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Breaking Away From The Fiscal Bind
Reforming The Fiscal System
Breaking AwayFrom The Fmcal Brad
Reforming The Fmcal System
Rosario G Manasan
pOsPhilippine Institute for Development Studies
Copyright eD 1994 by the
Phfl,ppme institute for Development Studies
Printed in the Philippines All rights reserved The findings interpretationsand conclusions m this book are those of the author and not necessarllythose of the Institute
This is Part II of a bigger study entitled 'PIDS Remew and Outlook of the
Philippine Economy for 1993 1994 which was presented m a symposium
jomtly sponsored by the PIDS with the Nat,onal Economic and Development
Authority (NEDA) and the Congressional House Committee on Socloeco
nomm Affairs on November 25 1993 at the Westm Philippine Plaza
Please address all mqumes to
Philippine institute for Development Studies4th Floor NEDA sa Makatl Bldg
106 Amorsolo St Legaspl Village Makatl 1229
Metro Manila Philippines
Fax No (632) 816 1091
Tel No (632) 893 5705 892 4059
ISBN 971 564 013 3
RP 9 94 500
Contents
List of Tables v11
List of Figures v111
List of _xes vln
Foreword IX
1 INTRODUCTION 1
2 rMPROVING GOVERNMENT REVENUE PERFORMANCE 5
Reformlnl the Tax System 6
Trends and eomposzhon 7
Tax structure 12
Taxes on income and profits 12
Import dutles and taxes 14
Excme taxes 18
Sales tax and hcenses 21
Tax euaszon 23
Evamon of the mdlvldual income tax 23
Evamon ofthe VAT 24
Sources of evaslon 24
Reformzng tax admm_strahon 27
Too much centrahzatlon 27
Weak systems and procedures 28
Low level of computenzatlon 28
Low compensatlon oftax collection_s_nt_l 31
Proposed tax enhancement meat_U_i_ . 31
Reformin I Local Government Taxation 34
Exploring the Potential of User Charges 4S
User charges zn government hosplta_s 50
User charges zn LGUs 53
3 IMPROVING THE ALLOCATION OF PUBLIC SPENDING SS
Trends and Patterns SS
Aggregate natlonal government expendztures 55
Economlc categories of natlonal government
expendztures 56
Current expendltures 56
Capital outlays 71
Functlonal categones of natlonal government
expendztures 72
General pubhc admmistratlon 72Social service sectors 72
Economic sectors 75
Publ,c Sector Investments and Growth 77
Composztzon of pubhc sector znvestment 77
By level of government 77
By sector 79
Trade off between current and capztal expendztures 82
Granger causality between economic growth and
public expenditures 82Results from macroeconometnc simulation 85
Impact of pubhc sector investment on pnuate sectorinvestment 85
Subsidies and Tax Expendltures 88
BOI incentz ues 90
Natzonal Food Authority 107
Petroleum product pnclng 109
4 CONCLUSION 111
BIBLIOGRAPHY 1 13
THE AUTHOR 119
LIST OF TABLES
1 RaUo of Na_onal Government Tax Revenues to GNP 1975 1992 8
2 Tax and Revenue Effort m Selected Asmn Countries 9
3 RaUo to Tax Revenues 10
4 Buoyancy Coefficlent of Major Tax Groups 1975 1991 11
5 Indlvldual Tax Rate and Corporate Income Tax Rate
m Selected Aman Countries 1990 13
6 Value of Imports and Dutaes CoUected
and Average Effective Rates 1980 1990 16
7 Average EPR and Standard DewaUon by Major Groups
Exportables and Importables 17
8 Compara_ve Yield of Sales Tax and VAT 1987 1992 22
9 Potential Revenue from the Indlvldual Tax
and the Level of Tax Evamon 23
10 Potential Revenue from the VAT and the Level of Tax Evamon 25
11 Potential and Actual Number
of Indlwdual Income Taxpayers 1985 1990 2612 Distribution of Taxable Returns Fried m 1990
and Assessment Personnel by Revenue Reglon 29
13 General Government Expenditures 35
14 General Government Revenues 36
15 Revenue Structure of Local Governments 1980 1991 38
16 Assessors Market Valuation and Advertised Market Prices
for Selected Prlces of Property 1992 42
17 Buoyancy of Revenues of Local Governments 1980 1990 43
18 CoUection Rate for Baslc Real Property Tax 44
19 Region 3 Cost Recovery Levels Income and Expenditures 1987 1989 51
20 Sapang Palay D1st_nct Hospltal Level of Cost Recovery
from the Revolving Drugs Fund 1989 1990 52
21 Profitabfllty Comparison Between City Government Operated Pubhc
Enterprises and Comparable Private Sector Run Facdlties 1988 54
22 National Government Expenditures by Economlc Classification
on an ObhgatJon Basls as a Percentage of GNP 1975 1992 60
23 NaUonal Government Deficlts 1975 1992 62
24 National Government Expenditures by Sectoral Clasmficatlon
on an Obhgataon Basis as a Percentage of GNP 1975 1992 73
25 Pubhc Sector Investment by Level of Government
as a Percentage of GNP 79
26 Pubhc Investment by Sector as a Percentage of GNP 80
27 Relatlonahlp Between Economic Growth G
and Government Expenchtures E 82
28 Reallocatlon of Expendlture from Current to Capital Outlays 84
29 Revenue Foregone by Type of Incentives 90
30 Factor Bias of BOI IncentJves Capital Labor RaUo
of BOI Reglstered F_-rns 1986 1992 93
31 Scale Bias of BOI IncenUves Average Number of Workers
per Firm of BOI Registered Fn-ms 1986 1992 94
32 Economywlde Average Number of Workers per Ylrrn 1986 1989 95
33 Location Bias of BOI Industries Share of NCR and Reglons III and IV
m Total Number of Projects Employment and Project Cost 1986 1991 9634 Economyw_de D1st_nbution of Number of Estabhshments
Employment and Book Value of FLxed Assets of Large
Estabhshments Across Reglons 1986 1989 99
35 Market Bias of BOI Incentives Share of Export Actlwties
m Total Number of ProJects Project Cost
and Employment ofBOI Reglstered Firms 1986 1992 102
36 Internal Rate of Return of a Hypothetical Firm Under
Selected Incentlve Schemes m ASEAN Countries 1988 106
37 NFALosses 1986 to 1991 108
38 Cost of Dehvermg NFA Submdy 1991 109
LIST OF FIGURES
i National Government Tax and Non Tax revenues 1992 5
2 NaUonal Government Expenditures as a Percentage of GNP 1975 1992 57
3 Per Capita National Government Expenchtures
m Real Terms 1975 1992 58
4 Pubhc Sector Investment by Level of Government
as a Percentage of GNP 78
LIST OF BOXES
1 Increased Pubhc Investments Financed by Domestlc Borrowing 2
2 Use of HCV for Import Valuatlon 19
3 Pricing Access to Forest Lands 47
4 Mopping Up of Excess laqulchty 63
5 Dynamlcs of Domestlc Debt 67
Foreword
In November 1993 the Phfllppme Institute for DevelopmentStudms (PIDS) launched the PIDS Review_and Outlook of the
Philippine Economy (PROPE) as part of Its continuing analysm ofthe mtua_on and outlook of the Phlhppme economy For its maugural presentahon the PIDS focused on the country s fiscal cnsls asthe special theme of the report ldenUfymg It to be the period s most
crmeal concern and the one posing the biggest challenge to thecountry s economic performance and prospects
Thin present volume deals with the specml topic of the inauguralPROPE report on the Philippines fiscal poslhon SpecLfically itanalyzes the roots and effects of the current fiscal bmd providesestimates on the magmtude of leakages from the revenue systemand offers opportumtles and measures that can help release thefiscal brad that ties the hands of government fiscal planners anddecls_onmakers
By pnntmg this part or special theme of the PROPE report as astand alone pubhcatlon thereby expanding its circular_ton to m
clude sectors outside the formal pohcymakmg circle the PIDS hopesto impress to a larger audience the enormity and urgency of theproblem -- that if left unattended and understated it may stymieall other efforts to improve and sustmn the economy Hopefully byexplaining the msue m more detanl more people wall come tounderstand and advocate measures that will help resolve the sltuatlon
It m with this hope that the PIDS is pleased to present thisvolume
PONCIANO S INTAL JRPresldent
September 1994
1
Introductlon
The past two years showed that the present fiscal posltlon of the
pubhc sector hmlted the optlons open to the government to support
economlc recovery sustain growth and allevmte poverty The strln
gent monetary and fiscal celhngs under the st-_bdmatlon program of
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) restricted government s
ability to pump prlme the economy and stimulate economic revlval
More _mportanfly excessive monetary and fiscal restraints pre
vented the government from financing power and infrastructure
projects needed for long term growth Thus de D1os (1992) proposed
that monetary and fiscal targets be relaxed as a first step toward
rewwng the economy
While It m possible to ]umpstart the ec nomy m the Immediate
term by slackening fiscal and monetary restraints the economy
cannot afford to contmually run large fis al deficlts A counterfac
tual mmulatlon where public sector lnveo rnents were increased by
P5 bllhon and financed through domestlc _orrowlng revealed that
whale the effect on output remmns poslt_ e m the first two years it
turns negatlve from the thlrd to the fifth vear (Box 1)
Clearly the government has to respc nd to the fiscal challenge
of _reconcflmg lower fiscal deficits with growth in the medlum term
Fiscal mlsmanagement undemably cot tnbuted to the series of
balance of_payment/economlc crises that the country has had to
deal wlth m the past Thus the Importance of a prudent fiscal pohey
which glves rise to sustmnable deficits m the long run cannot be
overemphamzed
:2 ROSARIOG MANASAN
BOX 1
Increased Publ,c Investments Financed by Domestm Borrowing
The effects of _ncreastng capital outlays by P5 bilhon in current
prices which is financed by increased domestic borrowing was
stmulated ustng an extension and update of the PIDS NEDA Macroeconometnc Model The shock or change in the baseline scenario is
apphed =n1986 (period 1) and the effects are monitored up to the
year 1990 (penod 5) A five year s_mulatlon period _srequtred m order
to account for dynamic adjustments and medium term _mphcations
of the pohcy change Specifically domestic borrowing entails interest
and amorttzat_on payments which affect the economy after the loan
proceeds are spent
From the results (Table A) tt is evident that private expenditures
are crowded out by domestm debt financing primarily through ther=se in the interest rate Comsumpt_on spending manages to post a
gain _nthe first penod but dechnes thereafter Output expands _nthefirst year Because of the short term nature of domesttc debt thebonds are assumed to be redeemable atthe end of the penod Thus
upward pressure =smaintained on the interest rate up to the second
period and this results in further cuts m prtvate investment The need
to meet _nterest obhgatlons causes a reduction in producbve spend
Lng(as mdmated by a drop In government comsumphon expenditureCG) and the double cr-,wdwng out effect leads to a drop m output
beginning _nthe th rd pertod wNch lasts untd the end of the simulation
pertod
BREAKING AWAY FROM THE FISCAL BIiND 3
Table A Scenario 3 Deflctt Financing by Domest=cBorrowmg
Variable Period
1 2 3 4 5
Percentagedewatsonfromthebaseline
GDP 0437 0 085 0 063 0 111 0 126GNP 0 449 0 081 0 066 0 113 0 126CPI 0 616 0 319 0 102 0 016 0 020TBILL 7 675 2459 0 864 0 475 0 175
CP 0 012 0 045 0 091 0 105 0 098CG 0 596 0409 0 063 0 023 0 023CONSPR 0966 1 132 1064 0 855 0 789IDER 0 912 0 615 0492 0 394 0 361
GOCF 3498 0520 0219 0354 0368XD 0 144 0 046 0067 0 100 0 103MD 0 483 0 051 0 196 0 191 0 162
DEFNG 31834 17239 2 045 1235 0 688
DevfatlonfrombaselineOnmllhonUS$)
TRABAL 17839 5 543 10645 9 006 8 759BOP 19331 5 813 11581 9 946 9 690
Variable definitions
GDP Gross Domeshc ProductGNP Gross National ProductCPI Consumer Price Index
TBILL Treasury Bdl RateCP Personal Consumphon ExpenditureCG Government Consumption ExpendttureCONSPR Total Private ConstruchonIDER Investment _n Durable EquipmentGDCF Gross Domestic Capital FormatLonXD Dollar Exports (million)MD Dollar Imports (million)DEFNG Nahonal Government DeficitTRABAL Trade Balance (mtlhon $)BOP Balance of Payments (mJlhon $)
Source Josef T Yap and Ceha M Reyes 1993 F_scal Pohcy Alternahves _nthe
Phd_ppmes
4 ROSARIO G MANASAN
Good fiscal management is not easy since the fiscal sector m
buffeted by competing clalms On the one hand increasing govern
ment spending on maintenance and capltal investments is a press
mg need These items had to absorb the brunt of the severe cuts m
government expendlture as part of the stablhzatlon program m
recent years Today inadequate maintenance of government capital
stock and a shortage of bamc infrastructure severely constrain the
country s growth potentlal Yet the government has to expand social
serwces and provlde adequate safety nets to protect the most
vulnerable groups from the burden that comes with stablhzatmn
and structural adjustment processes that w111inevltably take place
If growth Is to be sustained At the same tlme the sustained pursult
of the structural adjustment program m expected to reduce govern
ment revenues All these imply that the government may be trapped
m the mclous cycle of low growth and hlgh fiscal deficlts unless
steps are taken to _mprove government revenue performance fur
ther reduce some items m the government budget and allocate
government spending more efficiently
More revenues and less spending w111both be needed However
the potentml gains from the former will far exceed the latter because
the fiscal adjustments mstltuted in recent years were dominated by
expenditure cuts Thus opportumtles for incremental budget cuts
are extremely limited Nonetheless there are ways to further im
prove budgetary allocation
2
ImprovingGovernment Revenue Performance
Government revenues may come from tax and non tax sources
Taxes remain the government s pnnclpal source ofmcome account
mg for 86 percent of the natmnal government revenues or 15 2
percent of the gross national product (GNP) m 1992 In contrast
non tax revenues which conmst of grants user charges income
from public sector enterprises and proceeds from the pnvat_atmn
program account for 14 percent of total government revenues (2 5
percent of GNP) m the same year (Fig 1)
NonTax Revenues14/
Tax Revenues86 /
Figure 1 Nat=onalGovernment Tax and Non Tax Revenues 1992
6 ROSARIO G MANASAN
Whde capltal rece:pts from the sales of government corporations
accounted for a slgnlficant portion of non tax revenues since 1987
the potentml income from thls source Is expected to dwindle as the
pnvatlzatlon program unwinds m the next few years In the short
run however add:tlonal revenues could be generated If the pnvatlzatlon program were accelerated Moreover the contrlbuhon of
foreign grants essenhally fall outslde the government s control and
will hkely follow a downtrend in the 1990s wlth the general dechne
m officlal development asslstance (ODA) worldwlde and the removal
of the US base facdltles from the country m 1992
In examining the scope for increasing and restructunng pubhc
revenues th_s chapter therefore focuses on taxes and user chargesalone The first two sectlons address Issues related to central and
local government taxes whde the thlrd section assesses the potential
of user charges as a source of government revenues
Reformsng The Tax System
In 1986 the government restructured the tax system extenslvely
Whde prewous efforts to change tax pohcy were p_ecemeal m nature
and generally concerned with revenue generation the 1986 tax
measures represented the first attempt at a comprehenslve reform
of the country s tax system In hne with art:culated pohcy the
measures that comprlse the Tax Reform Package were not solely
dlctated by the need for government revenues Equity and efficiency
objectlves also recelved conslderable weight
The following major components make up the Tax Reform
Package 1) a shlft from the schedular to a more global approach m
taxing redly:dual income from compensation business trade and
exercise of professlon 2) increase m personal exemptions 3) sepa
rate income taxation of spouses 4} an increase m the final with
holding tax rate on interest income (17 5 percent) and royalties (15
percent) to a umform rate of 20 percent 5) the phase ou_ of the final
withholding tax prevlously lewed on dlvldends 6) the unlficatlon of
the earlier dual tax rate (of 25 and 35 percent) on corporate income
to 35 percent 7) the mtroductlon of the value added tax (VAT} m
place of the sales/turnover tax and a host of other taxes 8) the
BREAKINGAWAYFROMTHE FISCALBIND 7
convermon ofumt rates formerly used for exclse taxes to ad valorem
rates 9) the abolition of export taxes except those on logs i0) the
general rewslon in the valuation of real property for tax purposes
and 11) further reduction in tariff rates 1
In the last six years government had to introduce more tax
changes primarily to respond to the need to raise more revenues in
vlew of a series of fiscal adjustment programs But not all were
conslstent with the spirit of the 1986 reform package Some like
the Import levy Imposed m 1991 were put in place because they
were admimstratxvely and pohtically convement But they were
generally seen as hlghly dlstortIonary and having a perverse effect
on long term growth
The foUowmg subsectlons show that while tax moblhzatlon
achleved sigmficant gains In the last six years still more remain to
be done They also hlghhght the fact that the biggest opportunity
for increasing tax revenues at present lies in tax administration
even as certain structural changes have been identified Many of the
proposed changes in tax structure were shown to bear negative
revenue Impact Thzs makes st doubly important to increase revenue
on the basts of adminlstratlve mnouat_ons
Trends and composstson
The 1986 Tax Reform Package together wlth the other tax measures
put in place in the ensuing years resulted m a slgnificant improvement in the tax effort 2 Thus the ratlo of total tax revenues to GNP
chmbed from an average of 11 3 percent in 1975 1985 to 15 2
percent in 1992 (Table 1) This development allowed the Phihppmes
to somewhat catch up with the tax effort of other Aslan countries
Despite thls improvement however the country contmues to lag
behind the performance of Indonesla Malaysia South Korea and
Thailand (Table 2) a
1 This last item xsnot usually wewed as part of the Tax Reform Package but as themare element m the Tariff Reform Program2 Tax effort xsdefined as the ratao of tax revenues to GNP
3 Singapore s tax to GNPratao is low because a conslderable portaon of thelr revenuescomes from government capltal investments i e non tax revenue
Table 1 =Ratio of Nabonal Government Tax Revenues to GNP 1975 1992
(In percent)
t97585 197582 198385 198692 1988 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
Taxrevenues 1126 1187 1059 1356 t098 1276 tl 36 1340 1410 1445 1523
1 Bureauof InternalRevenue 6 94 720 6 65 9 05 7 85 8 71 801 897 9 66 921 9 77
a Incomeandprofits 2 85 2 90 2 79 4 29 3 21 3 24 345 4 11 4 61 484 5 12
Corporatetncometax 1 10 0 76 1 48 1 85 144 182 163 167 177 198 2 24
Indlvtdualincometax 0 83 0 70 0 97 1 38 1 O0 108 1O0 120 151 164 167
Others 0 17 0 02 0 35 1 06 0 78 033 0 82 124 134 122 121
b Excisetax 2 02 194 2 12 247 2 75 336 2 46 2 72 268 201 2 02
c Sa_estaxandhcenses 148 161 1 34 183 155 180 155 172 194 192 203
d Otherdomesttctaxes 0 59 0 75 040 046 034 030 0 55 042 043 044 061
2 BureauofCustoms 3 82 4 07 353 434 293 386 3 15 4 20 427 5 10 532
a Importdutiesandtaxes 3 6I 3 86 332 4 33 2 83 386 3 15 420 4 27 5 10 532
b Exporttaxes 0 21 0 21 021 001 0 ll 0002 0 0004 _"
3 OtheroEces 0 51 0 60 0 41 0 '_7 0 20 0 20 020 023 0 16 0 13 0 14o
Sourceofbasicdata BureauofTreasuryandOepartrnentofFinance >_
BREAKINGAWAYFROMTHE FISCALBIND 9
Table 2Tax and Revenue Effort m Selected Asian Countries
(In percent of GNP)
Country Tax Effort RevenueEffort
Indonesia(1990) 1981 20 93
Malaysia(1989) 1745 2645
Phdlpplnes(1992) 1523 1772
Singapore(1989) 1379 23 18
Thailand(1990) 1900 2028
SouthKorea(1990) 1654 1827
Source AsianDevelopmentBank
Hand in hand with the improved revenue performance of the tax
system a notable change in the composition of national government
taxes took place in recent years The marked rise m the share of
direct taxes to total taxes constitutes a positive development The
proportion contributed by taxes on income and profits (which
comprise close to 95 percent of aggregate dlrect taxes) expanded
dramatically from an average of 24 4 percent in 1975 1982 to 33 6
percent in 1992 Conversely excise taxes accounted for a dechnmgfraction of total taxes between 1987 and 1992 Meanwhile sales tax
and licenses as well as import duties and taxes maintained their
share through the years (Table 3) Despite the increasing share of
direct taxes In 1986 1992 the bulk of natlonal government taxes
continues to come from indirect taxes
More significant than changes in the relative importance of the
different tax groups are changes in their levels when measured
relative to GNP Taxes on income and profits when measured as a
proportlon of GNP rose by almost two percentage points in 1986
1992 after hovering in the three percent level in 1976 1985 Importduties and Indlrect internal revenue taxes also recovered In 1986
1991 the losses they suffered in 1981 1985 The resurgence of
revenues from import duties became striking as it increased by two
percentage points to reach 5 3 percent of GNP m 1992 even
Table 3Rat,o to Tax Revenues
(In percent)
197_85 1975-82 t98385 198692 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 199t 1992
Taxrevenues 10000 10000 10000 10000 10000 10000 10000 10000 10000 10000 10000
1 Bureauof IntematRevenue 6160 6064 6281 6674 7t 47 6820 7053 6696 6855 6378 64 16
a Incomeandprofits 2527 2440 2635 3t 62 2924 2537 30 34 3070 3270 3349 3360
Corporate_ncometax 977 641 1394 1363 t3 10 1427 1437 1243 1253 1368 14 69Indlvldualincometax 7 33 587 9 15 1014 907 8 49 8 80 8 98 1068 1138 1095
Others 155 0 16 3 26 7 84 7 07 2 61 7 17 928 949 843 797
b Excisetax I795 1632 1999 1824 2502 2635 21 69 2030 1903 1394 1324
c Salestax andlicenses 13 18 1361 1266 1348 '_412 1412 1368 1281 1373 1328 1332
d Otherdomestictaxes 5 20 6 32 3 81 3 41 3 10 2 36 4 82 3 16 308 3 07 4O0
2 Bureauof Customs 3389 3432 3337 3199 2672 3025 2769 3134 3029 3533 3492 I_
m_
a Importdut=esandtaxes 3202 3253 3138 3191 2574 3023 2768 3134 3029 35 33 3492
b Exporttaxes 1 87 1 79 198 0 07 0 97 0 02 0 0033
3 Otheroffices 450 505 3 83 127 182 t 55 1 79 170 1 18 0 89 093
SouroeofbasK:datB Bureau(YTreasuryandDepadmentofF_nance i
BREAKINGAWAYFROMTHEFISCALBIND 11
surpassing its peak of 4 5 percent m 1983 (Table 1) One observes
that the increased dependence on direct taxes m 1976 1992 did notresult from the replacement of redirect taxes by direct taxes Ratherit followed the marked rme m the overall direct tax effort without an
accompanying reductlon m the overall mdzrect tax effort In shortthe yield of redirect taxes measured agmnst GNP did not dnmmshwhile that of direct taxes increased slgmficantly
Concomitant with thin progress the buoyancy of the tax systemwith respect to GNP rose from 088 m 1976 1985 to 134 m
1986 1991 {Table 4) 4 The improved tax buoyancy has been suchthat _ts 1986 1991 level did not only rise above the 1981 1985 level
(0 92) but also surpassed the 1976 1980 level (1 09)
Table4BuoyancyCoefficientof MajorTaxGroups 19751991
19761985 19801985 19861991
Alltaxes 088 0 92 1 34
Income/profit 094 1 12 1 62IndlwdualIncometax 0 44 1 08
Corporateincometax 1 18 1 20Passive 5 05 3 20
Sales/l_censetax 095 0 69 1 26
SalesNAT+otherpercentagetax 0 83 149Exc_setax 102 138 0 58
Otherdomestictax 0 77 187 141
Importdutiesandtaxes 076 0 49 1 66
Source Author'sestJmates
4 Buoyancy refers to the ratao of the percentage change m tax revenue to the
percentage change m aggregate income GNP w_th the revenue changes mclus_ve ofthe increments m revenues brought about by thscre_onary tax measures It measures
the responsiveness of tax y_elds to changes m economm ac_wty
12 ROSARIOG MANASAN
Tax structure
Taxes on income andprofits The revenue performance of the aggre
gate tax on income and profits dramatically improved due to the
almost equal increases {0 6 percentage points on the average) m the
tax yield to GNP ratio of the mdwldual Income tax the corporate
income tax and the tax on passive income in the last SL_years (Table
1) Revenues from taxes on income and profits registered above
average growth rate dunng the period Compared with other direct
taxes revenues from taxes on passive Income exhibited the fastest
rate of growth (9.3 4 percent annually) in 1986 1992 Revenues from
the mdlwdual income tax (21 3 percent yearly) followed In contrast
revenues from the corporate income tax grew at a slower pace (19 3
percent yearly)
The tax rate hikes on interest income and royalties m 1986 as
well as the high Interest rate regime m the last six years completely
cancelled the negative revenue effect of ehminatmg the tax on
dlmdends The pomtive revenue impact of the switch from the
schedular to a global system and the reforms m tax administration
particularly the expanded coverage of the withholding system also
blunted the antmlpated revenue loss from the following 1) lowered
mdlmdual income tax rate on business and professional income
2) Increased personal exemptions and 3) the newly introduced
separate computation of spouses tax habihty However the mtro
ductlon of the tax holiday as an investment incentive in the Omm
bus Investment Code of 1987 and the existence of certmn loopholes
m the tax structure (such as those where firms enter into back to
back loan transactions to reduce their tax habflity) sermusly eroded
the corporate income tax take 5
On the whole the prowsmns of the 1986 Tax Reform Package
also promoted efficleney and equity Manasan (1990) showed that
the promslon allowing spouses to compute their tax liabilities
separately equalized effectively the marginal tax rates on the pn
5 Firms have an mcentave to engage m tax arbitrage by takang out loans and mvestangthe proceeds m high 3neldmgq_reasury bills In thas arrangement interest income istaxed at a rate of 20 percent while corporate income net of the interest expense istaxed at 35 percent
BREAKINGAWAY FROM THE FISCAL BIND 13
mary and the secondary earner She also demonstrated that ab
stracting from evasion the switch to the global system resulted m
a more neutral treatment of wage and non wage earners and m a
more progressive tax structure Moreover she argued that umfymg
the corporate income tax rate removes the blas against large and/or
profitable enterprises inherent in the dual rate structure that was
prevlously in place Finally Table S shows that the Phlhpplne
income tax structure is roughly comparable with those of other
countries In the region
Table 5
Indw,dual Income Tax Rate and Corporate Income Tax RateIn Selected Asian Countries 1990
(In percent)
MaximumMarginalRate CorporateIncomeCountnes Ind,wdualIncomeTax Tax Rate
Indonesia 35 35
Malaysia 40 40
Ph=hppmes 35 35
Singapore 33 33SouthKorea 50 30
Thailand 55 35
Source Manasan(1990)forcorporateincometaxrates
In 1992 Republic Act 7497 was passed permitting mamed
mdlvlduals to claim personal exemptions equal to P18 000 each
prowded both spouses were working While this amount is not large
If compared wlth the cost of hying mdlcators it is out of hne wlth
the P9 000 personal exemptlon allowed for single indwlduals Thus
this provlsmn led to a substantml loss m revenue (equal to about
P2 bilhon) wlthout any clear efficiency gains
The S1mphfied Net Income Taxation (SNITS) was also enacted m
1992 It reverted the ]ndlvidual income tax to the schedular system
14 ROSARIOG MANASAN
It reduced the tax rate on business trade and professlonal income
to 3 30 percent in contrast to the 0 35 percent rate for compensatlon income However SNITS restricted allowable deductions
against gross income to seven types of direct cost salaries of
employees raw materials and supphes business rental teleeom
mumcatlon and utilities expenditures depreclatlon interest pay
ments and contributions to government accredlted relief
orgamzatlons Expendltures on transportatmn representatmn and
advertmements are no longer tax deductlble as prevlously prac
tlced However _t replaced the provmion for a 10 percent optmnal
deductmn w_th one that allows 40 percent optlonal deductmn
SNITS clearly sought to plug the leakages m the system arising
from overstatmg tax deductmns particularly those related to trans
portatmn representatlon and advertmmg expenditures The tmpor
tance of Imposing celhngs on deductlons cannot be overemphamzed
But at this point the dlrectlon of net revenue gain from the SNITS
remains unclear Some anecdotal ewdences mdlcate that the SNITS
may result in a lower tax take than antlclpated Some also pointed out
that the 40 percent optmnal deductmn may be too liberal for certmn
groups of taxpayers Income sphttlng for mlxed income earners and
the reduced tax rate also work to lower the effective tax rate Moreover
the return to the schedular system once again Implies the recurrence
of efficlency problems assocmted with that system as noted earher
Import duties and taxes Of all indirect taxes duties and taxes
on _mports are the most Important in terms of revenue yield
Although their proportion to total taxes dechned from an average of
32 5 percent in 1975 1982 to 31 4 percent m 1983 1985 the share
of import revenues again chmbed upwards m the succeeding years
to about 35 percent m 1991/1992 (Table 3) In those years importdutles and taxes combined proved to be the blggest revenue earner
of all the major tax types
Measured relatlve to GNP national government revenues from
imports regained m 1986 1992 the two percentage points lost m
1980 1985 Thus Import duties and taxes stood at 5 3 percent of
GNP m 1992 from a low 2 8 percent m 1985/1986 (Table 1) Thin m
even greater than its peak level of 4 6 percent of GNP m 1980
BREAKINGAWAYFROMTHE FISCALBIND 15
Moreover tariffs and taxes on imports combined surpassed all
other types of taxes m terms of growth rate m 1985 1991 wlth an
average annual rate of increase of 26 4 percent during the period
Imtlally thls development was surprising given the overall reductionm tariff rates under the Tariff Reform Program started m 1981 A
number of factors moderated the expected negative impact of the
program on tariff revenues First an import surcharge/levy took
effect m 1983/1985 and then again m 1991/1992 m response to a
balance of payments {BOP) cnms in those years Second the wlth
drawal of the privilege of government corporations to capltal Impor
tatlon free of tax and duty in 1984/1985 blunted the likely drop m
revenues from thls source Table 6 shows a dechne in the proportion
of non dutlable imports to total imports m 1986 1988 In 1988
however the share of non dutlable imports began to inch up again
Third the mtroductlon of the Comprehensive Import Superwmon
Scheme (CISS) m 1987 somewhat improved customs collection
efficlency On the whole the changes m the tariff rates and m the
coverage of exemptions appear to have largely cancelled each other
out as suggested by the fairly even estimates of effectlve tariff rates
on total imports m 1980 1987 Although the effectlve tariff rate on
total imports tapered off in 1987 1990 a trend reversal occurred
when the import levy took effect in 1991 Finally the rapld growth
m tariff revenues m the last SLXyears resulted to a large extent
from the robust growth m Imports during the period
EO 470 which hopes to further cut down tariff rates and
restructure the tariff system over a five year pemod took effect in
1991 While the revenue effect of EO 470 is expected to be negatlve
its posltlve effects on overall competltlveness through further reductlon In the level and variation in effectlve protectlon rates are
well documented {Table 7)
An outstanding Issue on the tariff system still emsts Thls relates
to the use of the home consumption value (HCV) as the basls for
computang tariff To date the Phfllpplnes m the only country in the
world which does not use either the Brussels Definitlon of Value
(BDV] whlch is essentaally based on the export price plus insurance
and freight or the GATT system whlch m based on transactions
value Some sectors argued that since the HCV is generally higher
Table 6Value of Imports and Duties Collected and Average Effectwe Rates 1980 1990
(In b,ll,on pesos)
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
Total_mports 48.080 54030 64120 82.220 99710 92060 98697 124108 137206 225240 290082
Dutiableprnporls 37850 42780 54280 44270 61760 54370 70701 101153 103114 148013 187202
Non-dubabte_mports 10230 11250 9 840 379,50 37950 37690 27998 22955 34092 77227 102880
/otototal 2128 2082 1535 4616 3806 4094 2837 1850 2485 3420 3547
Totalimportdubesandtaxescollected 11453 10603 12141 15839 17329 16590 16965 25627 24866 38231 46514
TotaldutJescollected 7867 7 38t 8 551 12088 14199 13497 13013 1801t 17614 28197 33692EffecWetariffrates
Totaltrnportdubesandtaxescodlectec_
totaldurable_rnports 3026 2478 2237 3578 2806 3051 24CO 2533 2412 2583 2485Effectrvetariffrates
To_aldutP_,scollected/
totaldurable=reports 2078 1725 1575 2731 2299 2482 1841 1781 1708 1905 1800
EffecbvetanffratesTotaltmportdubesandtaxes _>
collected/total=mports 2382 1962 1893 1926 1738 1802 1719 2065 1812 1697 1603 ,._
Effectivetanffrates
TotaldutJescollected/_altmports 1636 1366 1334 1470 1424 1466 1318 1451 1284 1252 1161 I_
Sourceofba_cdata BureauofCustoms
==Table 7
Average EPR and Standard Deviation by Major Groups Exportables and Importables(Using pnce comparison)
1979 1985 SD 1986 SD 1988 SD 1990 SD 1995 SDSector
Group
0396 AIlsectors 06470 04904 11655 03937 07564 03649 07084 02539 0384 02002 02642 ,..:j
Exportables 00690 0069t 00594 00411 00325 00414 00327 >_
lmportables 11756 10226 14507 08072 09053 07514 08806 04810 04904 03806 02620 :ZE_
03 22 Agnculture fishery and
foresb'y 01229 00900 03737 00503 02616 00521 02632 00353 02365 00265 02094
Exportables NA 0 0849 00967 0 0570 00967 -00570 00967
Importables NA 07962 02088 04833 02702 04928 02627 03527 01152 03109 00414
28-96 Manufactunng 09330 07335 15895 06017 10604 05549 10080 03582 04925 02804 03446
Exportabtes 00445 00455 01113 00119 00989 00128 00994
Importables 02710 10727 18010 08693 11724 08024 11194 05055 04787 03927 03221
Source MedallaErl_ndaMAnAssessmentofTradeandlndustnalPolcy1986-1958PIDSWo_ngPaperNo90-07andMedallaErlindaM "TanffReformAssessmentpresentedatt_ePhitlpp_neEconomicSooetyAnnualMee_ngonDecember131991
18 ROSARIO G MANASAN
than the BDV or transactions value its continued use effectively
raises the tariff on Phihpplne tmports and reduces the international
competmveness of local products Medalla et al (1993) shows that
while the wedge between the HCV and the mvome value is not very
high on the average inter industry variation is quite substantial
As such the dlstortlonary impact of the use of the HCV may be more
slgmfieant than what the average HCV to lnvome value ratio lnd_
cates Moreover the revenue impact IS not as large as earher
estimates suggest (Box 2)
Excise taxes Of all the major mdlrect taxes lemed on domestic
goods and servmes excise taxes on alcohohc products tobacco
products petroleum products fireworks clnematographm films
automobiles and certain product goods classified as non essentml
goods provide the most slgmficant revenue yield Measured m terms
of their share in total tax revenues of the national government and
their raze relative to the GNP excise taxes are also larger than any
of the tax components on income and profits The traditional role of
excise taxes has been maintained m recent years despite its sluggish
growth (10 8 percent) m 1986 1991 compared with the growth of
other tax categories (average growth rate of all tax revenues m the
same period settled at 19 1 percent) and its own growth m earher
periods (18 0 percent m 1976 1982 and 32 9 percent m 1983 1985)The share of exc_se taxes in the total tax revenues of the national
government rose from an average of 16 3 percent m 1976 1982 to
20 percent in 1983 1985 After peaking at 26 4 percent m 1987 its
contribution continuously dropped to 13 2 percent m 1992 (Table
3) It exhibited a mmllar trend when measured relative to GNP
Excise taxes remained steady at about an average of two percent of
GNP between 1976 1985 Rising from 1985 onwards it peaked at
3 3 percent of GNP in 1987 From then on it took a downtrend and
stood at two percent of GNP in 1992 (Table 1)
The poor performance of excise taxes in recent years resulted
from a number of factors F_rst the excise tax on petroleum products
diminished when the excise tax on fuel oll was abohshed m August1987 and the effective tax rates on other items were reduced m 1990
Second some cigarette manufacturers avoided or evaded paying the
BREAKING AWAY FROM THE FISCAL BIND 19
BOX 2
Use of HCV for Import Valuat=on
Since the Jnactment of the Ph_hpp_neTanff Act of 1990 the dutiable
value of imported articles depends on the price at which the good ts freely
offered for sale in the usual wholesale quantities _nthe domestic market of
the exporting country at the time of exportation Th_s price is also referred to
as the Home Consumption Value (HCV) The actual determination of the
HCV was rather spotty over the years because of the hmlted resources that
the Bureau of Customs (BOC) was able to allocate to verify the HCV) Since
the Society Generale de Surveillance (SGS) was engaged to inspect and
value imports the use of the HCV for import valuation has been raised
Importers have complained that the use of HCV for tariff assessment tend
to overvalue imports and effectively _ncrease the cost of doing business _n
the country w_th d_re _mphcatlons on the international competitiveness of
Phdlppme exports and the country s ability to attract foreign investorsThe results of Medalla et al (1993) demonstrate that the HCV valuation
system indeed raises the dutiable of imports and thus further d_storts the
protection structure Table B shows that the weighted average ratio of HCV
to invoice value (IV) is equal to 1 11 after the globahzatlon of the CISS The
study also noted that inter industry vanatlon Jn the HCV IV ratJo Is qu_tesubstantial w_ththe ratio varying from 0 95 for mrscellaneous manufacturers
to 1 18 for machinery and transport equipment The antra industry dtspersion
in the HCV IV ratio as measured by the standard deviation Jsalso uneven
The study concludes that the wedge between the HCV and the IV translates
into an additional tanff on imports The unevenness _n the HCV IV ratio
across and within industries imphes that the use of the HCV produces a
highly arbitrary impact on the protection structure Consequently the use of
the HCV introduces additional distortions that are not fully predictable fromthe nominal tariff rates
Note that Medalla s numbers tend to underestimate the true Increment
_nthe cost of _mported goods because _tdoes not take transactions cost _nto
account SGS officials md=cated that the number of appeals submitted to the
BOC SGS Import Valuation and Class=ficatlon Committee increased _n
recent months The appeals process _s not costless to firms and consider
able amount of resources has been expended on th_s
The use of the HCV also deters the flow of foreign _nvestments It does
so not only because _traises the cost of doing bus_ness _nthe Ph_hppmes
but also because _tmakes doing business In the country more cumbersome
4
20 ROSAPIO G MANASAN
Note that the Phthppmes_sthe only country _nthe world that has not adoptedthe Brussels D_fit itlon of Value (BDV) or the General Agreement on Tariff
and Trade system which is based on transactions value Thus foreigninvestors who are more familiar w_ththese systems find that they need to
acquaint themselves to a new system when they enter the Phfl=ppmemarketAt the very least they vLewedthis as an _rksomeand burdensome process
From the policy perspective tt _sthus tmperabvefor the Philippinestoshift awayfrom the use of the HCV VVhdethe countrys economic managersagree on the disadvantages of the continued use of the HCV they are veryconcerned about the negative impact on government revenues that such amove wdlentail In this regard it is important to point out that the reductionintariff revenues estimated by Medalla ranges from 3 9 percent (P2 8 billionbased on 1992 revenues) to 6 5percent (P4 7 bdhon)depending onwhetherthe elastlctty of demand for imports _sNgh orzero These numbers are lowerthan official estimates
Table B
Average HCVIIV by Commod=tyGroupMarch 16 December 31 1992
Stmple WeightedAve Std Ave Std
SITC Description HCVIIV Dev HCVIIV* Dev
0 Food 1095 0328 0947 0042
1 Beveragesand tobacco 1208 0394 1 054 0 0442 Crudematprlals=ned=ble 1 292 0685 1 130 0 0133 Mineralfuels 1 186 0426 1 120 0 008
4 Anlmalandveg oils and fats 1341 0841 1118 00125 Chemicalsandproducts 1381 0 755 1063 00626 Mftdgoodsby matenal 1609 0 925 1044 0 1227 Machineryand transport 1 191 0 440 1 183 0 031
equtpment8 Misc manufactures 1 361 0 873 1076 0 004
9 CommodltlesNEC 1 355 0661 1126 0033M_xed 1348 0712 1166 0006
Allcommod=tlesexceptSITC9 1291 0713 1 110 0033
ValueofimportsisusedasweghtSource Medallaetal 1993Notes BOCBureauofCustoms
NECnotelsewhereclasaredSITCSlandardIntemaIionalTradeClassification
BREAKINGAWAYFROMTHE FISCALBIND 21
correct taxes through transfer pricing and mlsclasslficatlon of
brands Some analysts estimated the revenue loss at about P3
bllhon per year {Monsod 1993) Th:rd the tax base generally lagged
behind GNP m terms of growth Thxs last point rinses the msue of
whether the present excise tax rates are too high such that they
exert a negahve impact on demand and consequently on taxrevenues
In June 1993 Congress enacted a law revaslng the exeme tax on
clgarettes following acnmomous debate and intense lobbying from
various interest groups Unfortunately much of the debate centered
on the relative merits of specific and ad valorem taxation when the
real problem hes m the system s loopholes whlch permltted relative
ease m reducing tax hablhty through transfer pricing between the
cigarette manufacturer and wholesalers/traders and the mmclassl
ficat:on of brands While the mlsclasslficatlon issue appears to have
been adequately resolved the use of marketing frms to avold paying
the correct taxes is only i_artlally addressed by the mtroductlon ofthe floor tax 6 Moreover the new law continues to wolate GATT rules
by maintaining the higher rates on imported clgarettes relative to
their domest:cally produced counterpart
Sales tax and hcenses Sales tax and hcenses became the thlrd
fastest growing tax category m 1985 1991 wlth an average annual
growth rate of 20 3 percent compared wlth a 19 1 percent rate of
increase for aggregate tax revenues Thls marked a big shift from its
past performance Of the major tax groupings sales tax and hcenses
proved to be one of the most sluggnsh m 1982 1985 expanding by
only 15 8 percent on a yearly average
Consequently the share of sales tax and hcenses to total tax
revenues expanded from 12 5 percent m 1985 to 13 3 percent m
1992 (Table 3) Similarly revenues from sales tax and hcenses rose
from 1 4 percent ofGNP m 1985 to two percent m 1992 its highest
level m the last 18 years (Table 1)
6 Abstracting from the floortax and the classdicatton msue the provasxonthat apphesa 20 percent mark up to the reglstered manufacturer s price to arnve at the constructive pnce effectively raxses the revenue by 20 percent However _t tends to penahzefirms that used to pay the correct taxes relative to those that avoided doing so
22 ROSARIOG MANASAN
The VAT s mtroductlon m 1988 largely accounts for the credltable
performance of sales tax and hcenses The first two years of _ts
Implementatmn were problematm The ratm of revenues from sales
tax/VAT and other percentage taxes to GNP dropped from 1 4 percent
m 1987 to 1 2 percent m 1988 and 1 37 percent m 1989 But it has
recovered since then reaching 1 6 percent m 1992 It Is slowly
emerging to be a better revenue earner than the sales tax (Table 8)
Table 8
Comparatwe Yield of Sales Tax and VAT 1987 1992(In mdhon pesos)
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
VAT 59312 71467 101345 130793 150957 181129
OPT 34734 21449 24136 28143 35077 37171
Total 94046 9 2916 125481 158936 186034 218300
% toGNP 140 1 17 137 148 147 159
OtherpercentagetaxesareincludedinthisanalysisbecausetheVATreplacedsomeofthesetaxes
Manasan (1990) showed that the introduction of the VAT greatly
Improved efficmncy by reducing the average effectwe tax rates or
ETR (t e the sum of direct and indirect taxes on output resulting
from the successive layers of taxes on output taxes on inputs mto
outputs taxes on inputs into inputs etc ) from 14 4 percent to 6 5
percent as well as the variation m the ETRs from a range of 1 3 34 6
percent to a range of 0 4 13 3 percent The difference between the
ETRs and the nominal rates (whmh measures the extent inputs are
taxed mdmatmg the dmtorttons arising therefrom) was halved from
an average of 7 2 percent to an average of 3 3 percent Manasan also
estabhshed that the VAT m shghtly more progresswe than the
sales/turnover tax it replaced However she noted that taxes on
inputs under the present VAT stall accounts for more than 50
percent of the ETRs mdmatmg that some gains m efficmncy could
be achieved if the number of goods exempted from VAT is reduced
Thus thin supports current proposals to further refine the VAT
BREAKINGAWAYFROMTHE FISCALBIND 23
Meanwhile the gross recelpts tax on banks was found to con
tribute to the hlgher cost of financlal mtermedlatlon m the country
today (Lamberte 1990) Because of thls it is recommended that the
gross recelpts tax be abohshed
Tax evasion
The previous section indicates that changes in both the structure
of the tax system and its admlmstratmn m the last half of the 1980s
greatly improved revenue performance However estzmates of tax
evaslon zn recent years zndzcate that vast opportunzt_es exzst for
collecting more revenues w_thout the need to razse tax rates or to
tmpose new taxes It should also be emphasized that tax evaszon
weakens the progressltnty of even the best designed tax systems
Evaszon of the mdwldual zncome tax Table 9 presents revised
and updated estimates of the potentml revenue from the mdw1dual
income tax The numbers suggest that some improvement albelt
somewhat spotty occurred m its collectlon rate from 26 9 percent
m 1985 to 34 percent m 1991
Table 9Potent,al Revenue from the Indw,dual Tax and the Level of Tax Evasion
Collect,on Potent,al Actual Evas,on
Rate Revenue Revenue Difference Rate
(%) Year (PM) (PM) (PM) (%)
269 1985 2194960 5 9120 160376 73 1
383 1988 1550474 59400 95647 617
28 5 1988 2788730 79470 199403 715
35 1 1990 46 20030 162060 299943 649
340 1991 61 11210 207446 403675 660
Source Potent,alrevenueauthor'sest,matesActualrevenueBureauofInternalRevenue
24 ROSARIOG MANASAN
Despite the progress achieved to date m reducing the evamon
rate of the mdlmdual income tax Table 9 also shows the big potentlal
to increase the government tax take by improving further the
collection machinery Uncollected revenue from the mdlwdual m
come tax amounted to some P40 4 bflhon (or 22 2 percent ofnatlonal
government tax revenues) in 1991
Evaszon o/the VAT Potential revenue estlmates from the sales
tax/VAT mdlcate that while the collectmn rate deteriorated from
31 7 percent in 1985 to 27 8 percent in 1989 it has recovered since
1990 to reach 38 4 percent in 1992 (Table 10) Undeniably the early
years of VAT implementatlon were problematlc However emdence
seems to show that It has Improved considerably in the last three
years
Again the gains to be had from an admmlstratlve reform of the
VAT system continue to be large VAT s potential revenue m 1992
is P47 2 bflhon or 3 5 percent of GDP while actual collectlon reached
only P18 1 bflhon or 1 3 percent of GDP Thls Implies that the
amount of evasion and other leakages in that year amounted to
P29 1 billion (or 13 9 percent of national government tax revenues)m 1992
Admlttedly tax evamon estlmates are not preclse Because what
ts being measured Is something whmh is hldden and not directly
observable measurement errors cannot be assumed away Thus
the estimated evamon levels are at best approximate However the
magnitude of tax evasmn levels are so huge that even If one allows
a margin of error as large as 50 percent the estlmated leakage m
the tax system remains substantial
Sources of" evasmn 7 Manasan (1988) noted that tax evasion
usually takes the followmg forms non flhng of tax returns overstated
deductions and non reporting and/or understated income/sales
Comparing the actual and the potentlal number of Individual
income tax fliers reveals that outright non fihng of tax returns is amajor source of mdlmdual mcome tax evasion Table 1 1 shows that
7 This section draws heavily from Manasan (1988)
Table 10Potential Revenue from the VAT and the Level of Tax Evasion
Potenbal Potential Actual Evasion Collecbon _:Revenue Revenue Revenue Difference Rate Rate
Year {Inre,ilionP) %of GDP (InmilSonP) (InmillionP) (%) (%)F
1985 94280 165 29960 64320 68 2 318
1989 364140 394 101345 262795 722 278
1990 393950 368 13079 3 263157 66 8 332
1991 454430 365 15095 7 303473 66 8 332
1992 47 1910 352 181129 29078 1 81 6 384
Source Authorse_mates
26 ROSARIOG MANASAN
only 22 5 percent of potentlal taxpayers filed their income tax retums
m 1990 The Economlc Intelhgence and Invest_gatlon Bureau or EIIB
{1992) noted a slmdar problem emsted wlth regards to the corporate
income tax The problem also exasts m other types of taxes
Table 11
Potential and Actual Number of Individual Income Taxpayers 1985 1990
PotentialNumber ActualNumberof Actual/
of Indwldual Individual Potential
Year Taxpayers Taxpayers (%)
1985 10074039 2336337 23 19
1986 9247644 2093335 22 64
1988 10544 154 2434520 23 09
1990 11651988 2 619271 2248
Source Potentialnumberofindividualtaxpayersauthor'sestimateActualnumberofwndMdualtaxpayersBureauofInternalRevenue
Whale many tax hable mdwlduals and corporatlons opt to file
thetr tax returns (because such is needed to expedlte certain
transactions e g wlth banks or those related to travel abroad)
many of these tax fliers underdeclare thelr income or recelpts Many
taxpayers appear to adhere to the following precept What the tax
collectlon agency does not know wdl not hurt the taxpayer
Another n-nportant source of evaslon _s overstating expenses and
allowable deducttons in the case of self employed mdlwdual income
taxpayers and corporate taxpayers The Natlonal Tax Research Center
or NTRC (1986) reported a wlde dlsperslon m the ratio of deducttons
claimed to gross income Moreover Manasan (1988) estabhshed a
slgmflcant posltwe relatlonsh_p between the ratio of deducttons to
gross income and the gross mcome levels of mdlvldual income taxpay
ers At the same t_me she also found a posltwe correlation between
the ratlo of the deficiency tax (due to audit) to actual tax and the ratio
of deductions to gross income for corporatlons All these lndlcate the
prevalence of overstating deductions for tax purposes
BREAKINGAWAY FROM THE FISCAL BIND 27
Theoretlcal hterature suggest that a hlgh penalty rate and a high
probablhty of detectlon can effectlvely deter tax evasion The preva
fence and magnitude of tax evaslon m the country thus mdlcate
that exlstmg penaltles and/or the Iukehhood of being caught and
pumshed are not hlgh enough to actually discourage evamon The
creation of special tax courts and the passage of new law prowdmg
stiffer penaltles on tax evasion are steps m the right dlrectlon
However resoluteness on the part of the BIR and BOC to enforce
the legal sanctlons continues to be a crltlcal concern It _s notewor
thy that m recent months such commltment seems to be more
forthcoming than ever before
The study also identified other weak points m the tax admml
stratlon system that encourage evamon low computemzatlon level m
the major collecting agencies and mabfllty of the BIR/BOC to access
avadable data on the true income/receipts of hard to tax mdlwduals
These will be discussed m greater detail m the following section
Reforming tax administration
Various studies identified the following Issues concerning tax ad
mlnlstratlon
Too much centrahzatzon The NTRC (1986 1991) noted that the
BIR has a hlghly centrahzed orgamzatlonal structure Both the
central office and the regional offices heawly engage m the actual
collection audit and mvestlgatlon of taxpayers This arrangement
has led to a number of mefficlenc_es m assessment and collection
enforcement
The centralized procedure m issuing the Letter of Authority to
audit has led to substantml delay m the assessment process For
instance Manasan (1993a) found that It took from three to six
months on the average between the receipt of an apphcat_on for VAT
credit and the issuance of the Letter of Authority to audit Also under
present rules collecting accounts receivable exceeding 20 000 falls
under the jurlsdlctlon of the national office This sltuatlon has not
helped unclog the plpehne collection of uncollected dehnquentaccounts as the number of accounts receivable has remmned high
28 ROSARIOG MANASAN
over time Thus greater delegatton of authority should be pursued
within the BIR to enable the central office to concentrate on pohcy
formulation program planning and evaluatlon of the management
effectiveness of the lower level offices regmnal offices should focus
on momtonng and evaluating the revenue dmtncts operataons
Under such a set up personnel across revenue dlstncts should be
reallocated since the dmtnbutlon of revenue personnel m hlghlyuneven and does not match the actual work load m some revenue
dmtncts (Table 12) Recent pronouncements mdlcate that BIR offi
clals are fully aware of these posslblhtles and have attached highpmonty to decentrahzatlon
Weak systems and procedures The absence of an updated
master hst of taxpayers mgmficantly contributes to the poor morn
tormg of tax comphance Manasan (1991) uncovered for instance
that revenue dmtrtct offices found it dlfficult to Identtfy stop fliersand follow up dehnquent accounts because of the absence of a
master file of VAT taxpayers The introduction ofa umfied taxpayer
identlflcatlon system with the msuance of a unique Taxpayer Iden
tlflcatmn Number {TIN) to all taxpayers regardless of the type of tax
they pay will go a long way m improving the system Increased
computerization will also make it easier to maintain the TIN system
Meanwhile the NTRC (1986 199 I) identified the need for a clear
cut and defimtlve pohcy on selecting audlt cases Thin should reduce
the assessment workload at the BIR to manageable levels While It
Is tempting to concentrate on the audlt of large taxpayers for reasons
of revenue producUvlty such a pohcy may lead to the unwanted
result of increasing concentratmn of collectmns from few taxpayers
(de Jantscher et al 1991) Thus a schelI_ whereto a specificpercentage of returns per income bracket m selected for audit shouldalso be consldered
The NTRC (1986 1991) als0 recommended the need to adopt amore vlgorous program of collectmn enforcement The non enforce
ment of warrants of distraint and levy on property that have already
been msued remains a major problem The study attributes thin
partly to the lack of revenue selzure agents and partly to the more
baslc problem of phymcally locating defaulting taxpayers
Table 12
D,stnbut,on of Taxable Returns Filed ,n 1990 and Assessment Personnel by Revenue Regton
AverageNo
ofTaxableRevenueRegion Numberof ReturnPerAssessmentAssessment
.11
Total Individual Corporation Pertnersh_p Personnel PersonnelE
(1) (2) {3) (4) (5) (6)- (1}/(5)Total 1694067 1672,052 20605 1410 2,215 765
56451 55993 446 I2 126 448 _.1 BaguloCity2andCAR TuguegaraoCegayanandCorddleraAdmln_sb'abonRegion 76900 76520 370 10 69 t 114 m
,.3A SanFemandoParnpanga 77077 76400 611 66 1t8 6533B ValenzuelaBulacan 173752 172276 1369 107 165 10534A Manda 178043 173681 3874 488 315 565
481and4B2 QuezonCdyandMa_tl 505248 495931 8964 353 591 8554C SanPabbC_ty 91562 90941 594 27 90 10175 LegaspCdy 55866 55602 264 -- 62 901
6A IlodoQty 57295 56820 433 42 60 9556B Baco_ndC_ty 54731 53825 848 58 t08 5077 CebuC_ty 95855 94701 1046 108 140 685
8 TaclobanCdy 39485 39298 182 5 59 6699 ZamboangaQty 40940 40662 243 35 57 718
10A CagayandeOroCity 57601 57253 330 18 65 88610B BuPJanQty 31260 31133 116 11 45 69511A CotabatoCdy 33693 33425 249 19 59 571
11B DavaoQty 68308 6759"= 668 51 86 794
Source BIRAnnualReportasc_tedknNarwhalTaxResearchCenter(1991)
30 ROSARIOG MANASAN
Low level ofcomputenzatmn Although the BIR has a long hmtory
(starting m the mld 1960s) of computer use its present state of
computerlzatmn remains pnm_tlve Thin was attributed to the grow
mg obsolescence of the mainframe computer system their made
quate maintenance the acute backlog m data procesmng and the
lack of an integrated database m the BIR (Crown Agents 1993)
Instltutlonahzmg a major computenzatlon program wouldgreatly enhance the agency s collectlon enforcement and assess
ment functlons It should be emphamzed however that while
computemzatlon will greatly improve collectlon and collectlon en
forcement It will not cure all the 111s that currently plague the tax
admmmtratlon system Better systems and procedures w111lead to
better collectlon performance even wlthout the benefit of increased
automatlon (see preceding sub sectlon 1
Manasan (1988) noted that increased computemzatlon would
make It earner for the BIR to access mformatlon lodged m other
d_vlslons within the BIR and m other government agencles hke the
Bureau of Customs Socml Secunty System Department of Trade
and Industry and Secuntles and Exchange Commmmon In thls
way the BIR would be able to seek out more aggresmvely tax hable
mdw_duals and corporatlons who do not file thelr returns
The greater ability to access these external sources of mforma
tmn through greater computemzatmn could also help the BIR combat underdeclaratmn of income First It w111 be earner to
operatmnahze presumptlve income taxatmn (whereby tax m as
sessed not on the basra of declared income per se but on mdlcators
of income) Following the experience m other countries {World Bank
1982) specified amounts of income may be presumed to be assocl
ated wlth for instance ownership of remdent_al property automo
bales boats mrplanes and race horses forelgn travel and
employment of servants Related to thin the Bank Secrecy Act
prohlbltmg the dmclosure of mformatmn on bank deposlts greatlyimpedes the BIR s access to reliable mformatmn on the net worth
(and accretmn thereto) of mdlwduals An amendment of thin lawtherefore m m order
Second computer asmsted audit selectmn cnterla will greatly
increase the cost effectlveness of BIR audlts S1mllarly the enlarged
BREAKINGAWAY FROM THE FISCAL BIND 31
mformatlon system that would also result from a major upgrade of
the computemzatlon level should make It earner for the BIR toestabhsh "norms and standard ratlos that its examiners can use
m evaluating taxpayers deductlon clalms The D1scmmlnant Func
tlon System or DIF (whlch measures the probablhty of tax error m
taxpayers returns glven mdlcators hke economlc act_vlty sales
reported annual mark up and dlscrepancles resulting from cross
checking mformat_on from other agenclesl has been used m other
countries to maxlmlze the effectiveness of audlts (de Jantscher et
al 1991)
Thlrd computerization should mmlmme m the medmm term
contact between the revenue agents and the taxpayers whlch
presents opportumtles for corruptlon For instance computenmng
BOC operations should lead to mechamzed processing of tax docu
ments clasmficatlonoflmports assessment and paymentofdut_es
and taxes Under thls system only taxpayers tagged as hlgh risk
ones will be subject to audlt (Alano and Medalla 1993)
Thus the ongoing computenzatlon program at the BIR and
BOC whlch is expected to be completed m 1997 w111greatly improve
tax admmlstratlon m the medmm term
Low compensa_on of tax collectlon personnel Alano and MedaUa
(1993) pointed out that the low wages of revenue agents compared
w_th the large amounts that tax evaders can offer provldes the
blggest problem m curbing tax evaslon They suggest that a per
formance based compensatlon scheme be mstltuted to effectlvely
mmlmlze the dlspamty between legal and illegal raceme of revenue
agents They argue that such a system coupled w_th greater flexa
bdlty m hlnng and firing tax collection personnel will be a powerful
dlsmcent_ve to corrup_on at the BIR and BOC They noted that the
success of private agenmes hke the SGS can be traced to then" abfllty
to employ and mmntmn a hlghly quahfied effiment and honest
workforce by using the right combmatlon of reward (compensation)
and pumshment (hlmng and finng)
32 ROSARIOG MANASAN
Proposed tax enhancement measures
Since 1986 numerous tax measures have been proposed and
enacted year after year because of the need to bridge the gap between
projected revenue and programmed government expendltures Most
of these measures have the overriding objectlve of generating addl
tlonal revenues However the analysis above shows that thelr
impact on overall efficlency and equlty has not always been favorable At the same tlme the ceaseless stream of new tax measures
leglslated each year places undue burden on the tax admlmstratlon
system whlch further exacerbates the poor state of tax collectlon
and enforcement m the country
In pmnc_ple new tax measures should focus on plugging |oop
holes m the tax system should lead to efficiency gains and should
not make the tax system more regresmve than before Because not
all tax proposals meet all of these objectlves pohcymakers should
take into account the trade off between these sometimes confllctmg
goals as they often mdlcate the impact of vamous tax measures on
sustainable growth Also the cost effectiveness of each tax measure
0 e potentlal revenue relatwe to the cost of collecting the tax)should recelve due conslderatlon
Given the above perspective it _s appropnate to broaden the VAT
base and ratlonal_ze the motor vehlcle reglstrat_on fees As noted
elsewhere m thls paper including more goods and serwces m the VAT
system will lead to efficlency gains as _t reduces tax cascading Given
the earher expemence w_th the VAT It _s hkely that such a move will
not make the tax system more regresslve than before On the other
hand transport studies show that the current revenues from road user
charges do not suffice to cover the cost of road wear and traffic
congestion {Nathan Associates Inc 1990 World Bank 1988b) These
studles also show that registration fees follow an overly complex and
dlstortlonary structure They noted that damage done on roads de
pends primarily on the axle load rather than on total weight Conse
quently rigid trucks 0 e two and three axle trucks) appear to be
under taxed relative to articulated trucks under the exlstmg system
In contrast the proposed increase in the documentary stamptax and m the stock transactions tax the shlft from the ad valorem
BREAKINGAWAYFROMTHEFISCALBIND 3:]
to the specific system m taxang dlstflled splnts and fermented hquor
and the land convermon tax do not seem deslrable Ralsmg the
documentary s_amp tax (DST) would further increase the already
hlgh cost of doing business m the country In partlcular theproposed increase m DST on financml instruments would increase
the cost of capltal It would also exacerbate the uneven treatment
of foreagn exchange transactaons an the banking sector compared
wath those m the informal sector and does not take into account the
hagher counterpart risk m the latter Contrary to the contentlon of
certain sectors the prevmhng DST m most cases as effectavely an ad
valorem tax it as not a Fixed tax Thus except for the DST on bank
drafts and checks warehouse receipts promes and powers of
attorney DST rates need not be adjusted penodacally for mflataon
Also the proposed increase m the DST (on stocks and bonds) and
m the stock transactaon tax _s mconsastent wath the government
thrust to develop the capatal market since at tends to hamper the
much needed investment growth Converting the present ad valorem
tax on dlstdled sprats and fermented hquor to specafic tax wall make
the system less buoyant and will necessltate frequent adjustment
m the tax rate through legaslatave actlon samply to mamtmn the real
value of tax revenues The pubhc debate on the c_garette tax shows
that thas case reqmres a tamper proof defimtlon of the tax base (one
that would make the tax less vulnerable to tax avoldance) coupledwlth stricter enforcement of the law
Meanwhile the proposed land convermon tax would tend to
deter the socaally optlmal shift m land use If the present landclasslficat_ton under the CARP law as v_ewed to be reflectave of the
best land use then the conversaon from agricultural to resldentmlcommercaal or industrial use should not be allowed at all But if
thls as not the case then the land converslon tax would tend to have
deleterious allocatlve effects
Finally while the proposed expansaon m the excase tax coverage
on non essential commodltaes and the amposatlon of a national tax
on real property are demrable to enhance the redlstnbutlve charac
ter of the tax system they requxre further study m terms of thear
_mpact on other economic goals Wdl the exc_se tax on affluent
consumption generate enough revenues to warrant the cost of
84 ROSARIOG MANAS/
collecting it? Will a natlonal tax on real property adversely affect tax
revenues of local governments?
Reforming Local Government Taxation
Pubhc sector finance 112recent hlstory Is largely concentrated at the
center wlth local government units (LGUs) accounting for seven
percent of general government s expendltures or 1 6 percent of GNPm 1980 1990 (Table 13) The degree of fiscal decentrallzatlon ap
pears lower when measured in terms of revenues Local govern
ments account for approxlmately five percent of total general
government revenues during the perlod (Table 14) Thls has resulted
from the fact that about 50 percent of total LGU income comes from
external sources mainly transfers from the natlonal government
Thus the revenue effort of all LGUs m the aggregate has remained
low with locally generated revenues not exceeding an average of one
percent of GNP m the 1980s
The real property tax (RPT) is the single major source of locally
generated LGU income in 1980 1990 contributing 41 percent of
total LGU income from local sources But its importance weakened
in the 1980s its share in total local source LGU income dechned
from 46 percent in 1980 to 40 percent m 1990 Real property tax
effort hkew_se deterlorated from 0 5 percent of GNP m 1980 to 0 3
percent m 1990 (Table 15)Meanwhile revenues from other local taxes also dechned
throughout the period relatlve to total local LGU revenues andrelatlve to GNP Revenues from other local taxes shrank from 29
percent of total locally sourced LGU income m 1980 to 25 percent
m 1990 S1mdarly it contracted from 0 3 percent to 0 2 percent of
GNP dulnng the period (Table 15) In contrast LGU income from
economic enterprlses kept pace wlth GNP and remained stable at
0 3 throughout the 1980s
Given the massive transfer of functions authol_tles and respon
slb111ties from natlonal government agencles to LGUs under the
8 General government Is composed of the natJonal or central government and thelocal government unlts
BREAKING AWAY FROM THE FISCAL BIND 35
Table13GeneralGovernmentExpenditures
(In millionpesos)
Year Total NG Local
1986 119122 110874 8 2481987 162487 153444 9 0421988 173328 162570 107581989 206613 193316 132971990 265411 247502 179091991 306435 282824 23611
Average198085 67502 61532 5 970198691 205566 191755 13811
%DIstnbubon
1986 10000 9308 6 921987 10000 9444 5 561988 10000 9379 6 211989 10000 9356 6 441990 10000 9325 6 751991 10000 9229 7 71
Average198085 10000 9116 8 84198691 10000 9328 6 72
RatiotoGNP(%)1986 1998 1859 1381987 2414 2280 1341988 2180 2044 1351989 2261 2115 1461990 2466 2300 1661991 2429 2242 187
Average198085 1788 1630 158198691 2320 2164 156
Sources AnnualF;nanc4alReportsDepartmentof InteriorandLocalGovemmentsandCommLss;ononAudit
Table 14
General Govemment RevenuesNominalLevels(tnmdhonpesos)
I Average19801985 Average19861991 t988 f
Total NG LG Total NG LG Total NG LG
Total 50101 46721 3 380 148813 141570 7 243 118360 112861 5 499Taxrevenues 43 540 41 163 2 378 121218 116368 4 851 94203 90352 3 85tNon taxrevenues 6 560 5 558 t 002 27 595 25203 2 392 24158 22509 1649
Raboto GNP(in percent)
I Average19801985 Average19861991 1988 I
Total NG LG Total NG LG Total NG LGTotal 1327 1238 090 1680 1598 082 1489 t4 19 069
Tax revenues 1153 1090 063 1368 1313 055 1185 1136 048Nontaxrevenues 174 147 027 3 11 284 027 3 04 283 0 21
PercentageDistnbut_on
I Average19601985 Average19861991 1988 IoO
Total NG LG Total NG LG Total NG LG
Total 1000O 9325 6 75 10000 95 13 4 87 10000 9535 4 65Taxrevenues 10000 9454 546 10000 9600 4 00 10000 95 91 4 09Non taxrevenues 10000 8472 1528 10000 9133 867 10000 93 18 682
Table 14 (conbnued)
NominalLevels(Inmillionpesos)
I 1989 1990 1991 I
Total NG LG Total NG LG Total NG LG
Total 161066 152411 8 655 190170 180902 9 268 231321 220788 10533 '<Tax revenues 128020 122463 5557 157710 151700 6010 189256 182276 6980
Nontaxrevenues 33046 29 948 3 098 32460 29202 3 258 42065 38512 3 553RabotoGNP(Inpercent) r_
[ 1989 1990 1991 I i
Total NG LG Total NG LG Total NG LG _.Total 1763 1668 095 1767 1681 086 1833 1750 083Taxrevenues 1401 1340 061 1465 1410 056 1500 1445 055Nontaxrevenues 362 328 0 34 302 2 71 030 333 305 028
PercentageDistnbubon
[ 1989 1990 1991 ]
Total NG LG Total NG LG Total NG LGTotal 10000 9463 537 10000 95 13 4 87 10000 9545 455
Taxrevenues 10000 95 66 4 34 10000 96 19 381 10000 96 31 369Nontaxrevenues 10000 9063 937 10000 8996 1004 10000 91 55 845
Notes LG- LocalgovemmentNG- Nabonalgovemment
t4OlD
Table t5
RevenueStructure of LocalGovernments 19801991
NominalLevels(inmillionpesos)
19801985 19861991 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991Average Average
A Localsources 3 380 7243 4616 4 887 5499 8 655 9 268 10533
1Taxrevenues 2 378 4 851 3288 3 418 3851 5 557 6 010 6 980
1 Realpropertytax 1 460 2872 2080 2 123 2276 2 733 3 728 4 2932 Others 918 1978 1208 1295 1575 2 824 2 282 2 687
I_Operahngandm=screvenues 993 2 202 1323 1461 1634 2 444 3 039 3 310
Ill Capital 9 191 5 9 14 653 219 243B Externalsources 2 980 7 621 4 045 4036 7860 6 626 9 794 13366
1 Sharesfromnationaltaxes 2 335 5 234 3249 3359 4 202 4 097 6 995 9 504
2 Grantsandaids 496 2 253 734 633 3 604 2 457 2 693 3 396 o
3 Interlocalgovt trans 16 19 12 30 20 24 10 17
4 Borrowings 133 115 50 13 33 48 97 448
Totalincomeandextraordinary r.,,9receiptsandborrowings(A+B) 6361 14864 8 661 8 923 13359 15281 19062 23899
BR
EA
KIN
GA
WA
YFR
OM
TH
EFISC
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BIN
D39
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Table15(continued) o_
PercentageDistr=bubon
19801985 1986-1991 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991Average Average
A LocalSources 5314 4873 5329 5477 4117 5664 4862 4407
I Taxrevenues 3739 3263 3796 3830 2882 3637 3153 2921
1 Realpropertytax 2295 1932 2402 2379 1704 1789 1956 17962 Others 1443 1331 1395 1451 1179 t848 1197 1124
II Operabngandmlscrevenues 156t 1481 1527 1637 1223 1600 1594 1385
III Capital 0 15 128 0 06 0 10 0 11 4 28 115 t 02B Externalsources 4686 5127 4671 4523 5883 4336 5138 5593
1 Sharesfromnabonattaxes 3671 3521 3752 3765 3146 268t 3669 3977
2 Grantsandaids 780 1516 848 7 09 2698 _608 1412 1421 _o
3 InterIocaIgovt trans 025 0 13 0 14 0 34 0 15 0 16 0 05 007 _o4 Borrowings 2 10 0 77 0 57 0 15 0 25 031 0 51 188
Totalincomeandextraordinary >_receiptsandborrowings 10000 10000 10000 10000 10000 10000 10000 10000
BREAKINGAWAYFROM THE FISCALBIND 41
Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991 It Is imperatlve that LGUs
m'e able to generate an increasing portion of thelr income from local
sources Thls is partlcularly true for some 20 percent of total LGUs
whlch wdl suffer negatlve net transfer of resources and expendlture
respons:bdltles from national government to local government
(World Bank 1993) For the other LGUs improvements m local
revenue mob:11zatlon is equally important if local autonomy is to be
meaningful Financial independence of LGUs Is a key mgredlent tothe success of decentralization mlhatlves Thus a clear under
standing of the problems underlying the poor revenue performanceof LGUs is in order
A number of factors account for the poor revenue effort of LGUs
First the central government severely restricted the latitude of LGUs
m determining the rates at which they may levy local taxes Also
the prescrlptlon of umt rates rather than ad valorem rates for mostlocal taxes other than the RPT made these taxes hlghly melastJc
(Table 16) Similarly the centrally mandated postponement of the
general revlslon of the schedule of fair market value of real propertles
meant that untd 1987 the real property tax was lewed on grossly
outdated (1981/1982) property values 9 The results of Tan (1993)
confirm findings from key informant lnterv-lews (Manasan 1992a)that the ratlo of the _rue market value to the falr market value m
the assessor s schedule vanes from 3 to 5 (Table 17) 10
The Code also reduced the assessment levels on real property
for tax purposes and exempted remdentml buildings wlth fair marketvalue below P175 000 Thus the schedule of fair market values
must be adjusted upwards to levels that more closely apprommatethelr true market values to counteract the negative impact of these
changes on potentlal RPT revenues Where possible LGUs scheduleof fair market values should not fall lower than the zonal values
9 Pres_dentlal Decree 464 (Real Property Tax Code of 1974) mandated that theschedule of fau"market values should be rewsed every three years In 1980 such arew_aon was implemented However the revlslon scheduled for 1983 was contmuously delayed t.fll 1987 Under the Local Government Code of 1991 a new scheduleis supposed to be put m place not latcr than 199410 The Local Government Code of 1991 transferred the authority and respons_blhty
to update and unplement the schedule of fair market values to IX]Us
42 ROSARIOG MANASAN
Table 16
Assessors Market Valuation and Advertised Market Prices
for Selected Prices of Property 1992
Assessors_ Actual Assessors_Market Market Valuation
Value Value MarketPrice
(PIm2) (PIm2) (%)Diliman QuezonCityCommonwealthAvenue 1800/m2 8000/m2 225
(DonMananoMarcosAve)AyalaHeightsSubdivision 2 000/m2 6 000/m2 333LaVistaSubdivision 800/m2 2 900/m2 27 6XaviervllleSubdlwslon 800/m2 7 000/m2 114
Makati
ForbesPark(residentalproperties 3 500/m2 15000/m2 233
boundedby EDSA Aim
McKinley Pih Tamannd
Buend=aandGu_nguaPasayRoad(commercialproperties 8 500/m2 41000/m2 207
fromEDSAtoPasongTamo)PasongTamo(VJtoCruzto J P 2 800/m2 9 300/m2 30 1
RizalSt )MakabAvenue(commercial 4 000/m2 38000/m2 105
resident=alpropertiesfrom
Gen LunaSt to J P RizalSt)MakatiAvenue(commerc=al 10500/m2 64000/m2 164
propertiesfromPasayRoadto JupiterSt )
SanMiguelVtllage 3 000/m2 50000/m2 6 0
Assessors Actual Assessors
Market Market Valuation
Value Value MarketPrice
(PIm2) (PIm22) (%)AgriculturallandLaguna
Coconutland P18/m2 P50/m2 3 6Fishpond P120/m2 P421/m2 285
Source E A TanRealPropertyTaxationandItsPotentialAsaMajorSourceofLocalRevenue=nPovertyGrowthandtheF#scalCrtsssbyDeDiosetal 1993
BREAKING AWAY FROM THE FISCAL BIND
Table17Buoyancyof Revenuesof LocalGovernments19801990
(In percent)
RevenueSources Buoyancy*
TotalRevenues 0 87I Localsources 078
A Taxrevenues1 Realpropertytaxes 0672 Taxesongoodsandservices
Businesstaxes 072Occupationtax 0 24Franchisetax 1 15F=nesandpenalt=es 109MKscellaneous 0 83
3 OthertaxesResidencetax 0 51Amusements 070Sandandgravel 024Others 1 22
B Operatingandmiscellaneousrevenue1 Governmentservices 0992 Governmentbusinessoperattons
Rentals 107Pubhcutlhtles 062Market 0 71Slaughterhouse 100Tollsonroadsandbndges 0 59Cemetenes 091Otherbusinessoperations 127
3 Interest 2014 Others 044
Totaloperatingandserviceincome 0895 Incomefrompublicenterpriseorinvestments 0 916 Msscellaneous=ncome 107
ContnbutJons 0 10Others 140
C CapitalrevenueSalesofassets 241
II Externalsources 0951 Sharesfromnat=onaltaxes 0 912 Grantsandaids 1 333 Inteflocalgovernmenttransfers 0484 Borrowings 0 84
BuoyancyisdefinedastheratJoofthepercentagechangeintaxrevenueto thepercentagechange
fn aggregate=ncorneGNP
ROSARIO G MANASAN
estabhshed by the BIR for purposes of determining the capztal gainsand the estates taxes
Meanwhile the LGC perm:ts LGUs to :mpose taxes on some
actlvlt:es and sectors that were formerly outslde the amblt of local
taxatlon Moreover the Code razsed the mammum allowable rates
at whlch most local taxes can be zmposed Desp:te these modzflca
tlons the scope of LGUs authority to levy business and other typesof taxes remains severely clrcumscr:bed and hmlted
Second local officlals faded to maxlmlze the use of thelr hmlted
revenue ra:smg powers (NTRC 1981 1992) Many LGUs d:d not
_mpose the mammum allowable rates under the old Local and Real
Property Tax Codes and chose to maintain thelr taxes at the same
nominal umt rates over the years desplte the clear eromon of their
tax yields by mflat:on In th:s respect LGUs must acqulre the
techmcal and poht:cal expertlse m setting local tax rates at levels
that are hlgh enough to maxlm_ze local revenues and low enough so
as not to dlscourage businesses from locating m thelr junsdlctlon
Third the admmlstrat_on of local taxes has been mefficlent In
the aggregate LGUs collect less than 60 percent of potentml real
property tax revenues (Table 18) Whde no est:mates ernst of the
efficlency m collecting other types of local taxes they may be lower
than that of RPT whose collect_on Is better orgamzed
Poor LGU tax admmlstratlon can be traced to the inadequate
systems and procedures that currently govern assessment collec
Table 18
Collectmn Rate for BasmcReal Property Tax(In percent)
Year CollecbonRate
1983 58 61
1984 54 24
1985 46 85
1986 51 37
1987 5282
1988 5430
1989 6815
1990 5774
BREAKINGAWAYFROM THE FISCAL BIND 45
tlon and enforcement The Associates m Research Development
(ARD 1992) noted that the required improvements are rumple they
only need to be practiced conmstently These improvements include
I) estabhshmg a tax roll for each type that the LGU admmlsters
(conducting a tax census and developing an integrated revenue data
bank are key steps in thls regard) 2) using mdlcators of presumptave
income prudently to arrlveat the _true gross recelptsofbusiness
estabhshments (thisinvolvesthe use ofstandard ratiosthat relate
the amount ofincome with givenlevelsofeasilyvcrlfiableexpendi
ture varlableshke utlhttes{electnclty/water)consumption rental
number ofemployees and the hke) 3)sending tax billson a regular
basis 4) consclentlouslymonitoring tax payments and identifylng
and collectingtax dehnquencles and 51strictlyimplementlng sanc
tions and penaltles(hke auctlonlng dehnquent real propertles
closing business estabhshments imposing penaltles and sur
charges atratesthatare high enough to hurt}on erringtaxpayers
Computerization ofrevenue operationsand greateraccessto mfor
matlon maintained by other government agcncles (hke the BIR
Regmter ofDeeds) would alsohlghlyreinforcethe posmve effectsof
the abovementloncd improvements on LGU finances With regards
to the realproperty tax however the biggestopportunityfor Im
proving collectionhes m proper recordsmanagement
Exploring the Potentml of User Charges
User charges refer to fees that the government exacts from prlvate
sector beneficiaries of publicly provlded goods or servlces that are
associated with large private benefit Unhke taxes user charges
make households and firms pay for at least part of the cost of
producing those servlces they consume As such it has often been
argued by many economlsts that user charges increase efficlency
whde they raise revenues at the same tlme By collecting a charge
on the use of a pubhcly produced good or servlce the government
discourages wasteful consumption of such good/s_rvlce Moreover
funding the prowslon of these goods through user charges enables
the government to avoid the deadweight losses that are associated
wlth tax financing
415 ROSARIO G MANASAN
Some analysts have argued that since user charges are lewed
by the government on a quzd pro quo basis they effectively hmlt the
access of the poor to needed government sermces However others
have shown that thls crltlclsm is misplaced They point out that
2here are many subsldlzed (government} services in LDCs that
dlsproportlonately benefit the better off Tertlary education at the
University of the Phlhppmes prior to the implementation of the
socialized prlctng scheme is one such example They argue that
government can promote its equity and efflclency objectlves and find
some relief from Its fiscal constraints as well by charging all users
of the government service cost based fees and by surnultaneously
installing well targeted programs to deliver the needed subsldles to
the poor In the case of university education thls may take the form
of selective scholarshlps
The revenue potential of user charges has not been fully ex
plolted m the Phlhpplnes Thus the contribution of user charges to
total national government revenues c