Bokaro Steel plant //&963&environmentclearance.nic.in/writereaddata/online/... · iv. Steel making Shop v. Cold Rolling mill vi. Sinter Plant vii. Raw Material handling plant These

HAZARD IDENTIFICATION AND

RISK ASSESSMENT (HIRA)

AT

BOKARO STEEL PLANT

Steel Authority of India Limited (SAIL)Bokaro Steel Plant

HAZARD IDENTIFICATION AND RISK ASSESSMENT (HIRA) AT BOKARO STEEL PLANT

Bokaro Steel plant

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1. INTRODUCTION

Hazard Identification and Risk analysis (HIRA) deals with the identification and quantification of risks that are exposed to, due to accidents resulting from the hazards present or handling of hazardous substances in the workplace.

This involves Hazard analysis which essentially is identification and quantification of the various hazards that are likely to occur in the industry as well as quantification of the consequences due to a particular hazard. The risk analysis estimates the probability as well as severity of a particular hazard over an exposed group of people, plant equipment or both.

HIRA assists in identifying the most likely hazards which can have significant impact on workplace safety in an industry. It helps in devising effective management measures as well as engineering measures for both preventive as well as post-disaster management.

2. SCOPE OF THE STUDY

The scope of this report includes the study of proposed operations, storage and handling of hazardous materials with respect to Hazard Identification, Risk Assessment and updation of existing Disaster Management plan (DMP). Based on the Hazard Identification and analysis, the major disaster scenarios would be worked out to estimate the consequence of failure. Bokaro Steel plant already has a comprehensive Disaster Management plan (DMP) and the same would be evolved to also meet the emergency situations due to the proposed expansion-cum-modernization project.

The present report includes hazard identification and consequence analysis for the new projects included in the proposed expansion-cum-modernization of Bokaro Steel plant (BSL) as well as ongoing HIRA for existing critical units of BSL.

The primary potential hazards due to the proposed units are identified based on a detailed Primary Hazard analysis (PHA) along with consequence analysis for the risk assessment. The same has been elaborated in Chapter-7 of the EIA-EMP report and briefed hereunder.

The proposed expansion-cum-modernization units/departments considered in this report are as below:

A) Proposed Expansion-cum-modernisation projects i. Modernised BOF gas holder in modernised SMS-I

ii. New BOF gas holder in SMS-II iii. Revamped propane storages within modernised SMS complex iv. Additional gas pipelines with new Gas mixing station

The HIRA for these proposed expansion-cum-modernization units at BSL have been elaborated in Clause 3.0 of this report.


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The HIRA process is an ongoing and continual process for existing units and are undertaken on periodical basis for ensuring good workplace safety at Bokaro Steel plant. It also involves a periodic review of the same as well as dissemination of information to various employees through instruction and along with adequate documentation and record-keeping.

This information primarily includes: ≠ Hazard identification ≠ Assessment of risks associated with the identified hazards ≠ Control measures to manage the exposure to the risks ≠ Monitoring and review of the effectiveness of the controls.

The procedure for carrying out Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment (HIRA) in different units at BSL is well defined and the same has been briefed in Annexure-1A of this report.

The HIRA under implementation for the following existing units are included in this report: B) Existing Facilities of Bokaro Steel plant

i. Energy Management Department (Fuel gases etc.) ii. Blast Furnace

iii. Coke Oven and By-product plant iv. Steel making Shop v. Cold Rolling mill

vi. Sinter Plant vii. Raw Material handling plant

These have been elaborated in details in Clause 4.0 of this report.


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3. HAZARD IDENTIFICATION & RISK ASSESSMENT (HIRA) FOR PROPOSED FACILITIES

3.1. Background

BSL is engaged the production of Steel from iron ore and other required raw materials. During the process of manufacture of steel and other associated materials hazardous gases are generated which are stored and used in the plant. In addition to this, some other hazardous substances, which are required as feed/fuel in the process or producedas a by-product, will also be stored/handled by BSL.

The major substances handled / stored by BSL includes Coke Oven gas (primarily H2& CH4), Blast furnace gas (primarily CO), LD Gas (primarily CO, N2 & CO2), Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG)/Propane, etc.

In view of this, BSL’s existing and proposed activities are scrutinized in line of the above referred “Manufacture, storage and import of hazardous chemicals rules” and observations / findings are presented in this chapter. An elaborate and well-documented Disaster Management Plan covering all substances/gases handled by BSL for their existing plant covering all the chemicals / gases handled by BSL is already in place. The same shall be upgraded and extended to the units under the expansion programme of BSL.

The assessment has been made in a systematic manner covering the requirements of the abovementioned rules. Accordingly subsequent sections have been divided as follows: ≠ Brief Process description ≠ Applicability of the rule ≠ Description of hazardous substances ≠ Hazard Identification ≠ Hazard Assessment (& hazard scenarios) ≠ Consequence analysis ≠ Brief description of the measures taken and ≠ On site emergency plan

3.2. Brief Process Description BSL is producing steel products via BF- BOF Route of steel making. Iron ore lumps, sinters and coke (made from coking coal) and fluxes such as limestone, dolomite are the major raw materials. The major steps in the manufacturing process are as follows: ≠ Coke making - coal carbonisation ≠ Sintering ≠ Hot metal production (blast furnace) ≠ Steel production (basic oxygen furnace) ≠ Continuous casting


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The detailed analysis of the plant processes at BSL indicates that the process of Iron & Steel manufacturing via BF-BOF route requires considerable thermal energy. This thermal energy is supplied through fuel gasses generated in the plant e.g. Coke oven gas (COG), Blast Furnace gas (BFG), BOF gas as well as LPG/Propane gas. If there is any shortfall of these generated gasses then fuel gas is also supplied from outside source also.

The present proposal of BSL for expansion will create additional energy requirements, which will be catered to by in-plant COG, BFG, BOFG and/or Mixed Gas. In addition, use of LPG/Propane has also been considered for catering to the cutting requirements of SMS, Caster and auxiliary shops. In addition to these fuel gasses, a number of chemicals are being produced in the by-product plant of Coke Oven. Further Oxygen is also required as mentioned above. Therefore to run the plant, it is required to store and/or handle all these chemicals along with their distribution arrangement.

The expansion-cum modernization programme of BSL primarily envisages replacement as well as installation of new storage facilities such as replacement of existing BOF gas holder (50,000 m3) in modernized SMS-1, new BOF Gas holder in SMS-II (80,000 m3),and revamped existing Propane storages of 2 x 100 tonnes within the SMS complex to meet its requirements. The major hazardous materials to be stored, transported, handled and utilized within the facility have been summarized in Table 1:

Table-1. : List of Major Hazardous Substances to be Stored /Handled Sn. Hazardous

substance handled/stored

Quantity handled/ stored

Type of vessel used for handling / storage

Nature of hazard

associated 1. Coke Oven gas1 (major

components being CH4,H2 and CO)

2.5 tonnes handled via in-plant piping

network

In-plant Steel pipelines to new Gas Mixing Station (GMS)

Flammable gas

2. Blast Furnace Gas2 86 tonnes handled via in-plant piping

network

In-plant Steel pipelines to new GMS. Flammable gas

3. Mixed Gas3 81 tonnes handled via plant piping

network

In-plant Steel pipelines from new GMS.

Flammable gas

4. BOF gas1 102.1 T + 63.8 T = 165.9 Tonnes stored

in 02 BOF Gas holders

Stored in steel Cylindrical shaped gas holder (Wiggin’s type) with Dry Rubber

seal and handled via In-plant Steel pipelines

Flammable gas

5. Propane 2 x 100 T = 200 Tonnes stored in 02

bullets

Horizontally placed steel Bullet with hemispherical ends.

Flammable pressurized

liquidNote:1Coke Oven Gas density as 0.499 kg/m3 calculated at 25°C, 1 atm pressure conditions considering

tentative gas mixture composition2Blast Furnace Gas density 1.145 kg/m3 as calculated at 25°C, 1 atm pressure conditions considering

tentative gas mixture composition3Mixed Gas density as 1.08 kg/m3 calculated at 25°C, 1 atm pressure conditions 4BOF Gas quantity computed considering density as 1.37 kg/Nm3


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3.3. Applicability of the MSIHC Rules As per MSIHC Rules, 1989 with subsequent amendments, the galvanization process is classified as an “industrial activity” storing/handling hazardous substances.

To decide whether the above mentioned industrial activities/substances are likely to come within the scope of the above mentioned “Manufacture Storage and Import of Hazardous Chemicals Rules, 1989 & subsequent amendments”, the threshold quantities mentioned in the rules are used for comparison, as given in Table 2.

Table-2. : Threshold Quantity & Identified Hazardous Substances to be Handled as per MSIHC Rules, 1989 & Subsequent Amendments

Sn Hazardous substance handled/

stored

Maximum Quantity handled/

stored

Whether Included in The

List of Hazardous &

Toxic Chemicals

Type of vessel used for

handling / storage

Lower Threshold Qty. (In

Tonne) [For rules 5,7 to 9 &

13 to 15]

Upper Threshold Qty. (In

Tonne) [For rules 10 to 12]

Remarks

1. Coke Oven gas

2.5 tonneshandled

Yes,As per Sch. 3(i)

In-plant Steel pipelines to new Gas

Mixing station (GMS)

15 200 Below the lower threshold limit. Does not require

additional However, consequence analysis carried

out due to COG’s high flammability potential

2. Blast Furnace

Gas

86 tonneshandled


In-plant Steel pipelines to new GMS

15 200 Exceeds lower threshold limit but below upper

threshold limit.Consequence analysis

required to be carried out. 3. Mixed Gas 81 tonnes

handledYes,

As per Sch. 3(i) In-plant Steel pipelines from

new GMS



required to be carried out. 4. BOF gas 102.1 T +

63.8 T = 165.9

Tonnesstored in 02

BOF Gas holders


Steel Cylindrical shaped gas

holder (Wiggin’s type) with Dry

Rubber seal and handled via In-

plant Steel pipelines



required to be carried out.

5. Propane 2 x 100 T = 200

Tonnesstored in 03

bullets


Horizontally placed steel Bullets with

hemispherical ends.

15 200 Equal to upper threshold limit. Consequence analysis required to be carried out.

After comparison of the stored / handled and threshold quantities, it can be noticed that BOF gas and propane exceed the lower threshold limits and come under the purview of MSIHC Rules, 1989 amended in 2000. Accordingly, Rule-7 i.e. notification of site requires submission of a written report containing among other information.

Further, rule 17 i.e. preparation and maintenance of material safety data sheets are required for both the substances.


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Owing to the hazardous nature of BOF gas, Mixed gas and propane, consequence analysis of the facility has been done, taking in consideration all hazardous substances identified at Table 2 above. MCAA (maximum credible accident analysis) approach has been used to identify plausible worst case scenarios for hazard identification and risk assessment.

3.4. Hazard Identification

Hazards associated with the identified hazardous chemicals based on NFPA (National Fire Protection Association) ratings as well as other parameters are presented in Table 3.

Table-3. : Type of Hazards Associated With Identified Hazardous Chemicals

Name of Chemical Type

of Hazard

NFPA Hazard Rating IDLH Value

Flash point (°C)

Flammability range (for

gases)

Remarks Health Flammability Reactivity

Cons

titue

nts

of C

OG

/ BF

G/

BOFG

/ M

ixed

Gas

Hydrogen 1,6,9 0 4 0 - - LEL = 4% (<13%)

All gases transported

directly through pipelines.Release:

Leak/rupture

LD gas stored in Steel Gas holders.

Release: Leak/ Rupture

Methane 1,6,9 2 4 0 - - LEL = 4.4% (<13%)

Carbon monoxide 1,3,9 2 4 0 1200

ppm - LEL = 12% (<13%)

Ammonia(NH3) 4,8 3 1 0 300ppm - LEL = 16%

UEL = 25%Hydrogen sulphide(H2S) 1,4,8 4 4 0 100

ppm - LEL = 4.3%UEL = 46%

Naphthalene 1,7,8 2 2 0 250ppm 79° LEL = 0.9%

UEL = 5.9%

Propane (C3H8) 1,3,9 2 4 0 2100ppm -104° LEL = 2.2%

UEL = 9.5%

Stored in mounded bullets.

Release: Leak/rupture

Note: IDLH: Immediately Dangerous to Life or HealthType of Hazard : 1 Flammable substance 6 Gas or vapour not dangerous other than displacing air 2 Oxidising substance, reacts with reducing agents 7 Causes skin irritation or burns 3 Emits a toxic gas or vapour 8 Toxic substance 4 Emits an irritating gas or vapour 9 Explosive material under certain conditions 5 Emits a narcotic gas or vapour

NFPA HAZARD Rating a) HEALTH 1 - None 2 - Minor 3 - Moderate, could

cause temporary incapacitation or injury

4 - Severe, short exposure may cause serious injury

5 - Extreme, short exposure may cause death

b) FLAMMABILITY 1-None, Material does not burn

2- Minor, material must be preheated to ignite

3- Moderate, moderate heating is required for ignition and volatile vapours are released

4- Severe, material ignites at normal temperature

5- Extreme, very flammable substance that readily forms explosive mixtures

c) REACTIVITY1-None, stable when exposed to fire

2-Minor, unstable at high temp. or press and may react with water

3-Moderate, unstable but does not explode, may form explosive mixture with water

4-Severe, Explodes if heated or water added

5-Extreme, readily explosives under normal condition

From the above table it can be observed that Coke Oven gas, BF gas, BOF gas, mixed gas and propane are the hazardous materials of concern for the proposed project. Propane is proposed to be stored in mounded bullets, as per the design guidelines of OISD-150,


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which also confirms high levels of safety of mounded bullets, diminishing possibilities of BLEVE from the bullets. The summarised

The catastrophic potential of a hazardous substance depends on its flammability, toxicity and volatility. The ambient temperature vapour pressure of a substance is used as a measure of the ability to become air borne. Although COG, BFG and Mixed gas are not proposed to be stored in the plant and also, as per applicability of MSIHC Rules, 1989, there is no specific requirement for carrying out its consequence analysis, the fire hazards associated have been quantified owing to its toxic as well as high flammable nature. BOF gas and propane being highly flammable and stored in significant quantities in the plant require consequence analysis to be carried out for them.

The primary potential hazards due to the identified hazardous facilities is summarised in Table-4 as below.


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Table-4. : Primary Hazard Analysis of Proposed facilities Unit/ facility Hazardous activity Failure Scenario Nature of Potential Hazard Control measures SMS-I Storage of BOF gas

(modernized holder)Failed tank or associated fittings, pump or pipework or operator error or mechanical damage

≠ Fire and explosion≠ Toxic cloud dispersion

≠ Design of storage structures / tanks to relevant standards and legislations.

≠ Regular inspections and maintenance.≠ Operator induction and ongoing training.≠ Operational procedures.≠ Material safety data sheet (MSDS) register and MSDSs

kept on-site at different locations in form of signage etc.≠ Hazard Signage.≠ Design of storage structures / tanks to relevant standards

and legislations.≠ Appropriate storage of all chemicals, fuel and dangerous

substances in accordance with relevant Hazardous Chemical Rules, 2000 with subsequent amendments and associated legislations.

≠ Housekeeping activities – site would be kept clean and tidy and fire hazards removed where practicable.

≠ Availability of firefighting equipment, such as overhead water spray system, mounted on top of gas holders.

≠ Regular inspections and maintenance of firefighting equipment and storage areas, where required.

≠ Site policies, management plans and procedures.≠ Protection of storage facilities (e.g. bollards).≠ Operator induction and ongoing training.≠ Location of explosive storage should be such that it has

minimum interaction with people and property.

Storage of BOF gas (new holder)

Failed tank or associated fittings, pump or pipework or operator error or mechanical damage


SMS-II Storage of BOF gas (new holder)

Failed tank or associated fittings, pump or pipework or operator error or mechanical damage


Storage of Propane gas (modernized holder)

Failure in inlet, outlet or vapour balancing line or associated fittings, pump or pipe-work or operator error leading to impacts including chemical or fuel contamination

≠ Fire and explosion ≠ Design of storage structures / tanks to relevant standards and legislations.

≠ Design of pipelines (i.e. wall thickness and stress relief), well sites, Central Processing Facility and related infrastructure to relevant standards and legislation.

≠ Installation of pressure monitoring systems.≠ Regular inspections and maintenance.≠ Housekeeping activities – site would be kept clean and tidy

and fire hazards removed where practicable.


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Unit/ facility Hazardous activity Failure Scenario Nature of Potential Hazard Control measures ≠ Availability of firefighting equipment.≠ Maintenance of fire breaks to slow the progress of

bushfires.≠ Routine hazard reduction burns.≠ Fire-fighting equipment located in on-site vehicles and

infrastructure (wherever appropriate).≠ Regular inspections and maintenance of firefighting

equipment and storage areas, where required.≠ Operator induction and ongoing training.≠ Operational procedures.≠ Material safety data sheet (MSDS) register and MSDSs

kept on-site at different locations in form of signage etc.≠ Hazard Signage.≠ Location of explosive storage shall be such that it has

minimum interaction with people and property.Coke Oven plant

Handling of Coke oven gas and BF gas (new Gas mixing station)

Failure of pipeline, bursting of pipeline due to Corrosion, Vibration, external loading, Operation error, Over pressure, Maintenance failure, or Sabotage


≠ Design of pipelines (i.e. wall thickness and stress relief), well sites, Central Processing Facility and related infrastructure to relevant standards and legislation.

≠ Installation of pressure monitoring systems.≠ Conduct regular inspections, maintenance and testing of

equipment.≠ Site policies, management plans and procedures.≠ Operator induction and ongoing training.≠ Maintenance of fire breaks to slow the progress of

bushfires.≠ Routine hazard reduction burns.≠ Fire-fighting equipment and spill kits located in on-site

vehicles and infrastructure (where appropriate).≠ Restriction of access to storage areas, including securing

storage facilities.≠ Provision of adequate lighting around storage facilities.≠ Signage (i.e. unauthorized entry warning and information

signs).≠ Police would be notified as soon as possible in case of a

suspected breach.


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3.5. Consequence Analysis for fire and explosion as well as toxic hazards

Subsequent to the accidental release of hazardous chemicals, the consequence depends on various factors e.g. type and inventory of released hazardous materials, presence and location of an ignition source, meteorological conditions, etc. Consequence analysis for the selected accident scenarios has been carried to estimate the vulnerable zones.

DNV’s PHAST (Version 6.4) software, which is a consequence and risk assessment software for calculation of physical effects (fire, explosion, atmospheric dispersion) of the escape of hazardous materials has been used to perform the consequence calculations. The software allows detailed modeling and quantitative assessment of release of pure chemicals as well as mixtures from different scenarios.

Consequence analysis quantifies vulnerable zone for a conceived incident and once the vulnerable zone is identified for an incident, measures can be proposed to eliminate damage to plant and potential injury to personnel. Consequence analysis for existing BOF gas stored in gas holders, additional COG, BFG and Mixed Gas proposed to be handled via pipelines of new Gas mixing station and Propane envisaged to be stored in Mounded bullets at BSL has been carried out. The release scenarios selected and associated hazards based on MCA Analysis are listed below in Table 5.

Table-5. : Probable Release & Accident Scenarios Identified as per MCAA Sl. No.

Hazardous substance

Credible Release scenario Credible identified accidents

1. BOF gas Complete failure of Gas holder leading to catastrophic release of BOF gas

Fireball, Flash fire, Vapour Cloud explosion, Toxic Cloud dispersion

2. Propane Complete failure of inlet-outlet and other lines connected to the bullets leading to release from connecting points.

Fireball, Flash fire, Vapour Cloud explosion

3. Coke Oven Gas, BF Gas, Mixed gas

Leak from hole (100mm dia. hole) [for COG only]

Jet fire, Flash fire

Full bore rupture of piping [for all gases] Fireball, Flash fire, Vapour Cloud explosion, Toxic Cloud dispersion

The modelling of hazardous situations using DNV’s PHAST indicate the hazardous consequences have highest hazard extents in the atmospheric stability class D. The worst case results for the different releases enumerated above have been observed in the atmospheric scenario similar to 3D. The worst case results are summarized in Table 6.For assessing maximum damage from most credible scenarios, results have been shown for end point criteria corresponding to maximum observed damage due to a particular hazard effect.


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Table-6. : Worst Case Hazard Extents for Identified Hazardous Facilities Plant Unit Failure size Nature of hazard Hazard effects Worst case Hazard extent (m) GAS MIXING STATION

Hole Fire & Explosion Jet fire 11m @ 4.0 kW/m2

Flash Fire 8m @ LFLRupture Fire & Explosion Fireball 38m @37.5 kW/m2

Flash Fire 65m @LFLVapour Cloud Explosion 48m @0.21 bar(g)

Toxic effect Toxic effect safe distance > 25m @ no probability of fatalityBOF GAS HOLDERS

Rupture Fire & Explosion Fireball 84m @37.5 kW/m2

Flash Fire 127m @LFLVapour Cloud Explosion 136m @0.21 bar(g)

Toxic effect Toxic effect safe distance > 50m @ no probability of fatalityMOUNDED PROPANE BULLET

Vessel failure at pipe junctions

Fire & Explosion Jetfire 45m at 12.5 kW/m2

Flash Fire 8m @ LFLVapour Cloud Explosion 45m @0.21 bar(g)

The worst case Hazard extents of all identified major hazardous units is shown in Figures. 1(a) to 1(f).


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Fig.1 (a) Hazard Extents For Thermal Fire Radiation Effects

GAS MIXING STATION WITH ASSOCIATED PIPEWORK BOF GAS HOLDERS


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MOUNDED PROPANE BULLET


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Fig.1 (b) Hazard Extents For Flash Fires In Identified Hazardous Facilities



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Fig.1 (c) Hazard Extents For Flash Fires In Identified Hazardous Facilities



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Fig.1 (d) Hazard Extents For Vapour Cloud Explosion Effects In Identified Hazardous Facilities



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Fig.1 (e) Hazard Extents For Vapour Cloud Explosion Effects In Identified Hazardous Facilities



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Fig.1 (f) Hazard Extents For Toxic Cloud Dispersion Effects In Identified Hazardous Facilities



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The proximity of nearest habitations to Identified Hazardous facilities is shown in Figure 2 below:

Fig.2 Safe Distances From Hazardous Installations Of BSL To Nearest Habitations


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3.6. Conclusion on consequence analysis

3.6.1. Gas Mixing station

A maximum total of 75,000 m3/hr of mixed gas is proposed to be handled by a new Gas mixing station envisaged at BSL’s Coke Oven complex, wherein BF Gas and Coke Oven gas will be tapped from existing as well as future producing units and will be mixed in suitable proportions to produce Mixed gas of desired calorific value for use at the existing and new coke oven batteries. The results of MCA analysis indicates a maximum fire hazard distance for causing significant damage (@37.5 Kw/m2 thermal radiation) extending up to 38 m in the case of complete failure of the holder and catastrophic release of BOF gas, subsequently being ignited during worst meteorological conditions resulting in a fireball. The hazard extent for flash fire extends till 65 m (@ LFL concentration). Explosion effects having significant potential for damage (@0.21 bar(g) overpressure) is observed to be upto a distance of 48m.

The toxic effect of BFG, COG as well as Mixed gas (attributed to presence of Carbon Monoxide in the gases) will be limited to 25m from the gas holder, beyond which there will be no probability of fatality due to toxic effect in case of a release.

Overall, a minimum safe distance of 65 m from the Gas mixing station will ensure no damage to personnel as well as property, outside the plant premises. As observed from the overall analysis, the hazard extents will be contained within the plant premises and will not extend beyond plant boundary into any nearby settlement in the area.

3.6.2. BOF Gas holders There are two (2) BOF gas holders, i.e. a replaced BOF gas holder of SMS-1 of 50,000 m3

capacity and a new gas holder of 80,000 m3 capacity, both located within the SMS complex of BSL’s Bokaro Steel Plant. The results of MCA analysis indicates a maximum fire hazard distance for causing significant damage (@37.5 Kw/m2 thermal radiation) extending up to 84 m in the case of complete failure of the holder and catastrophic release of BOF gas, subsequently being ignited during worst meteorological conditions resulting in a fireball. Explosion effects having significant potential for damage (@0.21 bar(g) overpressure) is observed to be upto a distance of 136m.

The toxic effect of BOF Gas (attributed to Carbon Monoxide in BOFG) will be limited to 50mfrom the gas holder, beyond which there will be no probability of fatality due to toxic effect in case of a release.

Overall, a minimum safe distance of 136 m from the BOF Gas holders will ensure no damage to personnel as well as property, outside the plant premises. As observed from the overall analysis, the hazard extents will be contained within the plant premises and will not extend beyond plant boundary into any nearby settlement in the area.


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3.6.3. Mounded Propane bullet BSL has envisaged two (2) propane bullets, each of 100Tonne capacity, located within the BSL’s Bokaro Steel Plant for heating and cutting purposes. The results of MCA analysis indicates a maximum fire hazard distance for causing significant damage (@12.5 Kw/m2

thermal radiation) extending up to 45 m in the case of complete failure of the pipeline connections on the bullets and release of propane, subsequently being ignited duringworst meteorological conditions resulting in a jetfire. Explosion effects having significant potential for damage (@0.21 bar(g) overpressure) is also observed to be upto a distance of 45 m.

Overall, a minimum safe distance of 45 m from the Propane bullets will ensure no damage to personnel as well as property, outside the plant premises. As observed from the overall analysis, the hazard extents will be contained within the plant premises and will not extend beyond plant boundary into any nearby settlement in the area. Also, pressure-monitoring systems shall be installed to detect leaks or cracks in the pipeline. Fire-fighting facilities will also be installed to check any fire incident that may occur.

3.7. Risk Analysis for proposed projects

The hazardous event scenarios likely to make the significant contribution to the risk of potential fatalities are enlisted in Table 7. The risks to people at plant site are categorized as “On-site” risks while the risks to communities outside the plant premises is categorized as “Off-site” risks.

Table 7: Hazardous Events Contributing to Risk and their Risk Ranking (A) (B) C =

A*B Sn. Hazardous event Consequence of

significant damage Consequence

severity* (1=least severe; 5=most severe)

Likelihood* (1=least likely; 5=most likely)

RISK RANK

1. Onsite vehicle impact on personnel

Potential for single fatalities, onsite impact only 3 3 9

2. Entrapment/struck by Machinery

Potential for single fatalities, onsite impact only 3 2 6

3. Fall from heights Potential for single fatalities, onsite impact only 1 3 3

4. Electrocution Potential for single fatalities, onsite impact only 2 3 6

5. Gas Mixing Station fire & explosion as well as toxic dispersion

Potential for multiple fatalities, onsite impact only 4 1 4

6. BOF gas holder failure and fire & explosion as well as toxic dispersion


7. Propane Bullet’s fire & explosion


*based on Historical survey of similar facilities


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The above risk analysis indicates that although the most severe consequences will be due to rupture of BOF Gas holders followed by Gas Mixing station and Mounded propane bullets, their chances of occurrences are low due to implementation of better safety features in the installations and constant monitoring of vessel/pipework integrity for regular repair and maintenance, and hence these facilities have low levels of risk in the facility.

3.8. Summary & Conclusions of Risk Assessment

The risk assessment and analysis for BSL’s steel plant for most severe hazardous events is broadly summarized below:

≠ The nearest habitations in the vicinity of the BSL Plant are Tupkadih village at distance >4000min NW, Balidih village at distance >3000m in SW, LakdaKhanda village in SEat distance >2500mand Agardih village at distance >2300m in the NE, which are far away from the hazard distances observed for thermal effects (maximum at 127m) as well as toxic effects (maximum at 50m) due to failure of above identified hazardous facilities of BSL. Also, these facilities are located in the central part of the Bokaro steel plant away from each other to prevent multiple hazards, initiated due to fire in one facility and leading to a hazard in another facility, also known as domino effect. So, there will be no significant impact on the local community or damage to property / environment.

≠ The most severe damage effects due to the identified hazardous facilities will be limited to the plant premises and adequate safety controls as well as implementation of recommended control strategies in the design as well as operation stage will ensure effective management of the associated risks.

3.9. Recommended Risk Reduction and Mitigation Measures

The following opportunities shall be considered as a potential means of reducing identified risks during the detailed design phase:

≠ The zones identified from consequence modelling as affected areas due to thermal radiations greater than 12.5 kW/m2 shall be marked as “Heat Zones” and provisions for fire fighting will be made available close to these zones.

≠ It is also recommended to provide portable gas detectors within the site in order to facilitate manual gas leak monitoring and regular leakage checks. Constant monitoring of gas leak shall be ensured for immediate identification of leaks and subsequent implementation of action plan to prevent development of any hazardous situation.

≠ Further, all major units / equipment shall be provided with the following safety facilities:

- Smoke / fire detection and alarm system - Water supply - Fire hydrant and nozzle installation - Foam system - Water fog and sprinkler system - Mobile fire-fighting equipment


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- First-aid appliances ≠ Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) shall be provided for additional protection

to workers exposed to workplace hazards in conjunction with other facility controls and safety systems.

≠ Restricted access to these areas to have minimum casualties in an event of exposure.

≠ The onsite Emergency Plan will be integrated with the Bokaro district’s Offsite Emergency Plan for comprehensive management of emergencies in minimum response time and maximum rescue results in an event of a disaster /emergency. Co-ordination with nearby industries will also be maintained for creating unified Disaster management resource pool to be utilised in case of any disaster occurrence.

≠ The plant structures shall be designed for cyclone floods and seismic events to prevent structural collapse and integrity of weather (water) proofing for storage of dangerous goods.

≠ Isolate people from load carrying/mechanical handling systems, vehicle traffic and storage and stacking locations.

≠ Security of facility to prevent unauthorized access to plant, introduction of prohibited items and control of onsite traffic; and

≠ Development of emergency response management systems commensurate with site specific hazards and risks (fire, explosion, rescue and first aid).

≠ Regular safety audits shall be undertaken to ensure that hazards are clearly identified and risk-control measures are maintained within tolerable limits.

Bokaro Steel plant has a well laid down Onsite-emergency plan for the existing plan. The same will be extended to the proposed modernization and expansion projects also.


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4. HAZARD IDENTIFICATION & RISK ASSESSMENT (HIRA) FOR EXISTING FACILITIES

Bokaro Steel plant has a well-defined procedure for carrying out Hazard identification and Risk Assessment for effective risk control management at each unit of the plant. The procedure has been laid down based on the principles and standards of OHSAS-18001 and is continually reviewed for upgradation and improvement.

All new works are also required to carry out HIRA before commencement and the same is updated as and when these ongoing projects are completed.

The HIRA under implementation for the following existing units are detailed hereunder i. Energy Management Department (Fuel gases etc.)ii. New Gas pipeline networkiii. Blast Furnace iv. Coke Oven and By-product plant v. Steel making Shop vi. Cold Rolling mill vii. Sinter Plant viii. Raw Material handling plant

The summary of HIRA for the above mentioned units are briefed below, indicating major hazards, probable risks and their levels and control measures employed. The risk acceptance criteria at Bokaro Steel plant is given in Table-8 below:

Table 8: Risk levels and their acceptance criteria at BSLScore Risk level Risk Assessment Risk Control Measures 400 &>400

Very high Not Acceptable PPE + Engg Control/ Modification orcombination to REDUCE RISK LEVEL

200-399 High Not Acceptable PPE+ OH&S Program for engineering control along with RCP

60-199 Substantial Not Acceptable PPE+ RCP / OH& S Program / Signages /warning boards and/or/ administrative controls ( or combination)

10-59 Moderate Not Acceptable PPE + RCP/ Signages / warning boardsand/or/ administrative controls ( orcombination)

Upto 9 Tolerable Acceptable PPENote: Risk level is Tolerable on the basis of probability up to unusual but possible, exposure up to Occasional & Consequence is First aid. For NOT ACCEPTALE cases, Risk Control measures have to be taken as per Hierarchy of control.

4.1. Fuel Management : Gaseous And Liquid

Different liquid and gaseous fuel are used in various departments of BSL during plant operations and are managed by Energy Management Department (EMD) of BSL. The details of HIRA for storage and handling of these fuel is managed by EMD BSL.


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Additionally, the HAZOP study for existing gas holder in SMS-II is also attached with Annexure-1B.

The summarised HIRA indicating major hazards, probable risk and control measures employed are indicated in Table-9(a) below.

Table 9(a): Summarised HIRA of fuel managementSl. No. Activity Hazard Risk Risk level Existing risk control

measure 1. Distribution of in-house

Byproduct fuel gasesGas leakage Gas Exposure Substantial Gas Monitors & Alarms

2. Charging of the gascleaning plant

Gas leakage& Formationof explosivemixture

Gas Exposure& Explosion

Moderate Adherence to safe work procedures

3. Rectification of defects in charged gas line

Gas leakage Gas exposure Substantial Strict adherence to Gas line work Protocol and use of PPE

4. Standard MaintenancePractices

Flash over +Elec. Shock

Injury & burn Moderate Adherence to safe work procedures

4.2. Alternate Gas pipeline network

The HIRA carr ied out for the new gas network and associated repair and maintenance works is summarised below.

The summarised HIRA indicating major hazards, probable risk and control measures employed are indicated in Table-9(b) below.

Table 9(b): Summarised HIRA of installation of alternate Gas pipeline networkSl. No.

Activity Hazard Risk Risk level

Existing risk control measure

1. ElectricalInstallations

Electrocution Burn injury or fatal or lost time injury

Moderate Lockout/Tag out, Work Permit, Daily Checklist, etc. Strict Supervision is required from start of work to till completion of work

2. Welding Electric shock due to unearthed welding machine / Transformer

Fatal or Cut injurys/burns/Electric shocks.

Tolerable Work Permit, Daily Checklist, ELCBs, PPEs, Areabarricading, Use of sheets

Electric shock due to exposed joints of welding cable

Burn, Fire, Tolerable

Electric shock due to loose connections without industrial plug tops

Exposure to Eyes, Breathing problems, Occupational Diseases.

Tolerable

Burn injury due to the contact with hot surfaces

Burn injury Tolerable


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3. Materialhandling (Manual)

Non-use of PPE's(Helmet, gloves, shoes etc.)

Injury Tolerable Adherence to safe work procedures defined forHandling Of Reinforcement & Handling Of Cement / Concrete Competent riggers, Use of Proper PPEs, Guy ropes, Training & Awareness.

Inadequate manpower Back pain, sprain etc. Tolerable Lack of concentration in group effort

Property damage Tolerable

Wrong body posture Accident / injury Tolerable Lifting error Back pain,sprain etc. Tolerable Bur/sharp edges /corners / projecting parts /protruding nails.

Property damage Tolerable

Fall of materials Serious injury or Lost time injury

Tolerable

4. Materialhandling (Mechanical) forklift, crane

Lack of knowledge Accident / injury Tolerable Adherence to safe work procedures defined for mechanical material handling

Defective equipment Impact, crush injury Tolerable Defective lifting jacks Impact Tolerable Overloading Tilting of jacks / boom Tolerable Improper Slinging Impact, Collision Tolerable Untrained operator/ Rigger

Injury due to accident and property damage

Tolerable

5. Working atHeight

Fall of Men & Material Major injury, Fatal Tolerable Adherence to safe work procedures defined for work at height. Height pass shall be implemented, Work shall be carried out under direct supervision of TPL, OCP-07control measures shall be followed. Proper working platform shall be made where ever it is possible, proper temp. Ladders should be provided to access the height.

6. Transporting gascylinders: Oxygen, Acetylene, Argon, Nitrogen, LPG

Cylinders kept horizontal & near by

Fire & explotion Tolerable Adherence to safe work procedures defined for working with gas storages. Material secured before transporting. Materialmobilizing only with strict supervision & preplanning using suitable transporting methods on the basis of right vehicle, right material, lashing is done only by trained persons.

Cylinders with no valve cap

Gas leakage due to valve damage

Tolerable

Prolonged cylinder exposure to sun light

Explosion Tolerable

7. Work innear CO gas line

Oxygen deficiency Asphyxiation Tolerable Portable CO detector. Use proper PPEs (like nose mask). Skilled & Trained person only should carry out.

Fire hazard Burn Injury Tolerable


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4.3. Blast Furnace

T h e H I R A c a r r i e d o u t f o r t h e B l a st Furnace complex and associated documents are summarised below.

The summarised HIRA indicating major hazards, probable risk and control measures employed are indicated in Table-9(c) below.

Table 9(c): Summarised HIRA of BF complexSl. No.



1. Receiving,Transporting,Screening,Storing andBottom chargingof raw materials.

Dust concn. at the Skip Pit

Asphyxia.Consumption

Substantial Dust extraction system / Use of PPE

Hot Sinter Burn Injury Moderate Water sprayUnguarded coupling Severe Injury Substantial Provision of guards

wherever missingSpillage of oil fromG/Boxes

Slip & Fall Moderate Changing / Repair ofdefective Gear Boxes

Spillage of raw Materials in Sinter Galleries.

Minor Injury Tolerable Manual cleaning

2. ReceivingCold Blast from TBS, Heating of Cold Blast in Stoves, Feeding of Hot Blast through Tuyeres.

Gas poisoning due to Heating of Stoves,Leakage of BF gas atStoves, Dust Catcher, Cooling platforms,Walkways etc.

From Minor Health injury to even Death

Substantial Checking of gas conc.&Use of PPEs, Repair/Changing of leaking valves in Stove. Dust Catcher.Use of Gas Mask.

Noise & Heat due to Air Leakage in Snort Valves, Stoves on Blast,Leakage of Hot airthrough Tuyeres.

Impaired Hearing& injury

Substantial Use of PPEs. Changing ofTuyere/ Tuyere stocks.

3. Tapping ofHot Metal and Slag in Cast House.

Emission ofFlame, spark and back fire due to Drilling &lancing of tap hole

Eye injury and Burn Injury

Moderate Heat resistant dress, Goggles & fire resistant dress.

Splashing of metal / slagduring preparation /Cleaning of troughand runner beforeand during tapping

Burn injury Moderate Use of fire retardant dressand face shield etc.

Rolling of ladle, tilting, splashing during Coupling / decoupling metal & Slag

Run Over/ Hit/Pressed and Burn

Substantial Track maintenance,Coupling at dead speed of loco & no overfilling of ladles. No work on the top of the tracks at cast houseduring placement &withdrawal of loads.Provision of handle.

4. Granulationof LiquidSlag.

Hot water & Steam. Burn injury Moderate Aprons & Hand gloves, PPEsCorrosive slag

5. Handling ofRaw CDICoal

Coal dust concentration Health injury as well as Burn Injury

Substantial Dust mask, Special Dress.


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6. Chg. &Dischargingof Gas Lines.

Gas leakage Serious Injury to fatal. Moderate Use of N2 in the operation.

7. Puncturing /Bursting out of Blow Pipes / Tuyere Stocks

≠ Liquid metal / slag splashing

≠ Splinter of hot pieces of B/Pipes

Severe Burn / Fatal orinjury

Substantial Wind reductions & Off Blast

8. Explosion inMetal / Slag Ladles

≠ . Liquid metal / slag splashing

≠ Splinter of hot Pieces.

Falling from height,Gas poisoning

Substantial Use of Safety belt wherever required. Physical Inspectionby rods before stepping.Checking of gas & use of PPE

9. Gas leakagein BF Area

≠ Poisonous CO gas leakage

May lead to fatal accident

Moderate Use of Gas mask during wind reduction / Off blast of the furnace or prevention ofleakage from given point

4.4. Coke Oven and By-product plant

The HIRA carried out for the Coke oven and by-product plant and associated documents are summarised below.

The summarised HIRA indicating major hazards, probable risk and control measures employed are indicated in Table-9(d) below.

Table 9(d): Summarised HIRA of Coke oven and BPPSl. No.



COKE OVEN 1. Charging of coal Exposure to flame Burn injury Moderate Use of PPEs

Exposure to hot APCwater

Tolerable Safe Workinstructions

Exposure to coal dust Foreign bodies ineyes & lungproblem

Moderate Use of PPEs &medical checkup

Exposure to raw gas Breathing and lung problem

Moderate

2. Oven pushing Exposure to fine dustand heat

Foreign bodies ineyes & lungproblem. Burn injury

Moderate Use of PPEs &medical checkup.Safe Workinstructions

3. Quenching of hot coke Exposure to heat, dust,steam

Burn injury &smoke exposure

Moderate Insulation ofoperation cabin anduse of PPEs

4. Combustion of Cokeoven/Mixed gas

Exposure to CO/Mixed gas, explosion

Gas exposure and burn injury

Moderate Safe Workinstructions and inspection by EMD


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5. Cleaning and regulation Exposure to heat, gas, Burn injury,Breathing andlung problem

Tolerable Use of PPEs

Fall from height Physical injury Moderate Railing on platformBY-PRODUCT PLANT 6. Cooling of coke Oven Gas

with waterExposure to hot water Burn injury Tolerable Use of hand Gloves

7. Flushing of Primary Gascoolers with Hot Tar

Heat ,Exposure to hot tar

Hot spray in to eye/ face

Tolerable Use of hand GlovesEye protection withGoggles8. Removal of Sludge from

Tar decanterHeat ,Exposure to hot tar sludge

Chemical exposure Tolerable

9. Loading, unloading &storage of Conc.Sulphuric Acid

Exposure to Acid Acid burn Moderate Use of apron rubberhand gloves Eyeprotective shields

10. Distillation of Benzolisedoil to produce Crude Benzol

Heat hazardExposure to steam

Burn injury Moderate Use of PPE

11. CO gas line flushing withWash oil

Heat hazard Burn injury Tolerable Use of PPE

12. Conversion process formaking sulphuric acid

Exposure to acid,Heat hazard

Irritation to eyegiddiness

Moderate Use of gas mask & Eye protection

13. Storage and pumping oftar for distillation

Hot tar Exposure Burn injury Moderate Use of PPE

14. Mixing of crystallizedNaphthalene

Exposure ofnaphthalenefumes

Burn injury giddiness due to toxic vapor

Tolerable

15. Handling & Preparation ofOrthophosphoric Acidsolution, caustic lye (NaOH) and other chemicals & its dozing

Exposure toOrthophosphoric acid,caustic soda solution

Chemical burn Tolerable

4.5. Steel Making Shop

The summarised HIRA indicating major hazards, probable risk and control measures employed are indicated in Table-9(e) below.

Table 9(e): Summarised HIRA of SMS shopsSl. No. Activity Hazard Risk Risk level Existing risk control measure 1. Tap Hole

Opening And Closing

Flame Minor burn Injury Moderate Maintain good house-keeping, flame retardant suits, observation glasses/Face shield, safe work instruction,dust pad/mask, safety helmet, safety shoes, Anklets and safety hand gloves, training, ensure dryness of launder, ensure there is no water in thimble, use protecting sheet,

Fume Respiratory Illness TolerableHeat exposure Heat Stress TolerableHot metal/ slagSplashes

Burn Injury Tolerable


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Sl. No. Activity Hazard Risk Risk level Existing risk control measure 2. Charging of

scrap and hot metal in toThe furnace

Heat exposure,hot metal/ slagsplashes

Burn Injuries, Moderate Follow Work Instruction, maintain safe distance from furnace, PPES- dust masks/pad, helmet, safetyboot, hand gloves, anklet, blue glass, flam retardant suit/ canvass coat

3. Pouring of hot metal in to mixer barrelAnd to ladle

Dust/ fume, fire/ flame, flying graphiteParticle, heat exposure, hot metal/ slagsplashes

Burn Injuries,cuts/ wounds/crush injuries, heat stress

Moderate Follow Work Instruction, PPES- dustmasks/pad, helmet, safety boot,hand gloves, anklet, blue glass, flam retardant suit/ canvass coat

4. Ladle Heating Co-oven gasExposure

Discomfort/giddiness/ toxic CO poisoning

Low Portable CO gas monitor,

Fire/ flame dueto explosion inSide ladle

Burn Injuries Low Good house keeping

Heat exposure Heat stress Low Use of canvas / jeans coat duringregulating/working on runningburners

4.6. Cold Rolling Mill

The HIRA carried out for the CRM-III is summarised below.

The summarised HIRA indicating major hazards, probable risk and control measures employed are indicated in Table-9(f) below.

Table 9(f): Summarised HIRA of CRM-IIISl. No. Activity Hazard Risk Risk level Existing risk control measure 1. Lifting operation

with craneFall hazard Injury,

damage to equipment

Tolerable Clearance of passage, Good housekeeping, area barricading, adherence to safe work instructions, proper signage, Crane load certificate

2. Cutting Fire, gas leakage, explosion, fall hazard

Burn injury, discomfort, chemical poisoning, physical injury

Tolerable Trolley with chains for gas cylinder transportation, use of valve cap, working condition pressure gauge, flashback arrestor, joint-lesshosepipe, PPEs-safety helmet, shoes, face shield, leather hand gloves, apron, arm & leg guard, goggles, Provision for fire extinguishers/ sand/water at site, Use of full body harness and lifeline during work at height, area barricading etc.


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Sl. No. Activity Hazard Risk Risk level Existing risk control measure 3. Welding Fire,

electrocution, fall hazard

Burn injury, electrical shock, physical injury

Tolerable Double earthed welding m/c, electrical connection through ELCB/RCCB, proper lug joints and insulated, adherence to safe work instructions, removal of flammable material from hot work areas, area barricading, fully insulated holders, Lock-out-tag-out procedures, use of PPEs.

4.7. Sinter Plant

T h e H I R A c a r r i e d o u t f o r t h e S i n t e r p l a n t is summarised below.

The summarised HIRA indicating major hazards, probable risk and control measures employed are indicated in Table-9(g) below.

Table 9(g): Summarised HIRA of Sinter plantSl. No.



5. Storage of raw material Dust,spillage

Injury Moderate Casing repair, dust mask

6. Crushing of cokebreeze, flux etc.

Dust, noise

Chest problems, deafness

Moderate Dusk mask, De-dusting unit, ear plug

7. Blanking & de-blankingof gas line. Hearth light up, gas collector

Gas leakage

Injury Substantial Adherence to safe working procedures for Handling of fuel gases.

8. Sinter screening,cooling and despatch & storage

Heat, dust

Burn injury Tolerable PPEs, allowing natural cooling

9. Exhauster operation Noise Deafness Tolerable Ear plugs

4.8. Raw material handling plant

The HIRA carried out for the Raw material handling plant is summarised below.

The summarised HIRA indicating major hazards, probable risk and control measures employed are indicated in Table-9(h) below.

Table 9(h): Summarised HIRA of Raw material handling plantSl. No.

Activity Hazard Risk Risk level Existing risk control measure

1. Unloading of Railwaywagon in Tippler

Uneven floor and manualOperation Manual operation in between wagons

slip & fall &hand injuryBody injurymay be fatal

Substantial Manual signalsystem


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Sl. No.

Activity Hazard Risk Risk level Existing risk control measure

2. Conveying of rawmaterial through series of conveyors

Un even condition of floor , confined space betweenrunning conveyors

Slip & Fall ,Body injuryHit by Object

Substantial Regular cleaning ofmud & slurry

3. Stacking of raw materialwith the help of Twin Boom Stacker in pre-defined Bed.

Un even floor conditionconfined space betweentransfer car, Bed, & Stacker

Substantial Deployment ofskilled/Experiencedpersonal

4. Screening of rawmaterials

Multi floor screen building Dust sound & vibration hazard

Substantial Use of PPEs ear plug, nose pad, safety instruction

5. SAFE WORKING PROCEDURES FOR HIGH RISK ACTIVITIES

Highly flammable gases as well as liquid metal is handled during the operations at Bokaro Steel plant on day-to-day basis. These activities viz. handling of hazardous gases as well as handling of liquid metal are categorised as High risk activities due to their higher damage potential, higher exposure levels despite lower chances of occurrence.

BSL has defined safety procedures to be adhered to while handling hazardous gases as well as liquid metal in plant. These are elaborated in various Inter Plant Standard – Steel Industry (IPSS).

6. DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN & ON-SITE EMERGENCY PLAN

The Disaster Management Plan (DMP) is formulated with an aim of taking precautionary measures to control the hazard propagation and to take such action that the damage following a disaster is the minimum.

The on-site emergency plan relates to the laid-down and well-practiced procedure after taking care of all design based precautionary measures for risk control. This plan is aimed for tackling any emergency situation, if arises.

Both the DMP and the onsite emergency plan for the existing Bokaro Steel plant has been already prepared by BSL. The same will be extended to the proposed units also.

The overall Disaster Management Plan and the unit-wise onsite-emergency plan of Bokaro steel plant is attached as Annexure-3.2.

Documents

Bokaro Steel plant //&963&environmentclearance.nic.in/writereaddata/online/... · iv. Steel making Shop v. Cold Rolling mill vi. Sinter Plant vii. Raw Material handling plant These