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1092 Medical Ethics [ 1 4 6 # 4 C H E S T O C TO B E R 2 0 1 4 ]
Brain Death and Islam Th e Interface of Religion, Culture, History, Law, and Modern Medicine
Andrew C. Miller , MD ; Amna Ziad-Miller , JD ; and Elamin M. Elamin , MD
How one defi nes death may vary. It is important for clinicians to recognize those aspects of
a patient’s religious beliefs that may directly infl uence medical care and how such practices
may interface with local laws governing the determination of death. Debate continues about
the validity and certainty of brain death criteria within Islamic traditions. A search of PubMed,
Scopus, EMBASE, Web of Science, PsycNet, Sociological Abstracts, DIALOGUE ProQuest,
Lexus Nexus, Google, and applicable religious texts was conducted to address the question
of whether brain death is accepted as true death among Islamic scholars and clinicians and
to discuss how divergent opinions may aff ect clinical care. The results of the literature review
inform this discussion. Brain death has been acknowledged as representing true death by
many Muslim scholars and medical organizations, including the Islamic Fiqh Academies of the
Organization of the Islamic Conference and the Muslim World League, the Islamic Medical
Association of North America, and other faith-based medical organizations as well as legal
rulings by multiple Islamic nations. However, consensus in the Muslim world is not unani-
mous, and a sizable minority accepts death by cardiopulmonary criteria only.
CHEST 2014; 146(4):1092- 1101
ABBREVIATIONS: IFA 5 Islamic Fiqh Academy; IMANA 5 Islamic Medical Association of North America; MWL 5 Muslim World League; OIC 5 Organization of the Islamic Conference
[ Medical Ethics ]
Manuscript received January 15, 2014; revision accepted April 15, 2014.
AFFILIATIONS: From the Critical Care Medicine Department (Dr Miller), Clinical Center, National Institutes of Health, Bethesda, MD; New York Law School (Ms Ziad-Miller), New York, NY; and Department of Inter-nal Medicine (Dr Elamin), Division of Pulmonary, Critical Care, and Sleep Medicine, James A. Haley Veteran’s Hospital and University of South Florida, Tampa, FL.
FUNDING/SUPPORT: Th is work was supported, in part, by the Intramural Research Program of the Clinical Center, National Institutes of Health.
CORRESPONDENCE TO: Andrew C. Miller, MD, Critical Care Medi-cine Department, Clinical Center, National Institutes of Health, Bldg 10, Room 2C-145, 10 Center Dr, Bethesda, MD 20892-1662; e-mail: [email protected]
© 2014 AMERICAN COLLEGE OF CHEST PHYSICIANS. Reproduction of this article is prohibited without written permission from the American College of Chest Physicians. See online for more details.
DOI: 10.1378/chest.14-0130
Th e moment of death is among the most
mysterious of all human transitions. Cultur-
ally, defi ning death may be as complex as
life itself and may vary depending on
whether one views it spiritually, medically,
ethically, legally, or otherwise. Th us, the
concept of brain death poses a great chal-
lenge to clinicians who may be required to
bridge the interface of culture, religion, law,
and medicine. In the United States, the dec-
laration of death is governed by state law.
Some states, namely New Jersey and New
York, have amended their laws to accom-
modate religious objection to brain death. 1,2
Th is review discusses the evolution of
methods of determining death in Western
medicine and how such notions have his-
torically interfaced with Muslim societies.
Th is critique addresses the question of
whether brain death is accepted as true
death among Islamic scholars and clinicians
to improve communication among patients,
families, and medical providers who pro-
vide end-of-life care to seriously ill patients.
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journal.publications.chestnet.org 1093
Materials and Methods We performed a narrative review of 713 potentially relevant sources
derived from librarian searches of PubMed, Scopus, EMBASE, Web
of Science, PsycNet, Sociological Abstracts, DIALOGUE ProQuest,
Lexus Nexus, and Google to extract viewpoints and historical facts.
When applicable, religious texts were included. Detailed search strat-
egies are summarized in e-Appendix 1. Th e results of the literature
review were used to inform the discussion that follows.
Discussion
Evolving Defi nition of Death
Th e criteria for death and the manner in which they are
applied may vary by clinical setting or even by physician
within a clinical setting. For example, the neurologic
criteria to determine brain death is based on a basic
evaluation of brainstem function. Th is level of detailed
assessment may be inappropriate for use in an acute
resuscitation setting because some medications used in
the process of CPR can confound the examination (ie,
sedation, neuromuscular blockers used to secure an arti-
fi cial airway).
Traditionally, death has been defi ned as the irreversible
cessation of cardiac and respiratory activity, a defi nition
commonly used in emergency medicine settings. How-
ever, the duration of cardiopulmonary cessation at
which point death occurs remains unclear. Th is is fur-
ther complicated by advancements in technology, such
as mechanical ventilation, extracorporeal membrane
oxygenation, and cardiac bypass where cardiopulmonary
function may cease for prolonged periods but brain
function is sustained. Defi ning the time point at which a
patient’s cessation of cardiopulmonary functioning is
considered irreversible may vary greatly among practi-
tioners and institutions and may be infl uenced by the
patient’s underlying state of health or associated
comorbidities. 3
Brain Death and Western Medicine
Th e concept of brain death emerged in 1959 from the
studies of Mollaret and Goulon, 4 who described
patients with irreversible coma, and in the early to
mid-1960s, the terms “cerebral death syndrome” and
“electrocerebral silence” were used to identify such
patients. 5 In 1968, the Ad Hoc Committee of the Har-
vard Medical School to Examine the Defi nition of
Brain Death issued a report that defi ned irreversible
coma as brain death, stating that “an organ, brain or
other, that no longer functions and has no possibility
of functioning again is for all practical purposes dead.” 6
In this report, the diagnosis of brain death was to be
made on the basis of total unawareness of externally
applied stimuli, no evidence of spontaneous breathing,
no brainstem refl exes, and a fl at EEG. 6 During this
same period, other countries were also passing legisla-
tion recognizing brain death. 7
At the First World Meeting on Transplantation of Organs
in 1969, representatives of the Protestant, Catholic,
Jewish, and Muslim faiths discussed ethicoreligious
issues inherent with acceptance of such a defi nition of
death. Th e consensus was that cerebral death was a rea-
sonable concept fully within the province of the physi-
cian to identify. 5
In 1980, the Uniform Determination of Death Act
defi ned brain death, and that defi nition was approved
by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws. 8 According to this act, the determina-
tion of death is as follows:
An individual who has sustained either: (1) irreversible
cessation of circulatory and respiratory functions, or (2)
irreversible cessation of all functions of the entire brain,
including brain stem, is dead. A determination of death must
be made in accordance with accepted medical standards. 8
Currently, the guidelines and methods used to deter-
mine the presence of brain death may vary by defi nition
and compliance based on law, legal precedent, or indi-
vidual hospital policy. 9-11 In an international survey of
standards used to determine brain death across 80
nations, a national standard existed in only 69% of
countries, with only 59% requiring apnea testing. 12
Further ancillary testing (eg, intracranial blood fl ow
measured by cerebral angiogram by either CT scan,
MRI scan, or Doppler fl ow studies; EEG; somatosensory-
evoked potentials; or bispectral index) was required in
only 40% of countries to confi rm the clinical diagnosis. 13
Surveys of US hospitals have similarly shown consider-
able variability, including failure to identify exclusionary
conditions (eg, sedating or paralytic medications) in 12%
and not requiring apnea testing in 4%. 10,11 Despite regional
and institutional practice variability, there are no pub-
lished reports of recovery of neurologic function aft er a
diagnosis of brain death using the criteria reviewed in
the 1995 American Academy of Neurology practice
parameter. 14
Even aft er determination of brain death, some clinical
fi ndings may confuse observers as non-brain-mediated
spontaneous movements, which can falsely suggest
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1094 Medical Ethics [ 1 4 6 # 4 C H E S T O C TO B E R 2 0 1 4 ]
retained brain function, or ventilator autocycling may
suggest patient-initiated breathing. 14 Th e minimally
acceptable observation period to ensure that neurologic
functions have ceased irreversibly varies greatly among
centers, and there is insuffi cient evidence to determine
the optimal time period to assess this condition. 14 Fur-
thermore, only limited data are available to determine
whether these ancillary tests are suffi cient to confi rm
irreversible cessation of brain function. 14
Interfaith Perspectives on Brain Death
Th e laws, customs, and rituals of various religions all
have an organizational component associated with
them. 15 It is useful to consider the Islamic perspective of
death in the framework of other Abrahamic traditions.
Judaism: Halacha is the collective body of Jewish reli-
gious laws derived from the Written and Oral Torah. It
includes the 613 mitzvot (commandments), subsequent
Talmudic and rabbinic law, and the customs and tradi-
tions compiled in the Shulchan Aruch . 16
Th ere is rabbinic debate within the Talmud regarding
the defi nition of death. One opinion is that death is the
irreversible cessation of breathing, whereas others assert
that death is the irreversible cessation of the heartbeat. 17
Additionally, there are a number of halachic sources
that are relevant to the validity (or not) of brain death.
Th e most important of these are the Mishnah in Oholot
1:6, the Talmud Tractate Yoma 8:7 on 85a, passages in
Teshuvot �atam Sofer and Teshuvot �acham Tzvi ,
and pronouncements of Rabbi Moshe Feinstein in his
Iggerot Moshe . 17,18 This article is not the forum for a
detailed examination of these sources other than to note
that they may be subject to a variety of interpretations.
A discussion of the compatibility of brain death crite-
ria with the provisions of Jewish law was fi rst presented
in October 1970 by Rabbi Gedalia Rabinowitz and
Mordecai Koenigsberg, MD. 19 Th e authors predicated
their argument upon Mishnah Oholot 1:6 by equating
brain death with the decapitation of an animal, which
the Mishnah accepts as synonymous with death. Th is
position has been sharply opposed by many scholars
and does not currently represent majority opinion. 19
The Hebrew word for life, nefesh , is explicitly linked
to breath by the Torah (Genesis 2:7). 17 Moreover, the
words that describe the animating spirit that defi nes life,
neshamah and rua� , similarly relate to respiration. 17
From the Jewish perspective, as long as a person breaths,
the heart functions, and the blood circulates, death has
not yet occurred. 20 Th is does not mean, however, that a
lingering life must be prolonged in all circumstances. In
the case of an imminently dying patient ( safek goses ),
the emphasis is on providing comfort and withholding
and perhaps withdrawing active medical care wherever
the active care process causes suff ering or is disturbing
the dying process. 17,21-23 Thus, although one may not
actively cause or hasten the onset of death by with-
holding the normal and natural means to sustain life
(eg, nutrition, fluids, air), one need not necessarily
administer unnatural or advanced therapies (eg, antibi-
otics, vasopressors, chemotherapy) that will neither cure
nor relieve the suff ering of the patient. 22 Th is is supported
by the writings of Rabbi Moshe Feinstein who, based on
the Talmudic story ( Ketubot 104a) of Rabbi Yehuda the
Prince, stated,
If physicians have no means of healing such a patient or of
reducing his suff ering, but do know a treatment to keep him
alive for a limited time at the current level of suff ering, then
they should not give him this treatment. 22
Christianity: Th e three largest branches of Christianity
are the Roman Catholic, Protestant, and Eastern Ortho-
dox traditions. A discussion of all Christian traditions is
outside the scope of this article. Th is brief introduction
focuses primarily on Catholic tradition.
In Christianity, death is accepted as the unavoidable
end; however, it is valued as the transition to a glorifi ed
existence. 24 Christian denominations have tended to
support the diagnosis of death by brain criteria, but
debate exists about whether the mode of being view
expressed by the US President’s Council on Bioethics is
suffi cient given that the loss of integration view pre-
dominates in Christianity, an idea fi rst accepted as doc-
trine by the Council of Vienne in 1311 to 1312. 25,26
Th e modern Christian view seems to be based on a
willingness to accept that loss of all brain function
is sufficient evidence that the surviving body is no
longer integrated with the soul. 25 Th is view was most
clearly articulated by Pope John Paul II in 2000 when
he acknowledged that medical criteria cannot deter-
mine “the exact moment of a person’s death” but are
valid “as a scientifically secure means of identifying
the biologic signs that a person has indeed died.” 27
He further stated that “for ascertaining the fact of
death, namely the complete and irreversible cessation
of all brain activity if rigorously applied, does not seem
to conflict with the essential elements of a sound
anthropology.” 25,27
Pope Benedict XVI subsequently expanded on this by
stating:
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journal.publications.chestnet.org 1095
Th ere is no “right” kind of death. When meeting at a fi nal
common endpoint, death, the order in which heart, lung
and brain cease to function do not defi ne diff erent deaths.
Th ere are, however, diff erent forms of death and most people
are more comfortable and obviously used to the traditional
“cardio-respiratory arrest” form of death. 27
Additionally, he stated:
The traditionally accepted sequence has been that after
heart–lung arrest, loss of consciousness first, and then
BD [brain death] occurs. In the early 1950s, the advent of
mechanical ventilators allowed for the artifi cial prolonga-
tion of cardiac and lung function and reversed the conven-
tionally accepted chain of events to one initiated with death
of the brain followed by heart and lung arrest.…Society has
not had suffi cient time to accept and change to a paradigm
in which death does not follow the pattern of heart-beat
arrest. Th us, brain death can only be blamed as being a rela-
tively young artifi cial construct based on a counterintuitive
concept. Th is does not imply that brain death is not a bio-
logical truth. 27
Sources of Law in Islam
Th e idea that brain death represents true death in Islam
remains a subject of great debate. Just as secular legal
systems comprise multiple sources of law that at times
appear at odds with one another, the same is true for
faith-based judicial systems. For example, in the United
States, law is derived on federal and state levels (in order
of primacy) from the constitution, statutes, regulations,
and common law or case law. To understand why dis-
cordant opinions or laws may also occur within legal
systems rooted in Islamic tradition, one must fi rst under-
stand the origins of Islamic law and potential sources of
new law ( Table 1 ).
Th e science of law ( fi qh ) and the collection of legal rules
( a�kām ), can be reduced to four formal sources ( u�ūl )
of Islamic (moral) law ( sharī ˆ ah ) that inform the Islamic
perspective on end-of-life issues. Th ese sources include
textual sources ( nu�ū� ), including (1) the Holy Qur’an
and (2) the Sunnah , which comprise the inspired say-
ings and deeds (ie, traditions) of the Prophet
Muhammed as recorded in a genre of literature known
as �adīth . 28,29 Other sources include (3) ijmā ˆ , or con-
sensus of religious scholars ( ulamā ), and (4) qiyās , or
precedent-based analogy. 28-34 Th e primacy of place
within the hierarchy of all these sources is given to the
Qur’an, followed by the Sunnah, which elucidates (the
Qur’an’s) unclarity. 33 Although second in the order of
importance, the Sunnah has provided the greatest bulk
of material from which law was derived during the
formative period. 32
On issues where the primary legal sources are ambig-
uous, rulings may arise from human reasoning and
intellect ( ijtihād ) as exercised by a qualifi ed religious
scholar ( muftī ). 28,33,34 The role of ijtihād in modern
society has itself become a source of controversy within
the Sunni sect, whereas it is used more commonly
within Shī’a sects. Ijtihād applies only to gray areas of
law and holds no role where primary textual sources
(the Qur’an and the Sunnah) or scholarly consensus
( ijmā ˆ ) are unambiguous. Th e muft ī opinion ( fatwā ) is
considered to contain elements of uncertainty and,
therefore, deemed only probable ( thannī ). 29,33 Muft ī rul-
ings are generally worded and generally applicable
(eg, to one who does so and so is applicable such and
such, or one who says so and so is obliged to do such
and such). 35 As such, the fatwā is general in terms and
not obligatory. 35
Brain Death and Islam
Th e Holy Qur’an emphasizes the universality of death
(Qur’an 3:156, 3:185, 29:57, and 39:42), and from its
teachings, one would gather that the moment of death
( al mawt ) would be at the time the soul ( al ru� ; some-
times used interchangeably with al nafs meaning self)
is separated from the soulless body ( al Mawât ). How-
ever, there is neither a precise defi nition of death nor a
precise description of how to recognize the departure
of al ru� from al Mawât in either the Qu’ran or the
Sunnah. 36-38 Th ese specifi c issues were discussed 25 years
TABLE 1 ] Sources of Islamic Moral Law ( Sharī
˘
ah ) Listed in Order of Primacy
Legal Source Defi nition
Qur’an The sacred text of Islam, divided into 114 chapters ( sūrah ; plural, sūwar ): revered as the word of God, dictated to Prophet Muhammad through the archangel Gabriel, and accepted as the
foundation of Islamic law, religion, culture, and politics
Sunnah The inspired sayings and deeds (ie, traditions) of the Prophet Muhammed as recorded in a genre of literature known as �adīth
Ijmā
˘
Consensus of religious scholars ( ulamā )
Qiyās Precedent-based analogy
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1096 Medical Ethics [ 1 4 6 # 4 C H E S T O C TO B E R 2 0 1 4 ]
ago at a seminar where the participants concluded that
the Qu’ran does not defi ne death. 39
Similar to Western medicine, when discussing the
Islamic view of the physician’s role in determining
death, the principle of no harm functions like the prin-
ciple of nonmalefi cence. 21 Th e spirit of the ethical prin-
ciple of nonmalefi cence is manifest through the axiom
“no harm shall be inflicted or reciprocated in Islam
( la darar wa la dirar fi ’l-islam ). 21 Moreover, a report
from the International Organization of Islamic Medi-
cine stated,
In his/her defense of life, however, the Doctor is well advised
to realize his limit and not transgress it. If it is scientifi cally
certain that life cannot be restored, then it is futile to dili-
gently keep the patient in a vegetative state by heroic means
or to preserve the patient by deep freezing or other artifi -
cial methods. It is the process of life that the doctor aims
to maintain and not the process of dying. In any case, the
doctor shall not take a positive measure to terminate the
patient’s life. 40
Against the backdrop of soaring accidental deaths and
organ donation needs, the law academies (Islamic Fiqh
Academy [IFA]) of the Organization of the Islamic
Conference (OIC) in 1986 and the Muslim World
League (MWL) in 1987 each commented on the prob-
lems associated with legitimizing the brain death crite-
rion by issuing decisions ( qararat ). 7 The IFA-OIC
reached a decision during its third annual session
(October 11-16, 1986) in Amman, Jordan, where resolu-
tion number 5 declared that
A person [is] considered legally dead, and all the principles
of the Sharī ˆ ah can be applied when one of the following
signs is established:
1. Complete stoppage of the heart and breathing, and the
doctors decide that it is irreversible.
2. Complete stoppage of all vital functions of the brain, and
the doctors decide that it is irreversible, and the brain has
started to degenerate.
Under these circumstances it is justifi ed to disconnect life
supporting systems even though some organs continue to
function automatically (e.g. the heart) under the eff ect of the
supporting devices. 7,41-44
However, the IFA-MWL made some distinctions and
decisions that are not found in the OIC’s decision. 7
Notably, the IFA-MWL stated that brain death criterion
can only be applied if three physicians agree that brain
death has occurred and is irreversible. Furthermore,
any legal consequences linked to the determination of
death can come into eff ect only aft er circulation and
respiration have finally stopped. 7 In other words,
cardiac death and brain death are explicitly not
equated. 7
A historical timeline of other notable Islamic judicial
decisions and recommendations regarding brain death
is shown in Table 2 . As has been the case in other
faith-based traditions of bioethics, a parallel eff ort to
consider bioethical questions grew from medical
scholarship. In 2003, the Islamic Medical Association
of North America (IMANA) ethics committee devel-
oped a primer titled Medical Ethics: Th e IMANA Per-
spective that reiterates the generally accepted criteria
for the diagnosis of death and clarifi es the ambiguity
from the prior IFA statement regarding who deter-
mines death by embracing the key role of the physician. 44
Additionally, the issue of diagnostic uncertainty is
alluded to in more detail with added language on the
level of physician training needed to make a diagnosis of
brain death. 44
Although the IFA-OIC resolution and IMANA perspec-
tive are widely cited within the medical community as
an acceptance of brain death within Islamic law and the
Muslim community, conceptual and clinical ambiguities
remain. 44 At the Th ird International Conference of
Islamic Jurists, medical specialists were unanimous in
their support for brain stem criteria signifying death.
However, the fi nal verdict of the IFA-OIC described the
cessation of vital brain functions, and this wording left
several unanswered questions 44 :
1. What are the vital functions of the brain, and who
makes the determination?
2. What brain death criteria are to be used, whole brain
or brain stem?
3. Who determines the irreversibility of these vital
brain functions, and what level of certainty ( yaqīn ) is
required?
4. Is brain degeneration a necessary part of the defi ni-
tion? If so, how is this to be determined?
Regarding the fi rst of these issues, the debate rests on
whether whole-brain, brain stem, or higher brain func-
tions are most appropriate for conceptualizing and
diagnosing brain death. The answer to this may vary
based on the philosophical tradition of the discussant.
A comprehensive discussion of these philosophical
creeds ( aqidah ) is beyond the scope of this article. Briefl y,
Muslims from the mu’tazilite (rationalist) tradition may
defi ne personhood and, thus, vital functions of the brain
diff erently than those from other Sunni aqidah ( ash’arī,
māturīdī, and murji’ah ). Th ese should not to be confused
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journal.publications.chestnet.org 1097
with the Sunni schools of jurisprudence ( madhāhīb ) or
the many traditions within Shī’a, Sufī, or other minority
Islamic groups. 31,32
The determination of the irreversibility of these vital
brain functions is complicated by the lack of clarity sur-
rounding the term. Medically, it is limited by modern
science and technology. Th e addition of brain degenera-
tion in the IFA-OIC ruling is peculiar and leaves much
room for debate. Th e term per se is not defi ned, there-
fore, rendering further testing irrelevant because verifi -
cation cannot be done for an undefined condition.
Ancillary testing is performed in a minority of countries
and is of questionable utility due to inherent limitations
in sensitivity and specifi city. 12
Further complexity in the determination of brain death
emerged from the Islamic Organization of Medical Sci-
ences conferences on brain death that laid the foundation
for such deliberation by equating individuals declared
brain dead by brain stem criteria to those with unstable
life, al-�ayāt ghayr al-mustaqirr (dying but not dead ). 58
Dissenting Opinion
Th ere is a certain artifi ciality in diff erentiating between
the two possibilities of death (cardiopulmonary and brain
death) determination. On the one hand, brain death takes
place a short time aft er the cessation of circulation and
respiration, and, on the other hand, circulation and res-
piration can only be maintained artifi cially aft er the brain
dies. 7 However, the determination of death remains
important not only for burial rights of the deceased and
conformity with sharī ˆ ah but also for critically important
reasons, including inheritance, matrimonial law, and
criminal law. 7
TABLE 2 ] Historical Timeline of Notable Islamic Judicial Decisions on Brain Death
Year Legal/Judicial BodyEndorsed Brain
Death Classifi cation Purpose Criteria Used
1964 Iran: Ayatollah Khomeni Yes LD OD NS
1981 Kuwait: Religious Ruling Committee No … … …
1982 Saudi Arabia: Senior Religious Scholars Commission
Yes LD WLS, OD NS
1982 Lybia: Law No. 4/1982 Yes LD OD NS
1983 Lebanon: Decree Law No. 109 Yes LD OD NS
1984 Lebanon: Decree Law No. 1442
1985 IOMS Yes UL WLS BS
1986 IFA-OIC Yes LD NS NS
1987 IFA-MWL Yes UL WLS WB
1993 United Arab Emirates Yes NS NS NS
1993 Egypt No
1994 Oman: Ministerial Decision No. 8 Yes LD OD BS
1994 South Africa: Majlis al-Shura al-Islami Yes LD NS NS
1995 South Africa: Majlis al-Ulama No … … …
1995 United Kingdom: Muslim Law Council Yes LD OD BS
1996 Indonesia: Council of Ulama Yes NS NS BS
1998 Morocco: Law No. 16-98 Yes LD OD NS
1999/2000 Iran: Act H/24804-T/9929 Yes LD OD BS
2000 Turkey: Act No. 21674 Yes LD OD, WLS BS
2003 IMANA Yes LS NS NS
2003 Syria: Law No. 30/2003 Yes LD OD NS
2010 Qatar: Doha Donation Accord and Law No. 21 Yes LD OD BS
2010 Egypt: Right to health campaign and initiative for personal rights
No … … …
BS 5 brain stem; IFA 5 Islamic Fiqh Academy; IMANA 5 Islamic Medical Association of North America; IOMS 5 Islamic Organization of Medical Sciences; LD 5 legal death; MWL 5 Muslim World League; NS 5 not specifi ed; OD 5 organ donation; OIC 5 Organization of the Islamic Conference; UL 5 unstable life; WB 5 whole brain; WLS 5 withdrawal of life support. (Adapted from References 30 and 45-57.)
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1098 Medical Ethics [ 1 4 6 # 4 C H E S T O C TO B E R 2 0 1 4 ]
Despite the IFA-OIC, IFA-MWL, IMANA, and other
decisions ( qararat ) recognizing brain death criteria,
these decisions are no more than nonbinding resolu-
tions or recommendations. 7 Although qararat may
represent majority opinions, concerns have limited
widespread acceptance of this concept. 36,59,60 Moreover,
contemporary Muslim scholars have confl icting notions
regarding the irreversibility of patients maintained on
resuscitation devices. Some claim that absolute death
cannot become manifest without cardiac death. 44,59
Even within medical circles, the notion that brain death
represents complete death has been met with resistance. 59,61
In a survey of 115 house staff at a university-based
medical center in Morocco, 24% of physicians did not
know the defi nition of brain death, and 35% reported
not believing in the concept. 62,63 In a retrospective
study of 42 patients who were brain dead in Jeddah,
Saudi Arabia, the expectant terminal extubation
occurred in only fi ve (12%). Two patients remained full
code due to family opposition, and the remainder had
orders to not attempt resuscitation with life-sustaining
therapies. 64,65
Others have rejected the diagnosis over potential con-
fl icts of interest with issues of organ donation. 66-68 For
example, Egypt experienced an intense ethical reaction
against deceased donor transplantation and the notion
of brain death following the procurement of organs
from executed prisoners under controversial conditions. 66
Similar outrage regarding organ donation and its link-
age to declaration (or not) of death has fueled debate
following the allegedly government-sponsored forced
organ removal from Muslim political demonstrators in
China. 68
Navigating Bedside Dilemmas
In Islam, life saving is a duty, and the unjustifiable
taking of life is considered a grave sin. 28,69 Th erefore, the
determination of valid religious practice and resolution
of bioethical issues surrounding end-of-life care is left
to qualifi ed scholars of religious law who are called to
provide ruling on whether a proposed action is obliga-
tory ( wajib or fardh ), recommended ( mustahabb ), per-
mitted ( mubah ), discouraged ( mukruh ), or prohibited
( haram ). 28,70 We have summarized the available evi-
dence as it pertains to important ethical dilemmas in
clinical practice.
Is there guidance for navigating potential confl ict or
discordant opinions between medical staff and a sur-
rogate in the event that the surrogate does not accept
the diagnosis of brain death as true death? Communi-
cation should be the keystone for any confl ict resolution
between a patient, family member, or surrogate and the
medical staff . To that end, a pastoral care, ethics service,
or hospice consultant may be helpful in facilitating
communication between parties. 71-73 In particular, rep-
resentation from an appropriate Islamic spiritual leader,
including either an Imam or a Muslim chaplain, may be
benefi cial to facilitating discourse. 71,72,74 If a resolution or
agreement cannot be achieved, then it may be reason-
able for the team to proceed according to local laws,
hospital policy, and locally accepted medical standard of
care while maintaining respect and addressing concerns
of the patient surrogate or family. Transitioning the
goals of care from cure to comfort would be reasonable,
and this may include deescalation, or at least avoiding
escalation, of organ and perfusion-sustaining tech-
nology to allow the patient to die a natural death, for the
Qu’ran states that “God gives life, and He makes to die”
(Qur’an 3:156) and “God takes the souls at the time of
their death” (Qur’an 39:42). Hence, in Islam, a person
dies only when it is written.
Is there guidance for muslim physicians who do not
accept brain death as true death based on religious
grounds yet practice in a medical environment that
does? Islamic law permits withdrawal of futile and dis-
proportionate treatment on the basis of the consent of
the immediate family members who act on the profes-
sional advice of the physician in charge of the case. 75
However, as a physician, it may be diffi cult to comport
oneself when one’s own personal beliefs and profes-
sional duties are at odds. According to a �adīth of
Prophet Muhammed reported on the authority of Abu
Sa’eed al-Khudree, the Sunnah states,
Whosoever of you sees an evil, let him change it with his
hand; and if he is not able to do so, then [let him change it]
with his tongue; and if he is not able to do so, then with his
heart—and that is the weakest of faith. [Sahih Muslim]
Th us, for a Muslim physician who does not accept brain
death as true death yet is faced with making the diagno-
sis, there are a number of ways to acceptably and profes-
sionally fulfi ll the meaning of this �adīth . We believe
that one should either (1) function in accordance with
the standard medical care with conscientious objection
or (2) recuse oneself from the case and turn over care to
another qualifi ed provider, if necessary. Either of these
cases would fulfi ll the third portion of the �adīth . If one
believes strongly that the local rules or regulations are
not appropriate or are unjust, then one may engage in
debate to aff ect policy change because this would fulfi ll
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journal.publications.chestnet.org 1099
the second, and possibly fi rst, portion of this �adīth .
Th is latter course of action is obviously most appro-
priate for the public forum and not at an individual
patient’s bedside.
What do Islamic traditions say about prolonging the
suff ering of loved ones? Muslim theologians diff eren-
tiate between suff ering imposed by God and suff ering
imposed by human beings; the former has redemptive
value but the latter does not and should be avoided. 22,76
Moreover, relief of suff ering, if it does not confl ict with
preservation of life, is a duty of Muslim patients and
physicians. 76-78 Th e spirit of the ethical principle of non-
malefi cence is manifest through the axiom, “No harm
shall be infl icted or reciprocated in Islam ( la darar wa la
dirar fi ’l-islam ). 21 Moreover, this is supported by a
report from the International Organization of Islamic
Medicine that states ,
In his/her defense of life, however, the Doctor is well advised
to realize his limit and not transgress it. If it is scientifi cally
certain that life cannot be restored, then it is futile to dili-
gently keep the patient in a vegetative state by heroic means
or to preserve the patient by deep freezing or other artifi -
cial methods. It is the process of life that the doctor aims
to maintain and not the process of dying. In any case, the
doctor shall not take a positive measure to terminate the
patient’s life. 40
Limitations
The search was performed using English language
terms. Although articles of multiple languages were
included, it is likely that the inability to perform
Arabic and Farsi language searches potentially limited
our identifi cation of additional relevant sources.
Conclusions
How one defi nes death may vary among cultured tradi-
tions. It is important for clinicians to recognize those
aspects of a patient’s religious beliefs that may not only
directly infl uence medical care or the decisions of
health-care surrogates but also how such practices may
interface with local laws governing the determination of
death. Debate continues about the validity and certainty
of brain death criteria within Islamic circles. Although
brain death is accepted as true death by a majority of
Muslim scholars and medical organizations, as evi-
denced by decisions from the IFA-OIC, IFA-MWL,
IMANA, and other faith-based medical organizations,
and the legal rulings by multiple nations, the consensus
in the Muslim world is not unanimous, and there is a
sizable minority that still accepts death by cardiopul-
monary criteria only.
Acknowledgments Financial/nonfi nancial disclosures: Th e authors have reported to CHEST that no potential confl icts of interest exist with any com-panies/organizations whose products or services may be discussed in this article .
Role of sponsors: Th e sponsor had no role in the design of the study, the collection and analysis of the data, or the preparation of the manuscript.
Other contributions: Th e authors thank Anthony F. Suff redini, MD; Rashid M. Rashid, MD; and Razi M. Rashid, MD, for their thoughtful review of and feedback on the manuscript. They also thank Judith Welsh, BSN, MLSc, for her assistance and expertise with the literature search and search strategies. Th e opinions expressed are the view of the authors. Th ey do not represent any position or policy of the US National Institutes of Health, the Public Health Service, the Department of Health and Human Services, or the US Department of Veterans Aff airs.
Additional information: Th e e-Appendix can be found in the Supple-mental Materials section of the online article.
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