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8/8/2019 Brennan Center for Justice: Filibuster Abuse
1/36
F A
By Mimi MarzianiForeword by Susan Liss
B C Jat New York University School of Law
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ABOUT THE BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE
T B C J N Y U S L -
j. O
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, , B C ,
, , .
ABOUT THE BRENNAN CENTERS DEMOCRACY PROGRAM
T B C D P A . W
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ABOUT THE FIlIBUSTER REFORM PROJECT
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010. T C C A-N D-NC ( ://-.). I B C J NYU S L , C , . T , , C . P C .
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ABOUT THE AUTHORS
Mimi Murray Digby Marziani B C D P
. I , M. Mz ,
B C , C - . A x , M. Mz
U.S. News and World Report, Te National Law Journal, Politico, Te New York Law Journal, ,
, . M. Mz NYU
j , C NYU W S
P S. S V U NYU S L,
B N Y.
Susan Liss D D P, C V R E,
R V, M P, F I C, C R, N Y S
G A. I 30- , M. L , z. D C-G , D J
D A A G P D C S C C R
D. S C S M. G S C V P. P j
B C, D F R C M. S
U M G U L C, B D-
C.
ACKNOWlEDGEMENTS
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T B C T W C. B F, D A P
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8/8/2019 Brennan Center for Justice: Filibuster Abuse
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FOREWORD
By Susan Liss
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TABlE OF CONTENTS
I. Introduction 1
II. How Filibuster Abuse Harms Our Governmental Structure 5
A. Filibuster Abuse Devalues the Senate 5
B. Filibuster Abuse Disrupts Congress 7
C. Filibuster Abuse Threatens to Derail Our System of Government 8
D. Filibuster Abuse Blunts Legislative Accountability 10
III. Why Indefnite and Anonymous Holds Are Wholly Indeensible 11
A. IndeniteandAnonymousHoldsareaRampantFormofObstruction
in Todays Senate 11
B. IndeniteandAnonymousHoldsHarmOurDemocraticProcess 12
IV. Changing the Senates Rules at the Start o the Next Congress 14
A. TheSenatehasInherentRulemakingPowerUndertheConstitution 15
B. TheConstitutionContainsaPrincipleAgainstLegislativeEntrenchment 17
C. EntrenchmentoftheSenateRulesFurtherBluntsLegislative 18
Accountability
D. The Senates Overlapping Term Structure Cannot Justify 19
UnconstitutionalEntrenchment
V. Conclusion
Endnotes 23
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1|Filibuster Abuse
INTRODUCTION
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B C J at New York University School of Law| 2
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First, Some Terminology
Filibusters & Cloture
Theterm libusterrefers toany dilatory tactic thatis
strategically deployed to obstruct legislative action. AsoneofthemostdistinctiveproceduralfeaturesoftheU.S.
Senate,libustersarecommonlyassociatedwithsena-
torswho engagein prolonged,andperhaps irrelevant,
oor debate toprevent the adoption ofameasure or
nomination that is favored by the majority. In fact, todays
libusters almost neverinvolve actualcontinuousoor
speechestodayslibustersarelargelysilentandoften
occurbeforeaproposalevenreachestheSenateoor.
ThepossibilityoflibusteringexistsbecausetheSenate,
unliketheHouseofRepresentatives,lacksanyprocedure
throughwhichasimplemajoritycouldforceadebatable
measuretoavote.SenateRuleXXIItheClotureRule
providestheonlywaytoovercomealibusterbyendingdebateandforcingavote;however,itrequiresasuperma -
jorityvotetodoso.Underthisrule,three-fthsoftheentire
Senate(currently,60senators)mustvotetoinvokecloture.
When a cloture motion is successfully adopted, further
consideration of the matter at issue is l imited to 30 hours.
Thereisoneimportantexceptiontothis60-voterequire -
ment:Inordertoinvokeclotureonanymeasuretoamend
theSenateRules,two-thirdsofthosesenatorspresent
andvotingmustvoteafrmatively.Assumingnovacan -
ciesandfullattendance,67votesarethusrequiredtoenda
libusteronanyproposaltoreformtheClotureRuleitself.
Althoughobviouslyrelated,alibusterandacloturemo -tion are two distinct procedural features. Accordingly,
therecanbealibusterwithoutacloturevoteandvice
versa. Typically, eventhe viablethreatofa libuster is
enough to place a hold on legislation; this may effec-
tivelykillthemeasureorresultinanumberofrespons-
esother thana cloturevote.Likewise,cloturemotions
may be led to preempt anticipated libusters rather
thantoovercomelibustersthatarealreadyinprogress.
Holds
The practice of placingholds isan informal custom
bywhich a singlesenator can indenitely andanony-
mously stop legislation or nominations from reaching
theSenateoor.Toplaceahold,asenatorsendsalet-
ter to her partys leadership indicating her desire to halt
progressonaspeciedbillornominee.Theserequests
areseldommadepublic,sothereisnowayforthepub -
lictomonitorhowmanyrequestsaremade,whoisre -sponsible for the delay, or the reasons behind the hold.
A request for an indenite hold contains two implicit
threats:rst, itsignals asenators intentto objectto a
unanimous consent agreement; and then, to libuster
the targeted legislation or nomination. Given the scarcity
ofoortime in thecontemporarySenate, suchthreats
are commanding Senate leaders, fearing retaliatory
obstructionandthepossibilityofgridlock,aregenerally
unwillingtodisregardthem.Asanysenatorcanplacea
hold, this practice gives individual senators considerable
power.Often,senatorsusethistactictogainbargaining
leverageoverothersenatorsorovermembersoftheEx-
ecutive branch.
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B C J at New York University School of Law| 4
Cloture Motions
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
Congressional Session
66 68 7270 74 76 78 80 82 8 4 86 88 90 92 9 4 96 98 100 102 104 106 108 110
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5|Filibuster Abuse
HOW FIlIBUSTER ABUSE HARMS OURGOVERNMENTAl STRUCTURE
Filibuster Abuse Devalues the Senate
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The Stealth Filibuster
Todays stealth libusterwas createdby a signicant
change in Senate procedure that occurred in the 1960s.
Asaresponseto repeatedcivil rightslibusters,then-
Senate Majority Leader Mike Manseld (D-MT) de-
velopeda two-tracksystemfor handlingoordebate.
Unlikelibustersofthepast,whichdelayedallSenate
business during the course of any prolonged debate,
thenewsystemlimitedthetimetodebatelibustered
legislationandallowednewbusinesstocontinueona
separatetrack.Thiseliminatedthetypeofall-nightde -
bate sessions famously depicted in Mr. Smith Goes to
Washington.Overtime,thelibusterevolvedfromthis
two-tracksystemintothephantomaffairitistoday.
A 1963 Time magazine article paints a colorful picture of
thenewsystem:
ThetraditionalSenatelibusterwastedious,tobe
surerelaysofSenators,hourafterhour,croaking
hoarse-voiced recitations of the glories of South-
ernrecipesorreadingsfromreferencebooks.But
thelibustercouldalsobedramatic,fulloftension
andconictandsuspense.BykeepingtheSenate
insessionaroundtheclock, themajority tried to
wearthelibusteringminoritydowninanordealof
exhaustion.CotsweresetupintheSenatecloak -
room, and bleary, rumpled Senators stumbled from
themtoanswermiddle-of-the-nightquorumcalls.
But all that has changed. Gone is the ordeal, the
struggle,thedrama.Allthatisleftistalk.Lastweek
alibusterwasgoingonintheSenate,anditwas
the dullest show in town. Majority Leader Mike
Manseldtookthelifeoutofthelibusterbylimiting
it to gentlemanly hours: from noon to around 6 p.m.
EvenifManseldcarriesouthisthreattolengthen
theworkingdaytotwelvehours,theSoutherners
wouldstillreturnfreshtoeachdaysroundoftalk.
The Congress: The New-Style Filibuster, Time(Feb.1, 1963),http://www.
time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,829749,00.html#ixzz0dTrT2aD0.
II.
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B C J at New York University School of Law| 6
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The 60-Vote Senate
Now,libustersaresomuchthenormthatasuperma-
jority vote of 60 is assumed necessary for all legisla-
tiveaction.Historically,policy-makersassumedthat51
voteswouldbeenoughtopasseventhemostconten-tiouslegislation.Forinstance,inaDecember8,1964
memo concerning the Medicare bill, Mike Manatos
wrotetoLyndonJohnsonscampaigndirector,ifall
oursupportersarepresentandvoting,wewouldwinby
avoteof55to45.FranklinRooseveltsnotoriousat -
tempttopacktheSupremeCourtprovidesanotherex -
ample.Then-U.S.AttorneyGeneralHomerCummings
voicedpublicallythattheadministrationspositionwas
promisingwhenhelearnedof 53supportivevotes.
By contrast, a recent New York Times article reported,
To get the 60 votes needed to pass their bill, Demo-
crats scrapped the idea of a government-run public
insuranceplan.
Memorandum byMikeManatosto Larry OBrien(Dec.8, 1964),avail-
able at http://voices.washingtonpost.com/ezra-klein/obriencropped.jpg;
Jeff SheSol, Supreme power: franklin rooSevelTvS, The Supreme CourT 300
(2010);Robert Pear,Negotiating to 60 Votes, Compromise by Compro-
mise, n.Y. TimeS, Dec. 19, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/20/
health/policy/20care.html.
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7|Filibuster Abuse
R S, F-
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Filibuster Abuse Disrupts Congress
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Thepowerofthisminorityvetoisacutelyfeltbymem-
bers of the House. Wisconsin Congressman David
Obey,announcinghisretirementafterover40yearsof
publicservice,lamented:Thewearandtearisbegin -
ningtotakeitstoll....Therehastobemoretolifethan
explaining the ridiculous, accountability-destroying
rules of the Senate to confused, angry, and frustrated
constituents.
Statement by David R. Obey, Representative, Wisconsins 7th Con-
gressional District (May 5, 2010), http://www.obey.house.gov/index.
php?option=com_content&task=view&id=924.
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B C J at New York University School of Law| 8
As James Madison famously argued in Number 51 of
theFederalistPapers:
Inframingagovernmentwhichistobeadministeredby
menovermen,thegreatdifcultyliesinthis:youmust
rst enable thegovernment to control thegoverned;
andinthenextplaceobligeittocontrolitself.Adepen-
dence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on
thegovernment;butexperiencehastaughtmankindthe
necessityofauxiliaryprecautions.
Filibuster Abuse Treatens to Derail Our System o Government
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9|Filibuster Abuse
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Empowering the Minority Party
Manyscholarshavesuggestedmoreproductiveways
toempowertheminorityparty.Forinstance,NYUPro-
fessorofLawRichardPildeshasexplained:
[I]fwewanttoempowercongressionalchecksonex-
ecutivepowerthataremorelikelytobeeffectivedur-
ing unied government, we can consider measures
thatwouldgive theminority party,whichhasthe ap-
propriate incentives, greater tools to oversee theex-
ecutive branch. Some other democracies do so. As
Iandothershavedescribed,wemightconsidergiving
the minority control of a certain oversight committee,
such as an auditing committee; enabling the minority to
callhearingsundercertaincircumstances;orotherwise
increasing the opposition partys ability to get informa-
tionfromtheexecutivebranch.Thesemeasuresarenot
minority-vetorights,butwaysofenablingmoreeffective
oversight.
RichardPildes,Ungovernable America?: The Causes and Consequences
of Polarized Democracy(presentedatThomasM.Jordelecture,April14,
2010), available at http://www.law.nyu.edu/ecm_dlv3/groups/public/@
nyu_law_website__news/documents/documents/ecm_pro_065536.pdf.
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B C J at New York University School of Law| 10
Filibuster Abuse Blunts Legislative Accountability
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WHY INDEFINITE AND ANONYMOUSHOlDS ARE WHOllY INDEFENSIBlE
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Indefnite and Anonymous Holds are a Rampant Form o Obstruction in odays Senate
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Indefnite and Anonymous Holds Harm Our Democratic Process
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13|Filibuster Abuse
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Held Hostage by Holds
In March 2009, Senator Robert Menendez (D-NJ)
placedaholdontwocrucialenvironmentalnominees
toprotestawhollyunrelatedissueawidely-support -ed provision of the omnibus spending bill to ease rules
on travel and imports to Cuba.
WhenSenatorShelbyplacedaholdonover70nomi-
neesearlierthisyear,hedidsotoobtainearmarked
funding for his home state. According to Senator Shel-
by, he staged the delays due to unaddressed national
securityconcernsinAlabama.
SenatorJimBunningputamonths-longholdonthe
appointment of Miriam Sapiro, nominated to be the
deputy United States trade representative, over a
Canadian law banning candy-avored cigarettes.
Senator Bunning lifted the hold only after Democrats
agreedtoconrmamemberoftheRepublicanpartyfor a position on the Federal Maritime Commission.
MarthaJohnsonspentnearlyayearwaitingtobecon-
rmedasAdministratoroftheGeneralServicesAd-
ministrationduetoSenatorChristopherKitBonds
(R-MO)hold,atactictoreceiveapprovalforafederal
ofcebuildinginKansasCity.
SenatorJimWebb(D-VA)placedholdsonallpending
military nominations until his demand for information
onaclosedmilitarycommandinhishomestatewas
met.
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B C J at New York University School of Law| 14
Rules Reorm in the Senate
Since itwasrst enacted,the ClotureRule hasbeen
amended several times each time,withthegoalto
make it easier fora majorityto overcome obstruction
and force a substantive vote on the underlying matter.Duringeachsignicantreformpush,senatorshavear -
guedthattheConstitutionallowsamajoritytooverride
alibusterandvoteonproposedreforms,notwithstand -
ingany contraryprovisionswithin theRules.In 1953,
1957,1959,1961,1963,and1967,therewereorganized
movements at the beginning of the congressional ses-
siontoassertthispower.VicePresidentsRichardNixon
(in1957and1959)andHubertHumphrey(in1967)each
issuedadvisoryopinionsexplicitlyendorsing theSen-
atesconstitutionalpowertoeffectruleschangeinthis
manner.
VicePresidentNixonconsideredthisissueatlengthin
1957.Heconcludedthat:
ItistheopinionoftheChairthatwhiletherules
of the Senate have been continued from one Con-
gress to another, the right of a current majority of
theSenateatthebeginningofanewCongressto
adoptitsownrules,stemmingasitdoesfromthe
Constitution itself, cannot be restricted or limited
by rules adopted by a majority of the Senate in a
previousCongress.AnyprovisionofSenateRules
adoptedinapreviousCongresswhichhastheex-pressed or practical effect of denying the majority
oftheSenateinanewCongresstherighttoadopt
therulesunderwhichitdesirestoproceedis,inthe
opinion of the Chair, unconstitutional. It is also the
opinionoftheChairthat[RuleXXII]inpracticehas
suchaneffect.
Thus,Nixon continued, theSenate hasthreeoptions
atthestartofeachnewCongress:(1)proceedtocon -
duct business under the standing rules, thereby adopt-
ingthemforthenewsession;(2)votedownanymotion
to change the rules, also thereby adopting them for the
newsession;or(3)voteafrmativelytoproceedwiththe
adoptionofnewrulesbyamajorityvote.WhiletheSen-ate decided to operate under the standing rules for the
remainderofthe1957congressionalsession,Nixonsin -
terpretationoftheSenatesrulemakingpowerhasbeen
repeatedly embraced by members of the Senate.
103 Cong. reC. 178-89 (1957).
CHANGING THE SENATES RUlESAT THE START OF THE NEXT CONGRESS
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15|Filibuster Abuse
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Te Senate has Inherent Rulemaking Power Under the Constitution
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As Justice Joseph Story put it in his seminal treatise on
constitutionallaw:
No person can doubt the propriety of the provision au-
thorizing each house to determine the rules of its pro-
ceedings.Ifthepowerdidnotexist,itwouldbeutterly
impracticable to transact the business of the nation,
eitheratall,oratleastwithdecency,deliberation,and
order. The humblest assembly of men is understood to
possessthispower;anditwouldbeabsurdtodeprive
thecouncilsofthenationofalikeauthority.
JoSeph STorY, CommenTarieSonThe ConSTiTuTionofThe uniTed STaTeS
835 (1833).
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B C J at New York University School of Law| 16
x , , ,
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.9
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The Controversy o Senate Rule V
Senate RuleV stating that the Senate Rulesshall
continuefromoneCongresstothenextCongressun -
lesstheyarechangedasprovidedintheseruleswas
addedin1959aspartofacompromisedealbetween
senatorsseekingtoreininobstructionandthosewho
wantedtoretainthelibuster.Ultimately,RuleXXIIwas
tightenedtomakeiteasierfortheSenatetocutoffde-
bate,butRuleVwasaddedtodiscouragefuturerules
reform.
ThedebateoveraddingRuleVwasspirited,withmany
senatorsclaimingthatitwasunconstitutional.SenatorJacobJavits(R-NY),forone,vehementlycriticizedthe
proposedrule:ArewegoingtofollowtheConstitution
oftheUnitedStatesorarewegoingtofollowa rule
made by one Senate for all succeeding time, to bind
allSenates?Inotherwords,arewegoingtotrytogive
ourselvesanextra-constitutionalpowerorarewegoing
toobeytheConstitution?
OthersarguedthattheRulewasharmlessbecauseit
couldhavenolegalsignicance.SenatorThomasHen -
nings(D-MO),forexample,repeatedlyassuredhiscol-
leaguesthatRuleVwaswithoutnalforceoreffect.
Or,asSenatorJohnCooper(R-KY)putit,Idonotthink
[RuleV]would haveanylegal orconstitutionaleffect,butcertainlymighthavesomepsychologicaleffect.
86 Cong. reC.124,447-50(1959).
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17|Filibuster Abuse
Te Constitution Contains a Principle Against Legislative Entrenchment
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Speaking to the House of Representatives in 1790,
James Madison addressed fears that a bill temporarily
establishingtheNationscapitalinPhiladelphiawould
later prevent the capital from moving to Washington
D.C.Heexplained:
Butwhatmorecanwedothanpassalawforthepur -
pose[ofmakingWashingtonthefuturecapital]?Itisnot
inourpowertoguardagainstarepeal.Ouractsarenot
likethoseoftheMedesandPersians,unalterable.Are-
pealisathingagainstwhichnoprovisioncanbemade.
Ifthatisanobjection,itholdsgoodagainstanylawthatcan be passed.
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Entrenchment o the Senate Rules Further Blunts Legislative Accountability
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As modern social science research has demonstrated
time and again, rules of procedure regularly determine
legislativeoutcome.Forinstance,studieshaveshown
thatadenitivemajorityopinionveryrarelyexists.In-
stead, a legislature is typically composed of multiple
andequally-strong competinginterests,any ofwhich
canwin dependingon thestructureof thelegislative
process.So,inasituationinwhichoptionAispreferred
overoptionB,butnotoveroptionC,optionAcanwin
orlosedependingontheorderinwhichalternativesare
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from legislative outcome.
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19|Filibuster Abuse
O , S S , S R
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Te Senates Overlapping erm Structure Cannot Justiy Unconstitutional Entrenchment
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Indeed, imagine if thatrstSenate hadadoptedper-
manentrulesofproceedingwhenitrstmetonMarch
4,1789 at atimewhen the Senaterepresented11
states.The result todaywouldbe ludicrous. Therst
statesoutdatedproceduralpreferenceswouldcontrol
theother39stateswhichhadeithernotyetratiedthe
Constitutionorwerenotyetinexistence.Itishardto
believe that the continuing body theory could justify that
outcome.
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B C J at New York University School of Law| 20
. E , S
.89
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21|Filibuster Abuse
CONClUSION
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V.
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23|Filibuster Abuse
ENDNOTES
1 he Federalist No. , 10 (Ax H) (B N ., 00).
A Barbara Sinclair, Te New World of U.S. Senators, in Congress Recon-
sidered 7 (9 . 009).
3A U S S, S A CM, ://.///_/C. ( N. 3,010).
4 S Sinclair, supra , 0; homas Mann & Norman Ornstein, he Broken Branch 1-1(00); P K,A Dangerous Dysfunction, N.Y. imes, D. 1, 009, A31.
5 I F P, x, J M q x ; , q[] x . he Federalist No. 62, 34 (J M) (B N E., 00).
G. J. Grahm & S. G. Grahm, Founding Principles of American Government 11 (1984).
7 SeeJ Cz M G, D: I F C, 158 U. PA. L. REV. PEN-NUMBRA 45, 50-51 (010) (Cz O S); Sarah Binder & Steven Smith,Politics or Principle? Filibustering in the United States Senate 30-33 (1997).
8 SeeBinder & Smith, supra 7, 90-9; G M, Reforming the Filibuster, 105 NW. U. L. REV.1, 5 ( 011), available at://./=154747; Gregory Wawro & Eric Schick-ler, Filibuster: Obstruction and Lawmaking in the U.S. Senate (00).
9 SeeJ B E P, GOP Run Over in Game of Chicken, Roll Call, N. 5, 009, ://..//55_53//4079-1. ([A] 9- []
R R . N R . . . .); M L, Expansion of Unemployment Insurance Stalledby ACORN,Immigration Amendments, Wash. Independent, O. 0, 009, ://./4513/x-------- (T x .).
10 U.S. S, R C V 111 C - 1 S, ://..//LIS/__/___.=111=1=00334 ( M 14, 010) (V B, H.R. 3548 A).
11A S S, . SW S M, Sen. Richard Shelby of Alabama Holding Up Obama Nominees for Home-statePork, Wash. Post, F. , 010, ://../-///010/0/05/
AR0100050098..
1 S J DM, , 93% ; S J B 91.3%. F, T W L, ://./- ( D. 3, 010). Ex , []
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B C J at New York University School of Law| 24
[ j ] . E,After Health Reform, Is AnyoneWilling to Compromise?, Wash. Post, M. 4, 010.
13SeeC F E C, Te Filibuster, 49 Stan. L. Rev. 181, 00-09 (1997).
14
SeeWawro & Schickler, supra 8, 59-0; F C, supra 13, 03; M,supra 8, 4.
15 SeeM, supra 8, 4.
1 T M, N O, R W F-L, O-E, Reconciling With the Past,N.Y. imes, M. 7, 010, WK1; see also Binder & Smith, supra 7, 19-194.
17 See Examining the History of the Senate Filibuster: 1789-2008, Hearing before the Senate Comm. on Rules &Admin. 111 C. 3 (010) ( S P R); Cong. Research Service, Senate Amend-ment Process: General Conditions And Principles (001).
18 U.S. Const. . I, 7. A S C x, [] C -
x . INS . C, 4 U.S. 919, 951 (198).
19 R P, Ungovernable America?: Te Causes and Consequences of Polarized Democracy( T M. J , A 14, 010), available ://.../_3///@____///__0553..
0 Sinclair, supra , 18.
1 SeeJ Sz, H S S R, Cong. Q., A 19, 010, 90; see also Bruce Oppen-heimer, Te Process Hurdles: Energy Legislation from the OPEC Embargo to 2008, in Congress Reconsidered300-03 (9 . 009) ( H S ).
SeeBinder & Smith, supra 7, 14 ( 1-3).
3 homas Mann & Norman Ornstein, Is Congress Still the Broken Branch?, in Congress Reconsidered 3-3 (9 . 009).
4Y S C. . S, 343 U.S. 579, 35 (195).
5 D L R P, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 H. L. R. 311, 343 (00) (- T S, Te Limits of the Parliamentary Critique of the Separation of Powers, 34 Wm. & MaryL. Rev. 79, 718 (1993) W.B. Gwyn, he Meaning of the Separation of Powers 1 (195)).
Id. 344.
7 he Federalist No. 51, 88 (J M) (B N ., 00).
8 SeeL P, supra 5, 3.
9 E K, Presidential Administration, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 45, 311-15 (001).
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25|Filibuster Abuse
30 Id. 313-314.
31 P, supra 19, 4.
3 U.S. Const. . II, 3; see also U.S. Const. . II, . A j , j
. T -j .
33 E . U S, 50 U.S. 51, 59 (1997). I, Ax H P C .
[I] x , , x , , - , . T , , . I , .
he Federalist No. 7, 419 (Ax H) (B N ., 00).
34 U.S. Const. . II, .
35A W, oward the Framers Understanding of Advice and Consent: A Historical and extual Inquiry, 9Harv. J. L. & Pub. Poly 103, 11-17, 13-4 (005).
3 P R, T W H, P O A R A K AP (M 7, 010), ://../--/-------.
37 U.S. S, N C (C), ://..///___/_. ( N 19, 010).
38 MC . M, 17 U.S. 31, 404-05 (1819) (T U . . . , . I , , . I , x , .).
39J S, Ely and the Idea of Democracy, 57 Stan. L. Rev. 737, 757 (004) (O .) 90 ( ).
40 SeeGregory Koger, Filibustering, A Political History of Obstruction in the House and Senate,174 (010).
41 See id. 174-7; see also Cong. Research Service, Proposals to Reform Holds in the Senate (007); C. L E D L, Holds, Legislation and the Senate Parties1 (005) (
C S P, U Ox) ( ).
4 SeeS S. S M F,Managing the Senate Floor: Complex Unanimous Consent Agreementssince the 1950s, 14 Legis. Stud. Q. 349, 350 (1989). A S,
.See also Koger, supra 40, 175 ( -
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B C J at New York University School of Law| 26
).
43 N , q. SeeKoger, supra 40, 180-8.
44 SeeS F, supra 4, 353.
45 SeeE L, supra 41, 4.
4J. R,At Least Tree Senators Who Oppose Secret Holds Have Secret Holds of Teir Own, he Hill,M 17, 010, ://.///9891------; see also D
W, Reid Blasts Republicans Over Surgeon General Vote Delay, Other Holds, and Filibusters, Wash. Inde-pendent, O. 9, 009, ://./599/-----------.
47 SeeE MM-S, Report: Shelby Blocks All Obama Nominations In Te Senate Over AL Earmarks,alking Points Memo, F. 4, 010, ://../010/0/-----------.; S W S M, Sen. RichardShelby of Alabama Holding Up Obama Nominees for Homestate Pork, Wash. Post, F. , 010, ://.
./-///010/0/05/AR0100050098..
48 SeeJ K, Sen. Bunning Agrees to Allow Vote on Unemployment Extension Bill, A.B.C. News, M., 010, ://..//010/03/----z--..
49 SeeR, supra 4.
50 U.S. S, N C (C), supra 37.
51 U.S. S, Ex C 3-14, ://..//LIS/x_/x.( N 9, 010).
5 U S C, J E, ://../JAJ/JV/JE.x ( N 9, 010).
53 U.S. Const. . II, .
54 SeeJ E. G, Te Intended Role of the Senate in Supreme Court Appointments, 5 U. Chi. L. Rev. 337,341 (1989) ( A C, F , S . . .); see also L Rz,Advice, Consent, andSenate Inaction Is Judicial Resolution Possible?, 73 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1739, 175-5 (1998) (R F, , j S P. Id. 1753).
55
Seehe Federalist No. 7, 40 (Ax H) (B N ., 00) ( q - S I , , , , . I x P, S j, , , . I , .); he Federalist No. 77, 4 (Ax
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27|Filibuster Abuse
H) (B N ., 00) (I x - S, , . T .).
5 E . U S, 50 U.S. 51, 59-0 (1997).
57J I A M, Held Up for 15 Months, Withdrawn FEC Nominee Laments Broken Process, heHill, O. 7, 010, ://.///13031--------.
58 See, e.g.,J E, N H F S P, WASH. POS., M. 3, 009, ://../-///009/03/0/AR009030045.; S M- K DY,Momentum Grows for Relaxing Cuba Policy,Wash. Post., M. 30, 009, ://
../-///009/03/9/AR009039040.; H C,Legislative Limbo Strands Many of Obamas Nominees, N.Y. imes, D. 7, 009, ://../009/1/8///8.; Rx , Webb Lifts Holds Over Nominees, he Hill,N. 18, 010, ://.///130019------. Seealso supra 47.
59 Koger, supra 40, 174.
0 SeeWawro & Schickler, supra 8, -87; Binder & Smith, supra 7, 11-197; M B. G D G, Te Constitutional Option to Change Senate Rules and Procedures: A Majoritarian Means toOvercome the Filibuster, 8 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Poly 05, 17-0 (004); F C, supra 13, 09-13; see also J C. R,Majority Voting in Congress: Further Notes on the Constitutionality of theSenate Cloture Rule, 0 J.L. & Pol. 505, 513-518 (004).
1 U.S. Const. . 1, 5, . .
SeeR, supra 0, 53; AA P. B, Burying the Continuing Body Teory of the Sen-ate, 95 Iowa L. R. 1401, 144 (010).
3 U.S. Const. . I, 1.
4 U.S. Const. . I, 7.
5 U S . B, 144 U.S. 1, 5 (189); accordU S . S, 8 U.S. , 33 (193).
B, 144 U.S. 5; S, 8 U.S. 48 (T C S ; C .).
7 B, 144 U.S. 5.
8
I.
9 Mz . F. E R C, 75 F. 18, 18-88 (D.C. C. 198). S, , . T C x C. T, C -
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B C J at New York University School of Law| 28
. See also R, supra 0, 535.
70 R, supra 0, 53.
71 See, .., R, supra 0, 53-37 ( ); A-A P. B, Using
Statutes to Set Legislative Rules: Entrenchment, Separation of Powers, and the Rules of Proceedings Clause, 19 J.L. POL. 345 (003) ( - ).
7 SeeB, supra 71, 3-71. A P B x:I , . T x C . F , C , .
Id. 3.
73W , . SeeM . M, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) (
); see also J O. MG- M B. R, Symmetric Entrenchment: A Constitutional and Normative Teory, 89 Va. L. Rev.385, 417-439 (003) ( C x ).
74 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries *90.
75 F . P, 10 U.S. 87, 135 (1810).
7 L . U S, 54 U.S. 14, 147 (005) (S, J., ).
77 U S . W, 518 U.S. 839, 87 (199).
78 See, .., id.; R . Q, 87 U.S. 315, 319 (193) ([] C .); C M. L I. C. . S, 17 U.S. 0,1 (1899) ([E] q q j.); D .K, 18 U.S. 488, 497-98 (1897); B U C. . C C, 111 U.S. 74, 751 (1884);S . M, 101 U.S. 814 (1880); N . C, 100 U.S. 548, 554-55 (1880); B .
A, 94 U.S. 45, 50 (1877); O L I. C. . D, 57 U.S. 41, 431 (1854).
79 O L I., 57 U.S. 431.
80 F C, supra 13, 49 (q J N. E, emporal Limits on the Legislative Man-date: Entrenchment and Retroactivity, 1 Am. B. Found. Res. J. 379, 384-45 (1987)).
80 See, e.g., C . G, 531 U.S. 510 (001); Pz . U S, 51 U.S. 898, 90 (1997) (T
C S z.); N Y . U S, 505 U.S. 144, 18 (199) ( F G S , ); M . J, 495 U.S. 33, 9 (1990) (I - . . . L .).
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29|Filibuster Abuse
8 C, 531 U.S. 58.
83 Id.
84 B, supra . T .
85 Seehe Federalist No. (J M) (B N E., 00); V D. A, Te Senate and theConstitution, 97 Yale L.J. 1111, 1118 (1988). A J M , [] , , ; , . he Federalist No. 62, 347.
8 T x q , j q. SeeB, supra , 1443 .145.
87 SeeB, supra , 1444-145 x .
88 Id. 1445 ( Martin B. Gold, Senate Procedure and Practice 15455 (004)).
89 Id. 1448-54.
90 Id. 1430 ( ).
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