Beyond Marxist State Theory

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Beyond marxist state theory: State autonomy in

democratic societiesSamuel DeCanio

a

aDepartment of Political Science, Ohio State University, Columbus, OH, 43201 E-mail:

Published online: 28 Nov 2010.

To cite this article: Samuel DeCanio (2000): Beyond marxist state theory: State autonomy in democratic societies, CriticalReview: A Journal of Politics and Society, 14:2-3, 215-236

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Samuel DeCanio

BEYOND MARXIST STATE THEORY: STATEAUTONOMY IN DEMOCRATIC SOCIETIES

A B S T R A C T : Recent theories ofthe state often draw attention tostates' autonomyfrom social preferences. This paper suggests that the phenomenon ofpublic igno-rance is theprimary mechanism responsible for state autonomy indemocraticpolities. Such theorists asSkocpol andPoulantzus, who do not take account ofpublic ignorance, either underestimate the state's autonomy or stress causal mech-anisms that are necessary but notsufficient conditions for itsautonomy. Gram-sci's concept ofideological hegemony ispromising, even though it is far too insis-tent on the penetration ofideology ofany kind beyond relatively small numbersof political sophisticates.Until relatively recently, examinations ofstate activity marginalized thestate's auto nom y from social interests. Previou s structural-functionalist,pluralist, andMarxist theories emphasized "the importance of interestand pressure groups inpolicy-making " (A lmond 1988, 866), and dow n-played thestate's ability to operate autonomously from these interests.1However , the 1970s and 80s saw an explosion of interest in the au-tonomous capabilities ofstate actors.2 Numerous studies examined avariety ofinstances where state actions diverged from societal interests.Such studies aremost commonly associated with theefforts ofT h e d aSkocpol, et al., to"bring thestate back in" to social analysis. However,

Critical Review 14 (2000), nos. 2-3 . ISS N 0891-3811. 2001 Critical R eview Foundation.S amuel DeC anio, Department ofPolitical S cience, Ohio S tate University, C olumbus, OH432ol , e-mail , thanks Paul B eck, Gregory C aldeira, S tephenDeC anio, Jonathan DeC anio, Jeffrey Friedman, Morgan Marietta, andNadia Urbinatti fortheir helpful comments and suggestions, all too many ofwhich I ignored.

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state autonomy has also been the subject of various neo-Marxist schol-ars, such as Nico s Poulantzas and R alp h M iliband.Unfortunately, the existing accounts have not been successful in iso-lating the variables responsible for state auton om y. B arbara Ge ddes hascommented:

A lthough several authors have discussed the subject, no one has confirmedempirically the existence of political or social characteristics that allowgovernments to act autonomously. . . . A s a result, analyses tend to focusmore on the policy outcomes themselves rather than on the state structurethat is hypothesized to produce the ou tcome. (Geddes 1994, 5-6.)T his paper attempts to suggest the empirical gro und ing for state au-

tono my that has thus far eluded state theory. I argue that certain charac-teristics of democratic mass publicsspecifically those associated withtheir pervasive political ignoranceprovide a powerful explanation forwhy states often enjoy autonomy from society.3

Isolating the public's political ignorance as the key independent vari-able for state autonomy provides a distinct departure from most existingstate theories. T o focus on the dynam ics of the public's political kn ow l-edge is to recognize that society's primary check upon state actions isexercised through elections and public opinion . C onc ern with the in-teraction between public opinion and state actors highlights the uniquemechanisms of domination that are created by democratic institutions.As this approach attributes state autonomy to the mass political igno-rance that became salient following the state's adoption of such institu-tions, it may be helpful to call it "democratic state theory" so as to dif-ferentiate it from th eories that, l ike S kocpol 's , draw on prem od ernsocieties in conceptualizing the determinants of state autonomy. 4

As democratic state theory emphasizes the importance of electionsand public opinion, neither the ability of social groups to overthrow thestate militarily nor to manipulate it economically may be as importantin determining the degree of state autonomy as they were before theadvent of modernity, nor as important as is the public's knowledgeorlack of know ledg e of th e state's activities. If the m echanisms of rewardand punishment that elections exercise over state agents are the primarymeans by which social preferences are translated into approval or disap-proval over state policy and personnel, it may be quite important thatempirical studies of the public's understanding of politics show a major-ity of the public to be ignorant of the most basic political information.

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DeCanio Beyond M arxist State Tlieory 21 7

If the public is deeply ignorant of the government's activities, state ac-tors may enjoy a significant degree of autonomy simply because thepublic is unaware of wh at they are doing .

A dem ocratic state theo ry wou ld therefore illum inate significant as-pects of state autonomy that have eluded prior theories, which arebriefly reviewed and evaluated below. Skocpol's (1985) state theory fo-cuses on the state's policy instruments (i.e., state capacities), which arenecessary but not sufficient con ditio ns for state autonomy . A fter dis-cussing Skocpol's theory, I review several key studies of public opinionand vo ter behavior that illustrate the extent of the public's ignorance. Inthis section I suggest that public ignorance is perhaps the key indepen-dent variable responsible for state autonomy. Next I examine whetherneo-Marxist state theory, exemplified by the work of Poulantzas (1978),suitably explains state autonomy. I contend that if we take cognizanceof public ignorance, Poulantzas underestimates the degree of autonomyenjoyed by the democratic capitalist state. In this section I also summa-rize some of the concepts introdu ced b y A nto nio Gramsci. I suggestthat while the public's ignorance lends support to Gramsci's analysis ofideological hegemony, such hegemony results from different mecha-nisms than those Gramsci held responsible. I conclude with a generaldiscussion of state theory.

Non-M arxist State TheoryFor purposes of contrast, we might label Skocpol's version of state the-ory non-Marxist state theory (hereafter N M S T ). 5 T he contributions ofNM S T are varied and numerous.6 In the interest of brevity I have cho-sen to use Skocpol as an ideal type, while no ting that many NM S T re-searchers depart from her method of analysis.

T he chief NM S T claim is that contrary both to the normative ratio-nale of democratic states and to empirical theories such as Marxism andpluralism, "states conceived as organizations claiming control over terri-tories and people may formulate and pursue goals that are not simplyreflective of the demands or interests of social groups, classes, or soci-ety" (S kocpol 1985, 9). N M S T investigates the ability of state actors toundertake such policies, as well as the impact of those policies on theconte nt and workings of politics. A ccording to S kocpol, the state offi-cials most likely to pursue autonomous goals are "organizationally co-herent collectivities of state officials, especially collectivities of career


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officials relatively insulated from ties to currently dominant socioeco-no mic interests" (ibid.).T he specific factors responsible for state aut on -omy from society vary. Skocpol notes:

T he extranational orientations of states, the challenges they may face inmaintaining domestic order, and the organizational resources that collec-tivities of state officials may be able to draw on and deployall of thesefeatures of the state . . . can help to explain autonomous state action.(Ibid., 9.)S kocpo l attributes mu ch weight to the organization al capabilities ofstates:

A state's means of raising and deploying financial resources tell us morethan could any other single factor about its existing (and immediatelypotential) capacities to create or strengthen state organizations, to em-ploy personnel, to co-opt political support, to subsidize economic enter-prises, and to fund social programs. (Ibid., 17.)Perhaps one reason Skocpol emphasizes the state's financial and mili-

tary capacities is that she often sees state autonomy as a matter offorcibly imposing actions or policies upon a resistant public. 7 T he suc -cess of such efforts would be ensured if (contrary to pluralist and Marx-ist accou nts) the state had a source of revenu e in de pe nd en t of, say, aparticular social class or set of societal groups, and a military force thatwas willing and able to act against public manifestations of social disap-proval of state policies.

T his is a distinctly autocratic view of state-society interaction onethat seems to overlook the fact that the primary manifestations of soci-etal (dis)approval in the modern era are electoral. In the modern age,the state's military and financial resources, or lack thereof, flow from(electoral) manifestations of societal opinionpositive or negativerather than from the state's autonomy from such manifestations.

A lthou gh she does no t acknowledge this macrotheoretical problemwith her understanding of state autonomy, at the micro level Skocpolimplicitly recognizes the limitations of NM S T . In he r review of the lit-erature, S kocpol no tes that the factors responsible for state au tono myoften do not concern military or taxation capabilities. In her discussionof J. P. Nettle's "T h e S tate as a C once ptual Variable," the explanationSkocpol gives for the divergent degrees of autonomy enjoyed by theFrench and A merican states is their different constitutional traditions.


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DeCanio Beyond Marxist State Tlieory 21 9

S kocp ol (1985, 22) conclud es tha t "vario us sorts of states .. . give rise tovarious conceptions of the meaning and methods of 'polities ' itself,conceptions that influence the behavior of all groups and classes in na-tional societies." T he imp orta nce of variables that lie outside th e state'sorganizational and military capabilities suggests that a more successfulversion of NM S T may need to appeal to oth er factors to fully accountfor why certain states gain autonomy from social preferences.

B y using public ignorance as a central indepe nden t variable to ex-plain state autonomy, the shortcoming s of NM S T could be mitigated.Such an approach also indicates when states may be dominated by soci-ety. Indeed, the flip side of public ignorance is that although the publicis generally politically ignorant, this condition is not absolute. In mod-ern democracies legislative personnel, in particular, face the possibilityof removal if the public, for whatever reasons, rejects their bids for re-election. T his creates (at least) two possible ways society may d om inatethe state. State actors can be evicted from office if they make mistakesthat the public is aware of and rejects. Social domination of the statecan also occur if states anticipate social mobilization against their poli-cies. Even if the state enjoys ignorance-derived autonomy when it takesa specific action, state actors must often try to anticipate w he the r th epublic will become aware of actions it may reject, and then punish stateactors at the ballot box. 8

The Public's Ignorance of PoliticsStudies of public opinion documenting the mass public's political igno-rance paint a rather dismal picture of the average citizen in the industri-alized West. T hey indicate that th e ov erwhelm ing m ajority of the p op u-lace is ignorant not only of the content of the ideologies that dominatemodern political discourse, but even of the most basic features of poli-tics.

T he first point was demo nstrated in Philip C onverse's ground break-ing paper, "T he Nature of B elief Systems in Mass Publics" (1964). C on -verse showed that most citizens exhibit a disturbing amount of politicalignorance, and that there are striking differences between the levels ofpolitical knowledge possessed by the general public and the relativelysophisticated political elites. Un like politicians and o ther mem bers ofthe political elite, the public is grossly unaware of which issues "go to-gether" ideologically. In a survey in which respondents were asked


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"W ha t do th e terms liberal and conservative mean to you ?" only 17percent of the respondents gave an answer that roughly coincided withan accurate description of the terms, and 37 percent could not nameany difference betw een "liberal" and "conservative." S ubsequen t researchhas bo rne out C onverse's finding that descriptions of political ideologysuch as the following were far from being the weakest that pollsters en-counter :

For some reason conservative gets identified with the Southidentifiedwith drabby looking clothes vs. more something I would wear, drabbyclothes, too, but it is just a different type.Oh conservative. Liberal and conservative. Liberal and conservative.[...] I wouldn 't know. [...] Liberal . . . liberal . . . liberal . . . liberal. A nd -conservative. Well, if a person is liberal with their money they squandertheir money? Does it fall into that same category? (Neumann 1986,120.)T he public's ignorance of politics is not restricted to its inno cence of

ideology. Many studies of voter behavior document the public's blatantmisunderstanding of the most basic political issues and structures ofgovernm ent (Neum ann 1986; Delli C arpini and Keeter 1996, ch. 2, and1991; B enn ett 1988). Localized political information , such as the namesof senators and C ongressional representatives, are also unk no w n to amajority of U.S . citizens. In 1989, approximately 70 pe rcent of A me ri-cans could not n ame the senators of their ho me state, and 71 percen tcould no t identify the mem ber of C ongress from their hom e district(Delli C arpin i and Keeter 1996 ,94).

More important for present purposes, the public is often ignorant ofthe policies the state implements, and of whether their elected repre-sentatives suppo rt o r oppose given policies (e.g., Delli C arpin i andKeeter 1996, 262 -64). In one study, B arbara H inckley (1980, 644) foundthat only 10 percent of voters in an NES survey could remember a sin-gle bill their representative voted on. 9

Kn ow ledg e o f foreign po licy is equally abysmal. In 1964, at theheight of the C old War, only 38 percent of the A merican pu blic knewthat the Soviet Union was not a member of NATO (Page and Shapiro1992 ,10). In th e 1980s, only 43 percent o f surveyed A mericans kne w ofthe S trategic Defense Initiative, and a mere 22 percent kn ew it was U.S.policy to retaliate with nuclear weapons against a Soviet attack onW estern Eu rop e ( ibid.) . Fol lowing massive med ia coverage of theGeneva summ it attended by R onald R eagan and Mikhail Gorbachev, a


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DeCanio Beyond M arxist State Theory 221

majority of A mericans could not nam e the leader of the S oviet U nio n(Delli C arpini and Keeter 1996,62).

Public Ignorance and HeuristicsA lthough the public is often ignorant of political issues, many have a r-gued that public knowledge of politicians' personal traits or the gen-eral stance of political parties reduces the amount of information thepublic need s to cast a relatively informed vote (S niderma n, B rody, andT etlock 1991; C onverse 1990; Zaller 1992; Page and S hapiro 1992;Lupia and M cC ubb ins 1998; Pop kin 1991 and 1993; S timson 1990).Instead of devoting large amounts of effort to becoming familiar withdull and com plicated issues, peop le use the p ositions of political pa r-ties or favored politicians as heuristics to reduce the amount of timeand energy necessary to form an opinion about a given issue (but seeKuklinski and Q uirk 2 000, and Lau and R edlaw sk 20 01, for criticismsof the effectiveness of heuristics).

A lthough the extent to which the public uses information short-cuts may have important ramifications for the malleability of publicopinion, their use does not radically alter the picture of a largely ig-norant public and a largely autonomous state. Indeed, the public's useof heuristics may enhance state autonomy by conferring public ap-proval on policies undertaken by trusted officials or parties, even if thepolicies, evaluated in their own right, might meet with public disap-proval. Elite dom ination of mass opin ion may create situations w herestate officials may actually dictate what the public's preferences willbe, by shaping the heuristics in play. Jo hn Zaller's wo rk, in particular,is replete with examples of public opinion following (not leading) thepositions communicated by party leaders, even on such contentious is-sues as the Vietna m War (Z aller 1992).

Marxist State TheoryB ecause it interferes w ith the m ain societal check on democratically le-gitimized states, public ignorance seems far likelier to generate mo der nstates' autono my than the variables identified by previous forms of n on -Marxist state theory. B ut despite Marx's tendenc y to reduce th e state tothe role o f serving the interest o f the do min ant social class, som e forms


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of neo-Marxist state theory begin, at least, to accord public ignorancean important role in providing state autonomy.

It is important to note at the outset that there is rampant disagree-m en t a mo ng M arxists regarding the nature o f the capitalist state. W hileMarx (like Engels and Lenin) is usually seen as advancing a non-au-tono mo us accoun t of the state, many take Marx's (and Engels s) variouscom me nts on the state as the basis for hypothesizing the relative a uton -omy of the capitalist state.

A comprehensive review of the numerous Marxist theories of thestate is beyond the scope and purpose of this paper, and can be foundelsewhere.10 For present purposes, I have chosen to elaborate only onthose theories that incorporate claims of autonomy in their analysis.

Marxist theories that treat the state as instrumental to the interests ofthe dominant class may be called instrumentalist Marxist state theories(IMS T s). S uch treatments "stress the causal prima cy of the individualsor social forces in charge of the state systemin the most extreme casesseeing the state system as a wholly neutral instrument" (Jessop 1990,250). S uch analyses con tend that in capitalist societies the state's interestsare intimately tied to capital. T he state draws its funding from the bo ur-geoisie, is staffed by the bourgeoisie, and serves bourgeois interests(Marx 1972,187).T his view can be found in Marx's Preface to his Con-tribution to the Critique of Political Economy, and more recently in R alphMiliband's The S tate in Capitalist Society (1969).A lthoug h IMS T s view capitalist states as advancing the interests ofthe bourgeoisie, some of them see the bourgeoisie as often falling vic-tim to a collective-action problem . T he anarchy of prod uction , and cap -italists' willingness to pursu e e con om ic projects tha t are individuallybeneficial but that do not reflect their long-run collective interests, cancreate situations that potentially threaten the reproduction of capitalistrelations o f produ ction. T hese instabilities occasionally requ ire th e stateto act "contrary to the dem ands of a shor ts ighted, nar row minde dbourgeoisie in order to safeguard capitalist relations of production andmaintain political stability" (Nordlinger 1981,4748).

Yet in such instances the bourgeois state cannot simply act to furtherthe tru e interests of capital. T he state must c oun ter the resources m em -bers of the capitalist class may direct toward opposing the state's efforts.T he prim ary factor governing the state's ability to act autonom ously isthe relative strength o r weakness of such resources.


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DeCanio Beyond Marxist State Theory 223By way of exception, periods occur in which the warring classes balanceeach oth er so nearly tha t the state pow er, as ostensible m ediator, acquiresfor the moment, a certain degree of independence of both.... Such wasthe B onapartism of the First, and still more the S econd French Empire,which played off the proletariat against the bourgeoisie and the bour-geoisie against the proletariat. (Engels 1972,753, emphasis added.)

S imilarly, T rotsky (1973, 26) suggests that in T sarist R ussia, "it was no tthe equilibrium of the econom ically d omin ant classes, as in the West,but their weakness wh ich m ade R ussian bureaucratic autocracy a self-contained organization."

A lthough Ma rx and T rotsky allow that th e capitalist state sometimesacts autonomously, such autonomy is not a regularly occurring featureof the capitalist state. A uton om y occurs only in exceptional situations,when the weakness or equilibrium of antagonistic classes creates roomin which the state can maneuver.

Gramsci and Ideological HegemonyInstrumental Marxist accounts of the capitalist state were early attemptsto deal with recognized instances of state autonomy. However, the focusof such accounts on the strength or weakness of the bourgeoisie se-verely restricted the space they allowed the state for autonomous ac-tion. T his is not tru e of the version o f Marxist state theory A ntonioGramsci developed early in the twe ntieth century. A lthough a co mm it-ted socialist, Gramsci was not satisfied with the explanatory power oftraditional Marxist analysis. He recognized that such analysis failed toaccount for not only why the proletariat failed to overthrow capitalismin countries where it was highly advanced, but why proletarians ap-peared to becom e less militant over time. T hese phen om ena led Gra m-sci to develop explanations of the weakness of radical modern socialmovements that went beyond those offered by conventional Marxist so-cial analysis.

A lthough Gramsci continued to operate within the Marxist tradi-tion, he introduced a concern with the role ideological superstructureshad upon social interactions. Gramsci justified this theoretical move byarguing that the "h ege mo nic" ideology of the do min ant (capitalist) classinfuses the realm of culturethe superstructure that rests on the eco-nom ic base. T his hegem onic ideology is able to accomplish what the


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state's blun t coercive apparatuses would be un able to do : obtain the ac-tive consent of the dominated classes to the capitalist social system.

For Gramsci, intellectuals play a crucial role in determining thehegemonic ideology. Such intellectuals can be divided into two broadcatego ries. T he re are "trad ition al" intellectuals, such as scientists andprofessors; and more importantly, there are "organic" intellectuals. Or-ganic intellectuals, drawn from th e ranks of each class, serve to defineand clarify the interests of that class. S uch intellectuals give a class " h o -mogeneity and an awareness of its function not only in the economicbu t also in th e social and po litical fields" (Gramsci 1971, 5), and they at-tempt to advance the hegemony of their class over the rest of society(ibid., 12).

In capitalist societies the superstructure is dominated by intellectualsdraw n from the capitalist class. T his sup erstruc ture consists of two p ri -mary levels:

the one that can be called "civil society," that is the ensemble of organ-isms commonly called "private," and that of "political society" or "theS tate." T hese two levels correspond e n the o ne hand to th e function of"hegemony" which the dominant group exercises throughout societyand on the other hand to that of "direct domination" or command exer-cised through the S tate and "juridical" government. (Ibid.)Yet for Gramsci the traditional distinctions between structure and su-

perstructure, state and civil society, become blurred, 11 as both are in-volved in creating the mechanisms necessary for the continued repro-duction of capitalist social relations through the hegemonic dominationof the capitalist class.

[Should n ot] the "S tate" .. . be understood not only [as] the apparatus ofgovernment, but also the "private" apparatus of "hegem ony" or civil so-ciety? (Ibid.)T he seemingly imprecise division between state and society can be

clarified given Gramsci s definition of the state. Gramsci writes:T he state is the en tire complex of practical and theoretical activities withwhich the ruling class not only justifies and maintains their do mination,but m anages to win the active consent of those over whom it rules. (Ib id . )

In this definition Gramsci notes that since elements of society that areusually considered "p riv ate " serve to enforce t he capitalist classes' do m i-


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nation of society, such "priva te" elements ne ed to be considered as partof the state. Gramsci's position is drawn out when he illustrates how thestate's historical development, and hence the degree of hegemony en-joy ed by the capitalist class, is often con ting ent up on the activities of"priva te" social organizations:

In the (anyway superficial) polemic over the functions of the State (whichhere means the State as a politico-juridical organization in the narrowsense), the expression "the State as policeman". . . means a State whosefunctions are limited to safeguarding of public order and of respect for thelaws. T he fact is glossed over that in this form of regime . . . hegemonyover its historical development belongs to private forces, to civil societywhich is "State" too, indeed is S tate itself. (Ibid.)T he state 's participation in the formation of the hege mon ic super-

structure of society is crucial, as it secures the active consent of themass public to existing capitalist social relations. In this sense, bo th theprivate and public institutions of capitalist societies take roles in per-petu ating class division.

Gramsci assigned to the S tate part of this function of promoting a single(bourgeois) concept of reality, and, therefore, gave the State a more ex-tensive (enlarged) role in perpetuating class It was not merely lack ofunderstanding of their position in the economic process that kept work-ers from comprehend ing their class role, nor was it only the "priva te" in-stitutions of society . . . that were responsible for keeping the workingclass from self-realization, but it was the State itself that was involved inreproducing the relations of prod uct ion ... .T he S tate included the hege-mony of the bourgeoisie in the superstructure. (C arnoy 1984,66.)Gramsci believed that the resulting capitalist ideological hegemony

served to explain why highly developed capitalist countries enjoyedmore social stability, and a subsequent decline in overtly coercive activ-ity by the politico-juridical state. In a discussion of the comparative rev-olutionary developments in R ussia and Europe, Gramsci (1978,199) ar-gues that:

the determination, which in R ussia was direct and drove the masses on tothe streets for a revolutionary uprising, in central and western Europe iscomplicated by all these political super-structures, created by the greaterdevelopment of capitalism. T his makes the action of the masses slowerand more prudent, and therefore requires of the revolutionary party a


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strategy and tactics altogether more complex and long-term than thosewhich were necessary for the Bolsheviks in the period between Marchand November 1917.Gramsci's analysis of hegemonic ideology recognizes that there are

m any arenas, in bo th civil and political society, that are responsible forthe creation and synthesis of ideology.Yet

the state has always been the protagonist of history. In its organs thepower of the propertied class is centralized. W ithin the state, the proper-tied class forges its ow n discipline and unity, over and above the disputesand clashes of competition, in order to keep intact its privileged positionin the supreme phase of competition itself: the class struggle for power,for pre-eminence in the leadership and ordering of society. (Gramsci1977. 74-)

Ideological Innocence vs. Gmmscian HegemonyI f any th ing , Gram sc i goes too f a r in h i s co r r ec t ion o f Ma rx i s teconomism. It is hard to believe that ideological hegemony is even nec-essary in light of C onverse's dem onstration that the public is ignorantof the content of dominant political ideologies. Such ideological inno-cence indicates that the mass publics of industrial democracies are notaware of the philosophical rationales elites use to justify their class posi-tions. If the proletariat's default position is no (political) consciousness,then generating false proletarian consciousness is a luxury in which the(allegedly) heg em onic capitalist class need n ot e ngage . A nd as their m a-terial posit ion improves, the no tion that class consciousness wou ldoccur to the workers naturally if not for hegemonic capitalist ideologyloses whatever initial plausibility it might have had.

Indeed, the poorest and most disadvantaged citizens are the most ide-ologically unaware (Delli C arpini an d Ke eter 1996, 255-58). Gramsciapparently never escaped the assumption that class consciousness is sonatural that its absence must be explained by the intervention of someother ideology. T his means that he never really came to grips with thesocial conditionworking-class apathythat he was trying to explain.More broadlyregardless of the speci f ic socie ty in quest iononewonders why the ignorant public's "consent" must be anything but pre-dominantly inactive.

T he divergence in the use of ideology by elites and private citizens


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DeCanio Beyond Marxist State Theory 22 7

illustrates this point. Political elites tend to use a coherent set of unify-ing philosophical ideas to organize political information. T hese ideo lo-gies are constructed by acts of "creative synthesis" by people such asMarx (and Gramsci). Such ideologies make groupings of issues appearas "natura l whole s," and h elp political elites deter mi ne w hich issues "gotog eth er" (C onverse 1964, 211). B y contrast, the average citizen is typi-cally immersed in political ignorance, often using cues from opinionleaders (including, perhaps, cues to folkloric or commonsensical ideas)to compe nsate for their low level of awareness. S ince the p ublic is usu-ally ignorant of the nature of the decision heuristics (such as politicalideology) that opinion leaders use to determine their issue positions,12a modified, but more extreme, version of ideological hegemony seemsto be at work. Far from actively accepting a hegemonic ideology, thepublic is not even aware of what ideology motivates the opinion leadersfrom wh ich it takes its cues. T he result is a disturbing com bination ofpublic inactivity and ignorance-derived subordination.13

Structural Marxist State Theo ryGramsci's work on philosophy, culture, and politics provided severalconceptual tools that were used by subsequent theorists. Gramsci's the-ory of hegemony and state power served an important, albeit often-criticized, role in Nicos Poulantzas s structuralist account of the capital-ist state. S tructuralist approaches claim that "the social structure has nocreative subject at its core. R ath er the social form ation is a system ofobjective processes without subjects.... Individuals are the 'supports' or'bearers' of the structural relations in w hich they are situated" (C arnoy1984, 89).

In Political Pow er and Social Classes, Poulantzas developed the mostcomprehensive structuralist account of the capital state.14 Poulantzas(1978, 271) quickly dismisses IM S T on the basis of its inconsistencywith the historical examples of capitalist states found in Marx's writ-ings:

In Prussia during the particular period of transition from the feudalmode of production to the capitalist mode of produc tion, the B ismarck-ian state took on a totally particular auton om y... .T he autonomy of thestate's structures allowed it to accomplish the passage from feudalism tocapitalism against the politically dominant feudal class, by consolidating


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228 Critical Review Vol. 14, Nos. 2-3the emerging economic domination of the bourgeois class and by elevat-ing it to political domination. T he Prussian state thus had an autonomyvis-a-vis the politically dominant feudal class and this autonomy cannotbe reduced to equilibrium of force between the landed nobility and thebourgeoisie.For P oulantzas (1978, 255), the capitalist state is cha racterized by "th e

unity proper to institutionalized political power and its relative autonomy[from eco nom ic classes] ."T he state 's relative autono my from socialclasses is crucial to the stability of capitalist societies, since the state actsas a "factor of cohesion be tween the levels of a social formation . . . andas the regulating factor of its global equilibrium as a system" (ibid.,44-45, emp h. removed).

O n e of the capitalist state s functions is to im pos e a specific ju di co -political ideology up on its citizens. T his ideology is on e m echanism thatmasks the true class nature of social relations, isolating and splinteringthe co hesion of the workin g classes, wh ich com e to see othe r socialagents as individuals, not as members of classes that may have contradic-tory interests.

However, this "isolation effect" also splinters the cohesion of thebourgeoisie, which suffers from an "incapacity to raise itself to thestrictly political level [due] to its inability to achieve its own internalunity: it sinks into fractional struggles and is unable to realize its politi-cal unity on the basis of a poli t ically conceived common interest"(Poulantzas 1978, 284). En ter th e capitalist state, wh ich is no t m arred bythe disorganizing effects of class struggle. T he state "takes c harge, as itwere, of the bourgeoisie's political interests and realizes the function ofpolitical hegem ony which the bourgeoisie is unable to achieve. B ut inorder to do this, the capitalist state assume s a relative autonomy with regard tothe bourgeoisie" (ibid., 284-85). Poulantzas claims that its autonomy al-lows the state to intervene to arrange compromises with the dominatedand dominant classes when the long-term interests of the dominantfraction a re threaten ed (ibid., 285).

T he state is able to arrange such comprom ises because of its ability tomanipulate social actors' perceptions o f its goals. T he state "constantlyappears as the strictly political unity of an eco no mi c struggle It pre -sents itself as the representative of the 'general interest' of competingand divergent economic interests which conceal their class characterfrom the agents wh o e xperienc e th em " (Poulantzas 1978, 133). A l-


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though the state claims to advance the general interests of society, it isreally advancing the long-term interest of the hegemonic class.

T he hegemonic class is the one w hich concentrates in itself, at the polit-ical level, the double function of representing the general interest of thepeople/nation and of maintaining a specific dominance among the dom -inant classes and fractions. (Ibid., 141.)Poulantzas attr ibutes state auto nom y to tw o sources. T he f irst is

rooted in his functionalist explanation of the state's role in class-dividedsocieties. Poulantzas (1970, 70) claims that "social classes and the State[are] objective structures, and their relat ions [are] an objective system of regu-la r connections, a structure and a system who se agents, 'me n', are in thewords of M arx, 'bearers' of it trdager." More specifically,

[T he state] presents a relative autonomy vis-a-vis the dominant classesand fractions, but it does this exacdy to the extent that it possesses itsown peculiar unity (unity of class power) as a specific level of the [capi-talist mode of production] and of a capitalist formation. A t the same timeit possesses this institutionalized unity in so far as it is relatively au-tonomous from these classes or fractions, i.e. because of the functionwhich devolves upon it vis-a-vis these classes or fractions. (Poulantzas1978,256.)T his explanation explicitly rejects the noti on tha t state autono my re-sults from th e w ill of individu als or s ocial classes (ibid., 25667). Instea dthe state is an objective structure that is functionally necessary for class-divided societies; "th e function of the state is to m aintain th e global co -hesion of a class-divided social fo rm a ti o n .. .. T he capitalist state is thefirst to specialize in this function through its structurally-determinedcapacity to secure hegemonic class leadership" Qessop 1982,181).

S uch a structural acco unt of the capitalist state leaves little roo m forhu m an agency. How ever, after noti ng th e structural features and re -quirem ents of the capitalist state, Poulantzas g oes o n to claim that stateautonomy is contingent upon the specific historical arrangement of ex-isting social forces.

T hus, in its relations to the fie ld of the class struggle, the capitalist state'srelative autonomy depends on the characteristics peculiar to the eco-nomic and political class struggle in the [capitalist mode of production]and in a capitalist formation. T his must be understood in the generalsense of the relations between the structures and the field of the class


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23 0 Critical Review Vol. 14, Nos. 23

struggle. In this sense, the state sets the limits within which the classstruggle affects it; the play of its institutions allows and makes possiblethis relative autonomy from the dominant classes and faction s. T he vari-ations and modalities of this relative autonomy depend upon the con-crete relation between social forces in the field of the political classstruggle; in particular, they depend on the political struggle of the domi-nated classes. (Poulantzas 1978,289.)

T his seems to indicate that the degree of state auton om y can be ma nip-ulated by the specific historical experience of class-divided societies.Poulantzas's recognition that history and specific social conditions arerelevant for the state's autonomy stands in tension with the more struc-tural e leme nts of his analysis (Jessop 1982, 18283). B y int rod ucin g thespecifics of the class/political struggles as an intervening variable thatcan influence state autonomy, Poulantzas opens his accoun t to empiricalverification. Indeed, at times Poulantzas is quite explicit regarding theimp ortan ce of the political struggles of the d om inated classes, and theeffects such struggles have on the state's autonomy.

However, in order concretely to take on this relative autonomy which,inscribed in the play of its institutions, is what is precisely necessary forhegemonic class domination, the state is supported by certain dominatedclasses of the society, in that it presents itself, through a complex ideolog-ical process, as their representative: it encourages them in various ways, towork against the dominant class or classes, but to the political advantageof these latter. In this way it succeeds precisely in making the dominatedclasses accept a whole series of compromises w hich appear to be their po-litical interest. (Poulantzas 1978,285.)However, for the state to enlist the dominated classes to work against

themselves and accept a series of compromises they believe to be intheir political interest, the dominated classes must be aware of the state'spolicies and their class implications. In light of the public's well-docu-me nted ignorance, wh ich is magnified am ong society's most disadvan-taged mem bers ,15 it is implausible that such political awareness exists. 16

In light of public ignorance, the state might not have to mask possi-ble class bias in its policies in order to convince the public that it is ad-vancing a classless national interest. T he public's rampan t ignorance ofstate activit ies and policies strongly suggests that the mechanismsPoulantzas holds responsible for the permeation of false consciousnessamong the dominated classes cannot work. However, public ignorance


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DeCanio Beyond Marxist State Tlieory 23 1

also indicates that the state's autonomy may be more extreme than evenPoulantzas is willing to recognize.

Beyond M arxist State TheoryT hat state personnel often engage in auton om ous actions is a powerfulinsight that remains underdeveloped to this day. W hil e recogn izing suchautonomy, neither Marxist nor non-Marxist approaches to state theoryoffer convincing explanations of how democratic states achieve it. Howcan they be autonomous from electoral preferences? Non-Marxist statetheory tends to omit democracy itself in its account of autonomousstates. Its focus on the state's organizational, military, and taxation capabil-ities may be appropriate for premodern state structures,17 but slights theelectorally democratic features of the modern state that areat leastnom inally the very stuff of its existence.

B y contrast, neo-M arxist theories ab out th e state's ideological ma -nipulation of the mass public are attempts to deal with the democraticfeatures of mo dern states. Howev er, the M arxist tradition within wh ichthese theories operate constricts their examination of democratic insti-tution s. A lthough Gramsci and Poulantzas recognize that the politicalculture propagated either by the state or by the hegemonic fraction ofthe bourgeoisie often misleads the demos, the specific mechanisms theyhold responsible for such domination are dubious. Far from any activeendorsement or consent, the static ignorance of the mass public seemslikely to be responsible for its acceptance of the state's ideologicalagenda.

B ecause recent approaches to state the ory fail to identify th e mo stlikely possible cause of democratic states' autonomy, public ignorance isa useful independent variable for future studies of state action. One ofthe advantages of such studies is that they could provide clear criteriafor when modern democratic states are constrained by society. Suchconstraint is exercised when public opinion is mobilized against a spe-cific policy o r actor. A lthoug h th e emp irical evidence seems to indicatethat the public is rarely capable of such mobilization independently ofopinion leaders, opinion leaders (such as interest groups) may also effec-tively constrain state actors with the potential mobilization of latentopin ion (e.g. Zaller 1994,28 4-86).

Taking account of the role of public opinion in the interactions be-tween democratic states and societies is crucial for achieving an accu-


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rate understanding of the mo dern state's operatio n. T he public's perva-sive political ignorance, and its frequent reliance upon state-situatedop inio n leaders, provides a sound empirical basis for expecting evenmodern states to operate autonomously from the societies they govern.

NOTES1. I wish to qualify this claim by noting that previous pluralist research often rec-

ognized the existence of state autonom y (see A lmon d 1988, 854, 855). My con -tention is simply that states and state autonomy were not the focus of theirstudies. I do not intend to suggest that this research be denigrated. Quite thecontrary, the interactions betw een states and interest groups, both of which mayenjoy autonomy derived from public ignorance, may be a fruitful and empiri-cally accurate perspective for state-society interactions.

2. S ee for example Am sden 1992, B ates 1981, C um ming s 1984, and Johnso n 1987.3. State autonomy as derived from public ignorance has been noted previously.

S ee Friedman 1997, 455-56, and S orens 2000, 26.4. For the purposes of this essay, I will essentially follow Weber and define the

state as a collectivity of individuals who determine and undertake activitiesfrom which there is consideredby most members of "society"to be no le-gitimate appeal. A lthough this definition may seem to load the dice in favor ofstate autonomy, the princip le that is supposed to legitimize the authoritative ac-tivities of the state is, in democratic societies, public opinionthe will of soci-etyas manifested in popular elections.5. Often referred to as "state-cen tered state theory," I have chosen to use the"non-Marxist" designation to avoid possible confusion regarding the redun-dancy of the former term.

6. S ee Nordlinger 1981, Krasner 1984, and S kowronek 1984.7. However, S kocpol (1985, 22) also notes tha t states "no t on ly con duct decision-

making, coercive, and adjudicative activities in different ways, but also give riseto various conceptions of the meaning and methods of 'politics' itself."

8. See A rnold 1990.9. Some have argued that measuring levels of information possessed by mem-

bers of the public may underestimate the amount of knowledge they actuallypossess. A ccording to this view, individuals have r un nin g tallies of evaluationsthat process information, enabling them to make judgm ents and then forgetthe specific reasons for their evaluations, which they retain "on line." Unfor-tunately, research (McGraw, Lodge, and S troh 1989) has dem onstrated that theon-line model is typically used by the politically sophisticated; "those less in-volved in politics, however, are not as motivated to engage in on-line process-ing of information" (R ahn, Krosnick, and B reuning 1994, 587).


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10. For comprehensive overviews see Jessop 1982 and 1990, C arnoy 1984, and Vanden B erg 1988.11. A t one point Gramsci (1971, 160) allows that, "in actual reality, civil society andthe S tate are the same thing." See A nderson 1977 for a discussion of the c on -flicting definitions Gramsci gives of the state.

12. It seems likely that the public's ignorance of state representatives' use of politicalideology may contribute m uch to the perceived legitimacy of Western dem oc-ratic states.

13. T his is not to suggest that ideology is a particularly effective decision he uristicfor reaching policy positions.

14. S ee also Poulantzas [1978] 2000 .15. In on e such study, Delli C arpin i and K eeter (1996) found significant gaps in the

political knowledge held by the p oor, wom en, and ethnic m inorities. A series ofsurvey questions conducted in 1989 found that men were 1.35 times morelikely to answer correctly than w om en, the affluent 1.59 times more likely thanthe poo r, and whites twice as often as A frican A mericans (Delli C arpini andKeeter 1996, 157).

16. It is likely that Poulantzas would claim that political ignorance is the effect ofthe structural autonomy of the capitalist state, and not its cause.

17. It is possible that this focus is due to Skocpol's attention to premodern states inher doctoral thesis, States an d Social Revolutions (1979). I am indebted to JeffereyFriedman for this suggestion.

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