Book Reviews 165 Mind Association 2005 Mind, Vol. 114 .453 .January 2005(given his knowledge of Ss subject factors). So we have K(J, K(S, C)). Assumingthat John knows that knowledge is factive, we have K(J, [K(S, C)!C]). Thenby SPC we have K(J, C). This seems to show that SI yields a contradiction insuch a case.Hawthornes take on the situation is that the knowledge account of asser-tion can somehow come to the rescue (see p. Ioo). But the generation of thecontradiction makes no assumptions at all about assertion. The resolution ofthis problem (and the assertion and PR problems that seem to aict SI) is asfollows. We supposed in our example that K(S, C). Thus we were supposingthat C is true. We supposed that John was cognizant of Ss subject factors(which diered from his own regarding which possibilities were salient). Wethen tried to argue as follows. Since on SI, K(S, C), and since Johns knows SIand knows what Ss subject factors are, we have K(J, K(S, C)). But for John tohave that latter piece of knowledge, he must know that C is true. But if Johnknows that, then it cannot be that K(J, C), as we initially supposed. Even if thepossibility that the timetable is wrong is salient to John, SI will not yield theresult that K(J, C) if John has come to know by the foregoing reasoning that Cis true! So the most that John can know about S, given the assumption thatK(J, C), is that S satises all the conditions for knowing C up to the truth con-dition.Hawthornes monograph is like a Cy Twombly drawing: very minimal in itsdetails and yet elegant and important. It is required reading for those inter-ested in contemporary theory of knowledge.Department of Philosophyanthony bruecknerUniversity of California, Santa BarbaraSanta Barbara, CA 93106USAbrueckne@philosophy.ucsb.edudoi:Io.Io,,/mind/fzi160Between Kant and Hegel: Lectures on German Idealism, by DieterHenrich, edited by David S. Pacini. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,:oo,. Pp. liv + ,I. H/b ,,.,,.For anyone not already familiar with Dieter Henrichs work on the GermanIdealists, this book will serve as a ne introduction to some of its main themes,in a reasonably accessible style. Its text comprises lectures which Henrich gavein I,,, in Harvard, and is based on transcripts taken by the editor David Paciniand others, reworked with Henrichs help. The intention behind the lectures,delivered at the invitation of John Rawls and Stanley Cavell, was to bring thisGerman tradition to the attention of those conditioned by Russell and Mooreinto viewing it with deep suspicion, and thus to further some sort of rap-prochement between the analytic and continental schools. According to166 Book ReviewsMind, Vol. 114 .453 .January 2005 Mind Association 2005Pacini (who provides an extensive and moderately helpful foreword to the vol-ume), Henrichs hopes for dialogue were not substantially realized at thattime (p. xi); but as he rightly notes, things have changed substantially sincethen, as a new wave of American scholars (including Ameriks, Beiser, Brea-zeale, Pippin, Pinkard, Neuhouser, and many others) have made their mark.So, while at the time the lectures were originally given Henrich may have beena lone voice, now that they have come to be published, the lectures standalongside several recent studies of this period written in English, many ofwhich were inuenced to some degree by Henrichs earlier contributions tothis eld. However, Henrichs view of this period is no less distinctive for that,and remains of considerable interest.The book traces the now familiar trajectory from Kant, through Kants earlycritics (Jacobi, Reinhold, and Schulze), to Fichte, Hlderlin, and Hegel. Anotable omission from this course of lectures is any extended discussion ofSchelling, which Henrich explains on the reasonable grounds that this wouldhave required more background in Kants philosophy of science than is pro-vided herealthough a discussion of the later Schelling would have provideda nice coda to some of the critical remarks on Hegel made at the end. In mak-ing these remarks, Henrich shows his concern to avoid presenting his story asif it were a triumphal march towards the absolute standpoint: hence the use ofbetween in his title, as suggesting that each major gure deserves to be takenseriously in his own right, and that the transition to Hegel involves losses aswell as gains. In this respect, Henrich is closer to commentators like Frank,Bowie and Horstmann than to Pippin, Pinkard, and Beiser, who continue totreat Hegel as the culmination of a fundamentally progressive story.Henrich begins by trying to explain how post-Kantian German Idealismgrew out of Kants critical project. To his original audience, this must indeedhave seemed as puzzling as it was to the elderly Kant himself: how did the lux-uriant speculations of these later thinkers develop from the relatively austereoutlook of transcendental idealism? To answer this question, Henrich oers anice simile appropriate to the circumstances of his lectures:In [the eyes of his students], Kant was like the Spanish conquistadors who discov-ered America: he believed that this new land his theory of mental activitywould provide new means of survival and stability for the old world of science andmetaphysics. But the discovery of this new continent actually changed the oldworld completely, and his students did not follow Kants admonition to carry thenew treasures away and apply them to science and the criticism of metaphysics.They felt it necessary to explore and colonize the new land, a project that had alreadystarted, as a matter of fact. He was a kind of Columbus in their eyes, who neitherknew nor wanted to know the point at which he had arrived. (p. ,,)Henrich thus views Kant as an involuntary revolutionary (p. :o), whose con-ception of the self had opened up a new world, where this self has three fun-damental features: it is unied (it is the same in all thoughts); it is active(thinking is an act the self undertakes); and it is empty (my thought I thinkimplies nothing ontologically about the I except for this thought). But KantBook Reviews 167 Mind Association 2005 Mind, Vol. 114 .453 .January 2005did not want to explore this new world any further, and indeed felt that anyfurther exploration would be fruitless; this was left to his more audacious suc-cessors.A second, and related, link between Kant and the post-Kantians is also high-lighted by Henrich: namely, the systematic importance Kant gives to freedom,in his claim in the Critique of Practical Reason that the concept of freedom constitutes the keystone of the whole structure of a system of pure reason, evenof speculative reason. To Kants successors, this suggested that the philosophi-cal enterprise might end in a unied conception; it was this search for unitythat made Spinoza so attractive to this generation, but where this was to be aSpinozism of freedom, because (as Kant had suggested) freedom was to be itskeystone, through which Spinozism loses its commitment to determinism.Henrich then proceeds to a discussion of the way in which Jacobi, Reinholdand Schulze inuenced subsequent developments. Put simply, Jacobi set out achallenge that the Idealists later tried to meet, by claiming that a systematictheory cannot simultaneously be coherent and also a theory of freedom; Rein-holds attempt to develop such a theory by starting from some basic factoered a methodological ideal, although one he himself did not satisfy; andSchulzes scepticism appeared to raise serious problems for the Kantian posi-tion. These three elements, Henrich argues, form the background to Fichtesproject.Henrichs dicussion of Fichte is the centrepiece of the book, and has abroadly chronological structure, beginning from the review of Schulzes Aen-esidemus of I,,,. Here Fichte accused Schulze of hypostatizing the Kantiansubject, treating the mind as a kind of thing, whereas (Fichte claimed) themind does not exist except through its own self-conception: The faculty ofrepresentation exists for the faculty of representation and through the faculty ofrepresentation. It is this idea that forms the germ of the characteristically Fich-tean view of the self, as a self-positing subject, where the self is not a fact oraccident or substance, but a Tathandlung or fact/act, both agent and productof the same activity. As Henrich makes clear, it is easy to see why Fichte and hisreaders found this notion so exciting, for it appeared to satisfy just the meth-odological, metaphysical and ethical demands they felt to be so pressing: at amethodological level, this seemed to provide a genuinely basic rst principle,avoiding the threat of a further regress that Schulze had raised against Rein-holds more dualistic picture; at a metaphysical level, while the self-reexivestructure of the subject oered a unied starting point, dierence was notexcluded from this structure, but could be explained as a condition for self-positing; and at an ethical level, the idea suggests that the I essentially involvesself-determination or autonomy, thus seeming to realize the synthesis betweenKant and Spinoza that a Spinozism of freedom requires.However, of course, this Fichtean conception of the self is hardly straight-forward, and required further development to be properly understood. As hedoes elsewhere, Henrich here provides a careful analysis of Fichtes various168 Book ReviewsMind, Vol. 114 .453 .January 2005 Mind Association 2005attempts to get his view of the self-positing subject clear, in a way (Henrichsuggests) that shows Fichtes central philosophical contribution, which is toreveal what is wrong with standard accounts of self-consciousness. Theseaccounts all assume what Henrich calls a reection theory: in self-conscious-ness, I turn my attention to myself as an object of consciousness. The dicultywith such theories, Henrich argues, is that they all involve a circularity: I can-not identify the object on which I reect as myself, unless I am already con-sciousofmyself, sothereectiontheorycannotexplainhowsuchconsciousness is possible. As Henrich puts it, Any theory of self-consciousnessthat makes use of reection as a basic structure of the mind inevitably culmi-nates in circularity. Because reection presupposes that self-knowledge isalready available, we have to assume an original self-awareness of the self thatprecedes all acts of reection (p. ::). Henrich takes Fichte to have been therst to recognize this diculty, and to oer his conception of the self-positingsubject as a way of resolving it:We cannot conceptualise a self and its subsequent turning back on itself for thatwould be a repetition of the reection model. By the same token, we cannot have theself unless the self is already aware of itself. Or again, having the self means having itin such a way that there is an awareness of itself. The existence of the self, and the ex-istence of an awareness of the self as self, are inseparable states of aairs Withthese observations in mind, it becomes readily apparent that Fichtes use of thephrase positing itself in reference to the self constitutes his attempt to escape a the-oretical paradox: to posit is the opposite of to reflect. (pp. :,)Henrich argues, however, that developing this alternative to the reection the-ory was dicult for Fichte, as he attempted various ways of thinking throughhis new position, culminating in the formula of I8oI: The Self is an activityinto which an eye is inserted, and, inseparably from that, is an activity of theeye.This later position of Fichtes was destined to remain unexplored, however;for, as Henrich tells it, an earlier intervention by Hlderlin was to be decisivein shaping the subsequent debate. This intervention is to be found in a manu-script from I,,,, entitled Judgement and Being; and Henrich has done muchto underline the signicance of this text. In essence, Hlderlin argued againstFichte that understanding self-consciousness requires that we derive the selffrom something prior to the self, which grounds the correlation between sub-ject and object, where Hlderlin calls this undierentiated ground Being.Hlderlin argues, furthermore, that all consciousness containing the thoughtI (and hence Fichtes I am) is a case of separation, and thus of the mentalactivity of judgement (where the German Urteilung suggests original (ur-) sep-aration (Teilung)). Once this separation has occurred, Hlderlin held, therewas no way back into undierentiated Being, although a kind of self-surren-der is possible in love as a relation to beauty.Henrich argues that Hlderlins position here was to have a decisive in-uence on Hegel, but in a way that was to take the debate away from the direc-Book Reviews 169 Mind Association 2005 Mind, Vol. 114 .453 .January 2005tion that Fichte had begun to explore; as a result, he claims, the paradoxes ofself-reference that Fichte uncovered were never properly addressed by Hegel.Thus, Henrich claims, although Hegel was original in giving negation a self-referential structure, whereby everything depends on an other to be itself, sucha structure cannot resolve the Fichtean problem, which is peculiar to the self:[T]he distinctive problem of mental self-reference is the problem of self-iden-tification. The problem has many aspects, but we can put its principal pointmost forcefully by asking: How do I know who I am? Hegels approach is sim-ply bereft of these issues (p. ,:,). As a criticism of Hegel, this may seem rela-tively modest; for perhaps even Hegel can be allowed to admit that he hasntrevolved every philosophical puzzle, and maybe Fichtes is one of these. Butelsewhere, Henrich and those he has inuenced have suggested that thisbetrays a deeper diculty in Hegels method and project itself; for his claimthat the system can end when the subject nds itself in the world raises thequestionofhowsuchrecognitionispossible,unlessFichtespuzzleisaddressed.Given the time that has elapsed between when these lectures were rstdelivered, and their publication now, it is inevitably the case that the debatehas moved on, as Henrichs reading of these gures oered here has beenquestioned, by Theunissen, Dsing, Pippin, and others. And Henrich himselfhas also moved on, developing the ideas contained in these lectures in dier-ent interpretative and systematic directions. To anyone who has followedthese debates, therefore, this volume will contribute nothing new. However, itwill helpfully serve to introduce Henrichs seminal reading of German Ideal-ism to a wider philosophical audience, and thus enable these lectures toachieve the intention which motivated them a mere thirty years late.Department of Philosophy robert sternUniversity of SheffieldSheffieldS10 2TNUKdoi:Io.Io,,/mind/fzi165New Essays On Musical Understanding, by Peter Kivy. New York:Oxford University Press, :ooI. Pp. xii + :,o. H/b o.oo, P/b I,.,,.Peter Kivys latest collection contains some very interesting articles, and onethat is, I think, outstanding. As with Roger Scruton and indeed most analyticwriters on musical aesthetics, Kivy writes from the viewpoint of pre-modernistWestern art music. His guiding vision is the centrality, perhaps even the neces-sity, of the tonal system and the Viennese classical tradition which exploits it,to the aesthetic experience of music. However, given the particular emphasison absolute (pure instrumental) music, the result is a marked narrowness of