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Book ReviewsJoão Reis Nunesa University of Wales Aberystwyth , UKPublished online: 05 Jun 2008.

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Book Reviews

Rose Mary Sheldon, Intelligence Activities in Ancient Rome: Trust in the Gods, butVerify (New York & London: Frank Cass, 2005). $135/£65.00. Hb. ISBN 0-7146-5480-9. £20.00/$35.95. Pb. ISBN 0-4154-5271-6.

This generally excellent and readable volume provides a fascinating perspective onthe Romans and on their surprisingly naıve approach to a wide range of intelligenceservices. While maintaining her focus on intelligence activities in their various guises,the author skillfully weaves in contexts and larger themes that add to the reader’sunderstanding of both Roman operations and intelligence operations generally. Forthose who do not specialize in intelligence activities, Sheldon’s identification andanalyses of various types of intelligence services are generally clear and helpful, and,at least in the early chapters, mercifully jargon-free. For the intelligence specialist,Sheldon provides an extensive chronology and frequent maps to help with theparticulars of Roman history and empire.The 14 chapters of the book proceed in chronological order, which leads inevitably

to some repetition. Sheldon outlines and analyzes several features of the republic thathampered the growth of intelligence activities, from its essentially amateur nature tothe Romans’ own belief that their superiority in the field obviated the need forinformation and secrecy. These generalizations should not suggest that Romansavoided intelligence operations. On the contrary, they used them extensively – buttowards one another. As Sheldon points out in her epilogue, intense competition foroffices and glory required Roman patricians to know what rivals were up to, but theseinvestigations served individual interests, not Rome’s (p.277).Only several crises, from the humiliating surrender at the Caudine Forks to

Hannibal’s victories in Italy, led the Romans to acknowledge the importance ofintelligence operations, but even then they failed to create an ongoing and coordinatedsystem for gathering, analyzing, and acting on intelligence. Sheldon’s careful analysesof three subsequent disasters (chapters 5, 6, and 10) show Crassus, Julius Caesar, andVarus ignoring advice, failing to seek information, failing to learn from pastexperiences, and generally leaving themselves vulnerable to enemy action.Intelligence activities picked up markedly once Augustus instituted the principate;

finally, one person directed all affairs of state, and that person had a strong interest inmaintaining stability and his own hold on power. He created the first state postal andmessenger service, encouraged map-making, and probably used the newly institutedPraetorian Guard and city police, as well as private spies and army personnel, togather intelligence, along with army personnel. Informers were rewarded, andcensorship grew enormously.Once the book crosses this watershed, some of the later chapters flag, in part

because of the ongoing problem of finding information about secret activities, in partbecause of the author’s shift from analyzing particular sources and events towardsincreased definition and modern categorization. Chapter 9’s discussion of two types ofmilitary intelligence operatives shows more than anything that their functionsoverlapped, and overlapped with those of others: police officials, military intelligenceofficers, couriers, agents provacateurs, the Praetorian Guard, even undercoveroperatives.

Intelligence and National Security, Vol.22, No.4, August 2007, pp.573 – 587ISSN 0268-4527 print 1743-9019 onlineDOI: 10.1080/02684520701642908

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Chapter 11, ‘Transmission and signaling’, might best be left for those with anall-consuming interest in the technicalities of intervisibility and archeologicalspeculation. This chapter, the longest in the book, leaves behind the more generalquestions of intelligence activities to focus on the minutiae of signaling, particularlyfrom watchtowers. If the Romans built defensive lines with an eye towards effectivecommunications, Sheldon concludes, ‘then the Romans gave much higher priority tointelligence gathering than we have ever given them credit for’ (p.242) – which to someextent undercuts much of her argument in this and preceding chapters. The evidenceSheldon presents in this chapter suggests that the Romans did very much care aboutbeing able to monitor and report back on activities beyond the frontier line, so perhapswe know less about other covert operations because they were, well, covert.The remaining two substantive chapters, ‘The Roman secret service’ and ‘Big brother

is watching you’, introduce new intelligence gathering networks: the frumentarii, grainofficials, and the agentes in rebus, general agents. Again, the nature of their work hidesmuch of their activity from view. What is clear for both groups as well as for the lessformal network of spies and informers that surrounded imperial power is that theiroverall mission focused on protecting the person of the emperor far more than onsafeguarding the Roman Empire – reasonable, given that the average reign of a‘legitimate’ emperor was only three years. Especially in times of turmoil, ‘[E]xternaldefense was sometimes completely sacrificed for internal security’ (p.271). Rome wasfortunate that its neighbors took so long to federate, and that the ideal of Rome and itsempire persisted as long as it did; once those two conditions changed, ‘no intelligenceservice could have saved it’ (p.271). The epilogue, while making or recappingimportant points, seems an awkwardly constructed attempt to fit Roman intelligenceactivities into modern frameworks, particularly David Kahn’s law and its twocorollaries.Intelligence Activities in Ancient Rome has much to recommend it to both the ancient

historian and the historian of intelligence services. It approaches specific events inRoman history from an original angle and raises awareness of the importance ofaccurate information for building and maintaining an empire. The main criticism thisgroup will have for Intelligence Activities is its occasional slippage into modern jargonand models, which Sheldon at times strains to apply to ancient situations. Theintelligence specialist, by contrast, may marvel at the rudimentary and flawed nature ofthe Romans’ intelligence service, but must acknowledge that despite its obvious failingsthey had a remarkably long and generally successful run – a reminder that intelligence isbut one factor contributing to the stability and success of a regime, that brute force,loyalty, and sheer dumb luck can also play significant roles. Both audiences will find thebook provides fascinating and intimate insights into an elusive aspect of Roman society;both will eagerly await publication of the second volume, which begins withDiocletian’s complete overhaul of intelligence services in the late third century AD.

ALISON WILLIAMS LEWIN ª 2007Saint Joseph’s University, Philadelphia

Len Scott and Peter Jackson (eds.), Understanding Intelligence in the Twenty-FirstCentury: Journeys in Shadows (London: Routledge, 2004). Pp.xxþ 232. £85.00/$150.Hb. 0-714-65533-3. £22.99/$41.95. Pb. ISBN 0-714-68422-8.

In recent years the Gregynog conferences on intelligence – organized every two yearsor so by the intelligence studies staff at the Department of International Politics at the

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University of Wales Aberystwyth – has become one of the marquee professionalevents in intelligence studies in Britain. Aside from being situated in the amazing mid-Wales idyll of Gregynog Hall, it has attracted a wide-ranging and certainly hard-hitting array of speakers. It is the thoughts of the speakers from the Gregynogconference in November of 2002, published as Understanding Intelligence in theTwenty-First Century: Journeys in Shadows, and edited by L.V. Scott and PeterJackson, which are reviewed here.Appropriately, the foreword by Professor Peter Hennessy sets the tone of the

work: this is a book of its time, published while 9/11 was still burned on our retinasand the second Iraq War was launched, amid much controversy, by the BushAdministration and its allies. Hennessy notes that ‘By the time you read this sentence,this book will itself have acquired the status of historical artefact, and one whichteeters on the brink of being a primary source in its own right’ (p.ix). One can read thiswithout worrying that the book itself is out of date, because it is not meant to betopical commentary on events, but rather our study of those events. This volume, inthe first instance, is an excellent, and still current, state-of-the-art report penned at acritical point in time.One sees this clearly in the first three chapters of the book. Chapter 1, ‘Journeys in

Shadows’, by the editors of the volume, sets out a clear call to action to thepractitioners and students of the intelligence studies field. It provides a useful set ofparameters by which one can judge contemporary intelligence studies in the Anglo-Saxon world, and adds a call to a more theoretical and inter-disciplinary approach,taking it out of the realm of pure history and into a more publicly applicable andrelevant form. The authors worry that in the UK, unlike the US, government ‘mayremain sceptical about the value of engagement with the academy’ (p.13).Overcoming this official reticence, the authors hint later, will take a new concept ofopenness in government, the same openness which might help segments of the publicovercome their desperate grip on intelligence-related conspiracy theory as a means toexplaining world events. The implication that intelligence studies fits into this solutionis likewise clear, and sensible.The subsequent two chapters (respectively written by Professor Christopher

Andrew from the University of Cambridge and Professor Wolfgang Krieger of theUniversity of Marburg) offer a similar ‘call to arms’ of the profession. We learn that itis both the public and the government in Britain (as well as Germany and othernations in Europe) who do not understand how intelligence works and how it servesthe state.In their chapters, John Ferris from the University of Calgary and Gary T. Marx from

MIT add to the previous call to arms with an appeal to theory, noting how our abilityto collect information through technological means has outstripped our ability to turnthat information into actionable intelligence. Not only do the politicians and public notunderstand how intelligence works, the practitioners might also be bypassed by thefrenetic pace of technological innovation. An excellent view of modern C4ISR and‘4th generation’ technologies and their implications for strategic and battlefieldintelligence, Ferris’s chapter fits also into the overall tone of the book. In an echo ofprevious chapters, Ferris says ‘the situation calls for education in intelligence and itspathologies, and the creation of a new culture for assessment and use’ (p.64).It is not profitable here to give a summation of all the 13 chapters of this excellent

and accessible volume, but suffice to say that in terms of a timely reflection on thefield of intelligence studies, it covers all the major bases. There are excellentcontributions on issues such as the ethics (from the intelligence studies stalwartMichael Herman) and morality of intelligence, on the cultural place of intelligence

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within the public psyche, on twenty-first century intelligence challenges and even onthe iconic role of James Bond in shaping not only public perception but professionalperception of intelligence in Britain. The role of fiction within our field of study(examined in Nigel West’s interesting and original contribution), which I at firstthought might be out of place in what was otherwise a volume on theory,historiography and methodology, fits well into a very broad-ranging look at the field ofintelligence. For those seeking a survey of the topics currently under study within theacademy, this is an important volume.With its calls to action, its appeals to theory, and its excellent review of critical

matters within our chosen field of study, this is a useful book for those in theacademy or studying to enter within. Beneficially for the International PoliticsDepartment at Aberystwyth, it is also a clear demonstration of the utility andfruitfulness of an international, pan-university and pan-professional conference onintelligence studies. Subsequent conferences, and their published proceedings, shouldbe attended and read by all those interested in making intelligence studies a currentand relevant field.

K.C. GUSTAFSON ª 2007Centre for Intelligence and Security Studies, Brunel University

Anja Johansen, Soldiers as Police: The French and Prussian Armies and the Policingof Popular Protest, 1889–1914 (Aldershot & Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2005).Pp.ixþ 329. £60.00/$99.95. ISBN 0-7546-3376-4.

According to Anja Johansen, until the middle of the nineteenth century the policing ofpopular protest in France and Prussia depended on the deployment of military force.That the main form of protest until mid-century involved subsistence disorders whichdisappeared largely as a result of the growing efficiency of agricultural markets andrising real incomes is not a development with which she is concerned. She is moreinterested in the impact of the revolutionary disturbances in 1848, which persuadedinformed observers that the use of the army risked provoking an upward cycle ofviolence and the very revolutionary events it was intended to prevent. As a result,efforts were made to establish recognizably modern police forces in both France andPrussia – on the model developed by Sir Robert Peel in Dublin and subsequentlyLondon – although always with the prospect of calling on the military wheneverpolice resources appeared insufficient, and particularly if the authority of the politicalregime was being challenged. Nevertheless, mobilization of the army had become ameasure of last resort. The significance of these developments is stressed by Johansen.They are not, however, despite their impact on the policing of protest in the period onwhich she focuses, considered at sufficient length and neither, despite their impact, arethe developments of the subsequent four decades – including the Paris Commune andthe anti-socialist legislation in Prussia. An enlarged introduction might haveestablished a firmer basis for an assessment of the subsequent organization of policing.The essential paradox Johansen identifies and seeks to explain is the greater

likelihood that, from the 1890s, the Republican liberal-democratic regime in Francewas more likely to once again deploy military force against popular protest – by thistime most commonly taking the form of industrial strikes – than was the authoritarian,militaristic government of Prussia. This certainly runs contrary to the emphasisGerman historians have tended to place on the dominant position enjoyed by the army

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within a militarized state and society dominated by a small and socially quite cohesiveelite. In Prussia therefore there appeared to have existed a ‘distinction between theformal legislation and practice’ nowhere more evident perhaps than in the militaryauthority to declare a state of siege and the reluctance of the army to actually employthis power – in spite of occasional encouragement from the Kaiser (and supreme WarLord). In comparison, the French army faced growing anti-military sentiment,particularly in the aftermath of the Dreyfus Affair, and the shooting of strikers atFourmies in 1891. Furthermore, it was suspect because of the monarchist and Catholicsympathies of many of its officers. Although far less homogeneous than their Prussiancounterparts, the close collaboration between military and civil elites whichnevertheless developed is explained by Johansen in terms of the ‘inner logic ofbureaucratic practice’. The widely held commitment to repression might also,however, be ascribed to the values shared by a propertied elite in response to strikersinfluenced by a revolutionary syndicalist rhetoric. Case studies of the ways in whichpolicing developed in two major industrial areas – the contiguous departments of theNord and Pas-de-Calais on the one hand, and Westphalia (which includes the Ruhr) onthe other – is intended to provide insights into the fundamental characteristics of thetwo policing regimes.Previously, Johansen claims, scholars have primarily been concerned with the ways

in which governments adapted to ‘a changing social and political reality’ (p.6), andwith the deployment, and more effective coordination of growing numbers of policeand para-military gendarmerie in rapidly developing industrial centres. With theirtraditions of often violent strike activity, mining communities were a particular causefor concern, as were concentrations of steel and textile workers, as well as thoseemployed in transport at river and sea ports and on the railways. Johansen adoptsinstead an ‘institutionalist approach’, identifying the policy-making structures andprocedures for implementation adopted by ministers, and civil and militarybureaucrats, and the ways in which, once established, procedures substantiallydetermined subsequent decisions. The ‘self-sustaining dynamics in . . . bureaucraticprocedures’ (p.220) made radical policy shifts all the more difficult, regardless as towhether inter-institutional communication might be defined as ‘circular’ (France) or‘linear’ (Prussia) (p.254).In both political systems, as partial democratization occurred and a Rechsstaat

developed, there was an increasingly evident need to justify and carefully regulate theuse of military force against citizens. Respect for civil liberties had to be balancedagainst the protection of social order. For example, the law guaranteed both the rightto strike and the freedom to continue working. ‘Blacklegs’ and property frequentlyneeded protection. The right of employers to engage in a lockout was another potentialcause of disorder. There were additional variables in any developing situation. Thus,levels of participation in both unions and strikes varied considerably between theFrench and Prussian coalfields, as well as between trades, localities, and on a genderedbasis within each. There was a greater propensity within German unions to imposediscipline and avoid the sort of revolutionary rhetoric characteristic of French labourorganizations. Rituals – unwritten rules of engagement – were respected on both sidesin virtually every conflict. Nevertheless, there was always the possibility, withincultures characterized by a ‘violent masculinity’ (p.126), that tension amongstworkers, as well as with employers and the authorities, together with the normaljostling which represented competition for control of the streets, could lead to conflict.A challenge to the authorities’ control of public space always threatened to upset

power relationships and overwhelm the resources of ‘everyday policing’ (p.6).

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The limits to police manpower posed the threat that disorder might get out of controlduring strikes or the mass demonstrations characteristic of May Day. There was anadditional concern to protect industries of ‘strategic’ importance either to the entireeconomy, such as coalmining, or to military mobilization, such as communicationsnetworks. Requests from provincial governors or prefects for military assistance wererarely welcomed by military commanders, however. Officers with such a high sense ofpersonal status felt degraded by acting as policemen, an essentially ‘unheroic’ activity,which furthermore might threaten military discipline (particularly that of conscripts).Assisting the civil authorities additionally threatened military autonomy and detractedfrom the primary responsibility for national defence. Nevertheless, in practice Frenchcivil servants and military commanders increasingly adopted the tactical principlesdeveloped by the Paris Prefect of Police. Lepine was convinced that preventivemobilization reduced the likelihood of the sort of violence generated by heavy-handedpolice activity in the capital in the 1870/80s. Although better provided with policethan their Prussian counterparts, the French were far more likely to deploy troops fromthe 1890s, and in much larger numbers, in less threatening situations, far earlier in theproceedings, and for longer. The requisition of troops was the responsibility of thecivilian authorities (Interior Minister, prefect) and their subsequent deployment that ofthe military commander. Increasingly close and regular cooperation led to thedevelopment of more coherent and consistent strategies based upon the systematicexchange of information and of joint planning in the development of ‘standardoperating procedures’ (p.221). Although politically controversial, the development ofthis ‘prevention and containment’ strategy (p.270) was judged to be increasinglyeffective by its practitioners.In contrast the Prussian authorities moved in the direction of restricting military

involvement. Their objectives were much the same, but the tactics developed tocontain popular protest were radically different. In Prussian in general, and morespecifically in Westphalia, communication between the civil and militaryauthorities was far less frequent and less formalized than in France. Planningwas less developed. Whilst generally compliant with the wishes of the civilianauthorities, senior officers were anxious to avoid responsibility for coercivemilitary action which they continued to assume might generate an upward cycle ofviolence. They were possibly even more sceptical than their French equivalentsconcerning requests for assistance especially where these were made by municipalofficials and employers. The civil authorities themselves thus felt obliged to rely,to a greater extent than in France, on the policing resources directly under theirown control. In the case of army involvement, moreover, they would lose controlof the municipal police and be faced with a bill to meet the costs of militaryengagement. In this situation and given the relatively small numbers of policemeninvolved, and the tendency for demonstrations to be larger in Westphalia than inthe Nord, there was a tendency for the police to engage in a particularly aggressiveresponse, based on something akin to ‘zero tolerance’. In the last resort toomilitary support could always be called upon.Johansen appears at times to suggest that a more permissive attitude towards popular

protest developed in Prussia. Whether this was the case, however, depended notsimply on formal bureaucratic decision making but on the tactics employed on thestreet by whichever policing agency was involved. A major weakness of the book isthe failure to adequately consider the experience of protest, on both sides of theprimary divide. To what extent did brutalization occur? How extensive were arrests,prosecutions and dismissals and blacklisting by employers? How does one fully

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account for the cost of protest and assess the impact on subsequent perceptions of andattitudes towards protest? Taking account of the roles of soldiers and policemen callsfor more than an analysis of bureaucratic procedures.

ROGER PRICE ª 2007University of Wales Aberystwyth

Robert Mayhew, Ayn Rand and Song of Russia: Communism and Anti-Communism in1940s Hollywood (Latham, MD: The Scarecrow Press, 2005). Pp.213. $34.95/£18.99.Pb. ISBN 0-8108-5276-4.

In Ayn Rand and Song of Russia, the philosopher Robert Mayhew examines themaking of the movie Song of Russia and novelist Ayn Rand’s response to it. Hereminds us that Song of Russia, made in 1944, was written by members of theCommunist Party. For those who are unfamiliar with the movie, a synopsis is in order.Song of Russia, which starred actor Robert Taylor, depicted the Soviet Union in apositive light. Taylor’s character, Mayhew informs us, plays an American composernamed John Meredith who visits the Soviet Union before Hitler’s attack in June 1941.While there, he falls for a Russian peasant girl named Nadya. They are soon marriedin a peasant village. When Germany invades the Soviet Union in June 1941, Nadyareturns to her village to fight the Nazis. Meredith comes to the village to search forNadya, but finds death and destruction. Fortunately, Nadya is still alive and there is ajoyful reunion. The couple want to stay and fight the Nazis but are told by a villagerthat they will make a stronger contribution fighting the Nazis by returning to theUnited States and informing the American people of the bravery of the Russianpeople. As in other Hollywood movies of the time, such as Mission to Moscow, theRussians were portrayed as a happy and patriotic people eagerly fighting the Nazimenace.Three years after Song of Russia’s release, Ayn Rand testified before the House on

Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) as part of the committee’s investigationinto Communist infiltration in Hollywood. Rand sought to refute the depiction of theSoviet Union found in Song of Russia. She offered a number of critiques of the movie.For example, she noted that the restaurant which Robert Taylor and Nadya frequentedwas too expensive for a Russian peasant girl to afford. In another case, Soviet peasantswere portrayed as owning their own farms when in fact all farms were collectivizedunder Stalin. Likewise, the film presented no evidence that the Soviet Union was atotalitarian country. Another complaint was that the movie showed peasants havingplenty of food to eat when in fact they were starving and their lives were miserable.Other matters mentioned by Rand that were omitted from Song of Russia include theabolition of religion by the Soviet government, restrictions on travel, the Nazi–SovietPact, as well as the reign of terror under Stalin.Mayhew demonstrates Rand’s effectiveness at challenging many of the images of the

Soviet Union in Song of Russia. Rand could speak to these distortions because she wasborn and raised in the Soviet Union. She had experienced the repression of theBolshevik regime and was fortunate to leave the Soviet Union in late 1925. From herarrival in the United States in the 1926 until her death in 1982, she spoke out againstthe abuses of the Soviet regime. Her acclaimed novels, such as The Fountainhead andAtlas Shrugged, emphasized the power of the individual versus the state and wereinfluenced by her experiences in the Soviet Union.

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Mayhew, along with recent scholars such as Ronald and Allis Radosh, presents adramatically different depiction of Hollywood and HUAC than offered in most recent(and not so recent) historiography. As Mayhew points out, Rand rejected the notionthat HUAC violated the rights of free speech of the Hollywood witnesses. Indeed, likethe Radoshes, Mayhew stresses that Hollywood Communists practised a doublestandard on the issue of free speech. Furthermore, Mayhew lambastes liberals andleftists for what he sees as their hypocrisy in attacking the Hollywood blacklists,claiming that Hollywood imposed a blacklist against anti-Communists in its ranks. Hecites a lecture given by Rand in the 1960s in which she contended that anti-Communist actors such as Robert Taylor were shunned after their testimony beforeHUAC in 1947. In another case, Morrie Ryskind was no longer employed as aHollywood writer after appearing before HUAC as a friendly witness. Mayhew alsonotes that Rand questioned the view that the Communist Party was a traditional partylike the Republican and Democratic parties. She stated to HUAC that the CommunistParty was different from America’s two main parties because of its secretiveness.In writing Song of Russia, Mayhew has a number of goals. First, he wants to defend

Ayn Rand and her HUAC testimony, which he believes has been distorted. Second, hefeels that many books about Hollywood and HUAC have painted a misleading picturein that they offer a sympathetic portrayal of Communist actors and screenwriters.Mayhew especially singles out Victor Navasky’s book Naming Names, which, heargues, ignored strong evidence of Communist atrocities.There are some flaws in this book. For example, while Mayhew rightly notes that

Song of Russia is a piece of Soviet propaganda (though not as blatant as Mission toMoscow) he underestimates the intelligence of the American people. While the UnitedStates was an ally of the Soviet Union and the American people approved of theSoviet effort against Nazi Germany, that did not mean that the American people wereblind to the Soviet Union’s abuses of power. Indeed, Richard Fried has demonstratedthat the American people even during World War Two exhibited a strong sense ofanti-Communism.A second flaw is Mayhew’s failure to address the Soviet Union’s contribution to

fighting Germany. While he correctly points out Soviet atrocities and misleadingdepictions in Song of Russia, he gives the reader an uneven portrait. While the UnitedStates and Great Britain might have won the war without Russia, it would have beenmuch more difficult. For example, one struggles to examine what D-Day would havelooked like if Hitler had focused most of his manpower and resources on Normandyinstead of the Soviet Union. Likewise, a victory in North Africa by the GermanGeneral Erwin Rommel becomes more likely (he came very close with limitedmanpower and resources) without the Soviet contribution. Other areas of the war, suchas Italy, could have possibly been controlled by Germany after 1943 if not for the factthat numerous German divisions were tied up in the Soviet Union. Mayhew does notaddress the Soviet contribution to defeating Nazi Germany. The closest he comes toaddressing it is when he quotes Rand who argues that the United States could havesupported the Soviet Union in World War Two without embellishing its virtues.Third, while it is certainly true, as Mayhew points out, that the United States

government whitewashed the image of the Soviet Union during the war, it is also truethat the United States has had a tendency to explain away the defects of its allies. Onethinks of former Vice President Lyndon Johnson comparing South Vietnamese leaderNgo Dinh Diem to British Prime Minister Winston Churchill. Or one thinks ofPresident George Herbert Walker Bush referring during the Gulf War to the Kuwaitigovernment as a democracy.

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At other points, Mayhew seems to echo conservative charges that FranklinRoosevelt sold out Eastern Europe at Yalta. However, as many historians havepointed out, the Soviet Union had gained control of much of Eastern Europe by thetime of the Yalta Conference in February 1945. Short of the (unlikely) use ofmilitary force, there was no way that Stalin was to be forced out of Eastern Europe.Similarly, Mayhew seems to echo the sentiment of conservative pundit PatBuchanan that the only victor of World War Two was the Soviet Union and that thepeoples of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe were the losers of the war. Surely,this oversimplifies matters. Undoubtedly, the people of Western Europe, China,South Korea, and many other countries who were occupied by the Axis Powerswould disagree.At another point, Mayhew suggests that Communist actors and screenwriters were

victorious in Hollywood. However, other scholars, such as the Radoshes, have pointedout that anti-Communist liberals such as Olivia De Haviland and Screen Actors GuildPresident Ronald Reagan were successful in defeating Communists in Hollywoodbefore HUAC’s investigation into Communist infiltration in the movie Mecca.Despite its flaws, Ayn Rand and Song of Russia is an interesting book that provides a

useful counter-narrative to many of the books that have been written about HUAC andHollywood.

JASON ROBERTS ª 2007George Washington University

David M. Barrett, The CIA and Congress: The Untold Story from Truman to Kennedy(Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2005). Pp.xþ 542, biblio., index. $39.95.Pb. ISBN 0-7006-1400-1.

Benefiting from recently declassified documents, interviews with CIA veterans, andexhaustive archival research in several presidential libraries, as well as privatecongressional papers, Villanova University political scientist David M. Barrett hasproduced a detailed, comprehensive, and highly persuasive examination ofcongressional oversight of the Central Intelligence Agency during the early ColdWar. The purpose of this book – a revisionist treatment of the Truman-Eisenhoweryears – is to fill a noticeable void in the historiography of American foreign relations(including intelligence studies), which heretofore largely ignored Congress’ relation-ship with the CIA. According to the author – a staunch advocate of effective,constitutionally mandated congressional oversight – ‘The neglect of Congress occurs,in part, because the executive branch is far more conveniently researched andchronicled, given the ease of keeping track of a president and advisers versusresearching scores of relevant legislators’ (p.401). Congress’ obsession with secrecyand the scarcity of declassified and available records further compounded thechallenge of tackling this critical, but neglected, chapter in the history of the country’schief intelligence service.Barrett’s lengthy, somewhat densely written tome convincingly demolishes the myth

of congressional deference to and salutary neglect towards the CIA from its foundingin 1947 to the Bay of Pigs debacle in 1961. While the author concedes thatcongressional oversight of the Agency was ‘not comprehensive’ and hardly uniform orconsistently effective in either house of Congress, it was, nonetheless, far moresubstantial and even harshly critical than is commonly thought.

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While Congress viewed the CIA as a national security necessity in preventinganother Pearl Harbor and containing Soviet expansionism, members of both partieshad no intention of creating an ‘American Gestapo’ that would threaten the rights ofUS citizens. The legendary Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), Allen Dulles, faceddown Senator Mike Mansfield’s repeated and unsuccessful attempts to establish a jointcongressional intelligence committee to monitor the Agency’s covert operations andfinances.Congressional criticism of intelligence failures did not begin with Senator Frank

Church’s hearings in 1975. In reference to the CIA’s failure to predict the overthrowof the pro-American King Faisal of Iraq in 1958, Senator Wayne Morse complainedthat ‘Our intelligence was just plain lousy’ (p.295). (President Eisenhower consideredIraq ‘a bulwark of stability and progress’ in the Middle East and one supportive of theEisenhower Doctrine, which he intended ‘to block the Soviet Union’s march to theMediterranean, to the Suez Canal and the pipelines, and to the underground lakes ofoil which fuel the homes and factories of Western Europe’ (p.290).) Forty-five yearslater, faulty CIA intelligence concerning Saddam Hussein’s WMD would lead the USinto its present quagmire.The Agency’s standing with Congress was damaged when it failed to predict

Joseph Stalin’s acquisition of atomic weapons (1949), North Korea’s invasion ofSouth Korea (1950), the Hungarian uprising (1956), the Suez Crisis (1956), and theSoviets’ launching of the first satellite (Sputnik) in space (1957). The downing ofFrancis Gary Powers’ U-2 spy plane (1960) and the ‘missile gap’ controversy(1958–60) further blackened the Agency’s reputation. These setbacks led toquestions concerning the CIA’s competence, frequent congressional committeehearings, increased Agency liaison on Capitol Hill, the strengthening of ties betweenthe Agency and its powerful congressional friends like Senator Richard Russell, andWhite House complaints that congressional monitoring of the CIA was hamperingits operations and undermining Ike’s authority as Commander-in-Chief! The CIAfaced its harshest criticism from the nation’s premier Red-hunter, Senator JosephMcCarthy, who accused the Agency of lax internal security and of hiring securityrisks. McCarthy’s unsubstantiated accusations of Communist penetration of theAgency and his demands that Dulles investigate led to the DCI’s threat to resign andIke’s assurances that he would protect the director’s employees’ from the senator’sbullying. Barrett’s treatment of McCarthy is overly harsh, however, and would havebenefited from Arthur Herman’s revisionist biography, which he has ignored. Evensome of Dulles’ friends, such as Senator Stuart Symington, accused him of ‘playingpolitics’ with the ‘missile gap’ question by providing estimates of US missileproduction (not falling behind the Soviets) that pleased Eisenhower. Congressionalcritics of the Agency also included covert action hawks not content with justsubsidizing Radio Free Europe and keeping the Communists out of power in Italy.Enthusiastic congressional support for overthrowing Castro’s Communist regime inCuba encouraged the CIA’s Operation Zapata, which resulted in the Bay of Pigsdebacle in 1961.The CIA’s so-called ‘Golden Age’ during the Eisenhower administration was –

contrary to conventional wisdom – hardly devoid of congressional oversight.Indeed, as Barrett so convincingly demonstrates, Congress’ monitoring of theAgency, while uneven and often ineffective, was nonetheless frequent and oftenconfrontational during the early years of the Cold War. Barrett’s analysis shouldremind us – as we evaluate the intelligence failures that led the US into the presentwar in Iraq – that congressional oversight of and severe criticism of the CIA have

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been long-standing and certainly necessary safeguards of American liberty in adangerous world.

RORIN M. PLATT ª 2007Campbell University, North Carolina

Merrilyn Thomas, Communing with the Enemy: Covert Operations, Christianity andCold War Politics in Britain and the GDR (Oxford & Bern: Peter Lang, 2005).Pp.293. £34.00/$57.95. Pb. ISBN 3-0391-0192-7.

On 16 March 1965 a group of 31 idealistic young Christians from Britain led by ayoung curate from Rugby, Martin Turner, visited Dresden to help rebuild a hospitalbadly damaged by bombing during the Second World War. Many only stayed for ashort period and were replaced by others, but some stayed for the full seven monthsthat the project was to last. In the context of the Cold War, it was to all intents andpurposes an extraordinary event. It could have been a moving story of reconciliation,but Merrilyn Thomas tells a much more complex and fascinating story about ColdWar politics and the role of the British and German churches in it. Hers is a storyabout the impact of British–GDR relations on GDR state–church relations in the mid-1960s. Thomas has been able to put it together thanks to her research in the Stasiarchive, the archive of the Aktion Suhnezeichen and the Protestant church in Germany.In Britain, unsurprisingly, she was denied access to British secret intelligence fileswhich might well have shed further light on the affair. She has interviewed many ofthe surviving players in the story and made excellent use of a wide range ofsupplementary material in other archives in Germany and Britain.Behind the GDR’s surprising decision to let the British volunteers into the GDR

stood the attempt, which was initiated by the Stasi, to sideline one of the GDR’s mostprominent Protestant critics, the Bishop of Dresden, Gottfried Noth. In the mid-1960sthe Ulbricht regime was keen to bring about some kind of rapprochement between theCommunist state and the Protestant church. Figures such as Noth stood in the way ofthese plans. The British Christians, many of whom had been influenced by ideas of aChristian-Marxist dialogue, were pawns in the Stasi’s game. Her reconstruction of therole of Hans-Joachim Seidowsky, chief project negotiator for the GDR and Stasiofficer, is exemplary and makes fascinating reading, shedding much light on the wayin which a young GDR operated in a world which it perceived as predominantlyhostile. By the mid-1960s it was keen to use local-level contacts and promote towntwinnings in a conscious attempt to undermine the Hallstein doctrine which isolated itinternationally. But the main motivation for allowing the Coventry–Dresden project togo ahead was not to do with international recognition and foreign policy. It wascentred on the attempt to undermine the Protestant opposition against the Communiststate.However, the young British Christians were also pawns in a parallel game played by

the British Foreign Office. As Thomas argues convincingly, British foreign policy vis-a-vis the GDR was janus-faced by the mid-1960s. On the one hand, it officiallysupported the FRG’s Hallstein doctrine and the non-acceptance of the GDR. On theother hand, it unofficially sought to stabilize the Cold War by de facto backing up thesecond Germany and looking for ways of establishing dialogue with representatives ofEast Germany. To do this, British foreign policy was in need of unofficialintermediaries. In the case of the Coventry–Dresden project, the most important

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intermediary was the Labour politician Richard Crossman, who had the initial idea forthe project and subsequently played an important role in negotiating its realization andsetting up the Provost of Coventry Cathedral as front man for the project on the Britishside. But in the GDR, the whole Coventry–Dresden project was known as the‘Crossman project’. While Crossman and others on the British side also had some ideathat dialogue with the East was the most efficient way of undermining hard-lineCommunism and bringing about change, ultimately the policy was also gearedtowards maintaining peace and stability in Europe. On the West German side, thisearly variant of Ostpolitik was supported as another unofficial go-between, ErichMuller-Gangloff, a West German church leader with close links to Egon Bahr andWilly Brandt. In particular through his activities with Aktion Suhnezeichen, he servedas an early conduit for Ostpolitik and helped to build up oppositional networks behindthe Iron Curtain.Thomas is aware of the huge East German paranoia which saw every contact with

the West as potential conspiracy to undermine the GDR, even when the Westerncontacts just thought of improving relations by improving contact. Dialogue wasbetter than stand-off was the Western rationale, but in the Stasi’s warped mindset,every dialogue turned into subversion. Yet Thomas is willing to lend considerablecredibility to the Stasi assessments of Western organizations and individuals. Withoutthe possibility of comparing these with records from the Western intelligence services,aspects of her story have to remain conjectural. However, her main argument aboutChristian idealism being manipulated by high politics in the Cold War is a credibleone. Thomas has succeeded in putting together almost all the pieces in an absorbingpuzzle, going to extraordinary lengths to shed light on a past event shrouded in secrecyand myths. Hers is a story of high politics, spies and Christian idealism which anyoneinterested in any of these aspects of Cold War politics will find entirely absorbing.

STEFAN BERGER ª 2007University of Manchester

Philip B. Heymann and Juliette N. Kayyem, Protecting Liberty in an Age of Terror(London: MIT Press, 2005). Pp.194, 3 appendices. £12.95. Pb. ISBN 0-262-58257-0.£25.95. Hb. ISBN 0-262-08343-4.

Philip B. Heymann and Juliette N. Kayyem’s book consists of a set ofrecommendations to policy-makers regarding the ‘rules and procedures that shouldgovern the US legal system’s response to terrorism’ (p.2). According to the authors,US policies ‘have too often given insufficient weight to concerns about democraticfreedoms, human rights, lawfulness and international relations’ (p.3). Arguing that theUS should continue its tradition of being ‘a model for others’ and ‘an active source ofpositive change in the world’ (p.9), Heymann and Kayyem brought together a Boardof Advisors consisting of eminent academics, policy-makers, civil liberties activists,lawyers and police agents from both the US and the UK (full list on pp.179–82).Among these experts were Robert McNamara, Rand Beers (who served in theNational Security Council as a special assistant to George W. Bush on terrorismissues, before resigning and becoming John Kerry’s national security advisor in his2004 run for the presidency) and, interestingly, Michael Chertoff, then a Circuit Judgein the US Court of Appeals and since named Secretary of the Department ofHomeland Security.

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Even though the authors state that the contents of this report ‘do not represent thespecific beliefs of any given member of the Board’ and claim responsibility for the‘final analysis’ (p.179) therein, the book undeniably provides fascinating insights intothe current debates regarding the impact on civil liberties arising from the US responseto terrorism. Moreover, given that a considerable number of the members of the Boardhave held important positions within the US establishment, the contents of this bookare extremely valuable for anyone seeking to understand not only the legal andpolitical dilemmas of policy-making, but also the actual policies and practicalmeasures undertaken by the US government in recent years.Each of the chapters covers a particular issue in which the relationship between

security and liberty is brought to the fore. Specifically, these are coerciveinterrogations, indefinite detention, military commissions, targeted killing (assassina-tions), interception of communications, information collection, identification ofindividuals and collection of information for federal files, surveillance of religious andpolitical meetings, distinctions based on group membership and oversight ofextraordinary measures. The book also includes two essays which provide usefulbackground information: one on ‘Counterterrorism Policies in the United Kingdom’by Tom Parker (pp.119–48), which allows for an interesting comparative exercise, andanother on ‘Torture and Coercive Interrogations’ by Thomas Lue (pp.149–77).The range of recommendations will not be described here. Given the width and

complex nature of these issues, this review will instead seek to problematize some ofthe theoretical assumptions behind the recommendations as a way to discuss some ofthe most controversial measures advocated in the report. It must be recognized that theauthors did not intend this to be a theoretical text. Nonetheless, it is important toquestion some of the assumptions behind the policies here advocated becauseparticular theoretical standpoints are looming throughout the text and have aninfluence in the directions it ends up taking. Ultimately, this review intends to arguethat, for all the insights and thought-provoking questions it raises, this book fails toquestion some deep-seated assumptions regarding understandings of security, threatand political rationality.The first assumption regards the kind of ‘balance’ between security and liberty that

this book aims at contributing to. On the one hand, the widespread idea that securityand liberty are opposite realities obscures the interrelations between the two – inparticular, it fails to see how security policies are informed by normativeunderstandings about the preferable content of ‘liberty’; how security can be seenas a technique of the governance of liberty (as was argued by Jef Huysmans in his2006 book The Politics of Insecurity: Fear, Migration and Asylum in the EU(New York: Routledge)); and how security practices can be separated fromexceptionalist understandings and reconceptualized in more democratic and rights-responsive terms. Clearly, seeing security and liberty as binaries in a ‘when-I-go-forwards-you-go-backwards’ kind of relationship is an unnecessary theoreticallimitation, and any discussion about security practices must therefore attempt to gobeyond it. This is connected to another unexamined assumption of this book: themeaning of ‘what is the threat’ and ‘what is to be secure’ is never questioned or madeexplicit. The book departs from the premise that ‘the nature of the threat now facedwill inevitably call for more aggressive actions by the president and executiveagencies’ (p.6). It may be that the ‘terrorist threat’ demands a change in securitypolicies; nonetheless, the ‘nature of the threat’ is never explained, and it is hard to seehow policy changes can be advocated without an in-depth engagement with the ‘newsituation’ that prompted them. Who or what is at threat? What is the character of this

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threat? Who is threatening and why? What is to be secure and who or what is to berendered secure? This book takes for granted particular understandings of the terroristthreat and of the meaning of security in relation to the latter. These understandingshave a real impact in the policies and measures prescribed.Two examples demonstrate the conundrums that these unexamined assumptions may

lead to. The first one regards the ambivalent nature of the conflict: even though theauthors recognize that ‘the campaign against terrorists does not easily fall into thecategory of either war or not war’ (p.62), their recommendations regarding indefinitedetentions or targeted killings rely on distinctions based on the notion of ‘zone ofactive combat’. The meaning of ‘zone of active combat’ in the context of the USresponse to terrorism is never explained – the authors merely state that it is a ‘territorydeclared by the president, either publicly or in a classified presidential determinationmade available to the appropriate oversight committees of Congress, as constituting atheater of military operations’ (p.49). This section of the argument fails toacknowledge that a different kind of ‘war’ may elicit different understandings ofwhat a ‘military operation’ is; the mere fact that this definition allows for thepossibility of these ‘designated zones’ to remain classified demonstrates that ‘activecombat’ does not necessarily entail standard military personnel engaged in standardmilitary procedures. Rather, what it tells us is that there is significant scope for thepresidential determination of ‘zones of active combat’. In other words, the fact that theauthors fail to examine their assumptions regarding the nature of the threat leads toparadoxes in their definition of the type of conflict at hand and the kinds of measuresthat are seen as legitimate.This is more clearly visible in the second example, which regards the identification

of ‘suspicious patterns of activity that are potentially indicative of terrorism andwarranting closer scrutiny’ (p.74), that is, legitimizing extraordinary procedures ofinformation collection or ‘data-mining’. In this context, the authors have failed toquestion how activities that could easily be considered ‘normal’ (p.76) are turned intothreatening patterns of behaviour. Through which (bureaucratic) processes and(political) decisions are these ‘templates’ created? The authors dismiss the importanceof this line of enquiry by briefly stating that the transition from normal activity tothreatening behaviour is the government’s responsibility, that must ‘establish . . . to thecourt’s satisfaction’ (p.77) that a particular activity constitutes a threat. In other words,Heymann and Kayyem fail to examine the political and bureaucratic process behindthe particular constitution of a threat, and are thereby ultimately unable to ground theirassertions regarding the legitimacy of particular policies. Near the end of the report,whilst discussing the oversight of extraordinary measures, the authors seem to realizethis problem, when they recognize that ‘a variety of counterterrorism measures haveno clear home base. The question ‘‘‘who’s in charge’’ is still too often unanswerable’(p.116). This review argues that an analysis of the bureaucratic and political processesthrough which a particular threat is constituted can probably be helpful.The lack of sociological and political depth in Heymann and Kayyem’s

recommendations leads to the suspicion that decisions on appropriate and legitimatemeasures are somehow the result of a purely technical calculus, over which there is nosignificant scope for doubt and questioning. At the beginning of the report, the authorsargue that ‘it is time to reassess whether the [policy] changes that have occurred werewise and appropriate . . .Politics is irrelevant to this determination’ (p.10, emphasisadded). Their trust in a general ‘system of laws’ leads them to dismiss politicaldiscussion and normative decision as unimportant – the whole process is just a matterof devising and applying appropriate laws. It is easy to guess that this optimistic view

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of the norm runs into problems as soon as it is faced with the exception, and nowhereis this more visible than in the assumptions regarding what is ‘necessary’ and‘reasonable’. How can one justify, for example, the ‘special necessity power’ (p.38) ofthe president, advocated by the authors in the case of non-authorized interrogationtechniques? What exactly is the ‘urgent and extraordinary need’ that can legitimate theuse of these techniques? A similar problem can be seen in the use of criteria of‘reasonability’ throughout the book: religious and political organizations may bemonitored if there is a ‘reasonable’ suspicion (p.27); the treaty and statutoryobligations against torture can be interpreted in a ‘reasonable’ way (p.33); ‘highlycoercive interrogation’ techniques can be used if there is no ‘reasonable’ alternative(p.35); assassination is justified if there is a ‘reasonably imminent threat to the life ofone or more persons’ (p.65); the establishment of templates of suspicious activity is tobe undertaken by the government on the basis of ‘reasonable factual inferences’(p.77).One can conclude from this that Heymann and Kayyem base their recommendations

on a presumption of a particular kind of political rationality (that is, an understandingof ‘what is reasonable’) – a rationality that is already embedded within a specific viewof the terrorist threat and of what security means. This mentality – which could bedescribed as ‘warlike’ – allows for discrimination on the basis of nationality andreligion to be considered ‘logical’ (p.102), and for a consequentialist ethics to becondoned and put forward as part of a moral consensus that the ‘American people’would not reject (see p.36). Through this consequentialist ethics, ‘highly coerciveinterrogation’ techniques and targeted killings are, under certain circumstances,legitimate and justified.This review does not intend to argue that this consequentialist stance is morally

flawed or inadequate; rather, the objective is to highlight the eminently political andnormative decisions, as well as the bureaucratic micro-processes, that necessarilyunderlie some of the recommendations that in this book are presented asunproblematic and resulting from a technical process of legal deduction.In conclusion, given the relevance of the ‘security vs. liberty’ debate in the current

security agenda, and taking into account that this debate has often been conductedalong non-committal lines, Heymann and Kayyem’s recommendations are welcome.Their ‘hands-on’ approach to the subject and their often controversial conclusions willprovide food for thought to any reader. This kind of policy-oriented reflection mustalways be conducted alongside a theoretical questioning of its own political andnormative assumptions.

JOAO REIS NUNES ª 2007University of Wales Aberystwyth

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