2

3

Melanie Harster Marketing Chair

Niamh O'ConnorMarketing Chair

Dr. Heike Michelson Advisor

Sabrina Haertig Cover Artist

Ainav RabinowitzIllustrator

Mena Attia Illustrator

3

Leadership

Content

Hailey Shapiro Staff Writer

Hassaan bin SabirStaff Writer

Akhil Mithal Editor

Collin MattisStaff Writer

Creative

Administrative

Our Staff

Steven LiuEditor

David Sheng Editor

Daris Widya SaskaraEditor

Aishani Shukla Editor

John AshbrookStaff Writer

Samantha Surdek Staff Writer

Oscar MartinezStaff Writer & Illustrator

Luke Hartigan Staff Writer

Janet MalzahnEditor-in-Chief

Anika Bajpai Vice President

Christina Lu President

Asha PattManaging Editor

44

Table of ContentsForewordChristina Lu & Janet Malzahn 5

Chongryon: North Korea’s Outpost in JapanSamantha Surdek 6

Creeping Annexation: The Perfect Crime of GeopoliticsJohn Ashbrook 9

New World Atonement: Colonization in New Zealand Anika Bajpai 12

Cairo to Brasilia and Back: Why State-led Urban Modernization Programs Fail Hassaan bin Sabir 15

A House Divided: America’s Problem with Polarization Luke Hartigan 17

Coastal Conflict or Maritime Mediation: The Coming Crisis for Sea Borders Collin Mattis 20

A Dangerous Sovereign Nation: U.S. Avoidance of International LawHailey Shapiro 23

Yemen’s Age Border: Education’s Role in Development Oscar Martinez 27

References 29

5

ForewordFrom the FoundersBy Christina Lu and Janet Malzahn

Dear Readers,

We started The Cornell Diplomat in August 2018 to share student perspectives on global challeng-es. Since its founding, our magazine has exhibited different angles, places, and positions not com-monly discussed on college campuses. In the past, we have explored thought-provoking subjects such as regime stability, the politicization of gender, and the geopolitics of resources in Regime (In)Stability, The Gender Issue, and Rethinking Resources.

In a time where ever deepening political divisions meet the isolation of life socially distanced, we see new borders every day. In our fourth issue, Borders, we wanted to explore the breadth of sepa-rations that exist between territories, ideas, and even people. What are the things that divide nations and how do we overcome them? How do the geographic borders that separate country from coun-try change over time and shape the identities of the people that live within them? When should we break down existing borders, and when should we fortify them?

None of these questions are easy to answer–that is exactly why we chose to explore them in the Fall 2020 issue. This semester, we traded our normal Goldwin Smith Hall meeting space for a Zoom room, where we cracked jokes, traded ideas, and crafted an issue we can all be proud of. With this being our last semester at the helm of The Cornell Diplomat, we could not be more excited for this magazine and what is to come for all the members who make this organization possible. We hope you enjoy Borders.

Christina Lu and Janet Malzahn

Special thanks to the SAFC, Mario Einaudi Center for International Studies, and Samantha Malzahn for their support.

6

Chongryon: North Korea’s Outpost in JapanBy Samantha Surdek

While Japan is typically perceived as a homogenous society, the region is home to a plethora of ethnic minorities: most notably, Chinese, Koreans, Filipi-nos, and Brazilians.1 The historical myth of Japanese homogeneity perpetuates a culture of nationalism while simultaneously rejecting the struggle of disen-franchised ethnic minorities.2 Despite being one of the largest ethnic groups in Japan, Koreans have none-theless suffered in this nativist society. While born in Japan, Zainichi Koreans bear a label that is literally translated as “residing in Japan,” reflecting a tempo-rary sense of their residence.3 Historically, Zainichi Koreans have faced routine political discrimination, barred from certain employment, housing, and educa-tional opportunities. While these institutional restric-tions largely disappeared in the 1970s, the social divide and consequent xenophobia remain, manifesting in hate speech and direct violence.4 Despite attempts to curtail hate speech in 2016, such efforts to promote inclusivity have, for the most part, fallen short.5 The 2019 United States Report on Human Rights Practices found that “hate speech and hate crimes against ethnic Koreans were particularly prominent and numerous… There is no evidence of increased societal acceptance of ethnic Koreans.”6

Faced with an increasingly hostile environment, Zain-ichi Koreans are left feeling disenchanted, yearning to reconnect with their Korean roots.7 Chongryon have managed to maintain a relative amount of success as a North Korean ideological and political group that seeks to promote a shared North Korean identity with-in Japan. While it was once a financial powerhouse, the group seems to be on the decline: its member-ship is one-sixth of what it once was, its headquarters were forcibly auctioned off by a Japanese court, and it owes $750 million to the Japanese government fol-lowing the group’s inability to pay its debts.8 Clear-ly, the group’s financial base is quickly deteriorating. However, it would be premature to declare the group’s demise. Rather, Chongryon has diverted attention from its financial woes, choosing to operate more as a political and cultural entity. The organization holds continued appeal to Zainichi Koreans that seek to con-nect intimately with North Korea in ways that Japan limits. In a cultural and political way, Chongryon is able to form borders of inclusivity for Zainichi Kore-ans. Yet, as Chongryon take on an increasing political

role in Japanese-North Korean relations, their source of cultural identity comes under increasing threat.

Past and Present of Chongryon

The cultural and political alienation of ethnic Koreans can be traced back to Japanese imperialism in the early twentieth century. During Japanese imperial rule of the peninsula between 1910 and 1945, Koreans were treated as a subordinate group who “could be saved only by the divine intervention of the Japanese emperor.”9 In short, ethnic Koreans were exploited and oppressed for Japa-nese gains. By the fall of the Japanese Empire in 1945, there were two million Koreans living in Japan, many of whom worked and fought for the empire in World War II.10 Eventually, the majority of Koreans were repatriated to the Korean peninsula by 1954, mainly South Korea, while some 556,000 remained in Japan.11 The Koreans remaining in Japan after 1945 faced a wildly different reality. Under Japanese imperial rule, despite the routine discrimination against Zainichi Ko-reans by the government, Japan was still an aspiring hetereogenous empire. As Japan lost its empire in 1945, it also lost control of foreign states and a significant amount of ethnic populations, relinquishing its status as a multiethnic state. This new Japan, focused on con-structing a new homogeneous identity, passed a series of anti-Korean legislations, chiefly the Alien Registra-tion Law of 1952, designating Koreans as “foreigners for the time being.”12 As a result, Koreans were increas-ingly marginalized, living as subhumans in their own country of birth. For many, this marked the beginning of state political and cultural discrimination, inspiring a widespread longing to reconnect with their Kore-an identity and achieve political acceptance in Japan.

This sense of cultural disengagement culminated in the formation of two ideological groups: Chongryon and Mindan. Like their peninsula counterparts, the two are split along ideological lines: Mindan aligned with South Korea’s Rhee regime, while Chongryon looked to the Soviet-backed North Korea. Both groups pro-mote the idea of “long-distance nationalism,” offer-ing many Zainichi Koreans a romanticized opportu-nity to re-establish ties with their home countries.13 While the majority of Zainichi Koreans trace their lineage to South Korea, most aligned themselves with

7

Chongryon.14 Firstly, North Korean socialism proved attractive to impoverished Zainichi Koreans. While the South Korean President, Syngman Rhee, refused to aid poor Zainichi Koreans, North Korea’s Kim Il-Sung had already been providing financial assistance to Chongryon until the 1990s. The idea of a socialist state was comforting to a number of Zainichi Kore-ans, who found a rare opportunity to participate in the political apparatus of the state.15 Moreover, the North Korean economy was then stronger than South Ko-rea’s, partly owing to both Soviet and Chinese assis-tance.16 And as a result, many Zainichi Koreans would plan on someday returning to North Korea, a country that was projected as a socialist heaven.17 Finally, Jap-anese discrimination against Zainichi Koreans pushed them toward the Chongryon identity.18 For example, many Zainichi Koreans chose not to adopt Japanese citizenship, which required them to adopt Japanese last names and compromise their cultural identity.19 Hence, a sense of “otherness” that was already com-mon among many Zainichi Koreans simply grew.

Creating Borders within Borders

Given the intense Japanese societal discrimination against Zainichi Koreans, the Chongryon have been able to consistently promote a shared North Korea identity. Rather than promote individual thought, Chongryon seeks to teach a communal identity to its children that serves the broader Chongryon commu-nity.20 Funded by North Korea, Chongryon schools function as a de facto propaganda platform for the Kim regime and serve to educate children in the culture and language of North Korea. Propagandic in nature, the education system establishes a sense of belonging for Zainichi Koreans who are otherwise marginalized in a hostile environment. Through the system, a cy-cle of self-reliance is formed, as Chongryon members attend school, enroll in university, and find employ-ment within the same North Korean community.21 This marks a stark contrast to the societal oppression and isolation that they regularly encounter outside of the community. In the end, to a group who is consis-tently oppressed by their native country, the ideas of

Illustration by Ainav Rabinowitz

8

collectivism and inclusivity are undoubtedly appealing.

As aforementioned, while Chongryon’s education sys-tem provides Zainichi Koreans with a framework to participate in their heritage, it is concomitantly able to reinforce loyalty to the North Korean regime through this system. This is especially evident in the importance Koreans in Chongryon place on language. While many Zainichi Korean children will grow up speaking Jap-anese, Chongryon schools argue that Japanese should only be used exclusively to get by in Japanese society, and Korean should become the language of expressing political matters.22 Consequently, Chongryon Korean consists mainly of North Korean political idioms, lack-ing emotion and excitement. With this understanding of Korean, which they obtain in schools, Chongryon members are unable to question Chongryon in any meaningful way, strengthening the group’s allegiance to North Korea.23 Thus, language becomes critical in understanding the members’ long-term loyalty to Chongryon, illustrating how the group is able to pro-mote both North Korean propaganda as well as a sense of political and cultural belonging for Zainichi Koreans.

As Japanese society remains exclusionary towards Zain-ichi Koreans, North Korea appears to be the only enti-ty aiding their cultural development. Zainichi Koreans operate within a realm of their own, a place where they can reconnect with their heritage and find social ac-ceptance. For many, the only alternative is assimilation, which would deprive them of their cultural identity. A cycle emerges where Zainichi Koreans, finding solace in Chongryon, are discriminated against for their North Korean affiliation, which pushes them deeper into Chon-gryon. As long as Japanese society remains discrimi-natory towards Zainichi Koreans, it seems that Chon-gryon will continue to thrive as a cultural institution.24

The Role of Chongryon in the Future of North Korea-Japanese Relations

Although Chongryon has long served mainly as a cul-tural institution, over the past two decades, it has as-sumed a greater role as the de facto embassy of North Korea in Japan.25 Since the 1980s, Chongryon has served as a financial appendage of North Korea, send-ing money from its financial ventures back to the Kim regime and fostering a strong connection.26 The group has recently served as the primary facilitator between North Korea and Japan in terms of trade, which po-tentially foreshadows formal diplomatic relations be-tween the two.27 In fact, in 2017, the Japanese gov-ernment conveyed a wish to directly meet with the North Korean government via Chongryon, showing the group’s legitimacy as a diplomatic institution.28

Simply put, Chongryon is essential to the North Ko-rean regime as a political institution. The Kim regime sees the organization as an inlet into Japanese politics. As such, Kim Jong Il aims to prevent the group’s de-cline, which could leave North Korea without direct Japanese intelligence. On the sixtieth anniversary of the Chongryon, Kim Jong Un publically stressed Chon-gryon’s value, noting: “[the] party and the government of the Republic will take full responsibility for the fate and future of Chongryon and Koreans in Japan… and will do everything to strengthen and develop the Ko-rean movement in Japan.”29 To further confirm that sentiment, the organization has consistently proved its allegiance and value to the North Korean state, act-ing as an extension of their dogma and political range.

Currently, relations between North Korea and Japan are at an all time low as both entities debate North Korea’s aggressive missile program and the previous hostage situation. Since Japan and North Korea do not have formal diplomatic ties, Chongryon appears to be the only entity that could address these issues. Given Chongryon’s present role as a conduit for discourse between North Korea and Japan, it is likely that the group will continue to play an important role in fa-cilitating future discussion and diplomatic engage-ment. As a result, Zainichi Koreans’ identity has be-come the focus of Japanese attention. With tensions rising between North Korea and Japan, it is increas-ingly difficult for Japan to justify the existence of a pro-North Korean institution within Japanese borders.30

Generally, the future appears bleak for Chongryon, with both its membership and financial support de-clining.31 While the group continues to persist with support from North Korea, Japan’s hostility towards the group threatens its long-term stability. Chon-gryon’s increasing role as a political entity detracts from the cultural identity of Chongryon Koreans, only furthering their cultural disorientation in Japan.

9

Creeping Annexation: The Perfect Crime of GeopoliticsBy John Ashbrook

Samer is the owner of a small restaurant in the city of Ramallah in the West Bank. In 2011, amidst the clatter of a busy lunch service going on around him, Samer sat down for an interview with a British jour-nalist. He lamented many aspects of the Israeli occu-pation, such as devastating unemployment, depen-dence on Israel for secondary goods, and an untenable high cost of living. Amongst his grievances, one thing stands out: “we don’t even have our borders, we are a country with no borders, everything is controlled by Israel, Israel controls our lives from A to Z.”1

Vephivia lives in a town named Jariash-eni, which sits on the border be-tween Georgia and the self-proclaimed breakaway Repub-lic of South Ossetia, which Russia has oc-cupied since 2008. In a 2016 interview with the New York Times, Vephivia de-scribed how Russia had moved his home from Georgia to Russia overnight that summer, when Russian bulldoz-ers dug a dirt track through the town, delineat-ing between Georgia and South Ossetian territory.2

Though they live 900 miles apart, speak different lan-guages, pray to different gods, and live under the rule of different governments, Samer and Vephivia are both victims of an increasingly prevalent practice called “borderization” or “border creep,” which has enabled powerful states to expand their territory and influence without firing a single shot. Victims of border creep are simultaneously cut off from the resources they have relied on for their entire lives and denied ade-quate resources by their occupiers. This phenomenon represents a failure of the international community to protect state sovereignty and human rights. In a world where conventional conflict over territory is taboo, border creep is a new kind of annexation, one carried out with fences and roads instead of with bullets. More-over, the innately hierarchical structure of internation-al organizations allows for powerful and well-con-

nected states to escape repercussions for these actions.

Defining Border Creep

Border creep, also referred to as “creeping annexation,” is the strategy by which states construct infrastructure across internationally-recognized borders to blur the original lines of demarcation and gradually bring new areas under their control. This practice has several core characteristics. First, it only occurs in situations where power is heavily asymmetrical, as even these limit-ed incursions are only tolerated by those without the

material resources to resist, the assistance of allies, or both. Second, the gradual nature of this strategy means that it creates unnat-ural divisions within communities, caus-ing severe amounts of disruption to local economies and so-cial structures. Final-ly, borders are shaped specifically by the im-

position of new physical structures which deny peo-ples the “right to move.” This is a manifestation of teichopolitics, a larger global trend towards the con-struction of physical barriers that harden borders along “important economic or social discontinuity lines.”3

Annexation of Ossetia

Two contemporary examples exemplify border creep’s problematic outcomes. The first is Georgia’s region of South Ossetia. In 2008, following a de-cade and a half of strained relations between Georgia and Russia, Georgia’s explicit intent to join NATO sparked a five-day war in which Russia invaded and occupied the regions of Abkhazia and South Osse-tia, pushing the Georgian army back deep into their own territory. Despite international outcry from NATO and the EU, Russia decided to formally rec-ognize these territories as “Autonomous Republics,” effectively bringing them under Russian control.4

Beginning in 2008, Russia’s Federal Security Service

"In a world where conventional conflict over territory is taboo, border creep is a new kind of annexation, one carried out

with fences and roads instead of with bullets."

10

(FSB), the successor to the KGB, has conducted a pro-cess of “borderization” around the territory of South Ossetia in order to establish a solid boundary between Georgia and its secessionist region.5 Prior to 2008, no material border existed between Georgia and South-ern Ossetia. In the years that followed, a barbed wire fence gradually emerged, causing numerous disrup-tions to Georgian communities that once occupied both sides of the new border. Families have been com-pletely separated from the vital farmland they rely on to raise livestock and cut off from irrigation water necessary for growing crops. The imposition of this border has impacted cultural activities as well. Geor-gians on the Russian side of the border who wish to follow their tradition of visiting the graves on Easter are denied entry.6 Additionally, the mass migration of young people away from border villages due to a lack of economic opportunity raises the concern that an ag-ing population will be left behind without the ability to resist further border creep from the Russian FSB.7

The international community’s response to Russia’s creeping annexation has been minimal at best. Russia’s veto power on the UN Security Council and its refusal to ratify the Rome Statute shields it from being held ac-countable by the UN or International Court of Justice (ICC) . Additionally, since Georgia never successful-ly joined NATO or the EU, in part due to their lack of territorial integrity, these organizations can do little beyond a toothless condemnation.8 Russia’s great-pow-er status means that Georgians are forced to look on helplessly as the FSB gradually conducts borderization of their territory, ripping apart families, and destroy-ing the agricultural resources they need for survival.

Palestine Partitioned

For Palestinians in the West Bank, a similar process is underway. The West Bank has changed hands a num-ber of times throughout its history, most recently with Israel’s capture of the territory from Jordan during the Six-Day War in 1967. Until 1993, the region was under de facto military occupation, after which it was divided

Illustration by Oscar Martinez

11

into three areas: Area A under Palestinian control, Area B under joint control and Area C, which encompasses the majority of the West Bank, under Israeli control.

While the area has long been occupied by a Palestinian majority, Israel’s construction of a network of settle-ments within the West Bank beginning in 2001 has se-verely disrupted the area, resulting in a gradual, de facto annexation of the territory. These settlements consist of around 100 different gated communites of Iraelis con-nected by a complex road system that cuts through Pal-estinian territories. While these roads may seem benign at first glance, Palestinians are prohibited from travel-ling on many of them–often facing harassment from settlers and Border Patrol officers for even approaching them–turning the roads into de facto borders.9 These roads isolate Palestinians from one another in islands of Palestinian settlements, while simultaneously al-lowing Israel to connect its own gated communities and project its power. There is a certain poetic irony to the notion that roads, which on the surface serve to connect people and enable travel, inhibit those very things among the West Bank’s Palestinian population.

The Role of the International System

Similar to the divisions of Georgians in South Ossetia and Georgia proper, carving up the Palestinian com-munites has had grave consequences for the people who live there. It has limited economic opportunity and represents a “divide and conquer” strategy that prevents Palestinians from forming a larger united community in the West Bank. Yet like Russia, Israel cannot face persecution from the ICC because it has not ratified the Rome Statute. Moreover, Israel’s close relationship with the United States means that it is also unlikely to be punished by the UN. With absolutely no avenues for recourse through international institu-tions, and without the material capability to stand in the way of border creep, people like those in Northern Georgia and Palestine are all but helpless, making this strategy of annexation a perfect geopolitical crime.

Conclusion

The process of borderization and creeping annexation is a direct result of the international order’s hierarchical yet evolving power structure and the norms it enforces. A country like Israel can no longer send tanks into the West Bank and forcefully remove the Palestinians, as it would constitute a clear violation of human rights. Likewise, Russia can no longer send attack helicopters into Georgia and establish the borders of the Repub-lic of South Ossetia through military action, as such an egregious violation of a state’s sovereignty could

not be ignored by the UN. This reality has motivat-ed each state to take a more gradual and creative ap-proach to achieving the same ends: the annexation of a territory it believes it has a right to at the expense of those living in them. Barring major reform of inter-national institutions it is unclear what will stop Russia, Israel, and future opportunists from doing the same.

12

New World Atonement:Colonization in New ZealandBy Anika Bajpai

Since the Age of Exploration, encounters with for-eign intruders have left countless indigenous groups ravaged by diseases, driven from their lands, and at times enslaved. Although the prevalence of laws and attitudes that enabled much of this treatment has de-clined, the scars of colonization are still present and, without comprehensive corrective action, will per-sist. The establishment of Western colonial states upended traditional physical borders and created a legacy of socioeconomic and cultural divisions be-tween new settlers and indigenous peoples. How-ever, several countries, including New Zealand, are trying to break this cycle of native generational dis-enfranchisement with policies that aim not only to atone but to empower their indigenous communities.

The Broken Treaty

New Zealand’s story is similar to that of other New World countries: “discovery,” trade, treaties, and de-ceit, all ultimately giving way to the dispossession of its original inhabitants. At the end of the 18th cen-

tury, the islands saw an increasingly active Euro-pean and American commercial presence.1 In the 1830s, the British Crown took steps to regulate the islands by meeting with Maori chiefs to sign a Dec-laration of Independence, soon followed by a trea-ty establishing New Zealand as a British colony.2

The Treaty of Waitangi was signed in 1840. Differenc-es between its English and Maori versions have spurred arguments over reparations in New Zealand.3 The En-glish version of the treaty established British control over Maori sovereignty, but allowed the Maori to maintain ownership of their lands, which they could only sell to the Crown.4 Due to translational errors, however, the Maori chiefs who ratified the treaty were unaware that they had signed away these rights. The Maori be-lieved that tribes would be able to keep rangatiratanga, or sovereignty, while the British would only receive kawanatanga, or the right to make laws.5 This discrepan-cy would cement the British foothold in the islands, al-lowing British influence to expand in the coming years.

Illustration by Mena Attia

13

Over the next few decades, the British—now em-powered by the Treaty of Waitangi—chipped away at the cultural and physical border with the Mao-ri people. By 1865, the British Crown had come to own more than 90 percent of the South Island’s land-mass and was able to use its ownership to resell the land to new settlers at a profit.6 Consequently, whole tribes were expelled from their lands without prop-er compensation and replaced with new populations. Moreover, many Maori communities were legally pushed off their land because of the introduction of British law in New Zealand, which abolished com-munal land tenure in favor of individual ownership.⁷

This process of dispossession was exacerbated by a se-ries of conflicts in the 1860s between the Maori and the British. The New Zealand Parliament passed the Sup-pression of Rebellion Act 1863, allowing the govern-ment to confiscate the land of any dissenter. With this legislation, the British seized millions of acres of land from the Maori, regardless of whether they had rebelled against the British.8 Later laws and court rulings further chipped away at Maori land rights, and by the turn of the 20th century, with a steady stream of foreign set-tlers flowing into New Zealand, the Maori became a minority within the borders they once controlled.9

A Changing Equilibrium

The Maoris’ new peripheral status was soon reflected in their day-to-day lives. By the 20th century, the Maori experienced poorer health, greater unemployment, substandard housing, and lower educational attainment compared to their white coun-terparts.10 Forced to participate in a society controlled by Western colonists, a clear socioeconomic divide emerged between indigenous and non-indigenous peo-ples, highlighted by the fact that the Maori owned only a mere five percent of New Zealand’s land by 1975.11

Furthermore, political institutions threatened Maori culture, a phenomenon exemplified by the govern-ment banning the Maori language in schools and oth-er public administrations, all hastening the language towards extinction.12 While the Maori had seats re-served in the New Zealand Parliament, they could do little to slow these changes.13 To many Maori, it was clear from the moment the Treaty of Waitangi was signed that they had been cheated and that a con-scious effort would be needed to preserve their culture.In the 1970s, a new generation of Maori and their al-lies began pushing for a national conversation centered

around their historical treatment. For weeks, thousands marched under the slogan: “Not One Acre More of Maori Land.”14 As a response, in 1975, the New Zealand gov-ernment created the Waitangi Tribunal to investigate and redress historical violations of the namesake Trea-ty.15 This Tribunal allowed for tribes to negotiate with the Crown for a formal apology, monetary compensa-tion, and land restitution.16 These settlements, howev-er, do not aim for complete compensation for a history of disenfranchisement and trauma. Rather, they offer an official acknowledgement of the mistreatment of the Maori tribes, alongside the needed resources to rebuild.17

The Melting Pot of New Zealand?

The Waitangi Tribunal represents just one way in which New Zealand has tried to reconcile with its co-lonial past. A much subtler yet larger shift has taken place in the country in the past few decades. By em-bracing Maori culture, New Zealanders have grad-ually blurred the cultural barrier standing between European descendants and the Maori. From perform-

ing the Haka, a Maori ceremonial dance, before international sport-ing events to the Prime Minister beginning a speech to the United Nations in the Maori language, many indigenous symbols have been embraced as national sym-bols. Over time, New Zealand has integrated components of Maori culture into its national identity—a stark contrast to the decades spent repressing these very same cultur-al elements. Even the Maori lan-

guage is now taught at school and spoken in the na-tional parliament. Through governmental and public actions, New Zealand has been able to better remedy its colonial past, ultimately softening cultural boundar-ies to move a step closer towards a more united future.

Nevertheless, New Zealand’s approach is far from per-fect. Many Maori feel that the Tribunal does not go far enough, as both the land and monetary aspects of the Tribunal are restricted. The only lands eligible for negotiation remain the ones in the possession of the government, thus excluding all privately owned prop-erties. In addition, there is a fixed pot of one billion dollars for monetary settlements for all tribes, which limits the compensation Maori can receive for gener-ations of mistreatment. It is unclear how much these actions have helped level the playing field for the Mao-ri: while their average level of educational attainment, life expectancy, and income level have increased over the past few decades, a noticeable socioeconomic gap

"Though far from complete, the

progress that New Zealand has made is still meaningful. "

14

between them and their white peers persists.18 For in-stance, despite constituting just over fifteen percent of the total population, Maori make up more than half of all prisoners in the country.19 Although Maori and the descendants of immigrants live together under the borders of one country, much still divides the two.

Though far from complete, the progress that New Zealand has made is still meaningful. Compared to the treatment of Maoris half a century ago, there has been a seismic shift towards acceptance. While New Zealand has by no means leveled the playing field between the Maori people and European descendants, the govern-ment has nonetheless made large strides towards achiev-ing that goal. By establishing the Waitangi Tribunal and embracing Maori culture, among other changes, New Zealand is paving the way for a more just future.

A New Path Forward

The beginning of the Maori’s story in New Zealand res-onates with the founding of many New World coun-tries: systematic displacement and disenfranchisement over generations. However, unlike New Zealand, many of these countries have not taken extensive steps to ad-dress such historical injustices. The Maori’s status with-in New Zealand—furthered by guaranteed representa-tion in parliament, recognition of and compensation for historical wrongs, and a trend of cultural integra-tion—could provide a path forward to these countries.

Across the Pacific Ocean, the United States government has allocated billions of dollars for programs that aim to close the socioeconomic gap between Native Ameri-cans and the rest of the population and has even set-tled on an—admittedly small— financial compensation package to offer to tribes with historical grievances.20 However, the results are questionable—Native Amer-icans are still twice as likely to be below the poverty line, while also having a suicide rate 1.5 times above the national average.21 There exists a clear cultural and economic border between indigenous and non-indige-nous Americans. Large proportions of non-indigenous Americans remain unaware of the history of Native Americans and the problems facing their communities, with school curriculums continuing to place their focus elsewhere. In fact, a 2015 study found that nearly 90 percent of Native American history curriculums only address pre-20th century events, to say nothing of the fact that 27 states do not name individual Native Amer-ican historical figures in their curriculum standards.22 All in all, it seems likely the socioeconomic divide be-tween indigenous and non-indigenous peoples will persist in the United States until the country addresses the cultural border and its many economic implications.

Instead of following in the footsteps of New Zealand, countries such as Australia and Canada seem to be go-ing down a similar path to that of the United States’: addressing socioeconomic divides through monetary compensations and programs, with limited effort to address cultural divides. The Australian Federal Gov-ernment, despite allocating 0.3 percent of Australia’s GDP to programs for aboriginals, has not made an of-ficial apology for its past treatment of its native peo-ples.23 Further, both Australia and Canada still do not guarantee indigenous representation in their respective parliaments.24 That said, there are signs of progress in both countries. In 2019, the Australian High Court gave aboriginals the right to sue over land losses in-curred during colonial times. Meanwhile, Canada is in the process of settling with native families whose chil-dren were forcibly taken by government authorities.25 But, unless paired with cultural recognition and con-sciousness, New World countries will likely have limit-ed success in moving forward from their colonial pasts. New Zealand’s model, while not perfect, represents a sincere effort to repair the boundaries both broken and built up in the past, one for its friends to learn from.

15

Cairo to Brasilia and Back:Why State-led Urban Modernization Programs FailBy Hassaan bin Sabir

Contemporary Cairo, the largest city in the Arab world, is deeply fragmented. Its intensely segregated metro-politan area is a mosaic of detached urban communi-ties.1 Gated sectors on the outskirts of the Greater Cairo Region attract Egyptian elites seeking to isolate them-selves from the wider citizenry.2 Meanwhile, priced out of these areas, rural immigrants and other newcomers to Cairo are forced to search for affordable housing in satellite communities on the city’s periphery: near rail-ways, metro lines, highways, and floodplains.3 These spatial cleavages, which manifest themselves in physi-cal barriers—walls, fences, and even deserts—have pro-duced a city which lacks cohesion in the absence of an urban center that can fuse these disjointed residential areas into a functioning whole. Moreover, the physical markers which typify Cairo’s fragmented landscape are also symptomatic of more deep-seated cultural divisions which map onto the city’s socioeconomic stratification.

To ease the pressures on Cairo, the Egyptian govern-ment has announced plans to build a new capital city from scratch forty-five kilometers to its east. The proj-ect’s announcement in 2015 em-ployed emotive rhetoric aimed at rallying support for the invest-ment and breeding “confidence” and “pride” in Egyptians.4 Plans released so far show that the new capital will provide housing for 6.5 million people, alongside at-tractions such as a theme park, a new parliament and presidential palace, a business district, a central bank, and airport.5 Officials hope this will alleviate some of the overcrowding and congestion that plagues Cairo.6

The construction of the new capital is part of a larger urban development program, with the Egyptian gov-ernment aiming to build 14 new cities over the next de-cade.7 Key governmental figures claim that these proj-ects will create jobs, modernize the economy, and usher Egyptian society into the twenty-first century.8 While such state-led modernization programs can be expres-sions of national identity and tools for socioeconomic development, they are also susceptible to the pitfalls of centralized, top-down planning and implementation. Such shortcomings take root when states project ideal-ized visions of modernity to mobilize their populations. However, these visions rarely fit neatly with the reality

of urban life for the lower classes and migrants, who fail to assimilate into cities both spatially and culturally.

A Story of Broken Promises

Though the creation of new cities is not a recurring feature of twentieth-century Middle Eastern histo-ry, the region had its own encounter with moderni-ty. Faced with national boundaries drawn by colonial powers which did not map neatly onto the complex tribal and kinship structures of Arab society, nascent Middle Eastern states had to innovate new ways to incorporate the masses into the political arena and, through it, the nation.9 The objective underpin-ning this desire was the need to legitimate the state.

In Egypt, this legitimization played out following the proclamation of the Egyptian Republic in 1952 after a military coup overthrew the country’s pro-British mon-archy. With the vestiges of colonial rule removed from the scene, President Gamal Abdul Nasser embarked

on an ideological program which merged conceptions of Arab nationalism with modernization.10 Known as Pan-Arabism, this ideolog-ical construction was man-ifested in rapid state-led industrialization and infra-structural development.

Although rapid urbanization was rarely promoted ex-plicitly by Nasser and his regional counterparts, they nevertheless equated urban growth with progress.11

The project failed, largely because of a lag between social mobilization and social assimilation. Mobili-zation here refers to the process by which powerful centralized states like Nasser’s Egypt projected them-selves as the promoters of the economic interests of the people to derive support for their political programs.12 Modernization, they claimed, offered the pathway to economic prosperity for the Egyptian masses. This provided the public with a set of expectations about the positive effects of modernization on their lived experiences–expectations which were rarely met.

Migrants arriving in Cairo, at the time a center of growing industry, found themselves in a city with in-

"The project failed, largely because of a lag between

social mobilization and socialassimilation. "

16

adequate housing, overcrowded transportation, and overloaded public utilities.13 Pushed to the periphery, these individuals and their families were forced to find housing in shanty towns and other poorly planned communities which lacked basic necessities such as clean water and electricity. Moreover, owing to the authoritarian nature of Nasser’s regime, there was an absence of civil society groups which could foster an inclusive cultural life in these burgeoning commu-nities.14 These urban divides were symptomatic of a broader failure of Arab political elites like Nasser: their inability to assimilate the wider populace into a new, and modern, socioeconomic and cultural or-der. Its product is the disjointed Cairo we see today.

A Tale of Three Cities

On the surface, then, the incumbent Egyptian regime—also authoritarian in character—is on track to follow in the footsteps of Nasser’s government. Proponents of the ongoing modernization program, however, are likely to argue that through the construction of new cities, Abdel Fatah Al Sisi’s government aims to rectify the negative effects of Nasser’s project. This is easier said than done.

Egypt is not the first country to embark on an am-bitious urban development project. In the late 1950s, regimes in both India and Pakistan sought to use the construction of new federal and provincial capitals to break from their colonial pasts and start anew. Politi-cal leaders in both nations presented these enterprises as an embodiment of the goals and ideals of their na-scent states.15 This desire manifested itself in the forms the two cities took: with their gridiron plans and regi-mented streets, Pakistan’s Islamabad and India’s Chan-digarh stand in stark contrast to the urban and rural sprawl which characterizes their neighboring towns.

Across the globe, Brazil was also swept up in this mod-ernizing fervor. There, it found expression in the city of Brasilia, designed to embody Brazil’s progressive and egalitarian ideas in the 1950s.16 The task of implementing this vision fell to Brazilian architect Lucio Costa, who conceived of an urban space where the different socio-economic groups of Brazilian society could intermingle and enjoy equal access to the city.17 However, the reality of today’s Brasilia is far removed from these lofty goals.

Brasilia’s existing metropolitan area is divided into two distinct segments: the original Pilot Plan designed by Costa and the various satellite communities on its outskirts. Sharp socioeconomic divides map onto this spatial cleavage. The Pilot Plan, similar in structure to Chandigarh and Islamabad, is home to most gov-ernment officials and individuals from the profession-

al and managerial classes. The satellite communities, on the other hand, are inhabited by poorer families forced to move out of the city center as early as a de-cade after Brasilia’s inception.18 These deprived com-munities sprang out of informal settlements built by construction workers who worked on the Pilot Plan.19

Both Chandigarh and Islamabad have faced similar challenges in creating socially cohesive statist projects aimed at modernizing society. In Chandigarh, migrants from rural areas seeking low-paying jobs are forced to reside in the adjoining city of Rawalpindi, burdening its already weak infrastructure.20 Similarly, residents be-longing to Pakistan’s Christian minority, who struggle to gain access to adequate education and employment in a society whose official religion is Islam, have long inhabited slums near the city center. Though near to metropolitan life, these communities are materially deprived, and their poverty stands in stark contrast to the affluence enjoyed by residents of modern bunga-lows just a few hundred meters away. Chandigarh is not too dissimilar: nearly 10% of its population is rel-egated to slums on the city’s outskirts.21 The inhabi-tants of these communities–which lack basic ameni-ties like water, electricity, and working toilets–are mostly migrant laborers who earn low daily wages.22

Conclusion

It is by no means a foregone conclusion that Egypt’s new capital will follow a developmental trajectory akin to that of Islamabad, Chandigarh, or Brasilia. To avoid the hardships which befell these cities, it is impera-tive for Egyptian leaders to learn from their nation’s past. This has not been the case so far. Like Nasser’s government, the present regime’s attention is directed solely towards tugging at the population’s heartstrings. The hope is that these emotive appeals will both pla-cate the concerns of those questioning the financial prudence of these projects and generate widespread enthusiasm for them. However, while these rhetori-cal devices may mobilize the populace for now, more substantive efforts will be needed to create a cohesive urban space which can absorb the influx of millions of socioeconomically and culturally diverse citizens. Foremost among these is the need for an urban plan which prioritizes the construction of a vibrant public sphere, one which facilitates cultural autonomy and enables a flourishing civil society. This is easier said than done for an authoritarian regime intent on sup-pressing individual freedoms. Without it, however, the lag between mobilization and assimilation which led to the failure of Egypt’s first attempt at modern-ization is likely to rear its head once again. The prod-uct will be a new capital whose landscape is marred by the spatial and cultural borders we see in Cairo today.

17

A House Divided: America’s Problem with PolarizationBy Luke Hartigan

When Donald Trump declared victory in the 2016 U.S. presidential election, the world was shocked by America’s choice. A perfect storm of right-wing na-tionalism, political disenfranchisement, and anti-im-migrant sentiment combined with a candidate who embraced authoritarianism and racist messages to up-end American politics. Trump’s divisive rhetoric ex-acerbates domestic racial tensions and political strife, while also weakening the U.S.’s reputation abroad. However, his victory was less an anomaly and more the manifestation of a decades-long intensification of political polarization, fueled by the rise of identi-ty politics, an increase in income inequality, an em-phasis on racial diversity, and the changing role of the media. This polarization has built a wall between two halves of the American electorate, with each side being shoved towards the outer edges of extremism. How-ever, all hope is not lost. Implementing electoral re-forms can help limit the causes and lessen the effects of polarization, ultimately saving democracy from itself.

Identity Politics

Trump’s rise to power was not an isolated event, but rather a reflection of the global wave of nationalism that has been fueled by economic insecurity, immi-gration, and racial and ethnic tensions. And it wasn’t out of the blue. Britain’s 2016 Brexit vote foreshad-owed how deeply isolationist and nationalistic sen-timent had taken root, not just in Britain but in Eu-rope as a whole. The rise of the Vox party in Spain’s 2016 national elections, Marine Le Pen’s far-right National Rally’s sustained popularity in France, and the gains made by nationalist parties in Austria and the Netherlands all signalled the global movement away from multiculturalism, globalism and immigra-tion towards populism, nationalism, and isolationism.

While the populist wave has some consistent similar-ities across countries, its catalysts are unique. Britain, for example, had long resisted the urge to cede eco-nomic sovereignty to Europe as other member states had, evidenced by its attachment to the pound over the euro. In 2016, rising economic insecurity and a ‘Britain first’ trade policy with the EU rekindled that nationalist sentiment.1 In France, the influx of African and Middle Eastern refugees fueled anti-immigrant attitudes in a country with an already troubled his-

tory with racism and ethnic based nationalism, while Austria and The Netherlands both saw a rise in na-tionalistic sentiment for similar reasons.2 This too was the case for Spain, which had also suffered terrorist at-tacks that have heightened anti-immigrant sentiments.

What sets the U.S. aside from these European exam-ples is the U.S.’s two party political system. In Europe’s multi-party systems, voters choose from a wider range of political options that more accurately reflect their political ideology. In the U.S., two parties attempt but fail to cover the full diversity of political opinion. This two-sizes-fit-all model may leave some elements of each party disenchanted, but it ultimately contrib-utes to an irrational loyalty to one’s chosen side. A 2018 online poll found that 61% of Democrats think that Republicans are Racist/Bigoted or Sexist. 31% of Republicans felt the same way about Democrats and a majority considered them to be Spiteful.3 A little over 20% of each side views the other as Evil. These results reveal that the chasm between American vot-ers cuts deeper than just politics. The two party system as it currently stands leaves little room in the middle to address the challenges presently facing the country.

Income Inequality

In the U.S., political polarization has been exacerbated by the rapid rise in income inequality, most notably in the distribution of national income over the last half century. In his book, Capital, economist Thomas Piket-ty details the extent to which income inequality has changed over that time in the U.S.. In the period after World War II and prior to 1970, the top 10% of the na-tion's population earned 33% of national income. Since 1970, that measure has surged to 50% in the early 2000’s. Perhaps more dramatically, the total wealth of the top 0.1% and the bottom 90% are once again converging, just as they did in the 1930’s, the last era of populism.4

These disparities are driven by stagnant wages for many U.S. workers amid rising prices over the same period. Data on the consumer price index —a measure of infla-tion—shows prices skyrocketing sixfold over the past fif-ty years, while wages have seen little growth.5 As income inequality increases, so too does political polarization, an effect that manifests itself in a shift to the left among Democrats and a rightward shift in state institutions.6

17

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Racial Diversity

The rapid rise in identity politics has emphasized America’s racial and ethnic divisions, further alienating voters while eroding the trust in one another and in democratic institutions. A salient example of the im-pact of race-based polarization is racially targeted vot-er suppression. Following President Obama’s election in 2008, many hoped a new era of politics might be ushered in, defined less by race and more by commit-ments to policies. This “post-racial myth,” as named by Ezra Klein, has been clearly debunked. For example, the racial divide, meaning the difference between the black versus white support, for Obamacare, was 20% wider than for Bill Clinton’s equally controversial health-care plan.7 Given its tumultuous racial history, race still plays an outsized role in American politics, both in policy formation and public opinion. With ra-cial biases dominating American politics, polarization is only increased as the focus is drawn away from de-bates over policy and shifted to negative partisanship.

Polarization in the Media

Democracies rely on an informed and rational public, yet in the age of 24-hour media cycles, some Amer-icans are substituting accurate information for click-bait confirmation of their preconceived political ide-ologies. The spread of online media content has not only dominated the news landscape in recent years, but has also led to further polarization in the consumption

of news. Moreover, the rapid increase in accessibility of online and cable me-dia has given the average consumer the opportunity to see only the perspectives that appeal to them, solidifying their preexisting beliefs and confining them to echo chambers of like-minded ideas. This explains why the rise in media ac-cessibility hasn’t been met with a rise in voter engagement.8 Surveys show that the accessibility boom has not necessar-ily contributed to a more politically in-formed population, but rather allowed for a greater selection of choice for those who already chose to stay informed.⁹ Online media sources are not subject to the same journalistic and editorial stan-dards that traditional print sources are: anyone with access to a platform can post stories that are at best misleading, and at worst, intentionally false. These media sources can polarize their audi-ences by stoking the same fear and an-

ger that fuels populist nationalism. Infowars, Breitbart, and the Epoch Times are all examples of self validating yet grossly misleading sites that present its readers with only one very warped side of the whole story. Despite these sites’ abysmal reputations, Trump has embraced their agenda of misinformation by elevating them and granting them press credentials at the White House.

Electoral Reforms

Fortunately, this divide is not insurmountable. Al-though this polarization may seem dire in the short term, electoral reforms can still remedy the caus-es of political polarization and stem its effects.

The extremism encouraged by polarization is com-pounded by a political system that gives dispropor-tionate power to several states in the electoral process, and can be remedied by reforming how votes are allo-cated in presidential elections. The primary difference between the U.S. and other countries is the electoral college system. While the Framers of the Constitution created the electoral college to prevent ill-informed voters nationwide from affecting mob-rule, the Con-stitution remains silent on how these electoral college votes are to be employed. It was only in the early 1900s that states implemented laws requiring the entirety of its electoral college votes be allocated to whoever won the majority in that state, thereby enabling the loser of the national popular vote to win the election. Rather than campaigning to a nationwide voter base, candidates are

Illustration by Ainav Rabinowitz

19

encouraged to tailor their platform to voters in specif-ic states. Swing states are more likely to benefit from heightened attention and be allocated greater resourc-es by parties in efforts to seduce the voting public. In non-swing states, the lack of opportunity to gain pow-er dampens the voter turnout supporting the minority party. Unfortunately, this only contributes to the po-larization of the electorate as minority party voters feel helpless to change a state's designation of being labelled red or blue, further compounding voter disengagement.

Currently only two states have attempted to fix these issues by allocating their electoral college votes based on the proportion of votes won by each candidate, but more states are starting to follow. The National Popu-lar Vote Interstate Compact (NPVIC) is an agreement among a number of states to award their electoral col-lege votes to the candidate that wins the popular vote nationally, rather than the winner of the state. Counting the votes beyond state borders has the effect of making every vote count by eliminating the polarizing effect of the swing state phenomenon. Washington, D.C. and fifteen states have passed legislation adopting the com-pact, with Colorado passing its referendum on the sub-ject during the 2020 election cycle. However, the com-pact still has a long way to go. It only comes into effect if it is adopted by states representing at least 270 electoral votes, the threshold needed to win the election. Today, the members account for 196. Eliminating the arbi-trary state borders that define the power of a vote in the U.S. presidential election process and extending them instead to a national boundary can help eliminate the polarization plaguing the nation, ensuring a more ro-bust and engaging democracy where all votes matter.10

A second remedy to the electoral college system is the implementation of ranked choice voting (RCV), which ensures election winners receive the majority of the nation’s support. In most U.S. elections, the winner is determined by less than a majority of the vote, meaning that more than half the electorate supported the other candidate. In an RCV system, voters are asked to rank candidates in order of preference. If no one candidate garners 50% of the votes, the candidate with the fewest votes is eliminated, and ballots cast for the eliminated candidate are then recounted based on voters’ second-ary preferences. This process continues until one can-didate achieves an electoral majority.11 Maine became the first U.S. state to implement RCV during the 2018 senate elections, and although incumbent Susan Collins kept her seat in 2020, RCV is believed to have made the race much tighter.12 RCV also discourages negative campaigning because candidates are appealing to voters who have a different first choice in case a majority is not established in the first round. Therefore, it is against their interest to attack other candidates as voters will

naturally be hesitant to cast their second vote for can-didates who criticized their first choice. The absence of negative campaigning also helps build the foundations for potential bipartisanship after the election is over.

Outside of Maine, RCV has been successfully imple-mented in Australia, New Zealand, and Ireland.13 An Australian survey found that voters supported RCV as it removed guilt for wanting to support a third-par-ty candidate. In the past, third party votes may have been seen as simply hurting an ideologically similar candidate, but with RCV, voters could express their more accurate political beliefs while ensuring that their vote would not be wasted or counterproduc-tive. Additionally, RCV has proved to be a “prophy-lactic against extremism,” strengthening the political center at the expense of more radical parties.14 In the 2016 Republican primary elections, Trump amassed a total of 13 million votes, while his three main chal-lengers, Ted Cruz, John Kasich, and Marco Rubio, re-ceived more than 15 million combined.15 With ranked choice voting, the potential for voters to support nu-merous candidates through several rounds of voting mitigates the risks posed by an extremist candidate like Trump, who accepted the Republican nomina-tion with less than half of the voter base behind him.

Conclusion

The effects of political polarization are socially dam-aging and deeply divisive. While other countries have seen recent surges in right wing nationalistic senti-ment, their political systems help to thwart these ad-vances. Unfortunately, the political system in the U.S. lacks those same protections, trapping America in a downward cycle of extreme division. Spurred by in-come inequality, economic instability, identity pol-itics, racial divisions, and the accessibility boom of news media, political partisanship has created a border between everyday Americans. This cycle is extreme-ly destructive, but it can be reversed. Addressing the electoral college system using proportional allocation and ranked choice voting to promote majority support in elections while discouraging negative campaign-ing and providing more viable choices for voters will help lessen America’s current divisions. There is a de-fining wall driving voters to the extremes and in turn preventing any progress on urgent issues. This ob-stacle needs to be removed because America needs its leaders’ help in, as Reagan a former Democrat turned prominent Republican put it, tearing down the wall.

]

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Coastal Conflict or Maritime Mediation: The Coming Crisis for Sea Borders By Collin Mattis

In recent decades, the geopolitical importance of oceans has been on the ascent. Since WWII, the seas have become a critical highway for the shipping of goods, with approximately 80% of all global trade today being transported by sea.1 States frequently mismanage the extraction of maritime resources, such as oil, miner-als, and gas, leading to devastating environmental and economic impacts. Records even suggest at least 32% of fish stocks are overexploited.2 More gravely, climate change threatens to entirely reshape coastal baselines and even jeopardize the existence of some countries with rising sea levels.3 All of these factors will force na-tions to reconsider the importance of their maritime territory and may lead to an increasing urgency to set-tle the border disputes that define them. In particular, the rising scarcity of resources has reopened the old de-bate of who owns what, but now this time over bodies of water. A question naturally presents itself: how will sovereign nations go about solving maritime territorial disputes defined by international law in the 21st century global order? Whether states opt to pursue cooperation or conflict could largely be determined by their diplo-matic trust and the balance of power within the region.

Background

In 1982, the United Nations attempted to fold the world’s oceans into its legal jurisdiction with the es-tablishment of The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.4 The institution has since served as an international “constitution for the oceans,” lay-ing out the legal framework for determining territo-rial waters, sea-lanes, and resource rights.5 And yet, like many other international laws, the Law of the Sea struggles to elicit state cooperation. While over 150 countries have ratified the Convention, only 168 of the 427 potential maritime borders it sets out have been formally agreed upon, and many more have only partial consensus.6 Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ), maritime areas extending 200 nautical miles from a country’s shoreline, allow for exclusive extraction rights to the resources within them. However, these softer maritime borders often serve as a major source of dispute.7 Due to their increasing value, maritime borders and their contested nature will shift the sta-tus quo, as countries are incentivized to solidify these boundaries, either through conflict or cooperation.

Oceans to Create Compromise?

Violent exchanges over maritime borders often ap-pear to be too costly for states to seriously consider despite their potential benefits. While ocean terri-tories possess similar tangible attributes to land, such as economic resources and strategic value, they have been less likely to spark a war due to their lesser cul-tural and national significance.8 People have more trouble associating ocean territories with the idea of a homeland, ethnic or religious identity, or even a sense of ownership over the space.9 Rationally, state leaders prefer to avoid the costs of violent conflict whenever possible, particularly in a geopolitical climate where so many multilateral institutions are set up to prevent war.10 While oceans will become more economically and strategically valuable in the future, they do not hold the cultural and national weight often neces-sary to inflame the masses and rally the public behind a war. Therefore, maritime border disputes will most likely be resolved through diplomacy and negotiation.

Due to their economic value and increasing scarcity, the gains from harnessing ocean resources may serve as the necessary incentive to spur cooperation and solve maritime border disputes diplomatically. As re-cent as 2010, Norway and Russia agreed to solidify their 1,750-kilometer Arctic maritime boundary.[11]

Resource extraction of both oil and natural gas was a central objective to both countries’ Arctic strategies, incentivizing both parties to cement their boundaries in order to maximize their efficiency.[12] Back in 2010, this agreement was hailed as a sign of a new era in Norwegian-Russian relations and Arctic governance. As former Norwegian foreign minister Jonas Gahr Store noted, the agreement only worked because there was “trust between negotiating partners.”[13] Howev-er, such an agreement might not have been possible even four years later. With the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014, Norway would likely not have enough trust that a border would be respected. This suggests that when resource scarcity forces countries to turn towards ocean reserves, trust is an essential component in pursuing cooperation between nations.

Other than the establishment of mutual trust, diplo-matic solutions to disputed maritime resources can also be achieved when there is a clear power imbalance

21

between the competing parties. The Democratic Re-public of the Congo (DRC), according to international law, has legitimate access to the oil-rich maritime area currently occupied by Angola.14 Even though the DRC would be more likely to win an international court case over the border–making them the third largest oil producer in Subsaharan Africa–they have yet to press their claims against Angola.15 This is a result of the in-stability and debt created under the regimes of pres-idents Laurent-Désiré Kabila and Joseph Kabila, who became dependent on Angola’s support to keep their country afloat.16 With non-regime actors still pursuing these maritime claims, the Kabilas agreed to allow An-gola to maintain con-trol over the region in exchange for Angolan backing of their regime. 17 The dominant pow-er, Angola, thus main-tained access to the oil central to its economy, and the weaker power, the DRC, continued to fulfill short-term rent seeking and regime survival objectives. 18 This example demon-strates how peaceful agreements on mari-time borders can also be achieved when the power disparity is so promi-nent that the weaker state recognizes the most strate-gic way forward is to submit in return for concessions.

Oceans: A New Cause of Conflict?

Even though oceans often lack symbolic importance, their economic and strategic usefulness only continues to grow. In fact, because of these characteristics, bound-ary-making in oceans has generally been functionalist in that it prioritizes the utilitarian usage of maritime space. 19 In regard to whether this can directly lead to warfare, political theorist Jean-Marc F. Blanchard ar-gues that “the party more likely to escalate a border dis-pute to war is the party that views the border as having greater innate functional value relative to its needs.” 20 In other words, border disputes are more likely to escalate into war as the functional value of that bor-der and what lies within it increases. Therefore, while oceans generally fail to generate strong feelings of na-tional identity, their military-strategic and economic functionality will only grow with time, making fu-ture conflict over oceans a more reasonable possibility.

Once again, the increasing scarcity and value of ocean resources can sometimes guide countries to settle their disputes. However, with a more equal balance of pow-er and a lack of healthy diplomatic relations, disputes might boil over into armed conflict. The South China Sea offers an example of how the increasing strategic and economic value of oceans might lead to strong ten-sions or even naval warfares. Geopolitically, the region is subject to several overlapping disputes between Chi-na, Vietnam, the Philippines, Taiwan, Malaysia, and Brunei based on historic territorial claims or the need for control over key strategic islands.21 In addition, the region is also of crucial economic importance. Over

one-third of all global shipments pass through the South China Sea, which itself contains an estimated 22 bil-lion barrels of oil and 290 trillion cubic feet of gas, not to mention 10% of the world’s fish-eries.22 This econom-ic value helps explain why it has become one of the first maritime regions to experience real violent conflict.

In 1974, the Battle of the Paracel Islands saw China and Vietnam en-gage their navies, leading to the killing of dozens of Vietnamese soldiers.23 Today, the conflict is large-ly one between China and the Association of South-east Asian Nations (ASEAN), supported by the Unit-ed States. China cites historical claim to ownership, all the while steadily building artificial islands, while the ASEAN states object based on the parameters es-tablished by international law.24 China’s ambitions for regional hegemony and America’s support of the ASEAN have resulted in a tense stalemate, with no side able to force its will. The South China Sea offers an example of how disputes over maritime regions with particularly high economic and strategic functionality are harder to settle because of mistrust between equally powerful competitors. Scholar Robert D. Kaplan ex-tends this argument by suggesting that sea conflict is more appropriate to the 21st century, with technolo-gy further removing humans from the moral decisions and physical risks of war.25 Naval warfare is largely a battle defined by competing machinery and strategy, which minimizes direct human interactions and ca-sualties.26 Therefore, countries may actually grow to favor engaging in war in water rather than on land.

"While oceans generally fail to generate strong feelings of

national identity, their military-strategic and

economic functionality will only grow with time, making future conflict over oceans a more reasonable possibility."

22

Conclusion:

Nations have too much at stake to leave their ocean disputes unsettled. The question is whether states will resolve them with battleships or friendships. This is largely determined by the strength of the contend-ing countries’ relations and the balance of their power dynamics. When relations are healthy and both par-ties can trust that their newfound agreement will be upheld, a mutual compromise on the designation of maritime borders can be made, allowing both parties to engage in resource extraction, as is the case with Norway and Russia. Alternatively, if one country is dependent on a key good or service from another country due to a power imbalance, they may be in-centivized to agree on a deal that favors the claim of the dominant country in order to maintain stabil-ity, such as with Angola and the DRC. However, if a maritime border is contested between nations who do not trust one another and are each backed by rela-tively even levels of power, conflict may be the more likely outcome, such as within the South China Sea. Beyond the increasing economic and strategic value of maritime zones, several other emerging, less pre-dictable factors may alter how and where conflict or compromise is performed. While damage to ocean bi-omes and climate change is more likely to encourage international cooperation, the resulting depletion of re-sources and rising sea levels could transform how these borders are even defined. The resulting desperation and confusion wilserve as a major test of international institutions' ability to mediate and may force conflict. The accepted credibility of these institutions may also be challenged in coming years with the rise of anti-glo-balist, populist leaders. President Donald Trump not only places national interests above all others, at times even in defiance of international law, but he also en-courages other national leaders to do the same, embrac-ing their distinctive cultures, national sovereignty, and respect for borders.27 And they are listening. Brazilian President, Jair Bolsonaro, has made it his mission to put Brazil first, declaring war on globalism and internation-al institutions.28 His emphasis on Brazil’s borders signals the geographic limits of sovereignty and declares to oth-er countries that the state has the right to exist without

their meddling.29 If oceans were to obtain these consti-tutive functions, in addition to their economic and mil-itary-strategic value, their growing salience will only encourage more forceful action. There is no definitive answer as to whether these increasing pressures on state leaders to settle their maritime disputes will result in vi-olent violent conflict or careful cooperation. Regardless of the outcome, it is clear that we are entering a new era of oceans, where international law will be put to test.

"The resulting desperation and confusion will serve as

a major test of international institutions' ability to mediate

and may force conflict"

23

A Dangerous Sovereign Nation: U.S. Avoidance of International Law By Hailey Shapiro

The Trump administration’s sanctions are debilitating Iranian civilians. Since the U.S. first imposed sanc-tions on Iran in the summer of 2018, the price of food, books, and clothes has skyrocketed. Some families have resorted to buying rotting fruits; others are un-able to pay rising costs of water, gas, and rent.1 Doc-tors are no longer able to access some medicines and medical supplies, leaving patients with life-threatening conditions without adequate treatment.2 As the coro-navirus ravages the country and U.S. sanctions block Iranians’ access to ventilators and other supplies, the medical shortage has evolved into a national crisis.3

Seeking relief for its struggling citizens, in 2018 Iran filed a case at the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the United Nations’ principal judicial body.4,5 The U.S. sanctions, Iran argued, violated its 1955 Treaty of Amity, which required the U.S. to “accord fair and equitable treatment” to Iranian nationals and compa-nies. The ICJ agreed, and ordered the U.S. to meet Iranians’ urgent needs by removing related sanctions.6

Instead of complying, the U.S. withdrew from the Treaty.7

The US’ withdrawal is not unprecedented in American foreign policy. The U.S. has been criticized for failing to cooperate with other countries for decades, and in-ternational legal institutions such as the ICJ have few enforcement mechanisms to pressure defiant countries to comply.8,9 As a result, the U.S. has consistently with-drawn from international agreements and ignored the ICJ’s orders after unfavorable rulings.10 U.S. officials of-ten justify their decisions to withdraw with claims that the ICJ is unnecessary, or, as former U.S. National Secu-rity Advisor John Bolton said when the U.S. pulled out of the Treaty of Amity, “politicized and ineffective.”11

These accusations are dubious, and the aim of U.S. withdrawal—to augment its sovereignty by isolating itself from international law—is dangerous. When the U.S. builds up borders between itself and interna-tional agreements and institutions, it fails to fulfill its obligations to individuals from other countries. Fur-ther, it loses powerful tools to support human rights in the U.S. and abroad, and stifles transnational crit-icism and accountability. Ultimately, by isolating it-self from international law, the U.S. threatens the

wellbeing of Americans and people around the world.

Blowing Up Agreements

American officials 50 years ago would have probably been surprised to hear their successors dismiss the ICJ as politicized and ineffective. In 1943, the U.S. was one of the main forces that spearheaded the creation of the ICJ. After the U.S. and three other countries declared that a new international organization was necessary to maintain global peace and security, representatives from 50 countries signed the UN Charter, which, based on a statue drafted by an American-led committee, es-tablished the ICJ as the “principal judicial organ of the United Nations.”12,13,14 Mere months after the ICJ was established, the U.S. granted the ICJ jurisdiction over its future disputes.15 This declaration set the U.S. apart as especially supportive of the institution; most other countries decided to only allow the ICJ to resolve dis-putes over treaties that explicitly grant it jurisdiction.16,17

In 1984, however, under the presidency of Ronald Reagan, the U.S.’ enthusiasm for the ICJ faded when the country suspected that it would lose its first major case.18 That year, the CIA hired commandos to mine several Nicaraguan harbors in a failed attempt to over-throw the Sandinista government, which U.S. officials suspected had ties to the Soviet Union.19,20 After the mines destroyed several ships and resulted in numerous injuries, Nicaragua brought a case to the ICJ, arguing that the CIA’s actions had violated international law.21 When the ICJ concluded that it had jurisdiction over the dispute—even before it came to any final decisions—the U.S., fearing an impending loss, withdrew from the case, refusing to participate in any related proceedings.22

The U.S.’ reasoning then mirrored Bolton’s justifi-cation for exiting the Treaty of Amity two decades later. The Nicaraguan mining conflict, the U.S. State Department argued at the time, was “an inherently political problem” that was “not appropriate for ju-dicial resolution.” Further, U.S. officials warned, the ICJ’s decision to hear the mining case suggested that the institution was becoming “more and more polit-icized against the interests of Western democracies.”23

But these accusations were dubious then, and are du-bious now. Courts are not prohibited from resolv-

24

ing “political” problems; all courts, in fact, deal with important issues that impact political disputes. Ad-ditionally, there is little evidence that ICJ judges are predisposed to ruling against the US. ICJ judges base their decisions off of international law, not their per-sonal preferences or home countries’ advice.24 And even if the ICJ has any political bias, it probably leans in favor of Western democracies because West-ern lawyers dominate international legal practice.25

Nonetheless, U.S. officials, afraid that an anti-West-ern political bias had “infect[ed]” the ICJ, announced that they were “compel[led] to clarify [the US’] 1946 acceptance of the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction.”26 And clarify they did. A few months later, in October 1985, the U.S. made a decision that would transform its relationship with the ICJ: it withdrew its declara-tion that had granted the ICJ wide-ranging jurisdic-tion.27 In 1986, when the ICJ ordered the U.S. to pay reparations to the Sandinistas, the U.S. refused.28

Treaty Abandonment

Over the next 35 years, the U.S. continued to encounter unfavorable ICJ rulings. These rulings pushed the U.S. to abandon more agreements, including the Treaty of Am-ity and the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations—even after they had served the U.S. favorably in the past.

The VCCR requires that countries immediately noti-fy arrested foreign nationals of their consular rights.29,30 Consular rights ensure that people arrested outside of their countries can contact their embassy representative, who can provide legal advice, translation, and help trans-ferring documents and notifying family.31 These services are especially important for foreign nationals arrested in the U.S., where defendants can be sentenced to death.

The U.S. has used the VCCR and the Treaty of Am-ity to support its own claims at the ICJ. In 1979, the U.S. used both after Iranian demonstrators seized the U.S. embassy and took 52 American diplomats hos-tage.32,33 The U.S. brought a case to the ICJ, arguing that Iran had violated the VCCR and the Treaty of

Illustration by Mena Attia

25

Amity by failing to stop the demonstrators. The ICJ ruled in favor of the U.S. and required Iran to give the U.S. the hostages, the embassy, and reparations.”34

However, when the U.S. received unfavorable rul-ings for violating these treaties, it conveniently for-got their past utility. The VCCR met its end in 2005 after Mexico filed a case at the ICJ accusing the U.S. of sentencing 54 Mexican citizens to death without informing them of their consular rights.35 Two other countries had already filed cases against the U.S. for vi-olating the VCCR—Paraguay in 1998 and Germany in 1999—but, in both cases, the U.S. refused to abide by the ICJ’s preliminary orders to stay the executions, and killed both men before the ICJ released its final deci-sion.36 In the Mexican citizens’ case, however, the ICJ came out with its final decision before the U.S. could follow through with the executions: in 51 of the 54 cases, the ICJ determined, the U.S. had violated the VCCR and needed to reconsider the men’s sentences.37

In response, in March 2005, the U.S. withdrew from the section of the VCCR that gives the ICJ jurisdiction.38 The U.S. also ignored the ICJ’s demands; today, nearly 20 years after the ICJ decision, Congress has yet to pass legislation mandating compliance with the ICJ’s rul-ings, and several of the 51 Mexican nationals have been executed.39,40 According to the U.S. State Department, the US’ decision to withdraw was motivated by its de-sire to “protect[t] against future International Court of Justice judgments that might… disrupt [the American] domestic criminal system.”41 This explanation appeared to contradict the US’ position in 1979, when it advo-cated for the international community to disrupt the Iranian criminal justice system to save American citi-zens. When questioned about this apparent contradic-tion, a State Department spokesperson explained that it was inappropriate for the ICJ to interfere with U.S. do-mestic justice because the US, unlike “other countries, like Iran in 1979” had a “system of justice that works.”42 (The spokesperson, however, failed to explain how a “system of justice that works” could fail to inform 51 arrested men of their right to consular assistance.)43

Sovereignty and Suffering

The Nicaragua mining case, the VCCR, and the Treaty of Amity are not isolated incidents of with-drawal; rather, they reflect the U.S.’ demonstrat-ed habit of withdrawing from international agree-ments after receiving unfavorable rulings. In some of these cases the U.S. has withdrawn not only from the treaties themselves, but from the entire in-ternational legal system by ignoring ICJ rulings.

U.S. officials offer only unfounded justifications for the country’s withdrawals, such as its accusation that the ICJ is politicized. They ignore the fundamental is-sue at hand: the US’ withdrawal is dangerous. With-drawal aims to strengthen American sovereign power by weakening the country’s connections to interna-tional legal institutions. This approach robs the U.S. of powerful tools to fight human rights violations, weakens accountability measures on U.S. officials, and cuts off transnational criticism of U.S. policy—ul-timately threatening human rights around the world.

For one, Americans are harmed when the U.S. with-draws from international law. Based on the golden “what goes around comes around” rule of interna-tional politics, other countries will be less likely to fulfill their obligations to Americans if the U.S. fails to fulfill its obligations to foreign nationals.44 In the past, the U.S. has used treaties to support Americans under threat, such as during the Iran hostage crisis.45 By throwing away international agreements and dis-missing the ICJ, the U.S. loses valuable tools to help Americans in the future, including the thousands of Americans working as diplomats abroad and the 3,000 Americans arrested in foreign countries each year.46,47

But foreign policy is about more than just Americans. U.S. foreign policy will inevitably either harm or pro-tect people in other countries—and, by withdrawing from international law, American policies risk harm-ing more and protecting less. When the U.S. ignores the ICJ’s demands, it fails to fulfill its legal obligations to people from other countries, who will continue to suffer. In Nicaragua, the Sandinistas are still uncom-pensated for the destruction that the CIA’s mines in-flicted. Some of the 51 Mexican nationals have been wrongly executed without being notified of their consular rights, and many of the tens of thousands of foreign nationals arrested each year are speculated to be unaware of their protections due to U.S. authori-ties' ignorance of their duty to inform.48,49,50 The ICJ has yet to release its final decisions for the cases in-volving the Treaty of Amity case, but if the U.S. fol-lows its habit of ignoring ICJ rulings, Iranians will continue to suffer under accelerating U.S. sanctions.

Beyond these specific cases, U.S. withdrawal threat-ens global human rights more broadly. When the U.S. dismisses ICJ rulings and throws away inconvenient treaties, it loses legitimacy to peacefully pressure oth-er countries into abiding by international agreements or ICJ rulings.51 Additionally, by choosing strategic whim over international agreements and global prin-ciples, the United States sends the message that it is above criticism and accountability, both from interna-

26

tional actors like the ICJ and the very people its poli-cies hurt the most. When the US withdraws from in-ternational law, it impedes the ability of people who are directly impacted by American policies--such as Iranian citizens suffering under sanctions--to demand recourse through the ICJ or diplomatic pressure.52

The Trump administration has made clear that the country will continue to build up borders against in-ternational law. Bolton recently announced that U.S. officials are planning to “commence a review of all international agreements that may still expose the United States to purported binding jurisdiction.”53 Withdrawing from international law may strength-en U.S. sovereignty, but it threatens global human rights. By continuing down this lonely path to sov-ereignty, the U.S. will suffocate global criticism and accountability of its policies, and lose powerful tools to fight human rights abuses around the world.

27

Yemen’s Age Border: Education’s Role in DevelopmentBy Oscar Martinez

For years, Yemen has been crippled by severe political violence, a weak education system, and famine–serious issues that have only been exacerbated by the ongoing Yemeni Civil War. This conflict has not only prompt-ed a massive refugee crisis and rising national death toll, but also created significant demographic shifts in Yemen. Demographically, the war has magnified divi-sions in the country’s age structure, with the majority of Yemen’s population being 24 years of age or younger.1

Although this pronounced demographic cleavage, or “age border,” may foreshadow decades of further in-stability as an unprepared generation brought up in conflict attempts to meet the challenges of the 21st century, it also provides the victors of the Yemeni Civil War with a critical opportunity for develop-ment. If post-conflict recovery efforts are centered around creating and sustaining educational oppor-tunities for this young generation, Yemen can prog-ress from a war-torn state to a developing nation.

The Yemeni Civil War

The Yemeni Civil War is rooted in conflict between three key actors: the Houthi, a Shiite rebel group backed by Iran; the Yemeni government, supported by Saudi Arabia; and the Southern Transitional Council, a seces-sionist group that is backed by the United Arab Emirates.

The conflict began in 2014, when the Houthi insur-gents rebelled against President Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi with demands for a new government.2 In or-der to thwart the spread of Iranian influence, Saudi Arabia formed a coalition of several Middle Eastern countries to fight against the Iranian-backed Houthi rebels.3 In 2019, the Southern Transitional Council (STC) emerged as another critical party to the con-flict. Although the STC originally supported the Ye-meni government, it later rebelled against it over le-gitimacy concerns and seized control of key coastal cities in the South. With the Houthis, the STC, the Yemeni government, and their respective allies all

Illustration by Oscar Martinez

28

battling for control of Yemen, the conflict swept many Yemeni people into the fold of its carnage.4

This violence has also disrupted learning across the country, threatening Yemen’s educational institutions and preventing many young Yemenis from gaining access to crucial academic resources. As a result of the conflict, 256 schools have been completely destroyed, over 1,500 have sustained damage from armed con-flict, and several others have been occupied by armed groups.5 The education system has been further strained by the COVID-19 pandemic, as many schools lack the necessary infrastructure to provide a safe learning en-vironment. Currently, approximately 5.5 million chil-dren in Yemen are in need of educational services.6

Creating the Age Border

Since 2014, the Yemeni population has experienced significant damage from the conflict that has translat-ed into a substantial population shift. Not only has the conflict resulted in a death toll of over 100,000 civilians, but it has also forced an estimated four million Yemenis to flee the country as refugees. In addition to a high ad-olescent fertility rate, these factors have altered Yemen’s population so dramatically that 60.42 percent of the country’s population is under the age of 24 years old.7 This “age border” is further exacerbated by limited use of contraceptives, poor access to education, and a high adolescent fertility rate of about 6.2 births per woman.8

Youth, Education, and the Opportunity for Development

With this massive young population, Yemen has a huge opportunity for development if it prioritizes edu-cation in the post-conflict recovery period. Investing in education has enormous economic benefits: at a societal level, an increase in education contributes to macroeco-nomic growth.9 Research has also linked education to social cohesion, as education allows citizens to more ac-tively participate in state affairs, politics, and communi-ty events.10 If the post-conflict Yemeni government fo-cuses on developing strong educational institutions that have sufficient resources to support its young population, the economic and social benefits could be substantial.

Prioritizing early-education initiatives could also sup-port the post-conflict peacebuilding process. Studies show that governments who invest in early education in a post-conflict context ultimately create what is known as a “peace dividend,” in which a government’s commitment to peace, development, and human rights is demonstrated through investment in early educa-

tion.11 After enduring a civil war from 1983 to 2005, for instance, South Sudan was able to use education to progress economically. From 2005 to 2009, South Su-dan invested heavily in early education initiatives that taught life skills, HIV prevention tactics, and peace ed-ucation that challenged ethnic and group prejudiced violence. These educational reforms raised the nation's GDP per capita from 1,337 USD in 2009, to 1,516 USD in 2011. If Yemen follows Sudan’s example, the country may also experience a similar rise in GDP fol-lowing this model of development through education.

With a large portion of Yemen’s population at a prime age to benefit from increased education, investing in education in post-conflict Yemen can undoubtedly help create stability. However, the benefits of strength-ened education systems also extend more broadly to ad-vancing principles of peace as the country rebuilds. As seen in South Sudan, efforts to transform their education system have led South Sudanese President Salva Kiir to swear in the former rebel leader Riek Machar as the first vice-president–a massive step towards peace-building.12

If the post-conflict government fails to provide equal and sufficient access to education, or allows the wrong type of education, studies from South Sudan, Kenya, and Nepal suggest that it will fuel more violence.13,14 According to the “youth bulge” theory, rapidly ex-panding young populations experience high levels of unemployment, making them more susceptible to re-cruitment into terrorist or rebel organizations.15 Thus, it is especially important for the Yemeni government to focus its efforts on providing young people with an education that provides them with employable skills and prevents their recruitment into military or crim-inal activity.16 Given Al-Qaeda’s existing presence in Yemen, investment in these educational institutions is all the more necessary to optimize a post-con-flict Yemeni society’s prospects for development.

The age border in Yemen has created a window of opportunity. Post-conflict recovery focused on ed-ucation has the potential to heal the state and put it on track to becoming a developing nation. With Yemen facing countless hurdles in its quest for sta-bility, the victors of this conflict must be com-mitted to developing and sustaining an educa-tion that will create a brighter future for the nation.

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[1] Jane H. Yamashiro, “The Social Construction of Race and Minorities in Japan,” Sociology Compass 7, no. 2 (2013): 147–61, https://doi.org/10.1111/soc4.12013.[2] Debito Arudou, “‘Homogeneous,’ ‘unique’ Myths Stunt Discourse,” The Japan Times, November 2, 2010, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/community/2010/11/02/issues/homogeneous-unique-myths-stunt-discourse/.[3] Lie, John. Zainichi (Koreans in Japan): Diasporic Na-tionalism and Postcolonial Identity. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008, pg iv-v.[4] Bumsoo Kim, “‘Blatant Discrimination Disappears, But ...’: The Politics of Everyday Exclusion in Con-temporary Japan,” Asian Perspective 35, no. 2 (2011): 287–308.[5] Sayuri Umeda, “Japan: New Act Targets Hate Speech Against Persons from Outside Japan | Global Legal Monitor,” Library of Congress Law, August 31, 2016, //www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/japan-new-act-targets-hate-speech-against-persons-from-outside-ja-pan/.[6] United States Department of State, “Japan,” 2019 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Japan (blog), 2019, https://www.state.gov/reports/2019-coun-try-reports-on-human-rights-practices/japan/.[7] Narzary, Dharitri Chakravartty. “The Myths of Japanese ‘Homogeneity.’” China Re-port 40, no. 3 (August 2004): 311–19. https://doi.org/10.1177/000944550404000308.[8] Yaechen Lee, “Japan’s North Korean Diaspora,” The Diplomat, January 5, 2018, https://thediplomat.com/2018/01/japans-north-korean-diaspora/.[9] Sonia Ryang and John Lie, “Diaspora without Homeland: Being Korean in Japan,” UC Berkeley, April 1, 2009, 1–20.[10] Rennie Moon, “Koreans in Japan,” Stanford SPICE, 2010, https://spice.fsi.stanford.edu/docs/koreans_in_ja-pan.[11] Ryang, Sonia. "Space and Time: The Experience Of The "Zainichi", The Ethnic Korean Population of Japan." Urban Anthropology and Studies of Cultural Systems and World Economic Development 43, no. 4 (2014): 519-50. Accessed November 8, 2020. http://www.jstor.org/stable/24643204.[12] John Lie, Zainichi (Koreans in Japan): Diasporic Nationalism and Postcolonial Identity (University of California Press, 2008), https://escholarship.org/content/qt7qr1c5x7/qt7qr1c5x7_noSplash_8b5887ee-b590978317416a0de3057740.pdf.[13]Apichai W. Shipper, “Nationalisms of and Against Zainichi Koreans in Japan,” Wiley Online Library, January 8, 2010, https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/

full/10.1111/j.1943-0787.2009.01167.x.[14] Soo im Lee, “Diversity of Zainichi Koreans and Their Ties to Japan and Korea,” Studies on Multicultural Societies, no. 8 (2012): 1–28.[15] AFP, “‘Paradise on Earth’: Ghost of N.Korea Propa-ganda Still Haunts,” Bangkok Post, February 21, 2019, https://www.bangkokpost.com/world/1632646/paradise-on-earth-ghost-of-n-korea-propaganda-still-haunts.[16] 한한한, “North Korea’s South Korea Policy: An Evalu-ation of Determining Variables and Prospects for 2012,” International Journal of Korean Unification Studies, 2011, https://www.dbpia.co.kr/Journal/articleDetail?no-deId=NODE08827442.[17] Rennie Moon, “Koreans in Japan,” Stanford SPICE, 2010, https://spice.fsi.stanford.edu/docs/koreans_in_ja-pan.[18] Ryuta Itagaki, “The Anatomy of Korea-Phobia in Japan,” Japanese Studies 35, no. 1 (January 2, 2015): 49–66, https://doi.org/10.1080/10371397.2015.1007496.[19] Moon, “Koreans in Japan.”[20] Don Baker, “North Koreans in Japan: Language, Ideology, and Identity,” Pacific Affairs; Vancou-ver 71, no. 1 (Spring 1998): 114–15, http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2760846.[21] Yalla Venkata Surya Rama Narasimha and Rushabh Kotecha, “Chongryon’s Scenario in Japan,” International Journal for Advance Research and Development 3, no. 1 (January 31, 2018), https://www.ijarnd.com/manuscript/chongryons-scenario-in-japan/.[22] Baker, “North Koreans in Japan.”[23] Kaori H. Okano, “North Koreans in Japan: Lan-guage, Ideology, and Identity,” American Ethnolo-gist 29, no. 4 (2002): 1008–9, https://doi.org/10.1525/ae.2002.29.4.1008.[24] Johnny Harris, Inside North Korea’s Bubble in Japan, Vox Borders, 2017, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qBfyIQbxXPs&t=524s.[25] Narasimha and Kotecha, “Chongryon’s Scenario in Japan.”[26] Armie Rosen, “The Strange Rise and Fall of North Korea’s Business Empire in Japan,” The Atlantic, July 26, 2012, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/07/the-strange-rise-and-fall-of-north-ko-reas-business-empire-in-japan/260373/[27] Dewayne J. Creamer, “The Rise and Fall of Cho-sen Soren : Its Effect on Japan’s Relations on the Korean Peninsula” (Thesis, Monterey, California. Naval Post-graduate School, 2003), https://calhoun.nps.edu/han-dle/10945/6216.[28] Kaori Kaneko et al., “Japan Offers North Korea Summit, Pyongyang Discussing Meetings with Japan,” Reuters, March 28, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/arti-cle/us-northkorea-japan/japan-offers-north-korea-sum-mit-pyongyang-discussing-meetings-with-japan-asa-hi-idUSKBN1H43E9.[29] Kim Jong-un, “Comrade Kim Jong-Un’s Rojak,” Chongryon, May 25, 2015, http://www.chongryon.com/newyear2015/sohan60.html.

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Creeping Annexation: The Perfect Crime of Geopolitics

[1] Life in the Palestinian West Bank: Interview with Samer Part One, 2011. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jX85_PbwA2U&ab_channel=ConradMolden.[2] Higgins, Andrew. “In Russia’s ‘Frozen Zone,’ a Creeping Border With Georgia (Published 2016).” The New York Times, October 23, 2016, sec. World. https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/24/world/europe/in-russias-frozen-zone-a-creeping-border-with-georgia.html.[3] Rosière, Stéphane, and Reece Jones. “Teichopoli-tics: Re-Considering Globalisation Through the Role of Walls and Fences.” Geopolitics 17, no. 1 (January 1, 2012): 217–34. https://doi.org/10.1080/14650045.2011.574653.[4] LSE Human Rights. “Russia’s New Strategy in Georgia: Creeping Occupation,” February 5, 2019. https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/humanrights/2019/02/05/rus-sias-new-strategy-in-georgia-creeping-occupation/.[5] Boyle, Edward. “Borderization in Georgia: Sover-eignty Materialized.” Eurasia Border Review 7, no. 1 (2016): 1–18. https://doi.org/10.14943/ebr.7.1.1.[6] Mindiashvili, Nino. “CREEPING OCCUPATION COMPARATIVE STUDY AND ITS INFLUENCE ON POPULATION MIGRATION IN BORDER VIL-LAGES,” n.d., 14.[7] Tavakarashvili, Arina. “RESEARCH OF VILLAGES SUBJECTED TO CREEPING ANNEXATION,” n.d., 6.[8] Malek, Martin. “Georgian Soft Power vs. Russian Hard Power: What Can Be Done in View of South Ossetia’s ‘Creeping Border’?” The Polish Quarterly of International Affairs 26, no. 3 (2017): 109–14.[9] Handel, Ariel. “Gated/Gating Community: The Settlement Complex in the West Bank.” Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 39, no. 4 (October 1, 2014): 504–17. https://doi.org/10.1111/tran.12045.

New World Atonement: Colonization in New Zealand

[1] Bourassa and Strong, “Restitution of Land to New Zealand Maori,” 230.[2] Bourassa and Strong, 231.[3] Hayward, “Treaty of Waitangi Settlements,” 401–2.[4] Bourassa and Strong, “Restitution of Land to New Zealand Maori,” 231–32.

[5] Bourassa and Strong, 232.[6] Bourassa and Strong, 234.[7] Taonga, “Land Ownership and Māori Agriculture.”[8] Bourassa and Strong, 234.[9] Bourassa and Strong, 235.[10] Hayward, “Treaty of Waitangi Settlements,” 400.[11] Bourassa and Strong, “Restitution of Land to New Zealand Maori,” 236.[12] Metge and Durie, Tuamaka, 16.[13] Dow and Gardiner-Garden, “Indigenous Affairs in Australia, New Zealand, Canada, United States of Amer-ica, Norway and Sweden.”[14] Bourassa and Strong, “Restitution of Land to New Zealand Maori,” 237.[15] “Why New Zealand’s Maori Do Better than Austra-lia’s Aboriginals.”[16] “Reparations In New Zealand.”[17] “Reparations In New Zealand.”[18] Yeh et al., Wai 2575 Māori Health Trends Report .[19] Smale, “Why Are There so Many Maori in New Zealand’s Prisons?”[20] Hassan and Healy, “America Has Tried Reparations Before. Here Is How It Went. (Published 2019).”[21] Riley, “Here’s One Way to Help Native Ameri-cans.”[22] Shear et al., “Manifesting Destiny.”[23] Dow and Gardiner-Garden, “Indigenous Affairs in Australia, New Zealand, Canada, United States of Amer-ica, Norway and Sweden.”[24] Dow and Gardiner-Garden.[25] Code, “Australia Aboriginals Win Right to Sue for Colonial Land Loss.” Reuters, “Canada Will Pay Com-pensation to Thousands of Indigenous ‘Stolen Children.’”

Cairo to Brasilia and Back: Why State-led Urban Modernization Programs Fail

[1]Mohamed, A. A., A. Van Nes, M. A. Salheen, M. A. Khalifa, and J. Hamhaber. “Understanding Urban Segregation in Cairo: The Social and Spatial Logic of a Fragmented City.” [2]Architecture, Failed. “Cairo’s Metropolitan Landscape: Segregation Extreme.” Failed Architecture (blog). Ac-cessed November 3, 2020. https://failedarchitecture.com/cairos-metropolitan-landscape-segregation-extreme/.[3] Ibid. [4] “Egypt Unveils Plans to Build New Capital East of Cairo.” BBC News, March 13, 2015, sec. Business. https://www.bbc.com/news/business-31874886.[5]Ibid.[6] Reuters [7]Al Bawaba. “Why Is Sisi Building 14 New Cities in Egypt?” Accessed November 3, 2020. https://www.albawaba.com/business/why-sisi-building-14-new-cit-ies-egypt-1306079.[8] Ibid.

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Sources[9] Paper [10] Moore, Clement Henry. “Authoritarian Politics in Unincorporated Society: The Case of Nasser’s Egypt.” Comparative Politics 6, no. 2 (1974): 193–218. https://doi.org/10.2307/421461.[11] Ibrahim, Ibrahim and Georgetown University, eds. Arab Resources: The Transformation of a Society. Washington, D.C. : London: Center for Contemporary Arab Studies ; Croom Helm, 1983.[12] Ibid.[13] Moore, Clement Henry. “Authoritarian Politics in Unincorporated Society: The Case of Nasser’s Egypt.” Comparative Politics 6, no. 2 (1974): 193–218. https://doi.org/10.2307/421461.[14] Ibid.[15] Singh, Ganeshwari, Simrit Kahlon, and Vishwa Bandhu Singh Chandel. “Political Discourse and the Planned City: Nehru’s Projection and Appropriation of Chandigarh, the Capital of Punjab.” Annals of the American Association of Geographers 109, no. 4 (July 4, 2019): 1226–39. https://doi.org/10.1080/24694452.2018.1507816.[16] Badawy, Aya, and Nuno Pinto. “Egypt Is Building a New Capital City from Scratch – Here’s How to Avoid Inequality and Segregation.” The Conversation. Ac-cessed November 3, 2020. http://theconversation.com/egypt-is-building-a-new-capital-city-from-scratch-her-es-how-to-avoid-inequality-and-segregation-103402.[17] Ibid.[18] Ibid.[19] Ibid.[20] Liu, Yong, Shaker ul din, and Yue Jiang. “Urban Growth Sustainability of Islamabad, Pakistan, over the Last 3 Decades: A Perspective Based on Object-Based Backdating Change Detection.” GeoJournal, March 10, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10708-020-10172-w.[21] Firstpost. “Chandigarh Slum Residents Languish on City Outskirts as Houses Promised under Govt Scheme Are yet to Be Handed over - India News , Firstpost,” February 28, 2019. https://www.firstpost.com/india/chandigarh-slum-residents-languish-on-city-outskirts-as-houses-promised-under-govt-scheme-are-yet-to-be-handed-over-6173371.html.[22] Ibid.

A House Divided: America’s Problem with Polarization

[1] Halikiopoulou, D., and T. Vlandas. “Voting to Leave: Economic Insecurity and the Brexit Vote,” 2018. [2] Swain, Ashok. “Increasing Migration Pressure and Rising Nationalism: Implications for Multilateralism and SDG Implementation,” 2019.[3] Hart, Kim. “Poll: Majority of Democrats Think Republicans Are ‘Racist," ‘Bigoted’ or ‘Sexist.’” Axios,

November 12, 2018.[4] Piketty, Thomas, and Arthur Goldhammer. Capital in the Twenty-First Century. The Belknap Press of Har-vard University Press, 2017.[5] McMahon, Tim. “What Is Quantitative Tightening?” Historical Consumer Price Index (CPI), October 13, 2020. [6] Voorheis, John, Nolan McCarty, and Boris Shor. “Unequal Incomes, Ideology and Gridlock: How Rising Inequality Increases Political Polarization.” SSRN, Au-gust 23, 2015.[7] Klein, Ezra. Why We're Polarized. S.l.: Avid Reader PR, 2021. [8] Ibid.[9] Ibid.[10] “Agreement Among the States to Elect the Presi-dent by National Popular Vote.” National Popular Vote, March 8, 2020. [11] “Benefits of Ranked Choice Voting.” FairVote. Accessed November 8, 2020.[12] Naylor, Brian. “How Maine's Ranked-Choice Vot-ing System Works.” NPR. NPR, October 7, 2020.[13] “Benefits of Ranked Choice Voting.” FairVote. Accessed November 8, 2020.[14] Kambhampaty, Anna Purna. “What Is Ranked-Choice Voting? Here's How It Works.” Time. Time, November 6, 2019.[15] “2016 Republican Popular Vote.” RealClearPolitics. Accessed November 8, 2020.

Coastal Conflict or Maritime Mediation: The Coming Crisis for Sea Borders

[1]Osthagen, Andreas. “Lines at Sea: Why Do States Resolve Their Maritime Boundary Disputes?” London School of Economics and Political Science, 2019.[2] Ibid.[3] Ibid.[4] “Law of the Sea | International Law [1982] | Britanni-ca.” Accessed November 4, 2020. [5] Ibid.[6]Prescott, J. R. V. The Maritime Political Boundaries of the World. 2nd ed. Leiden: Nijhoff, 2005. [7]“Chapter 2: Maritime Zones – Law of the Sea.” Ac-cessed November 4, 2020.[8]Hensel, Paul R., and Sara McLaughlin Mitchell. “From Territorial Claims to Identity Claims: The Issue Correlates of War (ICOW) Project.” Conflict Manage-ment & Peace Science 34, no. 2 (March 2017): 126–40.[9]Hensel, Paul R., and Sara McLaughlin Mitchell. “From Territorial Claims to Identity Claims: The Issue Correlates of War (ICOW) Project.”[10]Blanchard, Jean-Marc F. “Linking Border Disputes and War: An Institutional-Statist Theory.” Geopolitics 10, no. 4 (January 1, 2005): 688–711.

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A Dangerous Sovereign Nation: US Avoid-ance of International Law

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