For my parents

I would like to thank Mr. Michel Boyer and Mr. Vincent Michelot, my advisors from the Institutd’Etudes Politiques de Lyon, France, and Mrs. Arista Cirtautas, my advisor from the Universityof Virginia, USA, for helping me with the redaction of this thesis.

I also wanted to thank my professors from France and from the USA, Mrs. MichèleBacot-Decriaud, Mr. Régis Juanico, Mr. Jeffrey Legro, Mrs. Carol Mershon, Mr. KarlPfefferkorn, and my teaching assistant Mr. Nicholas Wheeler.

Thank you to Mr. Jeffrey D. Rathke, the Deputy Director of NATO Operations in theAmerican State Department, for answering my questions.

I would like to thank my parents Florence and Claude, my two brothers Frédéric and Adrien,and all my family for their strong support.

Thank you to my two best friends Séverine and Emeline for their encouragements and theirpresence both in great and hard moments. I like you so much.

Thank you to my lovely roommate Alana, who boosted me all year long.

Thank you to my really good friends who were at UVA with me and wonderfully copedwith me during my stay there: Audrey and Jenny (fortunately you were there), François (ourgreat “serval”), Jacopo (our favorite Italo-Argentinean), Julien (my dear confidant), mArie (thisis not a misprint), Morenike (you made me laugh so much), Rémi (thanks again, you know why)and Samuel (the person able to take it easy). Merci à vous!

Thank you finally to Melinda and Paul, who were my host family in Charlottesville and arelike my second parents.

In this thesis, I initially aimed to concentrate on the Common Foreign and Security Policy(CFSP) of the European Union. I wanted to show that the CFSP could allow the EU to be aconsistent global power. But I rapidly realized that diplomacy needs a military backup to becredible. And as the European Union was about to carry through its European Security andDefense Policy (ESDP) established only in 1999, I decided to focus on it to prove that ESDP wasthe means for the EU to reinforce its CFSP and thus to assert itself as a power recognized on theinternational scene.

I started this thesis in January 2004. As with any work dealing with current affairs, it wasdifficult to determine a finish date. My study covers four EU missions, two of which have notbeen terminated yet. As a result, I have decided to use sources going up to late May 2005.However, as I began my work and research more than a year ago, I referred to the Europeanconstitution. Obviously, at this time, I could not predict that the French and Dutch refusals wouldhave occurred. I seek to point out here that I mentioned the progress brought by the constitutionfor ESDP, but I always qualified what I said by adding this kind of safe harbor statements: “Ifthe Constitution were adopted” or “the Draft Constitution.” And at this point, it is still impossibleto foretell what will happen. This text will probably not be adopted but another draft similar tothe present one—in regards to the Common Foreign and Security Policy—may be put forward ina couple of years.

I would also like to emphasize on the format of this document. Even if it is destined to aFrench university, I mostly wrote it when I was in the USA, as an exchange student at theUniversity of Virginia. Being there helped me a lot with my research because a significant partof my subject was about the USA. But as a consequence, I adopted American rules concerningcomposition, punctuation and page setting.

I finally wanted to say that I really enjoyed writing this thesis, although it was sometimesdifficult to manage to work on it and to compel with the academic requirements of a foreignuniversity. I have no regrets though, I really appreciated the year that I spent in UVA, and I hopethat you will have as much pleasure reading this thesis as I had composing it.

http://europa.eu.int/comm/publications/booklets/eu_documentation/04/txt07_fr.htm#DECLARATION

Parler de contradictions quand il s’agit de l’Union européenne relève dupléonasme : parce que l’intégration politique entre les quinze Etats membresreste à un stade embryonnaire, parce que l’Union n’est pas unie, elle restedavantage à ce stade une somme plus ou moins harmonieuse de quinze prioritésnationales qu’un acteur cohérent et consensuel dans la gestion des affairesinternationales. Que cette hétérogénéité structurelle de l’Union soit toutefois de

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plus en plus compatible avec l’affirmation d’une politique étrangère communereste malgré tout l’acquis le plus remarquable des dix années écoulées depuis lafin de la Guerre froide. Sur le rôle international de l’Union, la légitimité de sesmoyens militaires, la nécessité de conjuguer puissance économique et puissancepolitique et sur ses relations enfin avec les Etats-Unis et l’Alliance, ce quirassemble désormais les Européens est beaucoup plus important que ce qui lesdivise. 7

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Les Européens n'ont donc pas d'excuses. Ils gagneraient à cesser de geindre dèsqu'il s'agit des faits et gestes de "l'hyperpuissance" américaine ; ils devraientaussi se garder - tentation désormais aveuglante - de faire de l'antiaméricanismeleur idéologie. Car l'hyperpuissance n'est perçue comme telle qu'en écho àl'impuissance de l'Europe. L'unilatéralisme américain n'a libre cours que parceque l'allié européen ne sait ou ne veut pas se faire entendre. Nombre de crises - àcommencer par celle du Proche-Orient - ne trouveront de solution durable quepar un consensus et par une action commune américano-européenne. Mais il nepeut y avoir de partenariat entre entités si inégales. Non que l'Europe ait à sedoter d'un budget de défense aussi gargantuesque que celui dont bénéficie lePentagone. Mais, tant qu'il faudra aux Européens l'appui militaire américain pourintimider une puissance aussi médiocre que le fut la Serbie de Milosevic, tantqu'ils considéreront la moindre augmentation du budget militaire comme unerégression sociale, rien ne changera. Pour être crédibles lorsqu'on veut, à bondroit, comme le proclamait Dominique de Villepin à la tribune des Nations unies,réglementer l'usage de la force, il faut pouvoir en disposer. Enfin, nous n'avonsplus d'échappatoire, car nous ne pouvons plus croire à des retrouvaillestransatlantiques, faites de consultations et d'appréciations partagées entre gensd'un même univers. Même si l'Amérique des frontières - celles du Nord-Est et del'Ouest - a montré par son vote démocrate sa proximité avec le Vieux Continent,le cœur de l'Amérique - celle qui, du nord au sud, occupe tout l'espace central-,ce cœur de l'Amérique de Bush est bel et bien un monde à part. 11

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Europe as a political entity? To Americans, it's just a creaky old set ofgovernments presiding over a moribund economy marked by inflexible laborpolicies, bloated welfare bureaucracies and an aging, pampered populace. It's thestate of Eurosclerosis, right? Not anymore. Toss out that image of Europe asrelic. On Friday [29 October 2004], the heads of the 25 member nations of theEuropean Union signed the European Constitution (to be ratified over the nexttwo years by each state), effectively creating the first transnational political entityin history. These "United States of Europe" represent the rise of a new ideal thatcould eclipse the United States as the focus of the world's yearnings forwell-being and prosperity. Yet our country is largely unaware of and unpreparedfor the vast changes that are quickly transforming the Old World and giving birthto what I call the new European Dream. 13

Nous ne parlons pas et je n'imagine pas une politique étrangère unique, nousparlons d'une politique étrangère commune. […] Le général de Gaulle disait unjour, qu'il ne faut pas que l'Europe broie les peuples comme dans une purée demarrons. Nous gardons nos différences, j'ai toujours été Européen, je restepourtant passionnément patriote et Français, y compris lorsque j'étaiscommissaire européen. Il ne s'agit pas d'effacer les frontières, les identités, lescultures, ni d'oublier nos amitiés dans le monde, nos réseaux, notre Histoire, noshistoires quelquefois différentes, y compris dans cette région du Proche ou duMoyen-Orient. Mais il s'agit de mettre en commun une partie de tout cela pourexister politiquement ensemble. Pat Cox a dit une chose que je veux confirmer :moi j'ai une vieille conviction, très ancienne, c'est que ce projet européen quiétait parti d'une idée politique, la paix, la stabilité, une promesse qui a étérespectée, tenue depuis 50 ans, la promesse de paix que nous allons étendre enaccueillant la Hongrie et tous les autres pays qui nous rejoignent pour notre forcecommune et notre stabilité commune, ce projet est devenu quand même au fildes ans, davantage une construction économique, financière et monétaire et celane suffit pas. Il faut remettre l'homme au cœur de ce projet - la dimension sociale,culturelle - et il faut ajouter un point politique. J'ai une conviction, je vous l'ai ditet c'est pour cela que je me suis battu pour ces outils de la politique de défensecommune et de la politique étrangère commune, il faut que l'Europe soit une

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puissance politique, il faut que l'Europe soit un acteur global et si nous ne lefaisons pas, tout le reste sera fragilisé. […] Il y aura un ministre, si cetteConstitution est finalement approuvée, qui sera le ministre européen des Affairesétrangères et il y aura un lieu où des diplomates feront des analyses communes,travailleront ensemble, pourront créer ce que j'appelle une culture diplomatiquecommune. Qu'est-ce qui nous a manqué en Bosnie, lorsque la Yougoslavie aexplosé, que nous a-t-il manqué dans la crise irakienne ? C'est que,préalablement, nous n'avions pas réfléchi ensemble à la situation. Il n'y a pas eud'analyse préalable et donc, dans l'urgence, dans la crise, chacun retrouve sesréflexes, nous n'avons pas pu agir ensemble. Il faut donc remonter les choses,avoir un outil, un lieu de culture diplomatique commune et prendre le temps. Cene sera pas un miracle, mais je suis sûr que nous y parviendrons, au moins pourtous les sujets qui nous entourent et où il y a tant de risques et d'instabilité. 18

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- to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests and independence ofthe Union; - to strengthen the security of the Union and its Member States in allways; - to preserve peace and strengthen international security, in accordancewith the principles of the United Nations Charter as well as the principles of theHelsinki Final Act and the objectives of the Paris Charter; - to promoteinternational cooperation; - to develop and consolidate democracy and the ruleof law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. 22

The common foreign and security policy shall include all questions related to thesecurity of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defencepolicy, which might in time lead to a common defence. 23

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Trois principes essentiels étaient énoncés : la défense européenne devait êtrepartie intégrante de l’Union et du deuxième pilier (Politique extérieure et desécurité) ; l’Union devait posséder une capacité autonome de décision et d’action; la politique européenne de défense devait respecter le situation de chaquepartenaire vis-à-vis de l’OTAN. 26

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Apart from contributing to the common defence in accordance with Article 5 ofthe Washington Treaty and Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty respectively,military units of WEU member States, acting under the authority of WEU, could beemployed for: - humanitarian and rescue tasks; - peacekeeping tasks; -tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking. 28

Questions referred to in this Article shall include humanitarian and rescue tasks,peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, includingpeacemaking. 29

Replacing the Political Committee, the PSC keeps track of internationaldevelopments, helps define policies and monitors implementation of agreedpolicies. Composed principally of national representatives, it is the lynchpin ofcrisis management activities. To ensure its smooth operation, the PSC is assistedby a politico-military working group. The EUMC gives military advice to the PSCand the High Representative while the EUMS, which is part of the Secretariat ofthe Council, is responsible for early warning, strategic planning and situationassessment. 31

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- police cooperation: possibility of providing up to 5 000 policemen, including 1000 within 30 days, for tasks ranging from restoring order in cooperation with amilitary force to the training of local police. Candidate countries, Iceland andNorway participate in this cooperation by providing police capacities; -strengthening the rule of law: possibility of providing up to 200 judges,prosecutors and other experts in the field; - civilian administration: possibility ofproviding a team to establish or guarantee elections, taxation, education, waterprovision, etc.; - civil protection: possibility of assisting humanitarian actorsthrough emergency operations, etc. The EU will have to be capable, within threeto seven hours, of providing two to three assessment teams consisting of tenexperts as well as intervention teams consisting of 2 000 people. 32

- to make more systematic and coordinated use of the Community's instruments;- to identify and combat causes of conflict; - to improve the capacity to react tonascent conflicts; - to promote international cooperation in this area. 33

The first began on 1 January 2003, when the European Union Police Mission of500 officers took over in Bosnia-Herzegovina from the UN’s International Police

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Task Force. The mission, which will remain for a period of three years, is traininglocal police officers and establishing sustainable policing arrangements in linewith European standards and practice. The second operation followed later in2003, when a small NATO force in Macedonia was replaced first by an EU militaryforce, and subsequently by a 200-strong EU police mission, which is still in place.The biggest of the three started in December 2004, when an EU military force(EUFOR) took over from the previous NATO-led Security Force (SFOR) inBosnia-Herzegovina. SFOR had been in place since the end of hostilities in 1995.EUFOR has a total of 8 000 troops. 37

common positions, which require the Member States to implement nationalpolicies that comply with the position defined by the Union on a particular issue.One example of coordination can be found in the fight against the illicit traffic indiamonds, as a contribution to prevention and settlement of conflicts which arecentered on countries such as Liberia, Sierra Leone and Angola; joint actions,which are operational actions by the Member States under the auspices of theCFSP. One example is the support for the Palestinian Authority in its efforts to

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counter terrorist activities emanating from its territories. 39

The European Council defines, by consensus, common strategies in areas wherethe Member States have important interests in common. A common strategyspecifies the objectives, duration, and means to be made available by the Unionand Member States. In this respect, it forms the general framework for actionsunder the Union's three pillars, which ensures consistency in its externalrelations and enables the Council to implement common strategies through jointactions and common positions adopted by a qualified majority. The Council isalso responsible for recommending common strategies to the European Council,as happened in the case of Russia, the Ukraine and the Mediterranean inDecember 1998. The first common strategy, the strategy for Russia, was adoptedby the Cologne European Council six months later. 40

for decisions applying a common strategy defined by the European Council; forany decisions implementing a joint action or common position already adoptedby the Council. 42

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Plus que la possibilité de mettre certains Etats en minorité, il me semblecependant que l’important, pour renforcer l’efficacité de la PESC, est de trouverles moyens de dégager plus de consensus et de cohérence entre les positionsdes Etats membres et des institutions de l’Union sur toutes les grandesquestions de l’actualité internationale. La création de la fonction de ministre desaffaires étrangères de l’Union et d’un service européen d’action extérieure chargéde l’assister répond précisément à cet objectif. Elle devrait permettre de faciliterla prise de décision, même à l’unanimité, au sein du Conseil affaires étrangères,qui sera présidé par ce ministre. 43

The creation of a ‘Union Minister of Foreign Affairs’, who will be simultaneouslybe vice president of the European Commission, is to be the most visible andauthoritative representative of the union in international affairs. This new postwould finally be the answer to former Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger’sfamous question as to what telephone number an American president should callto consult with Europe in case of an emergency security crisis. 44

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The issue of a growing gap between American and European military capabilitiesis important for three reasons: because of the psychological effects in the UnitedStates, because it raises the question of whether the Europeans will in fact dowhat is necessary to set up a modern and effective military reaction force, andbecause it has relevance to the interoperability of European and American forcesin NATO. 45

The trends are not good. US forces are continually updating, even transformingthemselves. Without more and better European defense spending to createcapabilities the United States needs and wants, European forces will findthemselves increasingly unable to operate alongside a transformed US military.That situation would only exacerbate a division of labor—US troops for combat,European for peacekeeping—that has already helped undermine the sense ofshared risk that an alliance requires. A more balanced alliance would enhanceEuropean influence, as well as American wisdom, ultimately working in theinterests of both sides. 46

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There are only two solutions, neither of them ideal. One is for both Americansand Europeans simply to get used to living in an imperfect world, in which thereis a lead nation that is often dissatisfied with what it feels to be an unfair burdenand unfair criticism to go along with that, but which is grudgingly followed. Theother is for the Europeans to make a greater political and material effort toredress the imbalance. 47

The obvious aim of the United States is to ensure that no serious action withimplications for European security can take place without Americans having been

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heard and having had the opportunity to bring their views to bear and to exertinfluence on the course of events. It is worth looking at this from the Americanside to understand that it is not just a question of influence or power. After all, inthe course of the past century the United States had to intervene. […] Europeans,who like to emphasize the impact of history and tradition on political behavior,should understand that this is not different in the United States. 52

I believe that the transatlantic partnership must take […] changes intoconsideration. And, to be honest, it does so insufficiently at present. Thisbecomes clear when we look at the institu-tions which are supposed to serve thispartnership. The admission of new members is proof that NATO continues to beattractive. And NATO's presence in Afghanistan has highlighted how helpful itsmilitary organization can be even in distant crises. However, it is no longer theprimary venue where transatlantic partners discuss and coordinate strategies.The same applies to the dialogue between the European Union and the UnitedStates which in its current form does justice neither to the Union's growingimportance nor to the new demands on transatlantic cooperation. I hope that newimpetus will be generated in both areas on 22 February when the US Presidentvisits Brussels.[…] German foreign and security policy is determined by ourgeographic and political location at the heart of Europe. We are formulating it inEurope, for Europe and from Europe. It is in Germany's, as well as theinternational community's interests, that the European Union assume greaterinternational responsibility. The step towards creating its own set of political andmilitary instruments with the European Security and Defense Policy is thereforenecessary. The European Union is assuming an increasing number of securitytasks in close coordination and cooperation with NATO. It has alreadydemonstrated this in several missions. A strong European pillar guaranteesEurope's loyal partnership in the transatlantic alliance and its willingness toshare the burden of tasks. This is also in the vested strategic interests of the US.53

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Step by step, European defense is on the move. Either nationally or collectivelythe Europeans are gradually developing tools that will be of paramountimportance to fulfill the goal of strategic autonomy. In the domain of intelligencesatellites, for example, they will have about 15 reconnaissance satellites(including dual-use ones) in the next five years. In navigation systems thedevelopment of the Galileo satellite system will give a tremendous impetus toautonomous European capabilities in areas ranging from pure navigation toplanning long-range strike. To quote the Financial Times: ‘the way to gain moreautonomy from the US without further transatlantic ties lies in concretemeasures’ (“Galileo gathers pace”, Financial Times, 22 September 2003). 55

NATO has been said to no longer have a clear purpose. The plan to have adistinctive EU foreign and security policy inevitably will put into question therelationship between the European Union and NATO. […] What is the future, then,of the transatlantic alliance? NATO will likely survive, but it will never bereestablished in its old form. The Europeans have learned that they cansuccessfully rebuff Washington on a major issue. The Bush Administration’sstrategy of forming ‘coalitions of the willing’ instead of going to NATO as such, orsticking it out at the UN, proved more successful in war fighting than in winningthe postwar peace. 58

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Did the unilateral US shift to ‘out of area’ therefore imply that NATO was destinedto go ‘out of business’? That was the big debate which occupied the transatlanticdefense establishment throughout most of 2002. NATO will undoubtedly survive.At one level it will be further transformed from an essentially military organizationto an essentially political one. Enlargement to seven states from central andeastern Europe announced at the Prague summit in November 202, will acceleratethe Alliance’s transformation from a collective defense to a collective securityagency. […] On the other hand, plans to develop a NATO Response Force (NRF)deployable anywhere in the world, could well give NATO’s military activities anew lease of life. Whatever form the NRF eventually assumes, there are likely tobe further tensions with military developments in ESDP. Many see the NRF as atype of ‘cream-skimming’ which will divert the best military assets in Europeaway from the EU’s own military planning. 61

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Europe and the United States eventually joined together to effectively undertakeNATO’s first military missions in Bosnia and Kosovo, in which European militaryforces flew hundreds of sorties, provided critical bases and logistical support,and played key combat and then peacekeeping roles. In the peacekeeping phase,particularly, Europeans eventually provided over 80 percent of the troops inBosnia and Kosovo. More recently, when the United States took military action inAfghanistan […] European support was solid. […] Despite Pentagon reticence,European forces were involved by early 2002 in bombing, reconnaissance,cave-clearing, and Special Forces operations. European countries—first Britain,then Turkey, Germany, and the Netherlands, and eventually NATO itself—took onthe lead role in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) deployed tokeep the peace. 62

As far as the political, economic and military requirements of peacekeeping andpeace building are concerned, the European contribution is respectable, not onlyin Bosnia and Kosovo, but throughout the Balkans, and as it appears, wellbeyond that. Indeed, the European contribution almost dwarfs that of the UnitedStates, and it can hardly be categorized as less important for the common aim ofstability and peace. Calling this ‘doing the dishes’ (Kagan, 2002) is silly. After all,long-term stability and conflict prevention depend on it; military intervention atbest may solve a short-term problem and may also prepare the ground forlonger-term activity, but, without peace building, peace enforcement remains littlemore than a stopgap measure. 63

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I think there is always the possibility that a contradiction could develop. If thathappened, it would indeed be a serious problem for transatlanticrelations. However, if you look at the tasks that the EU has set for its own militaryengagement, I don't see that as a short-term danger. And, frankly, considering thereluctance of most European governments to spend money on military assets(particularly those that are expeditionary and modern), I don't consider this ahuge problem at the moment. The NATO-EU relationship is complicated; the moreit focuses on practical cooperation, the more successful it is—the establishmentof an EU mission in Bosnia at the end of 2004 is the perfect example. When thediscussion is about theoretical (or as some call them, theological) issues ofcompetencies and hierarchies, that is when difficulties arise. But they have notprevented NATO and the EU from working out an arrangement ("Berlin Plus") andapplying it (in Bosnia). Now, there is always the possibility that situations couldarise in which "Berlin Plus" is not a sufficient guide to cooperation. But wehave not encountered something like that yet. This last possibility depends in thefirst instance on the desire of the EU to involve itself in international crises. 66

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The exact balance of responsibilities between the EU and NATO is less importantthan reaching an agreement and for Europe to offer a coherent policy and aneffective force to its American partners. Absent those developments, it is likelythat even a new US administration will continue to engage with Europe asindividual European countries, rather than as a whole—or will not engage at all.From the American perspective, there is little to fear from an EU capable of suchactions, and much to gain, as EU missions to the Balkans and Africa have alreadydemonstrated. The greater problem is Europe’s current weakness, not itspotential strength. 68

Those in Europe who believe that they must weaken NATO to strengthen ESDPare only likely to achieve an insecure and incapable Europe unsure of itself andits role in the world. If they want Washington to support ESDP, they must producereal capabilities and assume real peacekeeping responsibilities, for instance inBosnia. Those in the United States who believe that strengthening ESDP meansweakening NATO are only likely to achieve a lonely superpower unable to counton the added abilities and resources of its allies when it comes to facing newthreats and risks. If they want European support for US initiatives, they must bewilling to allow allies to develop the capacity to do so. 69

Happily, NATO has made it easier for its European members to develop their ownability to act on EU missions. The relative importance of the EU and the Atlanticalliance as security providers is certainly changing, but European militarycapabilities would be greatly diminished by the demise of NATO within the next10 years. 70

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Measuring the success or failure of the EU’s CFSP is unquestionably difficult,perhaps impossible if one takes a narrow approach to the process advocatedhere. In fact, even where precise indicators are available, measuring policyoutcomes and drawing political implications for the future is controversial atbest. The annual review of the Lisbon Strategy shows that benchmarking againstdetailed figures, regularly updated, does not necessarily lead to a constructivepolitical debate. On the contrary, excessive analytical focus on a vast range ofparameters often hides the lack of political direction. In the CFSP domain, theseproblems are compounded by the absence of objective reference criteria. Whilethe ESS makes great strides, it is fair to say that the international identity of theUnion is ‘work in progress’. Foreign and security policy cannot be constrained ina regulatory cage either: room for discretion and radical twists should to be left tocope with unpredictable developments. No general criterion applies: delicatedecisions adopted under time pressure should be judged on their own specificterms. Gains and losses are often intangible: emphasis on influence as opposedto sheer power makes, for example, a precise evaluation of the EU performancehighly questionable, and open to counterfactual reasoning. The lack of a suitablebasis to ‘measure’ the performance of the Union in the world does not rule out,however, that policy guidelines and main initiatives under the CFSP can besubject of legitimate political scrutiny and assessment. 74

Nowhere is Balkans fatigue more evident than in the United States, where a newadministration came to power on an explicit promise to pull U.S. troops out of theBalkans. […] Although Bush has stepped back from his campaign pledge sincecoming to power, assuring Europe that the U.S. will pull out its troops fromBosnia and Kosovo only when the rest of NATO does, his administration has nointerest in seeing NATO embark on a new, large, and open-ended mission inMacedonia. And what about Europe? Is not a stabilization mission of the kindrequired in Macedonia precisely the sort of operation the European Unionenvisaged it would undertake as part of its European Security and DefensePolicy? Of course it is. But this ESDP is still no more than a paper construct-there

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are no new capabilities or real concepts that would enable the EU today to launchan operation of even the limited size necessary in Macedonia. So even if the EUmembers were prepared to do what needs to be done (and outside Britain there isno evidence that this is the case), they lack the capacity to do so. 75

In fact, the EU has attained, ahead of time, the objectives on civil capability incrisis management, set out at the European Council of Feira in June 2000.Europeans like to stress their non-military contributions to security and theimportance of conflict prevention and crisis management. These are certainlyimportant and the EU has established a number of ‘headline goals’ fornon-military capabilities. These include targets for police, judges and civiladministrators all essential in tackling the difficult problems related to failedstates. As a result of this progress, the EU was able to take over the internationalpolice mission in Bosnia from the UN on 1 January 2003. 77

The European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) [was] beginning to moveforward. The Union is active in two police missions in the Balkans (EUPM and

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Proxima) and is about to embark on its first ESDP rule of law mission in Georgia.In comparison to recent years this is an ambitious agenda and demonstrates anew mood in the EU to develop its crisis management capabilities. 78

In the Balkans, it is now the EU that usually takes the policy lead on non-militaryquestions and deploys real resources, especially aid or trade concessions. TheBalkans is simply where the EU policy lead is most visible and expensive. Toillustrate the point, the Union and its member states targeted more than €19billion in aid to the Balkans for 2000-6, or in excess of seven times more than theUS earmarked for 27 countries in Europe and ‘Eurasia’. Moreover, the EU hasbegun to lead even on ‘hard’ security in the Balkans by operationalising, for thefirst time, the capacity for crisis management built into its fledgling ESDP. In early2003, the Union took over the UN-led police mission to Bosnia, and then NATO’s450-strong peacekeeping force in Macedonia. 79

The European Union (EU) is widely recognized as the international actor with themost influence in promoting ethnic reconciliation, shoring up democracy, andsupporting the economic revitalization of the Balkans. The EU’s influence isimmediate—providing humanitarian aid, economic assistance, market access,and political support. It also long-term—shaping the tenor of domestic politics byoffering the prospect of EU membership. 80

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Planning for EUPM was successful. The mission began operations on scheduleon 1 January 2003 with personnel, equipment and programmes in place. The swiftway in which EUPM has established itself in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the pastfour months and the positive feedback that continues to come from the field arethe most telling indicators that the planning of the mission has met its objectives.84

In the Balkans in the early 1990s we were divided and hence incapable ofstopping the bloodshed. But today everyone is agreed on the strategy and wehave made massive progress in stabilizing and rebuilding these war-tornsocieties. We have made a long-term commitment to the region. With bothtechnical and financial assistance we are supporting the painful but necessarypolitical and economic reform processes. And by offering a clear Europeanperspective, we have created powerful incentives to persist on that path ofreform. 85

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Avec la mise en place de la PESD et la gestion d’une première mission danslaquelle l’UE a le statut d’organisation “chef de file”, celle-ci devient enfin unacteur crédible pour le maintien de la paix et de la sécurité internationales. 88

The EU’s CFSP backed up by the ESDP may work in the Western Balkansbecause the EU has a range of effective tools that can be used for countries thatare credible future members of the EU. In other words, the most powerful andsuccessful aspect of EU foreign policy has turned out to be the incentive of EUenlargement—and the Western Balkans are the region where EU enlargement canbe used to make the CFSP a success. […] The EU’s influence over its peripherystems from the attraction of future membership of the club. Whatever militarycapability the EU may develop, it will be a trivial source of influence incomparison to the carrot of membership. 89

While the operations described above represent a confidence booster to ESDP,they have also validated a number of challenges that previously remained at the

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‘hypothetical level’. A number of these challenges are crosscutting, i.e. affectingdimensions in all missions to varying degrees. Among the more notablecrosscutting issues are operational, financial, and planning constraints. 91

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L’expérience acquise par l’UE sur le terrain au cours des missions MPUE etEUPOL PROXIMA est spécifique, elle ne sera pas forcément la même que cellesde l’ONU ou de l’OSCE. Dans le cas de la MPUE, la mission ne déploie pas unpersonnel nombreux, assure le relais d’une mission déjà existante, repose sur leconsensus et dispose d’un large soutien politique. Le processus de prise dedécision a été relativement aisé et rapide comparé à un processus similaire ausein d’une organisation telle que l’OSCE par exemple. Ce ne serait peut-être pasle cas dans le cadre d’une mission plus vaste et plus complexe. 93

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The European Security Strategy adopted in December 2003 began a union-widedebate over the basic principles of an EU worldview. It signaled a potentiallymore proactive foreign policy formulated to address the principal challenges.Interestingly, the EU document’s enumeration of these global problems is quitesimilar to the American National Security Strategy. Chief among these are theproliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and its potential nexus withterrorists seeking mass effects; the arc of instability that some refer to as thegreater Middle East; and a new need for Europe to project power to help theUnited States in the “policing” of danger zones. This last concept has alreadybeen put into practice, with the EU running peacekeeping operations inMacedonia and the Congo. 96

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During the Dutch Presidency the EU took stock of its collective civiliancapabilities for crisis management and began to articulate how these should beexpanded both in scope and quality. The subsequent agreement of a CivilianHeadline Goal with a target date of 2008 (CHG 2008) establishes the frameworkfor these discussions and represents the first attempt by the EU tailor itscapabilities to local needs for third-party civilian interventions. 101

Civilian crisis management tends to become a privileged field of the ESDP.External demands are more and more numerous. Three civilian operations havebeen contemplated: in Sudan, in the Democratic Republic of Congo and in Iraq.[…] Police missions play a significant role and we know that the EU is able to useits soft power. 102

Today's Declaration is an important public recognition of the practicalcooperation that has been underway for some time now between the UnitedNations and the European Union in the area of crisis management. With thedevelopment of the Union's capabilities in this area in recent years, we have seenthis cooperation given practical expression, bringing tangible benefits on theground. For example, we have seen the establishment of an EU police mission inBosnia-Herzegovina and a military stabilisation force in the Democratic Republicof the Congo at the request of Secretary General Annan. The EU has a range ofinstruments available to it to advance security and development in Europe andbeyond: aid, trade and diplomatic instruments, combined with military andcivilian crisis management capabilities. It is with this broad range of instruments,applied coherently, that the Union can best cooperate with and support the UN, inparticular the Security Council, in the maintenance of international peace andsecurity. In a world where the UN may become increasingly reliant on regional

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organisations, such as the EU, this support and cooperation is not optional, it isessential. 110

Speakers underlined the rapid historical evolution of the EU-UN relationship, fromthat of mere ‘subcontractor’, to active cooperation, to the establishment of astrategic partnership. The fact that the EU can utilize a wide range of instruments,including financial, civilian, police and military, is highly appreciated at the UN.One participant explained the development of ‘integrated missions’, which wouldbe present on the ground from the crisis phase until the post-conflictreconstruction phase, and the important role that the EU can play in suchmissions. Other participants suggested that, bearing in mind that politicalmediation amongst warring parties is done simultaneously by both the EU andthe UN, better coordination could produce better results in many cases. Allparticipants agreed that current EU-UN collaboration for peacekeeping purposesshould be continued and intensified. 112

The EU and the UN are also complementary at the political level. The EU iscommitted to multilateralism, and is respectful of the UN Charter principles. Itneeds to become a stronger group within the UN, and in particular within the UNSecurity Council or in preparation of the Council’s meetings. The UN needs theEU for managing crisis. 113

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The European Union is often accused of being an indecisive, bureaucraticmonster. This sceptical view overlooks the fact that it has actually been a highlyefficient engine of peace and prosperity, cooperation and development. Itshistoric record is an example of the phenomenon Joseph S. Nye calls soft power.114

[Soft power] is the ability to get what you want through attraction rather thancoercion or payments. It arises from the attractiveness of a country's culture,political ideals, and policies. When our policies are seen as legitimate in the eyesof others, our soft power is enhanced. 115

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EU soft power induces nations to alter sometimes passionately held beliefs andobjectives and accommodate ancient enemies to meet EU requirements. Systemsof law and governance are willingly altered and protectionist barriers againstproducers in other EU states are pulled down in response to EU requirements. Isthis a manifestation primarily of soft power or of economic hard power?Undoubtedly, both are at work here, but the economic carrot seems to be clearlythe driving force for EU membership. For the transformation states in CentralEurope, the military security of NATO and EU membership is also a powerfulfactor. The current decline in popular support for increases in EU politicalintegration demonstrates the ephemeral nature of soft power, but does notcontradict its reality. […] Most people find its social safety net and other socialsecurity features more attractive than the more fluid U.S. systems. Its militaryforces play the predominant role in UN and NATO peacekeeping efforts. Its‘nation building’ efforts in Central and Eastern Europe—predominantly throughapplication of soft power influences—have achieved remarkable results. 116

The basic concept of power is the ability to influence others to get them to dowhat you want. There are three major ways to do that: one is to threaten themwith sticks; the second is to pay them with carrots; the third is to attract them orco-opt them, so that they want what you want. If you can get others to beattracted, to want what you want, it costs you much less in carrots and sticks. 118

Let me turn to the transfer of leadership to the Europeans, who failed in theBalkans a decade ago but now have another opportunity. Today's Europe isbetter prepared. It has fielded an excellent team: in addition to Ashdown in

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Bosnia and the Steiner in Kosovo, Javier Solana, Chris Patten, and Erhard Busekin Brussels. Europe has footed most of the bill for the Balkans, and providesmost of the troops. 119

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2003 is a landmark year for the EU’s security and defense policy (ESDP). EUpolicemen are already deployed in Bosnia, and the EU sent 350 soldiers toMacedonia on March 31st—the Union’s first military mission, named “OperationConcordia”. The EU has lost its military virginity. At the request of the UN, the EUsent 1,500 troops to Congo at the beginning of June 2003. Plans are afoot for theEU to take over NATO’s military role in Bosnia during 2004 as well. Thus, the EU’smuch-derided defense policy has finally moved from the drawing board intoaction. 126

A year ago, at the height of the Iraq crisis, there was much speculation that theEuropean Union (EU) could forget about its ambitions to develop a real commonforeign and security policy (CFSP). As for its hopes to establish a Europeansecurity and defence policy (ESDP) these goals seemed dashed in the sands ofIraq and competing visions of European defence in Paris, Berlin and London. Yet

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12 months later the picture is not so bleak. France, Germany and the UK areworking more closely than ever on foreign and security policy. The BrusselsEuropean Council agreed on the proposals in this area put forward by theConvention. Even ahead of the December meeting Member States agreed to setup an armaments agency focusing on research and development of new defencecapabilities. Member States also adopted a revised security strategy report byJavier Solana and reached a deal on the military planning headquarters for EUmissions. 2003 also saw a number of successful EU operations (police mission inBosnia, military missions in Macedonia and eastern Congo). This remarkableprogress has prompted some to ask whether foreign and security policy mightnot be the new driving force, as the single market was in the 1980s and the eurowas in the 1990s, propelling Member States towards closer integration. 127

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Between 1999-2002, the EU set up relevant political-military structures to assess,decide, plan and implement military operations. Although these structures are intheir infancy, they have been tested by two EU military operations: Concordia andArtemis. 135

Concordia is a small mission which is nevertheless significant in two respects.First, it has high political symbolism in that it is testimony to the political

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determination of the EU member states to deliver on the Helsinki Headline Goal.Second, and more importantly, it has allowed the EU to implement and to test itsown home-grown crisis-management procedures, requiring the mission toaddress every aspect of those procedures from command and control to forcepolicy, to logistics and the juridical dimension of cooperation with the hostnation. 136

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ESDP’s first five years have not been about process alone, of course. During thisperiod, in fact, the EU undertook its first actual operations: police actions inMacedonia and Bosnia; a NATO-supported military mission in FYROM; and anautonomous EU military operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Thesewere all small-scale missions and all could have been easily been done withoutinvolving the EU, either by a coalition of the willing within NATO or under an EU‘lead nation’. The Congo operation, in fact, was really a French mission supportedby a handful of other Europeans, onto which an EU role was grafted. But theseBalkans and Africa missions were none the less good indicators of the kind ofcontributions the EU could make if it continues to develop the will and capabilityto act militarily. The EU’s role in both FYROM and Congo was an importantsymbol of the Union’s common security and humanitarian interests. Both alsoprovided useful lessons in identifying what the EU would need both institutionallyand militarily for future missions of this type. 139

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The vast majority of these forces had to be deployed (over a distance of 6,200km), like almost everything else used for the operation (around 400 combatvehicles were deployed, as well as other military and communications equipment,fuel, food, etc), which explains the need for a substantial number of forces (about850 in between Entebbe and Kampala) in the force headquarters and supportbases in Uganda to assure the logistics flow. A reserve of 1,000 French forcesalready stationed in other countries in Africa was foreseen in case of need, butthey were in the end not used. 141

The time and location of the operation allowed only the stabilization of Bunia andthe surrounding area, while the fighting and violence against civilians continuedoutside Bunia [and] given the limitation duration of the operation, the effectivedemilitarization of Bunia did not really take place or was not fully accomplished.Weapons were no longer visible in Bunia, but that did not mean the town was aweapons-free zone—although it must be pointed out that the task of the forcesoperating under Artemis was demilitarization and not disarmament. MONUCcontingents have now been conducting systematic house searches looking forhidden weapons. 142

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L’insuffisance de l’effort de défense des Européens est un thème rebattu, et l’onne cesse de souligner l’écart entre les dépenses militaires des Etats-Unis etcelles de leurs alliés du Vieux Continent. Ainsi, les dépenses des Européensreprésentent environ 60 % des dépenses américaines, mais le produit final de cesinvestissements est très inférieur aux résultats obtenus outre-Atlantique. Parailleurs, le budget militaire américain croît d’une manière exponentielle etreprésente plus de 3 % du PIB, alors que les budgets européens sont endécroissance réelle de 22 % depuis 1990. A l’exception du Royaume-Uni et de laFrance qui s’efforcent de tenir le cap, les autres pays européens ont des tauxinférieurs à 2 % et les « lanternes rouges » sont l’Allemagne (1,4 %) et l’Espagne(1,2 %). Toutefois, des progrès ont été enregistrés sur la voie de l’Europe del’armement et les premières réalisations ont été le fait des industriels du secteurde la défense, soucieux de mettre en place des groupes d’une taille suffisantepour affronter la concurrence mondiale. A cet égard, la création de deux groupeseuropéens dans le domaine de l’industrie aérospatiale – BAE Systems et EADS –est une novation, et il convient de souligner la singularité des industriesd’armement où les intérêts nationaux demeurent très puissants et où secombinent la concurrence et le partenariat. Ainsi, les coopérations européennes,voire une certaine forme d’intégration avec le projet d’avion de transport militaireA 400 M, se sont inscrites dans le cadre d'une politique d’intégrationtransatlantique croissante. Cette tendance se renforcera sans doute à la faveurde l’augmentation du budget de la défense des Etats-Unis car le marchéaméricain, qui représente 55 % du marché aérospatial mondial, estincontournable pour les groupes européens. 143

Much progress could be made, however, even in the absence of politicallydifficult defense spending increases. Already, EU members collectively spendover $200bn on defense yearly. That is only about half of what the United Statesspends, but it is still quite a lot of money, and the EU does not have anywherenear as many defense commitments as the United States does. The problem isthat the money is spent badly, and disproportionately on large, outmoded.

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Brookings Institution defense analyst Michael O’Hanlon believes that, evenwithout major increases in defense spending, EU members could deploy some200,000 troops abroad if they made the right procurement and organizationaldecisions. That would not be a major contribution to Western security but itwould also represent a capability that American decision-makers would have totake seriously. 144

The Europeans need not invest in all the things that the Americans do. They donot have the same global priorities […] European governments are not willing tospend comparable amounts of money on defence, which limits their choicesfurther. […] Instead the Europeans should place more emphasis on poolingexisting military equipment. For example, countries could share the costs ofmaintaining and operating aircraft, since they often buy the same type. The recentdecision by France and Germany to set up a joint ‘top gun’ school for their attackhelicopter pilots and mechanics is a small step in the right direction. 145

Building on the Helsinki Headline and capability goals and recognising thatexisting shortfalls still need to be addressed, Member States have decided to

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commit themselves to be able by 2010 to respond to with rapid and decisiveaction applying a fully coherent approach to the whole spectrum of crisismanagement operations covered by the Treaty on the European Union. Thisincludes humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combatforces in crisis management, including peacemaking. As indicated by the ESSthis might also include joint disarmament operations, the support for thirdcountries in combating terrorism and security sector reform. The EU must be ableto act before a crisis occurs and preventive engagement can avoid that asituation deteriorates. The EU must retain the ability to conduct concurrentoperations thus sustaining several operations simultaneously at different levelsof engagement. 146

The days that European foreign policy could be dismissed as being all talk andno action have long gone. More than 7,000 European troops are operating underan EU flag, keeping the peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Other operations are takingplace in the South Caucasus, Africa and elsewhere. We are also making goodprogress in an area – military capabilities – where our traditionalunderperformance hindered our ability to be as effective as we should have been.

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Within the framework of the EU Rapid Reaction Force, the first of the planned 13battle groups have been created. We also set up the European Defence Agency -to get better value for money in defence procurement and increase the amount ofusable military capabilities European governments have at their disposal. And wehave brought civilian-military cooperation to a new operational level through thecreation of a civilian-military cell. All these measures should enable the Union toincrease its crisis management capabilities so that it can successfully addressthe complex, multi-faceted security crises of the 21st century. Thus, step by step,a more capable and coherent European foreign policy is taking shape. 147

It must be said that the operational/military challenges are likely to diminish overtime. [As aforementioned] new platforms such as the A 400 M transport aircraftand Galileo satellite navigation system will serve to ease certain logisticaldifficulties. Likewise, military gaps will continue to be plugged through the ECAPpanels. Several member states having made the transition to professional armies,deployability capabilities should be enhanced as legal barriers limiting theavailability of conscripts are lifted. 148

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The Italian Defense Minister, Antonio Martino, and the Head of EU Military Staff,General Rainier Schuwirth, spoke before the European Parliament’s ForeignAffairs Committee (on 25 and 26 November 2003 respectively) and hailedConcordia a success in terms of NATO-EU cooperation. 149

The management of this conflict [in Macedonia] is the perfect example oftransatlantic cooperation. […] And indeed, diplomats stress that the launch of theMacedonia force shows that the EU-US relationship is still working […] TheEU-NATO agreement and the following pass of the torch from NATO to EU inMacedonia, show that cooperation between Europe and US is still possible andgoing on in the security field, despite the differences magnified by the Iraq warand the lack of support of the EU as a whole to the US policy. 150

One of the aspects that went remarkably well in Operation Artemis according to

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those directly or indirectly involved in the operation (in the opinion of thehumanitarian community in general) was the excellent cooperation betweenArtemis and humanitarian agencies. […] There was very good cooperation withthe UN, on the ground as well as the highest political level. 152

It is both the first autonomous EU mission—one that does not rely on NATO’shelp—and the EU’s first military mission outside of Europe. Moreover, since theUS showed no enthusiasm to participate, NATO was not even asked to conductthe mission. This establishes a precedent: NATO will not always have a ‘right offirst refusal’ over a military mission that either the alliance or the EU couldmanage. […] The EU is likely to manage more military missions in the future.European countries already have a large number of troops deployedinternationally on peacekeeping missions in the Balkans, Afghanistan, Africa, andthe Middle East. And the US priorities are North Korea, Iran and Iraq. 154

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A military superpower? Foreign policy, like economic policy, does not asuperpower make. And in the aftermath of the Iraq crisis, an insistent questionremained: can Europe back its strength with power? Few doubted that Europehad ‘soft power’—the power to attract—in abundance. But could it exercise ‘hardpower’—the ability to make people do what they might not do otherwise? It wasthe ability, and the will, to use the full array of ‘hard power’, from economic power(including sanctions) through to military force, that was becoming its first greattest as a fully fledged superpower. 155

I am convinced that 2005 will be a crucial year for the political development of theEU and its growing international ambitions and responsibilities. It is clear that aself-confident and capable EU has a real contribution to make in building a saferneighbourhood and a better world. Both our citizens and our internationalpartners want and expect a stronger European presence on the internationalstage. If we seize the opportunities that present themselves, we can heed this calland deliver an EU foreign policy which is pro-active, coherent and henceeffective. And if we did, both the citizens of Europe and the rest of the world bebetter off as a result. 156

Operationally, these missions were all well within the current capabilities of theEU. Together, they demonstrate both the will and the capacity of the EU toengage in military missions. They constitute a real breakthrough in terms of theEU’s emergence as an international actor, if only because their very existencewould have been unimaginable only five years ago. 157

The EU has begun to lead even on ‘hard’ security in the Balkans byoperationalizing, for the first time, the capacity for crisis management built into

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its fledgling ESDP. In early 2003, the Union took over the UN-led police mission toBosnia, and then NATO’s 450-strong peacekeeping force in Macedonia. Far moreambitious was the Union’s pledge to take on command of the 12,000-strongNATO peacekeeping operation in Bosnia by 2004, which was made possible aftera landmark deal on EU-NATO relations at the 2002 Copenhagen EU summit. 158

A European superpower, serving to balance the USA in the world, would providea different western approach to the world, one of that would be more enduring. Itwould recognize, not obliterate, differences. Decisions would be made bynegotiations between superpowers through multilateral organizations. And,normally at least, the peace would be kept by deterrence and containment, ratherthan ‘pre-emptive attacks’ by the strong on the weak. 159

The size, quality, and strategic location of Europe may give the continent, and itsindividual nation states, great influence in the world—but a European superpowerthey do not make. For Europe, as for any superpower that becomes a globalplayer, unity is all. Without unity, or ‘acting and speaking as one’, the two greatglobal players of the late twentieth century, the USA and the USSR, would havehad major influence, but little power. 160

Whether the EU can produce some sort of unity in its foreign policy, and what

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kind of consensus it would coalesce around, will make a dramatic difference tothe options available for the United States in the world. The EU could becomeeither a super-partner, or a sniper-state, or remain the secondary force it is todayin the fundamental strategic issues, as ‘union’ of states with dramaticallydifferent opinions when it counts. It is impossible to conceive of an EU thatconsiders itself, simplistically, as a counterweight to American power on allissues. 162

No observer of recent events could fail to notice that the United States andEurope have different attitudes toward power, military force, and sovereignty, oreven that the divide is growing. The question, however, is whether thesedifferences are now so fundamental that the United States and the nations ofEurope can or should dismiss the transatlantic alliance as irrelevant, concludingthat they either do not need each other or that they might find better allieselsewhere. The answer is no. […] The Alliance should be saved, moreover,because it continues to serve a vital—indeed irreplaceable—role in maintaininginternational security and prosperity. American and European leaders have realchoices to make that cannot be dismissed by blithe assertions of structure, lawsof history, or unbridgeable cultural divides. […] Taking a broader view, theEuropean democracies are certainly closer to the United States, both strategicallyand culturally, than any other region is or is likely to be anytime soon. Americansand Europeans still broadly share the same democratic, liberal aspirations fortheir societies and for the rest of the world. 164

We do not have the luxury of living on separate planets. On this small planet,whose problems abound, neither the United States nor the European Union willfind an alternative substantial partner which shares to such a complete degreevalues and interests. 165

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Operation Althea will likely be an important test of the EU’s ability to utilize andintegrate its military, political, and economic instruments. It will test EU militarycapabilities and may shape the future development of ESDP. The Bosnia case isalso viewed as a significant practical application of the NATO-EU institutionalrelationship, as laid out in the Berlin Plus mechanisms. 168

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The EU has come a very long way in a very short time. After fifty years of totalimpasse, the process of Europeanisation of security and defence thinking hasbegun to make its impact. The EU, after fierce debate, has generated considerableconsensus about its strategic goals and Javier Solana’s December 2003European Security Strategy will become the benchmark against which the EU’scollective objectives will be judged. Everything should be done to ensure thatESDP/CSFP is developed in close cooperation with NATO, without anyteleological or ideological assumptions about the nature of the long-termrelationship between the two bodies. It should also be recognised on both sidesof the Atlantic that there will be occasions when the EU will wish to operateautonomously and that, on those occasions, it will require autonomous planningcapabilities. The EU is developing an unprecedented mix of civilian and militaryinstruments which will make it a unique and distinctive actor on the world stage.It will not aspire to military superpowerdom in the manner of the United States.But it will increasingly combine appropriate dosages of hard and soft power inthe implementation of policies geared to promoting good governance in theEuropean region, to building an international order based on effectivemultilateralism and to tackling the new threats of the 21st century. 169

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Institutions: European Union: http://www.europa.eu.int

Council of the European Union: http://ue.eu.int/showPage.ASP?lang=en EuropeanParliament: http://www.europarl.eu.int/home/default_en.htm

Activities of the European Union, CFSP website:http://europa.eu.int/pol/cfsp/index_en.htm

EUPM website: http://www.eupm.org/Mission%20Objectives.asp

EUPOL-PROXIMA website:http://www.eupol-Proxima.org/1%20Mission/Missionstatement.htm

CONCORDIA website: http://www.delmkd.cec.eu.int/en/Concordia/mission.htm

EU webpage on Operation ARTEMIS:http://ue.eu.int/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=605&lang=fr&mode=g

NATO: http://www.nato.int

OSCE: http://www.osce.org

UN: http://www.un.org

WEU: http://www.weu.int

Foreign and Commonwealth Office website: http://www.fco.gov.uk

French Ministry of Foreign Affairs: http://www.france.diplomatie.fr

French Ministry of Defense: http://www.defense.gouv.fr

Brookings Institution: http://www.brookings.edu

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace: http://www.carnegieendowment.org

Centre for European Policy Studies: http://www.ceps.be/Default.php

Centre for European Reform: http://www.cer.org.uk

Centro de Investigação e Análise em Relações Internacionais: http://www.ciari.org

EastWest Institute: http://www.ewi.info

EU Institute for Security Studies: http://www.iss-eu.org

European Policy Centre: http://www.theepc.be

European Security Forum: http://www.eusec.org

Groupe de recherche et d’information sur la paix et la sécurité: http://www.grip.org

Groupement d’Etudes et de Recherche Notre Europe: http://www.notre-europe.asso.fr

Institut Français des Relations Internationales: http://www.ifri.org

International Peace Academy: http://www.ipacademy.org

International Security Information Service: http://www.isis-europe.org

Internationale Weiterbildung und Entwicklung: http://www.inwent.org

La documentation française website: http://www.ladocfrancaise.gouv.fr

US Institute of Peace: http://www.usip.org

Young Europeans for Security: http://www.yes-dk.dk

BBC: http://news.bbc.co.uk

Die Welt: http://www.welt.de

Le Figaro: http://www.lefigaro.fr

Le Monde: http://www.lemonde.fr

Le Monde Diplomatique: http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr

Libération: http://www.liberation.fr

Los Angeles Times: http://www.latimes.com

The Guardian: http://www.guardian.co.uk

The New York Times: http://www.nytimes.com

The Times: http://www.timesonline.co.uk

The Washington Post: http://www.washingtonpost.com