Bonhoeffer-Devil whore to cloistered handmaiden.pdf

From Devils Whore To Cloistered Handmaiden:

Bonhoeffer's Engagement with Philosophy in Act and Being

Student: Josh de Keijzer

Date: 12/02/2012

Course: HC8810, Luther Seminary

I.Introduction

Another paper on Bonhoeffer, one may think, has not enough been written on a man who lived too

short to write his most important and mature work? Indeed, Bonhoeffer has been analyzed back

and forth and applied in widely varying contexts and for many purposes. He has been enlisted in

support so many often incommensurate theological paradigms. People haven been fascinated with

Bonhoeffer ever since he died as a martyr at the hand of the nazis. It is only fair to say that this same

fascination has gripped the writer of this paper. For me as a budding theologian, consciously moving

away from a foundationalist evangelicalism without wanting to surrender the vitality of a living re

lationship with God through Christ to a more abstract and moralizing liberalism, Bonhoefferand

with him a good many other Lutheran theologians of the 20th centuryprovides an intellectually

viable alternative. His interaction with continental philosophy makes for an interesting example of

the integration of faith and reason, relevant for contemporary debates on this and related topics.

Bonhoeffer is not merely a quotable hero of the German resistance, but a philosophical theologian in

his own right.1 His Act and Being, written as a Habilitationsschrift, shows the young Bonhoeffer in

teracting with philosophy from a Protestant dialectical perspective that is neither entirely antitheti

1. Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Act and Being: Transcendental Philosophy and Ontology in Systematic Theology, Dietrich Bonhoeffer

Works, vol. 2 (Fortress Press, 2009), 12.

cal nor fully integrative. In the light of the fact that my future dissertation topic will most likely focus

on this very integration in Bonhoeffer's thought, this exercise is, from a personal perspective, ex

tremely meaningful. Since this integration has not often been the focus of attention in the scholarly

Bonhoeffer community, probably out of eagerness to Nind useful application for his thought, re

searchintothissubjectisultimatelyrelevantforBonhoefferscholarshipingeneral.

Bonhoeffer's engagement with continental philosophy is not done on neutral ground nor

does it serve the purpose of simply assembling building blocks that integrate with religious con

cepts to form a contemporary theology. Rather the analysis of continental philosophy serves Bonho

effer's moral indictment of it. This is very clear in Act and Being. There Bonhoeffer presents a con

ceptual analysis of continental thought resulting in a judgment of philosophy that serves to create

space for revelation and theology in the 20th century. This judgment is similar to Luther's. In doing

so, Bonhoeffer proves himself to be a dialectical, and even somewhat existential thinker who stands

Nirmly in the Lutheran tradition. This is what this paper tries to show. For Luther, philosophy was no

longer, as in scholasticism, the handmaiden of theology but rather the devil's whore. Bonhoeffer

doesn't quite treat philosophy that badly, but in the end philosophy doesn't receive a much better

fate as she becomes a cloistered handmaiden. Philosophical concepts are used but in a radically dif

ferentframeworkthatgivesprimacytorevelation.

We will proceed as follows. This paper will start with an initial exposition of Bonhoeffer's

stance on the integration of philosophy into theology. We will limit our scope to Act and Being such

that whether (and, if so, how) Bonhoeffer later modiNied his stance, will not be part of this investiga

tion. After this we will examine how Bonhoeffer's move against continental philosophy compares to

that of theologians/thinkers relevant to Bonhoeffer: Luther, Kierkegaard, and Barth. These compar

isons will out of necessity be cursory but adequate enough to frame Bonhoeffer's thought. Lastly, we

will then move on to discuss the value of philosophy for theology in Bonhoeffer's thought. This be

From Devil's Whore to Cloistered Handmaiden | 2

ing a project under development, it speaks for itself that we will merely get a general overview of

the directions that Bonhoeffer was taking. It is a necessary stage on the way, useful for a general in

troductionintothethoughtofthisimportanttheologian.

II.TheConceptualFrameworkofActandBeinginPhilosophy

A.TheConceptsofActandBeinginContinentalPhilosophy

In Act and Being Bonhoeffer shifts his focus from sociality and church in Communio Sanctorum to

the relationship between continental philosophy and revelation. Interestingly, but maybe not sur

prisingly, sociality and church feature large in his theological response. As Bonhoeffer looks at the

German philosophical tradition since and including Kant up to Heidegger, he distinguishes two

broad movements that represent two contrasting attempts to comprehend reality and the self. He

succinctly captures them with the two short hands 'act' and 'being.' On the one hand is the group of

thinkers that belong to transcendentalism and idealism. Kant and Hegel are their main representa

tives. Philosophers that belong to either school are aware of the self and its limitations. In order to

preserve room for the transcendent, in the case of transcendentalism, thinking draws a boundary

between thought and the transcendent self, which it realizes it can not know. Kant for instance, dis

tinguishes between the noumenal and phenomenal. While he acknowledges that the self has access

to the phenomena of things as they represent themselves to the self, he realizes that the thing in it

self is inaccessible. There is a boundary between thought and the thing in itself, thought and the self,

or thought and God. Kant draws that boundary as a thinking subject. Idealism follows a similar

route in starting from the self, but rather than drawing a boundary between thinking and the

transcendental it takes itself as the starting point for thinking through and mastering all of reality.

Hegel, for instance, devised a grand system that accounted for everything that exists, in which di


vine consciousness and humanity, culture and the state blended into one as it became selfaware

throughout time, i.e. in the historical dialectical process. Bonhoeffer summarizes this movement

withtheterm'act.'Theself'sthinkingisanactofengagementwithreality.

The other movement in German postEnlightenment philosophy approaches reality ontolog

ically. In ontology being has the primacy over thought. Thought does not try to master reality but

merely attempts to describe it, thereby honoring being's otherness. 'Ontological thinking gives up

the creative power of thinking and wants to think only by viewing receptively.'2 Two thinkers Bon

hoeffer focuses on in particular are Husserl and Heidegger.3 They represent phenomenology and ex

istentialism respectively. Husserl's thought has a lot in common with transcendental realism as well

as idealism. Since the observing object leaves room for the otherness of being without fully having

access to it, that being stands as a transcendent reality over against the observer.4 However, since

the main focus in Husserl is always on how consciousness is conscious of being, on how conscious

ness can achieve a 'purely conceptual perception,' it seems that being is locked up or dependent on

consciousness as much as it is in idealism.5 Heidegger's existentialism, lastly, is an ontology without

a system. Being Ninds itself as Dasein, i.e. as existence, in the world. Thinking does not produce the

world (as in idealism) or deNines the boundary between itself and the world (transcendentalism),

but simply 'discloses the being of Dasein.'6 It means that in Heidegger 'being has priority over

thought,andyetbeingequalsDasein,equalsunderstandingofbeing,equalsspirit.'7

2. Christiane Tietz, Bonhoeffer on the Uses and Limits of Philosophy, in Bonhoeffer and Continental Thought : Cruciform

Philosophy, ed. Brian. Gregor and Jens Zimmermann, (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2009), 33.

3. Bonhoeffer also deals with the work of M. Scheler. I have left it out for considerations of clarity and brevity. Cf. Dietrich

Bonhoeffer, Act and Being: Transcendental Philosophy and Ontology in Systematic Theology, Dietrich Bonhoeffer Works, vol. 2

(Fortress Press, 2009), 64 pp.

4. Ibid., 34.







Act, then, is the collective name of the act of thinking that tries to deNine the boundary be

tween itself and the transcendent self or the transcendent other, or the act of grasping and master

ing reality in such a way that this reality is dependent upon thinking. Being on the other hand

stands for all ontological approaches, whether they are variations on idealism and transcendental

ismasinHusserl'sphenomenologyortrulyontologicalasinHeidegger'sexistentialism.

B.WhyPhilosophicalMethodsof'Act'and'Being'Fail

For Bonhoeffer all these attempts fail at adequately providing space for revelation and therefore

God. They are essentially expressions of the self turned in on itself. This is a moral indictment rather

than a logical refutation. We will come back to this observation, including the logic behind the moral

indictment. For now we are interested in how Bonhoeffer critiques these modes of thought in Ger

man philosophy. Bonhoeffer rejects transcendentalism and idealism as attempts of thinking to be in

charge, so to speak. Transcendentalism is quite willing to admit to the limits of thought. Kant's phe

nomenal/noumenal distinction is a prime example of that. However, though correct in this willing

ness, if we ask who or what is in charge of this distinction, we realize it is thought, the human logos,

that draws the boundary. After all, 'if it [i.e. the transcendent] can never be objectively knowable,

how can reason Nix its limits over against something unknown?'8 The transcendent self is thus de

pendent, so to speak, on thinking's judgment for it's transcendence. It is autonomous thought that

demarcates what is transcendent and what not, since it is, without anything but it's own judgment

available to it, forced to independently do so. Things get worse when we come to idealism. Here

thinking becomes the center and starting point for the world. The I becomes the creator of the





world.9 In Hegel, for instance, the world spirit comes to selfawareness as a synthesis between di

vine being and humanity. It does so through human consciousness. It is an 'WethinkthereforeGod

exists' kind of approach that makes everything (i.e. God plus all of reality) subordinate to the human

logos. Bonhoeffer concludes: "[...] this means that God once again becomes 'objectiNied' in con

sciousness and is thereby taken into the unity of transcendental apperception, becoming the prison

eroftheconsciousness."10

For all their heroic efforts, ontological approaches suffer from the same shortcoming: think

ing autonomously gets in the way one way or another. In the foregoing this might already have be

come clear. According to Bonhoeffer, Husserl's phenomenology doesn't completely get the ontologi

cal project off the ground. On the one hand the observing subject draws a boundary between itself

and the object observed much like it is done in transcendentalism, while on the other hand the

emphasis on conceptual perception ensures that his phenomenology 'is in a way still under the spell

of idealism.'11 Whichever way you look at it, thinking determines the rules of engagement: "the

human logos has overcome being, preventing any clear grasp of the concepts of being and God. Be

ing as existentia has been dissolved into essentia, and with that the transition to idealism is sealed."12

Even though Heidegger seems to manage to create an "ontology without a system,"13 the priority of

ontology is endangered by human existence's (i.e. Dasein's) understanding of being in its actual ex

istence in time. Bonhoeffer says: "It can come to itself, for it is able to understand itself, but this

means that Dasein is contained in the world, or, better, the world is contained in Dasein."14 While





11. Ibid., 62.

12. Ibid., 64.





Bonhoeffer is really impressed with Heidegger's "enormous expansion through the discovery of the

existential sphere" he considers Heidegger's thought "unsuitable for theology."15 This is because

Heidegger looks at Dasein only as closed in by Ninitude and therefore unable to see Ninitude as a

creatureliness that opens us for God. There is no room for revelation. While this rejection of Heideg

ger seems not as rigorous as Bonhoeffer's rejection of the other philosophers, later in Act and Being

even Heidegger (while again being praised for the critical suspension of thought in being) is accused

ofidealism.16

III.BonhoefferandLuther'sThought:aMoralIndictmentofPhilosophy

Why is it that Bonhoeffer makes the moral move in rejection of continental philosophy?17 It is not

that he Ninds nothing useful there, but there are good reasons why Bonhoeffer felt this move was

necessary in order to create space for theology again. Rather than an allout antithetical rejection, as

we see in Karl Barth, Bonhoeffer chooses a critical engagement. While consciously aligning himself

with dialectical theology (he tried to get Act and Being published as a supplementary issue in Zwis

chen den Zeiten18), Bonhoeffer "wished theology to speak with all the resources of modern thought,

yet with its own distinctive voice. . ."19 Philosophy may be on the wrong track but can still be of use

as a critical discipline: "Philosophy remains profane science; there is no Christian philosophy. But

philosophy has to be critical philosophy, not systematic. [...] By doing so it gives room, as far as it can,




16. Ibid., 106.

17. Ibid., 8.

18. Ibid., 5.

19. Ibid., 7.


for God's revelation, which indeed makes room for itself by itself."20 Above all, in order to fully ap

preciate Bonhoeffer's handling of philosophy, we need to locate him in his Lutheran context. We Nind

Bonhoeffer strongly embedded in a critical tradition that goes from Luther through Kierkegaard and

Barth (as a nonLutheran). Interestingly, the very philosophers Bonhoeffer criticizes (Kant, Hegel)

were by and large Lutherans with a solid theological education, who themselves were inNluenced by

Luther and lutheran thought.21 So there is a dialectical tension in Bonhoeffer's engagement with

continental philosophy: on the one hand there is conceptual and historical afNinity while on the oth

er hand he considers these approaches not viable theologically for reasons that have equally strong

lutheran overtones. These lutheran traits reoccur in Kierkegaard's existentially oriented philosophy

and Barth's dialectical theology. We need to look then at the historical (Luther), existential

(Kierkegaard), and dialectical/contextual (Barth) dimensions that function as background to Bon

hoeffer'sengagementwithphilosophy.

A.BonhoefferandLuther

Luther's disdain for philosophy is generally well known. Throughout his works he has scathing re

marks for Aquinas and other classic scholastics. The labeling of philosophy as 'devil's whore'22 is a

good example. He laments the fargoing integration between philosophy and theology at the ex

pense of the emphasis on faith. This emphasis was exactly what Luther rediscovered in his return to

the Scriptures: justiNication by faith. Pelikan writes: "...it is clear that it was because of what they had

done to free grace, and not principally because of what they had done with Aristotle, that Luther re

20. Dietrich Bonhoeffer and Clifford J. Green, Barcelona, Berlin, New York 1928/1931, Dietrich Bonhoeffer Works, vol. 10

(Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2008), 124.

21. Jennifer Hockenbery Dragseth, The Devil's Whore : Reason and Philosophy in the Lutheran Tradition, (Minneapolis:

Fortress Press, 2011), 1.

22. Martin Luther, Henry Eyster Jacobs; Adolph Spaeth, Works of Martin Luther : With Introductions and Notes, (Philadelphia:

Muhlenberg Press, 1943), Volumes 40:175; 51:374.


pudiated the systems of the medieval thinkers."23 Apart from this contention which very well ex

plains his harsh remarks, however, we notice a remarkable inNluence from philosophy. Luther relied

very strongly on Cicero's rhetoric for his christologically oriented practical reason.24 Simpson points

out that Luther was attracted to Cicero's ideas of how humans beings need to be lifted above their

primordial animallike nature to become social beings that are socially responsible.25 He summoned

Cicero's rhetoric to wisely love the neighbor, while reserving faith and grace for the relationship

with Christ. Morality and grace belong to different categories. As a late medieval nominalist Luther

was part of the via moderna which leveled a critique against medieval philosophy. This inNluence

would last a lifetime.26 While considering Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics 'the worst enemy of

grace,'27 the Aristotelian thread present in nominalism led him to reject a priori neoPlatonic ideas,

except the idea of God.28 All other things are known by sensory perception. Religiously, this meant

for Luther that God is beyond human understanding. God cannot be grasped by either observation

or reason. Dragseth puts it well: "For Luther, the only thing we can know of God is as God revealed

himself in the person of Jesus Christ, and Jesus, in this world, is the only way that we can think

about God. We accept Christ as the love of God in faith. We know him as portrayed in Scripture."29

This nominalism would resurface in the empiricist and rationalist traditions in the Enlightenment.

23. Jaroslav Pelikan, From Luther to Kierkegaard, a Study in the History of Theology, (St. Louis, Missouri: Concordia

Publishing House, 1965), 4.

24. Gary M. Simpson, "Putting on the Neighbor": The Ciceronian Impulse in Luther's Christian Approach to Practical Reason,

in The Devil's Whore : Reason and Philosophy in the Lutheran Tradition, ed. Jennifer Hockenbery Dragseth, (Minneapolis:


25. Simpson, 36-38

26. Jaroslav Pelikan, From Luther to Kierkegaard, a Study in the History of Theology, (St. Louis, Missouri: Concordia

Publishing House, 1965), 6.

27. Martin Luther, Henry Eyster Jacobs; Adolph Spaeth, Works of Martin Luther : With Introductions and Notes, (Philadelphia:

Muhlenberg Press, 1943), Volume 31:12.



29. Ibid., 5.


Because of it, Luther was never certain of his faith: "faith required a radical and irrational leap."30

Rather than solving the riddle of predestination, he would simply retort: "Let God be God."31 Luther

thus did not mind to leave contradictions for what they were. We can see the beginnings of dialectic

thought "in the dynamic tension presented in Luther's attention to opposing theological and exis

tential constructs, beginning with philosophy and theology, but focusing on letter and spirit, law

and gospel, law of nature and law of obligation, person and work, faith and love, the kingdom of

Christ and the kingdom of the world, freedom and bondage, and God hidden and revealed."32

Comparing Luther and Bonhoeffer is a natural thing to do. We notice a similar indictment of philos

ophy as a moral failure, i.e. a failure to provide adequate space for faith (Luther) or revelation (Bon

hoeffer). Where Luther speaks of a cor curvum in se (a heart turned in on itself) Bonhoeffer adds

that the ratio is curvatus in se; human reason is turned in on itself as well.33 If for Luther Christ is

our only means of access to God and knowledge of God, Bonhoeffer sees faith in Christ as the mode

of access (through an act surrender) to participation in Christ which manifests itself (in a manner of

speaking) materially as the church.34 Luther's Deus absconditus is Bonhoeffer's transcendental Other

who should not be subjected to any system of thought. The Luther connection is not immaterial to

Act and Being itself. Bonhoeffer purposed to connect consciousness and conscience with Luther's

commentary on Galatians for his postdoctoral dissertation.35 The editor's introduction remarks (in

a footnote!) that "One of the surprising discoveries of a careful reading of Act and Being may be the



31. Ibid.

32. Ibid., 9.



34. Ibid., 115.

35. Ibid., 3.


discovery of the extent to which the central philosophical sections of the book are deeply indebted

totheologicalinsightsfromMartinLuther..."36

B.BonhoefferandKierkegaard

This language of Luther's conception of faith as a radical and irrational leap is reminiscent of

Kierkegaard. His concept of the leap of faith is not to be equated with that of Luther, but there are

similar traits. Just as for Luther we can know God only through his revelation in Christ so, according

to Kierkegaard, the self can only live in transparency to the power that constitutes it (i.e. God) by

properly being related to itself by means of a relation. This in turn can only take place through the

possibility of offense in the encounter with the GodMan (i.e. Christ) which either leads to the leap

of faith or the conscious despair to will to be oneself in rejection of him.37 In Kierkegaard there is no

clear concept of original sin, but the possibility of sin is a pervasive possibility.38 For Kierkegaard

most people live in some form of despair or another.39 Apart from a similar christological center in

both there is also the ambiguous attitude toward philosophy. Luther rejected scholasticism's faith

stiNling synthesis of philosophy and theology while Kierkegaard resisted the totalizing synthesis of

Hegel that made the particularity of Christ, his incarnation, and the possibility of individual faith

subject to the philosophical system.40 Yet, like Luther, Kierkegaard borrowed ideas from philosophy:

Hegel's idea of dialectic and synthesis as well as Hegel's conception of the self as a selfrelation. We

see Kierkegaard's radical rejection of idealism in favor of the autonomous reality of revelation (and



37. Sren Kierkegaard and Walter Lowrie, The Sickness Unto Death, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1941), 212.

38. Cf. Jason A. Mahn, Fortunate Fallibility : Kierkegaard and the Power of Sin, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 2.

39. Sren Kierkegaard and Walter Lowrie, The Sickness Unto Death, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1941), 210.

40. Cf. Merold. Westphal, Kierkegaard's Critique of Reason and Society, (University Park, Pa.: Pennsylvania State University

Press, 1991), 34.


thus the incarnation) return in Bonhoeffer's dealing with continental philosophy, resulting in an

equally Christcentered focus. Geffrey Kelly notes that around the time Bonhoeffer studied at Union

Theological Seminary he was clearly "convinced that Kierkegaard, alone among nineteenthcentury

theologians and philosophers, had correctly perceived the true dialectic of faith and obedience

presentinLuther'searlierinterpretationofthebiblicalwordonjustiNication."41

C.BonhoefferandBarth

Bonhoeffer used the conceptual pair 'act' and 'being' not only to classify approaches in philosophy

to reality. Theologies too were categorized as either act of being. DeJonge explains: "Bonhoeffer un

derstands 'act' and 'being', then, as basic, formal, oppositional terms. 'Act' means the discontinuous,

contingent, and structurally open; 'being' means the continuous, the possible, and the structurally

closed."42 The latter (being) group reduces revelation to human possibility (the Bible as God's Word,

theologies of conscience). For Bonhoeffer Barth is the most important representative of acttheolo

gy. In Barth the mistake is avoided of "the reduction of revelation from a divine act to a human pos

sibility."43 Yet, according to Bonhoeffer, it results in another form of transcendentalism whereby the

gap between God and humans is never overcome.44 Though DeJonge provides an excellent analysis

of how and why Bonhoeffer critiques Barth, it is nevertheless also true that there is a strong conti

nuity between Barth and Bonhoeffer. Andreas Pangritz even contends that "Bonhoeffer's intention

was not to overcome Barth's theology but to develop some aspects within Barth's approach in a way,

41. Geffrey B. Kelly, Kierkegaard and Bonhoeffer, in Bonhoeffer's Intellectual Formation : Theology and Philosophy in His

Thought, ed. Peter Frick, Religion in Philosophy and Theology (Tbingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2008).

42. Michael P. DeJonge, Bonhoeffer's Theological Formation, Berlin, Barth & Protestant Theology, (Oxford, UK: Oxford

University Press, 2012), 19.

43. Ibid., 17.


Works, vol. 2 (Fortress Press, 2009), 84-5.


which had not been carried out by Barth himself."45 Barth's acttheology (and we must remember

this is not Barth's category but Bonhoeffer's) was a skillful attempt at breaking away from the dom

inating 'being' approach of liberal theology, where the gospel was reduced to the ethical, and human

thought lorded it over revelation. The young Bonhoeffer can be described as a Barthian theologian.46

He took the transcendence of God seriously. Bonhoeffer wanted to take Barth's theology a step fur

ther in that the latter's theology was still very heavily inNluenced by Kantian transcendentalism.

Bonhoeffer's persontheology retrieves an important Lutheran concept: God who freely makes him

self known in the person of Jesus Christ. The transcendent God is knowable in the act of faith by

which one becomes one with Christ and member of the body of Christ, while for Barth God in his

sovereignty remains far beyond human grasp. God is safeguarded, but at the same time locked up in

his transcendence. Bonhoeffer's persontheology overcomes this by equating the presence of Christ

in the world today with the church, the body of Christ. In creating space for revelation this way, Bon

hoeffer had less need of categorically rejecting philosophy. And thus, rather than a rejection of phi

losophy, Act and Being represents a proposal to critically use philosophy in a constructive way. Both

in his appropriation of Barthian theology and his critical engagement with it, then, we note the

Lutheran aspects in Bonhoeffer's thought. In continuity with Barth and Luther there is the rejection

of philosophy's attempt at mastering reality and revelation by means of reason, of integrating phi

losophy and theology at the expense of genuine faith and God's revelatory freedom. We also note

the dialectical method used by both Barth and Bonhoeffer which is similar to Luther's unresolved

conceptual and existential opposites.47 In discontinuity with Barth, Bonhoeffer develops his person

45. Andreas Pangritz, Dietrich Bonhoeffer: "Within Not Outside, the Barthian Movement", in Bonhoeffer's Intellectual

Formation : Theology and Philosophy in His Thought, ed. Peter Frick, Religion in Philosophy and Theology (Tbingen: Mohr

Siebeck, 2008), 245.

46. Michael P. DeJonge, Bonhoeffer's Theological Formation, Berlin, Barth & Protestant Theology, (Oxford, UK: Oxford

University Press, 2012), 2.

47. With regard to dialectic thinking it is important to note the difference between Realdialektik and dialectics as Denkform. The

former understands reality to move from dialectic to synthesis; the latter uses opposite forms of thought that are left unresolved.


theology as a further elaboration of Luther's concept of God as accessible and knowable only in the

person of Jesus Christ, a move Barth as a Reformed theologian was less likely to make. Interestingly

thisestablishesalinkbetweenBonhoefferandmedievalnominalism.

Having brieNly examined Luther, Kierkegaard, and Barth on their inNluence on Bonhoeffer we

may safely conclude that Luther's inNluence, both directly and as mediated through Kierkegaard and

Bonhoeffer's interaction with Barth is substantial and important for understanding Bonhoeffer's

engagementwithphilosophy.

IV.TheFunctionofPhilosophyinBonhoeffer'sThought

A.Uselessnessandusefulness:corcurvuminseorcriticalinstrument

As we near the end of this paper what is left for us is a brief sketch of Bonhoeffer's engagement with

philosophy as it emerges in Act and Being against his Lutheran background. Following Christiane Ti

etz we will adopt the categories 'usefulness' and 'uselessness' to assess Bonhoeffer's ideas on phi

losophy.48 After that we shall relate these ideas to Luther's in order to evaluate how strongly Bonho

effer'sLutherantheologicalformationinNluenceshisstanceonphilosophy.

On the one hand philosophy is useless. Continental philosophy of the 19th and early 20th

century allows no room for revelation. Philosophy thinks from its own thinking as it tries to under

stand itself. As a result it doesn't understand itself.49 Reason shows human autonomy at work as an

expression of the sinful heart turned in on itself. Since there is noone or nothing to show reason its

Barth's and Bonhoeffer's dialectical theology is o the latter kind. Cf. Michael P. DeJonge, Bonhoeffer's Theological Formation,

Berlin, Barth & Protestant Theology, (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2012), 38.


Philosophy, ed. Brian. Gregor and Jens Zimmermann, (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2009), 35 pp.

49. Ibid., 37.


limits it knows no boundaries. As a result it has to draw those boundaries itself, thereby proving its

autonomous nature and its inability to recognize and make room for revelation. Any system created

byphilosophyisthereforeuseless.

Philosophy is also useful, however. Bonhoeffer recognized (contra Barth) that one cannot do

without philosophy. In the introduction to Act and Being the editor makes the point (quoting Derri

da) that one can move beyond philosophy but not by simply turning the page on it.50 While rejecting

philosophy as a systematic discipline, Bonhoeffer regarded philosophy important as a critical tool.

As a systematic discipline philosophy departs from and arrives at thought, while losing itself in the

process. It cannot provide room for revelation for it is not able to recognize it. Theology has a syste

matic function for it starts with revelation and is thus able to do the job of constructing a system

that is dependent on and submissive to the demands of revelation. Yet theology needs the critical

function of philosophy. The latter provides the concepts for theology in order to think through its

own system in the light of revelation. Concepts like 'transcendence,' 'ontology,' 'existence,' and 'be

ing,' are part of a symbolic vocabulary that helps to achieve clarity and to critically engage the na

ture, meaning, and purpose of revelation as the theologian thinks about theological anthropology,

hamartiology, soteriology, christology, ecclesiology, and eschatology. Revelation may be a fact, a

properresponsetoitisnotautomaticallyagiven.

B.FromDevil'sWhoretoCloisteredHandmaiden

In conclusion, then, there is a lot of similarity between Luther's and Bonhoeffer's approach to phi

losophy. The latter was clearly inNluenced by the former's categorical rejection of philosophy. Yet,

while his approach is consciously more nuanced, even there we see a clear resemblance with




Luther. The context of both Luther and Bonhoeffer is similar in that the intellectual climate was

dominated by an integration of philosophy and theology that obfuscated faith. In both cases, it can

be argued, human reason (in the form of neoPlatonism and Aristotelianism in scholasticism and

Kantian dualism, Hegelian idealism, and existentialism in Bonhoeffer's time) had usurped the realm

of faith. There are differences too. Where reconciliation with and access to God through faith was at

stake in the Reformation, revelation itself was at stake in Continental philosophy. Luther then used a

rejection of scholasticism to get to the heart: justiNication by faith. Bonhoeffer uses the act of faith as

the starting point for his persontheology as an attempt to preserve room for revelation. Another

difference is that Luther was the prophet who nailed 95 confrontational theses on the door of the

Castle Church in Wittenberg, while Bonhoeffer was able to walk in the footstep of the slightly older

dialectical school of Barth and Gogarten that had already fulNilled the role of iconoclast for its time.

Consequently Bonhoeffer was already moving more towards a synthesis between Barthian theology

and the philosophical tradition. As a result Bonhoeffer's engagement with philosophy is both very

similar and yet subtly different. Core components remain the same. Even in going beyond Luther he

wants to be in accord with him.51 God's knowability as found exclusively in Christ allowed Bonhoef

fer to judge philosophy as wanting. It helped him too to develop a persontheology as a third way

beyond the impasse of kantian dualism and usurping idealism. This basic pattern in Luther's

thought allowed for ambiguity, opposites, and dialectical tension. But just as Luther continued to

make use of Ciceronian rhetoric and for him the nominalist hiddenness of God played a foundation

al role in his theology so Bonhoeffer was able to integrate core concepts of philosophy as a critical

tool to elucidate a theology that started with revelation. Luther may have called philosophy names

at times, but this was always in relation to philosophy's obscuring of faith. Bonhoeffer is perhaps

51. Wolf Krtke, Dietrich Bonhoeffer and Martin Luther, in Bonhoeffer's Intellectual Formation : Theology and Philosophy in

His Thought, ed. Peter Frick, Religion in Philosophy and Theology (Tbingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2008), 53.


more nuanced when he distinguishes between systemic and critical function. In the end Bonhoeffer

only slightly improves philosophy's status. While she seems to be theology's critical handmaiden

once again, she is now cloistered, i.e. walled in by Bonhoeffer's judgment of her autonomous drive

that leaves no room for revelation. Bonhoeffer sets the priorities right. Continental philosophybe

ing heavily inNluenced by Luther itselfhas given in to the rationalistic temptation resulting from

Luther's Deus Absconditus and must be called to account. We must start with revelation, says Bonho

effer, for with Luther he is Nirmly convinced that God is only knowable through his selfrevelation in

Christ.

This basic pattern of thought with its roots in scholastic nominalism returns in Bonhoeffer's

Christocentric persontheology, his rejection of systems based on human thought, and the attempt

to create space for the uniqueness of revelation and the otherness of God as the One overagainst us,

free, independent, hidden, accessible through faith alone. This theology and engagement with phi

losophy is highly relevant for our postmodern world as it opens a door beyond the modernist reign

of reason while not succumbing to radical postmodern relativism. It insists that we start with reve

lation as the a priori condition for thinking about and knowing God. It also allows room for dialecti

cal tension in its insistence that the revealed God is also the hidden God. We need to start afresh

withrevelationandBonhoefferbelongstothosewhowillshowtheway.


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