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Bound Together: Two Competing Visions Thomas J. Sargent Covenant University May 5, 2014 1 / 34

Bound Together: Two Competing Visions Thomas J. Sargent Covenant University May 5, 2014 1 / 34

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Substance and implications of the debate Intellectual foundations of planning and free markets Computational methods Ironies abound I I I 3 / 34

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Page 1: Bound Together: Two Competing Visions Thomas J. Sargent Covenant University May 5, 2014 1 / 34

Bound Together:Two Competing

Visions

Thomas J. Sargent

Covenant University

May 5, 2014

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Page 2: Bound Together: Two Competing Visions Thomas J. Sargent Covenant University May 5, 2014 1 / 34

Two Visions

Planning versus unfettered markets

The Tyranny of Experts, William Easterly

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Page 3: Bound Together: Two Competing Visions Thomas J. Sargent Covenant University May 5, 2014 1 / 34

Substance and implications of the debate

Intellectual foundations of planning and free marketsComputational methodsIronies abound

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Page 4: Bound Together: Two Competing Visions Thomas J. Sargent Covenant University May 5, 2014 1 / 34

An Economy

People of various ages, talents, preferencesNon-human resources like land, air, waterTechnologies for producing goods of various kinds

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Page 5: Bound Together: Two Competing Visions Thomas J. Sargent Covenant University May 5, 2014 1 / 34

Economic questions

ProductionDistribution

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Page 6: Bound Together: Two Competing Visions Thomas J. Sargent Covenant University May 5, 2014 1 / 34

Economic questions

How should resources (people, land, water, air) be combinedto produce different goods? (“production”)How should goods be distributed among different people? (“distribution”)

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Karl Marx: “From each according to his ability, to each accordingto his need.”

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Page 7: Bound Together: Two Competing Visions Thomas J. Sargent Covenant University May 5, 2014 1 / 34

Who is to decide

Production (allocating inputs) and distribution (allocatingoutputs)?

Competing classic answers:Government plannersNo one – an invisible hand

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Page 8: Bound Together: Two Competing Visions Thomas J. Sargent Covenant University May 5, 2014 1 / 34

Scientific methods for answering ‘who should decide?’

Intuition and English languageMath

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Page 9: Bound Together: Two Competing Visions Thomas J. Sargent Covenant University May 5, 2014 1 / 34

Who should decide?

The invisible handAssertion of faith in good unintended consequences

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Page 10: Bound Together: Two Competing Visions Thomas J. Sargent Covenant University May 5, 2014 1 / 34

Law of unintended consequences

One of Milton Friedman’s favorites

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Page 11: Bound Together: Two Competing Visions Thomas J. Sargent Covenant University May 5, 2014 1 / 34

Adam Smith

Moral philosopher – Theory of Moral SentimentsEconomist – Wealth of NationsEach book contains describes the activities of the invisible hand

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Page 12: Bound Together: Two Competing Visions Thomas J. Sargent Covenant University May 5, 2014 1 / 34

An invisible hand

By directing that industry in such a manner as itsproduce may be of the greatest value, [the individual] intends only his own gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention. Nor is it always worse for the society that it was no part of it. By pursuing his own interest, he frequently promotes that of society more effectively than when he really intends to promote it.

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Page 13: Bound Together: Two Competing Visions Thomas J. Sargent Covenant University May 5, 2014 1 / 34

An invisible hand

It is not from the benenovelence of the butcher, thebrewer, or the baker that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest. We address ourselves, not to their humanity, but to their self-love, and never talk to them of our own necessities, but of their advantages.

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Page 14: Bound Together: Two Competing Visions Thomas J. Sargent Covenant University May 5, 2014 1 / 34

Adam Smith

Prices send signals back and forth between producers andconsumersCompetition means that no one sets prices – an invisible hand

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Page 15: Bound Together: Two Competing Visions Thomas J. Sargent Covenant University May 5, 2014 1 / 34

Competition

Decentralization“production” and “distribution” are decided jointlyIncentives and information

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Page 16: Bound Together: Two Competing Visions Thomas J. Sargent Covenant University May 5, 2014 1 / 34

Power

No market powerSpontaneous order

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Page 17: Bound Together: Two Competing Visions Thomas J. Sargent Covenant University May 5, 2014 1 / 34

Smith’s list of enemies of invisible hand

Monopolies (market power)Government impediments to competition and support of monopolies

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Page 18: Bound Together: Two Competing Visions Thomas J. Sargent Covenant University May 5, 2014 1 / 34

Proof ?

Smith’s argument was verbal and informal.1776-1939, economists sought to formalize a formal proof forSmith’s ‘invisible hand’ assertionAn effort to understand more thoroughly the “ifs’ that implyAdam Smith’s “then”

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Page 19: Bound Together: Two Competing Visions Thomas J. Sargent Covenant University May 5, 2014 1 / 34

Proof ?

The quest for a proof led to many discoveries along the way – rolesof returns to scales, monopolies, monopolistic competitition, number of markets needed to be open, information available to traders, . . .

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Page 20: Bound Together: Two Competing Visions Thomas J. Sargent Covenant University May 5, 2014 1 / 34

Proof – the welfare theorems

Pareto, Hicks, Oskar Lange:Method of proof: formulate a grand optimal resource allocation optimizationUnder some ‘ifs’, then . . .

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Page 21: Bound Together: Two Competing Visions Thomas J. Sargent Covenant University May 5, 2014 1 / 34

Victory: proof – the welfare theorems

Just as Smith said, a competive equilbrium allocation is good(i.e., optimal), but . . .The same allocation can be obtained by a command economy run by a “benevolent planner” who issues orders to workers and consumers and who don’t see prices

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Page 22: Bound Together: Two Competing Visions Thomas J. Sargent Covenant University May 5, 2014 1 / 34

Two interpretations

Smith wins – free markets, unfettered competitionBenevolent socialist wins – command economy

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Page 23: Bound Together: Two Competing Visions Thomas J. Sargent Covenant University May 5, 2014 1 / 34

Ironic consequence

The cases in favor of ‘planning’ and ‘free markets’ are tied togetherintellectually and not easily divorced

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Page 24: Bound Together: Two Competing Visions Thomas J. Sargent Covenant University May 5, 2014 1 / 34

Caveats

The ‘ifs’ are importantInformation available to people and the plannerNature of technologies – returns to scaleNature of the goods – private or public, ‘rival’ or ‘non-rival’

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Page 25: Bound Together: Two Competing Visions Thomas J. Sargent Covenant University May 5, 2014 1 / 34

Followup – a great debate

Planning versus complete trust in free markets and unfettered,unplanned competition

An important but tenuous debate because of shared intellectualfoundations

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Page 26: Bound Together: Two Competing Visions Thomas J. Sargent Covenant University May 5, 2014 1 / 34

Examples

Friedman and free bankingSocial security – government or private?

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Page 27: Bound Together: Two Competing Visions Thomas J. Sargent Covenant University May 5, 2014 1 / 34

Hayek’s attack

Hayek objected to the ‘welfare theorems’ because they ignoreddifficulties of private and disparate information, dynamic processes of learning, experimentation, trial and error.He doubted whether there could exist a benevolent, knowledgeable, and disinterested planner – a harmful fictionHe said that existing mathematical formalisms did not capture what a free market economy accomplished, and doubted that mathematics ever would

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Page 28: Bound Together: Two Competing Visions Thomas J. Sargent Covenant University May 5, 2014 1 / 34

Accepting Hayek’s challenge

After 1950, modern economic theory accepted Hayek’s challengeto add dynamics, disparate information, conflicting interests – many ‘incentive constraints’ – to social allocation problems. Mathematics a key tool.

Irony: through modern versions of ‘mechanism design’ andpost-Hayek ‘welfare theorems’, the intellectual cases for free markets and planning remain intricately linked.

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Page 29: Bound Together: Two Competing Visions Thomas J. Sargent Covenant University May 5, 2014 1 / 34

Computation and another irony

Relation to planning in WWII – linear programmingUsed to compute competitive equilibria in scientific modelsComputationally challenging

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Page 30: Bound Together: Two Competing Visions Thomas J. Sargent Covenant University May 5, 2014 1 / 34

Another irony

Distributed computing – break one big problem into manysmaller problemsStarts to look like a decentralized competitive economyCurse of dimensionality

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Page 31: Bound Together: Two Competing Visions Thomas J. Sargent Covenant University May 5, 2014 1 / 34

Reallocation

Creative destruction

Exits and entries – firms in US Job creation and destruction

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Page 32: Bound Together: Two Competing Visions Thomas J. Sargent Covenant University May 5, 2014 1 / 34

Banks

Time, savings, projects, ideas, matching savings to ideas andprojects

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Page 33: Bound Together: Two Competing Visions Thomas J. Sargent Covenant University May 5, 2014 1 / 34

Incentives

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Page 34: Bound Together: Two Competing Visions Thomas J. Sargent Covenant University May 5, 2014 1 / 34

Adaptation versus design

Return to Easterly book Tyranny of Experts

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