equipments are well earthed appropriately and well protected against Static Electricity. Also for draining in drums proper earthing facilities have been provided.

10. Materials are transferred by pumping through pipeline or by vacuum from drums. 11. All reaction vents are connected to vapor condensers system. 12. All solvents and flammable material storage tanks away from the process plant and

required quantity of material will be charge in reactor by pump. 13. Flammable material drum is also charged by vacuum. 14. Temperature indicators are provided near all reactor and distillation systems. 15. Jumpers are provided on and will be provided on all solvent handling pipeline

flanges. 16. Caution note, safety posters, stickers, periodic training & Updation in safety and

emergency preparedness plan are displayed and conducted. 17. Flame proof light fittings are installed in the plant. 18. All the Plant Personnel are provided with Personal Protection Equipments to protect

against any adverse health effect during operations, leakage, spillages or splash. PPE



like Helmets, Safety Shoes, Safety Glasses, Acid-Alkali Proof Gloves etc. are provided to the employees. All employees are given and updated in Safety aspects through periodic training in safety.

19. Material Safety Data Sheets of Raw Materials & Products are readily available that the shop floor. The same practice should be continued

20. Third Party Process Safety Audits are carried out on annually, last audit carried out in August 2009.

Transportation 1. Class B solvents is proposed to be received by road tankers and stored in storage

tanks. 2. Solvent unloading Standard procedure is in place and will be implemented for safe

unloading of road tanker. 3. Earthing provision has been made for tanker unloading. 4. Earthed Flexible Steel hose will be used for solvent unloading from the road tanker. 5. Fixed pipelines with pumps are and will be provided for solvent transfer up to

reactors. 6. Double mechanical seal type pumps installed for solvents. 7. NRV provision made on all pump discharge line. 8. Some solvents are received at plant in drums by road truck and stored in a separate

drum store. 9. Drum handling trolleys are used for transportation of drums up to plant. 10. Solvent charged in reactor from drum through SS day tank by vacuum or barrel

pump or by gravity. 11. Storage area Safety 12. For Proposed Tank Farm: (Underground MS Tank for 50kl – 2 Nos.) 13. The Tank farm will be is isolated from the process area. With expansion the new

products, the underground storage tanks shall be used for storage of Class B Petroleum products namely Dicylcopentandiene. The license procurement procedures with explosive department will be undertaken.

14. Safety Precautions at the tank farm: 15. Flame Proof Pumps and Motor will be provided in the tank farm. 16. Underground tank will have natural earthing. 17. Tank will be surrounded by RCC dyke wall and collection pit with valve will be

provided. 18. The gap between tank and RCC wall will be filled with sand. 19. Tank farm location will be away from the all hot areas, process area, Boiler house

and other movement area. 20. This tank farm area will be fenced area with restriction on entry of unauthorized

person. 21. Level of the liquid will be taken on daily basis by dip/magnetic indicators. Once the

clearance is obtained, level Indicators will be installed. 22. Provision for flexible Tanker Earthing will also be provided. 23. Spark Arrestor/Muffler will be provided at the security gate to each vehicle which

comes in to the tank farm for unloading. 24. Non Sparking Tools to be used the tank farm area. 25. Appropriate Copper Flange Jumpers will be provided to prevent any accumulation

of Static Electricity during pumping or draining. All electrical, Mechanical equipments along with its accessories will be earthed.

26. Nitrogen Blanketing with safety valves is provided to both the storage Tanks.



27. Flame arrestor will be provided on solvent storage tanks. 28. Dyke wall will be provided to all above ground storage tanks,. 29. Level gauge and level measurement instruments will be installed on all hazardous

material storage tanks. 30. Lightening arrestor on all chimneys and building provided. 31. Storage tanks of hazardous material will be stored away from the plant and safe

distances will be maintained. 32. Fencing and caution notes and hazard identification boards will be displayed. 33. Only authorized person will be permitted in storage tank farm area. 34. Safety permit for hazardous material loading unloading will be prepared and

implemented. 35. Static earthing provision will be made at all unloading points of flammable

chemical storage tank farm area. 36. Loading unloading procedures will be displayed at loading unloading point. 37. TREM CARD will be provided to all transporters and will be trained for

transportation Emergency of Hazardous chemicals. 38. Fire hydrant system in tank farm area will be installed. 39. Safety Shower and eye wash will be installed at acid/ alkali handling and storage

area. Fire fighting system 1. Cooling Tower of 301m3 with 200m3store capacity along with a stand by pump also

doubles up as emergency water supply in case of any eventuality. 2. Sufficient numbers of Fire extinguishers installed in all plants and storage area. 3. Fire hydrant system as per TAC norms will be installed in the plant. 4. It is proposed to have a provision for separate Water storage tank for fire water as

well as process water requirement. 5. D.G. Sets provided for emergency power. 6. Third Party Periodic Fire Hazard Analysis is carried out on annually. Pipelines: The various pipelines used to transfer i.e. charging, draining etc. in the plant are periodically inspected for Support, Vibration, Corrosion conditions, Painting, and Colour Code. Pipelines and Flexible pipeline (SS 316/MS) are appropriately earthed to avoid accumulation of Static Electricity. Periodic Check ups of the pipelines are conducted to curb any chances of mishap due to leakages. Preventive Maintenance Schedules are in practice. Emergency Planning:

7. Emergency siren and wind sock. 8. On Site emergency Plan has been prepared. 9. Tele Communication system and mobile phone are used in case of emergency

situations for communication. 10. First Aid Boxes and First Aid centre are made at site.



SECTION IV

HAZARD IDENTIFICATION

4.0 INTRODUCTION

Risk assessment process rests on identification of specific hazards, hazardous areas and areas vulnerable to effects of hazardous situations in facilities involved in processing and storage of chemicals. In fact the very starting point of any such assessment is a detailed study of materials handled & their physical / chemical / thermodynamic properties within the complex at various stages of manufacturing activity. Such a detailed account of hazardous materials provides valuable database for identifying most hazardous materials, their behaviour under process conditions, and their inventory in process as well as storage and hence helps in identifying vulnerable areas within the complex. Hazardous posed by particular installation or a particular activity can be broadly classified as fire, explosive and toxicity hazards. Whether a particular activity is fire and explosive hazardous or toxicity hazardous primarily depends on the materials handled and their properties. It will be from the above discussion that study of various materials handled is a prerequisite from any hazard identification process to be accurate. Based on this study the hazard indices are calculated for subsequent categorization of units depending upon the degree of hazard they pose. In proposed plant main hazard is handling of Various types of chemicals, as per raw material list, the primary concern has always been toxic release, fire and explosion prevention and control as this is the main hazard posed by such units. This concern has grown through the lose of life, property and materials experienced after experienced after major disasters, which have occurred over the years. Identification of hazards is the most important step to improve the safety of any plant. The hazard study is designed to identify the hazards in terms of chemicals, inventories and vulnerable practices /operations.

The hazard evaluation procedures use as a first step by chemical process industries and petroleum refineries are checklists and safety reviews. Dow and Mond fire and explosion indices, which make use of past experience to develop relative ranking of hazards, is also extensively used. For predictive hazard analysis, Hazard and Operability studies (HAZOP), Fault tree analysis, Event tree analysis, Maximum credible accident and consequence analysis etc are employed.

4.1 Dow’s fire and Explosion Index (F & EI) 4.1.1 Dow’s fire and Explosion index is a step by step objective evaluation of the realistic fire,

explosion and reactivity potential of process equipment and its contents. The quantitative



measure employed is based on historical loss data, the energy potential of the material under study and the extent to which loss prevention practices are currently applied. This is helpful in identifying high risk process areas needing more detailed hazard analysis to ensure that the facilities do not pose unacceptable risks.

4.1.2 The most widely relative ranking hazard indices are Dow chemical company’s Fire &

Explosion Index (F && EI) and Mond’s Toxicity Index (TI). They are commonly referred together as Fire Explosion and Toxicity Index (F & EI).

4.1.3 Once the pertinent process unit is selected, the Material Factor (MF) for the material in

the unit is estimated. This depends on the flammability, reactivity and operating temperature. Factor for general process hazards (F-1) takes into account, the nature of the reaction, ventilation of the unit, accessibility of the unit, drainage facilities etc. Factors for special process hazards (F-2) takes into account toxicity of the material, operating pressure, operation near flammable range, quantity of material, joints and packing, use of hot oil exchange system etc.

4.1.4 Identification of hazard prone areas can be done either by process parameter

considerations or by hazard potential of the materials being handled. For identification of later methods Dow Chemical Company developed a systematic procedure and guidelines. Using the Dow & Mond’s guidelines FEI for the facilities under study have been found out.

4.1.5 Any operation where a flammable, combustible or reactive material is stored or handled

or processed can be evaluated using this method. This technique gives the radius of exposure surrounding the process from the point of release that could cause injury to individuals and damage to equipment.

4.1.6 The Dow’s FEI technique can be used to meet the following objectives 4.1.7 To identify high risk process areas needing more detailed hazard identification / risk

analysis to ensure that the facilities do not pose unacceptable risks. 4.1.8 To determine the degree of both on and off site emergency planning and response that

may be necessary in case of major accident. 4.1.9 The procedure followed in evaluating the FEI is described below briefly

a. Select major process units that the potential to damage significant portions of the

plant based on inventory, flammability, flash point and toxicity. b. Determine the process unit material factor (MF) that is a function of chemical

flammability and reactivity. c. Calculate the general process hazard (GPH) factor that is a measure of the relative

probability of and incident. d. The product of GPH and SPH represents the Unit Hazard Factor (UHF) that

measures the degree of hazard exposure of the process unit. This is used with MF to calculate the damage factor which represents the degree of loss exposure.

e. Product of UHF and MF represents the FEI that is directly correlated to the area of exposure.

f. Degree of hazard due to fire and explosion is identified based on the FEI range as per the criteria given below



FEI Range Degree of Hazard 1 to 60 Light 61 to 96 Moderate 97 to 127 Intermediate 128 to 158 Heavy 159 to above Severe

g. Obtain toxicity factor (TH) for the valid NFPA hazard factor (Nh) and penalty (Ts) fro

the MAC value application to the substance. h. Degree of hazard due to toxicity is identified as per the criteria given below:

Toxicity Index (TI) Degree of hazard < 6 Light 6< T1 ≤10 Moderate >10 Severe

4.1.10 FE & TI involves objective evaluation of the realistic fire, explosion, toxicity and reactivity

potential of process or storage units. The quantitative methodology relies on the analysis based on historic loss data; the energy contents of the chemical under study and the extent to which prevention measures are already incorporated. FE & TI are primarily designed for operations involving storage, handling and processing of flammable, combustible and toxic chemicals.

4.1.11 Steps in fire and explosion index calculation are given below:

Select Pertinent Process

Determine Material Factor

Calculate GHP (F1), General Process Hazards

Calculate SPH(F2), special process Hazards

Determine Hazard Factor F1 X F2 =F3

F3XMaterial Factor =F & E Index

Determine Exposure area



4.1.12 Results of fire explosion and toxicity indices.

Table No. 4.1

Sr No

Material stored

Storage Qty. (KL)

Nh

Nf

Nr MF

GPH

SPH FEI Degree of Hazard

Radius of Exp.

(m)

Th Ts TI Degree of

Hazard

1. Dicyclope-ntadine

50 KL X 2 Tanks= 100kl

2 2 1 14 2.2 3.08 95 Intermediate

27.84 125 50 10.0 Moderate

2. Pentanol Mixture

50 KL X 2 Tanks= 100kl

2 2 0 14 2.2 3.08 95 Intermediate

27.84 125 50 10.0 Moderate

3. Acetic Acid

10 KL X 1 Tank

2 2 1 14 2.2 3.08 95 Intermediate

27.84 125 125 15.7 Severe

Nh = NFPA Health rating GPH = General Process Hazard Nf = NFPA Fire rating SPH = Special Process Hazard Nr = NFPA Reactive rating FEI = Fire Explosion Index MF = Material Factor Th = Penalty Factor Ts = Penalty for Toxicity TI = Toxicity Index

4.2 Failure Frequencies 4.2.1 Hazardous material release scenarios can be broadly divided into 2 categories

I) Catastrophic failures which are of low frequency and II) Ruptures and leaks which are of relatively high frequency. Releases from failure of gaskets, seal, rupture in pipelines and vessels fall in the second category whereas catastrophic failure of vessels and full bore rupture of pipelines etc fall into the first category.

4.2.2 Typical failure frequencies are given below:-

Item Mode of failure Failure frequencies Atmospheric storage

Catastrophic failure Significant leak

10-9 /yr 10-5 /yr

Process Pipelines < = 50 mm dia Full bore rupture

Significant leak 8.8 x 10-7 /m.yr 8.8 x 10-6 /m.yr

> 50 mm <=150mm dia Full bore rupture Significant leak

2.6 x 10-7 /m.yr 5.3 x 10-6 /m.yr

< 150 mm dia Full bore rupture Significant leak

8.8 x 10-8 /m.yr 2.6 x 10-6 /m.yr

Hoses Rupture 3.5 x 10-2 /m.yr



4.3 Identification of Hazardous Areas:

A study of process given in chapter 3 of the report indicates the following:

Batch process plant. Raw materials are stored in godown and in tank farm area. Required batch charge

materials are only kept in process area at the time of batch charging. All liquids charged by pipeline from storage tank or by vacuum from drum. Powder

charged in reactor through manhole. Process parameters control is provided vide Standard Operating Procedures. Hazardous materials are transferred by pipelines and in control manners. Reaction carried out under atmospheric pressure, close condition and under control

manner. The vent is connected to water/chilled water cooled vapor condensers. High Vacuum Fractionation distillations carried out for products. Non Return Valves

provided on three different locations on vacuum main system to avoid vaccum failure due to stoppage or failure of vacuum failures.

Nitrogen Blanketing provided through cylinders for inert atmosphere.

Thus the raw material requirement for the Produce unit will be very low & variable depending upon products being manufactured. Various raw materials used in the manufacturing processes are listed in Section-3 along with mode / type of storage & storage conditions. It can be readily seen that raw materials even though hazardous in nature, will be used in small quantities & storage quantities are also very low at process plant. However some chemicals such as Dicyclopentadine, Pentanol Mixture, Acetic Acid and sulphuric acid used in process & therefore their requirement is slightly higher. Above mentioned chemicals are stored in dedicated tanks in tank farms area and other small quantity of chemicals stored in drum storage area. List of chemicals stored in larger quantities is provided in Section-3 in raw material list.

4.3.1 Evaluation Of Hazards : 4.3.1.1 Storage in Tank Farm :

Major inventory of liquid organic chemicals within the factory premises is in Drum storage godown. Based on the nature, the raw materials are stored in the same godown but away from the flammable liquids. Major inventory of Dicyclopentadine, Pentanol Mixture, Acetic Acid within the factory premises are in under ground storage tank. The materials were studied with respect to their flammability, reactivity and toxicity based on the criteria given by the NFPA (NFPA ratings). Material factor values were determined using these ratings. General process hazards and Special process hazards for all the materials stored were determined as per the guidelines given by DOW Chemicals Company in DOW Index. FEI values for all these materials were calculated form the above data. Value of material factor, General Process Hazard & Special Process Hazard as also FEI / TI values & degree of hazard are given in Table 4.1. As can be seen storage in tank farms is mostly in the light-moderate category. Fire & Explosion Index, primarily due to small tank sizes. The storage will be also seen to have light – moderate toxicity



hazards. The radius of exposure for various tanks considering FEI Values is also calculated and presented in the Tables.

4.3.1.2 Evaluation of Process Areas : Process Safety Review – What If Method A. Materials

1. Have materials been defined as “hazardous” or “non-hazardous”? (Ingredients as well as final products and by-products)

Yes 1. Verdyl acetate 2. Amyl Salicylate 3. Verdyl Propionate 4. Iso Amyl Salicylate 5. Terpineol acetate 6. Terpineol 7. Acetic Anhydride 8. Prop ionic acid. 9. Dicyclo-penta-diene 10. Boron tri fluoride 11.Pentanol Mixture 12. Toluene 13. Iso amyl alcohol 14. Methanol etc

2. What process materials are unstable or spontaneously ignitable?

Reference to MSDS does not indicate such tendency.

• What evaluation has been made of impact sensitivity?

Reference to MSDS does not indicate such tendency.

• What evaluation of possible uncontrolled reaction or decomposition has been made?

Evaluated at Pilot Plant. Uncontrolled reaction or decomposition unlikely

3. What precautions are necessary to meet environmental requirements and maintain personnel health

Periodic monitoring of workplace emissions.

4. What data are available on amount and rate of heat evolution during decomposition of any materials in the process?

Before scale up all trials are Evaluated at Pilot Plant. Hence Uncontrolled reaction or decomposition unlikely

5. What precautions are necessary for flammable materials?

1. Flameproof lighting & Drives. In place 2. Precautions against generation of Static Electricity In place 3. Inert Atmospheres. Like Nitrogen Blanketing in place 4. Flame arrestors on flammables vents in place 5. Spillage control in place 6. Fire Proofing of structural supports in place. 7. Fire fighting Facilities in place but required to be updated.

6. What flammable dust hazards exist? None 7. What materials are highly toxic? None 8. What has been done to ensure that materials of construction are compatible with the chemical process materials that are involved?

Materials selected based on corrosives data. Regular inspection schedules followed.

9. What maintenance control is necessary to ensure replacement of proper materials, e.g., to avoid excessive Corrosion and to avoid producing hazardous compounds and reactants?

Specifications & Inspection

10. What changes have occurred in composition of raw materials? What resulting changes have occurred in the process?

None

11. What is done to ensure sufficient control of raw material identification and quality?

QA tests before acceptance for all incoming materials.

12. What hazards can occur as a result of loss of gas for purging, blanketing, or inerting? How certain is gas supply quality?

Explosive mixtures. N2 Cylinders used. Ample spare cylinders are kept available at all times.

13. What precautions need to be considered relative to stability of all materials in storage?

Storage precautions specified in MSDS followed.

14. What fire extinguishing agents are compatible with the process material?

Dry Powder, Co2, water spray (for some products)



15. What fire emergency equipment and procedures are being provided?

50-kg/ 25kg trolley mounted DP, 5kg cylinders for DP & CO2. List attached at Annexure 2.

B. Reactions

1. How are potentially hazardous reactions isolated?

Temperature controls. Inert atmospheres. Operator vigilance.

2. What process variables could, or do, approach limiting conditions for hazard?

Operations well within limiting conditions

3. What unwanted hazardous reactions can be developed through unlikely flow or process conditions or through contamination?

Unlikely

4. What combustible mixtures can occur within equipment?

Many of the raw materials are used above flashpoint with vapour concentrations within explosive range. Nitrogen blanketing proposed.

5. What are process margins of safety for all reactants and intermediates? What are the consequences of missing ingredients or wrong proportion of reactants?

Less/ more addition of components does not create hazardous side products. It is only commercial loss.

6. What reaction-rate data are available on the possible reactions, both normal and abnormal?

Production plant reaction completion periods based on Pilot Plant information, and refined based on plant experience using QA back-up for Reaction monitoring.

7. How thorough is the operators’ knowledge of the process chemistry? What undesired reactions can take place?

Operators well trained. Good knowledge of Process Chemistry available at site. Side reactions may increase impurity levels. Separated during distillation No reactions with high exothermicity. Runaway reactions improbable a batch process undertaken

8. What foreign materials can contaminate the process and create hazards?

Moisture may retard reaction rate. No other foreign materials are expected in the raw material drums which are tested by QC before issue to process.

9. What provision is made for rapid disposal of reactants if required by plant emergency?

No provision. Total inventory in process listed at Annexure 3.

10. What provisions are made for handling impending runaways and for short-stopping an existing runaway?

None of the reactions can lead to runaways.

11. What hazardous reactions can develop as a result of mechanical equipment (pump, agitator, etc.) failure?

Temperature can rise on failure of cooling water pump, Tripping of agitators may cause localized reaction but the bulk reaction will be inhibited

12. What hazardous process conditions can result from gradual or sudden blockage in equipment?

The only blockage that can occur is the distillation still outlet if the residue becomes dehydrated causing thickening of the mass. This will not have any affect on the process.

13. What raw materials or process materials can be adversely affected by extreme weather conditions?

Though Terpineol solidifies in winter. Products are not directly exposed to sunlight or heat medium.

14. What process changes have been made since the previous process safety review?

This is the first study of its kind.

C. Equipment

1. In view of process changes since the last process safety review, how adequate is the size of equipment?

This is the first risk assessment study of its kind.

2. Are any venting systems manifold and, if so, what hazards can result?

Distillation systems, vacuum systems get manifold but no hazards are foreseen.

3. What procedure exists for ensuring an adequate liquid level in the liquid seals?

Liquid seals at present.



4. What is the potential for external fire (which may create. Hazardous internal process conditions)?

Flameproof equipments used.

5. Is explosion suppression equipment needed to stop an explosion once started?

No.

6. Where are flame arrestors and detonation arrestors needed?

None

7. In confined areas, how is open-fire equipment protected from spills?

Open fire equipment is isolated through perfect partition walls. No open fire allowed in process area.

8. What safety control is maintained over storage areas?

Flame proof lightings, Daily inspections, Fire extinguishers put up in the area.

9. In cases where glass or other fragile material equipment is used, can durable materials be substituted? If not, is the fragile material adequately protected to minimize breakage? What is the hazard resulting from breakage?

Fragile material of the equipment is adequately protected.

10. Are sight glasses provided only where positively needed? On pressure vessels, are sight glasses provided which have a capability to withstand the pressure?

Yes. All reactions are at atmospheric pressure.

11. What emergency valves and switches cannot be reached readily and safely?

Valves are easily assessable. No emergency switches.

12. When was the pressure rating for all pertinent equipment, especially process vessels, last checked?

As per statutory requirement.

13. What hazards are introduced by failure of agitators?

Tripping of agitators may cause localized reaction but the bulk reaction will be inhibited

14. What plugging of lines can occur? What are the hazards of plug gage?

The only blockage that can occur is the distillation still outlet if the residue becomes dehydrated causing thickening of the mass. This will not have any affect on the distillation.

15. What provisions are needed for complete drainage of equipment for safety in maintenance?

Draining, flushing and purging facilities available. Blanking of the feed pipelines.

16. How was adequacy of ventilation determined?

Adequate ventilation.

17. What provisions have been made for dissipation of static electricity to avoid sparking?

SS Flexible metallic hoses used for transfer of material. Proper Earthing provided to equipments. Free fall avoided.

18. What requirements are there for concrete bulkheads or barricades to isolate highly sensitive equipment and protect adjacent areas from disruption of operations? 19. What provisions have been made for relieving explosions in building or operating areas?

Open Building Structure

20. Do all pressure vessels conform to state and local, requirements?

Yes.Statuory Test regularly carried out.

21. Are the vessels registered in compliance with state or local code requirements?

Yes.Statuory Test carried out.

22. When were pressure vessels inspected visually? When were they callipered, radiographed, and hydrostatically tested?

Visual tests are conducted every six months. Statutory tests are undertaken.

23. Has the history of all vessels been completely reviewed?

Yes

As explained earlier, the unit is very small. Study of the process flow sheets indicates that the reactions are mostly of similar type involving Solvents in most of reactions.



Some reactions are exothermic but can be readily controlled and reflux unit connected under control process. The process units do not warrant any detailed calculations as consequences due to any worst case scenario will involve very quantity of material & damage is such a case is expected to be limited to within the factory premises. Considering this, the risk analysis studies ware concentrated on drum storage godown and under ground storage tank area.



SECTION V

RISK ASSESSMENT

5.1 Effects Of Releases Of Hazardous Substances

Hazardous substances may be released as a result of failures / catastrophes, causing possible damage to the surrounding area. In the following discussion, an account is taken of various effects of release of hazardous substances and the parameters to be determined for quantification of such damages.

In case of release of hazardous substances the damages will depend largely on source strength. The strength of the source means the volume of the substance released. The release may be instantaneous or semi-continuous. In the case of instantaneous release, the strength of the source is given in kg and in semi-continuous release the strength of the source depends on the outflow time (kg/s.). In order to fire the source strength, it is first necessary to determine the state of a substance in a vessel. The physical properties, viz. Pressure and temperature of the substance determine the phase of release. This may be gas, gas condensed to liquid and liquid in equilibrium with its vapor or solids. Instantaneous release will occur, for example, if a storage tank fails. Depending on the storage conditions the following situations may occur. The source strength is equal to the contents of the capacity of the storage system. In the event of the instantaneous release of a liquid a pool of liquid will form. The evaporation can be calculated on the basis of this pool.

The heat load on object outside a burning pool of liquid can be calculated with the heat radiation model. This model uses average radiation intensity, which is dependent on the liquid. Account is also taken of the diameter-to-height ratio of the fire, which depends on the burning liquid. In addition, the heat load is also influenced by the following factors:

Distance form the fire The relative humidity of the air (water vapor has a relatively high heat-absorbing

capacity) The orientation i.e. horizontal/vertical of the objective irradiated with respect to the

fire.

Tank On Fire / Pool Fire: The liquid pool or tank material if ignited causes a “Pool fire / Tank on Fire”. In the pool/ Tank On fire material burn with a long flame throughout the pool/ Tank diameter radiating intense heat, which creates severe damage to the adjourning building, structure, other vessel and equipment causing secondary fire. The flame may tilt under influence of wind



and may get propagated / blown several pool diameter downwind. The damage incase of such fire is restricted within the plant area and near the source of generation. In order to fire or explosion the source strength, it is first necessary to determine the state of a substance in a vessel. The physical properties viz. pressure and temperature of the substance determine the phase of release. This may be gas, gas condensed to liquid, liquid in equilibrium with its vapor or solids. Instantaneous release will occur, for example, if a storage tank fails. Depending on the storage conditions the following situations may occur. The source strength is equal to the contents of the capacity of the storage system.

5.2 Identification of High Risk Areas :

It is observed that the storage areas pose fire/explosion hazards as it has a substantial inventory of flammable liquid which may lead to major accident event. In the process areas it is observed that inventories of chemicals are very low & so there are not deemed to pose major off-site hazards. Thus the quantitative risk assessment studies are limited to tank area.

5.3 Modes of Failure:

5.3.1 Following failure is considered for detailed analysis and safe distances computed:

Storages system can fail in different ways depending on the materials stored, storage conditions & may involve systems in their vicinity. Event Tree Analysis (ETA) to define outcome of release of hydrocarbons for atmospheric storages of liquids is presented in Fig. 5.1. Conditions such as over filling, over pressure & missile, lightening or bomb attack, earthquake & resultant replier or release scenarios have been identified. Outcomes of such incidents are determined by presence of ignition either immediate or delayed. As can be seen depending upon modes of failure different scenarios are possible viz: ◊ Continuous release ◊ Instantaneous release This may be of gas / liquid depending upon type of material stored/released & its characteristics. More examples, a liquid boiling at ambient conditions, will immediately be converted to gas upon exposure to atmosphere & will be have accordingly. An instantaneous release is any release occurring for a period less than 15 seconds. Failure mode responsible for instantaneous releases may be catastrophic failure of road tanker. For an instantaneous gas release important parameters are release height & quantity released whereas for instantaneous liquid release, important parameters are amount spilled, spill area & pool temperature, evaporation rate, vapor mass etc. Continuous release occurs when the material is released over a period greater than 15 seconds. For a continuous gas release, important parameters include height of leak above ground, emission rate & total time of release. For continuous liquid release important



parameters are spill rates, duration, area & pool temperature, evaporation rate and vapor mass or Gas mass. Analysis of the above leads to reduction of total list of incidents into three representative sets viz:

Liquid release due to catastrophic failure of storage vessel or road tanker. Liquid release through a hole/crack developed at welded joints/flanges / nozzles /

valves etc. Vapour release due to exposure of liquid to atmosphere in the above scenarios.

Based on the above the following accident scenarios were conceived as most probable failure cases:

TABLE-5.1

Event Causes Solvent road tanker outlet Ignition availability Pool fire, Ball Fire, Flash Valve failure Fire Acetic Acid tank failure Ignition available Pool Fire Catastrophic failure Failure of drum of flammable liquid Ignition availability Un confined Pool fire Considering the small quantity of storages following scenarios were taken up for detailed analysis & safe distances computed:

Catastrophic failure of road tank and presence of ignition source poses heat radiation hazards to nearby areas.

Catastrophic failure of solvent drum which on ignition poses heat radiation hazards to

nearby areas. Failure cases considered for consequence analysis are representative of worst-case scenarios. Probability of occurrence of such cases is negligible (less than 1 x 10-6 per year) because of strict adherence to preventive maintenance procedures within the complex. But consequences of such cases can be grave & far reaching in case such systems fail during life history of the company. Hence such scenarios are considered for detailed analysis. It is to be noted however that such situations are not foreseeable or credible as long as sufficient measures are taken. Also, consequence analysis studies help us evaluate emergency planning measures of the Company.



Table-5.2 Sr. No.

Failure Type Failure Mode Consequence

1. Road tanker catastrophic failure for Dicyclopentadine, Pentanol Mixture and Acetic Acid

Road tanker outlet valve 100 % bore failure

Unconfined Pool fire

2. Acetic Acid storage tank catastrophic failure

Random failure Pool fire

3. Solvent drum failure Random failure Unconfined Pool fire In storage godown

5.4 Damage Criteria For Heat Radiation:

Taking into consideration the published literature, on the subject, damage estimates due to thermal radiation and overpressure has been arrived. The consequences can then be visualized by superimposing the damage effects zone on the proposed site plan and identifying the elements within the project site as will as in the neighboring environment, which might be adversely affected, should one or more hazards materialize in real life. Thermal Damage The effect of thermal radiation on people is mainly a function of intensity of radiation (Heat Flux) and exposure time. The effect is exposed in turn of the probability of death and different degrees of burn. The following table gives the effect of various levels of heat flux:

TABLE 5.3 Damage Criteria – Heat Radiation

Heat Radiation (kW/m2)

Damage to equipment Damage to people

1.2 Solar heat at noon 1.6 Minimum level of pain threshold 2.0 PVC insulation cable 4.0 --- Causes pain if duration is longer than20

seconds. Blistering is unlikely. 4.5 --- Blistering of skill 6.0 --- First Degree burn 9.5 --- Pain threshold reached after 8 seconds.

Second degree burns after 20 seconds. 12.0 --- Initiation of secondary fires. 12.5 Minimum energy to ignite

wood with a flame; Melts plastic tubing.

First degree burns in 10 seconds. 1 % fatality in 20 seconds. 30 % fatality in 30 seconds.

16.0 --- Severe burns after 5 seconds. 21.2 --- 1% fatality in 10 seconds, with protection

of clothing. 25.0 Minimum energy to ignite

wood at indefinitely long exposure without a flame.

100 % fatality in 1(one) minute.

27.0 --- Third degree burns ( 30 Seconds) 30.0 Damage to plant &

machinery. ---

37.5 Severe damage to plant 100 % Fatality



TABLE 5.4 Practical significance of Overpressure

Over pressure bar/ psi

Mechanical damage to equipment

Damage to people

0.3/4.41 Heavy damage o plant and structure

Fatality probability = 1 for humans indoor as well as outdoor

50 % eardrum damage >50 serious wounds from flying

objects. 0.1/ 1.47 Repairable damage 1 % death

>1% eardrum damage >1 serious wounds from flying

objects. 0.03/ 0.441 Major glass damage Slight injury from flying objects 0.01/0.147 10 % glass damage --



Figure – 5.4: Event Tree Analysis Storage vessel failure

Over Pressure Over filling (Level control fails Missile/Bomb Earth quake Expansion of liquid, temp. rise) Spill with fire Spill Spill (Heating due to reaction) (Failure of vents, valves Pool Fire Flash fire UVCE Clogging of pipe lines) Pool Evaporation Toxic Dispersion Pool Fire Toxic Dispersion Pool Evaporation Rupture (failure of Welded joints/ Rupture (failure of Toxic Dispersion valve/nozzles Flanges) Welded joints/

valve/nozzles Flanges) Leak (Corrosion, cracks/ holes Valve/ flange joints leaks Pool Fire Toxic disp.

Toxic Dispersion Spill Jet Spill Pool Evaporation Pool Evaporation Pool Fire Toxic dispersion Jet fire Pool Fire

Toxic Dispersion Toxic Dispersion Pool Evaporation

Pool Fire Toxic Dispersion Pool Fire Toxic Dispersion Toxic Dispersion Toxic Dispersion



CHAPTER VI

CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS 6.1 Consequence analysis.

In the risk analysis study, probable damages due to worst case scenarios were quantified and consequences were analyzed with object of emergency planning. Various measures taken by the company and findings of the study were considered for deciding acceptability of risks.

6.1.1 Maximum Credible loss scenarios ( MCLS)

MSCL assume maximum inventory of hazardous chemicals and worst weather condition prevailing at the time of failure. Further, no credit is given for the safety features provided in the facility to determine maximum possible damage from the scenario selected. In reality, leakage of hazardous chemical will be smaller in magnitude. Also the leakage will be detected immediately by plant operating staff then initiate various mitigation measures to prevent any disastrous situation. The maximum credible loss Scenarios (MCLS) identified for pant base on above criteria are listed below:

Table-6.1

Sr. No.

Failure Type Failure Mode Consequence

1. Road tanker catastrophic failure Catastrophic failure

Unconfined Pool fire,

2. Acetic Acid storage tank Catastrophic failure

Catastrophic failure

Pool Fire

3. Solvent drum failure Random failure Unconfined Pool fire In storage godown

6.1.2 Quantitative Risk Assessment Studies:

Weather Data: Average wind speed : 3 m / sec. Average Ambient Temperature : 35 deg. c. Average Humidity : 55 % Atmospheric Stability : 2F3D

6.1.3 Assumption :

6.1.3.1 Basic assumptions For road tanker release scenarios

Catastrophic failure is considered for 20 MT Dicyclopentadine and Pentanol Mixture road tanker while unloading and due to vapour cloud of evaporated solvent vapor mass comes



in the contact with ignition source unconfined pool fire scenarios were considered for various situations. Basic assumptions For Acetic Acid tank catastrophic failure release scenarios Tank on Fire if direct ignition on tank. Pool Fire in storage tank due to catastrophic failure of tank. Basic assumptions For Solvent Drum release scenarios Worst to worst case Fire scenario for drum storage area. Scenario-1 Unconfined Pool Fire Simulation for 20 MT Dicyclopentadine and Pentanol Mixture Road Tanker.

TABLE –A FOR 20 MT DICYCLOPENTADINE AND PENTANOL MIXTURE ROAD TANKER

Scenario : UNCONFINED POOL FIRE In put Data Results of Computations

Stored quantity 20 MT Max. IHR at flame centre height 93 Kw/m2 Pool diameter 13.0(m) Flame centre height 17.34 meter Pool liquid depth 0.001 (m) Maximum Flame width 17.34 meter Wind speed 3 m/s Mass burning rate liquid 7.74 kg/ m2/min. Liquid Density 980 kg/m3 Flame burnout time 1.0 Hrs.

Incident Intensity

of Heat Radiation ( IHR) at ground

level KW /m 2

IHR- Isopleth Distance ( Meters )

Effect if IHR at Height of Simulation

37.5 15.3 Damage to process equipment. 100 % Fatal in 1 Min. 1 % fatal in 10 sec.

25.0 18.7 Min. to ignite wood (without flame contact). 100 % fatal in 1 Min. Significant injury in 10 sec.

12.5 26.5 Min. to ignite wood (with flame contact). 1 % fatal in 1 min. 1st deg. burn in 10 sec.

4.0 46.8 Pain after 20 secs. Blistering unlikely. 1.6 73.9 No discomfiture even on long exposure.

♦ In the 15 meter radius area is considered as 100 % fatality in 1 min. and first degree burn in 10

sec. ♦ In the 46 meter radius area will give pain after 20 seconds. Blistering unlikely. ♦ In the 73 meter radius area is considered as safe area and no discomfiture even on long

exposure.





Scenario-2 Spill pool Evaporation Simulation for catastrophic failure of Acetic Acid

TABLE –B FOR ACETIC ACID Scenario : Spill pool Evaporation

In put Data Results of Computations Stored quantity 10 MT. Max. ground level conc. 303 ppm Rate of release 1000 g/s Molecular weight 102.1 Wind speed 3.0 m/s Density ( Air) 3.5 kg/m3

Dist. of maxi. ground level conc.

44 meter

Hazard Level Concentration

(PPM) Begin point

(Meter) End point (Meter)

Lc50 Human 11920 - - IDLH 50 25.72 198.32

TWA/ TLV 10 22.87 408.82 Results ♦ IDLH (Immediate danger to life and health) 50 PPM concentration area up to 198 meter and

TWA (10 PPM) area up to 408 meter.





Scenario-3 Pool Fire Simulation For 10 KL Acetic Acid Storage tank

TABLE –C FOR 10 KL ACETIC ACID STORAGE TANK

Scenario : POOL FIRE In put Data Results of Computations

Stored quantity 10MT Max. IHR at flame centre height 24.43 Kw/m2 Pool diameter 5.0(m) Flame centre height 10.26 meter Pool liquid depth 1 (m) Maximum Flame width 9.26 meter Wind speed 3 m/s Mass burning rate liquid 8.3 kg/ m2/min. Liquid Density 1051 kg/m3 Flame burnout time 2.1 Hrs.

Incident Intensity of Heat Radiation ( IHR) at ground

level KW /m 2

IHR- Isopleths Distance ( Meters )


37.5 7.9 Damage to process equipment. 100 % Fatal in 1 Min. 1 % fatal in 10 sec.


12.5 7.9 Min. to ignite wood (with flame contact). 1 % fatal in 1 min. 1st deg. burn in 10 sec.

4.0 14 Pain after 20 secs. Blistering unlikely. 1.6 22 No discomfiture even on long exposure.

Results

♦ In the 7.9 meter radius area is considered as 100 % fatality in 1 min. and first degree burn in 10

sec. ♦ In the 14 meter radius area will give pain after 20 seconds. Blistering unlikely. ♦ In the 22 meter radius area is considered as safe area and no discomfiture even on long

exposure.





Scenario-4 Fire Simulation for Drum Storage Area.

TABLE –D FOR CLASS A & B PETROLEUM DRUM STORE

Scenario : UNCONFINED POOL FIRE In put Data Results of Computations

Stored quantity 10 KL Max. IHR at flame centre height

32.75 Kw/m2

Pool diameter 5(m) Flame centre height 3.1 meter Pool liquid depth 0.001 (m) Maximum Flame width 3.11 meter Wind speed 3 m/s Mass burning rate liquid 1.3 kg/ m2/min. Liquid Density 760 kg/m3 Flame burnout time 1.35 Hrs.

Incident Intensity

of Heat Radiation ( IHR) at ground

level KW /m 2

IHR- Isopleth Distance ( Meters )


37.5 - Damage to process equipment. 100 % Fatal in 1 Min. 1 % fatal in 10 sec.


12.5 4.2 Min. to ignite wood (with flame contact). 1 % fatal in 1 min. 1 st deg. burn in 10 sec.

4.0 7.4 Pain after 20 secs. Blistering unlikely. 1.6 11.6 No discomfiture even on long exposure.

Results ♦ In the 3.5 meter radius area is considered as 100 % fatality in 1 min. and first degree burn in 10

sec. ♦ In the 7.4 meter radius area will give pain after 20 seconds. Blistering unlikely. ♦ In the 11.6 meter radius area is considered as safe area and no discomfiture even on long

exposure.





6.2 Risk Estimation Table I : Risk Estimation

Sr. No.

Scenarios Chemical Involved

Type of Risk Fire/Explosion/ Toxic release

Probability (Frequency)

Severity (Type of injury or damage possible)

Concentration & Damage Distance

from source (Meters)

Persons and property likely to be

affected within damage distance

No Damage distance/ No

Injury distance

Risk control measures provided

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Catastrophic failure of road tanker

1 Unconfined Pool fire

11 KL Fire 3E-6/ year Fatal 15.3 (37.5Kw/M2) Near by tanks, Road tanker and unloading pumps and pipelines

73 (1.6 Kw/M2) Given Bellow

Catastrophic failure of Acetic Acid storage tank 2 Spill Pool 10 KL Toxic release 3E-6/ year Fatal - (11920 ppm

LC50 ) Within factory

premises 198 (50 ppm

IDLH ) Do

3 Pool fire 10 KL Fire 3E-6/ year Fatal 7.9 (37.5Kw/M2) Do 22(1.6 Kw/M2) Do Fire Simulation for Drum Storage Area

4 Unconfined Pool fire

10 MT Fire/ Explosion 3E-6/ year Fatal 3.5 (37.5Kw/M2) Within Drum storage area

11.6 (1.6 Kw/M2) Given Bellow



6.2 Comments

The appended table summarizes the consequences of the various hazards analyzed under this study.

It can be seen from the results of the summary of the Risk Analysis study, the 100 % structural damage and fatality zone up to 15 meters and 73 meter to be considered as an Evacuation zone for fire and explosion scenarios. On site emergency preparedness plan On site emergency preparedness plan is to be updated as per risk assessment findings and emergency control facilities and resources to be updated, rehearsal and Mock- Drill frequency of the same needs to be increased to combat emergency in minimum time. Emergency handling facilities and training: All employees are well aware about possible emergencies and its consequences, emergency control equipments and practices to control such hazardous condition within premises.



SECTION VII

RISK REDUCTION MEASURES

Some of the safeties and risk reduction measures adopted and recommended for the safety of the plant are as follows:- 7.1 Design 7.1.1 Relevant and prevalent international and Indian standards will be followed for design,

fabrication, and inspection of the storage tanks. 7.1.2 Civil foundations are designed to take care of earthquakes, cyclones, landslides, flooding,

collapse of structures etc and statutory check are conducted every 5years. 7.1.3 Plant operator and staffs are selected on relevant experience and qualified for chemical

plant operation. New Inductees are appropriately trained on Handling and safe operation through induction programs.

7.1.4 All key personals are trained and updated for emergency handling procedures and regular Mock- Drills will be conducted on various scenarios.

7.2 Safety Devices

Following safety devices are and will be provided to protect from any malfunctioning of plant equipments:

7.2.1 Storage tanks.

a) Level & Pressure gauges will be on storage tanks b) Static bondings are and will be provided on pipeline flanges. c) Dyke wall provided surround above ground storage tanks. d) Flame arrestor will be installed on flammable material storage tanks. e) Tank will be designed as per IS code and standers and as per petroleum Act and rules. f) All pumps for flammable and toxic chemicals are and will be provided flameproof type

and double mechanical seal type. g) All pipeline and tanks are and will be painted as per IS color code. h) Jumpers and static earthing provision are be made on all flanges and will be provided

for tanks. i) Caution note and Material identification, capacity will be displayed on all storage

tanks. 7.2.2 Pumps

a) Out let valve and NRV are provided on pump outlet. b) Modular fire extinguishers provided near of most of the pumps. c) FLP type and mechanical seal type pump are installed for flammable chemicals.



7.2.3 Pipelines

a) Jumper connections on flanges to prevent build up of static electricity charge. b) Proper supports and clamping are provided c) Double earthing provided to all electrical motors. d) Color code as Per IS will be maintained.

7.3 Operation and Maintenance

Operations and maintenance of the plant will be in accordance with the well-established safe practices. Some of the guidelines are as follows:-

a) Periodic testing of hoses for leakages and continuity are conducted. b) Earthing of all plant equipment and earthing of vehicles under unloading operations. c) Planned preventive maintenance is practiced for different equipment for their safety

and reliable operations. d) Inspection of the storage tanks as per prefixed inspection schedule for thickness

measurement, joint and weld efficiency etc. e) Comprehensive color code scheme to identify different medium pipes. f) Strict compliance of safety work permits system. g) Proper maintenance of earthing pits is followed with periodic checking inhouse, data

maintained by The Maintenance Manager. h) Strict compliance of security procedures like issue of identify badges for outsides, gate

pass system for vehicles, checking of spark arrestors fitted to the tank lorries etc. i) Strict enforcement of no smoking & Tobacco free regime. j) Periodic training and refresher courses with updation to train the staff in safety, fire

fighting and first aid. 7.4 Recommendations 7.4.1 From the Risk Analysis studies conducted, it would be observed that by and large, the risks

will be confined within the boundary walls in case of fire & explosion, except in the event of a catastrophic failure of storage tank, it will create OFF site emergency situations and required more attention and emergency preparedness for combat such situations. To minimize the consequential effects of the risk scenarios, following steps are recommended.

Plant should meet provisions of the Manufacture, storage & Import of Hazardous

Chemicals Rules, 1986 & the factories Act, 1948. Emergency handling facilities to be maintained in tip top condition at all time. Safe operating procedure to be prepared for hazardous process and material handling

process. Safety devices and control instruments to be calibrated once in a year. Fire hydrant system needs to be installed as per TAC/NFPA Norms in each plant and

buildings. Proper color work as per IS 2379 to plant pipeline and tank, equipments to be done

once in a six month to protect from corrosion. Preventive maintenance schedule and record is and should be maintained for all

equipments. Permit to work system is and should be maintained for hazardous work in the plant.



Periodic On Site Emergency Mock Drills and occasional Off Site Emergency Mock Drills to be conducted, so those staffs are trained and are in a state of preparedness to tackle any emergency.

Safety manual as per Rule-68 K & P and Public awareness manual as per 41 B & C has been prepared and the same is distributed to all employees and nearby public.

Emergency siren to be provided in the plant to declare emergency. As per spill pool release Scenario for Catastrophic Failure of tank, it has been

observed that IDLH distance cover surrounding 197 meter distance it is up to company premises Hence, onsite evacuation plan needs to be prepared for factories employees in wind direction in case of extreme accident scenario.

Manual call points for fire location identification to be installed in plant premises. Fire & Safety organization setup to be planned and implement for better plant process

safety. Induction safety course to be prepared and trained all new employees before starting

duties in plant.



SECTION VIII

DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN

An onsite emergency in the industries involving hazardous processes or in hazardous installations is one situation that has potential to cause serious injury or loss of life. It may cause extensive damage to property and serious disruption in the work area and usually, the effects are confined to factory or in several departments of factory, premise. An emergency begins when operator at the plant or in charge of storage cannot cope up with a potentially hazardous incident, which may turn into an emergency. 8.1 ONSITE EMERGENCY PLAN 8.1.1 OBJECTIVES OF ONSITE EMERGENCY PLAN

A quick and effective response at during an emergency can have tremendous significance on whether the situation is controlled with little loss or it turns into a major emergency. Therefore, purpose an emergency plan is to provide basic guidance to the personnel for effectively combating such situations to minimize loss of life, damage to property and loss of property. An objective of Emergency Planning is to maximize the resource utilization and combined efforts towards emergency operations are as follows. :

8.1.2 DURING AN EMERGENCY.

To increase thinking accuracy and to reduce thinking time. To localize the emergency and if possible eliminates it. To minimize the effects of accident on people and property. To take correct remedial measures in the quickest time possible to contain the incident

and control it with minimum damage. To prevent spreading of the damage in the other sections. To mobilize the internal resources and utilize them in the most effective way To arrange rescue and treatment of causalities.

8.1.3 DURING NORMAL TIME.

• To keep the required emergency equipment in stock at right places and ensure the

working condition. • To keep the concerned personnel fully trained in the use of emergency equipment. • To give immediate warning tooth surrounding localities in case of an emergency

situation arising. • To mobilize transport and medical treatment of the injured. • To get help from the local community and government officials to supplement

manpower and resources. • To provide information to media & Government agencies, Preserving records,

evidence of situation for subsequent emergency etc.



8.2 SCOPE OF OSEP

This OSEP is prepared for industrial emergencies like fires, explosions, toxic releases, and asphyxia and does not cover natural calamities and societal disturbances related emergencies (like strikes, bomb threats, civil commission’s etc.)

8.3 ELEMENTS OF ONSITE EMERGENCY PLAN

The important elements to be considered in plan are

Emergency organization Emergency Facilities. Roles and Responsibilities of Key Personnel and Essential Employee. Communications during Emergency Emergency Shutdown of Plant & Control of situation. Rescue Transport & Rehabilitation. Developing Important Information.

8.4 METHODOLOGY.

The consideration in preparing Emergency Plan will be included the following steps:

• Identification and assessment of hazards and risks. • Identifying, appointment of personnel & Assignment of Responsibilities. • Identification and equipping Emergency Control Centre. • Identifying Assembly, Rescue points Medical Facilities. • Formulation of plan and of emergency sources. • Training, Rehearsal & Evaluation. • Action on Site.

Earlier, a detailed Hazard Analysis and Risk Assessment was carried out on hazards and their likely locations and consequences are estimated following the standard procedure. However the causing factors for above discussed end results may be different and causing factors are not discussed in this plan.

8.5 EMERGENCIES IDENTIFIED

Emergencies that may be likely at bulk fuel storage area, process plant, cylinder storage area, and drum storage shed, and autoclave reactor area. There are chances of fire and explosive only.

8.6 OTHERS

Other risks are earthquake, lightning, sabotage, bombing etc., which are usually, not in the purview of management control.



8.7 EMERGENCY ORGANIZATION.

Plant organization is enclosed. Based on the plant organization, which includes shift organization, an Emergency Organization is constituted towards achieving objectives of this emergency plan. Plant Manager is designated as Overall in Charge and is the Site Controller. The following are designated as Incident Controllers for respective areas under their control. Shift in charges (Plant Operations) is designated at Incident Controller for all areas of plant.

8.8 EMERGENCY FACILITIES 8.8.1 EMERGENCY CONTROL CENTRE (ECC)

It is a location, where all key personnel like Site Controller; Incident Controller etc. can assemble in the event of onset of emergency and carry on various duties assigned to them. Security Office is designated as Emergency Control Centre. It has P&T telephone as well as internal telephones as also mobile phone, ECC is accessible from plant located considerably away from process plant, Storage’s and on evaluation of other locations, Security Office find merit from the distance point of view, communication etc.

8.8.2 FACILITIES PROPOSED TO BE MAINTAINED AT EMERGENCY CONTROL

CENTRE (ECC)

The following facilities and information are and would be made available at the ECC

• Latest copy of Onsite Emergency Plan and off sites Emergency Plan (as provided by District Emergency Authority).

• Intercom Telephone. • P&T Telephone. • Mobile Phone • Telephone directories (Internal, P&T) • Factory Layout, Site Plan • Plans indicating locations of hazardous inventories, sources of safety equipment,

hydrant layout, location of pump house, road plan, assembly points, vulnerable zones, escape routes.

• Hazard chart. • Emergency shut-down procedures. • Nominal roll of employees. • List and address of key personnel • List and address of Emergency coordinators. • List and address of first aides, • List and address of first aid fire fighting employees, • List and address of qualified trained persons.



8.8.3 FIRE FIGHTING FACILITIES.

• Internal hydrant system • Portable extinguishers

8.8.4 FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEMS

These systems are proposed to protect the plant by means of different fire protection facilities and consist of • Hydrant system for exterior as well as internal protection of various buildings/areas of

the plant. • Portable extinguishers and hand appliances for extinguishing small fires in different

areas of the plant. • Water cum foam monitor to be provided in bulk fuel storage area. • Fire water pumps. • Two (2) independent motor driven pumps each of sufficient capacity and head are

proposed for the hydrant system which is capable to extinguish Fire or cooling purpose.

8.8.5 HYDRANT SYSTEM.

Adequate number of fire hydrants and monitors will be provided at various locations in and around the buildings and other plant areas. The hydrants will be provided on a network of hydrant mains drawing water from the hydrant pump, which starts automatically due to drop of pressure in the event of operating the hydrant valves. We are suggesting you to go for TAC approved hydrant system for foolproof safety and benefit from fire policy premium.

8.9 EMERGENCY ESCAPES

The objective of the emergency escape is to escape from the hazardous locations, to the nearest assembly point or the other safe zone, for rescue and evacuation.

8.10 ASSEMBLY POINT.

Assembly point is location, where, persons unconnected with emergency operations would proceed and await for rescue operation.

8.11 WIND SOCK.

Wind socks for knowing wind direction indication would be provided at a suitable location to visible from many locations.

8.12 EMERGENCY TRANSPORT.

A Vehicle would be stationed at the Site at all times. However, the other vehicles of the company also would be available for emergency services.



8.13 EMERGENCY COMMUNICATION.

There are two kinds of communication system are provided.

(a) Regular P&T phones with intercom facility. (b) Mobile phone

8.14 WARNING/ALARM/COMMUNICATION OF EMERGENCY

The emergency would be communicated by operating electrical siren for continuously for five minutes with high and low pitch mode.

8.15 EMERGENCY RESPONSIBILITIES:

Priority of Emergency Protection.

• Life safety • Preservation of property • Restoration of the normalcy

8.16 MUTUAL AID

While necessary facilities are available and are updated from time to time, sometimes, it may be necessary to seek external assistance; it may be from the neighboring factories or from the State Government as the case may be.

8.17 MOCK DRILL

Inspite of detailed training, it may be necessary to try out whether, the OSEP works out and will there be any difficulties in execution of such plan. In order to evaluate the plan and see whether the plan meets the objectives of the OSEP, occasional mock drills are contemplated. Before undertaking the drill, it would be very much necessary to give adequate training to all staff members and also information about possible mock drill. After few pre-informed mock drills, few UN-informed mock drills would be taken. All this is to familiarize the employees with the concept and procedures and to see their response. These scheduled and unscheduled mock drills would be conducted during shift change, public holidays, in night shift etc. To improve preparedness once in 6 months and performance is evaluated and Site Controller maintains the record. Incident Controller coordinates this activity.



APPENDIX

DESCRIPTION OF RECOMMENDED MINIMUM PREVENTIVE

AND

PROTECTIVE MEASURES BASED ON FETI (Fire Explosion and Toxic Index)

A detailed description of recommended preventive and protection measures for fire and explosion hazards is outlined as follows: Fire Protection of Structural Supports Fire protection of structural support is carried out by the application of concrete cement or Hydite Blocks, Thermolag, Pyrocrete, Albi-clad and similar fire-resistant materials to the steel supports for vessels, pipe racks, equipment and structures. The fireproof rating required is based on the depth of flammable liquid, which is expected to be impounded in the area. To compute the rating the depth of the anticipated spill is first determined form its volume. The duration of the fire is then determined, assuming a one minute burning time for each 0.25 cm. Of depth. Whenever possible, drainage is preferable to fireproofing as a means of protecting against the hazards of spills. A minimum slope of 2% is required to carry soil away from the process structure or dyke. The number of support members of support members requiring fireproofing increases with increasing fire and Explosion Index. Where the Fire and Explosion Index is in the moderate range, only principal vessel supports need be fireproofed. However, for areas with a severe Fire an Explosion index all structural steel must be protected. Directional water spray may replace fireproofing in some cases, but it is not satisfactory because of the vulnerability of the sprinkler piping to blast damage. Dump Blow down or Spill Control Dump blow down or spill control system are basically designed to facilitate hazardous materials to be removed quickly and effectively from areas where their unwanted presence poses a danger. For example:

Where moderate to large amount of flammable materials are used, appropriate devices such as fixed water deluge equipment should be installed to remove spilled material from the vicinity of equipment and vessel as quickly as possible. This may include pump out equipment or slope drainage directed to a sump or skimmer pond. These devices minimize the need for fireproofing and release the water-spray coverage required.

Internal Explosion Control Devices The techniques for controlling internal explosion ensure that explosive mixtures do not form inside process equipment , to contain or suppress the explosion or eliminate sources of ignition. This is possible with:



Employing inert lines on flammable liquid tanks so that material is discharged into the tank near the bottoms, thereby eliminating the free fall or static electricity.

Building Ventilation Smoke and heat ventilation involves the removal of the hot fire gases and smoke during a fire. The NFPA standard No. 204 should be used for guide, however the vent ratio will range form 1:30 of floor area in high-heat-release area and it is 1:150 of floor area in low-heat-release areas. Air change for each area where flammable liquid is handled should range from six air changes per hour for inside enclosed flammable liquid, liquid storage areas to 0.3 cu.m. of air per each square meter of floor space. NFPA standards Nos. 30, 33 and 91 should may be required for this purpose. Building Explosive Relief Explosion damage can be minimized by segregating hazardous operations in small detached building or locating them I adequately vented units separated form the main portion of the operating building. The necessary area of the explosion vents depends primarily upon the expected intensity of the explosion. NFPA standards 68 and 654 recommended explosion relief in the range of 1 m2 per 6.5 to 32m3 of volume. Dyking When the dyking system is designed to carry a spill away from the lank or facility, a slope of not less than 2% away from the area is required and the stops must terminate in an impounding basin with a capacity no less than the largest spill which might occur. The ratio of drainage and the location of the basin must be such that if the liquid is ignited, the fire will not seriously expose tanks or adjoining property. When protection of the property is to be accomplished by confining the spill to the area around the tanks, the volume of the dyked area must not be less than the capacity of the largest tank in the dike plus at least 10% freeboard. Dyke walls must be of concrete or solid masonry design and restricted to average height of not more than 1.5 m. protection for draining water from the no flammable spill be allowed to escape form the dike area. Dyke should be equipped with normally closed post indicator valves accessible under fire conditions. Blast or Barrier Walls Installation of blast or barrier walls for separating high-hazards processes from areas of lesser hazard will be an effective measured for mitigating explosion consequences while keeping a minimum separation distance.

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Best Value Chem Pvt Ltd Risk Assessment Report