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Road to Sibiu

#EURoad2Sibiu

Building on the Spitzenkandidaten Model Bolstering Europe’s Democratic Dimension

What is now widely referred to as the ‘Spitzenkandidaten’ process was born in unique circumstances. Aft er six years

of fi nancial and economic crisis that transformed the European landscape and left many Europeans deeply concerned about their future and that of their children, faith in the European project and in its ability to foster a long-term return to growth and upwards convergence among all Member States was severely dented. The percentage of citizens with a positive view of the EU was on a downward slope, falling from 48% in September 2006 to 35% in September 2014.

The need for reinvention was clear. Faced with unprecedented criticism, European leaders recognised that extracting the EU from the crisis would not be enough to win back the hearts and minds of European citizens, and that a renewed eff ort was needed to strengthen the democratic legitimacy of the European House. And among the diff erent options to achieve this, the ‘Spitzenkandidaten’ idea stood out both as having reached suffi cient institutional and political maturity, and as holding the promise of instilling a stronger democratic ferment at the heart of the EU system.

Introducing a visibility contest for the top executive job in the European Union, with lead candidates competing for the post through campaigns across the EU, rather than through the meanders of the political process, was not an uncontroversial

innovation. Critics have questioned its impact on the institutional balance of the EU, expressing concerns over a politicisation of the European Commission, and challenging the extent to which the process truly addresses contemporary challenges in the EU’s democratic dimension.

In the run-up to the May 2019 elections, the debate over the Spitzenkandidaten innovation has been reignited, garnering support across the European institutions and the Member States. Most recently the Irish Prime Minister Leo Varadkar and Croatian Prime Minister Andrej Plenković endorsed the innovation in separate speeches delivered to the European Parliament on 17 January and 6 February 2018 respectively.

What started out as an experiment in 2014, has the potential to be reproduced and strengthened, with clear democratic benefi ts for the Union, confi rming it as the right choice for a Europe which is not afraid of discussing its fundamentals.

What started out as an experiment in 2014, has the potential to be reproduced and strengthened, with clear democratic benefi ts for the Union.

‘If you want to strengthen European democracy, then you cannot reverse the small democratic progress seen

with the creation of lead candidates – “Spitzenkandidaten.” I would like the experience to be repeated.’ – European

Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker, State of the Union address, 13 September 2017.

DisclaimerThe #EURoad2Sibiu Series is part of an ongoing project by the European Political Strategy Centre (EPSC) to intellectually accompany the work of the European institutions in setting out a path for the future of the EU at 27 in the run-up to the Leaders’ Summit in Sibiu in May 2019. The Series will shed light on a number of initiatives that were identifi ed as priorities in European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker’s State of the Union address and/or have been included on the Leader’s Agenda.The views expressed in these papers are those of the authors and do not necessarily correspond to those of the European Commission.

Issue 1 | 16 February 2018

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The Spitzenkandidaten model: part and parcel of the EU’s institutional developmentThe European Union has been through more than two decades of dynamic institutional development. It has embarked on new projects, such as the Economic and Monetary Union; enlarged to twenty-eight members; created new structures and streamlined its decision-making. The need and desire to deepen the EU’s legitimacy has closely accompanied these endeavours, fuelled by a perceived ‘democratic deficit’ that dominated debates about the future of Europe in the 2000s. Attempts to bridge the gap between decision-makers and citizens were therefore prominent on the EU’s political agenda.

In accordance with the EU’s system of ‘dual legitimation’, set out in Article 10 of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU), citizens are represented both directly through the

European Parliament, and indirectly through their own governments, working together in the Council and in the European Council. Yet, while the EU has acquired new functions, its democratic mandate had not adapted accordingly.

It was the desire to breathe new political life and energy into the EU’s legitimisation process that led to the launching of the Spitzenkandidaten experiment in 2014. Although conceived in a relatively short time, the Spitzenkandidaten approach was in effect both a result, as well as an integral part of the process of EU reform. Far from being a one-off event, it reflected a long-term trend in the EU’s institutional development. It was also a logical consequence of the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, which specified that the outcome of the elections to the European Parliament needs to be taken account when proposing candidates for President of the European Commission (Box 1). The Treaty of Lisbon also established a closer link between citizens and the democratic life of the EU, explicitly stating that Members of the European Parliament are ‘representatives of the Union’s citizens ’.

The development was met with a strong endorsement from citizens. In a 2014 survey, 63 percent of respondents agreed with the statement that ‘the election of the President of the Commission taking into account the results of the European elections represented significant progress for democracy within the EU’, whereas only 18 percent disagreed.1

Box 1. The EU has travelled far: Treaty evolutions leading up to the Spitzenkandidaten modelThe European Parliament first gained a say in the procedure to appoint the Commission with the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992, which stipulated that the nomination by the governments was to take place by common accord after consulting the Parliament. But this was not extended to the selection of the President.2 Only with the Treaty of Amsterdam, in 1997, did the Parliament gain the right to approve the candidate for the post of Commission President, prior to the approval of the entire College.3 The Treaty of Nice then modified the appointment procedure in the European Council, moving from unanimity to qualified majority.

Finally, the Treaty of Lisbon decisively strengthened the role of the Parliament, empowering it to elect the candidate, rather than merely approving him or her. Specifically, Article 17 paragraph 7 of the Treaty on European Union states that a candidate for President of the European Commission is proposed by the European Council to the European Parliament, ‘taking into account the elections to the European Parliament and after having held the appropriate consultations’. The candidate is elected by the European Parliament, requiring a majority of its component members.

Far from being a one-off event, it reflected a long-term trend in the EU’s institutional development.

The development was met with a strong endorsement from citizens.

Figure 1: Citizens say stronger role for European Parliament in designating Commission President is democratic progress‘To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement: the election of the President and the European Commission as a whole by the European Parliament based on the result of the European elections represents significant progress for democracy within the EU?’

Total ‘Agree’Total ‘Disagree’Total ‘Don’t know’

63%18%

19%

Source: European Parliament, 2014

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History as it unfolded: the 2014 Spitzenkandidaten experienceThe Treaty of Lisbon did not explicitly require European political parties to identify ‘lead candidates’ in advance of the European Parliament elections. However, this idea had been brewing for a number of years (Box 2), and the combined effect of the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty and political readiness helped the Spitzenkandidaten idea to reach maturity in the run-up to the 2014 European Parliament elections.

For the first time in the history of the European Union,10 five parties decided to elect their ‘lead candidate’, whilst two declined to do so – the Alliance of European Conservatives and Reformists,11 and the European Alliance for Freedom.12

Germany’s Martin Schulz, then President of the European Parliament, was selected in November 2013 to represent the Party of European Socialists. Belgium’s Guy Verhofstadt was selected to represent the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats, while Germany’s Ska Keller and France’s José Bové together represented the European Green Party, and Greece’s Alexis Tsipras the Party of the European Left. Finally, in March 2014 and less than three months before the elections, Luxembourg’s Jean-Claude Juncker emerged as the lead candidate for the European People’s Party during the its Convention in Dublin, where he received 382 of 627 votes cast. Michel Barnier, the other contender for the role and the then French European Commissioner in charge of financial services, received 245 votes. A third candidate – former Latvian Prime Minister Valdis Dombrovskis – had withdrawn his candidacy before the poll took place, on 5 March 2015, choosing to endorse candidate Juncker instead.13

The hope was that the process would help European political parties to convey their propositions more clearly to the electorate and raise interest among citizens, as their votes played into the process of selecting a new President of the Commission.

This sentiment was captured by then-candidate Jean-Claude Juncker, who stated that the process aimed ‘not to personalise, but to visualise one of the issues of the election campaign, which was to know who would be appointed President of the Commission and how’.

The five Spitzenkandidaten launched pan-European election campaigns in order to introduce themselves to the European public and present the positions of their political groups. These took place over a very short period of time – concentrated in the last three to four weeks ahead of the elections.

Held under the motto: ‘This time it’s different. Choose who’s in charge’, the 2014 elections nonetheless did not guarantee that the candidate put forward by the party which ultimately won the largest share of the vote would be elected as President of the Commission. It did ensure, however, that that candidate would be best positioned to find a majority support in the Parliament.

In practice, as the lead candidate of the party which won the largest number of seats in the European elections of 22-25 May 2014 – the European People’s Party Group obtaining 221 out

Box 2. The gestation of an idea: how the Spitzenkandidaten concept emergedThe story of the Spitzenkandidaten process goes back to at least 1997, when a general convention of Germany’s Christian Democratic Union (CDU) party endorsed the idea of putting forward a ‘top candidate’ in the European elections who would go on to become President of the European Commission, should the party win the majority. The idea of a lead candidate was also picked up by think tanks at the time – most notably in a petition from the Jacques Delors Notre Europe Institute in 1998.4

Discussed thoroughly by the European Convention on the Future of Europe (2002-2003), the first apparent ‘nomination’ of a party ‘candidate’ was made during the European People’s Party’s Warsaw Congress on 29-30 April 2009, when the party designated the incumbent Commission President José Manuel Durão Barroso as its lead candidate for the 2009 elections – a decision that was made in anticipation of the Treaty of Lisbon, rather than as a consequence of it.5 However, this nomination did not culminate in a Europe-wide campaign, nor did any of the other European parties designate a lead candidate.

Thus, in 2012, President Barroso called on other European political parties to nominate lead candidates for the post of President of the European Commission,6 a call that was reiterated in a Resolution of the European Parliament in November 2012.7 The following year, the Commission issued a Recommendation8 calling for lead candidates in the 2014 European elections, as well as a Communication9 linking the selection of lead candidates to enhancing the democratic and efficient conduct of the upcoming elections.

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of 751 seats, with 29.43% of the vote, against 191 seats or 25.43% of the vote for the Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats – Jean-Claude Juncker was proposed as the candidate to the post by the European Council in its decision of 27 June 2014, which was adopted with 26 Heads of State or Government voting in favour and two against.

On 15 July 2014, following a debate on his political priorities, to which the European Council was also invited (in line with Rule 117 of the European Parliament’s Rules of Procedure), the European Parliament voted in Juncker, with 422 votes in favour, 250 against, 47 abstentions and 10 non-valid votes. His support stemmed from across the Parliament’s party groups, providing him with much more than the required absolute majority of 376 votes out of 751 MEPs, and making him the first President of the European Commission elected according to the Spitzenkandidaten model.

Has the Spitzenkandidaten experience worked?Given the short time afforded to prepare and execute it, the Spitzenkandidaten process made a strong imprint on the EU’s political reality. When assessing the pros and cons of the approach, it is important to draw a distinction between what it can be and what it cannot be, given the EU’s legal framework and political tradition. The Spitzenkandidaten approach is about allowing citizens to better identify with the leading candidates for the function of the President of the Commission and the programmes they stand for. The corollary of that is the creation of a political Commission, with a stronger mandate to set priorities for the EU and respond to challenges in a manner which results from its political programme. The Spitzenkandidaten approach is not the equivalent of direct presidential elections, by means of which citizens would directly elect the head of the EU’s executive arm, but it is comparable to the practices of parliamentary democracy that exist in many Member States.

Introducing the leadership factor in EU political campaigningWhen it comes to giving European politics stronger visibility, the 2014 elections were indeed unprecedented, very much as a result of the Spitzenkandidaten process. The candidates embarked on electoral roadshows across Europe, debating both with each other and with citizens.

They also held, for the first time ever, pan-European televised debates. Although the candidates concentrated their campaign activities on the last three to four weeks prior to the elections, the Spitzenkandidaten process introduced a positive ferment to the party political dynamic, boosting competition for ideas.14

And, while national issues continued to dominate the elections, as has traditionally been the case, the Spitzenkandidaten process nonetheless strengthened their European dimension.

The televised debates structured the campaign process, ensuring that each candidate had the opportunity to present his or her campaign proposals to citizens across the EU. From 9 April 9 to 20 May 2014, a total of nine TV debates were organised, a first for European Parliament elections.

Of these nine, four were bilateral debates between candidates Jean-Claude Juncker and Martin Schulz, hosted by national media outlets (Austrian public broadcaster ÖRF and German public broadcaster ZDF; the German public broadcaster ARD; France 24; and LCI/RTL), with the head-to-head debate on 9 April 2014, hosted by France 24, kicking off this series.

Particularly noteworthy were the 28 April 2014 debate in Maastricht, where four of the lead candidates took part in their first-ever live exchange aired on Euronews,15 and the 15 May 2014 Eurovision #tellEurope debate hosted by European Broadcasting Union in the European Parliament, in which all five lead candidates took part. The latter was the first TV debate held in all official languages of the European Union (i.e. with simultaneous interpretation, and where each candidate could speak the language of their choosing).

On 9 May 2014, candidates Juncker and Schulz debated in Florence, Italy, at the invitation of RAI and the European University Institute. By the time the last votes were cast on 25 May 2014, Martin Schulz had visited 25 Member States,16 while the Juncker campaign had covered over 90 stops in all EU Member States.

It is nevertheless important not to overestimate the impact of these campaigns on European citizens. Their short timeframe was a natural

While national issues continued to dominate the elections, as has traditionally been the case, the Spitzenkandidaten process nonetheless strengthened their European dimension.

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limitation on their ability to generate public attention. Furthermore, none of the candidates was able to visit all 28 Member States, both due to the short campaigning time but also because of the difficulty of coordinating with local and regional party structures.

Boosting all EU institutions By placing the candidates and their political programmes under increased scrutiny, and opening up the electoral process, the Spitzenkandidaten process ultimately equipped the new President of the Commission with a stronger mandate to lead the institution in a more political fashion and to take tough decisions when it proved necessary. Importantly, it enabled him to enshrine his campaign platform as the Commission’s policy programme, and its starting point for all policy initiatives, rather than subjecting him to the usual compromises based on the lowest common denominator.

Far from being an example of one institution boosting its powers against another, the Spitzenkandidaten process led to a more mature relationship within the institutional triangle. One could further argue that its introduction helped to ‘manage the dichotomy between supranational and intergovernmental’.17

In fact, a number of political leaders and governments had actively supported the experiment, as reflected in the final report of the Future of Europe Group of eleven EU foreign ministers who wrote in 2012: ‘The European Parliament should boost its democratic visibility by the nomination of a European top candidate by each political group for the next European Parliament elections’.

And while a number of other Member States were concerned about the apparent ‘power grab’ on the part of the European Parliament that the Spitzenkandidaten process represented, with some considering it to go ‘further that what is foreseen by the Treaties’, it is important to recall that many individual Heads of State and Government

– and their national parties – themselves participated in the European party congresses that led to the

selection of lead candidates ahead of the 2014 elections. In addition, consultations between the European Council and the European Parliament with regard to the election of the President of the European Commission took place, in line with the Declaration on Article 17(6) and (7) of the Lisbon Treaty, which recalls that the European Parliament and the European Council are ‘jointly responsible for the smooth running of the process leading to the election of the President of the European Commission’, and requires them to ‘conduct the necessary consultations’ with each other prior to the decision of the European Council.18

Finally, it is significant that other institutional arrangements, in particular those concerning the composition of the European Commission, remained the same. Once elected, Jean-Claude Juncker took decisions regarding the nomination of candidate Commissioners in close cooperation with national governments, which is what many capitals were most concerned about.

Not a silver bulletThe Spitzenkandidaten process was never meant to solve all the challenges of the EU’s legitimation process, which extends far beyond the European Parliament elections. This was made explicit in the European Commission’s Recommendation of 2013, which proposed a series of complementary steps to enhance the democratic and efficient conduct of the elections to the European Parliament.

Nor was the Spitzenkandidaten process ever going to be an antidote to the steadily declining turnout that elections to the European Parliament have been witnessing since 1979. However, the 2014 elections were the first to stem the steady fall in overall turnout rates since the first direct European elections in 1979: Whilst turnout in 2014 was still the lowest ever, at 42.61 percent, the decline between 2009 and 2014 was minimal (0.36 percent) compared to the period between 2004 and 2009, when turnout fell by 2.5 percent19 (Figure 2).

The Spitzenkandidaten process led to a more mature relationship within the institutional triangle.

‘To understand the challenges of his or her job and the diversity of our Member States, a future president

should have met citizens in the town halls of Helsinki as well as in the squares of Athens.’ – European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker, State of the Union address,

13 September 2017.

Figure 2: Voter turnout in European Parliament elections, 1979-2014

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

1979EU9

61.99 58.98 58.41 56.67 49.5145.47 42.97 42.61

1984EU10

1989EU12

1994EU12

1999EU15

2004EU25

2009EU27

2014EU28

Note: EU average

Source: European Parliament, 2014

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In some countries, the turnout even increased significantly, for example in Germany – rising from 43.27 percent in 2009 to 48.10 percent in 2014 – or in Greece – from 52.61 percent in 2009 to 59.97 percent in 2014.20 However, extremely low voter turnout in a small number of Member States such as the Czech Republic (where voter turnout was as low as 18.2 percent in 2014) or Slovakia (13.05 percent) had a non-negligible effect, bringing down the EU average.

Language also remained a natural barrier, limiting the impact that the Spitzenkandidaten had in the different Member States. The rather hasty organisation of the 2014 Spitzenkandidaten process reinforced the language constraint because many of the debates and events were scheduled at late notice, affecting arrangements for interpretation. As a result, there was weak interest on the part of the mainstream media in many of the debates. For example, even though the 15 May 2014 ‘Tell Europe’ debate was broadcast simultaneously in 28 countries by 55 TV channels, 88 websites and 9 radio stations, in France, the event was only available via two public channels of the Assemblée Nationale and the Senate, as well as one news channel, iTélé. In the future, provided adequate arrangements are made, the extent to which the language barrier will continue to affect the selection of lead candidates is less certain, although multilingual candidates will continue to have a clear advantage.

One of the lessons learned of the 2014 experience is certainly that more time should be allocated to the campaign itself. However, the caveat of extending the duration of the campaign is that it would require candidates to declare themselves at an earlier stage. This could be particularly challenging for acting high officials – especially serving Prime Ministers – although this is not so very different in the context of national elections.

One can also argue that the context and content of the campaign remained predominantly national in 2014, given that the candidates for Members of the European Parliament were selected nationally by the political parties and elected in line with the different national procedures. At the same time, the Spitzenkandidaten process did allow the parliamentary campaign to gain a stronger

European dimension. Each representing a European political family, the candidates focused extensively on the European agenda, while listening to national, regional and local sensitivities.

However, it is these very sensitivities that make European level campaigns uniquely challenging: issues and programmes that resonate in one part of the EU may not garner similar interest – and may even be interpreted negatively in other parts of the Union, leading to the perception that European debates do not resonate

with local realities. And naturally, Eurosceptics will always be ready to jump on the occasion to argue that European elites are out of touch with the day-to-day reality of European citizens.

More broadly, a true European ‘polity’ can only be created over time, and requires regular investment, during European Parliament elections and beyond. For this reason, efforts to engage more and better with European citizens on Europe and its future cannot be condensed to the mere duration of an electoral campaign, but need to be fostered over time – through Citizens’ Dialogues, democratic conventions, in national and regional Parliaments – by representatives of EU institutions, but also by national and regional politicians.

Laying the foundation for a more political Commission The Spitzenkandidaten process enabled the Juncker Commission to be, from its very inception, a fundamentally more political Commission, compared to its predecessors. Indeed, Jean-Claude Juncker successfully mobilised a cross-party majority in the European Parliament, which arguably generated a sense of joint political ownership – across party lines – around his political guidelines.

It gave a greater personal legitimacy21 to candidate Juncker and to his ten areas of priority action.22 These ‘Ten Priorities’ originally stemmed from candidate Juncker’s five-point campaign pledges,23 but were then expanded to fit with the European Council’s Strategic Agenda, and further refined through exchanges with all the political groups of the newly elected European Parliament. They eventually became a shared Agenda for Jobs, Growth, Fairness and Democratic Change that would provide the necessary impulse to prioritise efforts and enable the Commission’s political capital to take targeted action, taking responsibility for the outcome of decisions, and decisive steps in the face of complex and emerging challenges.

A true European ‘polity’ can only be created over time, and requires regular investment.

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President Juncker’s concept of a political Commission sought to shift the perception of the Commission as a technocratic and slow institution to one that is becoming more proactive, responsive and assertive. Furthermore, the Juncker Commission has not shied away from responding flexibly to the complex challenges it faced, whether in the field of economic management, investment or migration.

His call for a European Union ‘that is bigger and more ambitious on big things, echoed what he had learned from European citizens on the campaign trail. It led to a number of innovations inside the Commission, fostering more cross-policy work, and more collegial discussion of proposals, thereby helping to overcome past policy silos and ensure greater collaboration amongst members of the College. It has not only contributed to a strategic repositioning of the European Commission’s work, but it was also taken up in the EU’s 60th anniversary Rome Declaration, signed by all leaders of the 27 Member States, the European Council, the European Parliament and the European Commission,24 making it a defining functional criterion for the work of the EU as a whole.

To put this ambition into practice, the Juncker Commission created a Task Force on Subsidiarity, Proportionality and ‘Doing Less More Efficiently’ in 2017, under the chairmanship of the Commission First Vice-President. In line with the twin principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, the Task Force will identify policy areas where work could be devolved or definitely returned to Member States, as well as ways better involving regional and local authorities in EU policymaking and delivery. The final political ambition of this work is to close the gap between ‘promise’, ‘expectation’ and ‘delivery on the ground’ – integral features to foster democratic accountability and legitimacy in the European Union.

President Juncker also encouraged members of the College to take part in more public debates, both at

the European level and in the Member States, in line with the spirit of the Spitzenkandidaten process of reaching out more deliberately to

European citizens. College members have engaged politically with citizens in an unprecedented manner, whether via Citizens’ Dialogues or visits to national (and where relevant, regional) Parliaments, presenting and communicating the common agenda for Europe, but also listening to ideas.

The Juncker Commission’s renewed efforts to increase transparency and accountability for its actions is also a legacy of the Spitzenkandidaten process,

insofar as the imperative of increasing the democratic legitimacy of EU institutions was at the heart of the process. To bolster this, it proposed a mandatory Transparency Register covering all three EU institutions – which has now been agreed.

Impact on the institutional architecture of the Union The question of the impact of the Spitzenkandidaten process on the institutional balance within the Union has raised broad political and analytical interest.

One of President Juncker’s key campaign goals was to raise the Commission’s standing vis-à-vis the two other co-legislators, and to ensure it became more equidistant between the European Parliament and the EU capitals.

Insofar as the political guidelines put forward by each candidate the Spitzenkandidaten process were intended to shape the legislative basis of the entire mandate, Members of the European Parliament were de facto more active in the political agenda-setting of the next European Commission. For some observers, the closer proximity between the Commission and the Parliament risked creating too much acquiescence between the two institutions.25 But in reality, support for Commission proposals in the European Parliament is never guaranteed and securing it remains a challenge on a case-by-case basis.

In addition, inter-institutional consultations between the Commission, the European Parliament and the Council, as well as with the European Council, have intensified under the Juncker Commission. After his election to the Commission Presidency in Strasbourg on 15 July 2014, he stressed that the Commission would neither be a ‘servant of the European Parliament’, nor a ‘secretary to the heads of government’. While pushing for a more political role for the Commission, he also insisted on the need for the three institutions to work more closely together, as ‘Community players’.

This willingness to cooperate more systematically was, among others, put into practice through the adoption of the European Commission’s work programmes,26 which are signed by the three institutions involved in the legislative process (the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission) in 2016, in line with a new Interinstitutional Agreement on Better Law-Making. This same agreement has also led to a new practice according to which the Presidents of the three institutions issue joint declarations on the legislative priorities following the adoption of the

The Juncker Commission’s renewed efforts to increase transparency and accountability for its actions is also a legacy of the Spitzenkandidaten process.

Discarding the Spitzenkandidaten system would be a step back in the direction of a more opaque and less inclusive decision-making system in the EU.

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Commission’s work programme and drawing on it. These joint declarations set out broad objectives and priorities for the following year and identify items of major political importance which, without prejudice to the powers conferred by the Treaties on the co-legislators, should receive priority treatment in the legislative process.

Options for the future: from improving the Spitzenkandidaten process to an integrated EU governanceIn spite of the short run-up time, the Spitzenkandidaten process granted more visibility to the election of the President of the Commission and enabled its formula to evolve in the direction of a political Commission that responds swiftly to emerging political challenges. For a first-time experiment, its contribution towards strengthened vibrancy of the democratic life in the Union was considerable.

Discarding the Spitzenkandidaten system would be a step back in the direction of a more opaque and less inclusive decision-making system in the EU. This would neither be in line with the progressive development of the European Union of past years nor with the need for a further strengthening of its legitimation process in years to come.

The experience of 2014 already enables the identification of certain characteristics that individuals selected as Spitzenkandidaten are likely to share. Multilingualism provides a clear advantage, and knowledge of the three working languages of the EU institutions can be considered quasi pre-requisites. Executive experience is necessary given the scope of the tasks at hand. And finally, the credibility and effectiveness of the candidate will be bolstered if they are considered by the European Council as ‘one of their peers’ – given that the Commission President also sits in the European Council. Of course, these characteristics do not, and cannot, preclude the pool of potential candidates to the position of Spitzenkandidat, and eventually to President of the European Commission, but they can serve to facilitate the process in the future.

Given the importance of reconstituting the European Union as a Union of twenty-seven members and in light of the debate on the future of Europe that was initiated by the European Commission’s White Paper in March 2017, consideration should be given to a more ambitious move towards a fully-fledged and integrated system of EU governance with an

appropriate legitimisation process. This would entail improving the Spitzenkandidaten model along two main channels, which are mutually compatible and can be pursued in parallel:

• Improving the existing model: In this scenario, the basic tenets of the Spitzenkandidaten system would be preserved but practical changes would be introduced to make sure the approach has greater impact in the next elections.

• Bolstering European political parties with strong links to their members at nation level: European political parties will need to play a more pronounced role in the electoral campaign to ensure that elections to the European Parliament are about European issues. Today, they remain diverse confederations that struggle to resonate with their national constituent members. Stronger political parties, with close links to the capitals, would make the Spitzenkandidaten experience more valuable.

Improving the Spitzenkandidaten processAmong the main drawbacks of the 2014 Spitzenkandidaten experiment were the sheer novelty of the idea and the limited amount of time available for the campaign, which made proper outreach difficult. While these downsides will naturally be less significant second-time round, in the 2019 elections, European political parties can and should also take further steps to improve the process by addressing a number of issues, including:

• Timing and procedures for selecting parties’ candidates and their role in the drafting of electoral manifestos Longer campaigning periods would allow for enhanced political engagement. The democratic vibrancy of the debate would generally gain from the political families deciding about Spitzenkandidaten at an early stage. The caveat is that top candidates, especially people who are acting Prime Ministers or Presidents, might not be willing to put their names forward too early. Furthermore, the work of the European Commission could be affected if a sizeable number of Commissioners were to decide to stand for election and the campaign starts early. However, it has certainly also been the case that holding primaries has contributed to making European issues clearer to the citizens. In practical terms, the establishment of electoral lists, as well as the nomination of lead candidates by European political parties, would benefit from being completed by the end of 2018, although of course, it is up to the political parties to decide on the procedure for selecting their candidates.

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• Upgrading the visibility of the Spitzenkandidaten Changes in electoral laws should ensure that the names and logos of European political parties and the names of the Spitzenkandidaten feature on electoral lists and ballot papers across the EU, as is already established practice in a number of Member States for some or all of the national parties. In 2014, nine Member States allowed national parties to indicate their affiliation to European parties on ballot papers. They should also appear in media campaigns and in the manifestos of national parties. In this way, citizens would be better able to decide on their choice of European electoral platform.

• Marathon campaigning across the EU Prior to their selection, candidates could commit to debating actively across the EU, with a significant number of campaign stops, ideally in all Member States. Provisions enabling translation and/or interpretation into national languages would also be useful.

• New rules for the financing of the Spitzenkandidaten campaign European political parties that are registered as European legal entities have access to European financial support. In September 2017, the Commission put forward proposed new rules aimed at: increasing transparency, so that people know who they are voting for. These rules also seek to

improve democratic legitimacy, so that funding goes to entities that register at the European level, that meet clear and updated criteria – including representation in a sufficiently large number of EU Member States – and that respect of the values on which the EU is founded. Finally, they strengthen enforcement, so that abuse can be tackled and funds reclaimed. Beyond political party financing, the Spitzenkandidaten campaigns themselves will require support if they are to achieve real outreach.

Bolstering European political parties with strong links to their members at national levelEuropean political parties have developed over time as confederations of their national constituent members, striving to be more than the sum of their parts. Their political platforms are often very wide-ranging, reflecting the diversity of views across the Union and existing national parties, whilst their structures also vary. The way that parties resonate in Member States can be reinforced through more visibility and engagement around their values and views on the future of Europe. As part of the evolution of European political parties, boosting membership across the EU and with more engagement around political platforms would greatly benefit European democracy.

Figure 3: Timeline for the election of the new President of the European CommissionEuropean Political Parties Developing manifestos and

identifying potential candidates (Spitzenkandidaten)

European ParliamentElection of the new European

Commission President by majority of component members

European ParliamentApproval of the new

European Commission

Council, in agreement with the Commission President-electDesignation of candidates for

Commissioners

Spitzenkandidaten campaign across Europe

European Political PartiesSelection of

Spitzenkandidaten

European CouncilDecision to propose a

candidate for President of the European Commission

European CommissionTaking office

European ParliamentHearings of candidates for

new Commissioners

European Parliament Elections

September 2018 to February 2019

1 November 2019

20-21 June 2019

Early 2018

May/June 2019

Informal meeting of the European Council on institutional issues, including Spitzenkandidaten

23 February 2018

European ParliamentNew legislature

October-November 2019

September 2019

July 2019

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Conclusion: making European democracy more completeThe Spitzenkandidaten process of 2014 was a political innovation aimed at offering European citizens clarity on the names of contenders for the top executive post in the European Union and their electoral programmes. In this sense, it fulfilled its purpose and led to a stronger and more mature relationship between the institutions. It contributed to making European democracy more complete.

However, this remains a work in progress. For 2019 and beyond, more effort is needed to improve the Spitzenkandidaten model, by ensuring that campaigns are active and dynamic. This is first and foremost the responsibility of the European political parties, and relies in part on their relationship with national constituents. The objective at the end of the day is for the European elections to be about European issues: about the challenges that Europeans face jointly in the Union. More than sixty years into the project and at a historic time of relaunching the Union in a smaller setting, this is what both the institution and the citizens deserve.

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Treaty of MaastrichtArticle 158 EC Treaty

Treaty of Amsterdam Article 214 EC Treaty

Treaty of Nice Article 214 EC Treaty

Treaty of LisbonArticle 17(7) TEU

Step 1: Governments of the Member States nominate by common accord, after consulting the European Parliament, the person they intend to appoint as President of the Commission

Step 2: The Governments of the Member States, by common accord with the nominee for President, nominate other persons whom they intend to appoint as Members of the Commission

Step 3: Nominated candidate and other Members of the Commission are subject, as a body, to a vote of approval by the EP

Step 4: After approval by EP, final appointment by common accord by governments of the Member States

Step 1: President of the European Commission is nominated by common accord by the Governments of the Member States. The nomination shall be approved by the European Parliament

Step 2: The Governments of the Member States, by common accord with the nominee for President, nominate other persons whom they intend to appoint as Members of the Commission

Step 3: The President and other Members of the Commission are subject, as a body, to vote of approval by the European Parliament

Step 4: After vote of approval, final appointment – by common accord of the governments of the Member States

Step 1: The Council, meeting in the composition of Heads of State or Government, and acting by qualified majority, nominates the person it intends to appoint as President. The nomination shall be approved by the European Parliament

Step 2: The Council, by common accord for European Commission President, adopts list of persons it intends to appoint as Members of the Commission, in accordance with the proposals made by each Member State

Step 3: The President and the other Members of the Commission are subject, as a body, to a vote of approval by the European Parliament

Step 4: After approval by European Parliament, President and Members of the Commission are appointed by the Council, acting by qualified majority

Step 1: Taking into account the elections of the European Parliament, and after having held the appropriate consultations, the European Council (EUCO), acting by qualified majority, proposes a candidate to the European Parliament

Step 2: The candidate shall be elected by the European Parliament by a majority of its component members

Step 3: The Council, by common accord, adopts the list of other persons it proposes for appointment as Members of the Commission, on the basis of the suggestions made by Member States

Step 4: The President, the HRVP and other Members of the Commission subject as a body to a vote of consent by the European Parliament Step 5: After consent from the European Parliament, the Commission is appointed by the EUCO, acting by qualified majority

Annex: Evolution of the selection process of Presidents of the European Commission

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Notes1. European Parliament, 2014, ‘Parlameter survey 2014: citizens

cheer Parliament’s role in Juncker election’, available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20150213IPR24006/parlameter-survey-2014-citizens-cheer-parliament-s-role-in-juncker-election

2. Article 158(2) TEC Maastricht

3. Article 214 (2) TEC Amsterdam

4. Jacques Delors – Notre Europe, 1998, ‘From the single currency to the single ballot box’, available at: http://www.delorsinstitute.eu/011-19881-De-la-monnaie-unique-au-scrutin-unique.html

5. See Peñalver García, N. and Priestly, N. (2015). The making of a European President. Palgrave Macmillan: New York.

6. José Manuel Durão Barroso, 12 September 2012, ‘State of the Union 2012 Address’. Available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-12-596_en.htm

7. European Parliament, 22 November 2012, Resolution on the elections to the European Parliament in 2014 (2012/2829(RSP), available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&language=EN&reference=P7-TA-2012-462

8. European Commission Recommendation of 12 March 2013 on enhancing the democratic and efficient conduct of the elections to the European Parliament (2013/142/EU), available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.L_.2013.079.01.0029.01.ENG

9. European Commission, 12 March 2013, Communication on ‘Preparing for the 2014 European elections: further enhancing their democratic and efficient conduct’ (COM(2013) 126 final), available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52014DC0012

10. European Parliament, 2015, ‘Spitzenkandidaten; the underlying story’, available at https://www.europarltv.europa.eu/en/programme/others/spitzenkandidaten-the-underlying-story

11. Euractiv, 24 February 2014, ‘EU Conservatives call single candidate election campaigns a ‘1950-style vision’’ http://www.euractiv.com/section/eu-elections-2014/news/eu-conservatives-call-single-candidate-election-campaigns-a-1950-style-vision/

12. Euractiv, 10 April 2014, ‘Far-right parties join Tories in rejecting common EU candidate’ http://www.euractiv.com/section/uk-europe/news/far-right-parties-join-tories-in-rejecting-common-eu-candidate/

13. Cerulus, L., 6 March 2014, Juncker wins Dombrovskis backing as EPP congress kicks off, for Euractiv, available at: https://www.euractiv.com/section/eu-elections-2014/news/juncker-wins-dombrovskis-backing-as-epp-congress-kicks-off/

14. See Jean-Claude Juncker’s acceptance speech after delegates of the EPP Congress in Dublin elected him as EPP Spitzenkandidat in March 2014 for the 2014 European elections: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Dm66RtyWxtM

15. The invitation was declined by Alexis Tsipras.

16. For a more detailed account, see Martin Schulz’s campaign’s website: https://www.pes.eu/en/news-events/news/detail/Martin-Schulz-wraps-up-historic-European-tour-in-Lyon

17. Term used by Andrew Duff: http://andrewduff.blogactiv.eu/2017/09/10/is-the-european-parliament-really-a-serious-parliament/

18. The Declaration on Article 17(6) and (7) of the TEU annexed to the final act of the intergovernmental conference which adopted the Treaty of Lisbon, signed on 13 December 2007, states, inter alia: ‘(...) in accordance with the provisions of the Treaties, the European Parliament and the European Council are jointly responsible for the smooth running of the process leading to the election of the President of the European Commission. Prior to the decision of the European Council, representatives of the European Parliament and of the European Council will thus conduct the necessary consultations in the framework deemed the most appropriate. These consultations will focus on the backgrounds of the candidates for President of the Commission, taking account of the elections to the European Parliament (...).’ The Declaration leaves open the choice of how and where these consultations should take place.

19. European Commission, 8 May 2015, ‘Report on the 2014 European Parliament elections’, DG Justice and Consumers, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/newsroom/citizen/news/150508_en.htm

20. European Parliament, 2014, ‘Results of the 2014 European elections’, available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/elections2014-results/en/turnout.html

21. See Hussein Kassim. et al., ‘Managing the house: the Presidency, agenda control and policy activism in the European Commission’, (2017) 24(5) Journal of European Public Policy, 653-674

22. Ten Priorities, as outlined in the ‘New Start for Europe: My Agenda for Jobs, Growth, Fairness and Democratic Change’.

23. See Juncker.epp.eu ‘My Priorities’, available at: http://juncker.epp.eu/my-priorities

24. European Council, 25 March 2017, ‘Declaration of the leaders of 27 member states and of the European Council, the European Parliament and the European Commission, available at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/03/25/rome-declaration/

25. See Desmond Dinan, ‘Governance and Institutions: The Year of the Spitzenkandidaten’, Journal of Common Market Studies, Volume 53, 2015

26. See: Etienne Bassot, Wolfgang Hiller, ‘The Juncker Commission’s ten priorities: State of play in mid-2016’, (2016) European Parliamentary Research Service, 1-36