Biochar Cameroon Report - Mines-ParisTech

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“Biochar Fund Trials In Cameroon Hype And Unfulfilled Promises” by B Ndameu and Biofuelwatch

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Contents

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .......................................................................................................... 3

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION Biofuelwatch................................................................................. 4

What is biochar? .................................................................................................................. 4

Background to the Biochar Fund ............................................................................................ 5

Background to Key Farmers .................................................................................................. 5

CHAPTER 2: ASSESSMENT OF CAMEROON TRIALS Benoit Ndameu .............................................. 6

Selection and training of participants ..................................................................................... 9

What were farmers told about biochar? .................................................................................. 9

What were farmers' experiences as participants? ................................................................... 11

Many participants failed to complete trials ............................................................................ 12

What was the fate of biochar trial plots? ............................................................................... 13

Status of plots visited during our visit in April 2011 ............................................................... 14

Biochar production and its impacts ...................................................................................... 16

Traditional agriculture practices in the region ........................................................................ 16

Threats to forests in the region ........................................................................................... 18

Were the trials a “success”? ................................................................................................ 18

CHAPTER 3: DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS FROM THE FIELD INTERVIEWS Biofuelwatch ................... 19

Were Biochar Fund's claims about carbon offsets by 2010 realistic? ......................................... 21

False promises .................................................................................................................. 22

Who benefited? ................................................................................................................. 22

Questions about Biochar Fund's and ADAPEL's project in DR Congo.......................................... 23

RECOMMENDATIONS ............................................................................................................ 24

General recommendations to funders, agencies and policy-makers .......................................... 24

ANNEX 1: FORESTS IN SOUTHWEST CAMEROON ..................................................................... 24

Threats to forests in SW Province and the region around Kumba ............................................. 24

The South Bakundu forest reserve: Continuous degradation due to poor management ............... 25

Industrial logging activities: Not good governance ................................................................. 25

Villagers experiences and views of the pressures on forests .................................................... 26

This report was made possible with generous funding from the Wallace Global Fund.

Thanks are due to Meg Sheehan for comments on an earlier draft.

www.biofuelwatch.net

November 2011

Biochar%20Cameroon%20report-11%20word.doc#_Toc310089955




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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Biochar, fine grained charcoal added to soils, has been promoted with claims it can sequester carbon

in soils for “hundreds to thousands of years”, improve soil fertility and hence increase crop yields and

also provide renewable energy from pyrolysis production. Yet scientific research, particularly field

trials, are woefully lacking. Field studies that have been done do not support these claims (for review

see the accompanying report: “Biochar: A Critical Review of Science and Policy”).

A significant number of biochar “trials” and projects have been initiated in Africa by companies and

NGOs. These trials are based on assumptions that biochar “works” and can contribute to improving

livelihoods by boosting food production and providing income from carbon finance. This “win-win”

poverty alleviation framing is used to advocate for scaling up production and use of biochar – and for

inclusion of biochar in carbon markets. Some advocates are advancing biochar on a very large scale

as a “climate geoengineering” technique.

Biochar Fund trials in Cameroon were expected to be the largest and longest lasting biochar trials to

date, with potential to provide useful insights. Preliminary data were published in late 2009 indicating

dramatic positive results on maize yields. Media headlines pronounced “Exceptional Results From

Biochar Experiment in Cameroon”. However, the data were preliminary. It was indicated that further

data were forthcoming but these were never made publicly available. Biochar Fund‟s website was

subsequently terminated.

Benoit Ndameu traveled to the area to assess the trials, and to interview participants about their

experiences in April 2011. To our knowledge, this is the only independent assessment of any biochar

trials.

Mr. Ndameu found that participating farmers had donated time and land to the trials. Biochar Fund

and Key Farmers provided them with literature proclaiming the “benefits” of biochar. Of the 75 plots

established, farmers failed to follow through to completion on 31, for a variety of reasons. Some

interviewed participants reported enthusiasm for the maize yield results from plots with large

amounts of biochar added - 20 tonnes per hectare. These yield increases could have been due to pH

effects of biochar on soil, and/or to nutrients contained in ash associated with biochar – however

long term yield increase was not demonstrated. The trials had been abandoned, with no indication

they would be continued. Yet farmers were still being told that when funds arrived, the project would

continue and some were still awaiting this 18 months later. In particular, participating farmers had

been led to expect that the next phase of the project would result in income from the sale of carbon

credits for biochar. Materials provided to them by Biochar Fund indicated these would be

forthcoming, even though currently no carbon markets offer credits for biochar use.

Biochar had been produced for the trials by Biochar Fund and Key Farmers staff, using a (very

inefficient) single barrel stove method which did not offer any chance for producing renewable

energy. Farmers were not trained or equipped to carry forward with biochar production themselves.

Data collected were not scientifically useful due to lack of replication and randomization in the trial

design. While reports indicated that data were to be collected from two maize harvests, the trials

were halted following a single harvest. Soil analysis data, though apparently collected were never

reported.

Laurens Rademaker, Biochar Fund‟s founder and director formerly ran a bioenergy web and

consultancy service. He now offers his consultancy services, claiming on his website to have

attracted over a million dollars in funding for projects since 2009 and to have established 9 NGOs

mostly within Africa. He is also a cofounder of Green College Africa, as well as Equator Oils (now

Agroils) which invests in jatropha projects.

Rademaker claimed in an interview in 2010 that the Cameroon trials were still ongoing, and used the

proclaimed “success” of the Cameroon trials as leverage to obtain funding for another project in the

same region (A project involving Cocoamasters, for which Rademakers serves advisorial role). He

also used the proclaimed success of the Cameroon trials to obtain support from the Congo Basin

Forest Fund for biochar trials in DRC, a project in partnership with Congolese NGO ADAPEL. This

project was based on the claim that using “slash and char” instead of “slash and burn” could reduce

deforestation. Little information is available about the current status of these DRC trials.


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Developing interest in biochar is similar to what occurred with biofuels, especially jatropha about

which claims of remarkable productivity on “marginal” lands have proven false. Baseless claims

resulted in major investment, speculative and otherwise, in jatropha - driving land grabs and

displacement of peasant farmers rather than alleviating poverty.

With interest growing in using carbon and other forms of finance to spur development of improved

agriculture practices in Africa, farmers are vulnerable to being drawn into participation in trials and

feasibility projects that can be both costly to them and also may generate false expectations.

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Biofuelwatch

This report is about a biochar project undertaken in Southwest Cameroon by the Belgian-based

'social for profit organization', Biochar Fund, in collaboration

with a local NGO, Key Farmers Cameroon. Media reports

suggested that this was the biggest biochar project worldwide to

date, involving around 1,500 local farmers, that it had

successfully helped to raise small farmers' maize crop yields,

and could reduce demand for agricultural land, hence reducing

deforestation, provide renewable energy and bring income to

farmers via sale of carbon credits. During April 2011, Benoit

Ndameu undertook a 7-day field visit during which he

interviewed local farmers, some of whom had been directly

involved in the project, members of Key Farmers Cameroon and

members of local institutions about their experience with the

project. To our knowledge, this is the first independent

investigation of any biochar trial involving communities in Africa

or indeed any Southern country. As the report below shows,

there are significant discrepancies between project information

published on websites and in the media and the information

obtained locally by Mr. Ndameu through field interviews and

examination of written materials the project organizers had

distributed to farmers

As described in the accompanying Biofuelwatch report “Biochar:

A Critical Review of Science and Policy”1, biochar has been

presented as a “win-win solution” based on unfounded claims

that it is capable of sequestering carbon “for hundreds or even

thousands of years” while simultaneously improving soil fertility.

A review of the scientific literature however reveals a lack of

any basis for such claims.

Nonetheless, biochar advocates have been lobbying strongly for

subsidies and carbon credits for biochar. Their goal is to

facilitate large-scale global application – as a means of addressing global warming, improving soil

fertility and possibly even “geo-engineering” the climate with biochar.

A number of companies and NGOs have sought to gain experience with biochar by engaging small

farmers in Africa and elsewhere in the global South in experimental “trials”. These are presented as

opportunities to alleviate poverty for participants by increasing crop yields and gaining cash income

from the sales of carbon credits. The experimental trials are taking place at a time when there is

intense lobbying for soil carbon sequestration to be included in major carbon trading mechanisms,

including the UN's Clean Development Mechanisms (CDM) - from which all soil carbon (including

biochar) schemes are currently excluded. A 2009 report “Biochar Land Grabbing: The impacts on

Africa” by the African Biodiversity Network, Biofuelwatch and the Gaia Foundation2, updated in

1 www.biofuelwatch.org.uk/2011/a-critical-review-of-biochar-science-and-policy/ 2 www.gaiafoundation.org/sites/default/files/Biochar%20Africa%20briefing(2010).pdf

What is biochar?

Biochar is basically fine-

grained charcoal applied to

agricultural soils. It can be

a byproduct of a type of

bioenergy production called

pyrolysis, which produces

syngas and bio-oil, both of

which can be used for

energy, as well as char.

However, most so-called

biochar projects and trials

so far, including the Biochar

Fund's project described in

this report, rely on adding

crushed charcoal to soils.

http://www.biofuelwatch.org.uk/2011/a-critical-review-of-biochar-science-and-policy/

http://www.gaiafoundation.org/sites/default/files/Biochar%20Africa%20briefing(2010).pdf


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December 2010, showed the significant number of different biochar projects across Africa as well as

the wider policy context in which most such trials are being used to justify future biochar carbon

offsets. Although such biochar projects are commonly called 'trials', they are not scientific field

studies with the primary intention of publishing results in peer-reviewed articles.

Prior to this investigation into the Biochar Fund project in Cameroon, no independent assessment or

information had been published about any biochar project in Africa.

Biochar Fund's Cameroon project was chosen as the subject for this investigative report for several

reasons. First, according to the figures published by Biochar Fund, it involved more farmers than any

other biochar project worldwide – 1,500 in total, although, as the report shows, there are serious

questions about this number.

Second, having commenced in December 2008, it would, at the time of assessment, have been

ongoing long enough to expect meaningful results, at least about short-term effects.

Third, although Biochar Fund itself is a 'small social profit organization', the Cameroon project had

broad implications. It was endorsed and supported by the International Biochar Initiative (IBI), the

main global biochar advocacy organization. IBI selected the Cameroon project as one of its‟ “9

country projects” for “biochar work in developing countries”. The IBI's aim for those projects was to

Background to the Biochar Fund

Biochar Fund was founded as a 'social profit organization' in March 2008.1 It was set up by

Biopact, a Brussels-based bioenergy web and consultancy service which has since been

dissolved.2 Laurens Rademakers, formerly of Biopact, is the founding and Managing Director of

Biochar Fund. We have not been able to find records of any directors or members other than

Laurens Rademakers working for Biochar Fund. Farmers interviewed indicated that Laurence

Goddiman, from Manchester, UK was the Biochar Fund's project manager for the trials. We

found no relevant web-references under that name, however, and Mr Rademakers gave Kumba

as one of his addresses at the time of the trials. As Laurens Rademakers' personal website

shows,3 Biochar Fund has been only one of many different enterprises which he has been

working on in recent years. He also describes himself as Managing Director of Farmers for the

Future' (farmersforthefuture.org) and Fast Forward Farms (fastforwardfarms.com), as scientific

and technology advisor to a range of NGOs including CocoaMasters (cocoamasters.org/, Key

Farmers members based in the same region where the biochar trials discussed in this report took

place, Women for Green Growth (womenforgreengrowth.org/ ) and Techniciens pour le

Developpement, and senior lecturer and co-founder of Green College Africa (www.green-

college.org). Mr Rademakers also states that he was co-founder of Equator Oils, an Italian

jatropha consultancy company now trading under the name Agroils SA (www.agroils.com).

Agroils announced in 2009 that they had invested in jatropha projects in Brazil, Cameroon,

Ghana, Morocco and Senegal,4 however we have been unable to find any more recent

information about jatropha investments by them. Mr Rademakers describes himself as a

'consultant to NGOs, government agencies, foundations and companies.'

Background to Key Farmers

Key Farmers Cameroon, based in Kumba, Southwest Cameroon, describe themselves as 'a non-

profit organization with the mission of promoting sustainable agriculture and rural development'.

Key aims are helping farmers who are members to 'increase food production, and develop

renewable energy projects, etc in order to alleviate poverty'. According to Key Farmers

coordinator, Mr. Etchi Daniel Jones, in addition to work on biochar, they are working on promoting

biodiesel including from jatropha and palm oil.5 Mr Etchi Daniel Jones is also Director of Green

College Africa, which was founded by Mr Rademakers.6 Key Farmers also encompasses

CocoaMasters, which successfully applied to the Congo Basin Forest Fund for a grant for (non-

biochar) renewable energy project in Cameroon, Sao Tome and Principe and Equatorial Guinea

with Laurens Rademakers.

1. http://news.mongabay.com/2008/0310-biochar.html

2. www.biopact.com/aboutus.html

3. http://laurens-rademakers.com

4. http://af.reuters.com/article/investingNews/idAFJOE54701620090508

5. www.gvepinternational.org/en/community/directory/6041

6. http://green-college.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=frontpage

http://farmersforthefuture.org/

http://fastforwardfarms.com/

http://cocoamasters.org/

http://womenforgreengrowth.org/

http://www.green-college.org/

http://www.green-college.org/

http://www.agroils.com/


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“help [developing countries] develop and evaluate cost effective approaches for the widespread

introduction of biochar.”

The Cameroon project has been very widely reported as a 'success story' for biochar - by the IBI3

and by many in the media. The project was chosen as one of the top ten entries4 and in the

'Manchester Report', a competition for “ideas for solving the climate crisis” by the Guardian and

Manchester International Festival and chaired by the Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales in

2008. One UK commentator impressed by Biochar Fund's reported results in Cameroon was Chris

Goodall.5 Goodall is a partner in a consultancy firm, Oxford Climate Associates, which helped draft

the 'carbon neutral' strategy for the Government of the Maldives.6 It appears that, persuaded at

least in part by Biochar Fund's announcements, he succeeded in convincing the Maldives President

that biochar should play an important role in meeting his Government's Zero Carbon Goal.7

Finally, the Cameroon trials are of interest because their experience in Cameroon they were used to

help Biochar Fund and another of their partner organizations, ADAPEL, to leverage around 315,000

Euros in funding from the Congo Basin Forest Fund (CBFF) for a another biochar project, in DR

Congo. This became the first and to our knowledge, so far the only, biochar project supported by a

multinational fund in the context of REDD (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest

Degradation). This is particularly significant because (presumed) carbon sequestration in soils and

croplands does not form part of current UN proposals for REDD, yet there is strong lobbying by

carbon traders and a range of interest groups that would profit from their inclusion. The trials by

Biochar Fund and Key Farmers in Cameroon's Kumba Province are also mentioned in another

successful proposal to CBFF, by CocoaMaster. (CocoaMaster is a member group of Key Farmers that

works closely with Biochar Fund and their Managing Director Laurens Rademakers). That project

involved using renewable energy to dry cocoa.

What claims were used to justify the Cameroon trials? What were the results? How were those

results used? What impact did these trials have on participants? These are key questions relevant

not only in this particular case, but also to the larger context of efforts underway to “improve”

agriculture and forestry practices in Africa, as envisioned, funded and commonly directed by outside,

often Northern funders, organizations and companies. The development of biochar carbon offsets has

been one of the declared aims of the Biochar Fund projects both in Cameroon and DR Congo. When

publishing the “interim” (and so far only) trial results from Cameroon, Biochar Fund founder and

director Laurens Rademakers stated: “[Local farmers] are enthusiastic about the idea that they can

play a role in mitigating climate change...The worlds' carbon credit' are the talk of town here.”8 And

the successful proposal for the ADAPEL/Biochar Fund DR Congo project included a 'carbon package,

whereby farmers will be introduced to the voluntary carbon market and efforts to sequester carbon

through biochar use in soils will thus be compensated.”9 Biochar Fund's Cameroon trials were one of

several biochar projects in Africa and other Southern countries, and one of a much larger number of

agricultural and REDD 'pilot projects' supposed to test the feasibility of integrating different

agricultural practices into the carbon markets. This field report provides an insight into the

experiences of farmers involved in one such project, one in which their hopes about future income

from carbon markets were raised, even though biochar carbon offsets are not yet a reality.

CHAPTER 2: ASSESSMENT OF CAMEROON TRIALS

Benoit Ndameu

The overall objective of this investigation was to:

1) Provide an independent assessment of the trials and their impact on participants.

3 www.biochar-international.org/cameroon 4 www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2009/jul/13/manchester-report-climate-change1 5 www.carboncommentary.com/2009/10/01/761 6 www.oxfordclimate.com 7 www.reuters.com/article/2009/09/22/idUS127353+22-Sep-2009+PRN20090922 8 www.carboncommentary.com/2009/10/01/761 9 http://cbf-fund.org/sites/default/files/ADAPEL_0.pdf

http://www.biochar-international.org/cameroon

http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2009/jul/13/manchester-report-climate-change1

http://www.carboncommentary.com/2009/10/01/761

http://www.oxfordclimate.com/

http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/09/22/idUS127353+22-Sep-2009+PRN20090922


http://cbf-fund.org/sites/default/files/ADAPEL_0.pdf


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2) Compare the Biochar Fund‟s claims with the results and other information available about

biochar and about pressure on forests in the region.

3) Collect and analyze information about the existing farming practices and pressures on forests

in the areas.

While the trials commenced in late 2008 and preliminary results were made publicly available in late

2009, Biochar Fund's Managing Director Mr Rademakers still spoke about the project as ongoing in

August 2010.10

The trials were undertaken in conjunction with a local partner NGO, Key Farmers‟ Cameroon. They

were based in Kumba and surrounding areas and in 11 villages of the Meme (10 villages) and Manyu

(one village) divisions of Southwest Cameroon. The results from the preliminary stages of the trials

were published, with much fanfare, claims of improved crop yields and photographs of smiling

farmers.

A field trip was undertaken from 5 to 12 April 2011, during which interviews took place with farmers,

the coordinator of Key Farmers Cameroon and other individuals. According to what we were told, the

Project Manager from Biochar Fund was called Laurence Goddiman, based in Manchester. The

brochure given to participant farmers, however, lists Laurens Rademakers' as the contact for and

Managing Director of Biochar Fund. Biochar Fund and Key Farmers‟ staff were responsible for,

organizing and managing the groups (CIGs). Key Farmers‟ coordinator, Mr. Etchi Daniel Jones advised

us during an interview with him that the budget was close to 20 million CFA (about 30,000 Euros).

Key Farmers Cameroon describe themselves as an umbrella organization active in the field of

sustainable agriculture and rural development in Southwest Cameroon. According to information

given to farmers during the biochar trials, as well as the Key Farmers website, Key Farmers are

constituted “of 50 autonomous organizations and 1200 members…from 25 villages.”11 The

“autonomous organizations” are CIGs.

Most of the farmers who participated in the trials and were interviewed were

representatives/delegates of Common Initiatives Groups (CIGs). A CIG is a type of association

recognized under Cameroonian law, set up to enable individuals who share a common interest to

unite their efforts in order to achieve common goals. CIGs exist in various different sectors and

contexts. In the rural sector for example, they are perceived as strong tools/units through which

financial and technical investments can be made available by government institutions, bilateral or

multilateral partners, banks specialized in the agricultural sector and non governmental institutions,

with a view to boosting rural development.

CIGs whose representatives we met with during the field trip had been in existence before the

biochar trial started. Many of them had been set up early in 2000 or before. The CIG KOYAFA (Kosala

Yamba Farmers) for instance, was created in 1996. Participation in the Biochar Fund project was

seen as a new opportunity to widen their quest for improving the welfare of the group.

We interviewed representatives of the following 11 CIGs:

Village Common Initiatives Groups (CIG)

Kumba Humble Ladies (Otoko quater)

Kosala (Ekindi-Maley) KOFAPRU (Kosala Farmers Producers Union)

Kosala KOYAFA (Kosala Yamba farmers)

Kosala Yamba women group

Ikiliwindi Amueh group

Kake II Ambitious women

Barombi-kang Rainbow Farmers

Mabonji Agro Satellite

10 http://news.mongabay.com/2010/0816-hance_rademakers.html 11 www.keyfarmers.org/

http://news.mongabay.com/2010/0816-hance_rademakers.html

http://www.keyfarmers.org/


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Village Common Initiatives Groups (CIG)

Ediki Young farmers association; Yaounde Quarter

Mbalangi Solidarity

Teke Firm Hands farmers

Table1: location of the CIGs which took part in 2009 trials.

We also met with other farmers, including ones who had not participated in the trials but were based

in villages where tests plots had been cited; and farmers whose activities were located in the

Bakundu forest reserve area). Furthermore, we interviewed local officers of the Ministry of

Agriculture and Rural Development (MINADER), the Ministry of Forestry and Wildlife (MINFOF) and

the Cocoa and Coffee Seedlings Project (CCSP).

We were told, that neither Biochar Fund nor Key Farmers formally sought the collaboration of the

Region's locally based institutions, such as the departmental services of the Ministry of Agriculture

and Rural Development (MINADER), the departmental services of the Ministry of Forestry and Wildlife

(MINFOF), the departmental services of the Ministry of Environment and the Nature Protection

(MINEP), nor the formal collaboration from regional state development programmes such as the

Institute for Agricultural Research for Rural Development (IRAD), the Cocoa and Coffee Seedlings

Project (CCSP) or the RUMPI Programme. However, the project succeeded in developing close

collaboration with individuals from some of these institutions. For example, an extension worker with

MINADER was the Key Farmers‟ project supervisor during the trial. Through her contacts and

capacity, she easily mobilized groups that took part in the trial and she was also a key person during

some thematic workshops attended by farmers. Key Farmers‟ coordinator obtained cocoa seedlings

from the CCSP during our visit to that institution

Members of Common Initiative Group discuss their experience with Biochar Fund trials.

While we had initially intended to cover Kumba and the 11 villages where the trials took place,

logistics dictated that we were only able to visit plots in Kumba and a few neighbourhoods. The Key

Farmers Coordinator contacted farmers in advance and those who were available were visited. We

interviewed farmers and met with people in the Meme division where 95% of the trial took place.

We were unable to visit members of the CIG in Malende, even though initial contact was made, and

we could not visit Kemden, the one village involved in the project located in the Manyu division.

In total, nineteen (19) interviews were undertaken. These interviewees were as follows:


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11 farmers who had participated in trials and were interviewed individually or in groups; All of

those were farmers who had completed biochar trials. Five of these interviews with farmers took

place in the presence of three or more other members of their respective groups (CIGs).

2 Key Farmers‟ officials (the Coordinator and the Project Supervisor);

3 farmers living in villages were trials took place but who had not participated in them (1 farmer

living in Konye, 1 living in Kake and 1 farmer from near Lake Barombi, in the Bakundu Forest

reserve);

3 officials from local government institutions: one official from MINADER, one from the CCSP and

one from MINFOF. We chose to interview them in order to gain some insights into their experience

of local problems and challenges.

From the field survey, it appears that only a small number of farmers actively participated in the

trials. Those farmers belonged to CIGs that had signed up to the trials, but not all members of the

CIG actually participated, in fact most individual CIG members appear not to have been involved at

all. A brochure produced by Biochar Fund and Key Farmers, and given to farmers at the start of the

trial (discussed further below), states that the plan had always been to involve just 75 farmers in the

trials a figure which accords with the information we obtained during the interviews. Published

reports of trial results refer to a much larger number of participants, apparently because all members

of CIGs were counted rather than just those who actually participated.

Selection and training of participants

We were informed that the Biochar Project Coordinating Team had distributed application forms to

groups that might potentially be willing to participate and had then selected from amongst those who

applied.

The manner in which the decision to participate was made within CIG groups varied from one group

to another, depending on the internal structure, the leadership capacity of the delegate (the key

person and usually founder of the CIG) and the number of members (the size of the group). In most

groups, the delegate and a few members made the decision. Some of the members were then

designated as active participants in the trials. In Teke for example, the CIG set up a 'biochar

committee' with a dedicated chair person.

The practical groundwork for the biochar trials appears to have started in January 2009, with

background preparations having begun a few months earlier, in the second half of 2008. It was

explained that a set of workshops and training events had been organized at the time. Farmers who

participated in trials took part in those training events and were also provided with inputs including

maize seeds and chemical fertilizers. They did not however, receive any financial rewards or

compensation for their participation in the trials. The project organizers considered that winning

farmers' support and dedication would be important for the future of the project, especially if further

funding to expand the project was to be attained.

What were farmers told about biochar?

Key Farmers advised that they were told by the Biochar Fund's representative that biochar was a

proven technique for improving soil fertility. Farmers were told that biochar would improve their

farming practices and increase crop yields. The Biochar Fund provided Key Farmers‟ Cameroon with

various forms of literature (reports, studies and leaflets), all of them discussing the 'benefits of

biochar'.


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Map of Cameroon and the study sites


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We were further told that when the trials started in early 2009, Biochar Fund presented to farmers

concerns about climate change and the potential for obtaining carbon credits as key motivations.

These concerns were brought up during training sessions. A brochure distributed to all participants

states: “climate change or 'global warming' is the result of the emission of the so-called 'greenhouse

gases' into the atmosphere. These gases trap heat and warm the planet.” It then refers to biochar

as “one of the most effective strategies to reduce the amount of CO2 in the atmosphere. When

plants grow, they suck up CO2 and store it in their stems and leaves as carbon. When we turn this

biomass into char, and then store the char into the soil, we are actually putting the dangerous gas

away for a long period of time. Biochar can remain unaltered in the soil for hundreds of years.

Contrary to others types of biomass, it does not decay and does not release CO2. This is why it can

help us win the fight against climate change”12

Climate change was not an altogether new topic for farmers. A member of KOFAPRU (Kosala Farmers

Producer Unit) cited as an example that the International Institute of Tropical Agriculture (IITA) had

also raised awareness of climate change, as had other organizations that work in the area. IITA is an

international NGO with an office in Yaoundé, which works with groups of farmers in the area through

the Sustainable Tree Crop Project (STCP).

The focus on climate change was also confirmed by other CIG representatives. A representative of

the CIG Koyafa (Kosala Yamba farmers) explained that “during one of their workshops, the

organizers held discussions on the issue of climate change: what it is all about, the consequences, if

the situation continues as we observed today, etc.”

The potential for earning money from the sale of carbon credits for biochar was mentioned as an

incentive by some farmers we interviewed. They had been told that following the initial trial, the sale

of carbon credits would be possible by 2010. The brochure given to participants claims: “Wealthy

countries are ready to help solve the problem by financing actions to prevent climate change. They

do this via the so-called 'carbon markets'...The Biochar Fund and Key Farmers Cameroon will present

the results of the trials in Kumba to the European voluntary carbon market, with the aim to start a

larger project in 2010. This expanded project would attract a considerable number of 'carbon

credits'. This money would then be distributed amongst the participating farmers.”

From the interviews we conducted with farmers, it appears that their motivation to participate was at

least partly based on the prospect of such future revenues. One participant in the trial, explained

that his group “rented a piece of land close to the village for the trial and would have been ready by

2010 to devote 12 hectares of community land for the purpose”.

At the start of the planting season (March and April), farmers started preparing the land by removing

and burning weeds. As usual, they practiced 'slash and burn' which involves cutting and burning

forests or woodlands in order to create fields.

The maize variety used for the trials came from the Cocoa and Coffee Seedlings Project (CCSP). The

CCSP Centre is based in Barombi-kang. CCSP is is a sub-division of the Government-owned Institute

of Agricultural Research for Development (IRAD), which specializes in the production of seeds. The

variety of maize, known as CMS 8704, is planted in most areas of Cameroon, in particular in the

Centre, South, East, Southwest, Littoral and North Regions. A nursery worker with the CCSP stated:

“The variety has a composite genetic background and a productivity range between 5 and 6 tonnes

per hectare”. This variety had been distributed to farmers free of charges in the past (i.e. before

2009).

What were farmers' experiences as participants?

Farmers stated that they had found the training for the biochar trials a difficult exercise overall. For

each of the plots, they had to do exactly as instructed, with all plots labeled in the same manner.

Plots were divided into 12 sub-plots and each of the subplots had a specific assignment.

From what we were told, the size of the plots appears to have varied from one group to another

depending on the area of land made available. In general, the average area per subplot appears to

have been around ten square meters (10m²).

12 A copy of the brochure is available to the authors of this report and can be obtained on request.


12

Control Plot

(no

treatment)

Plot with

organic

fertiliser

Plot with

chemical

fertiliser

Plot with organic

and chemical

fertilizer

Char 10

Char 10 +

organic

fertiliser

Char 10 +

chemical

fertiliser

Char 10 + organic

and chemical

fertilizer

Char 20

Char 20 +

organic

fertiliser

Char 20 +

chemical

fertiliser

Char 20 + organic

and chemical

fertilizer

Table 3: Subplots within a plot for the trial13 Note: 'Char10' refers to

biochar added at the rate of 10 tonnes/hectare' and 'Char20' to

biochar added at the rate of 20 tonnes/hectare. (Adapted from

brochure supplied to farmers by Biochar Fund and Key Farmers.)

Land made available for trials was provided by farmers, generally contributed by a member of the

CIG. That person was in most cases a member or the delegate of the CIG. These sites had different

types of status and ownership. In some cases the land belonged to members of CIG groups, in other

cases they were home gardens, or were rented from the owner on an annual (or longer) basis. In

those cases, the farmers would thus have been paying rent for the land made available. In some

cases plots were situated in gardens next to homes; in other cases the plots were close to the

villages and were either a home garden or a piece of land intended for future construction of new

houses. In other cases, plots were on farms, often situated far from the village houses. Key Farmers'

coordinator, Mr Etchi Daniel Jones also made part of his home garden available.

According to those farmers who completed the trial and were interviewed, many were convinced that

biochar appeared to have produced good results.

For example, during our introductory meeting in Kumba with local farmers who participated in the

trials and with the Coordinator of Key Farmers Cameroon, the farmers told us that they had been

impressed by the quality and quantity of the maize harvested, particularly in the subplots with

„biochar 20‟ (i.e. 20 tonnes of biochar per hectare). This may have been particularly noticeable given

that soil quality in the area is very poor.

One person stated that “the soil quality of the area is not good for planting maize seed, that the

experience with biochar produced good yields, helping to retain a number of soil nutrients.” One

participant farmer advised us that the size of the maize they produced in the biochar plots had been

a subject of curiosity amongst the members of the group and from other groups that exist in the

village, saying “people were asking if the maize they harvested was from a new variety of seed?”

It should be noted that we were only able to interview farmers who had been contacted by Key

Farmers Coordinator Mr Etchi Daniel Jones, and further, only those who had completed the trials. A

large number of participants did not complete the trials however (discussed below). Furthermore, the

introductory meetings were all organized by and held in the presence of Key Farmers staff, i.e. the

project partners.

Many participants failed to complete trials

In spite of the apparent yield benefits, participation in the trial was clearly not always beneficial for

farmers. A large number of plots were completely abandoned prior to completion. From the

information we were given by Key Farmers, trials started in early 2009 with 75 operational plots. At

the time the project ended, in December 2009, only 31 of the 75 plots had reached completion

(meaning that all the harvesting, weighing and analysis required had been completed). Fifty-eight

percent of the plots would therefore have been unsuccessful as far as the trials were concerned.

Biochar Fund stated in their published information that partial data had been obtained from a further

10 plots.

Three main reasons explained the low rate of successful participation, according to those

interviewed, including Key Farmers staff: 1) Some of the groups did not properly follow the

instructions provided for the trial and therefore their group and plots were eliminated from the

process. 2) Some plots were set in places where the quality of soil was not appropriate for farming.

13 Adapted from the brochure handed to participating farmers


13

Soils in the area are Ferralitic and some of them are sandy with high level of acidity. The high level of

acidity and low level of nutrients in these soils made farmers less interested in farming there, and

plots established on such soils could not produce good results and were abandoned. Initially the idea

had been to test the capacity of biochar to enrich these particularly poor soils, but unfortunately, this

appears not to have worked. 3) In some cases, the maize was stolen, making it impossible to provide

measurable results. In general, theft is widespread in the Kumba area and its neighborhood, due to

demographics and the poor soil condition in the area. According to a local farmer from Kosala, theft

of maize crops is a “situation that occurs during the harvesting period of maize. It is easy for

someone on foot to steal some corncobs without being caught. The maize produced from the biochar

trials was stolen because others wanted the variety for their seeds, so that they could use them

during the next planting season. They didn‟t know that the variety of the maize seed used is the

same as is sold everywhere here and some of these people who stole even had it in their seed

stocks. It is only because we planted them with biochar [that they appeared to be a different

variety].”

Those who had completed the crop growing phase of trials were instructed to harvest their maize

harvests which would then be collected and taken to the Key Farmers‟‟ office in Kumba to be weighed

and tested. Mr Etchi Daniel Jones, the Key Farmers‟ coordinator explained “the series of tests were

done to assess the quality and the quantity of the production of each plot”.

Farmers did not always adhere to these final instructions. In some cases, this was apparently

because they were concerned about security/theft. Some mentioned having grown impatient while

awaiting authorization from the coordinating team, or they did not understand fully what was

expected due to lack of communication.

Searching for remains of biochar plot

What was the fate of biochar trial plots?

The trials ended in the second half of 2009. Indeed, the brochure given to participant farmers at the

start of the trials outlined a 'work plan' according to which the trials would only involve a single


14

harvest and the project would end with a report in December 2009, with efforts made to obtain

carbon finance for a larger project in 2010. This is very different from information published

elsewhere by Biochar Fund before, during and after the trials. The brochure was produced in English

only, not in the farmers' local language and some may have relied on Key Farmers staff for a

translation. We therefore do not know how many farmers were aware the biochar trials were to end

in late 2009, but from our interviews it was clear that they had expected the project to continue and

to obtain funding from it. Many still expected this to happen in the future.

During our field visits, some of the farmers interviewed expressed weariness about the contribution

they had made. The time spent on training and workshops attendance was costly to them, especially

because the technology was not something the participants felt able to use themselves in future. The

Key Farmers coordinator, Mr Etchi Daniel Jones appeared notably embarrassed at times during the

field trip when asked by farmers‟ to visit their plots. Farmers repeatedly asked questions about the

purpose of the visit, and also asked if we were staff involved with the project management.

The trial plots used for the Biochar Fund project trial have in most cases been subsequently

abandoned or converted to fallows (several plots in Kossala), or cultivated, using pre-trial farming

methods, with maize, cassava and/or other food crops (Ediki, Barombi-kang, Ikiliwindi, Kumba). In

one case, the plot was used for construction of a house (Teke). Of all the plots visited, none had

been subjected to any follow-up in relation to the trial.

Only one CIG, in Teke, having participated in the trial, subsequently took the initiative to produce

their own char (from palm nuts) which was applied to a plot growing chilli peppers.

For the former trial plots which subsequently in 2011 were being used to grow maize, it was not

possible at the time of the field visit to assess whether previous biochar application still influenced

yields since harvesting had not yet occurred – (harvests generally done between the end of June and

July). Assessing the influence of prior biochar application will be difficult since farmers practice slash

and burn and often apply the resulting ashes to garden plots.

Status of plots visited during our visit in April 2011

Village CIG Status of the plot* Remarks

Kumba Humble Ladies (Otoko

quater)

1 The plot is now used to grow

cassava and a variety of

crops (banana).

Kumba (mile 1) 1 Growing yams and maize

Kumba (mile 1) 1 The plot was first abandoned

but then cultivated this

season (maize, yams,etc)

Kosala (ekindi-

Maley)

KOFAPRU (Kosala

Farmers Producers

Union)

1 The plots are now use to

grow cassava

Kosala Etchi‟s home garden 1 Abandoned

Kosala 1 Abandoned

Kosala KOYAFA (Kosala

Yamba farmers)

1 Abandoned

Kosala Yamba women group 1 Abandoned

Ikiliwindi Amueh group 1 growing cassava

Kake II Ambitious women 1 Growing food crops

Barombi kang Rainbow Farmers 1 The wife of the CIG delegate

planted maize and peanuts

this year

Mabonji Agro Satellite 1 The plot was burned over to

grow maize


15

Village CIG Status of the plot* Remarks

Ediki Young farmers

association Yaounde

Quater

1 Abandoned but now used for

growing maize and cucumber

Mbalangi Solidarity 1 Not cultivated

Teke Firm Hands farmers 2 On the original plot, a house

was built and the family

devoted a piece of their home

garden to replicate the

experience by using char

derived from palm nuts.

Mambanda -/- 1 Growing maize

Malende -/- 1-3 Cocoa plot could not be taken

into account because it is a

long term crop.

Table 5 : Status of trial plots as of April 2011.

* Legend: 1 Still in place; 2 relocated somewhere else; 3 abandoned.

Biochar making barrel. Most of the equipment had been discarded. One group had preserved a

barrel and made a batch of biochar for application to a garden following the trial.

Since the completion of the preliminary trials in 2009, many groups had received no communications

from Key Farmers‟ representatives concerning the project. In Ediki, for example, one farmer

interviewed could not even remember if his group had participated in the trial. He said: “Since 2009,


16

I have not received any news from the white man, nor from Key Farmers. That‟s why I could not

easily remember the project again or where the plots were situated”. Farmers were still wondering if

the project would continue as they had been led to believe. The Key Farmers coordinator who had

been involved with field work seemed embarrassed when groups met and inquiries were made about

the future of the project.

Biochar production and its impacts

According to Key Farmers, the biochar used in the trials was produced at: 1) Kosala, a neighborhood

of the main town 2) Kumba, at the residence of Mr Etchi Daniel Jones, the coordinator of Key

Farmers; 3) Kendem, for the Manyu division.

During our field trip to Kosala, it was not possible to see active biochar production. Most of the

barrels that had been used to produce biochar were out of use; except one in which old biochar was

kept. Our understanding of how the biochar had been produced comes from discussions with Etchi

Daniel Jones from Key Farmers and from a leaflet entitled “Biochar for Developing Countries”14 which

illustrates char making barrels similar to those found in Kosala. Holes were made at the lower ends

of the barrels to allow some air to enter and, when the fire gets underway, the top end is covered.

The leaflet states: “As the fire moves down the heat drives off gases below the fire and these ignite

and add to the heating thus reducing the amount of wood needed.” No energy generated from the

process was recovered and used. Mr Etchi explained that during biochar production, the barrels were

heated to a very high temperature – and it was necessary to keep some distance away from them.

He also pointed out that producing good biochar depended on using the right feedstock.

Procuring the biomass for the production of biochar was the task of Biochar Fund and Key Farmers‟

staff and did not directly involve the farmers. A few farmers who had participated in the trial, pointed

out that since farmers had not participated directly in the production of biochar, it was quite difficult

for them to assess whether there might have been any impact for example on local biodiversity.

Farmers were told that the biochar was made from weeds, palm trees branches and some pieces of

wood. Their impression was that this could be a good thing to use weeds as collecting those could

not pose a problem.

According to Key Farmers, the feedstock included cassava stems, palm trees branches and weeds as

well as pieces of waste wood, collected from woodwork stores. It was generally difficult to assess the

quantity or proportion of each type of feedstock used, since that information was not recorded.

Feedstock was collected and stacked to allow drying prior to use. The weed species used for biochar

production (Chromoleana odorata), is commonly known as bokassa. It is recognised as one of the

most invasive weed species in the tropical area. Once a farm is abandoned, it is likely to be invaded

by bokassa.

The trial also used wood collected from nearby cultivated areas. An article that had been published

on the Biochar Fund website explained: “The biochar was made in a low-technology kiln using

agricultural wastes from the previous harvest and some wood cut back from trees surrounding the

cultivated areas”. Key Farmers‟ coordinator pointed out that they had to mix char derived from

residues with char from wood in order to produce biochar that was bulky enough. Denser wood

produced bulkier char and was preferred. It was not possible in retrospect to determine which type of

wood had been used for making the biochar. Amongst the residues of the feedstock which had been

used in Kosala we found a piece of a red wood whose common local name is acajou. Acajou is found

in the area and often used by woodworkers to produce household goods of high quality.

No long-term system for ongoing production of biochar was put in place, nor were steps taken to

ensure ongoing supplies of biomass. Planting crops or trees to produce biochar had not been

considered as an option for the project. The main goal appears to have been to popularize the

biochar concept with low cost investment.

Traditional agriculture practices in the region

Agriculture – for food and cash crops - is the main activity amongst the population in the villages

found in the Meme division.

14

api.ning.com/files/G0Zkik3*TTNqbX0KElBp1tUz0RSLt3UhQrsEKUxfYg66itDMoUInt1lUnAJ8jJV0geEjZLKXF9yq8BKu-W3Z-5Mp6b*4AB*3/Biocharafrica1109.pdf

http://api.ning.com/files/G0Zkik3*TTNqbX0KElBp1tUz0RSLt3UhQrsEKUxfYg66itDMoUInt1lUnAJ8jJV0geEjZLKXF9yq8BKu-W3Z-5Mp6b*4AB*3/Biocharafrica1109.pdf

http://api.ning.com/files/G0Zkik3*TTNqbX0KElBp1tUz0RSLt3UhQrsEKUxfYg66itDMoUInt1lUnAJ8jJV0geEjZLKXF9yq8BKu-W3Z-5Mp6b*4AB*3/Biocharafrica1109.pdf


17

The main cash crop is cocoa. Many of the farmers in the area are landowners and growing cocoa

contributes important annual income for the family, with cocoa prices having increased since 2005-

2006. Oil palms are also grown as a cash crop, but less commonly in this region.

Traditional crop practices

The most widely cultivated food crops in the area are cassava, plantains, groundnuts, maize, banana,

yam, cucumber, plums, oranges, grapefruits and lemons. Food crop cultivation is practiced mainly for

subsistence although the surplus is sold. The main cash crop in this region of Cameroon is cocoa.

Many of the farmers in the area are landowners and growing cocoa contributes important annual

income for the family, with cocoa prices having increased since 2005-2006. Oil palms are also grown

as a cash crop, but less commonly.

Cash crop cultivation is often considered to be work for men, as the head of the family. Growing food

crops on the other hand, is often a task undertaken by women. This division of labour is not

observed as strictly as was traditionally the case. Choosing what to farm in rural areas is a question

of opportunity and depends on the land tenure system and on decisions made by the person who has

the right to the land. Farmers who have their own land can set aside part of it to grow cash crops,

including ones which remain in place over long term such as cocoa or palm trees. Farmers, who rent

a piece of land – usually for a period of two to five years - can only grow short rotation crops such as

maize. This was the case for some groups who participated to the trial, i.e. they rented the land used

for the biochar trial in order to grow maize.

Villagers, most of whom are living in poverty, use slash and burn to clear lands prior to planting.

Strategies used by farmers for improving soil fertility include crop rotation, leaving land fallow and

applications of compost. These practices are familiar to farmers, but using biochar was not.

Fertilizers use is generally possible only for those with the financial capacity to purchase them and

are most often used for cash crops. Farmers interviewed said they did occasionally use chemical

fertilizer for growing vegetables, on small plots. Compost, generally made from kitchen residues, as

well as other food residues and leaves was used for food crops. Biochar production requires some of


18

the same feedstock elements and could thus potentially compete for the same material used

otherwise for composting and for traditional rearing of domestic animals.

Threats to forests in the region

This region of Cameroon is under tremendous pressure, due to economic factors strongly linked to

the Structural Adjustment Programmes imposed by the IMF and World Bank. The Kumba region has

grown rapidly in population and is now the largest city in Southwest Cameroon. Much of the populace

is dependent upon agriculture for food and cash. Expanding demand for agricultural land both by

farmers and by plantation companies (especially CDC) in combination with intense logging has

resulted in serious degradation of surrounding forested lands, including the South Bakundu Reserve,

which includes some of the villages involved in the biochar trials. Further details regarding forests in

the region is provided in Annex 1.

Slash and burn: clearing forest for agricultural land

Were the trials a “success”?

Articles and reports published by Biochar Fund and others convinced by claims, state, amongst other

things that the Cameroon trials illustrated “the powerful benefits that biochar might bring to food

availability”15. Key Farmers‟ Coordinator also hailed the 2009 biochar trial projects as a “success”,

stating that the lessons learned would help to guide expansion of the project if they received

funding. He pointed to the following indicators of success:

1) The project engaged farmers with strong potential agricultural practices and ecological

knowledge about the production of food crops.

2) The organization of farmers into Common Initiative Groups (CIGs) allowed for a fast

mobilization of members and a follow-up of the activities on the different sites.

15 e.g. www.biochar-international.org/cameroon

http://www.biochar-international.org/cameroon


19

3) The rigorousness applied to setting up the plots and the collection of data and final results,

which underscored the relevance of the project at this trial phase.

Very little information was made available regarding the relationship between Key Farmers and their

international partner, Biochar Fund. Since the completion of the trial, it seems that despite farmers'

ongoing expectations of funding for a next project phase, none have been obtained. We found no

information indicating what efforts, if any, were made by Biochar Fund and/or Key Farmers to obtain

such funds.

Since the trials and the involvement of CIGs, relations between Key Farmers Cameroon and the local

groups of farmers have clearly become more distant and Key Farmers' communications with a

number of CIGs appears to have ended. A few groups situated in Kosala and the Kumba

neighborhood still remain in close contact with the coordinator. Members of local groups we spoke to

were still hoping - and still being reassured by Key Farmers‟ coordinator - that funds for the

extension of the project would be available soon. Farmers indicated they would continue the project

if there was funding and they were invited to do so. This may best be understood in light of the CIG

group‟s purpose – which is to broaden their expertise with a variety of farming practices.

Additionally, there is a strong “myth” which embraces the notion of “white man” teaching Africans

new techniques to lift them out of poverty. The biochar project in Cameroon, as it was implemented,

reinforced this perception: By engaging farmers in villages of the Southwest Region of Cameroon to

biochar techniques, Biochar Fund, through persuasive marketing of biochar, succeeded in

perpetuating this 'myth' and instantly captivated the farmers‟ attention by assuring them about

'multiple benefits' of biochar. This “new technique”, for all the promises made to the farmers in the

Southwest region of Cameroon, became a broken promise.

Many farmers, including members of Key Farmers expressed skepticism about what had happened to

the project. Even farmers who had described participation in the trial as a positive experience at the

time, were wondering what benefits – financial or otherwise, they had actually gained from the

experience. Such skeptical attitudes were perceived when meeting with members of the CIGs

involved in trials. In Teke for example members of the CIG that had participated in the trials openly

asked KFC‟s coordinator where he had been since the completion of the trial. Key Farmers

coordinator appeared very embarrassed by such questions when groups repeatedly inquired about

the future of the project and asked about the silence which had prevailed since the termination of the

trial in 2009. Most of the time he replied by reassuring farmers that “funding has not yet arrived to

pursue the project further; when it will come, things will start as promised”.

Participating farmers in this case, were essentially experimental subjects. The cost to them in terms

of time, labour, diversion of land area that could have been put to other uses etc, must be taken into

account. Indications at this point are that the most participants gained was, in some cases, improved

yields for one crop rotation. Ongoing benefits in terms of consistent improved yields, training and

access to a new technology, access to finance from carbon markets or renewable energy have simply

not been forthcoming.

CHAPTER 3: DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS

FROM THE FIELD INTERVIEWS

Biofuelwatch

In August 2010, Biochar Fund‟s Laurens Rademakers gave an interview to Mongabay in which he

claimed: “Our trials in Cameroon and Congo indicate that we can produce and apply biochar in a

sustainable manner (we use biomass that would otherwise be burned, and farm residues) and make

a profit, merely because of the crop yield increase. A carbon credit for sequestering carbon

permanently in soils would be an added bonus. Money for the „avoided deforestation‟ resulting from

the intervention would be so too. We did this trial with 75 farmers' groups, representing around 1500

subsistence farmers."16

On what basis are these claims made? Do they fit with the findings reported in previous chapter?

16 http://news.mongabay.com/2010/0816-hance_rademakers.html

http://news.mongabay.com/2010/0816-hance_rademakers.html


20

The assessment was undertaken to investigate farmers‟ experiences of the biochar trials, 18 months

after the trials had been abandoned (although the farmers still had not been officially informed that

the project would not be resumed). Verification of the actual trial results would have been

impossible at this stage and was therefore not an aim of this investigation.

Nonetheless, Biochar Fund's claims about the success of the trial deserve scrutiny. As far as the

data published from the trial and its analysis are concerned, we are not aware that results were ever

submitted to any scientific journal for peer review – they certainly have not been published. Indeed

the actual data which listed different yield results from different plots17 is no longer accessible since

Biochar Fund‟s website was closed down in early 2011. A debate about the accuracy and significance

of the data would therefore have to be based on speculation. There are credible reasons why biochar

additions may have resulted in a substantial short-term boost to crop yields. For example, if the

soils were acidic, adding alkaline biochar would have led to more neutral soil conditions which would

boost crop uptake of nutrients – we note that Mr. Ndameu was told that several of the plots on

particularly acidic soils had been abandoned by farmers.. Furthermore, the trial results were

seriously undermined by the low rate of trial completion and by the the fact that different treatments

were not replicated within each of the plots. According to the IBI‟s Guide to Conducting Field Trials :

„3 replicates of each treatment…is the minimum required to conduct statistical analyses of the data,

and draw conclusions that will be accepted by the scientific communities.‟18

No soil analyses were ever published from the trials even though Biochar Fund‟s website had

reported that “Soil data are currently being collected and require further analysis.” The lack of soil

analysis means no information was gained about soil properties, nor was it possible to assess

whether biochar increased soil carbon levels.

Biochar Fund website also noted that two maize harvests per year were possible in this region and

indicated data from the second harvest were forthcoming « This first harvest closes the first phase of

the project. However, the same exercise will now be repeated on August maize, which the farmers

will plant on the 15th of this month. Thus, at the end of this year, a set of robust data will emerge

which will allow us to draw several definitive conclusions on the effectiveness of biochar.» No data

from this second harvest were published.

From the point of view of biochar research, the trials appear, regrettably, to have been a lost

opportunity.

Some claims made by Biochar Fund, for example in the above-cited Mongabay interview in August

2010, were clearly contradicted by the findings of this field assessment and, in some cases, also by

the brochure given to farmers at the start of the trial:

Firstly, at the time the time Biochar Fund‟s claims were made in 2010, according to the persons

interviewed, research was not ongoing but had been abandoned at least eight months previously.

The brochure given to farmers stated that only a 3-month long actual field trial had been planned

and that the project would end in 2009, though funding for a new, larger project would be sought

and farmers interviewed remained under the impression that they could expect this to be

forthcoming. When Biochar Fund published their interim (but so far only) results, they promised:

“The results from the second maize sowing of the year (to be harvested in the next few weeks) will

show whether the yields improvements continue.“19 According to the project timeline given in the

brochure, it appears that no collection of maize from a second harvest had been planned and from

what the field interviews suggested, none took place.

The Biochar Fund's enthusiastic initial reports and 'interim result's were followed by a complete lack

of further information about the trial or any future plans and then by the disappearance of Biochar

Fund‟s website in early 2011.

Secondly, the figure of 1,500 farmers is contradicted both by the information provided from field

interviews and by the brochure which was given to farmers and which states that only 75 farmers

would have been involved in the trials, with a possibility of 500 being involved in a larger 2010

project which, as we now know, has not occurred.

17 This data had been presented on the now defunct Biochar Fund website. 18 www.biochar-international.org/sites/default/files/IBI%20Biochar%20Trial%20Guide%20final.pdf 19 http://www.carboncommentary.com/2009/10/01/761 and text from www.biocharfund.org downloaded

April 2011

http://www.biochar-international.org/sites/default/files/IBI%20Biochar%20Trial%20Guide%20final.pdf


http://www.biocharfund.org/


21

Thirdly, the trials did not show whether or not biochar could be produced and applied in a sustainable

manner. This is partly due to the lack of scientifically verified and verifiable data and evaluation and

partly due to the short duration of the trial (with the results published by Biochar Fund relating to

only a 3-month period). The “sustainability” of biochar production cannot be assessed from the

Cameroon trials since no information was made available about the materials and methods used,

including how much biochar had been used in total and how much biomass feedstock had been

charred – and thus how much feedstock farmers could expect to require if they were to adopt

biochar as a future farming method. Furthermore, since the trial was discontinued after just a few

months, no information was obtained to show how long observed yield benefits would have lasted

and thus how often biochar would need to be applied to the soils in the trial area to maintain soil

fertility. This means that the longer-term need for biochar feedstock remains unknown. It is clear

that farmers were not prepared to carry forward with biochar. The setup of the trials did not, include

any training or involvement in biochar production on the part of local farmers, who entirely relied on

external inputs which were no longer available after the trials were abandoned. Out of the 11 CIGs

contacted for the field study, only one, the CIG in Teke, appears to have subsequently made a small

quantity of biochar for growing chili peppers.

Fourth, while it appears from the field interviews that farmers had not been trained in any methods

for making biochar, the benefit of any such training based on the cheap and inefficient method used

for the project would have been questionable. This is because the single barrel charcoal making

method used has a a reported efficiency rate of just 5-10% 20 and could not have been adapted to

meet Biochar Fund's declared aim of alleviating energy poverty, since no energy can be recovered

from the single barrel charcoal making process used.

Finally, the trials did not in any way prove whether or not biochar use could be profitable for farmers.

Farmers made no financial gain from the project, even though local farmers' groups gave up a

significant amount of time and in some cases donated or rented land which would otherwise have

been used for different purposes. In some cases farmers appear to have rented land at their own

expense to use for trial plots. No public records of any efforts made by Biochar Fund to obtain

funding for continuing the trials exist and we found no indication that applications for public or

private funds or for carbon credits to continue the trials were ever made. Below we discuss whether

obtaining carbon credits, including through the European voluntary carbon market (as claimed in the

brochure given to farmers) would have been a realistic prospect at all. No costs analysis of the trials,

including details of the costs of biochar production, was ever published. Indeed, there is no

published information providing any indication as to how the Cameroon trials were financed,

discussed further below.

Other concerns raised by the this investigation include the fact that farmers were not advised about

any health and safety issues or the need for safe procedures for biochar storage and handling. This

would include protection from inhalation of charcoal dust and simple soil testing to rule out toxins

which can become concentrated in biochar. This latter concern is acknowledged by, among others,

the International Biochar Initiative who propose to address it through testing guidelines for biochar

specifications.21

Were Biochar Fund's claims about carbon offsets by 2010 realistic?

The brochure handed to farmers who participated in the trials stated that the trial results would be

presented to the European carbon markets with the aim of starting a larger project including carbon

finance in 2010. As we have seen, farmers interviewed had been, and in many cases still were under

the impression that imminent carbon finance was a realistic prospect. Soil carbon sequestration is

currently excluded from most regulated carbon trading systems and biochar from all of them, so the

voluntary markets would have been the only option for Biochar Fund. The prospect of financing a

larger biochar project through the European voluntary carbon markets currently seems remote.

First, the voluntary carbon markets overall are very small, accounting for less than 0.1% of all

carbon credits traded globally.22 Projects related to agricultural soils accounted for only 2% of the

voluntary carbon market in 2010. Second, 90% of voluntary carbon offsets are accredited by one of

several standards. So far, none of those standards contains a relevant protocol which covers biochar

20 http://biochar.pbworks.com/w/page/9748043/FrontPage 21 www.biochar-international.org/node/2843 22 www.forest-trends.org/documents/files/doc_2828.pdf

http://biochar.pbworks.com/w/page/9748043/FrontPage

http://www.biochar-international.org/node/2843

http://www.forest-trends.org/documents/files/doc_2828.pdf


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or has otherwise approved any biochar projects.23 Finally, voluntary carbon offsets were traded at

an average cost of $6 per tonne CO2e in 2010. This is far below the level that, for example, the U.S.

Biochar Initiative predicts biochar could become economically viable if it were to be included in

carbon markets.24 Viable voluntary carbon finance for the Cameroon biochar project by 2010 (or

indeed for the foreseeable future) would thus have been highly unlikely.

False promises

As the field investigation shows, farmers had been told to expect very positive results from biochar,

as well as future funding through carbon offsets. Those who were interviewed and who had

participated in and completed trial participation spoke about being impressed with the 'maize yields'

from the trial in general and none of them expressed any doubt about what they had been told about

the 'positive impacts' to be expected from biochar. Some still had high hopes for biochar, but there

was a clear sense of disappointment and of having been let down in view of the abrupt termination of

the project and the lack of communication between those who had run the project, especially Biochar

Fund, and the local farmers. Even though there is no evidence of any interest on the part of Biochar

Fund in reviving the Cameroon project or applying for any type of funding for it, farmers were still,

even in 2011, under the impression that what they had been promised initially might still happen and

that they might yet be able to benefit financially from biochar and carbon credits.

Who benefited?

Farmers clearly did not benefit much from the trials, financially or in terms of sustained higher crop

yields or capacity to improve their yields in future.

Since little has been published about how the Cameroon biochar project was financed, we do not

know whether Biochar Fund derived any immediate financial gains from the project. It would appear

that the overall project expenses to Biochar Fund and Key Farmers would have been very limited:

Farmers gave their time and access to their land for free. Biochar was produced from local feedstock

through a cheap if inefficient method, and no data resulting from any (potentially costly) laboratory

char or soil analysis was ever published. On the other hand, Key Farmers advised that around

30,000 Euros had been available for the project. However, the ADAPEL/Biochar Fund application to

CBFF, for their DR Congo biochar project, states that 45,000 Euros had been made available for the

Cameroon project by Biochar Fund and private investors. No information as to where Biochar Fund's

investment would have come from, who the private investors were, how the money was spent and

whether any of it was exchanged between Biochar Fund and Key Farmers has been made publicly

available.

The Cameroon project 'experience' formed part of the successful application by ADAPEL and Biochar

Fund to the Congo Basin Forest Fund.25 Yet Biochar Fund (and biochar in general) is just one of a

large range of different activities for which its founder director Laurens Rademakers has been raising

funds, in many cases successfully, according to his personal website.26 One of those, as mentioned

above, is the CBFF funded project by CocoaMasters for passive solar and biomass combo ovens in

Cameroon, São Tomé and Príncipe and Equatorial Guinea. Although biochar is not part of that

project, it appears to have developed out of contacts made during the Cameroon biochar trials, with

CocoaMasters being based in Kumba and members of Key Farmers and their website having been set

up by their 'advisor' Laurens Rademakers. The websites of the other two partner organizations in the

project were also set up by Mr Rademakers. CocoaMaster's CBFF funding application27 referred to

CocoaMasters having received substantial project funds from Biochar Fund and Farmers for the

Future (without stating that both belong to the same person, Mr Rademakers) and Key Farmers

Cameroon. It is not clear how such funds were raised, given that Key Farmers define themselves as

a 'non-profit self help organization' and no information about any funding received by Biochar Fund is

available (except potentially through their collaboration with ADAPEL in DR Congo). Particularly

interesting is a statement in that application that Biochar Fund and Key Farmers paid CocoaMasters

23 While some standards, such as the Verified Carbon Standard relyon protocols/methodologies, others,

such as the Climate, Community and Biodiversity Standard, accredit projects according to broader

principles. 24 http://www.biochar-us.org/ 25 For the project application, dated December 2008, see http://cbf-

fund.org/sites/default/files/ADAPEL_0.pdf . The application was approved in May 2009. 26 http://laurens-rademakers.com/ , accessed October 2011 27 www.cbf-fund.org/node/262/2nd-Call-Winning-Proposals--

http://www.biochar-us.org/



http://laurens-rademakers.com/

http://www.cbf-fund.org/node/262/2nd-Call-Winning-Proposals--


23

20,000 Euros for an ongoing biochar project in Cameroon, no recent information about which

appears to have been published.

For Mr Rademaker's wider project and consulting business, the benefits from the widely publicized

Biochar Fund projects may have been quite significant. He advertises his services on his personal

website by stating: “As a project writer I have successfully attracted major funding from some of the

world's leading agencies and grant-makers in the very competitive arena which is that of public calls

for proposals.” Figures cited on his website about his recent 'portfolio' suggest he has obtained a

total of $1.325 million in funds for different projects since 2009, all but $150,000 of this from 'public

calls' and that he has created 13 different NGOs, 8 of them in Africa since 2006 which have each

attracted funding and which, between them, employ between 125 and 220 staff.28 Biochar is clearly

a very small component in a large and, (according to the figures given on Mr. Rademaker's about his

recent activities and successes), financially highly successful consultancy and project portfolio.

Nonetheless, Rademaker‟s Biochar Fund projects appear to have helped him build up networks

relevant to other projects and to gain greater credibility with at least one funder (CBFF). The very

successful framing of biochar used by Biochar Fund appears to have been adapted by Mr

Rademakers for framing other current project activities – for example speaking in terms of the

potential for different practices to 'double' output by 'average African farmers'.29

Questions about Biochar Fund's and ADAPEL's project in DR Congo

Assessment of the short-lived Cameroon project raises serious questions regarding Biochar Fund and

ADAPEL's CBFF-funded project in DR Congo. Those questions can ultimately only be answered

through an independent assessment of that project. The scarce details published by Biochar Fund

underline the need for such an investigation :

Although the CBFF grant was approved in May 2009 and, according to Biochar Fund, the project

started in 2010, no data and no interim results have been published anywhere, even though soil

scientist Christoph Steiner was to be a project partner and to guarantee soil analysis and scientific

research arising from the project, according to the CBFF grant application30.

With the Biochar Fund website having closed in early 2011, it is not clear to us whether Biochar

Fund still exists as a legal entity;

A video released about the project released in June 201131 only shows pictures relating to the

very early project stages, i.e. biochar production and application to soil, even though the

commentary alludes to long-term impacts. No evidence that any trial stages have been

completed exists.

According to the 2011 video, an 'Adam oven' (generally called Adam retort) is used for biochar

production. Though reported to be more efficient than the simple single barrel method used in

the Cameroon project, Adam retorts cannot be adapted to obtain and use energy. The CBFF grant

application, however, promised an 'energy package, which introduces an innovative technology,

the co-generation of electricity, useable heat and biochar'. CBFF Coordinator Clotilde Louisette

Molo Ngomba who is interviewed in the video states that one of the benefits from the project and

from biochar is the co-production of energy which will lead to people needing less firewood. Yet

the Adam retort technique adopted does not make this possible.

In the same video, Laurens Rademakers makes claims about the prospect of carbon finance for

farmers, similar to what farmers in Cameroon indicated they had been told. Mr Rademakers

states : 'There is a genuine market out there. At the moment it is worth about 20 Euros but the

rate fluctuates...Getting into the market...can cost as much as 200,000 Euros [per tonne]...We

intend to fight for our project on the market and intend to keep our cost down because it is

important that the money benefits the poorest farmers around here.' He thus once again

suggests that biochar carbon offsets are a viable option for farmers right now, at a time when not

a single biochar methodology has been adopted for any carbon trading mechanism.

28 www.laurens-rademakers.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=49&Itemid=56 29 www.ted.com/conversations/3969/what_should_be_done_about_the.html?c=277584 30 cbf-fund.org/sites/default/files/ADAPEL_0.pdf 31 tinyurl.com/brcjuuv (kaltura.endirectv.com)

http://www.laurens-rademakers.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=49&Itemid=56

http://www.ted.com/conversations/3969/what_should_be_done_about_the.html?c=277584



24

RECOMMENDATIONS

1) Open an immediate investigation into the following projects currently funded by the CBFF,

given the questions and concerns raised by this report about the reliability and veracity of

claims and information by Biochar Fund and its Managing Director Laurens Rademakers:

ADAPEL: Phasing out slash-and-burn farming with biochar (in which Biochar Fund is a

partner)

CocoaMasters CIG: Eliminating fire-wood consumption in the cocoa sector: passive solar +

biogas combo ovens (in which Biochar Fund's Managing Director Laurens Rademakers is

Project Coordinator)

In the case of the ADAPEL project, the importance of such an investigation is underlined by

the fact that videos released earlier in 2011 suggests that there has been no attempt to

implement one of the three 'packages', i.e. the 'energy package', for which the project

received CBFF funding.

2) Investigate the basis on which the ADAPEL project was approved: Various of the claims on

which the application was based are either contradicted by biochar field studies or have not

been scientifically tested. For example, there is no peer-reviewed field study showing that

biochar amendments are capable of raising soil fertility for longer than slash-and-burn

farming.

General recommendations to funders, agencies and policy-makers

3) Based on the findings of this report as well as the Critical Review of Biochar Science and

Policy report, funding for biochar deployment should be suspended since it is not justified by

the science.

4) Farmers who have given up their time and (at least temporarily) their land for biochar

projects including that in SW Cameroon should be compensated.

5) Other biochar projects in developing countries should be independently assessed evaluated,

including the experience of local farmers who have participated in such projects. So far there

appears to have been no other independent evaluation of any biochar project (other than

purely scientific trials) in developing countries.

6) In general, claims that carbon finance will be gained from projects should be scrutinized to

ensure they do not generate “false hopes” among project participants.

ANNEX 1: FORESTS IN SOUTHWEST CAMEROON

Threats to forests in SW Province and the region around Kumba

The biochar project took place in a highly biodiverse part of Southwest Cameroon considered to be

part of the Lower West African Guinean Forest 'biodiversity hotspot'.

According to the UN Food and Agriculture Organization, Cameroon has been losing on average

220,000 hectares of 0.9 – 0.99% natural forest cover since 1990.32 According to a report published

by the Global Forest Coalition, based on workshops organized by the Institute for Cultural Affairs

(Cameroon) in 2009, the main underlying causes of forest loss in the country mentioned by

participants are the Structural Adjustment Programme leading to greater poverty and thus more

forests being converted to farmland, and an increase in rubber and oil palm plantations.33

32 http://rainforests.mongabay.com/deforestation/2000/Cameroon.htm 33 Getting to the Roots : Underlying Causes of Deforestation and Forest Degradation and Drivers of Forest

Restoration, Global Forest Coalition, 2010, www.globalforestcoalition.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/11/Report-Getting-to-the-roots1.pdf

http://rainforests.mongabay.com/deforestation/2000/Cameroon.htm

http://www.globalforestcoalition.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/11/Report-Getting-to-the-roots1.pdf

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A previous World Bank report in 2001, by Essama-Nssah and Gockowsky,34 had listed timber

exploitation, slash and burn agriculture, conversion of forests land into large scale plantations and

gathering of firewood for households as drivers of forest destruction and degradation, suggesting

that “agricultural expansion contributes between 85 to 95% in Cameroon.”

The environmental situation in the Southwest Region in general and Kumba area in particular is

concerning. For the last two decades, the economic crisis which started in the 1980s has affected

the economy of the entire nation and of this population in particular. The economic situation has

impacted on earnings from cash crops and falling disposable incomes amongst rural communities

whose livelihoods solely depend on agriculture. A Structural Adjustment Program imposed by the

International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, has impacted on Kumba by drastically

increasing the number of local residents: People have had to leave nearby villages to move to

Kumba, the main town, in search of new livelihoods from activities such as trading, driving or

working for companies based in the town. It is now recognized that Kumba (K-town as it called

colloquially) is the largest city in the Southwest Region, with 150, 000 inhabitants. This has also

impacted severely on the surrounding environment as Kumba has become one of the main trading

centres for cocoa and palm oil grown in the region. The forest in the Meme division has been

progressively degraded by human activities in the quest for land. Lands available in Kumba and

around are either converted to cash crops plantation (oil palm, rubber and cocoa plantations) or to

food production.

In 2003, the Mount Cameroon Technical Operational Unit (TOU) was created by law signed by the

Prime Minister. It covers three divisions (departments) of Southwest Cameroon, Fako, Meme and

Ndian, and an area of 248,000 hectares. Kumba and its surrounding area is located in the Meme

Division and thus inside the Mount Cameroon TOU. Forests within the Meme division include the

highly biodiverse Southern Bakundu Forest Reserve (south-west of Kumba), with an area of 19,425

hectares. Part of the biochar trial area, and some of the farmers interviewed, were located inside and

in the vicinity of this forest reserve.

The South Bakundu forest reserve: Continuous degradation due to poor

management

Pressures on the South Bakundu forest reserve are alarming. Uncontrolled clearing for farming,

harvesting of forest products and illegal hunting have led to ongoing depletion of natural resources

and forest degradation. They have dramatically affected the equilibrium of the forest ecosystem.

Restrictions on the use of and access to the forest reserve are not respected or enforced. Poor

management practices are amongst the main factors which impede the protection of the forest.

Large areas of land in the Mount Cameroon TOI have been devoted to corporate agro- and timber

business activities, especially rubber and oil palm plantations. Many of those plantations are owned

by the Cameroon Development Corporation (CDC). Efforts to protect the Bakundu Forest Reserve are

ineffective and poor management has severely affected the state of the forest reserve.

Industrial logging activities: Not good governance

Forest exploitation is an important economic activity within the Mount Cameroon TOI, including

Meme division. Timber concessions have been the privilege of domestically and foreign owned

logging companies. In 1996 for example, 8 logging companies were officially registered in Kumba. It

has been reported that Asian logging companies, which have been operating in Cameroon since

1997, have also been active in the Meme division through local partners like the Mukete Plantations

Company. Logging companies activities' have largely disregarded legal requirements and created

social conflicts. In 2001, Transformation Reef Cameroon (TRC), a logging company which is still

active in the Meme and Koupé-Manengouba divisions, and which owns the largest sawmill in the

Southwest Region, was accused by inhabitants of four villages from two divisions for having

destroyed their cash crops during logging and road building. The compensation process took place 5

years later and the sum of 20 million CFA (30,490 Euros) was paid to those villagers. Even though

the compensation process took place, the chief of Ediki village, Mr Samuel Etonegwe said to the TRC

representative: “We suffered great damages when your company carried out activities in our village.

34

http://econ.worldbank.org/external/default/main?pagePK=64165259&theSitePK=469372&piPK=64165421&menuPK=64166093&entityID=000094946_00110405591366

http://econ.worldbank.org/external/default/main?pagePK=64165259&theSitePK=469372πPK=64165421&menuPK=64166093&entityID=000094946_00110405591366

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26

This token cannot cover the loss we incurred. We do appreciate it anyway because I believe my

people will use it to improve and extend farmlands. All our families depend solely on our farms.”

Villagers experiences and views of the pressures on forests

From the perspective of the villagers interviewed, the main observed pressure on forests in the area

is the quest of land for agricultural activities. This view was expressed by Mr Leke of Kosala, who told

us: “Look, from the road we see that the Bakundu forest reserve is beautiful; if you go inside what

you will see will be completely different. People have cut down trees to create farms and the forest

department here is doing nothing. All the resources found there in the past have been destroyed.”

Documents

Biochar Cameroon Report - Mines-ParisTech