The social world is accumulated history, and if it is not to be reduced to a discontinuous scril'S of instantaneous mechanical equilibria berneen agents '~ho arc neatcd as inter­change:able particles, one must remtroduce into it the notion of capital and with it, accu­mulation and all its effects. Capitu.l is accumu­lated bbor (in its marerialized form or its 'incorporated,' embodied form) which, when appropriated on a pri,•ate. i.e., e'tclusi,·e, basis by agents or groups of agentS, enables rhem to appropri:uesocial encrg) in the form of reified or li,inglabor.ltisa v.sinsrta,a force inscribed in objective or subjective structures, bur it is also a lex insita, the principle underl)ing the immanent regularities of rhe social world. It is "hat makes the games of society-not least. the economic game-something other than simple games of chance offering at e\CI) moment the possibilit) of a miracle. Roulette, which holds out the opportunity of winning a lot of money in a shon space of time, and therefore of changing one's social status quasi-instantaneous!}, and in which the win­mng of rbe pre,;ous spin of rhe "heel can be staked and lost at C\'ery new spin, gh•es a fairly accurate image of this imaginary universe of perfect competition or perfect equality of opportunity, a world ,,;tbout inertia, wirhout accumulation, \\'lthout heredity or acquired properties, in which every moment is per­fectly independent of the previous one, e\·ery soldier has a marshal's baron in his knapsack, and every prize c:1n be attained, instanta­neous!\, bv e\ ervone. so that at each moment anyone caii become anything. Capital, which, in its objectified or embodied forms, takes time to accumulate and which, as a potential

2 The Forms of Capital

Pierre Bourdieu

c:1pacity to produce profits and to reproduce itsclfin identical or expanded form, contains a tcndenc) to persist in its being, is a force inscribed in the objecnvity of things so rhat C\CI") thing is not equall} po:.sible or impo:.si­ble.1 And the structure of the distribution of the different t) pe, and subty]».t of c:1pital at a given moment in time representS the imma­nent structure of the social world, i.e., rhc set of constraints. inscnbed in the \ 'CIJ reality of that world, which go,·em its functioning in a durable way, determining the chances of suc­cess for practices.

It is in fact impossible to account for rhe srrucrure and functioning of the social world unless one reintroduces capital in all its forms and not solcly in the one form recognized b) economic thCOT) . Economic theory has allowed to be foilot<.-d upon it a definition of the econom) of practi~ which il> the historical invention of capitalism; and by reducing lhe universe of exchange. to mercantile exchange, which is objecti,el} and subjectivcl) oriented toward the maximiz,arion of profit. i.e., (eco­nomicaUy) se/f-snt"esud, it has implicitly defined the other forms of exchange as noneconomac, and therefore Jrswu•usud. In particular, it defines as disinterested those forms of exchange which ensure the transub­stantiation whereby the mOst material types of c:1paul-those which are economic in t.he restricted sense--can present themselves in the immaterial form of cultural capital or social capital and vice versa. Inrcrcsr, in the resrrieted sense i l is gi ,·en in economic theol"). cannot be produced without producing its neg:u:i,-e counterpart, disinterestedness. The class of practice:. whose explicit purpose is to

From). E. R.ch:ardson (ed .), ll!~r.dboo;ofTir~llf)'II{R~srllrrltfor llrLSonolu.l{'ltJ{EJuamtt• (Grecn"onl Press, 1986); 2'1 I- SS Tnmsla1ed b~ Riclwd -.;ia:. Rernn1cd b~ pcrmlssinn.

maxinuze monetary profit cannot be defined as such mthout producing the purposeless fimlit) of cultural or ani.stic practices ond their producrs; the world of bourgeois man, \\ith his double~tr) accounting, cannot be mvented without producing lhe pure, perfect umven.e of the anist and the intellectual and lhe gratuitous acti,i.ties of an-fur-an's sake and pure theory. ln other words,lhe constitu­tion of a science of mercantile relationships which, inasmuch as it takes for granted the \·en· foundations of the order it claims to ana­l)oze-pm;ate propeny, profit, wage labor, etc. - as not e,·en a science of the fieJd of CC(r

nomic production, has prc\ented the consti­tution of a gcmcral science of the economy of pracnces, '' hicb would treat mercantile exchange as a particular case of exchange in all 1ts forms.

It b remubble that the practices and a.<; ers thus sahaged from the 'iCJ water of cgot.i:.tical calculation' (and from science) are the vinual monopol) of the dominant class-as if economi.sm had been able ro reduce c\'cn·­thing to economics only because the reduction on \\ruch that discipline is based protects from s:acrilegious reduction eyerything which ne!eds to be protected. If economics deals onlr 'nth practices that have narrowly economic interest as their principle :tnd only wirh goods that are directh and immediateh· con,·enible into mone~ (\\ liicb makes them Quantifiable), then the UOI\'etseofbourgeois production and c.t.change becomes an exception and can see itself and present itself as a realm of disinter­estedness. As everyone knows, priceless things ha\ e lhcir price, and the extreme diffi-. cult) of con' ening certain practices and cer­tain objeCts into mone) is only due to the fact that this COO\ cr..ion is refused in the vel') mtcntion that produces them, which is noth­ing other than the denial (I emmtung) of the «<nom~ A gene raJ l>Cience of rheeconomy of pm:tices., c:1pable of rc:1ppropriating the totalit) of lhe practices whach. although ob)ecti.,..ely economic, arc not and cannot be ~iaJiy recognized as economic, and which an be performed on I} at the cosr of a whole labor of dissimulation or, more precisely, (llphmlt::.ation, must ende:avor to grasp c:1piral and profit in all their form.~ and to establish the laws whereby rhe different types of capital (or power, which amounts to d1e same thmg) change mto one anomer .1

Depending on the field m which it func-

The Fonns of Capital 4 7

tion:., and at the cost of the more or less expen­she transformations which are the precondi­tion for 1ts efficacy in rhe field in question, capital can present itself in three fundamental guises: as uonomic capllol, which is immedi­ately and direcd) comerrible into mone) and may be institutionalized in lhe form of prop­erty rights; as t'llltura/ capttol, which is con­vertible, on certain conditions, inro economic capital and may be institutionalized in the form of educational qualifications; and as soriol cop11al, made up of sod2.1 obligations ('connections'), which is con"ertible, in cer­tain conditions, into economic capital and ma) be institutionalized in the form of a title of nobility.l

Cultural Capital

Cultural cnpital can exist in three forms: an the embodid state, i.e., in the form oflong-lasting disposirions of the mind and body; in the ob;trtifitd stare., in the form of cultural goods (pictures, books, dictionaries, instruments, machines, etc.), which arc the r:.racc or realiza­tion of theories or critiques of these theories, problema tics, etc.; and in the mst•tut1011aliud tate. a form of objeccifiC:ltion which must be

set a pan because, as will be seen in the case of educational qualifications. it confers enrirel) original properties on the cultural capital \\ hich it is presumed to guarantee.

The reader should not be misled bv the somewhat peremptor} air \\ hich the effort at axiomaat:ion rna} give to my argumenr.~ The notion of culrural capital initiall) presented irsclfro me., in the course of research, as a the­orecical hypothesis which made it possible to explain the unequalscllolasticachievement of children originating from the differenr social classes b) rclanng ac:1dernic success, i.e., the specific profits which children from the dif­ferent classes and class fractions c:1n obtain in the academic market, to the distribution of cultural capital benveen the classes and cla.~ fractions. This st2rting point implies a break with the presuppositions inherent both in the commonsense ,;C\,, "hich sees academic suc­cess or failure as an effect of natural aptitudes., and in human capital theories. Economists might seem to deserve credi1 for explicitly raising the question of the relationship between the rates of profit on educational

48 The Fonns of Capttal

investment and on economic invesnnent (and its evolution). But their measurement of the vieJd from scholastic investment takes account only of monetary investments and profits, or those directly convertible into money, such as the costs of schooling and the cal h equivalent of time devoted to study; they are unable to explain the different proportions of their resources whic:h different agents or different social classes aUocnte to economic investment and cultural investment because they fail ro rake systematic account of the sttucturc of the differential chances of prolit which the various markets offer these agents or classes as a function of the volume-and the composition of their assets (sec esp. Becker 1964h). Furthermore, because they neglect to rclare scholastic invesonent strategies to the whole set of educational strategies and to the system of reproduction strategies, they inevitably, by a necessar) paradox, let slip the best hidden and socially most determinant educational invesnnent, namely, thedome.stic transmi.<>Sion of cultural capitaL Their studies of the relationship between ncadernic ability and academic in\•estment show that they are unaware that ability or talent is itself the prod­uct of an .invesnnent of time and cultural cap­ital (Becker 1964a: 63-6). Not surprisingly, when endeaYoring to e\">lluate the profitS of scholastic investment, they can only consider the profirability of educational expenditure for societY as a whole, the 'social rate of rerum,' or the ·social gain of education as mea­sured by its effects on national productivity' (Becker 1964/1: 121,155). This typically func­tionalist definition of the functions of educa­tion ignores Lhe contribution which the educational system makes to the reproduction of the social structure by sanctioning the hereditary transmission of cultural capital. From the very beginning, a definition of human capital. despite its humanistic conno­tations, does not move beyond cconomism and tgnores, mur alia, the fact that the scholastic yield from educarion·al acrion depends on the cultural cap-ital previously invested by the family. Moreover, the eco­nomicand social yield of the educational quaJ­ifiC:ltion depends on the social capital, again inherited, which can be used to back it up.

THE EMBODIED STAT£ Most of the properties of cultural capital can be deduced from the fact that, in irs funda-

menr:al state, it is linked to the body and pre­supposes embodiment. The accumulation of cultural capital in the embodied state, i.e., in Lhe form of w bar is called culrure, cultivation, B;/d.u,~, presupposes a process of embodi­ment, incorporation, which, insofar as it implies a labor ofinculcarion and assimilation, costs time, time which musr be im·ested per­sonally by the investor. Like the acquisition of a muscular physique or a suntan, it can nor be done at second hand (so that all effects of del­egation are ruled out).

The work of acquisition is work on oneself (self-improvement), an efforr that presup­poses a personal cost (tm paic de sa personne, as we say in French), an in,·csrment, above aU of time, but also of that socially constituted fonn of libido, libido srimdi, with all the privation, renunciation, and sacrifice that it may enrail. lt follows that the least inexact of aU the mea­surements of cultural capital are those which take as their srandn:rd the length of acquisi­tion-so long, of course, as rhis is not reduced ro length of schooling and allowance is made for early domestic education b)' gi \'ing it a pos-­iti\'e value (a. gain in time, a head starL) or a negative '"alue (wasted time, and doubly so because more time must be spent correcting its effects), according ro its distance from the demands of the scholastic market. s

This cmbodi<:d C'.tpital, extema.l wealth converted i.oto an inregrnJ part of the person, into a habitus, cannot be tranSmitted instant.'~-­neously (unlike money, property rights, or even titles of nobility) by gift or bequest, pur­chase or exchange. It follows that the usc or exploitation of cultural capital presents par­ticular problems for the holders of economic or political capital, whether they be private patrons or, at rhe other extreme, entrepre­neurs employing executives endowed with a specific cu.lrural competence (nor ro mention !he new state patrons). How can this capital, so clo ely linked to the person, be bought without buying the person 1Wd so losing the very efTect onegitimation which presupposes the dissimulation of dependence( How can this capital be concenrnued-as some under­takings demand-without concentrating the possessors of the ca.pirnl, which cnn hftve all sortS of unwanted consequences?

Cultural <."llpital can be acquired, to a vary­ing extent, depending on the period, the soci­ety, and the social class, in the absence of any deliberate inculcation. and therefore quite

unconsdous1} . lL always remains marked by its earliest conditions of acquisition which. through the more or less \isible marks they lea ~e (such as the pronunciations characteris­tic of~ class or region), heJp to determine its distinctive value. 1t cannot be accumulated beyond the appropriating capacities of an mdi\iduaJ agent; it declines and dies with its bearer (with his biological capacity, his mem­OT)\ etc.). Becnuse it is thus linked in numer­ous ways to the person in his biological singulariryand is subject to a hereditary trans­misl>ion which is alwars hea,•ily disguised, or even inYisiblc, it defies the old, dee(H'OOted distinction the Greek jurists made bern ccn inherited properties (to polroa) and acquired properties (epikwa), i.e., those which anindi­,-idual adds to his berir:age. It thus manages to combine the prestige of innate property wilh the merits of acquisition. Because the social conditions of its transmission and acquisition are more disguised than those of economic capital, it is predisposed to function as sym­boliccapital, i.e., to be unrecognized as capital and recognized 3B legitimate competence, as authority e.~erting an eiTecr of (mis)rccogni­tion, e.g., in the matrimonial market and in all. the markets in which economic capital is nor fully rccognizcd, whether in matters of cul­ture, with LhegreatartcoUectionsorgreatcul­tunll foundations, or in social we lfarc, with the economy of generosicy and -the gift. Further­more, the sp<.--cilically symbolic logic of dis­tinction additionally secures 1ll3terial and symbolic profits for the possessors of a large cultural C:lpital: a~· given cultural compe­tence(e.g., beingnble to read in a world ofillit­tr.~res) derives a S(Jafcity >alue from its position in rhc distribution of cultural capital and )ields profits of distinction for its owner. In other words, the share in profits which scarce cultural capitnl secures in class-divided societies is based, in the last analysis, on the fact that all agentS do not have the econon-Uc and (."lllturnl means for prolonging their dul­dren'c;education beyond the minimum neces­sary for the reproduction of the labor-power least valorized at a given moment. 6

Thus the capital, in the sense of rhe means of appropriating the product of accumulated labor in the objectified state which is held by a gi\Teo agent, depends for its real efficacy on the form of the distribucion of the means of appro­priating the accumnlated and objectively :l\'a.il.1ble resources: and rhe relationship of

The Forms of CapltaJ 49

appropriation between an agent and the resources objectively a\·ailable, and hence the profits they produce, is media red by the rela­tionship of( objective and/ or subjective) com­petition between himself and the other possessors of capir:al competing ror the same goods, in whic:h scarcity-and through it social \'alue-is generated. The structure of the field, i.e., Lhc unequal distribution of cap­ital, Is the source of the specific effects of cap­ital, i.e.., rhe appropriation of profits and the power to impose the laws offunction.ing of the field most favourable to capit'lll and its repro­duction.

But the most powerful principle of the symbolic efficacy of cultural capital no doubt lies in the logic of its transmission. On the one hand, the process of appropriatingobject:ilied cultural capital and the time necessary for it to take place mainly depend on the cultural cap­ital embodied in the whole family-through (among other things) the generalized Arrow effect and all forms of implicit rransmiss1on.7

On the other hand, the initial aecumulatinn of culrural capital, the precondition for the fast, easy accumulation of every kind of useful cul­tural capital, starts at the outset, without delay, withour wasted time, only for rhe off­spring of families endowed with strong cul­tural capital; in this case, the accumulation period CO\ ers rhe whole period of sociali7.a­tion. It follows that the transmission of cui­rural capilal is no doubt the best bidden form of hereditary transrnis ion of capital, and it therefore receives proportionately greater weight in the system of reproduction strate­gies, as the direct, visible forms of transmis­sion tend to be lllore strOngly censored and controUed.

Ir can immediately be seen that the link between economic and cultural C:lpital is established through the mediation of the time needed for acquisition. Differences in the cui­rural capital possessed brthe family imply dif­ferences first in the age at which the work of transmission and accumulation begins-the limiting case being full use ofrhc time biolog­ically available, "ith the muimum free time being harnessed to maximum cultural capi­tal--and then in the capacity, thus defined, to b-atisfy the specifically cultural demands of a prolonged process of acquisition. Further­more, and in correlation \vJth this, the length of time for which a given i:ndi\wual can pro­long his acquisition process depends on the

50 The Forms of Capital

length of time for which his fiunilycnn pro\'ide him '"ith the free time, i.e., time free from economic necesSJt}, which IS rhe precondition for the initial accumulation (time" h.ich c:m be evaluated as a handicap lObe mad~ up).

nn: OD]EcrtFlED STATE Cultural caphal, m the objectified state., has a number of properties which are defined only in the relationship with cultural capital in irs embodied form. The cultural cnpital objecti­fied in IIlllterial objectb and media, such as writings, paintings, monuments, instru­ments, etc., is tr.t:nsrrlU;sible in irs materialit}. A collection of paintings, for e:wnple, can be transmiued as ~ell as economic capital (if not better, because the capital transfer is more dis­guised). But what is rransmissible is legal ownership and not (or not necessarily) what coru.ritutes the preoondu'ion for specific appropriation, namely, the possCbsion of the means of 'consuming' a pajntin1! or using a m2cbine., "'h1ch, being nothing other than embo<lied cnpital, are subject to the same bws oftr.msmission.~

Thus culrura1 goods can be appropriated both materially-\\ hich presupposes eco­nomic capital-and symbolical]y-which presupposes cultural cnpiml. Ir follows that the O\\ner of the means of production mu.,t find a wa) of appropriatinge1ther the embod­ied capital which iJ; lhe preconrurion of spe­cific appropriation or the senices of the holders of thjs capital. To possess the machines, he onl) needs economic capital; to appropriare them and use them in accordance ~ith their specific purpose (defined br the t.-ultural capital, of scientific or technical type, incorporated in them), he must have access to embodied cultural capital, either in person or by proxy. Th1s is no doubt the basis of the ambiguous status of cadres (e:~ecutives and engineers). !fit isemphasired that they are not the possessors (in the stricti y economic sense) of the means of production which they usc, and that they deri"c profit from their O\\ n cui­rural capital only b~ selling the senices and produCtS which it makes possible, then the) "';u be clas:.i6ed among the dominated groups; if it is emphasized that they dra'~ their profitll from the use of a particular fonn of cap­iml, then the) will be classified among the dommanr groups. Everything suggests that as the cultural capital incorporated in the means of production increases (and with it the

period of embodiment necd\!d to acquire the means of appropriating it), so the collective Strength of the holders of cultural capittl would tend to increase-if the holders of the dominant type of c..-apital (economic capital) were not :able to set the holders of cultural capital in compennon ~;rh one another. (The} are, moreo\er, inclined to competition by the \Cry condnions in which the} are selected and trained, io particular b} the logic of scholastic and recrWDJlent competitions.)

Cultural cnpital in its objectified state pre­sents itself with all rhe appearances of an autonomous, coherent uruvcrse which. although the product ofhistoricnJ action, has its own laws, transcenrung individual mus, and \\ hicb, as the example of language well illustrates, therefore remains irreducible to that which each agent, or e\·en the aggregate of the agents, can appropriate (i.e., to the cul­tural capital embodied inench.agent oren:n in the aggregate of the agents). However, it should not be forgonen thar ir exists as ym­bolicall)" and materially active, effective capi­tal onl) msofar as it IS appropriated by agents and lmplememed and iO\cstcd as a \\capon and a stake in the struggles'' hich go on in the fields of cultural production (the artistic field, thescienufic field, etc.) and, beyond them, in the field of the sodal classes-struggles in which the agents wield strengths and obtam profits proportionate to lhcir lllllStery of this objectified capital, and therefore to the extent of thelr cmbodjed capn.al. 9

THE l'ISTlTVIlO'Io\UZED STATE The objectification of culrural capital 1n the form of aC:ldemic qualifications is one 'val of neutralizing some of the properties it dcri\es from the fact that, being embodied. it has the same biological limits as its bearer. This objec­tification is what makes the difTcrcnce betwc..'Cn the capital of the autodidact, \\ hich 013} be called into question at any rime, or even the culrurnl capital of the courtier," hich can yield only ill-defined profits, of fluctuat­ing value. in the market of rugh-sociecy exchanges, and the cultural capital academi­cally sanctioned b) lcgall) guaranteed quali.6-cations, formally independent of the person of their bearer. With the academic qualification, a certificate of cultural competence \\ hich confers on its holder a con'enrional, coru.t.ant. legall) b'llarantced \'alue wtth respect to culture, social alchemy produces a form of

culruraJ capital \\ hich has a relative autonom} ~is.-a-,is it~ bc..-arcr and e,·en vis-a-\'is the cui­rural 01pita.l he eiTecti\ cl} possesses at a given moment in Lime. It institutes cultural capital by collectiyc magic, just as, nccording ro ,\terleau-Pont), the Jiqng institute their dead through t.he ritual of mourning. One has only to think of the concours (competitive recruit­ment esarninarion) which, out of the contin­uum of infin.itesunaJ differences between performances. produces sharp, absolute, last­ing differences, such as that which eparates the last successful candidate from the first unsuccessful one, and instilutcs an essential difference between the officiall) recognized, guJrantecd comperencc and simple culrnra.l capital, which is constant I) required to prove itself. [n this case, one !tees dearly the perfor­nuth·e magic of the power of instituting, the flO\\Cr to sho" forth and SC..'Cure belief or, in a word, to impose recognition.

B) conferring instirurional recognition on the cultural capital possessed b) an) gio,;en i~t, t.heacademic qualification also makes it po;:.1ble ro compare qualification holders and e\en to e~change them (by substituting one for another in succession). Furthermore, it maL:es it possible to esta.blish con\ ersioo rates between cui rural capital and economic 01pital by guaranteeing the monetary value of 11 given acaderruc capita.l. 10 This product of the con­\·e~lon of economic capnal into cultural capi­r:~l C!>tablishes the value, in terms of ctlltu.nl capital, of the holder of :1 gi\'cn qualification n:lati\e tO other qualification holders nnd. by the same toL.en, the monetary value for wmch it can be exchanged oo the labor marker (acn­dcm•c mvesrment has no meaning unless a minimum degree of reversibility of the oon­\ernon it implies is objcctivel) guaranteed). .Because the material and symbolic profits which the academic qualification ~orunrantees also depend on its scarcny, the. investments m:~de (in rime and effort) may rum out to be less profitable than mJS anticipated w ben the}' were m.1de (rhere having been a d~ forto change in the oon"ersion rate between acade­miccapnal :1nd economic capital). Tb.est:r:ne­gtt:!> for oon,crting economic capital into cultural capital, wmch are among the short­term factors of the schooling explosion and the inflation of qualifications, are go\'­crned by changes in the structure of the chan~ of profil offered by the different types of Cllpltal.

The Forms of Capital 51.

Social Capital

Social capital is the aggrt-gate of lhe acrual or potential resources which are linked to pos­session of a duruble network of more or less institutionalized relationshlps of mutual acquaintance and recognition-or in other \\Ords, to membership in a group11-which pro\ ides each.ofits members with the backing of the collcctivit)-o\\'ned capital, a 'creden­tial' " hich entitles them to credit. in the van-

us. senses of th word. These relationships may exist only in the practical state, in mater­ial and/or symbolic exchanges which heJp ro maintain them. The, m:ay also be sociall"· instituted and gua.ratlreed b} the appl.icarion of a common name (the name of a f.-tmily, a class, ora tribe or of a school, a party, etc.) and by a "'hole set of instimting acts designed simulaneously to form and inform those who undergo them; m this case, the) are more or less realh coacted and somaint..-tined and rein­forced, in <:-~changes. Being based on indissol­ubly m.:ne.rial and symbolic exchanges, the establishment and maintenance of which pre­suppose rcndmowledgmcnt of proximit}, they are also partially irreducible to objective relations of pronmicy in ph) ical (geographi­cal) space or even in economic and social space. 1z

The volume oft he social ca. pi raJ pos!>cssed by a gi ,.en agent th U!> depend~ on the size of the networl of connecrions he can effectively mobilize and on rhc volume of the capital ( eco­nomic, cultural or symbolic) possessed in his own right b} each of those to whom he is co~r nccted. u This means that, although it is rela­tive!} irreducible to the economic and cui rural capital possessed by a given agent, or even by the "hole set of agents to whom he is con­nected, social apital is never oompletel.} independent of it because the <:-'\:changes insti­tuting mutual acknowledgment presuppose the rcacknowledgmeru of n minimum of objective homogeneit}, and because it ex ere. a multiplier effect on the capital he possesses m his own right.

The profits which accrue from member­ship in a group are the basis of the solidarity which makes them po!>s.ible.14 Trus docs not mean that they are consciously pursued as such, even in the case of groups lil.:e select clubs, \\ ruch are delibe.rarel} organized in order to concent:rute social cupital and so to derh·e full benefit from the multiplier effect

52 The Forms of capital

implied in concentration :md ro secure the profits of membership-material profits, such as all the t} pes of sen;ces accruing from useful relationships, and symbolic profits, such as those derived from association with a rare, prestigious group.

The e:cistence of a network of connections is not n natural given, or even a scx.'inl given, constituted once and for all bv an initial act of institution, represenrcd, in -the case of the fa.miJ} group, by the genealogical definition of kinship relations, which 1s the characteristic of a social fomution. It is the product of an end­less effort at institution, of" hich imtitution riteS-Often \\TOng!) described as rites of pas­sage--mark the essen rial moments and which is necessaf} in order to produce and repro­duce lasting, US(!fuJ relationships that can secure material or srmbolic profits (see Bour­dieu 1982). In other words, the network of relationships is the product of investment stnltegies, indh-idual or coiJecrivc. con­sciously or unconsciously aimed at cstabli~-.h­ing or reproducing social rebtionships that are directly usable in the shan or long term, i.e., ar transforming contingent relations, such as thl>!>eof neighborhood, the workpbce, or even kinship, into relationships that are at once necessary and elective, implying durnble obliptions subjecti\ eJ} felt (feelings of grati­rude, respect, friendship, etc.) or institution­ally guaranteed (rights). This is done through the alchemy of co11sccration, the symbolic con­stitution produced by sociaJ instirution (insti­tution as a rebtivc-brother, sister, cousin, etc.--Qrasaknighr, an heir, an elder, etc.) and endlessly reproduced in and through the exchange (of gifts, words, women, etc.) "hich it encourages and which presupp<>S(.'i> and pr~ duces mutual knowledge and recognition. Exchange transforms the things exchanged into signs of recognition and, Lhrough the mutual recognition and the recognition of group membership \\hich it implies, re­producc..c; the group. 8} the same token, it reaffirms the limits of the group, i.e., the lim­its beJond \\ hich the constitutive exchange­trade, commensaJjt}, or marriage- amnor take place. Each member of the group is rhus instituted as a CUStodian of the limits of the group: lx:cause the definicion of the criteria of enlT) is at stake m each new entry, be can mod­if} the group by modif};ng the limits oflegir­imate e~change through some form of misalliance. It is quite logical that, in most

societies, the preparation and conclusion of marriages should be the bu iness of the~ hole group, and not of the agents directly con­ccmed. Through the introduction of new members into a famiJ}, a dan, or a club, the whole definition of the group, i.e., its fines, irs boundaries, and its identity, is put at st:1ke, exposed to redefinition, alterntioo, adulter­ation. When, ru, in modem societies, fumilies lose the monopoly of the establishment of e.~changes which can lead ro lasting relation­ships, whether socially S3nclioned (like mar­riage) or not, they may continue to control these e.~changcs, "hile remaining "ithin the logic of laissez-faire, through all the institu­tions which are designed to favor legirim:ue exchanges and e,cJude illegitimate ones b} producing occasions (raJiie:., cruises, hunts. parries, receptions. etc.), plaC\.'S (smart neigh­borhoods, select schools, dubs, etc.), or prac­tices (smart sports, parlor games, cultural ceremonies, ere.) which bring together, in a seemingly fortuitous way, individuals as homogeneous as possible in all the pertinent respects in terms of rhe e'<istcncc and persis­tence of the group.

The reproduction of social capital presup­poses an unceasing effort of sociability, a con­tinuous series of e'<changes in which recognition is endless!} affirmed and reaf­firmed. This "or I., "hich implies C-'<pendi­rure of time and cncrg) md so, directly or indirectly, of coo nomic capital, is not prof­itableor even conceivable unless one invests in it a specific competence (knowledge of genealogical relationships and of real connec­tions and skill at using them, ere.) and an acquired disposition to :tcquire and maintain this competence, which arc themsch cs inte­gral parts of this capitaL 15 This is one of the factors \\hich explain "'hy the profirabilit} of this labor of accumulating and maintaining social capital rises in proportion to the size of the capital. Because the social capital accruing from a relationship is that much greater to the extent that the person who is the object of it is richl) endowed with capital (mainJy socia~ bur also cultural and e'en economic capital), the possessors of an inherited sociaJ capital, symbolized b) a great ruune, are able to r:rans­fonn aU circum~tanwl relationships into last­ing connections. The} are sought after for their social capital and, because they are well l..nown, ace "'orth~ of being known ('l kno" him "ell'); the} do nor need to ' make the

acquaintance' of all their 'ac:quaintances'; they are lnowmo more people than the) know, and their" or!.. of sociabilit) , "hen it is exerted, is h1ghl) productive.

EH:ry group has its more or Jess instirution­ali:tcd forms of delegation \\ hich enable it to concentrate the totalit} of the social capital, "hicb is Lhe basis of the ex.istence of the group (a family OI a nation, of course, but also an association or a party), in the hands of a single agent or a small group of agents :tnd to man­date this plenipotenti311, charged with plena PQitffo$ ogmdi tl loqurnd1, 111 to represent the group, tospcakandactin its name and so. with the aid of this coUecrively owned capital, to c\ercise a po\\Cr incommensurate w;th the a~~:ent's personal contribution. Thus, ar the mfh< elementaJ) degree of institutionaliz.a­non. the head of the family, the paur [ar111litn, the eldest, most senior member, is tacitly rec­o~i;.ed as theonl~ person cntitk-d to speal. on behalf of the fiunily group in all official cir­c~l2.Dces. But \\ hereas in this case, diffuse delegation requires the great ro step fonrard and defend the collective honor when the honor of the wealest members is Lhreatened, the institutionalized ddeg:~tion, which ensures the concentration of social capital, also has the effect oflimiting the consequences of indi\-idual lapses by explicitl) delimiting responsibilities and authorizing the recog-­nized spokesmen to shield the group as a \\hole from discredit by expelling or excom­municating the embarrassing indi\ iduals.

If the internal competition for the monop­ol) ofh:gilimate representation of the group is not to threaten tbeconsenation and accumu­lation of the capital \\ hich is the basis of the group, the members of the group must regu­l:ate the conditions of a~ to the right to declare oneself a member of the group and, abO\e all, to set oneself up as a representative (ddegate, plenipotentiary, spokesman. etc.) of the whole group, thereby committing Lhe social cnpiml of the whole group. The title of nobility is the form par t.wdlmct of tbc insti­tutionalized social caphal which guarantees a ranicular form of social relationship in a last­in[!\\a). One of the paradoxes of delegation is that the mandated agent can exert on {and, up to a point., against) the group the power" hicb the group enables him to concentrate. (This is pcrh:aps especialh true in the limiting cases in \\hich the mandated agent crcates the group \\ hich creates him but \\ hich onJ)' exists

The Forms of Capital 53

through him.) The mechanisms of delegation and representation (in both the theatrical and the legal senses) which fall into place-that much more strongly, no doubt, when the group is large and its members weak-as one of the conditions for the concentration of social capiraJ (among other reasons, because it enables numerous, Yaried, scattered agents to act as one man and to overcome the limitations of space and time) also contain the seeds of an embe?.zlemcnt or misappropriation of the capital \\ hich they assemble.

This embezzlement is latent in the fact that a group as a whole can be represented, in the ,-arious meanings of the word, by a subgroup, clear!} delimited and perfectly visible to all, !mown to all, and recognized by aU, that of the 11obifts, the ' people who are known', the para­digm of whom is the nobility, and who m:ty s~ on behalf of the whole group, represent the whole group, and exercise authority in the name of the whole group. The noble is the group personified. He bears the name of the group to \\hich he gi' es his name {the metonrm} which links the noble to Iris group isclcarh seen whcnSbakespearecallsCieopa­tra 'Egypt' ortheKingofFrancc'France,' just as Racine t-ails P} rrhus 'Epirus'). lt is by him, his name, the diOerence it proclaims, that the members of his group, the liegemen, and also the land and castles, are known and recog­nized. Similarly, phenomena such as the 'per­sonality cult' or the identification of parties, trade unions, or movements with their leader arc latent in the very logic of representation. Evef}'l:hing combines ro cause the signifier to take the place of the signified, the spokesmen thatofthegroup he is supposed to express, not least because his distinction, his 'ourstanding­ness,' his \'isibility constitute the essential part, if not the~~ of this po"cr, which, being entire!} set Y.ithin the logic oflnO\\<I­edgcand acknO\\ ledgmcnt, is fundamentally a symbolic power; but also because the repre­sentative, the sign, the emblem, may be, and create, the whole reality of groups which receive effective social existence on!) in and through representation.~'

Conversions

The different types of capital can be derived from uo11om1r rapuol, but only at the cost of a more or less great efforr of transformation,

54 The Fonns of Capital

which b needed to produce the type of po\\ er efTectin:in the field in question. For example. there are some goods and sci"\ ices to which economic capital gives immediate access, \\ ithout secondary costs; others can be obtained only bl virtue of a social capital of relationships (or socin.J obligations) which cannot actinstantaneo~J), at the appropriate moment, unless they h:ne been established and maintained for a long time, as if for their own saL.e, and therefore outside their period of use. i.e., at the cost of an m\'estlllent in socia­bility which is necessarily long-rerm because the time lag is one of the factors of the trans­mutation of a pure and simple debt into that recognjtion of nonspecific indebtedness which is called gratitude.'~ In contrast to the C} nical but also economical transparenq of economic exchange, in which equivalents change hands in the same instant, the essential ambiguity of social e~change, which presup­poses misrecognition, in other words, a form of faith and of bad faith (in the sense of self­deception), presupposes a much more subtle economv of time.

So It has to be posited simuh:aneousJy that economic capital is at the root of all the other types of capital and that these transformed, disguised forms of <.'Conomic capital, never emircl) reducible to that definition, produce rheir most specific effects only to the extent that the) com:eal (not least from their posses­sors) the facr that economic capital bat their root, in other '' ords--but onh in the last ana h l>is--at the root of their effects. The reaJ logic of the functioning of capit.al. the com·er­sions from one type to another, and the law of consen•ntion which goverm them cannot be understood unless two opposing but equall} parriaJ ' 'iews are superseded: on the one hand, economism, which, on the grounds that e'"ery type of capital is reducible in the last analvsis to economic capital, ignores what makes.the specific efficag of the other types of capital, and on the other hand, semiologism (no\\a­days represcmed by st.rucruralism, symbolic intcractionism, orethnomcthodology), which reduces socin.J exchanges to phenomena of communication and ignores the brutal fact of uni\ersal reducibilit\ tocconomics.19

In accordance with a principle '' hich is the equivalent of the principle of the con.crervation of en erg), profits in one area are necessaril} paid for bJ costs in another (so that a concept like wastage has no meaning in a genenl sci-

ence of the econom) of practices). The uni­\Crsal equi,·alent, the measure of aU equiva­lences, is nothing other than labor-time (in the widest sense); and the conservation of social energy through all its conversions is verified if, in each case, one takes into account both the labor-time accumulated in the form of capital and the labor-time needed to transform it from o.ne cype into another.

lt has been seen, for example, that the trans­formation of economic capital into social ca~ ital presupposes a spe..cilic labor, i.e., an apparently graruirous expencliture of time, attention, care, concern. which, as is seen in the endeavor to personalize a gift, has the effect of transfiguring the purely monet:m import of the exchange and, by the sam~ toL.en. the \CT) meaning of the e\change. From a narro\\ ly economic standpoint, this effort is bound to be !teen as pure" astage, but in the terms of the logic of SQCial exchanges, it is a solid invesoneot, the profits of which will appear, in the long run, in monetary or other form. Similarly, 1f the best measure of cultural capital is undoubtedly the amount of time dc,·ored ro acquiring ir:. this is because the transformation of ecoooJlllc capital mro cul­tural capital presupposes an expenditure of time that is mnde possible bj posse&'ion of economic capital. \1ore prt!CU.el), it iJ. because thcculrural capital rhar iscfTectivch rransmit­ted within the famil} itself depends not only on the quanut) of cultural capital, itSelf accu­mulated b} spending time, that the domestic group poS:>CSs, but also on the usable time (particularly in the form of the morher's free time) available to it (by "irtu.e of its economic capictl, which enables it to purchase the lime of others) to ensure the transmission of this capital and to delay entry into the labor marker through prolonged schooling, a credit which pays off, if at aU, only m the n:ry long term 111

The convernl>ilil) of the different types of capital is the ba.c;is of the strategies aimed at ensuring the reproduction of capital (and the position occupied in social space) by means of the conversions least costly in terms of con­' erl>ion w-orL. and of the losses inherem in the con,e:rslon ltSClf(io a ghcn state of the social power relations). The different types of capi­tal can be distinguished according to thcir reproducibllit) or, more preciscl), accordin~ to how Cllsil) they are transmitted. i.e .• with more or less los.c; and with more or les:. con­cealment; the rate of loss and the degree of

conccaJment tend to \an in im~erse ratio. E\cnthing which helps to disguise the eco­nomi' aspect also tends to mcrease the risk of lol)ll (particularly the mtergenerational trans­fers). Thus the (apparent) incommensurabil­it) of the different types of capital introduces a high degree of uncertainty into all transac­tions between holders of dtfferent t)·pcs. Sim­ilarh. the declared refusaJ of calculation anc.l of g\Jarantees which cluractenzes C.\changl!l> tending to produce a social capital in rhe form of .1 capital of obligations that are us-.tblc in the more or less long term (exchanges of gifts, ser­vices, visits, etc.) nC(:ess:~rily entails the risk of mgratitude, the refusal of that recognition of nonguaranteed debts v. hich such exchanges aim to produce. Similar!}, too, the high dt.-grec of conceaJment of the transmission of cultural capital h2s the disadvantage (in addi­tion to its inherent risks of loss) that the academic qualilication which is its institution­ali.lcd form is neither transmissible (like a title of nobility) nor negotiable (like stocks and ~hares) More precise I ~. cultural capital, "hose diffuse, continuous transmission v.ithm the famil) csc:~pcs obsen-ation md control (so that the educational system ~'CmS ro award its honor.. sold) to naturn.J qualioes) and v.hichisincrea.o;ingly tending to attain full cfficaC), at least on the labor market, only "hen ''alidated b} the educational system, 1.e .• converted into a capital of qualifications, is .. ubjcct to a more disguised bur more risl..) transmission than economic capital. rh the educational qualilic:nion, invested ,.,.;th the specific force of the official, becomes the con­dition for legitimate access to a growing num­ber of positions, parricularly the dominant ones, the educational system tends incre:lS­mgly to dispossess rhe domestic group of the monopoly of the transmissiOn of power and pri,ilcgcs-and, among other things, of the choice of its legitimate heirs from among chil­dren of different SC:{ and birth rank.21 And economic capital itself poses quite difl'erent problems of transmission, depending on the particular form it takes. Thus, according to Gns~b} ( 1970), the liquidity of commercial capital, \\hich gives immediate economic p()\\er and fa,·ors tntnsnussion, also mal.:es it more \uJnerable than landed property (or eH:n real eiitate) and does not f.wor the estab­lishment oflong- lasting dynasties.

Because the question of the arbitr11rincs:. of appropriation arises most sharply in the

The Forms of Capital 55

process of rran mission-particularl~ at the time of succession, a critical moment for all power~very reproduction srrategy IS at the same time a legitimation Strategy aimed at consecrating both an exclusive appropriation and its reproduction. When the subversi\'e critique which aims to weaken the dominant class through the principle of its perpetuation b) bringing to light the arbitrariness of the enrirlements uansmitted and of their trans­mission (such as the critique which the Enlightenment ph1losophe; directed, m the name of namre, against the arbitrariness of birth) is incorporated in institutionalized mechanisms (for example, laws of inhcri­rance)aimed at controlling the official, direct transmission of power and pri,iJcges, the holders of capital ha\ eane'-er greater interest in resorting to reproduction strategies capable of ensuring better-disguised rrnnsmission, but ar the cost of greater loss of capital, by exploiting the convertibility of rhe types of capital. Thus the more the official tran~mis­sion of capital is prevented or hindered, rhe more the effects of rhe clandestine circulation of capital in the form of cultural capital become determinant in the reproduCtion of the social stru<:ture. As an inStrument of reproduction capable of disguising its own function, the scope of the educational system tends to increase, and together with this mcrease is the unification of the market in social qualifications which ghes nghts to occup) rare positions.

Notes

1 This inerna, entailed b~ the rendeoC) of the structures of capital to ~produce thcmsches rn inJ>tituLions or in dispositions ad.aprro to the st:ruetu:res of which the) are the product, is, of course, rcmforced by a speci6call} polincaJ action of conccned conscrnation, i.e., of demobilization and depolitici.mtion The laner tends to l.t:~:p the domin.-ued agmts m the state of a pncric::d group, unilcd onl} by the orchestration of rhcir dispmritions and condemned to function as an o~ggregate repcaredl} performing discrete, indi,idual acts (such as consumer or eleccof'21 choteeli).

2. This is true of all exchanges betw ec:n members of diffcrent fractions of the dominant c~ possessmg dtffcrcnt types of capu:a.l. Thc;e runge from sales of cxpertiM!, t.re;ttmcnt, or other ~enices which mire lhe form of gift tl.chunge and dignify themselves with the

56 The Fonns of Capital

most decorous names that c:m be found (hon­onria. emoluments, etc.) to mauimon.ial c,"(ch:mges. the prime enmple of a rransaccion that c:m onl) take place insofar as it is not per­cei\cd or defined as such by the conn-acting parties. It is retrull'kable Lhltt the apparent extensions of economic theor) beyond the limits constitutin~t the discipline haxe left innlct the ~'}lum of the sacred, apart from a few sacrilegious incursions. Gary S. Becker, for example, who was one of rhe li:rst to tnke expliciucrount of the rypes of capital rhar are usually ignol'((i, never considers anything other than monetary costs -and profits, forget­ting the nonmonetary im·esnnenrs (inur alia, the afTecrin: ones) and the material and sym­bolic profits that education pro,;des in a defcrn-d, indirectway, such as the added value which the dispositions produced or reinforced by schooling (bodily or ,·erb:tl manners, mstes, ere.) or the relationships t:Stahlished with fellow srudents can vidd in the matrimonial nurket(Beckcr 1964tl).

3. Syf!Jbolic capital, th:u is to say, capital--in whmever form--insofar as it is represented, i.e., apprehended symbolil'lllly, jo a relation­~hip ofkflowlerlge or, more prt.'Cisely, of mis­recognition and recognition, presupposes the intervention of the habitus, as a socially con­!ititut~d cOgnitive c.:apacity.

4. \\'hen mlldng 2bout concepts for their own sake, as 1 do here, rather than using them in research,onealwnys runs theri.'ik ofbeingboth schematic and formal., i.e., theoretical in the most usual and most usually approved sense of the word.

5. This proposition implies no rec::ognilion of the value of scholastic verdicts; it merely registers the relationship which e..:ists in realicy between a certain culrur:tl capital and the laws of the educational market. Dispositions that a:re given a nt.'g'lltive vnluc in the educational market may re(leivc very h.igb value in other m:trkets-not IC3St, of course, in the relation­~ ips inrerml to the class.

6. ln a relatively undiffereru:uued societ)', in which access to the means or appropriating the cultural heritage is very equally distributed, embodied culruredoes not fonction as culturnl capital, i.e., as a means of acquiring txelusive adnmtages.

7. \'Vhat 1 call the genemlized Arrow effect, i.e., the fact that all cultural goods-paintings, monuments, machines, and any objeci:S shaped by man, particularly all those which belong to the childhood emironmem-exert an educative effect by their mere existence, is no doubt one of che s-trucrural factors behind the "schooling ~plosion,' in the sense Lh2t a growth in the quantity of cultural capital accu­mulated in the objectified state increases the

educative effect automatically exerted by the environmem. If one adds to this the: fact that embodied cultural capital is consta.ntJy increasing, it tan be 51..-cn that, in each gc:nerll­tion, the educational sysrem can 1~ke more for granted. The fact that the same education11l in vestment is increasingly producthe is one of the srrucrunl factors of the inHation of quali­fications (together with cyclical factors linked to effects of cnpital COD\<ersion).

8. The cultural obj~'l, as n thing social instiru­tion, is, simulumeously, a sociall>· instituted materi:t.l object and a particular class of habi­tus, to wh.ich it is addressed. The aurerial object-for exrunpJe, a work of an in its mate­riality-may be separ.ned b) space (e.g .• 11 Dogon statue) or by time (e.g., a Simone MlD'­cini painting') from the habitus for whlchil was intended. This !cads to one of the most f unda­mental biases of an histOry. Understanding the effect (nor ro be confused with the func­tion) which the work u:nded to produ~or exrunJlle. the fonn of belief it tended W induce--and wh.i~h is the rruc basi<> of the conscious or unconscious choice of ~he means used (technique, col{)rs, etc.), and therefore of the fomt itsclf, is possible only if one at least nises the question of the habitus on wh.ich lc 'operated.'

9. The rualecticaJ relationship between nbjecr­ifit.-d cultural capiGIJ-of \\hidl the fonn .Par t:rcdlenu is wriring'-3D.d embodied cu.lrural capi.taJ has generally been reduced to an exalted description of the degr:~dation of the spirit by the letter, the living by the inert, creation by routine, gr'IICC b) heaviness.

10. This is particularly true in France, \\htre in many occupations (particularl) the civil ser­vice) there is a vc:cy strict reL1tionshlp be:twecn qualilic;ation, rank, :mtl remuneration (lr.ID1.­Iator's note).

11. Hen; roo, the: notion of cultul."31 capital did nor spring from pure theoretical work, still less from an malogical extension of economic con­cepts. h arose &om the: need to identify the principle or social effects which. although rhc.} can be S<.-en clearly nt the lend of singular agents-where statistical inquiry inevitably 0pcr.1tes--emnor be reduced tO the set of properties individually possessed hy a given agent. These effects, in wbith spontaneous sociology r1.>:~dily pcrcehes the \\Ork of 'con­nections, • are p:uricularlyvis-ible in all cases in "hich different indi,·iduals obwn \~n· unequal profits from virtually equivalent («.'ODomic or cultural) capiml, depending on theextenr m which they can mobilize by proxy the capital of a group (a family, then.lumni of an clire school, a select club, the arisrocracy, etc.) that is more or less constituted as ~ch and more or Less rich in capital..

12 eighborhood n:lationshlpli rna~. of course, recehe an elementarY form of instirutiorul­it:lrion, as in the Bcam-o:r the Basque region-- where neighbors, lous lmis (a word which, in old texts, is applied to the le:girim:~te inhabitants of the village. the rightful mem­bcrsoftheasscmbly),artellplicitJydesignated, in accordance with fairly codified rules, and are assigned functions which are di.fferen­riated according to their rank (there is a 'first neighP<n-,' 11 'second neighlx1r,' and so on). particularly for the major social ceremonies (funerals, mMriages, etc.). Out e\'l!ll in this case; Lhe relationships actually used by no means always coincide with the rel:uionships social]) instiruled.

13 . . .'vlanners(bearing, pronunciation, etc.)may be includc:Q in social capiwJ insofar as, through the moc.le- of acquisition the~ point to, they indicate initial membership of a more or less prcst!gmus group.

H. National liber.u:ion movement!. or nationalist ideologies c:umot be accounted for solely by reference t·o stricti) economic profits, i.e., .mriciparion of rhe profits ~ hic.h m11y be derived from redistribution oh proportion of wl!:llth to the :tdvamage of the nationals (nationalization) and the recoYery of highly paid jnbs (see Breton 1964). To these specifi­c:~ II) ~'Gnomic anticipated profits, which wouldonl) tlCplain the nationalism of the priv­ileged classes, must be added the very real and very immediate profits derh·ed from member­ship (social capital) which are proportionately greater for those" hoare lower down the social .hierarch)' ('poor whires') or, more precisely, more thre:trened by economic and social decline.

I i There is every reason to suppose: Lhltt sociali1..­ing, or, more genera II}, relational, dispositions are very unequally distribured among the social classes and, within a given class, among fractions or different origia

l6. :\ 'full power to act and speak' (t:nmslator). 17. lt goes without saying that social capital is so

totally goyemed by the logic of knowledge and ac.lrnowledgment that it always functions as symbolic capital.

18. It should be made clear. ro dispel a likely m.is­uoders!2nding, that the investment in ques­tion here is not n~·essarih conceived as a calculared pursuit of g;Un, but that ir has every l.ikellhood of being experienced in renns of the logic of emotional investment., i.e., illi an lnvoh emenr wh.ich is both necessary and dis­interested. This has not al"l":lys been appreci­ated by ltistorians, who(even when they are as alert to symbolic cfTeco. as E. P. Thompson) rend to conceive symbolic pruc:ri<..'CS---l>OW­dercd wigs and the whole paraphernalia or office-as ciplicit strut:egies of dominauon,

The Forms of Capital 57

intended to be seen (from below). and to inter­pret generous or chantable conduct as 'c:J!cu­Jared acts or class .appeasement.' Th~ naively Machia\·ellilln view forge~ that the mCb"t sin­cerely disinterested acts ma) be those best corresponding to objective interest. A num­ber of fields, particularly those which most rend to deny interest and every sort of calcula­tion, like the fields of culruml production, gram full recognition, and with it rhe conse­crntion which guarantees success, only to tho..-.e who distinguish thcmseh-es b) the immediate conformit) of their in,·estments, a token of sincerity and attachment to 'the essen­tial principles of the field. Jt would be thor­ough]) erronco~,ts to dc:scribe the choices of the hnbitus which lead an nnist, wr:irer, or rCSQreht.-r t0\\'11rd his narural place (a subject, style, mnnner, etc.) in rerrns of rational stnt­egy and cynical calculacion. This is despite the fact th:it, for cxampll.·, shifts from one g~mre, ·chool, or specWity to anorher, quasi­religious conversions drarare performed 'in all sincerity,' can be unders1ood as capital ~"'n­\ersions, the direction iltld moment of which (on which their success often depends) are derermined by a 'sense ofim·estment' which is the less likely 10 be !>Cell ns such the more skillful it is. Iirnocence is the prhilcgc of those "ho move in their field of acriYity fike fish in water.

l9. To understand theau:ractiveness of this pair of antngonistic positions 11 h.ich serve as e~~ch other's alibi. one would need to ana)p;e 1he unconscious profit:S and the profirs of 'Uncon­sciousness which they procure for intellec­t;Uals. While some find in economism a means of c:xcmpring thcmselvt>s by excluding the cultural capital and all the specific profitS which place them on the side of the dominant, others can abandon che deres.tablc terrain of the economic, where e\et')Lhing reminds tht>tU that thev can be evaluated. in the last analysis, in economic rerms, for that of the symbolic. (The latter merdy reproduce, in the ~ of the symbolic, the strategy whereby mrellccruals and artists ende:avor to impose the recognrrion of their \-alues, i.e., their vn.lue, by in,-erring the 13~\ of the market in which 11hat one has or ~hat one earns completely defines" hat one is worth and what one is--as is shown by the practice of banks which, with t~'Chniquts sucb as thtt personal­ization of credit., tend to subordinate the gr:mt­ingofloa.nsand thcfixingofinteres£ rates roan e\-haustive inquir) into the borrower'~ presc:nt and future resources.)

20. Among the advantages procured by capilill in all its 11 pes, the most precious is the incr~ volume of useful rime rhat is mnde possible through the vnrious methods of approprinting

58 The Forms of CapttaJ

othet- people's mne (in the fonn of sen aces). h tm~ take the fonn eathu of increased spare time. secun.>d by reduong the nme consumed in acthioes directly channeled towurd pro­ducing rhe mc:~ns of reproducing the exist­ence of the domestic gy-oup, or of more in tense use of the time so consumed, by recourse to other people's labor or to de\ tees and mer hods whach are a\'ailablc onh to those who hne spent time le:mllng how io use them and" bach (lil.-e better rr.msport or li \·mg close to the place of work) make it possible to 5a\C time (This IS

in contr.LSt to rhc cash saving!> of the poor, which are paid for in rime-<lo-it-yourself, bargain hunting, etc.) 'lone of this is rrue of mere econormc capital, it is possession of cultural capital tbar makes it possible to derh c greater profit not only from labor-time, b) securing a higher yield from the same rime. but also from spare time. and so to increase both economic and culrur.al capital

21 h goes withouuaring that the dominant fr.ac­tions, who tend to place e,·cr gy-eater emphasis on educational investment, "ithin an overall strategy of asset dnersification and of in\ est­ments aimed at combuung secunt) "ith high ~ teld, ba\-eallsoru. ofwa)sof C\·adingscholas­uc 'erdiru. The direct transmission of ceo-

nomic apataJ mm.ins one of the prinopal means or reproduction, and the effect of social capital ('a helping lund,' 'string- pullmg,' the 'old boy nerworl. ') wruls to correct the cfTecrof academics:mctions. Educational qu~llllications never function perfcalyascurrency. They are neH:r cntirtly separable from thcir holders: their \;tlue rues in proportion 10 the value of their bearer, espcciall~ in thelcast ripd areas of the social structure.

References

Becker, G. S. ( 196-la), A Thrord~eal aud EmprriCal AMiysu tl!lth Spuwl Refatnrt 10 £®catron (New York: -.:aoon21 Bureau of Economic Research).

--(1964/t),Hu,an Cispillll(~cw York· Colum­bia Um'. Press).

Bou:rdieu, P (I 982), 'l.es rites d'inrutution', -Ina tk iD rrdrrrdrttnsrimwsnrialcs, H ; 58-63.

Breton, A. (1962), 'The Economics of NatiQnal­ism',Jouma/ u/Polrtrcal Enmumy, 72: 376-86.

Gns:sb), R. ( 1970), 'English Merchant Capitalism in the Late Sc' enteenth Century: The Compo­sition or Busmess Fortunes', Pust and Pranrt, 46:8/-107

3 Class and Pedagogies: Visible and Invisible

1 .-.hall e'<amine some of the assumptions and the cuJtural come\t of a particular form of preschool/infant school pe<bgc>ID, a form '' h1ch has at least the following duractcns­ti~.

I. Where the conrrol of the teacher over the ch1ld is implictt rarher rhan explicit.

1. \\"here, ideaJJ), 1 he reacher arranges the rrmto:t \\hich the child io; expected to re­arrange and explore.

J. Where "ithin this arranged COnlC\l, the child apparcnll) has ''ide po\\en. O\er \\hal he selcru, O\-cr ho" be suucturCl>, and over Ule lime scale ofhis acthicics.

4. Where the child apparent!} regulates hts O\\o mo,ementsnnd social relalionships.

5 \\ here Lhere tS a reduced emphasis upon the ~•on and acquisition of specific slills (see ~ore l).

6. \\here the crneria for evaltlllting the peda­gog) nre multiple and d1ffuse and so not easily measured.

Invisible Pedagogy and Infant Educat ion

One can cbaracrense rhis pedagogy as an an\ isiblcpedagog) . In terms of the concepts of classification and frame, the pedagogy is rClllised through" cak classification and wCtlk frames. Yisible pedagogics arc realised rhrough strong clao;.c;ificarion and srrong iramcs. The basic dafTerence between 'isible and im isible pedagogic~ is in the manntr in which critena arc rransmiucd and in the degree of spt.'Cifi<.il) of the criteria. The more tmplicit the manner of tronsmis.sion and the

Basil Bernstein

more diffuse the criteria the more annsiblc the pedagog}·; the more specific the criteria, rhe more C.\plicit the manner of their transmis­sion, rhe more "isiblc rhe pedagog). These definition'" ill be C\tendcd later in the paper. lfthc pedagug) is in' isible, \\hat aspt:c~ofthc child ha\C high \ isibility for the teacher? 1 suggest two aspects. The first arises out of an inference the te:~cher makes from rhc child's ongoing beha' iour about Lhe dtulopmmtal stage of the child. Tlus inference tS then referred to a concept of rtadrntss. ·rhe second aspect of the child refers to his exlemal beha\ ­iour and is conceptualised by the tcacher as busyness. The child should be busy doing things. These mncr (readincs.<>) and outer (bus) ness) aspects of the child can be trans­formed into one concept of'reath 10 do.' The teacher infers from rhc 'doing' the state of 'rcadinc::.s' of the child as it is rc\c:.lled in his present act!\ it) and as this srate adumbrates future 'domg.'

We can bridl} note in passing a point\\ hich will be developed later. In the same way llli the child's reading releases the child from Lhe teacher and sooalises hun into the priv:aised solitas) leammg of an exphctt anommous past(i.e. the tC\tbool.),so bus) children (chil­dren domg) release the child from rhe teacher bm socialise htm into an ongoang inter­actional present in which the pasr is in'isible and so implicit (i .e. the teachers' pedagogical theory). Thus a non-doing chtld in the im isi­ble pedagoro is the cquhalcnt of a non­reading child in the 'isible pedagog). (Howe\er, a non-readjng child ma) lx at a greater thsad\antage and expenencc greater difficull) than a 'nnn-domg' c:hild.)

The concept basic to the im isiblc p~dagogy

I rom Basil Ikrnsu:in, rttJIS, Ct!J~s IJM C9ntrol, \ ol 3 (Routledge :tnd 1\.qr.an l'~ul, 1975), 111)..56. Reprinted Wi[h rcnn~it>n.