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Black Swans, Yellow Gold

How gold performs during periods of deflation, chronic disinflation, runaway stagflation and hyperinflation

by Michael J. Kosares

"The inability to predict outliers implies the inability to predict the course of history. .

.But we act as though we are able to predict historical events, or, even worse, as if

we are able to change the course of history. We produce thirty-year projections of

social security deficits and oil prices without realizing that we cannot even predict

these for next summer -- our cumulative prediction errors for political and economic

events are so monstrous that every time I look at the empirical record I have to

pinch myself to verify that I am not dreaming. What is surprising is not the

magnitude of our forecast errors, but our absence of awareness of it."

- Nicholas Taleb, The Black Swan -- The Impact of the Highly Improbable, 2010

"Having been mugged too often by reality, forecasters now express less confidence

about our abilities to look beyond the immediate horizon. We will forever need to

reach beyond our equations to apply economic judgment. Forecasters may never

approach the fantasy success of the Oracle of Delphi or Nostradamus, but we can

surely improve on the discouraging performance of the past."

- Alan Greenspan, The Map and the Territory, 2013

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Introduction

This short study examines gold's performance under the four most commonly predicted worst-case economic

scenarios -- a 1930s-style deflation, chronic Japanese-style disinflation, a 1970s-style runaway stagflation,

and a Weimar-style hyperinflation. "That men do not learn very much from the lessons of history," Aldous

Huxley once wrote, "is the most important of all the lessons of history." Though I agree with Huxley's

assessment when applied to contemporary policymakers and central bankers, I do not agree with it when

applied to their counterparts in the private sector, i.e., the individual investors. As justification, I offer the

ongoing (and long-term) success of the USAGOLD website as well as the soaring statistics of late on private

gold ownership both here and abroad. Individually, we can and do learn the lessons of history even if we do

not always do so collectively.

Black Swans, Yellow Gold is dedicated to those who believe, like Nicholas Taleb, that it is just as important to

prepare for what we cannot foresee as what we can. Some might put their money on the latest Oracle of

Delphi or the contemporary reincarnation of Nostradamus -- or even an all-seeing eye plug-in that can be

downloaded from the internet -- but in the end, such notions are the dreams of government planners and

retired central bankers. For the rest of us, a solid hedge in gold coins, as your are about to read, is the more

sensible and reliable alternative -- a wealth haven for all seasons.

A couple real-life experiences worth noting

A few years ago I did an appraisal for a client who was pledging his gold as collateral in a commercial real

estate transaction. In the course of doing the appraisal, I was struck with the large gain in value. His original

purchase in 2002 was in the seven figures when gold was still trading in the $300 range. His holdings had

appreciated 50% after a roughly three-year holding period. (Since that appraisal, the value has risen another

nearly three times at this writing.) I asked his permission tell his story at our website as an example how gold

can further one's business plans.

"No problem at all," he wrote by return e-mail, "I have viewed it as a hedge, but also as an alternative to

money market funds. Now I can leverage it for investment purposes -- private equity and real estate mostly.

The holding has averaged 7%-10% of my total assets. And I do hope to buy substantially more, when

appropriate. Thanks again."

It needs to be emphasized that he was not selling his gold, but pledging it as collateral to finance other

aspects of his business. Selling it would have meant giving up his hedge -- something he didn't want to do.

Instead, he was using gold to further his business interests in a transaction in which he would become a

principal owner.

Upon publishing his story at the USAGOLD website, we received a letter from another client with a similar

story to tell:

"I read the article in the newsletter about one of your client's buying 1 million of gold four years ago and it now

being worth $1.5 million. I have a similar true story if you would like to use it. About four years ago, I talked my

father into converting about a third of his cash into gold, mostly pre-33 British Sovereigns. I bought for him

from USAGOLD approximately $80,000 when spot gold was about $290 per ounce. He had the rest of his

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money in 1-2% CDs in the bank. My father passed away recently and I am executor. He willed my brother

$250,000 which was essentially all of his gold and cash. I gave my brother the gold along with the bank CDs.

While the CDs had earned barely a pittance in those 4 years the gold had become 41% more valuable.

"So instead of receiving $250,000 my brother really received about $282,800 ($80,000 x 141% = $112,800 or

+ $32,800). Had my father converted all his paper money to gold my brother would have received $352,500.

Ironically my father was very conservative and didn't like to gamble. In this case his biggest gamble was

watching those CDs smolder and not acquiring real money -- gold."

(Author's note: Today this client's holdings have nearly tripled in value again to nearly $350,000 -- even after

gold's most recent correction. A modest inheritance has become quite

valuable.)

If you would like to broaden your view of gold market, we invite you to sign-up

for our regular newsletter and receive quality commentary like what you are

now reading. It's free of charge and comes by e-mail. You can opt out at any

time.

It is interesting to note that both clients view their gold as a savings and safe

haven instrument as opposed to an investment for capital gains -- a viewpoint

very different from the way gold is commonly portrayed in the mainstream media. An interesting side note to

their successful utilization of gold is that it occurred in the predominantly disinflationary environment of the

"double-ought" decade (from 2000-2013) when inflation was moderate -- a counter-intuitive result covered in

more detail below.

Now, as the economy has gotten progressively worse, many investors are beginning to ask about gold's

practicality and efficiency under more dire circumstances -- the ultimate black swan, or outlier event like a

deflationary depression, severe disinflation, runaway stagflation or hyperinflation. The following thumbnail

sketches draw from the historical record to provide insights on how gold is likely to perform under each of

those scenarios.

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Gold as a deflation hedge (United States, 1929)

WEBSTER DEFINES DEFLATION A "CONTRACTION IN THE VOLUME of available money and credit that

results in a general decline in prices." Typically deflations occur in gold standard economies when the state is

deprived of its ability to conduct bailouts, run deficits and print money. Characterized by high unemployment,

bankruptcies, government austerity measures and bank runs, a deflationary economic environment is usually

accompanied by a stock and bond market collapse and general financial panic -- an altogether unpleasant set

of circumstances.

The Great Depression of the 1930s serves as a workable example of the degree to which gold protects its

owners under deflationary circumstances in a gold standard economy. First, because the price of gold was

fixed at $20.67 per ounce, it gained purchasing power as the general price level fell. In 1933, when the U.S.

government raised the price of gold to $35 per ounce in an effort to reflate the economy through a formal

devaluation of the dollar, gold gained even more purchasing power. President Franklin D. Roosevelt also

confiscated gold bullion by executive order in concert with the devaluation, but exempted "rare and unusual"

gold coins which later were defined by regulation simply as items minted before 1933. As a result, only those

citizens who owned gold coins dated before 1933 were able to reap the benefit of the higher fixed prices. The

accompanying graph illustrates those gains, and the gap between consumer prices and the gold price.

Figure 1 - Gold as a deflation hedge

Second, since gold acts as a stand-alone asset that is not another's liability, it played an effective store of

value function prior to 1933 for those who either converted a portion of their capital to gold bullion or withdrew

their savings from the banking system in the form of gold coins before the crisis struck. Those who did not

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have gold as part of their savings plan found themselves at the mercy of events when the stock market

crashed and the banks closed their doors (many of which had already been bankrupted).

How gold might react in a deflation under today's fiat money system is a more complicated scenario. Even

one under a fiat money system, the general price level would be falling by definition. Economists who make

the deflationary argument within the context of a fiat money economy usually use the analogy of the central

bank "pushing on a string." It wants to inflate, but no matter how hard it tries the public refuses to borrow and

spend. (If this all sounds familiar, it should. This is precisely the situation in which the Federal Reserve finds

itself today.) In the end, so goes the deflationist argument, the central bank fails in its efforts and the economy

rolls over from recession to a full-blown deflationary depression.

How the government treats gold under a deflationary scenario will play heavily into its performance:

- If gold is subjected to price controls and restricted ownership, as it was in the 1930s deflation, it would likely

perform as it did then, i.e., its purchasing power would increase as the price level fell. Under such

circumstances, the ownership of "rare and unusual" gold coins might once again come into play.

- If ownership is not restricted, it would turn out to be the best of all possible worlds for gold owners. Its

purchasing power would increase as the price level fell, and the price itself could rise as a result of increased

demand from investors hedging systemic risks and financial market instability.

Note: That, by the way, is the primary reason governments tend to restrict gold ownership when confronted

with widespread bank runs and failing financial markets. Governments seize gold not because they need the

money; they seize it to cut off the escape route and force capital flows back into banks and financial markets.

As an aside, that is precisely the reason why governments have an interest in controlling the price of gold.

Former Fed chairman Paul Volcker, it has been copiously reported, once said, "Gold is my enemy. I'm always

watching what it is doing."

Though there is no direct evidence I know of that the Fed or Treasury Department intervened directly in the

gold market during Mr. Volcker's tenure, his statement does reflect the acute interest in gold on the part of

monetary policy-makers. Alan Greenspan voiced a similar interest in gold throughout his Fed chairmanship

and still does today, though unlike Volcker he has always defended gold and expressed an appreciation for its

use as a form of money or final payment or reconciliation. Gold, in the end, is not just competition for the

dollar; it is competition for the bank deposits, stocks and bonds most particularly during times of economic

stress, and that is the source of enduring interest among policy-makers.

(Please see Gold Seizure: How it could happen and what you can do about it by David L. Ganz, J.D.)

The disinflationary period leading up to and following the financial market meltdown of 2008 serves as a good

example of how the second scenario might unfold. The disinflationary economy is a close cousin to deflation,

and is covered in the next section. It provides some solid clues as to what we might expect from gold under a

full deflationary breakdown.

Gold as a disinflation hedge (United States, 2008)

JUST AS THE 1970s REINFORCED GOLD'S EFFICIENCY as a stagflation (combination of economic

stagnation and inflation) hedge in the modern era, the 2000's decade solidly established gold's credentials as

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a disinflation hedge. Disinflation is defined as a decrease in the inflation rate over time (or a constant low

inflation rate), and should not be confused with deflation, which is an actual drop in the price level.

Disinflations, as pointed out above, are close cousins to deflations and can evolve to that if the central bank

fails, for whatever reasons, in its stimulus program. Central banks today are activist by design. To think that a

modern central bank would sit back during a disinflation and let the chips fall where they may is to

misunderstand its role. It will attempt to stimulate the economy by one means or another. The only question is

whether or not it will succeed.

Up until the "double oughts," the manual on gold read that it performed well under inflationary and deflationary

circumstances, but not much else. However, as the decade of asset bubbles, financial institution failures, and

global systemic and sovereign debt risk progressed, gold marched to higher ground one year after another.

As events unfolded, it became increasingly clear that the metal was capable of delivering the goods under

disinflationary circumstances as well. The fact of the matter is that during the 2000s even as the inflation rate

hovered in the low single digits, gold managed to rise from just under $300 per ounce in the early 2000s to

just over $1900 per ounce by 2011 -- a gain of over 600%. Since then, gold has taken a breather. As this

essay is written, it is trading in the $1250 per ounce range -- still up over 400% in the new century.

In the aftermath of the 2007-2008 financial crisis something else happened to the yellow metal: It firmly re-

established itself with private investors and nation states as perhaps the ultimate asset of last resort. As the

economy flirted with a tumble into the deflationary abyss in recent years, it encouraged the kind of behavior

among investors that one might have expected in the early days of a full deflationary breakdown with all the

elements of a financial panic. Stocks tumbled. Banks teetered. Unemployment rose. Mortgages went into

foreclosure. Nation states defaulted on their debts. Disinflation globally became chronic and debilitating.

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Figure 2 - Gold as a disinflation hedge

As it became evident that the economic and financial malaise could become a permanent fixture (the new

normal), gold came under accumulation globally. In 2009, U.S. Gold Eagle sales, a bellwether for public

interest in the metal, broke all records by a wide margin, and the pace of accumulation has remained at high

levels ever since. The world's central banks, historically at odds with each other with respect to currency

policies, have teamed up to deliver ever larger doses of monetary stimulus that goes far beyond ordinary

tinkering with interest rates. Money printing has become a global undertaking -- a phenomena the

consequences of which are yet to be determined.

Meanwhile, the disinflationary crisis that began in 2007-2008 is still with us, and through it all, gold demand

has not only gone undeterred. Though many thought the price correction would dampen interest, the opposite

has happened: It encouraged a new wave of investment interest particularly in the East where low prices

were greeted with a wave of public demand. In 2013, China reportedly imported nearly the equivalent of the

world annual gold mine -- almost 2700 tonnes, and other emerging and developed nation states alike have

experienced their own versions of a rush to own.

All in all, as the graph immediately above demonstrates, the first decade of the 21st century ushered in a new

era for gold, one in which it filled a hole in its resume. Now gold has come to be viewed as an effective hedge

against one of contemporary economies most nettlesome problems -- chronic disinflation and the systemic

financial risks it periodically imposes.

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Gold as a hyperinflation hedge (France, 1790s)

ANDREW DICKSON WHITE ENDS HIS CLASSIC HISTORICAL ESSAY on hyperinflation, "Fiat Money

Inflation in France," with one of the more famous lines in economic literature: "There is a lesson in all this

which it behooves every thinking man to ponder." The lesson that there is a connection between government

over-issuance of paper money, inflation and the destruction of middle-class savings has been routinely

ignored in the modern era. So much so, that enlightened savers the world over wonder if public officials will

ever learn it.

White's essay tells the story of how good men -- with nothing but the noblest of intentions - can drag a nation

into monetary chaos in service to a political end. Still, there is something else in White's essay -- something

perhaps even more profound. Democratic institutions, he reminds us, well-meaning though they might be,

have a fateful, almost predestined inclination to print money when backed against the wall by unpleasant

circumstances.

If there is a hyperinflationary shock in the United States, the opening salvo would probably be a sudden

undermining of the dollar's status as the world's reserve currency. Up until recently, the United States enjoyed

a strong world-wide demand for its government paper. Thus, the negative affects of government deficits have

been subdued. Now, with consistently low interest rates, and a growing fear globally that U.S. deficits may

have run out of control, foreign support for the U.S. bond market has faltered. In the absence of international

buyers, the Fed already has been forced to monetize an ever larger portions of the debt -- the modern

equivalent of printing money. Whether or not it can follow through on its promise to reduce government bond

purchases in the face of lagging foreign demand remains an open question.

Though the global demand for dollars remains the principle factor standing between relative calm and

monetary mayhem, an inflationary surprise could come from another direction entirely. With nation states

around the world engaged acutely in the money printing game (and in deadly competition with one another),

one cannot rule out the possibility of a generalized global descent into the inflationary abyss -- at first slowly,

then more rapidly until a large portion of the world's population awakens one day to a global hyperinflationary

breakdown.

Episodes of hyperinflation ranging from the first (Ghenghis Khan's complete debasement of the very first

paper currency) through the most recent (the debacle in Zimbabwe) all start modestly and progress almost

quietly until something takes hold in the public consciousness that unleashes the pent-up price inflation with

all its fury. Frederich Kessler, a Berkeley law professor who experienced the 1920s nightmare German

Inflation first-hand, gave this description some years later during an interview published in Ralph Foster's

book, "Fiat Paper Money: The History and Evolution of Our Currency" (2008): "It was horrible. Horrible! Like

lightning it struck. No one was prepared. You cannot imagine the rapidity with which the whole thing

happened. The shelves in the grocery stores were empty. You could buy nothing with your paper money."

Towards the end of "Fiat Money Inflation in France," White sketches the price performance of the roughly

one-fifth ounce Louis d' Or gold coin:

"The louis d'or [a French gold coin .1867 net fine ounces] stood in the market as a monitor, noting each day,

with unerring fidelity, the decline in value of the assignat; a monitor not to be bribed, not to be scared. As well

might the National Convention try to bribe or scare away the polarity of the mariner's compass. On August 1,

1795, this gold louis of 25 francs was worth in paper, 920 francs; on September 1st, 1,200 francs; on

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November 1st, 2,600 francs; on December 1st, 3,050 francs. In February, 1796, it was worth 7,200 francs or

one franc in gold was worth 288 francs in paper. Prices of all commodities went up nearly in proportion. . .

Examples from other sources are such as the following -- a measure of flour advanced from two francs in

1790, to 225 francs in 1795; a pair of shoes, from five francs to 200; a hat, from 14 francs to 500; butter, to,

560 francs a pound; a turkey, to 900 francs. Everything was enormously inflated in price except the wages of

labor. As manufacturers had closed, wages had fallen, until all that kept them up seemed to be the fact that

so many laborers were drafted off into the army. From this state of things came grievous wrong and gross

fraud. Men who had foreseen these results and had gone into debt were of course jubilant. He who in 1790

had borrowed 10,000 francs could pay his debts in 1796 for about 35 francs."

Those two short paragraphs speak volumes of gold's safe-haven status during a tumultuous period and may

raise the most important lesson of all to ponder: the roll of gold coins in the private investment portfolio.

Most Americans take the attitude that "it can't happen here", but the truth of the matter is that no economy or

monetary system is immune to the ultimate effects of printing too much money. "Like previous hyperinflations

throughout time," says Patrick Barron, an economics professor at Wisconsin University's Graduate School of

Banking in a paper published at the Ludwig von Mises Instiutite, "the actions that produce an American

hyperinflation will be seen as necessary, proper, patriotic, and ethical; just as they were seen by the monetary

authorities in Weimar Germany and modern Zimbabwe. Neither the German nor the Zimbabwean monetary

authorities were willing to admit that there was any alternative to their inflationist policies. The same will

happen in America." The official mindset that unleashes the hyperinflation is already present in U.S. monetary

policy and to think it might be suddenly brought to heel could become the source of our undoing. History tells

us that once the inflationary genie is out of the bottle, it is difficult to get it back in.

Gold as a runaway stagflation hedge (United States, 1970s)

IN THE CONTEMPORARY GLOBAL FIAT MONEY SYSTEM, when the economy goes into a major tailspin,

both the unemployment and inflation rates tend to move higher in tandem. The word "stagflation" is a

combination of the words "stagnation" and "inflation." President Ronad Reagan famously added

unemployment and inflation together in describing the economy of the 1970s and called it the Misery Index.

As the Misery Index moved higher throughout the decade so did the price of gold, as shown in the graph

immediately below.

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Figure 3 - Gold as a stagflation hedge

At a glance, the chart tells the story of gold as a runaway inflation/stagflation hedge. The Misery Index more

than tripled in that ten-year period, but gold rose by nearly 16 times. Much of that rise has been attributed to

pent-up pressure resulting from many years of price suppression during the gold standard years when gold

was fixed by government mandate. Even after accounting for the fixed price, it would be difficult to argue that

gold did not respond readily and directly to the Misery Index during the stagflationary 1970s.

In a certain sense, the U. S. experience in the 1970s was the first of the runaway stagflationary breakdowns,

following President Nixon's abandonment of the gold standard in 1971. Following the 1970's U.S. experience,

similar situations cropped up from time to time in other nation-states. Argentina (late 1990s) comes to mind,

as does the Asian Contagion (1997), and Mexico (1986). In each instance, as the Misery Index rose, the

investor who took shelter in gold preserved his or her assets as the crisis moved from one stage to the next.

Fortunately, the 1970's experience in the United States was relatively moderate by historical standards in that

the situation fell short of escalating to either a deflationary or hyperinflationary breakdown. These lesser

events, however, quite often serve as preludes to more severe and debilitating events at some point down the

road. All in all, it is difficult to classify stagflations of any size and duration as insignificant to the middle class.

Few of us would gain comfort from the fact that the Misery Index we were experiencing failed to transcend the

100% per annum threshold or failed to escalate to a state of hyperinflation and deflation. Just the specter of a

double-digit Misery Index is enough to provoke some judicious portfolio planning with gold serving as the

hedge.

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A portfolio choice for all seasons

A BOOK COULD BE WRITTEN ON THE SUBJECT OF GOLD AS A HEDGE against the various 'flations. I

hope the short sketches just provided will serve at least as a functional introduction to the subject. The

conclusion is clear: History shows that gold, better than any other asset, protects the portfolio against the

range of ultra-negative economic scenarios, such so-called black swan, or outlier, events as - deflation,

chronic disinflation, hyperinflation or runaway stagflation.

Please note that I was careful not to favor one scenario over the other throughout this essay. The argument

as to which of these maladies is most likely to strike the economy next is purely academic with respect to gold

ownership. A solid hedge in gold protects against all of the disorders just outlined and no matter in which

order they arrive.

I would like to close with a thoughtful justification for gold ownership from a UK parliamentarian, Sir Peter

Tapsell. He made these comments in 1999 after then Chancellor of the Exchequer, Gordon Brown, forced the

auction sale of over half of Britain's gold reserve. They get to the heart of the matter and are as relevant today

as they were when they were first spoken. Tapsell's reference to "dollars, yen and euros" has to do with the

British treasury's proposal to sell the gold reserve and convert the proceeds to "interest bearing" instruments

denominated in those currencies. Though he was addressing gold's function with respect to the reserve of a

nation-state (the United Kingdom), he could have just as easily been talking about gold's role for the private

investor:

"The whole point about gold, and the quality that makes it so special and almost mystical in its appeal, is that

it is universal, eternal and almost indestructible. The Minister will agree that it is also beautiful. The most

enduring brand slogan of all time is, 'As good as gold.' The scientists can clone sheep, and may soon be able

to clone humans, but they are still a long way from being able to clone gold, although they have been trying to

do so for 10,000 years. The Chancellor [Gordon Brown] may think that he has discovered a new Labour

version of the alchemist's stone, but his dollars, yen and euros will not always glitter in a storm and they will

never be mistaken for gold."

These words are profound. They capture the essence of gold ownership. In the decade following the British

sale, gold went from $300 per ounce to over $1400 per ounce -- making a mockery of what has come to be

known in Britain as Brown's Folly. The "dollars, yen and euros" that the Bank of England received in place of

the gold have only continued to erode in value while paying a negligible to non-existent return. And most

certainly they have not glittered in the storm. What would the conservative government of David Cameron

give to have that 415 tonnes of gold back as it introduces austerity measures in Britain and attempts to

undergird the value of the British pound?

Returning to the stories told at the top of this essay, these are just two accounts among thousands that could

be swapped among our clientele. I receive calls regularly from what I like to call the "Old Guard" -- those who

bought gold in the $300s, $400s and $500s, even the $600s. Many had read The ABCs of Gold Investing:

How to Protect and Build Your Wealth with Gold. Some have become very wealthy as a result of those early

purchases. The most important result though is that these clients managed to maintain their assets at a time

when others watched their wealth dissipate. Gold has performed as advertised -- something it is likely to

continue doing in the years ahead. After all is said and done, as I wrote in The ABCs many years ago, gold is

the one asset that can be relied upon when the chips are down. Now more than ever, when it comes to

preserving assets, gold remains, in the most fundamental sense, the portfolio choice for all seasons.

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Michael J. Kosares is the founder of USAGOLD and the author of "The ABCs of Gold Investing - How

To Protect and Build Your Wealth With Gold." He has over forty years’ experience in the physical gold

business. He is also the editor of Review & Outlook, the firm's newsletter which is offered free of

charge and specializes in issues and opinion of importance to owners of gold coins and bullion. If you

would like to register for an e-mail alert when the next issue is published, please visit this link.

USAGOLD Review & Outlook is the contemporary, web-based version of our client letter, which

traces its beginnings to the early 1990s under the News & Views banner. Its principle objectives have

always been to keep our clients informed of important developments in the gold market; condense the

available gold-based news and opinion into a brief, readable digest; and counter the traditional anti-

gold bias in the mainstream media. That formula has won it a five-figure subscription base (and

growing). In addition to our regular newsletters, we occasionally publish in-depth special reports that

focus on events and developments of interest to gold owners.

Valued for its insight, accuracy and reliability, this publication is linked and reprinted regularly by a large

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countless websites, individuals and organizations who contribute regularly to its content. To this group,

we owe a deep debt of gratitude.

Disclaimer - Opinions expressed on the USAGOLD.com website do not constitute an offer to buy or

sell, or the solicitation of an offer to buy or sell any precious metals product, nor should they be viewed

in any way as investment advice or advice to buy, sell or hold. USAGOLD, Inc. recommends the

purchase of physical precious metals for asset preservation purposes, not speculation. Utilization of

these opinions for speculative purposes is neither suggested nor advised. Commentary is strictly for

educational purposes, and as such USAGOLD does not warrant or guarantee the accuracy, timeliness

or completeness of the information found here.

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