51.

122. ~aranatha, o~.c1t., p.295 f.n.l3. 123. C~tto?adhyay2, o~.cit. ~.295.

124. ~ee celow, p. 219.

~\... .!.!l en- ' . h

also translated the Udanavarga into Chinese, and whose ~eriod of activity as a translator under the Sung ~

~eror rai !suncr was from 380-1000 ~.~. See 3uddh1st Text Infornation no: 6, ;':arch 197E, ::l0.3-4. :t is indicative of t~e icrnorance of Chinese 3uddhists =oncerninc Santideva that the 55 (T.2G~5: ~s ai~o wrongly att=i~utedJ to :Jhar::1ayasas nr ~:-""'*"lC.tirti (:-:: 7c ).

_ '25

. =y- ~ . le Td'~an ::lon~.. ""i ns~-' t sai=-~(

53.

i E7. 26-170. 24

:~l these auxilaries were ~aught by t~e 3age :o~ the

sa :

55.

in Q~CVL~aUce with similar formulations by earlier _ 7 ~dh1~~ka writers. This verse, however, has occasioned an enormous mas= of ~e;etical comment among Tibetan

scholars on the question as to whether it is to ~ understocti literally or interpreted. ~ince this body of

exegetical ~terial illuminates crucial differences

among :he Tibetan schools in their understanding of the

~~dhyamika system, I have discussed the problems raised by the differing interpretations of this verse in the

Introduction LCf. 9P' 20-37 ~~veJ. 177.29-179.2

As to that, two tYPES of Jeople are obsErved -- the - ~yogin and the common person. L'E~e perceptions OLJ common

persons are sublated by those of the yoqins. And Lthe

perceptions of] the yogins also are sublated, Leach lower

one] by each higher, because of the differences in Ltheir] intellectual capacity. L3-4b]

ifuile 3uddhists have generally denied the pretensions

to hereditary spiritual superiority of Srahmans and 8

others, social ~galitarianism has been oalanced by the willingness of 3uddhist thinkers to distinguish between

superior and inferior human beings on the basis of their 9

intellectual and moral attainments. The ontological and

epistemological diVision into superficial (or conventional) and ultimate truths leads naturally to a diVision of

people according to their knowledge of these truths. Santi

deva distinguishes between yogins, who perceive the non

56.

errcr.eous nature of ~eality as a co~sequence ot having

attained a meditative state characterized by the non

perception of any element (sarvadharmanuoalarnbha) from common people (prakr,tika), who perceive things from a common-sense realistic point of view who have not

attained the meditative state in which tranquillzation

and insight are inextricably united (sarnatha-vl~asyanalC

yugannadha). :n the very ~road ~ategcry of common persons, the

commentators include everyone from the ~lettered masses,

whose minds are unaffected ~y philosophical views, ~ut

who nevertheless cling to a substantial and ego-centered

?erception of the world as a result of in:Xll.-n ;.'redilec

tions, to the heterodox non-Buddhists (tlrthika) who accept either an abiding mental or physical substratum

such as atman, ~rakrti, jiva, isvara, etc., or who----- .

nihilistically deny moral causality altogether, like _ _ 11

the Carvakas. :-_ccording to 3Uston all 3uddhist dogma

ticians arE to ~ considered as yogins, or at lEast

those of thE..':1. who have attained the

- -

57.

:':ot onl;;r a:-e the wholly er!'oneous vl.ews of common

gersons sublated (oadhy~tP.) by those of the ;;rogins, ~t also among the yogins the~selves the views of adherents of the 'higher' ;uddhist doctrinal syst~~S will sublate

:rom the~hose of the adherents of the 'lower' schools. 13

?Oint of view of a ?rasanqika-~~dhyarnika like gantideva, the Ollddhist schools in ascending order are the '/aibha

s1ka, 3autrantika, "!ogacara. Svatantr1ka-Hadhvarnika and.

?rasansiJea-r.,adhyam1ka. '::ven aI!IOng yogins who have rea

l1zed ::mptiness f!'om the l'rasangika-Hacihyamika ~1nt of vie"I, there will ::,e a hierarc.hy of views, since those of

?rasanqika yoqins on a hiqher .=odhlsattva stac;e ylculd

subldte those of one on a lower stage, since t~~y repre...

sent a more penetrating intuition of 3m~tiness.

179.2-130.19

3ecause the example Lof dreams, illusions, etc,]

is accepted by both [the ~~dhY-amlka and the ~ealistJ the uninvestigated is for the sake of the Joal. .:ntities are

~erceived and also conceived by the worldly realistic

ally, not indeed as being like illusion -- hence the

de~te between the yoSin and the worldly. L4C-S]

.;t this ~int the non-l:adhyamika might ask why the

;>osition of an ordinary person is sublated by that of

the ~~dhyamika yogin, since there is no proof of non

substantiality. ~antideva replies with an argument by analogy, and states that just as all geople are agreed

Sci

~he~ creams, illusions e~c. co r.ot Exist in the ~nner

~n which tjey ap?ear,15, so ell ?henonena do not exis~ ~n ~~e way ~ha~ they seem to, that is, they are nen-sucstan

tial. .'!lile ~his type of analogical :-easoninq is not

?roeative, it dces serve to indicate the ?ossibility tha t

our orcina!'y waking judgements can =e as ~staken as the y as they are in creams. ~is analosy ~s eften ~~~loyec

in the 2!'ajna-~ara~ta literature. 1E :oncedinq nor:su;:,stantiality, the o;>;>onent then tries

to draw ~he consequence that all religious actions and

ei~s would lack ;>ur?ose cecause 0: their non-substantiality; any att~n;>t to achieve relisious ~oals would ~e,

in t:1is case, as vain as "buying an il1uso!y ~e:-se:'

:'he ::.adhyamika cannot end does not devy tie t:.i.. ~i:ne te non

substanticlity of the ?ath and its _~al, as it is, af~er

all, one of the basic tenets of ~is school,13 =ut his re91y ~s a ~rasr.atic one, ~ha~ is that we ou~ht to utilize

~ninvestiqated, i.e. conventicnal ~henone~a, s~eci=ically

~ivin~ an the other :noral ?er:ections and aces series

of the 30dhisattva career, as a ~ethod :or brin~inS about

hap?iness and ellev1atins suffe:-ing ~th for oneself and

:or others, as long as w,~ haven't attained the highest

~on-dual ?erce?tion and continue ~o operate in the worle

of de;>endently-produced actions and their results. 1 9 ~t

is just zy means of t~s type of ethical action that we will attain an understanding of ultimate tLuth. The two

truths can be viewed in a cause anc ef:ect relation:

17

59.

"Conven~ional truth is skillful :ileans, ulti::tate trut:'

is the object IOhich arises fror.! that." 20 :he realist opponent, wnor.! ~gyal.tshab here takes

~c refer s~eci=ically to ~he 3autrantika, ~~ht then

::-aise the ques~ion as to what the ;-:adhyarnika ccuarrel with the realists is actually a~utl surely Lhe says] the ~~dhyanika as Well as he himself ~erceives conventional ~henooena and utilizes tha~ according to their

functions or natures- he =Urns things with fire, sits on

chairs etc. :'he ;-;adhyar:tika re;:ly 15 that they have no

argQ~ent with the ~ea11sts concerning conventional ap

~earance; that fire Ourns etc. is established by a valid

~eans of knowled~e.21 ~s ~antideva savs 1n the ~iksa-- ~

sa::luccava: "~thoUSh all eleillents laCk self, the connec

tion bet~-IGc::, ~=t~:::: and its effect is :'lot contradicted ;

~~e appearance of all eler

61.

~owledge of ~~tinessJ. Actually th~se Centities] are ~ot instantaneous. If Cit is said thatl this is contradicted even conventionally ewe reply that] there is no fault Cof ~permanence not ~ing validated]. 'Jom?ared to worldlings, yogins conventionally perceive ~eality

Lwho perceive L~pe~nence J o If that were not so. t~e deternination of w~man's ~purity ~ould ~e subIated ~y

the worldly [viewl. ~ 7-3 i

~antideva now considers the ?Ossible objections of a ?~~a~r.anist who can cite many scri?tural ?assages in

~.,hich t:1e 3uddha a9?arently ;,lreaches that the sxandhas,

ayatanas and dhatus, etc., are t=uly existent. ~~thou~h the ;ayayana also acce;>ts these scrii?tures as the tr'.le

:'iord of 3uddha, they ~ve resorted to the nerne!lUetic

device of classif~nng 5cri?tures into ~hose whose 3eaninq

is to 0e taken literally (nita:tna) and those whose ::leaning is a judicio'us e.'{?edi~'1t (neya'-tbCj). :'bus, according to the ,:adhyamika, the realistic teachings of

t:he 2lnayana were ?reacned ~y the =uddha for the sake of those disci~les who for the t~~e ~eing were not advanced

enough to ~ras? the 9rofound teaching of ~~ptiness in

order that tney :ni~ht 0e led s-radually i~to that teaching.

7ne doctrine of ~omentariness (kla~i~atvaj, which is

a~~lied to the skandhas and other phenonena, is only con

ventionally valid according to the i!idhyamika. ~ne realist might the.'1 object that in that case there are insufficient grounds for accepting ~omentariness, i.e. impermanence,

:2

even CQnve~tionally, si~ce ordi~ary ?eo~le understand

things to endure in tL~e; e.g. they see a pot 1n t~e eVt:!r.ing as ~i:lg identical ',Jith t:he ?Ot they noticed in

the morninS-0 ?he i:adhya.-nika answer 15 that ~!lermanence 1s validated ~y the yogin's ~editative concentration on ?ersonal selflessness (Dudaalanaira~~vasanadhi), altho~g h their understa~ding, neverthEle~~. still ?ertains to the conventional. ~ese yogins, however, are held to see reality conventionally; as comp?red to ordinary worldly

?eop1e who ~staxenly L~pcte ?ermanence to 9henomena. This type of yogic gerception must disaffirm that of the

vulgar worldling, just as a yogin absorbed in the cor.t~~plations on the repulsiveness of th~ ~dy Qt~aff1rms worldly views of its purity.

133.6-184.10

i;eri t can arise :rom an illusory ::onqueror, just as it would from a truly e.."d.stent one. ~Query ] If sentient beings are like illusion, ~ow can they be reborn after having died? (Reply] As long as the aggregate of L1ts ] conditions e.'

=3.

is the case, how could merit (~) possibly arise through worship?inq such an illusory 3uddha? It could

not, any more than it could be produced by reverancing

a ~gical creation. ~antideva replies that just as truly existent merit would De produced as a result of worship

9ing the truly existent 3uddha accepted by the realist,

just so is illusion-like mer~t produced from worship~ing an illusion-like 3uddha; the difference =e~~een the ;.;ad:'1yamika and his adversary is solely over the ontolog

ical status to be assigned to merit and 3Uddha -- the

causal ?rOcess fu~ctioning identically in either case

~nis ar~~ent is taken u? at len~h later on CV.3E-40J.

;.:oreover, if sentient lleings are like illusions,

how could they be reborn? According to the opponent re

birth could not take ?lace in that situation, since an

illusory ~an cannot be regenerated after the illusion is destroyed. ~antideva's answer is as above, n~~ely that causality will continue to 0gerate whether the causes and

results be substantially existent or illusory; an illusion

~ill persist as long as the spells or drugs or whatever factors are involved in its ?roduction remain o~erative. Likewise, as long as the aggregate of nec~ssary conditions (oratyayasamacrrl) for birth in cyclic existence are ?resent , i.e. ignorance, a~tion and craving (avidva

~arma-t~,qa), the continuum of a sentient being (sattyasamtana ) will not cease to enter into the varioUS states

. - . j .

of cyclic existence. ~e objection might be put forth that the continuum of a sentient beinq, since it endures

throughou~ measureless aeons, could not be a ~ere illusion,

cagical creations being of a notoriously short duration.

~e re~ly is that is not necessarily the case; the continua

of sentient beings are of long duration just because their conditions last a long time. :ength of existence is not

a valid criterion for judging whether something exists genuinely or not, as eva~ illusory objects can have a long

continu~, e.g. dre~~ renembrance from the distant 9ast.

184.11-24

=Objectionl There is no sin in killing an illusory ~rson because Lan illusory person] ~as no mind. CReply] 3ut when there is ?Dssession of an illusory mind there is

the ~roductive source of sin and merit. ellJ Continuing his attack the realist now tries to show

that the consequences of the !'~dhyarnika thesis of :1onsubstantiality would be the nullification of the Dasic

:-\r)r",l ~rec.epts of :Uddh5 $~ ?~ainst ~urder, theft, etc.

5ince sentient teinqs are like illusion Che argues], they

do not have any cons~~ousness, and so murdering them

would only produce the sin of murderous i.ntention and

not the sin of actual wurder, just as if one were to murder an illusory person conjured up by a magician. In reply

~antideva distinguishes between the ?roducts of magical illusion and sentient beings, who are "like illusion" in

their mode of existence. The latter do possess minds,

22

c5. ~hough t~ose ~nds are likewise of an illusory nature,

and through harminS or ~nefitting them ~erit and sin 2E

are actually ~roduced.

164.25-185.14

CObjection] ~here is no ?roduction of an illusory ~nd, because that is not within the capacity of s?ells,

~tc. ~~e91YJ Illusion, which is ?roduced ~:om various

conditions, is li~ewise of various sorts; nowhere does a

single condition ?Ossess the capacity Lto ?roduceJ all 27

Ceffectsj. ~12-13bJ ?he opponent then ta~es exception to the ?Ossibility

~f there ceing such illusory minds by again totally

equatipg "real" sentient beings with ::Lagically created

ones. ~s idea is that just as consciousness cannot exist in an ele9hant created by a magician, since spells, drugs

and the like do not have the capacity to produce con

sciousness in the illusions they create. in just the same Nay illusory sentient ~eings could not ?Dssess a ~nd.

~e ?Oint of the reply is that ~gical creations and con

ventionally real beings can ~e easily distinguished,

although their intrinsic ~atures ~y ~ similar. since

~hey are ?roduced by different types of conditions. iagi

cal creations are generated by s?ells, etc., and living

'~ings by ignorance. etc.; the latter conditions have the

ca?acity to give rise to conscious creatures, while the =ormer do not have such a ca?acity. I have followed

{. --'

?rajnakar~ti's line of inter~retation here, as it see~ to fit ~ore easily into the line of argument; although Tsong.kha9a and ~gyalt.shaD inter?ret i.12ab as ~antideva's statement rather than as an objection, emphasizing the difference ~tween livin~ bein~s and ~q_ ical creations, as the latter cannot te conscious due to

29 the inca?acity of s~ell~, etc. Tso~q.~~a.9a and ~~lt.-shaz here, as alsewher=, are followinq the line of inter

?retation laid down ~y 3us~on who re~rts 2raj~;cara-30

nati's ?OSition as well.

125.15-1e7.11

~CbjcctiOuJ !f a ~~inq l~ dlready libera~ed from

the standpoint of ~he ultL~te, and transnigrates ~onlyJ

conventiona_~y, in that case even ~uddha wouid transrniqrate. and what would ~e the point of 30dhisattva activ

ity: C~eplyJ rlhen its causes are ~ot extirpated e~~~ or. illusion will ~ot cease, zut when its causes are extir?atec CcycliC ~~i5te~cel will not arise even Conventionally. 13c-15bl

The 0P90 nent here is a ~ddhist sUDstantialist

(sv;>.bna-"av?:"din ), either a 1aiohasika-;;arv~stivadin who

.

:cceots nirva~a ~s =ei~g a real, eternal entityo _ (asamSkrta-dharm a ), 0= a 3autrantika. who holds to thei 'liew thet it is wholly a negation (nirodha) which does

31 not exist as a real entity (dravva). In either case, these schools acceDt

o a nirvana which is entirely dls

tinct from cvclic existence (sarnsara). ~owever, to- .

32

~7.

:: he ' :C"':;l ~aill.i.i

ES.

tiality would pertain to mind itself, the ;~~~yamika

view would not allow for the ?erception of even illusory

phenomena. 51e '!ogacara claims to .::.void this fault by

accepting a truly existent ~nd which; however, errs in 34

perceiving objects as external to it. An a!"!alogous cour.te~-objection to this Yogacara position is t~en ad

vanced: since the Yogacara accepts that even illusions

which are external to consciousness do not exist, ~t

that there is only the appearance of forms such as

elephants, etc., which are in actuality only conscious

ness, how then does he account for the perception of

phenone..l1a "1hich temporal occcrence (deSa-k~la-niyama)? On the basis of Yogacarin assumptions there can ce ~o intelligible accounting for an ordered sequence of events, or for

publicity of knowledge, and phenomena should therefore 35 ~e able to appear at any place or time.

':'he meaning of 'l.16cd is rather unclear, Out I have

followed the 3C8.? in my translation, which takes it as

forestalling a possible yogacara defense of their ?Osi

tion, i.e. that there is a perceived aspect (akara) wpich appears in logical sequence conventionally, but

which is of the nature of mind itself, although it is

objectified as external. The ~~dhyamika counters that because it appears ~ ~ there must be something other

than the perceiving consciousness itself, i.e. there

must be an efficient object (~) which is the cause

7U.

of its pe~ception; such a . conclusion would of course

De unacceptable to the Cittamatrin. ~ere is, however,

a wide divergence of opinion among cornmentato~s as to the

36 actual meaning of these six Pada-s.

187.31-188.26

;'lhen mind itself is an illusion, then t,lhat is per

ceived, and by what? '!he .t'rotector of the ~lorld has said that mind does not perceive mind; just as the blade of a sword does not cut itself, so mind Ldoes not

cognize itself]. [17-18bJ

"The Yogacarin takes the POSition that perceived

objects arp- not in fact differ~~t =ram thp- natur~ of consciousness, out are aspects of mind appearing as

external objects and are therefore like illUsions in that they do not exist as they appear. There is, then,

the problem of accounting for perception since there

is no actual external object t~ function as the cause of perception. In this connection the Yogacarin might

bring up the function of self-consciousnEss (svasaQvedana), which is simultaneously aware both of itself and of ?erceived oejects which are actually identical to it in nature. The next ten VerEes are devoted to

Santideva's denial of t~e necessity or possibility of this type of perceptual ?rocess.

:irstly, scriptural authority is cited in order ~o refute the ~ogaca~a acceptance of self-consciousness.

37

71

':.'he 3uddha explicitly denies that t:us is ?QssiblE, in the ~2tnacu~asut ..a, "Indeed, :nind does not ?erceive

mnd." It would also be a logical contradic-cion for

the perceiving agent co be essentially identical with the

perceived oDject in ~~e sane way that a sword blade cannot 38

cut itself, or the tip of a finger touch itself.

lS3.3C-109.3

~op?Dnent's thesis] ~t is like a lamp which ill~nes itself. ,-?eplyJ --, lam? is !lot illuoined, ~cause it is not covered by darkness. =l8c-l~bl

In order to da~onstrate the ?Ossibility of self-con

~~!c~s c~itic~ of ~e~ta! objects the Yog~carL~ ~aise5 the analo~J of the lam~. Just as the la~p can illumine

other o~jects such as pots and itself at ~he sane ~L~e,

so does self-=onsciousness ?erce1ve ~th itself and the

39

object of ?erception at the sa@e time. I:ne ;radhyamika

sees this as an ip-appropr1ate exa~ple since the function

of light is to reveal that which is obscured DY darkness,

and as there is no darkness in a light, a la~p ~as no

40

need to illumine itself. ?urtherrnore a lanp could not

illUMine itself since that would ~ean darkness would

41

cover itself, in Iolhich case there would :::e no darkness.

~vP?Onent's t~esisJ Just as a non-blue crystal depends on another for its blueness, therefore som~

things are ?erceived 1epa~dent on another, and so@e non

7 .J.

dege~de~t on anocher. }e?lyJ ;'hen there is non-blueness, 42

that :::lue ~'llll not ::e ?roduced by itself. 19c-201 The !ogacarln may ac;ree that the mind does not ?er

ceive itself in the sa~e ~nner that it ~erceives other objects, out ~lntain, ~evertheless, that it has a eual fUnction. ~ust as the blueness of a clear crystal is the =eflEctio~ of sunethir.g else, e.g. = =l~e flower-getal ?laced under it, so the ~nd reflects other objects in ~e~endence on certain latencies (vasan2), and it can also

!Jerceive itself in t~e sane way that a ;:'lue o;;,ject like

lapis lazuli a?pears blUe inde?en~-,tly of other attri

~utes (uoaani). ~ne l~dhya~ika does not accept this

analogy, since even the blue of a blue oOject a?pears in

de~endence on causes and conditions. 7ne blUeness of

1a?is lazuli is not 7=oduced by itself, since ?roduction

from self is rejected by all ~uddhists.

190.29-191.1.3

"?he lam!) shines " is ex~ressed because it is icnown

~y cognition, but by what can Cthe statE..~ent '1 "the intellect illumnes" ::e said to have ceen ;cnO\m?

If illumination or non-illumination is not ?erceived ~y anyone,

then even tal~ing about it is foolish, LlikeJ ~alking about the char@s of a Darren wOQen's daughter. ~21-22J

:Ven if we acce9t t~at tne nature of a lam~ is illumination, it does not follow that conSCiOusness can

139.9-190.24

44

73.

ill~~ne (i.e. ?erceive) itself. :'hat a lamp s:u.nes is understood via its ~eing an object of cognition but there is no way that self-consciousness could be ?erceived in

a similar fashion. It can't be known by a ?rior cognition

Decause it would not yet have Deen ?roduced, or ~y a sub

5e~uent co~ition because it would already have ceased;

~or could it ~e ?erceived ~y a si~ltaneous cognition,

si~ce it would not ~ave existed prior to ~t, and so could

~ot ~e the cause of that cogniticn, which is a sine ~ua 43 ~on for being an object of cognition. Consequently it is foolish even to discuss whether or not se1f-conscious

ness cognizes as there is no means ~y which such a self-

conscious cognition could ::::e :ulc-.m, either by itself or

by 30me other cognition. ~o discuss it is as senseless

as dp-bating whether a ~arren woman's daughtp-r is charming

or not; ~th self-consciousness and the barren wo~n's

daughter should =e understood as non-existent, ~ecause

neither can be validated by any perception.

191.21-192.24

~'Juery J If there is no self-consciousness, how is

consciousness rema~red7 L~e9lYJ ~ough connection Nith the ex?erience of another Lobjectj memory Lof its ?erception] arises, like Lreme~eringJ a rat's venom. ~23J

The op?Onent may try to ?rove the existence of

self-consciousness by inferring it through its effect,

the m~~ory of a subjective experience, e.g. ~he memory

7 ', .

of a ?rior gerceptio~ of ~lue. ~ince we do remember

ex?eriencinq such things, there must have been a self-

conscious witness ?resent at the time of the experience.

The ;'';-dhyamilca holds that this cause and effect rela

tionship does not necessarily a~?ly, and that we can

have the rena~ranc~ of a subjective experience without having perceived it at the time of its occurance by

self-consciousness. ~antideva rai5es the example of a 45

.!:at bite; at the time one is bit~en the bite itself

is experienced, aut not the fact that some disease-

causing organisms carried by the .!:at have entered one's

body. 50wever at a later ddte the disease may tcorne

~nifest, and at that time one will rema~ber the rat

bite, and infer that the infection took ?lace at that

time and, in just the same way, do we remember a ?rior subjective experience.

.lith relation to the remembrance

of an object which is other than the perceiving subject itself, we reme~r that there was a prception of the object aithough there was no such awareness of the ?erceptual experience at the time that it too~ 9lace. 192.26-193.10

~Opponent's thesis] 5ince Lather ~nds are] seen Hhen one is endowed with other conditions, Cthe ~ndJ then illumines itself. .... 'l-._LReplyJ decause of

.... 'u:::: a;:;;:.!..!.

cation of efficacious eye-ointment a ?ot of treasure is

seen, but the Ointment itself will not be seen. L24J

75.

5ince 2uddhists accept that the a~tainment of cer

tain contemplative states brings about the ability to

?erceive the minds of othe~s, the opponent argues that

one certainly could ?erceive one's own ~nd as well,

inasmuch as it is ~ch closer and eas~er of access than

others', ~antideva denies that we a~e a~le to ~erceive ~he means 0: ge~ception itself and !1e offers the analogy of an eye-oin~ent which has been rendered efficacious

~'1 s;ells, etc" in oreer to enable one to see buried

treasure. ~~thoush one can see a pot of treasure

buried far beneath the ground nhen the eye ointment is

applied, one still cannot ?erceive the ointment itself

upon one's own eyes. 3L~larly, although one can attair.

knowledge of others' minds, one's own ~nd is not 46

directly knowable.

193.15-194.4

The nanl'ler in which things are seen, heard and

;

77.

48 oy a truly existe:lt mind. This difficulty does not

ar-ise for t::e "!adhyam.ika since he acce?ts that ~t!"l the object of perception and ~he ?erceiving mind are not ulti

~tely existent, =ut ~hat ~ind nevertneless !"las the ca?2.-Tnus the realistic vie~ of an

city for oerception.

ess~~tially different ?erceived object and ~erceivin~

su~ject can ~e maintained conventionally while kee?ing in

=ind t~eir non-inherent existence.

1.94.27-195.20 If ~you say ~hatJ cycliC existence has a real entity

as its support ~~e re?ly that] it would ~e otherwise, .:lew could a non-existent 1:hi:1c; ;:;e endo\Oled

like s?ace.

~ith activity on ~he ~~sis of its de?endence on a real

e:ltity? ~27c-280J

~.e !oqac~ra deni~s ~r~t cyclic existence is objectively or ultiraately existent ;:ecause the ,.12 jor afflictions (s~~esa) of ?assion (raoQ), etc., are :nerely adventitious (acrantuka), inasm~ch as they arise :rom ~he

L~?utation of a :alse ~

79.

is t.~e case "Ioat virtue is obtained even if ,-:.i~c.-o!lly l.S o!:ltained? ~2Sc-29J

:oavinS shovm then that ::lental objects can have no ~elation to the t:l?e of ~nd ?ostulated in the !ogacara

syst~, ..Ie are led to the conclusion that for th~~ wind i s entirely non-dual and free of any accoQpany1ng as~ects

~en thou;h thE iogacarins s~eak

of sucject and object. of the extirpation of afflictive characteristics, how can

thera =e any relation between afflictive c~zracteristicS and an i~herently 9ure nind? If mind is thus free fran subjectiVity and ocjectivity, there can be nothing

wn~ch is falsely im~uted or L~g1~ed, and all sentient eeinas would be perfectly enliqhtenec ~athagatas from the very beginnin~ since they would be already endowed

If that is the case, then all 9racticewith such a mind.

of the 3uddhist Path :or the sake of extir?atins defiling

?assicns would ~e useless. ~ne o?ponent oight object that these consequences

do not necessarily :ollow; although there is in reality

no subject-object dichoto~y, sentient beings ~ersist in clinging to a =elief in objectivity (ohayaphinivesa) and

=.ut if3ave therefore not extirpated their afflictions.

that is the case, reto:-ts ~antideva, there -,Iould ce no .rirtue in the realization of ,-lind-only, since even the

actual possession of such a mind is insufficient ~o SO

eradicate the afflictions.

' 0_

196.10-197.8

CObjectionJ ~e~ if [?nenomenaJ are :-mO,1n as havi ns a nature which is like illusion, how will ?assio~ ce

suppressed? CIt will not] since 92.ssicn for an illusory woman is arousec even in her creator. CReply] -!hnt creator ~4S not abandoned his passionate propensities

concerning objects; ehus when he sees Lthe illusory womanJ, his conception of ~ptiness is of insufficient

51 ?Ower ~ to ?revene ~he arousal of passion]. ~30-31 J

~ne ~ogacarin now ?Osits a counter-objection to the j-i"dhyamika 'amch is cOlil?arable to the one just ( v . 2 9 ) raised against his school, i.e. that a knowledge of

reality as it is described by t.he ::adhya."a1ka would be

inefficacious to end SUffering. 2Ven if all phenonena

are icno\~n to be empty of true existence and like illusions

as the :-!adhyamika cla!n, one cannot eradicate the passions

by such knowledge, because even a magician vlno has created

a =eautiful i~lusory woman may become ?assionately at

~ached to her, des9ite his having full knowledse of her 52

illusory nature.

~antideva =etorts that such a magician is not com?arable to a ":adhyamika meditator who has (through re?eated conte~lative exercises) internalized the knowledge of the lacl< of true e."d.stence of all 9henomena. :'"ne

magician; while he may have a superficial intellectual

knowledge of the illusory nature of the woman that he has

conjured up, has certainly not suppressed his latent

21.

tendancies to hypostatize ~henomena (vastuta-samarooa), which have =een continually reinforced within his mental

continuum thro~ghout =eginningless cyclic existenc~,

through the agency of false constructive ideation

(mithva-vixaloc). Therefore the ~gician's weak knowledge of the ~~ical wo~n's ~~ptiness 1s overcome oy

his predilection to hold to the reality of objects, a~d his passionate attachment to his own illusion beco~es

?Ossible thereoy.

~97.12-28

3y reinforcing the 9ropens~ties Ltowards the ~nder-

standing of] 3mptiness, the propenSities Ltowa~ds clinging to sUbstantial~ ~x~s~ence will De abandoned.

?hrough constant p=actice Cin cont~~~lating thatJ "nothing at all exists," that too will be abandoned subse

quently. ~32J In order to extirpate the afflicting passions, a

dee~ly ingrained awareness of ~?tiness is necessary

which will :,ave the force to O'lercome one's irlnate ?ro

9ensities tQ hold phenow,ena as being SUbstantial entities. ~owever. not only must dogmatic attachment to the view of

existence be destroyed, but equally so must the dogmatic

attachment to the Ernpt~ness of existence since both these

views are imaginative constructions, and as such, obscur

ations of ineffable ~ealityj the danger of objectifyinq _ 53

~ptiness is a frequent th~~e of ;sdhya~~ka writers .

~erefore after one has obtained insight into ~ptiness

:3 2

he should :ueciitat-.= that not:"1ing truly exists, neither

real things nor ~ptiness. 3Ven though 3mptiness is the indispensible counteragent to su~stantialistic views, it must be jettisoned eventually; this is in aqre~ent with the general ~uddhist view that all teachings are =ut ex?edients for reaching some goal, and once that goal

is reached, t!1e :neans !:lust De discarded, a ...lclicated by

the \-Iell-known ;:arable of the raft.

198.1-199.7

:'ihen one considers that nothing c.:-:ists and one does

net perceive any eY~stent, how then can non-existence

remain before the mind, Deing unsuPPOrted? rlhen neither

existence nor non-~stence remains oefore the mind, as there is no ether condition, it is pacified. C33-34]

~ne opponent ~ght Object that contemplating "nothing at 'ill exists" will not eliminate all Views as

the I'adhyaraika clai..'lIs, since the conception of non

existence itself (abhavakalpana) would still be present. ~antideva denie~ that this is so, and states that once the conception of an imputed existent entity is no longer

perceived, its negation, non-substantiality, will also

disa~pear from the mind, since it depends on an imputed subject to =e produced; and once that subject is negated. its negation also will automatically disappear. In other words non-existence irnolies its o\-In negation, and

not any sort of POsitive position.

::3.

~ ;nen all ~ossi~le ideas of either existence or ~on-

existence ~ave =een el~oinated fro~ the nind, one =ecomes

free fro~ the two ocscurations and there is no longer

=ny SU9~rt for ~he intellect's 9roliferatins tendancies

(~ra~ancaj, since in riddir.~ oneself of the views of

Sot~ ~~istcnce and non-existence one has a~hausted all

?Ossi=le ~eta?hysical conditions. ~~ t~ere i.s :'!o

terti~~ ~id, t~e ~nd =eco~es co~~letely ?a~ified, i.e.

~liq~t~~aent is attained. :':.-:.e.5e t'iC 'lerses :-e?:resent

-:he ~intessence of the ..:cdhyc::u':-:a c=iti~ue, and accorc

in.:; to ~radition, while reciting- them, ~antideva !:ose into the air and. disappeared, altho'.lgh his audience

5~ continued to hear ~s recital of the rest of the ;~,.

199.1.2-200.4

;'.lst as desires are fulfilled '::Jy wis~-~=antin"

jeo,1els and wis~inq trees, the i:.lage of tne .:onqueror is seen ~y the disci?les. ~ecause of ~the ~erit of 1 t~E disci?les and the ~2.0dhisattvaJ vow. 351

Zf it is the case that a ~udd~a is con?letely free

of constr'..!ctive ideation as t~e ;oadhya~ika clai:ns, an

o09Qnent ~ight oeject that then ~e would De unable ~o :ulfill the ai3s of sentient Dein~s, ~ince he would Oe

without any thoughts concerning them or the ~eans to

aid th~". ~antideva concedes that the 3uddha is in fact ~yond all intellect'.lal or other worldly activity, and

that the a!?pearance of the .3uddha' s !Jody endowed with

--'" .

~he thirty-two characteristics 0: a ~reat being and ~he activity in which he sea~s ~o enqa~e are all auto;~tic r9s~nses, and fulfill the ?ur~ses of sentien~ ~ein~s without any nore ideational activity than is dis~layed oy t~e wish-grantinq jewel or tree (cint;~a1i. ~aloat2ru) in qranting the worldly desires 0= ~ods and ::len.

:'he ca~se of this ii9gearance of the .;;uddh? is

two-fold: the ~turation of the wholesome actions (kusala-~arna) of those who ;,ecoI:le the .::uddha' s disciplEs, and the ?rojective ~wer of the intense vow (oranidhana) to achieve the welfare of sentient Deings which was ~de ~y the ~ddha at t~e t~~e of his ~ecOming a :Odhisattva.

:'his docetistic view is in acco:-..:ance

'./i th the ~eneral ;;ahayana conce9tion of t~e sU~er55 ~danc nature of the 3uddha.

2CO.IO-30

';ust

- - - - - - -

57

35.

the vow is no longer 9resent, naving 9assed away into

~;irvana. ~antideva replies tha~ these Gffects will occur

~eqardless of the 20sence 0= the ~dhisattva, just as a stick consecrated ~y the use of s?ells, etc., by a dealer

56 in antidotes as a remedy to snake Dite and other

poisons will continue to De effective, even though the

consecrator will have been long dead. 3imilarly, al

though the 50dhisattva has ?assed into the highest non

aoidlna nirvana (aoratiithlta nirvanai, the effects ofJ. i ;-u.s practice of -=::::"';1s:.'.:t'1a activity are still :1ani

f ested in the many a9parent deeds of the ;uddha for the

'oenefit of sentient =eings.

201.1-202.16

~eryJ ~w can t:here De a result of worshipping . a ':uddha"j who is without thouaht? ;' i eolvi . '!'here can

~el ~ecause it is taught that Cthe merit of worshipping ~ ~ddhaj a~idins Lin the world] and one who is extin';uished is equal. 5cripture says that there will ;,e a

r esult either conventionally or ultimately -- otherwise

:"10W can it be that "worshipping a real ~ddhc. is

efficc.::ious. C38-3S]

.iere ~antideva dismisses as invalid a ?Ossible :iinavana objection to the Hahayanist worship of a 3uddha who is free from all conce~tions. ?ow can ~erit De 9ro

duced for the devotee, they ask, since the j'iahayana 3uddha, lacking all thought, could not enjoy their worship? ~e reply 1s that 1t is taught in scripture

;;L .

that there is no difference at all in the ~erit obtained from worshi~ping a l~ving =uddha or one who has ?assed awav into remainderless nirvana (niruoadhisesa-nirvan~).

- . .

-~though the scri?tural passages cited in the 3cnP are

- - 58

all from j'ahayana works, t:his would seem to be a conclUsion that the :nayana, too, -;.,'ould have to accept, to

justify their own veneration of the ~istorical ~akyamuni, who has :Jassed into the extinction of oarinirvana. '':-:,e

' '. ~eritorious effects of reliqious ?ractice are ~ot depen

dent on there bein~ a =eneficiary apart trom the ?racti

tioner; the merit of worship is ?roduced ~cause of th~

ef=ect of that wors~~9 on the rr~nd of the devotee.

nnether the ~esults of worship are conventionally exis

tent as n",ld ~y the ,!idhyamika, or substantially ~eal

as the 2lnayanist is depicted as believing, the fact

~emains that Doth agree that there 1s a meritorious

effect "roduced. !'he :ilnayanist must agree that the

.anayanist worship is as efficacious as his own, since

the "real .3uddha" (satya-bUddha j whom he worships is

as insensate as the more illusory ~uddha of the rahayana, as he has =een totall y extinguished in pari59 nirvana

.

2C2.17-204.lS

: ':

- - - - - -

204.16-30

87. of unde~standing 3mptiness t CReply] ~s ~cripture says: "':'here is no =:nlightenment

87.

of unde~standing 3rnptiness? CReply] ~s 3cripture says: "':'here is no :::nlightenment

39.

deny that such is ~he case, aut he =ejects ehe :iinayanists 9rete~sio~s to a~ excl~sive ~~th-cla~~ on

~he grounds that these v~lidating criteria are ~ually

c.?plicai:Jle to the ~:a.ha:tana.

,'~t~ough che i-ahayana also claLrr.s an uncro:~en te.~

tradition, t:le ::act that they assert that the ,:anayana

scri!?tures were crans:r.i t ted :,y i'aitreya, ,:en jusri and 63

OC;1er ahistorical .=odhisaetva figure:; rather weakens

their claims to historical authenticity, a situation

which the ::a.~:~nists the~elves could not fail to notice. ?=ajnakara~ati accordinqly ~oncentrates ~ere on laying out material ra~her than fo~al or historical criteria

for the acce~tance of a scri?ture as the ~uthentic ;~rd

of =Uddha. L'1 gE~eral, ~on-falsehood is t~e mark of

:uddha's s?eech. :he ::our characte.istics found in the 64 ;'Eifl~asa"asamcodanasut~a are (li connection with the

aooroQriate ~eanina (Dratibhana~art~ooasamhita~) rather- ... ... - . ,

than with the inappropriate, (2) connection with the ~harma rather than w~th non-Cha~a, (3) ~einq a cause of renunciation of defil~ents rather than of their in

crease and (4) sho~~ing the good qualitlEs (aur;a) of nirva~a rather chan those of cyclic existence. .:jince the

:~hayana scri?tures meet these criteria, ~hey should be

res~ected as the speech of the =uddha by the ~nayana.

~~at the ~inayana scri?tures are accepted also ~y sone non-;uddhists as oeinq authentic is quickly disposed of

?O. as a 9roper reasor. -- if acceptance by non-=uddhists

.;ere an acceptable validation of scripture, 'Chen toe :iecias

and other heretical ~ndu and ~ter1alist texts would be true. ~t is a conclusion tOa'C ~he ?~na~anist could

not accept, ~eing a 2uddhist.

206.3-22

!:: ~ou say i "'::'he r:.aha~'1a ~ scripturesJ have controversial ?Dints ~and should therefore be rejected] then you should reject your o~m scri~tures, :;ince with these scri?tures there are ?oints contested by the non-~uddnist, and ~y Cthe adherents ofl your o~m Lsectarian divisionl and other ~~nayana sects]. 431

5ince the 2tnayanist finds inconsistencies in the

,'lahiyina canon, some of which he accepts as agreeing with

his own teachings, and SO!!le of which, such as the .;adhya

:!like. ViE.l of :::CUptiness, he rejects as erroneous, he believes this casts doubt on the authenticity of the

canon as a whole, This cannot hold water, ~owever, Since ~ny ?Ositions in the ~nayana canon are sL~larly areas of de!::ate, It goes without saying that the adherents of

the 3rah~nical systa~s reject ~any ~nayina Views, cut within the ~inayana itself thare is no consensus. Traditionally the ?JLnayana is divided into four ~ain divisions and eighteen sub-sects, each with differing

Versions of the whole or ~rts of the canon, and there are numerous sharp disagreements on doctrine and disci

91. E5

?line ~etwee!1 and within these 'Tarious oivisions. 206.22-207.29

?rUe ~o~khood is the root of the ;uddha's ?eaching; ~either trUe ~onkhood aor nirvana can ~ claL~ed for.

C44J~hose whcse minds p~ve objectS. dt this ?Oi!1t ~antideva ~ou~ts a direct attac~ on ~he ~nayana contention that ~lishtenment can ~ obtained via the cOr.lprer.ension of the ::our ~,oble l'rut!1s alone l';40J.

~e state of bei~~ a true ~nk (bhik~uta) is the foundation for all the abilities ~~d meditative states that lead to ;:nlighten.,"-ent r and thUs is of ?rl.mary L-a90rtance

to 3uddhism. ::;y a ::lonk ~antideva weans not merely a ,

nominal, self-professed or beggerly ::lonk (S?rnjfi~

ty?es W!10 have

and Dhik~aQasil~ 2hik,u-S),::>rati jna... =een always ~ch in evidence in India, or even a ?roperly ~lly-0rd?ined monk (inaoticaturthalsarpano:)a

s2moanna-~hi!Ssu), although such a one is of course riahtlv. . - entitled to be called a monk in co~on ~arlance. Only a

o~onk who ~as destroyed the defilc~ents (ohinnakleS bhi::~) fully deserves the c.ppelation "monk." ::or that

~eason these who have only ?erceived the sixteen aspects of the .?our -rruths according to the :iinayana tenets

cannot =e said to have achieved true monkhood because

under the r.idhyamika groundrUles the ~'{tirpation of the defil~~ents can only come abOut through an understanding 0f Emptiness and the acquisition of a state of conscious

92

ness free trom all conceEltual activity Lsee '/.33-34, 49l.

3ince the ~nayanist's understandin~ of the ~our 'rruths

is dependent on o~jects, (although that specific understanding is free from defil~~ent)J it leads co attach-

EE ment to real entities (bhava~hin1rvesa), conceptualization, passion. karma and rebirth. Therefore one who

has not understood ~ptiness is i~capable of co~pletely

destroyin~ the defil~~ents and of attaining remainderless

~irvana. In this and the following verses, Santideva is.

further confirmed to ~ a ?rasangika, rather than a

.3vatantrika j:adhyamjJ

33.

t.hat the c2~acity of ?revious karma for ~ene~2tin9 a

futl'.re effect i st.ill ;Jresent. in these ;,rhats. ':'"nis

::'.Cy be illustrated =y the ::,eatin-q ;.;c.udgalyayana suffered

at. the ~nds 0: some disci?~es of a tirthika teacher whom he met on his return jo __~ey from ~ell after he had told

t.ha~ to sto~ the ?ractices which were causing t.heir

teacher to suffer there. .~~other exa~?le would be

:'"nqulimila IS chast.isement by an angry alOD, '..Ihlch re

sulted from t.he ~=ders he committed 9r1or to his con63

version by the 3uddha ~ne ?Otentialities for results

such as those were of course formed long ::,efore either

;.~udgalyay:'..na ~r ..:..ngulinala had !Jecome sair.t.s (ar~ra), 63

when they were st.ill defiled common ?e09le. .~though

they ~ad destroyed the innate defil~~ents (kleSasahakarij, they t'iere not CO::l9letely freed fron further re::irth since

they had not destroyed ignorance which is the root cause

of cra'.Ting (tH7a). It is craving and the ?Ossession of ~staken views which are the main causes of r~~~~h.

200.17-,,09.2

If U'ot.: sayJ it is certain that L_=Uhats J do not take rebirth, ::,ecause they are without craVing, ~we re91y that

they do have craving; J i!lthough this craving is non-defiled,

why cannot it ~e like ~non-defiled; ignorance? 2raving arises fr08 feeling, and that feeling exist.s in those

.c..rhats. ~4E-47bl ~'1e o?ponent might attem9t to argue that the _~hats

could not take rebirth since they were free from its

3roduced again, as in the case of non

?erce9tual meditative eqUipoise. 7heref~re, ~9tiness

- -

':5.

5~ou1d je con~a~?lated. _~7c-~3J 7ne ar~C\a'!t whic~ cownenced at -;.44 is here SU:,,

:ne ~xhat who has not understood:2ri.::ed and concluded.

~he non-substantiality of all things r~ins attached to se~~ngly truly eXistent ~tities ~n ~s cont~~91ation of ;:he :our ';:ruths, eitner to the conte,n~lati'le enjects ':.he!-:lselves, or the nirvana, which is the-roa1 0::: that. cen

.-.s a result of that attac!'-;:tent, cravin; :'3 ':.e.~?lation. not destroyed, and tne .~ha~ is conda~~ed to continue in ;:he cycle of rebirth and not attain fL~al ~anci?2tion. :hus, without the unders~anding of ~9t~n:ss, a ~nd fettered =y attac!1.

97.

210.15-211.12

3avin; ~een liberated from the extremes of attachment

and fear [the =odhisattvaJ ra~1ns in cyclic existence for the sake of those that suffer, because of Lvoluntary] ignorance. rhis then is the result of Emptiness. L52J

~ttachrnent and fear are prod~ced ~y adherence to the

two extra~e vie~ of ~e~nence and nihilism (saSyatauccheda-anta)j through oelier in the endurin~ nature of ;:hinqs one becomes attached to thern, and thro~qh thinking

that nothing exists at all great fear and terror can arise.

:'he !;adhyamika claims to offer a middle ;Jath netween these

two extremes: unde!:standing t?1e ultimate truth of non-

substantiality is the ra~edy for ~elief in ~e~anence,

and acce?tance of conventional existence is the coun~er-

agent to nihilisr:l. :'he 30dhisattva hO'lrJever, althou-~h

he ~as attained wisdom, still elects to r~ain in cyclic

existence underrudence :?resents Xlth alternatives i.~Dartially, althouc:;h he ?er

ha~s =avors che fO~e!" sli~htly ~y ccnmentiuq cn it fi!:st. : have aoo:;:ted the la-.:te!: \-;hich =e~resents ut least as valid a:1 e:~e

-0 ,,~ .

h~vinq understood it 9r0gerly will De ter~ified c? this conception of universal non-s'.lbstantiality which encoI!t

-'~c.55e5 even thG

_.' and~uddhls~ ic.th and the ~oal of :,irvana, ~hat fear will cause XL~ co tu~ ~~s bac~ on che cranquil bli55 of :i~~ation and continue to endure the ~iseries of cyclic ~v~stence

~11.13-30 ~~s objections ~o tr.e ~ositicn of 23ptiness do

7herefore Jm?tiness should ~ cont~~?latednot ::cllo.l

'..Jit!'!out hesitation. 3ince .:mptiness is t::e counteragent

to the dar~~ess of the emotional and co~itive obscura

ho.1 could one desirous of or.miscience not quidd.y

':ions,

cont~?late it? ~53-54J

~~e oDjection that cont~91ation of ~~9tiness

would lead to a~~iety which is i~L~cal to ~i=eration, as well as the other objections to the efficacy of the _.:adhyamika .Ihich had ~een advanced in this section ~ '1.40 et s~.J are inapplicable see also 'i.S5-56], and there

:o~e one should ?ractice ~eGitation on ~?tiness ~ithout any doucts. ~ne obstacles to attaining ~he o~iscience (sarvainatai of 3uddhahood are the a~otional c.nd cog

5ince an understancing of ~ptinessni~ive obscu~ations. =er.~ves ~th of these oDscurations it is indis?ensible

~o the aspirant to ~lighte~~ent.

2121-22 It is pro?er that fear be ?roduced regarding that

l aO.

which generates sufferins, cut why should 3Dptiness which

allays suffering ?rod~ce fea~7 If there were some Sel f ,

then fear could occur regarding any object whatsoever. ~t since there is not any Self at all, whose fear ~ould

it ~e? ;-55-56"1

It miqht be objected that contemplation of ~9tiness is not suitaole for most ?eople, on the qro~~ds that

such a radical overturni~g of all our notions of ~he

5ubsuntial reality of the tmiverse .lill ;:rodcce only ab

ject terror at first. ~antideva does not deny the ?sychological truth of this, =ut att~~?ts to dispell

such fear through rationc.l analysis. ;"ctually, it is

ordinary phenomena that should frighten us, cs they a~e

directly or indirectly causes of suffering. ~~ under

standing of ~ptiness on the other hand is ?roductive of

spirit~al advancement and Li=eration. end as such should

::e welcomed vIi th joy. ":"s for fear itself, Iole cannot

find any basis for its production upon ?roper cnalys~s.

7ear arises onl/ in those afflicted ~y the ignorance of

clinging to a truly existent 3el (at~acrahaj; if there were really c.~ ego existing apart :ron the various ;?sycho

sornc.tic eler:1ents, it would ~e ap?ropriate that a person

"lould fear va~10us unpleasant or terrifying thir.ss. 3uch a personal 3elf, however, is just hypostatized =y the

L~gination (kal~anasarnarooita), and upon analysis is found to have no SUbstantial reality whatever a?art from

le1.

its utility as a verbal and conce~tual convention. If this

~s the case, fear of =nyt~nq at all ~ecomes an absurdity,

as there is seen to De no real sucject which could be the ?Ossessor of that fear.

213.5-215.23

::':1e c>el:: is neither teet:h, hair or nails, :1or is it

~lood, snot or ?i1legn, pus or l~~h. ~e 3elf is neitr.er

~rrow, sweat, fat or entrails, nor is it the colon, ~osition in t~ese verses does not differ

102. from those of the ~nayana. Prajnakaramati cakes these verses as a refutation of Jaina, ;."Irnamsaka and ?udgala

.

vada views en the :>elf, ~ut t::u.s is not e:q?licitly indicated by the verses. :'he last quarter of 'i. 59, which

refers to the six-consciousnesses (si~ht, smell, ~earing, taste, tactile and ~ental consciousnesses) begins t:he refutation of the 5~~hva ~sition, which identifies

, - . 79

the ~elf with consciousness.

215.26-216.20

.;.~ ;mo\-Jledge of sound is '- the 3elfl then sound \-Jill always oe ?erceived. ;~en there is no o~ject of knowledge,

what is known ~v ~eans of which Cthe 3elf1 is deSignated as ~'1owledge: If that which doesn't know is ~'1owledge, then it 'Would follov) that a 9iece of ',lOod is knowledge; i~ is certain that there is no knowledge without ?roxinity to an object of knowledge. C60- 61]

~ere begins the refutation of the 2erson (ouru~a), "-~ _l... "-'k_ . ., .. ~ ..... " ,-,.e ";a,.7J(n':ic.. cCCeut::S as :;..einq -- _..... _---,c;.u c .... C,L.Ua..r.. cogn.:Lzinq

.' . ;:>rinci;:>al. ;antideva begins :'y statinq the consequence

(orasancr?,) that if :

103.

of knowledge (~) that. defi~es knowledge or knowing. !f the .:ia':l.Iec2use

~~ that case it woul~ =e a dual entity. ... 3ee "1.123- 29 .~

:'he t:u-ee .::onsc:ituent ale.'1lents ;.}hich constitute the ~atu.re of t~c funda~ental $u~stance, i.a. sattva, =aje5

end tamas, abide in their own nature ("svasvabi1avavavasthit~ " " )

105.

and are ahlays isolated. 7nus it is incor~ect to 90sit

any ~nd of ~~ifold cha~ac~er to ~h~~, which ~ould be

~e?endent upon their having the ca?acity fo~ change, to

Ce either ?roduced O~ ?~u~ucers, as are fat~er and son.

.~thouqh the 3~~~h~~ does ascribe an evolutionary ability ':0 fU.\1ciai~ental su~stance, the ;:adhyar.ti.ka sees this as a =latant contradiction of its ?artless and gernanent na

tu=e. ?Urthe~o=e, if the 2e~son were a!'! all-ge~asive

cogr.i=e~, it sho~ld co~i=e all t~ngs at all t~es. but

~e knOvl er.t;:>i.rically that this is not so.

217.23-219.17

~09ponent's thesis:i ~nus that ~consciousness takes on I anot~er fo~, like a dancer. ?e91yJ :n that case

it is non-eternal. If that ~fo~er consciousness ?roduc=s] the latte= c~racter, that singularity has never existed 9reviously. If ot~er characteristics are not

real, ;:ell us \~ha!: is the innate nature of that ~ ..>elf]. :f it is consciousness, t~cn it would follow that all ~en

are identical. 7he oental and non-mental would also be

identical, because their mode of neing is eouivalent. .\nd

if particulars are false, what is the foundation for their

~imilarity? =65~671

?he 3~hya argues that while consciousness may

c~n~e its form, pe~ceiving first soune and then shape

and color (form), its underlying basis is identical, just as the same dancer or actor can change costume and a99car

leE,.

in many diffe~ent roles. If the ~~hya accepts this, re~lies ~antideva, then he is adoitting the ~on-eternality (asasvata) of the cOq!li~inq 3elf, since ! t has cast off one character and taxen on another. It cannot be viewed

as a single su~stance in ~th its former and latter ~odes ~cause tWQ cognitions with different attributes ~st ~e regarded as se?arate ?henomena (at least Eroo the ~cdhist Viewpoi!'!t) although the :3~hya theory of sat!

219.18-220.15

107.

JOintless to oostulate an unde~lyins substance of =L~. 35 la~ity i~ ithe~ the ?hysical o~ co~nitive realm

~cause there could be no raal ~ases u9Qn ~r~ch s~ch ~ su~stance could =e established.

~ne no~-~ental also is not the 3elf, ~ecaUse of its 7hen Lif the 09?Onentinsentience, like a cloth, etc.

says j it coqniz~s through conjunction with 3ind, it

would follow that ~thE 3elf2 is destroyed ~hen it is ~on

?hen if there is a chan~eless 3elf, how couldcoc;nizant.

it =e affected by the ~ind? ;ou would have to acce?t

S?2 as ~he 3elf since it toO is! insentient andce

. c3-r-:J 1 non-functional. - --..1 ;'~ese ~v~ stanzas deal with the refutation of the "iyaya- '/aise~il

109.

-?e;>ly1 :':'1is ?Ossi~ility is?Ossessor of the effect. .-,sent and enjoyer -"ere t:aught ti1rou~n

no'c ;:erceived. ~70-72Jrecourse to thE ~nity of a ?ersonal continu~-:\ ~~e of the ~ost i@portant onjections to 'che ~ey ~GGhi3t coctrine of ~ersonal selflessness is that: if tne ?Ers is indeed 2.S ~~dc~ists cla:!.n only 2.n L~?ernanent cn aggregate of :::sychoso;;Jatic el~-:\ents, thEre ,louIe. ::'e :-:0

~asis for the o?eratior.. of ~oral caus2.tion, inasQUch as there -,Jould be :}o relation :Jet',]een the ?erson ;.Iho ?erfo!:'-!ed a v1r:ucus or: -""i1 cction and the one \-iho wculd

35 ~antie.eva

receive the reward or ?unis~ent for it. coes not attack the ?robl~ directly here, ~t states that thE oc~onent who ~elieves in ielf actuall~ is wror.s

~o criticise ~~e ;udd~sts on ~~s scers si~ce ?Oth ~f

a~ ac~io!l is ?erfc:c.lea :"r! t~S 1i::e ~:'e.:""] 2.~=ee -cnat

and the ",ffect is ex?eriencea in the ne::t, the ?erson

,mo is the SU??Drt (~'dhagj for the :?erfo!T.lance cf the action is different fro~ tnut for the er_jo~.ent of its

If the o??Dnent claL~s that in his syste..~ ~hEre::-esult. is an unchanqing ;el= underlyinq these disti~c~ ?ersons.

~antideva can a~air. =ring u? the consequence that such a ielf ':Jculd ::e cOr:J::;letely 5e~ara tee. from the act:!.vi ties of ?erforming actions and enjoyin~ their results =ecause of

39 ~us there is ~eally no SUD-its non-co';:nitive !1ature

stantial difference ~etween the ?rogonent of ~elf (at~a

,adin) and the :udchist.

1 1

It is ti"'.rouqh tile ,-,ental activity of a ?ersonal

continu,"--,-,-:\ (sa,?tana J that: the consequences of ?ctior..s an' ~!'ans.."r1.itt.eci; ~nd ~s al\r;ays ceen for the :uddhists

?G s:mony::tou~ with the o~eratio~ of :nora.l causality. ..;1e:l

a virtuous or non-virtuous ~ind ceases to exist, it leove~

:;ehlnd a late::t ?r0gensity (vasan;) ,.!rich is 2. s?ecial :: ~n of ::lental force (saI