.

e

HOPE CREEK GENERATING STATION

MONITORING OF LNG AND LPG SHIPPING ANDCONSTRUCTION ACTIVITIES ON THE DELAWARE RIVER

4. BI-YEARLY REPORT - 1983(BYR-3)

t

8504300139 850419PDR ADOCK 05000354R PDR Docket Nos. 50-354

50-355

M P83 9/05 1-li April 1985

.

.

4.1 CALCULATION OF CONDITIONAL PROBABILITY

4.1.1 _ Accident Rate Per Ship Mile

The number of accidents occuring per mile traveled byliquid fuel tankers is based on information collectedfrom the U.S. Coast Guard Marine Casualty ComputerData and the U.S. Coast Guard accident files. Thetotal number of accidents was divided by the totalexposure (average yearly one way trips on the Dela-ware River) as determined from the publication" Waterborne Commerce of the United States," to arriveat an accident rate per transit mile in the DelawareRiver. An analysis of each of these sources of datais presented in the following pages.

U.S. Coast Guard Marine Casuality Computer Data wasused to identify all collision incidents on the Dela-ware River over the years 1981-1982 in the following

~

seven categories:

1. a meeting situation.

2. a crossing situation

3. an overtaking situation

4. an anchored or moored condition

5. fog

6. docking or undocking operation

7. not otherwise cla'ssified

Liquefied gas carriers operate in U.S. Coastal Watersunder very strict supervision of the U.S. CoastGuard. In the section of river adjacent to the HopeCreek Generating Facility, the tanker will be movingin the channel at all times under Coast Guard es-cort. In particular, in this section of the river,the liquid gas carrier:

will not be moored.

will not be in area of industrial docks or.

piers

will not encounter any area of rock river.

bottom

M P83 9/05 2-11

_. -- - . -. _- - .- -

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.

will not overtake or be overtaken by other.

ships

will not meet other ships at bends.

will not meet oncoming ships of a relative.

speed of greater than 12 knots

will not itself exceed a speed of 12 knots.

will only transit if visibility is two miles.

or greater

will only transit with tug escort.

will be in continuous communications on two.

radio channels

will be U.S. Coast Guard supervised.

Because of the strict operating procedures involvingliquefied gas carriers, those accidents which occurin the seven categories listed above were examined,and any which could not occur under the operatingconditions mentioned above for liquid gas carrierswere excluded. Any incidents which were questionablewere included so that the estimate will be conserva-tive, but any accident which did not involve at leastone large vessel of over 18 ft. draft was discarded.

Next, the total number of one way trips in the Dela-ware River (either inbound or outbound) of largetankers, dry cargo, and passenger ships with a draftof more than 18 feet was obtained from the " Water-borne Commerce" publication. Each one-way trip con-stitutes a distance of approximately 100 miles, sothat the average ship-miles / year is 100 times thetotal number of one-way trips.

The accident rate per ship mile was calculated bydividing the total number of accidents by the totalship miles. This calculation was carried out for theperiod under consideration and also for the cumulat-ive accidents since the first estimate was made. Thevalue calulated for a single period is for compariconpurpcaes only; in the calculation of the overallprobability, the cumulative value was used since ithas more statistical validity because of the largersample size. Tables 7 and 8 summarize these values.

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4.1.2 HISTORICAL COLLISION ANALYSIS FY81-FY82

The United States Coast Guard (USCG) Marine CasualtyComputer Data tape was utilized to identify the oc-currence'of all collision incidents (the seven cate-gories listed above) on the Delaware River in theyears FY1981 and FY1982. A total of 62 collisionincidents were identified and-.the U.S. Coast Guardcase number of each incident was recorded. Thisrecord of case number was then utilized to obtain de-tailed accident reports from the U.S. Coast Guardaccident files available for 47 of the 62 incidents.The details of the remaining 15 incidents were ob-tained from the decoded printout of the USCG CasualtyComputer Data Tape. These 62 detailed incidentreports were examined and analyzed further.

The 62 events were initially screened with the pur-pose of deleting those accidents only involving rela-tively small vessels that are not representative oflarge, self-propelled, liquefied gas carriers andcould not puncture the LPG gas tanks if they were thestriking vessel. There are 17 such incidents iden-tified in Table 4 by their assigned Coast Guard casenumbers. An attached Appendix summarizes ourrationale for their selection, together with ourrationale for all other decisions outlined below.

A second screening of the remaining 45-incident re-ports was conducted to delete those incidents whichwere minor in nature, i.e., the incidents which arenot large enough to cause credible accidents wherebyspills of liquified gas of enough magnitude might beinitiated. There are 12 such'. incidents identified inTable SA.

A third screening of the remaining 33 incident re-ports was carried through to delete those incidentsresulting in grounding only. The bed of the DelawareRiver is soft, and also the modern liquified gascarrier tankers are designed with double sidewallsand double bottom walls. As a result, the groundingof these liquified gas carriers in the soft bed ofthe Delaware River will not cause credible ac-cidents. The recorded consequences of the groundingincidents in the Delaware River totally bear out theabove conclusion as the damages were either minimalor nill. There are 25 such incidents identified in

! Table SB.

I

!

lI

M P83 9/05 4-li

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Three (3) of the remaining 8 incident reports, asshown in Table 6, involved collisions beween vesselswhile at least one was being intentio.nally moved.

The cases 0007 PHI, 0022 PHI and 0038 PHI-all inFY82, involved collisions while one of the vesselswas in the process of docking or undocking, or onevessel was moored or anchored. Although a liquifiedgas carrier will not be moored, anchored, docked, orundocked in the 24 mile river section of interest,i.e., the catchment distance in which a cargo releasemight impact the nuclear power generating facility,all of the above cases were conservatively consideredas potential collisions while underway and properlyincluded in the accident data base. This practice isconsistent with previously submitted testimony beforethe~NRC. In conclusion, therefore, we conservativelyfind 3 incidents that should be included in theaccident data base: FY82-0007 PHI, 0022 PHI, and 038PHI. Each is considered relevant and potentiallyapplicable to the analysis of the LNG or LPG tankerspill probability in the 24 mile river segment ofinterest.

The results of this analysis are summarized in Table7.

As a reference for the methodology employed above,the following can be consulted:

Supplemental Testimony of Dr. Ashok Kalelkar inresponse to matters raised by the Atomic Safety andLicensing Appeals Board in ALAB-429,11 October 1977Docket Nos. 50-354-

50-355'Pages 5-21

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$

TABLE 4.

INCIDENTS INVOLVING ONLY SMALL VESSELS

BY USCG CASE NUMBER *

Total number of cases: 17

FY81 FY82

0265 PHI 0004 PHI0270 PHI 0006 PHI0275 PHI 0008 PHI1344 PHI 0014 PHI2618 PHI 0021 PHI3174 PHI 0030 PHI

0031 PHI0052 PHI0068 PHI0085 PHI0086 PHI

,

,\

'

.

:

',

,

t ,

,

*These incidents only involved tugs, towboats, non-selfpropelled barges, or other relatively small vessels.

t

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*s

p , ,, , , . . . _ . . e -----v--r g,--- - ,- -~~ ---w ---- ---* s-

..

.

TABLE SA

MINOR INCIDENTS BY USCG CASE NUMBERS *

Total number of cases: 12

FY81 FY82

0267 PHI 0037 PHI0271 PHI 0084 PHI0273 PHI1112 PHI1316 PHI1979 JAC2577 PHI2925 PHI3171 PHI4267 PHI

.

* Minor incidents involve the physical boundary of only onevessel and are not capable of causing credible accidentswhereby spills of liquified gas of enough magnitude mightbe initiated.

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TABLE 5B

GROUNDING INCIDENTS INVOLVING LARGE VESSELS___

BY USCG CASE NUMBERS

Total-number of cases: 25

FY81 FY82

0263 PHI 0034 PHI0271 PHI 0065 PHI1174 PHI1175 PHI1182 PHI1320 PHI1342 PHI1592 PHI2113 PHI2193 PHI2353 PHI2712 PHI2901 PHI2913 PHI3173 PHI4091 NYC4123 PHI4260 PHI4262 PHI4271 PHI4712 PHI5936 PHI5937 PHI

M'P83 9/05 8-11

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TABLE 6

COLLISIONS INVOLVING LARGE VESSELS

NO. CASE NO. DESCRIPTION

1. FY82:0007 PHI Freighter collided with mooredfreighter

2. FY82:0022 PHI Freighter collided with mooredfreighter

3. FY82:0038 PHI Towing vessel collided withfreighter while assisting it toberth

,

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TABLE 7

ACCIDENT RATE PER SHIP MILE

Cumulative CumulativeT9tal Cumulative One-Way One-Way Accident Accident

Year Accidents Accidents Trips Trips Rate Rate

1969-1975 10 10 66321 66321 1.5x10-6 1.5x10-6

1976-1978 7 17 28344 94665 2.5x10-6 1.8x10-6 -1979-1980 8 25 14498 109163 5.5x10-b 2.3x10-6

1981-1982 3 28 12525 121688 2.4x10-6 2.3X10-6

1983-1984

1985-1986

1987-1988

1989-1990

1991-1992

1993-1994

1995-1996

1997-1998

1999-2000_

2001-2002

.2003-2004~

2005-2006

2007-2008

2009-2010

2011-2012

2013-2014

2015-2016

2017-2018

2019-2020

2021-2022

2023-2024-

2025-2026

2027-2028_

-2029-2030

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TABLE 8

DELAWARE RIVER ONE-WAY TRAFFIC IN TANKERS, DRY CARGO, ANDPASSENGER SHIPS OF GREATER THAN 18 FT DRAFT

(Source: " Waterborne Ccanerce")

Year: 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980

One-Way Trips: 9744 10151 9258 9553 9858 9086 8671 9559 9300 9485 7789 6709

Year: 1981 1982

One-way Trips: 6452 6073

121688Average One-Way Trips = 14 = 8692

Each one-way trip representing a distance of about 100miles, the average ship-miles / year is 100 times the averagenumber of one-way trips. Therefore, this figure is 8.692x105.

4.1.3 Collisions With Fixed Objects

The calculation of collision rates with fixed objects(e.g. Tower 97, which is approximately 9 miles up-river - see Figure 6 and a partially submergedshipwreck about 4.5 miles upriver from the Hope Creeksite), was handled in the same manner as the accidentrate.From the Coast Guard accident casualty data forthe previous years, the number of occurrences oframmings of fixed objects involving a ship of over 18feet draft was determined. As in the previousanalysis, any accidents which could not have happenedto a ship following U.S. Coast Guard regulations forliquefied gas carriers were eliminated from the database. The number of one-way transits per year ofships of over 18 feet draf t is the same as was usedin the accident rate calculation.

The number of collisions with fixed objects is basedon approximately 100 rammable objects * which largeships could have struck; Tower 97 and the shipwreckrepresent two of them. Thus, to calculate the prob-ability of a col) . ion with either Tower 97 or theshipwreck per transit, the total number of collisionsin the river is divided by 50 (100/2) and thendivided by the total number of one-way transits.

* As counted from NOAA Navigational Charts for theDelaware River. None of the 100 objects, exceptTower 97 and the shipwreck occur in the 24 miles of

'interest.

M P83 9/05 11-11. _. . _. . _

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Table 9 summarizes the-5 remaining incidents thatinvolved large ship-collisions with fixed objects.An examination of all 5 collisions involving vesselsand fixed objects in the Delaware River (FY81-FY82)reveals that, all 5 of them are relevant and poten-tially applicable to the analysis of LNG and LPGtanker spill probability.

The'results of this analysis are summarized in Tabl910.

.

9

&

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e . . . .

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TABLE 9i

SHIP COLLISIONS WITH FIXED OBJECTS,

NO. CASE NUMBER - OBJECT CIRCUMSTANCES_

a

1 FY81-0262 PHI Bridge Operator error

2 FY81-1169 PHI Pier Docking pilot error

3 FY81-2463 PHI Pier Improper mooring / towing

4 FY81-2883 PHI Bridge Negligence on the part ofthe master

5 FY81-5023 PHI Pier Material failure

',

.

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, _ _ _ . . , . _ _ . _ . . . , . . ,,.m., _ . - . . - . . . ~ . , , ,. _ . _ . _ , . , . , _ .. ,

.-- - - - --

TABLE 10. .-

COLLISIONS WI'IU 'IOWER 97 OR ' LEE SHIPWRECK PER TRANSIT

Ctmulative CtmulativeTotal Ctmulative One-Way One-Way Collision Collision

Year Collision Collisions Trips Trips Rate Rate,

|i

1969-1975 8 8 66321 66321 2.4x10-6 2.4x10-6 |

1976-1978 11 19 28344 94665 7.8 x10-6 4x10-6

|1979-1980 8 27 14498 109163 1.1x10-5 5x10-6

1981-1982 5 32 12525 121688 8.0x10-6 5.3x10-6>

2 1983-1984

4 1985-1986

1987-1988,

1989-1990

1991-1992

1993-1994

1995-1996 [1997-1998

1999-2000'

2001-2002I 2003-2004;

2005-2006

2007-2008'

2009-2010.

f 2011-2012

2013-2014

2015-2016

2017-2018',

2019 -2020| 2021-2022

2023-2024.

2025-2026

2027-2028

2029-2030

M P83 9/05 14.*-11

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l,'

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4.1.4 Spills Per Accident

The probability that a spill will occur given thatthere has been an accident was calculated based on acomplex energy conservation model developed by V. U.Minorsky.** The model estimated the depth of pene-tration of the hull of a ship based on the speeds ofthe colliding ships and the angle of collision.

Conservative estimates of the spill per accident rateare 0.1 for propane, butane, butadiene and liquefiednatural gas carriers,* and 0.01 for vinyl chloridecarriers. Vinyl chloride has a much smaller valuebecause it is carried in self contained tanks nearthe center of the' ship, at a larger distance from thehull.

Table 13 presents the probability values for spillsper accident associated with each type of liquefiedgas.

The probability that a storage tank on a gas carrierwould be ruptured given that an accident has occurredwas calculated based on a method developed byVladimir U. Minorsky.** In order to determine ifthere have been any new developments in this field,PSE&G has contacted Mr. Minorsky at George S. Sharp,Inc., N. Y. Since Mr. Minorsky had retired, wediscussed this item with an associate of Mr.Minorsky, Mr. Richard Rodi.

In response to our inquiry, Mr. Rodi indicated thatthere have been no new developments in the area ofship damage models which would lead to changes in theprobability figures presented in Table 11.

*These values were used in the ASLAB decision al-though the applicant's more rigorous estimate forLNG tankers indicates a much smaller conditionalspill probability.

**V. U. Minorsky " Analysis of Ship Collisions withReference to Protection of Nuclear Power Plants,"Journal of Ship Research October 19 53.

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TABLE 11

SPILIS PER ACCIDENT_

VinylYear Propane Butane Butadiene Chloride ING

1978 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.01 0.1

1980 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.01 0.1

1982 0.1 0.1 _0.1 0.01 0.1

1984

1986

1988

1990

1992

1994

1996

1998

2000

2002

2004~

2006

2008

2010

2012

2014

2016

2018

5 20

2022

2024

2026__

2028

2030,

M P83 9/05 16.*-11

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4.1.5 Vapor Cloud Formation Per Spill

Given that there has been a spill of a liquefied gascargo, a vapor cloud will form only if the fuel isnot ignited at the source of the spill. In a crashsituation which is large enough to release the cargo,it is expected that there will be ample sources ofignition from severed wires, frictionally heatedmetal, and associated sparks. Although a vapor cloudcould be expected in less than one percent of allspills, a conservative value of 10 percent has beenused.

Table 12 presents the probability values associatedwith various liquefied gases.

In order to verify if any new developments in thearea of vapor cloud formation and dispersion haveoccurred, PSE&G has contacted the following sourcesinvolved in this type of research:

a. Risk and Industrial Safety Consultants, Inc.Mr. Sami Atallah - President

b. Dept. of Chemical Engineering, College of. EngineeringNortheastern UniversityDr. Elizabeth M. Drake- Chairperson

In their response to our inquiry, both sources ofinformation indicated that there were no new develop-ments in this field which would lead to changes inthe probability values presented in Table 12.

M P83 9/05 17-11

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TABLE 12.

VAPOR CIDUD FORMATION PER SPILL_

VinylYear Propane Butane Butadiene Chloride LNG

1978 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1

1980 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1-

1982 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1-

1984

1986

1988

1990

1992

1994

1996~

_

1998

2000-

2002

2004

2006

2008-

2010

2012~

2014

2016_.

2018_

2020

, 2022

2024

2026

2028

2030_

M P83 9/05 18.*-11

t

r

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4.1.6. Meteorological Factor

The meteorological factor is based on distancebetween the spill and facility, and the mean windspeed and direction. It represents the probabilitythat a- vapor cloud formed at a particular locationwill reach the nuclear plant with a flammable mix-ture of fuel to air. It is not expected to changeunder ordinary circumstances over the lifetime ofthe facility and the values which were used aregiven in Table 13 for the entire 24 mile catchmentdistance and for Tower 97 and the shipwreck.

Table 13 - Meteorological Factors *

Tower 9724 Mile and

Catchment Shipwreck **

Propane 0.31 0.002Butane 0.32 0.002Butadiene 0.25 0.002Vinyl Chloride 0.24 0.002LNG 0.354 0.002

*For details on how the Meteorological Factor isderived, see answer to Question 3 of Exhibit 10 onDocket Nos. 50-354 and 50-355 dated January 13,1975.

**The value of 0.002 is very conservative since itassumes a 10,000 ton spill. Such spill sizes arenot considered credible for propane, butane andbutadiene since individual tank sizes for suchcargoes are considerably smaller.

4.1.7 Conditional Probability Calculation

The probability that a flammable vapor cloud willreach the nuclear facility was calculated for eachfuel type under consideration (propane, butane,butadiene, vinyl chloride, and LNG). For each fueltype, two separate calculations were made, the firstwas based on the likelihood of a collision withanother ship anywhere within the 24 mile catchmentdiJcance and the second was based on a ramming ofeither Tower 97 nine miles upstream or the shipwreck4.5 miles upstream of the nuclear plant.

,

M P83 9/05 19-11

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The overall probability of a flammable vapor cloud-reaching the nuclear plant is the sum of these eightterms.* .

The individual terms were calculated as the productof five other factors. These factors are:

1. Total number of ships per year2. Accidents per mile; or accidents per passage3. Spills per accident4. Vapor cloud per spill5. Meteorological factor

The first of these five factors is determined an-nually for each fuel type as listed in Table 1. Theremaining four factors have been conservativelyestimated and are described in Sections 4.1.4, 4.1.5,and 4.1.6. These factors may vary somewhat as a re-sult of a biyearly review of shipping experience, andthe method for their calculation is also described inSections 4.1.4, 4.1.5 and 4.1.6.

The results of all these calculations are presentedin Tables 14 and 15, for both ship to ship collisionsand collisions with fixed objects.

4.2 Conclusions

The results provided in Tables 14 and 15 show thatthe er conditional probability of a flammablevapo. iud reaching the Hope Creek plant is9.5xl for 1982; and 2.1x10-7 for 1983. Bothvalues are significantly less than the 10-6 valueestablished as an upper limit by the NRC, based onconservative approximations.

All approximations in this study have been made in aconservative manner. The resultant probabilities of9.5x10-8 and 2.1x10-7 are, therefore, conservativeresults.

*Since LNG is not shipped on the Delaware, only fourcargoes (propane, butane, butadiene, and vinyl chlor-ide) and two spill modes (ship-ship collision andcollision with Tower 97 or the shipwreck) arerelevant, leading to eight probability terms to beadded for the total probability.

M P83 9/05 20-11

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., -

The actual LNG and LPG traffic has decreased from1981 to 1982 but there was some increase in LPGtraffic in 1983; no additional rammable objects,mooring or docking sites, or any other facility thatmight cause a significant change in the probabilityof a flammable vapor cloud reaching the plant havebeen built or are planned for construction within the24 mile catchment distance on-the Delaware River; andno proposals for construction of LNG terminals alongthe Delaware River have been received by FERC.

Based on the above information, we can conclude thatthe probability of a flammable vapor cloud reachingthe nuclear facility is sufficiently small such thatthe associated hazards to the health and safety ofthe public are negligible.

4

3

1

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TABLE 14

PROBABILITY OF FIRMABLE VAPOR CIIXJD RFACHING NUCLEAR FACILITY

(Based on 1982 Data).

No. of Ships Accidents Ramnings Spills Per Vapor Cloud MeteorologicalPer Year Per Mile Per Passage Accident Per Spill Factor Probability

ING 0 2.3x104 0.1 0.1 0.354 0

: LPG

I Propane 0 2.3x10-6 0.1 0.1 0.31 04

i Butane 8 2.3x10-6 0.1 0.1 0.32 5.89x10-8Butadiene 6 2.3x10-6 0.1 0.1 0.25 3.45x10-8q

'

Vinyl Chloride 0 2.3x10-6 0.01 0.1 0.24 0_

i Tower 97 + Shipwreck

DG 0 5.3x10-6 0.1 0.1 0.002 0-

LPG 14 5.3x10-6 0.1 0.1 0.002 1.48x10-9i Vinyl Chloride 0 5.3x10-6 0.01 0.1 0.002 0

i Tote.1 9.5x10-8

;

i

ii

!i M P83 9/05 22.*-li

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i

!

1

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C

TABLE 15

PROBABILITY OF FIJM4ABLE VAPOR CILUD REACHING NUCLEAR FACILITY

(Based on 1983 Data)

rioud MeteorologicalNo. of Ships Accidents Ramnings Spills Per Vapor [llPer Year Per Mile Per Passage Accident Per Sp Factor Probability

IE O 2.3x10-6 0.1 0.1 0.354 0

LPG

Propane 9 2.3x10-6 0.1 0.1 0.31 6.42x10-8

Butane 4 2.3x10-6 0.1 0.1 0.32 2.94x10-8

Butadiene 19 2.3x10-6 0.1 0.1 0.25 10.93x10-8

Vinyl Chloride 0 2.3x10-6 0.01 0.1 0.24 0

Tower 97 + Shipwreck

IE O 5.3x10-6 0.1 0.1 0.002 0

LPG 32 5.3x10-6 0.1 0.1 0.002 3.39x10-9

Vinyl Chloride 0 5.3x10-6 0.01 0.1 0.002 0._

Total 2.1x10-7

i

iI

M P83 9/05 23-1il

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APPENDIX

USCG CASE REVIEWS

INTRODUCTION

The following sections, denoted by U.S. Coast Guard (USCG)case numbers, discuss our interpretation of each of thesixty-two (62) reported incidents in the waterways of theDelaware River and the Delware Bay during the period FY81 -FY82. An abstract of each of the incidents prepared fromthe detailed printout of the Marine Casualty Data tape andthe USCG accident data files is provided in the beginning.It is then followed by the rationale for our decision toinclude or not to include the incident in the accident database.

CASE YEAR 1981

0262 PHI

Freighter collided with Walt Whitman Bridge, Delaware River,Phildelphia, Pennsylvania, due to negligence on the part of'ship operators. Included in the accident data base.

0263 PHI

Tank barge under tow ran aground at Reedy Point Anchorage,Delaware River, due to failure prior to anchoring on thepart of the pilot. Should not be counted, since it was acase of grounding only involving one non-self propelledbarge.

0265 PHI

Bulk ore carrier caused wake damage to a tank barge and atowing vessel at the Interstate Pipeling Company facility onthe Delaware River at Burlington, New Jersey. Should not be

| counted since it involved only small vessels.

! 0267 PHIi

Tank ship developed small fire due to mechanical f ailurewhile being moored at the Sun Oil Company Dock 2A, Marcus

| Hook, Pennsylvania. The fire was subsaquently brought under| control with some damage to one of the cargo pumps. Should

not be counted, since it was a case of minor incident andalso a liquified gas carrier will not be moored or anchoredin the 24 mile river segment of concern.

M P85 48/04 1-mw

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0268 PHI

Tanker developed material failure in the form of " crack ingenerating tube of starboard boiler, in the Delaware River"with minimal damage. Should not be counted, since it was acase of minor incident.

0270 PHI

Fishing vessel sank 1/2 mile south of Egg Island Point, NewJersey, in Delaware Bay. Should not be counted, since itinvolved only one small vessel.

0271 PHI

Cargo ship ran aground in the Delaware River at thejunction of Marcus Hook Range and Bellevue Range, due tofailure on the part of the pilot. Should not be counted,since it was a case of grounding only.

0273 PHI

Tanker lost main propulsion power 1/2 mile northwest of MiahMaull Light in Delaware Bay due to failure of the pumpcontroller. Should not be counted, since it was a case ofminor incident.

0275 PHI

Passenger ship collided with submerged pipe.from_ dredge,Cape May Canal West Entrance, Lower Delaware Bay, due toerror in judgement on the part of the master. Should not becounted, since it involved only one small vessel.

1112 PHI

Docked cargo vessel developed minor flooding in engine roomat Packer Avenune Marine Terminal, Delaware River,Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, due to error on the part of thealready working repair crew. Should not be counted, sinceit was a case of minor incident.

1169 PHI

Ore-bulk oil carrier collided with Pier 122 on the DelawareRiver, Phildelphia, Pennsylvania, while being assisted toberth by tugs, due to an error in judgement on the part ofthe docking pilot. Although it happened while docking,conservatively included in the accident data base.

M P85 48/04 2-mw

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+

1174 PHI

Cargo vessel ran aground due to steering failure in theDelaware Bay near Buoy R42 without any physical orfunctional damage. Should not be counted, since it was acase of grounding only.

1175 PHI

Towing vessel ran aground in White's Basin, Delaware River,Bridgeport, New Jersey, due to an error in judgement on thepart of the operator. Should not be counted, since itinvolved only a small vessel and also was a case ofgrounding only.

1182 PHI

Bulk carrier grounded against river bank on three occassionswhile anchored at Mantua Creek Anchorage, Delaware River,due to an error in judgement on the part of the master.Should not be counted, since it was a case of grounding onlyand also a liquified gas carrier will not be moored oranchored in the 24 mile river segment of concern.

1316 PHI

Tanker caught fire in one of the center tanks at Gulf OilCompany, Hog Island, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, on theDelaware River. Should not be counted, since it was a caseof minor incident.

1320 PHI

Freighter ran aground in fog in the Deepwater Point Range,Delaware River, due to failure on the part of the pilot.Should not be counted, since it was a case of grounding onlyand also occurred in a fog situation.

*1342 PHI

Oil tanker ran aground in the Delaware River. Should not becounted, since it was a case of grounding only.

1344 PHI

Two secured empty barges grounded near Buoy 91, Burlington,New Jersey, Delaware River, due to downward flow of icemass. Should not be counted, since it involved only smallvessels and also was a case of grounding only.

M P85 48/04 3-mw

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1592 PHI

Container ship ran aground in the vicinity of HorseshoeShoal, Delaware River, due to failure on the part of thepilot and the master. Should not be counted, since it was a-case of grounding only.

*1979 JAC

Oil tanker, while docked at Delaware Bay, developedmechanial failure, resulting in no damage. Should not becounted, since it was a case of minor incident.

2113 PHI

Bulk carrier ran aground at Marcus Hook Anchorage, DelawareRiver, probably due to inattention to duty on the part ofthe master. Should not be counted, since it was a case ofgrounding only.

2193 PHI

Ore-bulk oil carrier ran aground at Berth 3A, Sun OilTermina'1, Marcus Hook, Delaware River, due to f ailure of theterminal personnel to provide accurate information. Shouldnot be counted, since it was a case of grounding only.

2353 PHI

Tanker ran aground in the Delaware River due to error on thepart of the operating personnel. Should not be counted,since it was a case of grounding only.

*2463 PHI

Oil tanker collided with a pier on the Delaware River due toimproper mooring / towing. Conservatively included in theaccident data base.

2577 PHI

Oil tanker developed mechanical f ailure in the reductiongear on the Delaware River, resulting in minimal damage.Should not be counted, since it was a case of minorincident.

2618 PHI

Tug while towing barge ran aground, subsequently collidingwith the barge, Fort Miffin Range, Delaware River. Shouldnot be counted, since it involved only small vessels andalso was a case of grounding only.

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2712 PHI

Oil tanker ran aground at Mantua Creek Anchorage, DelawareRiver. Should not be counted, since it was a case ofgrounding only.

2883 PHI

Bulk carrier collided with the Delair Railroad Bridge,Delaware River, due to negligence on the part of themaster. Conservatively included in the accident data base.

2901 PHI

Oil tanker ran aground on the east bank of the DelawareRiver, near Buoy 44, due to loss of the rudder. Should notbe counted, since it was a case of grounding only.

*2913 PHI

Ore-bulk oil freighter ran aground in the Delaware river,due to inadequate supervision of personnel. Should not becounted, since it was a case of grounding only.

2925 PHI

Gas tanker lost main propulsion on Marcus Hook Range,Delaware River, due to over heating of the tail shaft.Should not be included, since it was a case of minorincident.

3171 PHI

Bulk carrier lost propulsion in the Delaware River, south ofTacony-Palmyra Bridge, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, due to agovernor failure of both main engines. Should not becounted, since it was a case of minor incident.

3173 PHI

Oil tanker ran aground on Brown Shoal, Delaware Bay, due tof ailure on the part of the pilot. Should not be counted,since it was a case of grounding only.

3174 PHI

Towing vessel collided with tank barge, Upper Liston Range,Delaware Bay, due to a malfunction in the steering system.Should not be included, since it involved a small non-selfpropelled barge.

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4091 NYC

Tank barge while under tow ran aground on McCrie Shoal, CapeMay, New Jersey, due to failure on the part of theoperator. Should not be counted, since it was a case ofgrounding only.

4123 PHI

Tank barge while under tow ran aground in Bulkhead ShoalChannel, Delaware River, due to f ailure on the part of theoperator. Should not be counted, since it was a case ofgrounding only.

4260 PHI

Oil tanker ran aground at the approach to the Delaware Bay,Cape Henlopen, Delaware, Atlantic Ocean, due to an erroron the part of the master. Should not be counted, since itwas a case of grounding only.

4262 PHI

Tug, while towing tank barge, ran aground, EddystoneGenerating Station Range, Delaware River, due to silting ofthe channel. Should not be counted, since it was a case ofgrounding only.

4267 PHI

Tanker sustained a crack across the starboard side of themain deck, and part of the way down the starboard side,while in the process of discharging a cargo of crude oil atDelaware City, Delaware. Should not be counted, since itwas a case of minor incident.

4271 PHI,

Ore-bulk oil tanker ran aground at Marcus Hook Anchorage,Delaware River, due to f ailure on the part of the master.Should not be counted, since it was a case of groundingonly.

4712 PHI

Tug, while towing barge, ran aground in the Delaware River,due to an error on the part of the operating personnel.Should not be counted, since it was a case of groundingonly.

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*5023 PHI

Oil tanker collided with pier on the Delaware River, due tomaterial failure of the main engine / motor. Included in theaccident data base.

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5936 PHI

Cargo vessel ran aground while undocking from Beckett StreetTerminal, Camden, New Jersey, Delaware River, due to anerror in judgement on the part of the pilot. Should not becounted, since it was a case of grounding only.

5937 PHI

Bulk carrier ran aground in the New Castle Range, Delaware,due to unknown reason. Should not be counted since it was acase of grounding only.

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CASE YEAR 1982

*0004 PHI

A small fishing vessel was foundering in the Delaware Bay.Should not be counted, since it involved only one smallvessel.

0006 PHI

Tug, while towing barge, ran aground south of Drydock NumberFour, Sun Ship Inc., Chester, Pennsylvania, Delaware River,due to operator failure. Should not be counted, since itinvolved only small vessels and also was a case of groundingonly.

*0007 PHI

Freighter (467 Ft. in length) collided with a mooredfreighter due to an error in judgement on the part of theoperator. The computer printout does not contain anydetails of the size of the moored freighter which may verywell be a small vessel. Conservately included in theaccident data base.

0008 PHI

Tanker lost main circulating pump. Should not be counted,since it involved only a small vessel and also was a case ofminor incident.

*0014 PHI

Two tugs collided with each other and ran aground, due toerror in judgement on the part of the operating personnel.Should not be counted, since it involved only small vessels.

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0021 PHI

Barge in tow by tug collided with another barge at theentrance to the C&D Canal, Delaware River, due to failure onthe part of the operator of the tug. Should not be counted,since it involved only small vessels.

*0022 PHI

Freighter (660 Ft. in length) collided with another mooredfreighter (750 ft. in length). Included in the accidentdata base.

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0030-PHI

Tug, while towing barge, ran aground at Buoy 44, DelawareRiver, due to failure on the part of the operator. Shouldnot be counted, since it involved only small vessels andalso was a case of grounding only.

0031 PHI

Passenger vessel' collided with fixed object, eastern end ofthe Delaware River and Bay Authority, Cape May - Lewis ferryJetty, Lewis, Delaware, Delaware Bay, due to failure on thepart of the master. Should not be counted, since itinvolved only a small vessel.

*0034 PHI

Ore-bulk oil carrier ran aground in the Delaware River, dueto error in judgement on the part of the operating person-nel. Should not be counted, since it was a case ofgrounding only.

*0037 PHI

Freighter developed propeller failure while on the DelawareRiver but proceeded to Jacksonville, Florida. Should not be. counted, since it was a case of minor incident.

0038 PHI

Towing vessel collided with freight vessel while assistingit to Berth, Pier 80 South (North side), Delaware River,probably due to "the momentary failure of the pneumaticclutch control on the main engine to operate properly."Although it involved a small tug not large enough to causeany appreciable damage when colliding with a large modernliquified gas carrier, it was conservatively included in theaccident data base. '

0052 PHI

Tug, while towing barge, collided with another barge on theDelaware River, due to failure ~ to account for current / windand adverse weather condition, by the operating personnel.Should not be counted, since it involved only small vessels.

0065 PHI

Container vessel ran aground at night, one mile south of theReedy Point Breakwater entrance to the C&D Canal, DelawareRiver, due to an error in judgement on the part of thepilot. Should not be counted, since it was a case of

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0068 PHI

Tanker collided with Mobil Oil Company Pier, Delaware Riverat Paulsboro, New Jersey, due to an error in judgement onthe part of the mate on watch. Should not be counted, sinceit involved only one small vessel.

0084 PHI

Freighter developed material failure in the cargo boom atNorthern Shipping Company, Delaware River, Philadelphia,Pennsylvania. Should not be counted, since it was a case ofminor incident.

0085 PHI

Tug, while towing barge, collided with an unknown object indense fog, on the Delaware River. Should not be counted,since it involved only small vessels and also occurred in afog situation.

0086 PHI

Tug developed material failure, resulting in steeringcasuality, at the Delaware Bay entrance. Should not becounted, since it involved only one small vessel and alsowas a case of minor incident.

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* Accident reports of these incidents were prepared from thedetailed printout of the USCG Casualty Computer data tape.

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