Bridge Team Management - Course Content

Bridge Team Management

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Associate ProfessorAssociate ProfessorAssociate ProfessorAssociate Professor Radu HanzuRadu HanzuRadu HanzuRadu Hanzu----Pazara, PhDPazara, PhDPazara, PhDPazara, PhD Lecturer Anastasia Varsami, PhDLecturer Anastasia Varsami, PhDLecturer Anastasia Varsami, PhDLecturer Anastasia Varsami, PhD

BRIDGE TEAM MANAGEMENT (Student manual)


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1. ERRORS CHAIN AND PREVENTION OF HUMAN

ERRORS

Assuming that the rules, meaning safe operating procedures, are well founded, any

deviation will bring the violator into an area of increased risk and danger. The violation itself

may not be damaging but the act of violating takes the violator into regions in which subsequent

errors are much likely to have bad outcomes.

This relationship can be summarized quite simply by the equation:

Violations + errors = injury, death and damage

The resultant situation can sometimes be made much worse because persistent rule

violators often assume, somewhat misguidedly, that nobody else will violate the rules, at least

not at the same time! Violating safe working procedures is not just a question of recklessness or

carelessness by those at the sharp end.

Factors leading to deliberate non-compliance extend well beyond the psychology of the

individual in direct contact with working hazards and include such organizational issues as:

- the nature of the workplace

- the quality of tools and equipment

- whether or not supervisors or managers turn a “blind eye” in order to get

the job done

- the quality of the rules, regulations and procedures

- the organization’s overall safety culture, or indeed its absence.


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Unsafe acts and preconditions

A brief description of the major components and causal categories follows beginning

with the level “nearest” the accident – unsafe acts.

The unsafe acts committed by operators generally take on two forms, errors and

violations. The unsafe acts operators commit can be classified among three basic errors types and

two forms of violations.

The basic error forms are:

• Decision Errors – this is one of the more common error forms, represent the

actions or in-actions of individuals whose heart is in the right place, but they either did not have

the appropriate knowledge available or just simply chose poorly.

• Skill-based Errors – is best described as those basic operating skills that occur

with little or so significant conscious thought, are particularly vulnerable to failures of attention

and/or memory.

• Perceptual Errors – when your perception of the world is different then reality,

errors can, and often do, occur, like visual illusions or spatial disorientation.

Violations in general are defined as the willful departure from authority and are two

distinct types of violations, as:

• Routine/Infractions – tend to be routine/habitual by nature constituting a part of

the individual’s behavioural repertoire and can be further broken down in: routine violations,

optimizing violations and situational violations.

• Exceptional – appear as isolated departures from authority, not necessarily

indicative of an individual’s typical behavior pattern, nor is it condoned by management.

Preconditions for unsafe acts are described by two major subdivisions: substandard

conditions of operators and substandard practices of operators.

The substandard conditions of operators are categorized as:

� Adverse Mental States – those mental conditions that affect performance;

� Adverse Physiological States – those medical or physiological conditions that

preclude safe operations;

� Physical/Mental Limitations – those instances when the task requirements

exceed the capabilities of the individual at the controls.


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The substandard practices of operators are categorized as:

� Crew Resource Mismanagement – often the substandard practices of the team

will lead to the conditions and unsafe acts;

� Personal Readiness.

Overview of the terminology

Various terms are used to describe the complex interaction between technology and

the individuals and organizations that design, build, and use technology-based systems. In

general, the term “human factor” is used to describe accident causality when cause is attributed

to the characteristics or behavior of an individual or organization, rather than structural or

mechanical failure or some environmental or other contextual factors that are outside our control.

“Human errors,” on the other hand, are the mistakes people make often resulting from these

human factors.

Other terms may be used to describe human factors; the International Maritime

Organization, for example, uses “human element” to describe the same basic concept of the

human side of the human-technology interface.

Human factors vs. Human errors


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Types of Human Errors

Human errors are specific acts that either directly (active errors) or indirectly (latent

errors) cause an incident. The effects of active errors are usually realized almost immediately,

while the consequences of latent errors may lie dormant within the system for a long period of

time, until they combine with other factors to compromise the system and lead to an accident.

A skill-based human error might occur when an operator is distracted or

preoccupied with another task and allows a mistake to occur. In rule-based or knowledge-based

errors, attention may not stray far from the problem, but problem-solving failures may occur

due to application of an incorrect rule (rule-based) or lack of familiarity with the problem

(knowledge-based).

The United States Coast Guard’s risk-based decision-making guidelines categorize

human error into four categories, which form a matrix: intentional errors, unintentional errors,

errors of omission, and errors of commission.

An intentional error is an action committed or omitted deliberately, because of a

perception that there is a better or equally effective way to perform the task or step. This can be a

shortcut that may not be recognized as a mistake until other conditions arise that result in a

noticeable problem. An intentional error may also be committed or omitted because the

worker misdiagnosed the system's problem or need. At best, such an action delays the correct

response; at worst, it compounds the problem. Intentional errors do not include acts of

sabotage. An unintentional error is an act committed or omitted accidentally, with no prior

thought; therefore, intentional errors have also been referred to as "routine violations". An

error of omission occurs when an operator fails to perform a step or task. An error of

commission occurs when an operator performs a step or task incorrectly.

Types of Human Factors

There are three categories for human factors that contribute to accidents in the offshore

oil industry, including tanker operations: individual factors, group factors, and organizational

factors. Other researchers focus on individual vs. organizational causes.

Researchers have found that although the majority of immediate causes are attributable

to individuals (e.g. operating personnel), the majority of contributing, or underlying, factors

can be attributed to the organizational context or group dynamics that influence the individual.

Similarly, once an accident sequence has begun, organizational influences may allow the


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sequence to continue, resulting in an accident. Therefore, the culture, incentives, operating

procedures, and policies of organizations have important effects on the safety of marine systems.

United States Coast Guard Error Categories

Individual Human Factors

Although most researchers recognize the importance of the organizational safety

culture, the role of the individual operator is critical. The competence, perceptual judgments,

stress, motivation, and health risks (such as work over-load) of an individual operator are

critical to the chain of events that may cause an accident or oil spill. Two of the most

recognized and studied individual factors as related to the maritime industry are described here:

inadequate knowledge and fatigue.

Other Individual Factors

People typically act to receive awards and avoid negative consequences, but

more weight is generally given to potential negative consequences to themselves, such as

being caught and punished, rather than how specific behaviors may contribute to

catastrophic accident risks. Production pressures, an organizational factor, may contribute to

risk-taking behaviors, because the potential for reward for high production may outweigh the

consequences of the worst-case scenario, especially for activities where that risk seems


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particularly remote.

Another component of individual human factors can be attributed to a lack of

preparedness for crises. Operators may be extremely proficient in routine day-to-day

operations; however, because crises occur so rarely and are not always well predicted, an

operator may be poorly prepared to deal with such an event.

Finally, people have a tendency to ignore information that is inconsistent with their

beliefs until it becomes irrefutable. This has been cited as a cause for unrealistic optimism in

a variety of industries where accident risks are characterized by uncertainty. Only when

faced with inevitable, catastrophic consequences do people acknowledge the potential for

disaster, at which point intervention may not be possible.

Relationship between sleep loss, fatigue, and accidents

Inadequate Knowledge

A United States National Research Council study cited inadequate general technical

knowledge as the cause of 35% of marine casualties: “Mariners often do not understand how the

operation works or under what set of operating conditions it was designed to work effectively”.

In the same study, 78% of mariners ascribed a lack of understanding of the overall

system of the ships they work on as a contributing factor to accidents. Moving among

different sizes and types of vessels can cause confusion and compromise decision-making

abilities if mariners are not familiar with the ship-specific systems.

When people take actions that increase the risk of failure, it is often because they have


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encountered a rare event that is not part of their training or general awareness, and they are

unaware of how their actions will affect the system or are unaware that they are contributing

to accident risk.

“Mariners are charged with making navigation decisions based on all available

information. Too often, we have a tendency to rely on either a favored piece of equipment or

our memory. Many casualties result from the failure to consult available information (such as

that from radar or an echo-sounder). In other cases, critical information may be lacking or

incorrect, leading to navigation errors (for example, bridge supports often are not marked, or

buoys may be off- station).”

A 1993 human factors study by the United States Coast Guard identified the need for

automated design approaches that incorporate human factors into the design and use of

automated systems, so that operators “will understand the concept of operations and form

appropriate mental models during initial learning and routine use.” The integration of

existing equipment and skills with new systems, such as navigation electronics, was identified

as especially important.

While not having adequate information may cause an individual to make an error, the

fact that he or she is not adequately trained for his or her position is reflective of an

organizational human factor - in this case, an organizational failure.

Group Factors

At the group level, the relationships among individuals, the members of a vessel

crew, for example, or between a supervisor and subordinate, may influence safety. Group

factors may overlap with organizational factors, but in the marine oil transportation industry, the

dynamics at the group level, such as crews or duty sections, can be extremely important to

overall safety.

An important group factor for vessel operations is the atmosphere that exists within

operational units, such as a vessel crew. The maritime tradition of “iron men on wooden

ships” has been cited as a contributor to risk-taking behavior. Overconfidence or bravado may

contribute to actions that violate a company’s stated safety policies. Pressure from the

organization or company to meet unrealistic demands with the number and qualifications of

available personnel may encourage irresponsible or risk-taking behavior as crew stretch to meet

demands from supervisors.

Reporting channels are also critical to safety considerations at the group level. Informal


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communication channels can be as important as or more important than formal ones for

encouraging open and proactive communication of safety concerns. Direct communications

between operators can be a powerful source of organizational memory and can contribute

significantly to accident prevention, especially in regards to maintenance practices. In the

marine transportation industry, this kind of organizational knowledge is best realized onboard

vessels where crew members are retained long-term. With new crewmembers or trainees, it is

extremely important that their work be subject to diligent oversight and inspection, as close

supervision can have the dual benefits of educating employees while minimizing risks.

Team Errors

Team error is one form of human error. The difference is that team error considers how a

group of people made human errors when they work in a team or a group. Then we can define

team error as human error made in group processes. Reason categorized human errors into three

types: mistakes, lapses and slips. Mistakes and lapses arise in the planning and thinking process,

whereas action slips emerge primarily out of these execution processes. Mistakes and lapses are

more likely to be associated with group processes. Slips are errors in the action process of a

single individual and are likely to be divorced from the activities of the team as whole.


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2. COMMUNICATION ONBOARD

Communication is the exchange and flow of information and ideas from one person to

another; it involves a sender transmitting an idea, information, or feeling to a receiver .

Effective communication occurs only if the receiver understands the exact information

or idea that the sender intended to transmit. Many of the problems that occur in an organization

are the either the direct result of people failing to communicate and/or processes, which leads to

confusion and can cause good plans to fail.

Studying the communication process is important because you coach, coordinate,

counsel, evaluate, and supervise throughout this process. It is the chain of understanding that

integrates the members of an organization from top to bottom, bottom to top, and side to side.

The communication process:

o Thought: First, information exists in the mind of the sender. This can be a

concept, idea, information, or feelings.

o Encoding: Next, a message is sent to a receiver in words or other symbols.

o Decoding: Lastly, the receiver translates the words or symbols into a concept or

information that he or she can understand.

During the transmitting of the message, two elements will be received: content and

context. Content is the actual words or symbols of the message that is known as language — the

spoken and written words combined into phrases that make grammatical and semantic sense. We

all use and interpret the meanings of words differently, so even simple messages can be

misunderstood. And many words have different meanings to confuse the issue even more.

Context is the way the message is delivered and is known as paralanguage — it is the

nonverbal elements in speech such as the tone of voice, the look in the sender's eyes, body

language, hand gestures, and state of emotions (anger, fear, uncertainty, confidence, etc.) that

can be detected. Although paralanguage or context often cause messages to be misunderstood as

we believe what we see more than what we hear; they are powerful communicators that help us

to understand each other. Indeed, we often trust the accuracy of nonverbal behaviors more than

verbal behaviors.


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Some leaders think they have communicated once they told someone to do something, “I

don't know why it did not get done. I told Jim to do it.” More than likely, Jim misunderstood the

message. A message has NOT been communicated unless it is understood by the receiver

(decoded). How do you know it has been properly received? By two-way communication or

feedback. This feedback tells the sender that the receiver understood the message, its level of

importance, and what must be done with it. Communication is an exchange, not just a give, as all

parties must participate to complete the information exchange.

Anything that prevents understanding of the message is a barrier to communication.

Many physical and psychological barriers exist:

o Culture, background, and bias — We allow our past experiences to change the

meaning of the message. Our culture, background, and bias can be good as they allow us to use

our past experiences to understand something new, it is when they change the meaning of the

message that they interfere with the communication process.

o Noise — Equipment or environmental noise impedes clear communication. The

sender and the receiver must both be able to concentrate on the messages being sent to each

other.

o Ourselves — Focusing on ourselves, rather than the other person can lead to

confusion and conflict. The “Me Generation” is out when it comes to effective communication.

Some of the factors that cause this are defensiveness (we feel someone is attacking us),

superiority (we feel we know more that the other), and ego (we feel we are the center of the

activity).

o Perception — If we feel the person is talking too fast, not fluently, does not

articulate clearly, etc., we may dismiss the person. Also our preconceived attitudes affect our

ability to listen. We listen uncritically to persons of high status and dismiss those of low status.

o Message — Distractions happen when we focus on the facts rather than the idea.

Our educational institutions reinforce this with tests and questions. Semantic distractions occur

when a word is used differently than you prefer. For example, the word chairman instead of

chairperson, may cause you to focus on the word and not the message.

o Environmental — Bright lights, an attractive person, unusual sights, or any other

stimulus provides a potential distraction.

o Smothering — We take it for granted that the impulse to send useful information

is automatic. Not true! Too often we believe that certain information has no value to others or

they are already aware of the facts.


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o Stress — People do not see things the same way when under stress. What we see

and believe at a given moment is influenced by our psychological frames of references — our

beliefs, values, knowledge, experiences, and goals.

These barriers can be thought of as filters, that is, the message leaves the sender, goes

through the above filters, and is then heard by the receiver. These filters may muffle the message.

And the way to overcome filters is through active listening and feedback.

Hearing and listening are not the same thing. Hearing is the act of perceiving sound. It is

involuntary and simply refers to the reception of aural stimuli. Listening is a selective activity

which involves the reception and the interpretation of aural stimuli. It involves decoding the

sound into meaning.

Listening is divided into two main categories: passive and active. Passive listening is

little more that hearing. It occurs when the receiver of the message has little motivation to listen

carefully, such as when listening to music, story telling, television, or when being polite.

People speak at 100 to 175 words per minute (WPM), but they can listen intelligently at

600 to 800 WPM. Since only a part of our mind is paying attention, it is easy to go into mind

drift — thinking about other things while listening to someone. The cure for this is active

listening — which involves listening with a purpose. It may be to gain information, obtain

directions, understand others, solve problems, share interest, see how another person feels, show

support, etc. It requires that the listener attends to the words and the feelings of the sender for

understanding. It takes the same amount or more energy than speaking. It requires the receiver

to hear the various messages, understand the meaning, and then verify the meaning by offering

feedback. The following are a few traits of active listeners:

o Spend more time listening than talking.

o Do not finish the sentences of others.

o Do not answer questions with questions.

o Are aware of biases. We all have them. We need to control them.

o Never daydreams or become preoccupied with their own thoughts when others

talk.

o Let the other speakers talk. Do not dominate the conversations.

o Plan responses after the others have finished speaking, NOT while they are

speaking.

o Provide feedback, but do not interrupt incessantly.

o Analyze by looking at all the relevant factors and asking open-ended questions.

Walk others through by summarizing.


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o Keep conversations on what others say, NOT on what interests them.

o Take brief notes. This forces them to concentrate on what is being said.

The purpose of feedback is to alter messages so the intention of the original

communicator is understood by the second communicator. It includes verbal and nonverbal

responses to another person's message.

Providing feedback is accomplished by paraphrasing the words of the sender. Restate the

sender's feelings or ideas in your own words, rather than repeating their words. Your words

should be saying, “This is what I understand your feelings to be, am I correct?” It not only

includes verbal responses, but also nonverbal ones. Nodding your head or squeezing their hand

to show agreement, dipping your eyebrows shows you don't quite understand the meaning of

their last phrase, or sucking air in deeply and blowing it hard shows that you are also exasperated

with the situation.

There are five main categories of feedback. They are listed in the order in which they

occur most frequently in daily conversations. Notice that we make judgments more often than we

try to understand:

o Evaluative: Making a judgment about the worth, goodness, or appropriateness of

the other person's statement.

o Interpretive: Paraphrasing — attempting to explain what the other person's

statement means.

o Supportive: Attempting to assist or bolster the other communicator.

o Probing: Attempting to gain additional information, continue the discussion, or

clarify a point.

o Understanding: Attempting to discover completely what the other communicator

means by her statements.

Imagine how much better daily communications would be if listeners tried to understand

first, before they tried to evaluate what someone is saying.

To deliver the full impact of a message, use nonverbal behaviors to raise the channel of

interpersonal communication:

o Eye contact: This helps to regulate the flow of communication. It signals interest

in others and increases the speaker's credibility. People who make eye contact open the flow of

communication and convey interest, concern, warmth, and credibility.

o Facial Expressions: Smiling is a powerful cue that transmits happiness,

friendliness, warmth, and liking. So, if you smile frequently you will be perceived as more


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likable, friendly, warm and approachable. Smiling is often contagious and people will react

favorably. They will be more comfortable around you and will want to listen more.

o Gestures: If you fail to gesture while speaking you may be perceived as boring

and stiff. A lively speaking style captures the listener's attention, makes the conversation more

interesting, and facilitates understanding.

o Posture and body orientation: You communicate numerous messages by the

way you talk and move. Standing erect and leaning forward communicates to listeners that you

are approachable, receptive and friendly. Interpersonal closeness results when you and the

listener face each other. Speaking with your back turned or looking at the floor or ceiling should

be avoided as it communicates disinterest.

o Proximity: Cultural norms dictate a comfortable distance for interaction with

others. You should look for signals of discomfort caused by invading the other person's space.

Some of these are: rocking, leg swinging, tapping, and gaze aversion.

o Vocal: Speaking can signal nonverbal communication when you include such

vocal elements as: tone, pitch, rhythm, timbre, loudness, and inflection. For maximum teaching

effectiveness, learn to vary these six elements of your voice. One of the major criticisms of many

speakers is that they speak in a monotone voice. Listeners perceive this type of speaker as boring

and dull.

o When speaking or trying to explain something, ask the listeners if they are

following you.

o Ensure the receiver has a chance to comment or ask questions.

o Try to put yourself in the other person's shoes — consider the feelings of the

receiver.

o Be clear about what you say.

o Look at the receiver.

o Make sure your words match your tone and body language (nonverbal behaviors).

o Vary your tone and pace.

o Do not be vague, but on the other hand, do not complicate what you are saying

with too much detail.

o Do not ignore signs of confusion.

We often hear that the content of a message is composed of:

o 55% from the visual component

o 38% from the auditory component

o 7% from language


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However, the above percentages only apply in a very narrow context. A researcher,

named Mehrabian, was interested in how listeners get their information about a speaker's general

attitude in situations where the facial expression, tone, and/or words are sending conflicting

signals.

Thus, he designed a couple of experiments. In one researched the interaction of speech,

facial expressions, and tone. Three different speakers were instructed to say “maybe” with three

different attitudes towards their listener (positive, neutral, or negative). Next, photographs of the

faces of three female models were taken as they attempted to convey the emotions of like,

neutrality, and dislike.

Test groups were then instructed to listen to the various renditions of the word “maybe,”

with the pictures of the models, and were asked to rate the attitude of the speaker. Note that the

emotion and tone were often mixed, such as a facial expression showing dislike, with the word

“maybe” spoken in a positive tone.

Significant effects of facial expression and tone were found in that the study suggested

that the combined effect of simultaneous verbal, vocal and facial attitude communications is a

weighted sum of their independent effects with the coefficients of .07, .38, and .55, respectively.

Some researchers caution their readers about the limitation to their research, “These

findings regarding the relative contribution of the tonal component of a verbal message can be

safely extended only to communication situations in which no additional information about the

communicator/addressee relationship is available.” Thus, what can be concluded is that when

people communicate, listeners derive information about the speaker's attitudes towards the

listener from visual, tonal, and verbal cues; yet the percentage derived can vary greatly

depending upon a number of other factors, such as actions, context of the communication, and

how well the communicators know each other.

Trust your instincts. Most emotions are difficult to imitate. For example, when you are

truly happy, the muscles used for smiling are controlled by the limbic system and other parts of

the brain, which are not under voluntary control. When you force a smile, a different part of the

brain is used — the cerebral cortex (under voluntary control), hence different muscles are used.

This is why a clerk, who might not have any real interest in you, has a fake look when he forces a

smile.

Of course, some actors learn to control all of their face muscles, while others draw on a

past emotional experience to produce the emotional state they want. But this is not an easy trick

to pull off all the time. There is a good reason for this — part of our emotions evolved to deal


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with other people and our empathic nature. If these emotions could easily be faked, they would

do more harm than good.

So our emotions not only guide our decisions, they can also be communicated to others

to help them in their decisions... of course their emotions will be the ultimate guide, but the

emotions they discover in others become part of their knowledge base.


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3. SHIP BRIDGE WATCHKEEPING

Safe navigation is the most fundamental attribute of good seamanship. An increasingly

sophisticated range of navigational aids can today complement the basic skills of navigating

officers, which have accumulated over the centuries.

But sophistication brings its own dangers and a need for precautionary measures against

undue reliance on technology.

Experience shows that properly formulated bridge procedures and the development of

bridge teamwork are critical to maintaining a safe navigational watch.

Seafaring will never be without its dangers but the maintenance of a safe navigational

watch at all times and the careful preparation of passage plans are at the heart of good operating

practice. If this Guide can help in that direction it will have served its purpose.

To navigate safely at all times requires effective command, control, communication and

management. It demands that the situation, the level of bridge manning, the operational status of

navigational systems and the ships' engines and auxiliaries are all taken into account.

It is people that control ships, and it is therefore people, management and teamwork

which are the key to reliable performance. People entrusted with the control of ships must be

competent to carry out their duties.

People also make mistakes and so it is necessary to ensure that monitoring and checking

prevent chains of error from developing. Mistakes cannot be predicted, and once a mistake has

been detected, it is human nature to seek to fit circumstances to the original premise, thus

compounding a simple error of judgement.

Passage planning is conducted to assess the safest and most economical sea route

between ports. Detailed plans, particularly in coastal waters, port approaches and pilotage areas,

are needed to ensure margins of safety. Once completed, the passage plan becomes the basis for

navigation. Equipment can fail and the unexpected can happen, so contingency planning is also

necessary.

Ergonomics and good design are essential elements of good bridge working practices.

Watchkeepers at sea need to be able to keep a look-out, as well as monitor the chart and observe

the radar. They should also be able to communicate using the VHF without losing situational


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awareness. When boarding or disembarking pilots, handling tugs or berthing, it should be

possible to monitor instrumentation, particularly helm and engine indicators, from the bridge

wings. Bridge notes should be provided to explain limitations of any equipment that has been

badly sited, pointing out the appropriate remedies that need to be taken.

The guiding principles behind good management practices are:

• clarity of purpose;

• delegation of authority;

• effective Organization;

• motivation.

Clarity of purpose

If more than one person is involved in navigating it is essential to agree the passage plan

and to communicate the way the voyage objectives are to be achieved consistently and without

ambiguity. The process starts with company instructions to the ship, as encompassed by a safety

management system supported by master's standing orders and reinforced by discussion and

bridge orders. Existing local pilotage legislation should also be ascertained to enable the master

to be guided accordingly.

Before approaching coastal and pilotage waters, a ship's passage plan should ensure that

dangers are noted and safe-water limits identified. Within the broad plan, pilotage should be

carried out in the knowledge that the ship can be controlled within the established safe limits and

the actions of the pilot can be monitored.

In this respect early exchange of information will enable a clearer and more positive

working relationship to be established in good time before the pilot boards. Where this is not

practicable the ship's plan should be sufficient to enable the pilot to be embarked and a safe

commencement of pilotage made without causing undue delay.

Delegation of authority

The master has the ultimate responsibility for the safety of the ship. Delegation of

authority to the officer of the watch (OOW) should be undertaken in accordance with agreed

procedures and reflect the ability and experience of the watchkeeper.

Similarly, when a pilot boards the master may delegate the conduct of the ship to the

pilot, bearing in mind that pilotage legislation varies from country to country and from region to


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region. Pilotage can range from optional voluntary pilotage that is advisory in nature, to

compulsory pilotage where the responsibility for the conduct of the navigation of the ship is

placed upon the pilot.

The master cannot abrogate responsibility for the safety of the ship and he remains in

command at all times.

If the master delegates the conduct of the ship to the pilot, it will be because he is

satisfied that the pilot has specialist knowledge, ship handling skills and communications links

with the port. In doing so the master must be satisfied that the pilot's intentions are safe and

reasonable. The OOW supports the pilot by monitoring the progress of the ship and checking

that the pilot's instructions are correctly carried out. Where problems occur which may adversely

affect the safety of the ship, the master must be advised immediately.

The process of delegation can be the cause of misunderstanding and so it is

recommended that a clear and positive statement of intention be made whenever handing over

and receiving conduct of the ship.

When navigating with the master on the bridge it is considered good practice, when it is

ascertained that it is safe to do so, to encourage the OOW to carry out the navigation, with the

master maintaining a monitoring role.

The watch system provides a Continuity of rested watchkeepers, but the watch

changeover can give rise to errors. Consequently routines and procedures to monitor the ship's

position and to avoid the possibility of mistakes must be built into the Organization of the

navigational watch.

The risks associated with navigation demand positive reporting at all times, self

verification, verification at handover and regular checks of instrumentation and bridge

procedures. The course that the ship is following and compass errors must be displayed and

checked, together with the traffic situation, at regular intervals and at every course change and

watch handover.

Effective Organization

Preparing a passage plan and carrying out the voyage necessitates that bridge resources

are appropriately allocated according to the demands of the different phases of the voyage.

Depending upon the level of activity likely to be experienced, equipment availability, and

the time it will take should the ship deviate from her track before entering shallow water, the


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master may need to ensure the availability of an adequately rested officer as back-up for the

navigational watch.

Where equipment is concerned, errors can occur for a variety of reasons and poor

equipment calibration may be significant. In the case of integrated systems, it is possible that the

failure of one component could have unpredictable consequences for the system as a whole.

It is therefore essential that navigational information is always cross checked, and where

there is doubt concerning the ship's position, it is always prudent to assume a position that is

closest to danger and proceed accordingly.

Motivation

Motivation comes from within and cannot be imposed. It is however the responsibility of

the master to create the conditions in which motivation is encouraged.

A valuable asset in any Organization is teamwork and this is enhanced by recognising the

strengths, limitations and competence of the people within a team, and organising the work of

the bridge team to take best advantage of the attributes of each team member.

Working in isolation when carrying out critical operations carries the risk of an error

going undetected. Working together and sharing information in a professional way enhances the

bridge team and the master/pilot relationship. Training in bridge resource management can

further support this.

Passage Planning

Passage planning is necessary to support the bridge team and ensure that the ship can be

navigated safely between ports from berth to berth. The passage plan should cover ocean, coastal

and pilotage waters.

The plan may need to be changed during the voyage; for example, the destination port

may not have been known or may alter, or it may be necessary to amend the plan following

consultation with the pilot.

If the plan is changed during the voyage, the bridge team on each watch should be

consulted and briefed to ensure that the revised plan is understood.

The passage plan should aim to establish the most favorable route while maintaining

appropriate margins of safety and safe passing distances offshore. When deciding upon the route,

the following factors are amongst those that should be taken into account:


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. the marine environment

. the adequacy and reliability of charted hydrographic data along the route;

· the availability and reliability of navigation aids, coastal marks, lights and radar

conspicuous targets for fixing the ship along the route;

· any routing constraints imposed by the ship e.g. draught, type of cargo;

· areas of high traffic density;

· weather forecasts and expected current, tidal, wind, swell and visibility conditions;

· areas where onshore set could occur;

· ship operations that may require additional sea room e.g. tank cleaning or pilot

embarkation;

. regulations such as ships' routing schemes and ship reporting systems;

. the reliability of the propulsion and steering systems on board.

The intended voyage should be planned prior to departure using appropriate and

available corrected charts and publications. The master should check that the tracks laid down

are safe, and the chief engineer should verify that the ship has sufficient fuel, water and

lubricants for the intended voyage.

In addition, the duty of the master to exercise professional judgement in the light of

changing circumstances remains a basic requirement for safe navigation.

In most deep sea ships it is customary for the master to delegate the initial responsibility

for preparing the passage plan to the officer responsible for navigational equipment and

publications.

In small ships the master may plan the voyage himself, while responsibility for the plan

in pilotage waters rests with the ship, the pilot on boarding, or before if practicable, should

advise the master of any local circumstances so that the plan can be updated.

Notes on passage planning

Before planning can commence, the charts, publications and other information

appropriate for the voyage will need to be gathered together and studied.

Only official nautical charts and publications should be used for passage planning, and

they should be fully corrected to the latest available notices to mariners and radio navigation

warnings. Any missing charts and publications needed for the intended voyage should be

identified from the chart catalogue and obtained before the ship sails.


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For coastal and pilotage planning and for plotting each course alteration point (or

waypoint) large scale charts should be used. For ocean passage planning and open water legs

smaller scale charts should be used.

The route plan

The route plan should incorporate the following details:

- planned track showing the true course of each leg;

- leg distances;

- any speed changes required en route;

- wheel over positions for each course alteration, where appropriate;

- turn radius for each course alteration, where appropriate;

- maximum allowable off-track margins for each leg.

At any time during the voyage, the ship may need to leave the planned route temporary at

short notice. Marking on the chart relatively shallow waters and minimum clearing distances in

critical sea areas is but one technique which will assist the OOW when having to decide quickly

to what extent to deviate without jeopardising safety and the marine environment. However, in

using this technique, care should be taken not to obscure chart features. On paper charts, only

pencil should be used.

The route plan should also take into account the need to monitor the ship's position along

the route, identify contingency actions at waypoints, and allow for collision avoidance in line

with the COLREGS.

The main details of the route plan should be recorded using sketches, if appropriate, so

that the plan can be readily referred to at the main conning position.

Passage planning and electronic navigation systems

Passage planning can be undertaken either on paper charts or using an electronic chart

display and information system (ECDIS) displaying electronic navigational charts (ENC),

subject to the approval of the flag state administration. Raster chart display systems (RCDS)

displaying raster navigational charts (RNC) can be used for passage planning in conjunction with

paper charts.

When passage planning using ECDIS, the navigating officer should be aware that a

safety contour can be established around the ship. The crossing of a safety contour, by


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attempting to enter water which is too shallow or attempting to cross the boundary of a

prohibited or specially defined area such as a traffic separation zone, will be automatically

indicated by the ECDIS while the route is both being planned and executed.

When passage planning using a combination of electronic and paper charts, particular

care needs to be taken at transition points between areas of electronic and paper chart coverage.

The voyage involves distinct pilotage, coastal and ocean water phases. Planning within any one

phase of the voyage should be undertaken using either all electronic or all paper charts rather

than a mix of chart types.

Where a passage is planned using paper charts, care should be taken when transferring

the details of the plan to an electronic chart display system. In particular, the navigating officer

should ensure that:

· positions are transferred to, and are verified on, electronic charts of an equivalent scale

to that of the paper chart on which the position was originally plotted;

· any known difference in chart datum between that used by the paper chart and that used

by the electronic chart display system is applied to the transferred positions;

· the complete passage plan as displayed on the electronic chart display system is

checked for accuracy and completeness before it is used.

Care must be taken when transferring route plans to electronic navigation aids such as

GPS, since the ship's position that is computed by the navaid is likely to be in WGS84 datum.

Route plans sent to the GPS for monitoring cross track errors must therefore be of the same

datum.

Similarly in the case of radars, routes and maps displayed on the radar will be referenced

to the position of the ship. Care must therefore be taken to ensure that maps and plans transferred

to, or prepared on, the radar are created in the same datum as the navaid (typically a GPS) which

is connected to, and transmitting positions to, the radar.

Notes on passage planning in ocean water

In open waters, the route selected will be either a great circle, composite great circle or

rhumb line route.

When planning ocean passages, the following should be consulted:

. small scale ocean planning and routing charts providing information on ocean currents,

winds, ice limits etc.;

· gnomonic projection ocean charts for plotting great circle routes;


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· the load line zone chart to ensure that the Load Line (LL) Rules are complied with;

· charts showing any relevant ships' routing schemes.

Anticipated meteorological conditions may have an impact on the ocean route that is

selected. For example:

• favorable ocean currents may offer improved overall passage speeds offsetting

any extra distance traveled;

• ice or poor visibility may limit northerly or southerly advance

• the presence of seasonal tropical storm activity may call for certain waters to be

avoided and an allowance made for sea room.

Details of weather routing services for ships are contained in lists of radio signals and in

Volume D of the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) Publication No. 9. Long-range

weather warnings are broadcast on the SafetyNET Service along with NAVAREA navigational

warnings as part of the World-Wide Navigational Warning Service (WWNWS).

Landfall targets need to be considered and identified as to their likely radar and visual

ranges and, in respect of lights, their rising and dipping ranges and arcs/colors of sectored lights.

Note on passage planning in coastal or restricted waters

By comparison with open waters, margins of safety in coastal or restricted waters can be

critical, as the time available to take corrective action is likely to be limited.

The maneuvering characteristics of the ship and any limitations or peculiarities that the

ship may have, including reliability problems with its propulsion and steering systems, may

influence the route selected through coastal waters. In shallow water, particularly if the ship is

operated at speed, ship squat can reduce underkeel clearances.

Ships' routing schemes and reporting systems along the route, as well as vessel traffic

services, should be taken into account.

Coastal weather bulletins, including gale warnings and coastal navigational warnings

broadcast by coast radio stations and NAVTEX, may require changes to be made to the route

plan.


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Monitoring the route plan

It is important that when a route is planned through coastal or restricted waters, due

consideration is given to ensuring that the progress of the ship can be effectively monitored.

Of particular importance is the need to monitor the position of the ship approaching the

wheel over position at the end of a track, and checking that the ship is safely on the new track

after the alteration of course.

Distinctive chart features should be used for monitoring the ship's position visually, by

radar and by echo sounder, and therefore need to be an integral part of the route plan.

Ahead, transits can provide a leading line along which a ship can safely steer. Abeam,

transits provide a ready check for use when altering course. At anchor, several transits can be

used to monitor the ship's position.

Bearing lines can also be effectively used. A head mark, or a bearing line of a

conspicuous object lying ahead on the track line, can be used to steer the ship, while clearing

bearings can be used to check that a ship is remaining within a safe area.

When radar conspicuous targets are available, effective use can be made of radar clearing

bearings and ranges.

Ships with good arthwartship track control can use clearing bearings to monitor the

advance of a ship towards a wheel over position, while parallel indexing can be used to check

that the ship is maintaining track and not drifting to port or starboard.

Pre-arrival planning

A preliminary plan should be prepared covering pilotage waters and the roles of the

bridge team personnel.

A plan should still be prepared even if the master of the ship has a Pilotage Exemption

Certificate for the port.

Planning for anchoring off the port or aborting port entry in the event of problems arising

should feature as part of the plan. The plan should also identify charted features that will assist

monitoring progress and include contingency measures in the event of primary equipment

failure, poor visibility etc.


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The Pilot Card should also be updated. The Card contains information on draught and

ship's speed that is liable to change as the loading condition of the ship changes, as well as a

checklist of equipment available and working.

Particularly where the master has limited local knowledge of the pilotage waters, it is

recommended that a pre-arrival exchange of information take place with the pilot before

boarding.

An information exchange initiated by the ship approximately 24 hours before the pilot's

ETA will allow sufficient time for more detailed planning to take place both on the ship and

ashore. The exchange will also allow communications between the ship and the pilot to be firmly

established before embarkation.

Ship to Shore Master/Pilot Exchange and Shore to Ship Pilot/Master Exchange forms can

be used for this purpose.

These forms are intended only to provide a basis; the exact detail of the forms can vary

from ship to ship, trade to trade, or indeed from port to port. It is nevertheless recommended to

keep preliminary information exchange to a minimum, and limit the information to that which is

strictly necessary to assist in planning the pilotage. If appropriate, the Shore to Ship Pilot/Master

Exchange form can be supported by a graphical route plan.

In certain pilotage areas, the passage can last for several hours, in which time

circumstances can alter significantly necessitating changes to the plan. The preferred way of

working within any pilotage area can also vary between pilots.

Detailed exchanges can take place when the pilot arrives on board, as indeed can

discussions on berthing.

Pilot on board

The pilotage passage plan will need to be discussed with the pilot as soon as he comes on

board. Any amendments to the plan should be agreed, and any consequential changes in

individual bridge team responsibilities made, before pilotage commences.

Where pre-arrival exchange has not taken place extra time and sea room may need to be

allowed before pilotage commences in order to discuss the plan fully.

The pilot should be handed the Pilot Card and shown the Wheelhouse Poster. The

Wheelhouse Poster provides a summary of ship manoeuvring information. A maneuvering

booklet containing more detailed information may also be available on the bridge.


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After berthing and before the pilot departs the ship, the opportunity should be taken to

discuss the outward bound pilotage passage plan with the pilot, bearing in mind that the precise

way of working within any pilotage area can vary between pilots.

Once the pilot has embarked and has arrived on the bridge, the pilot will join the bridge

team. The pilot has a specialized knowledge of navigation in local waters. Depending on local

pilotage laws the master may delegate the conduct of the ship to the pilot who directs the

navigation of the ship in close co-operation with the master and/or the OOW. It is important that

the responsibilities of the pilot and the master are agreed and clearly understood.

The presence of a pilot does not relieve the master or the OOW of their duties and

obligations for the safety of the ship. Both should be prepared to exercise their right not to

proceed to a point where the ship would not be able to maneuver, or would be in any danger.

The preliminary pilotage passage plan prepared in advance by the ship should be

immediately discussed and agreed with the pilot after boarding. There should be sufficient time

and sea room to allow this to happen safely.

Where lack of time or sea room does not allow the plan to be discussed fully, the bare

essentials should be covered immediately and the rest of the discussion held as soon as It is safe

to do so.

Indeed, on a long pilotage passage, it may be appropriate to review and update the plan in

stages.

The safe progress of the ship along the planned tracks should be closely monitored at all

times. This will include regularly fixing the position of the ship, particularly after each course

alteration, and monitoring under keel clearance.

Verbal orders from the pilot also need to be checked to confirm that they have been

correctly carried out. This will include monitoring both the rudder angle and rpm indicators

when helm and engine orders are given.

It is recommended that communication between the pilot and the bridge team is

conducted in the English language.

If the master leaves the bridge, the OOW should always seek clarification from the pilot

when in any doubt as to the pilot's actions or intentions. If a satisfactory explanation is not given,

the OOW should notify the master immediately, taking whatever action is necessary before the

master arrives. Whenever there is any disagreement with decisions of the pilot, the cause of

concern should always be made clear to the pilot and an explanation sought.

The OOW should bear in mind that during pilotage, the ship will need to be properly

secured for sea. Excessive use of deck lighting at night may cause visibility interference.


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Passage planning and ships’ routing

Ships' routing measures have been introduced in a number of coastal waters to:

• reduce the risk of collision between ships in areas of high traffic densities;

• keep shipping away from environmentally sensitive sea areas;

• reduce the risk of grounding in shallow waters.

The use of ships' routing measures should form part of the passage plan.

Ships' routing measures can be adopted internationally by IMO. Such schemes are

recommended for use by, and may be made mandatory for, all ships, certain categories of ships

or ships carrying certain cargoes. Mandatory ships' routing schemes should always be used

unless the ship has compelling safety reasons for not following them.

IMO routing schemes will be shown on charts with a note of any pertinent provisions as

to their use. Fuller details may be described in Sailing Directions. The IMO publications Ships'

Routing and Amendments to Ships' Routing contain full descriptions of each scheme and any

rules applying, but this publication is produced primarily for the benefit of administrations. It is

not kept up to date as regularly as nautical publications, which should always be consulted for

the latest information.

Elements used in routing systems include:

• traffic separation scheme a routing measure aimed at the separation of opposing

streams of traffic by establishing traffic lanes;

• traffic lane - areas within defined limits in which one-way traffic flows are

established

• separation zone or line - a means to separate traffic lanes in which ships are

proceeding in opposite or nearly opposite directions in order to separate traffic

lanes from adjacent sea areas or to separate different traffic lanes;

• roundabout - a separation point or circular zone and a circular traffic lane within

defined limits;

• inshore traffic zone - a designated sea area between the landward boundary of a

traffic separation scheme and an adjacent coast;

• recommended route - a route of undefined width, for the convenience of ships in

transit, which is often marked by centerline buoys;

• deep water route a route which has been accurately surveyed for clearance of sea

bottom and submerged articles;


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• archipelagic sea lane - sea lanes designated for the continuous and expeditious

passage of ships through archipelagic waters

• precautionary area - an area where ships must navigate with particular caution

and within which the direction of flow of traffic may be recommended;

• area to be avoided - an area in which either navigation is particularly hazardous or

it is exceptionally important to avoid casualties and which should be avoided by

all ships, or by certain classes of ships.

Passage planning and ship reporting system

Ship reporting has been introduced by a number of coastal states so that they can keep

track, via radio, radar or transponder, of ships passing through their coastal waters. Ship

reporting systems are therefore used to gather or exchange information about ships, such as their

position, course, speed and cargo. In addition to monitoring passing traffic, the information may

be used for purposes of search and rescue and prevention of marine pollution.

The use of ship reporting systems should form a part of the passage plan.

Ship reporting systems can be adopted internationally by IMO. Such systems will be

required to be used by all ships or certain categories of ships or ships carrying certain cargoes.

The Master of a ship should comply with the requirements of ship reporting systems and

report to the appropriate authority all information that is required. A report may be required upon

leaving as well as on entering the area of the system, and additional reports or information may

be required to update earlier reports.

Ship reporting requirements may be referred to on charts and in sailing directions, but

lists of radio signals provide full details. Details of IMO adopted systems are contained in Part G

of the IMO publication Ships' Routing updated by the 1996 Amendments to Ships' Routing.

Passage planning and vessel traffic services

Vessel traffic services (VTS) have been introduced, particularly in ports and their

approaches, to monitor ship compliance with local regulations and to optimize traffic

management. VTS may only be mandatory within the territorial seas of a coastal state.

VTS requirements on ships should form part of the passage plan. This should include

references to the specific radio frequencies that must be monitored by the ship for navigational or

other warnings, and advice on when to proceed in areas where traffic flow is regulated. VTS


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reporting requirements may be marked on charts but fuller details will be found in sailing

directions and lists of radio signals.

Duties of the officer of the watch (OOW)

Under the STCW Code, the OOW is the Master's representative and is primarily

responsible at all times for the safe navigation of the ship and for complying with the

COLREGS.

As the Master's representative, the OOW is in charge of the bridge and therefore in

charge of the bridge team for that watch, until properly relieved. In compliance with shipboard

operational procedures and master's standing orders, the OOW should ensure that bridge watch

manning levels are at all times safe for the prevailing circumstances and conditions.

In order to maintain a safe navigational watch, the primary duties of the OOW will

involve watchkeeping, navigation and GMDSS radio watchkeeping.

The watchkeeping duties of the OOW include maintaining a lookout and general

surveillance of the ship, collision avoidance in compliance with the COLREGS, recording bridge

activities and making periodic checks on the navigational equipment in use. Procedures for

handing over the watch and calling for support on the bridge should be in place and understood

by the OOW.

The navigational duties of the OOW are based upon the need to execute the passage plan

safely, and monitor the progress of the ship against that plan.

With the introduction of the Global Maritime Distress and Safety System (GMDSS)

radio-communications have now become an important element in the functions of the OOW,

who will be responsible for maintaining a continuous radio watch at sea. During distress

incidents, one of the qualified radio personnel should be designated to have primary

responsibility for radio-communications. On passenger ships that person can have no other duties

during a distress situation.

The OOW will need to be conversant with the means and best practices of controlling the

speed and direction of the ship, handling characteristics and stopping distances. The OOW

should not hesitate to use helm, engines or sound signaling apparatus at any time.

The OOW also needs to be fully conversant with shipboard obligations with regard to

pollution prevention, reporting and emergency situations. The OOW should know the location of

all the safety equipment on the bridge and how to operate that equipment.


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There may also be a number of additional duties for the OOW to undertake while on

watch. General communications, cargo monitoring, the monitoring and control of machinery and

the supervision and control of ship safety systems are typical examples.

Additional duties should under no circumstances interfere with the exercise of primary

duties.

The OOW should not leave the bridge unattended. However, in a ship with a separate

chartroom the OOW may visit that room for short periods of time to carry out necessary

navigational duties after first ensuring that it is safe to do so.

In compliance with the COLREGS, a proper look-out must be maintained at all times to

serve the purposes of:

* maintaining a continuous state of vigilance by sight and hearing as well as by all other

available means, with regard to any significant change in the operating environment;

* fully appraising the situation and the risk of collision, stranding and other dangers to

navigation;

* detecting ships or aircraft in distress, shipwrecked persons, wrecks, debris and other

hazards to safe navigation.

Full attention to look-out duties must be given by the bridge team on watch. A helmsman

while steering, except in small ships with an unobstructed all round view at the steering position,

should not be considered to be the look-out.

On ships with fully enclosed bridges, sound reception equipment will need to be in

operation continuously and correctly adjusted to ensure that all audible sounds on the open deck

can be clearly heard on the bridge.

Under the STCW Code, the OOW may be the sole look-out in daylight provided that on

each such occasion:

* the situation has been carefully assessed and it has been established without doubt that

it is safe to operate with a sole look-out;

* full account has been taken of all relevant factors, including, but not limited to:

• state of weather

• visibility

• traffic density

• proximity of dangers to navigation

• the attention necessary when navigating in or near traffic separation schemes


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* assistance is immediately available to be summoned to the bridge when any change in

the situation so requires.

If sole look-out watchkeeping practices are to be followed, clear guidance on how they

should operate will need to be given in the shipboard operational procedures manual.

The OOW needs to maintain a high level of general awareness about the ship and its day-

to-day operations.

This may include maintaining a general watch over the ship's decks to monitor, where

possible, people working on deck, and any cargo or cargo handling equipment. Special

watchkeeping arrangements may be appropriate in waters where there is thought to be a risk of

piracy or armed attack.

Whenever work is being carried out on deck in the vicinity of radar antennae, radio

aerials and sound signaling apparatus, the OOW should be particularly observant and should post

appropriate warning notices on the equipment controls.

The OOW must always comply with the COLREGS. Compliance not only concerns the

conduct of vessels under the steering and sailing rules, but displaying the correct lights and

shapes and making the correct sound and light signals.

A vessel drifting off a port with her engines deliberately shut down is not; for example, a

'vessel not under command' as defined by rule 3(f) of the COLREGS.

Caution should always be observed when approaching other vessels. Vessels may not be

displaying their correct light or shape signals, or indeed their signals could be badly positioned

and obscured by the ship's structure when approached from certain directions. In sea areas where

traffic flow is regulated, such as port approaches and traffic separation schemes, it may be

possible to anticipate movements from certain ship types. In these circumstances it is prudent to

allow extra searoom, as long as it is safe to do so.

In general, early and positive action should always be taken when avoiding collisions,

and once action has been taken, the OOW should always check to make sure that the action

taken is having the desired effect.

VHF radio should not be used for collision avoidance purposes. Valuable time can be

wasted attempting to make contact, since positive identification may be difficult, and once

contact has been made misunderstandings may arise.

In clear weather, the risk of collision can be detected early by taking frequent compass

bearings of an approaching vessel to ascertain whether or not the bearing is steady and the vessel

is on a collision course. Care however must be taken when approaching very large ships, ships


34

under tow or ships at close range. An appreciable bearing change may be evident under these

circumstances but in fact a risk of collision may still remain.

In restricted visibility, conduct of vessels is specifically covered by the COLREGS. In

these conditions, radar and in particular electronic radar plotting can be effectively used for

assessing risk of collision. The OOW should take the opportunity to carry out radar practice in

clear visibility, whenever it is possible.

It is important that a proper, formal record of navigational activities and incidents, which

are of importance to safety of navigation, is kept in appropriate logbooks.

Paper records from course recorders, echo sounders, NAVTEX receivers etc. should also

be retained at least for the duration of the voyage, suitably date and time marked if practicable.

In order to allow the ship's actual track to be reconstructed at a later stage, sufficient

information concerning position, course and speed should be recorded in the bridge logbook or

using approved electronic means. All positions marked on the navigational charts also need to be

retained until the end of the voyage.

Operational checks on navigational equipment should be undertaken when preparing for

sea and prior to port entry.

After lengthy ocean passages and before entering restricted coastal waters, it is important

also to check that full engine and steering maneuverability is available.

The OOW should undertake daily tests and checks on the bridge equipment, including

the following:

• manual steering should be tested at least once a watch when the automatic pilot is

in use;

• gyro and magnetic compass errors should be checked once a watch, where

possible, and after any major course alteration;

• compass repeaters should be synchronized, including repeaters mounted off the

bridge, such as in the engine control room and at the emergency steering position.

Checks on electronic equipment should both confirm that the piece of equipment is

functioning properly and that it is successfully communicating to any bridge system to which it

is connected.

Built-in test facilities provide a useful health check on the functional state of the piece of

equipment and should be used frequently.

Electronic equipment systems should be checked to ensure that configuration settings -

important for correct interfacing between pieces of equipment - have not changed.


35

To ensure adequate performance, information from electronic equipment should always

be compared and verified against information from different independent sources.

Good practice also requires the OOW to check that orders are being correctly followed.

Rudder angle and engine rpm indicators, for example, provide the OOW with an immediate

check on whether helm and engine movement orders are being followed.

The OOW should not hand over the watch if there is any reason to believe that the

relieving officer is unfit to, or is temporarily unable to, carry out his duties effectively. If in any

doubt, the OOW should call the master.

Illness or the effect of drink, drugs or fatigue could be reasons why the relieving officer

is unfit for duty.

Before taking over the watch, the relieving officer must be satisfied as to the ship's

position and confirm its intended track, course and speed, and engine controls as appropriate, as

well as noting any dangers to navigation expected to be encountered during his watch.

The relieving officer should also be satisfied that all other members of the bridge team

for the new watch are fit for duty, particularly as regards their adjustment to night vision.

If a maneuver or other action to avoid a hazard is taking place at the moment the OOW is

being relieved, handover should be deferred until such action has been completed.

The OOW should notify the master, in accordance with standing orders or special

instructions, when in any doubt as to what action to take in the interests of safety.

Guidance on specific circumstances for calling the master or other back-up support

should be given in the shipboard operational procedures, supported by standing and bridge

orders, as appropriate.

The OOW will continue to be responsible for the watch, despite the presence of the

master on the bridge, until informed specifically that the master has assumed that responsibility,

and this is mutually understood. The fact that the master has taken command on the bridge

should be recorded in the log book.

It is important that the OOW executes the passage plan as prepared and monitors the

progress of the ship relative to that plan.

If the OOW has to make a temporary deviation from the passage plan for any reason, the

OOW should return to the plan as soon as it is safe to do so.

If the OOW has to leave the passage plan - a reporting of ice may, for example, require

an alteration of course - the OOW should prepare and proceed along a new temporary track clear

of any danger. At the first opportunity, the OOW should advise the master of the actions taken.


36

The plan will need to be formally amended and a briefing made to the other members of the

bridge team.

Good navigational practice demands that the OOW:

• understands the capabilities and limitations of the navigational aids and systems being

used and continually monitors their performance;

• uses the echo sounder to monitor changes in water depth;

• uses dead reckoning techniques to check position fixes;

• cross checks position fixes using independent sources of information: this is particularly

important when electronic position-fixing systems such as GPS or Loran-C are used as the

primary means of fixing the position of the ship

• uses visual navigation aids to support electronic position-fixing methods i.e. landmarks

in coastal areas and celestial navigation in open waters;

• does not become over reliant on automated navigational equipment, including

electronic chart systems, thereby failing to make proper navigational use of visual information.

Care should also be exercised when taking geographical positions from electronic

position-fixing systems like GPS, and plotting these onto charts.

The OOW should bear in mind that:

• if the chart datum differs from the datum (usually WGS84) used by the electronic

position-fixing system, a datum shift will have to be applied to the position co-

ordinates before they are plotted on the chart, it should be noted that where an

appreciable datum shift does exist for a particular chart, a, satellite-derived

position' note providing latitude and longitude datum shift values will appear on

the chart;

• on charts whose survey source data is very old, the accuracy of those charts may

be poor in certain areas-. under these circumstances the OOW should not rely

totally on position fixing using electronic systems, and should where possible use

visual and radar navigational techniques to maintain safe distances off the land.

As a general rule, navigation should be carried out on the most suitable large scale charts

on board, and the position' of the ship should be fixed at frequent intervals. All relevant

navigation marks should be positively identified by the OOW before they are used. Visual and

radar position fixing and monitoring techniques should be used whenever possible.

In coastal waters, the OOW should be aware that ships' routing schemes and ship

reporting systems requiring reports to be made to coast radio and vessel traffic stations may

exist.


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Knowledge of the ship's draught, stability conditions and maneuvering characteristics is

also important. As the ship enters shallow water, squat may have a critical effect on the

maneuverability of the ship and cause an increase in draught. Squat effect varies in proportion to

the square of the ship's speed, and will therefore reduce as speed is reduced.

The importance of all the bridge team fully understanding the coastal waters phase of the

passage plan, as well as understanding their individual roles and those of their colleagues, cannot

be stressed too strongly.

At anchor

On anchoring, a fix on the anchor drop position should be made and the ship's swinging

circle ascertained, based upon the length of cable in use. Landmarks and transits should be

selected for ease of monitoring the position of the ship as it lies at anchor and appropriate light

and shape signals should be exhibited according to the COLREGS and any local regulations.

While at anchor, the OOW should maintain a check on the ship's position to monitor that

the ship does not drag its anchor or move too close to any other anchored ship.

A proper look-out must be maintained and ship inspection rounds periodically made,

particularly if the ship is anchored in waters which might present a risk of attack by pirates or

armed robbers.

The master should be immediately notified if the ship drags her anchor, and if sea

conditions or visibility deteriorate.

Controlling the speed and direction of the ship

In order not to jeopardize the safety of the ship, the OOW should not hesitate to use the

engines to change speed on passage if the situation so requires.

Whenever possible, timely notice of intended changes to engine speed should be given to

the engine room. If the ship is fitted with UMS engine controls, direct control of the engines will

be possible from the bridge.

In compliance with the COLREGS, ships should at all times proceed at a safe speed. In

restricted visibility safe speed may require a reduction in service speed to reduce the stopping

distance of the ship. Near ice, ships are specifically required to proceed at moderate speeds.

Speed changes may be required to avoid a collision in circumstances where the ship is unable to

alter course.


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To control the main engines effectively, the OOW should be familiar with their operation

from the bridge, as well as the operation of the propeller mechanism. The OOW should also be

aware of any limitations the system may have, and appreciate that the type and configuration of

the ship's engines could have implications when changing speed. Direct-drive diesel, diesel

through gearbox/clutch, turbo-electric and gas turbine engines all have relatively quick responses

to change, provided the engines are on stand-by. Geared turbines are less responsive.

Steering control of the ship will comprise manual steering, probably supplemented by an

automatic pilot (autopilot) or other track control system.

In areas of high traffic density, in conditions of restricted visibility and in all other

potentially hazardous situations a helmsman should be available on the bridge, ready at all times

to take over steering control immediately.

When steering the ship under autopilot, it is highly dangerous to allow a situation to

develop to a point where the OOW is without assistance and has to break the continuity of the

look-out in order to take emergency action and engage manual steering.

Changing between automatic and manual steering should always be made in good time

under the supervision of the OOW. Manual steering should be tested after prolonged use of the

autopilot.

Manual steering override controls can be used on those occasions when the autopilot is

engaged and the OOW needs to take immediate and direct control of the steering.

Override controls typically have a non follow-up type of operation and are likely to differ

from the main steering control position where follow-up control is usual.

The OOW needs to be familiar with the operation of the steering control systems on the

bridge, as well as the method of control at the emergency steering position.

Ship's maneuvering data is contained on the Pilot Card and Wheelhouse Poster. Some

ships also have a maneuvering booklet. The OOW needs to be familiar with this data.

It is important not only to record on the Pilot Card the ship's draught, but also any

permanent or temporary ship idiosyncrasies that could affect the maneuverability of the ship. A

ship may, for example, have a tendency to steer to port at full speed, but steer to starboard at

slow speed.


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4. BRIDGE RESOURCE MANAGEMENT AND THE

BRIDGE TEAM

Composition of the navigational watch under the STCW Code

In determining that the composition of the navigational watch is adequate to ensure that a

proper look-out can be continuously maintained, the Master should take into account all relevant

factors including the following:

1. visibility, state of weather and sea;

2. traffic density, and other activities occurring in the area in which the ship is navigating;

3. the attention necessary when navigating in or near traffic separation schemes or other

routing measures;

4. the additional workload caused by the nature of the ship's functions, immediate operating

requirements and anticipated maneuvers;

5. the fitness for duty of any crew members on call who are assigned as members of the

watch;

6. knowledge of and confidence in the professional competence of the ship's officers and

crew;

7. the experience of each OOW, and the familiarity of that OOW with the ship's equipment,

procedures and maneuvering capability;

8. activities taking place on board the ship at any particular time, including radio-

communication activities, and the availability of assistance to be summoned immediately

to the bridge when necessary;

9. the operational status of bridge instrumentation and controls, including alarm systems;

10. rudder and propeller control and ship maneuvering characteristics;

11. the size of the ship and the field of vision available from the conning position;

12. the configuration of the bridge, to the extent such configuration might inhibit a member

of the watch from detecting by sight or hearing any external development;

13. any other relevant standard, procedure or guidance relating to watchkeeping

arrangements and fitness for duty.


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Watchkeeping arrangements under the STCW Code

When deciding the composition of the watch on the bridge, which may include

appropriately qualified ratings, the following factors, inter alia, must be taken into account:

- the need to ensure that at no time should the bridge be left unattended;

- weather conditions, visibility and whether there is daylight or darkness;

- proximity of navigational hazards which may make it necessary for the OOW to carry

out additional duties;

- use and operational condition of navigational aids such as radar or electronic position-

indicating devices and any other equipment affecting the safe navigation of the ship;

- whether the ship is fitted with automatic steering;

- whether there are radio duties to be performed;

- unmanned machinery space (UMS) controls, alarms and indicators provided on the

bridge, procedures for their use and limitations;

- any unusual demands on the navigational watch that may arise as a result of special

operational circumstances.

Reassessing manning levels during the voyage

At any time on passage, it may become appropriate to review the manning levels of a

navigational watch.

Changes to the operational status of the bridge equipment, the prevailing weather and

traffic conditions, the nature of the waters in which the ship is navigating, fatigue levels and

workload on the bridge are among the factors that should be taken into account.

A passage through restricted waters may, for example, necessitate a helmsman for

manual steering, and calling the master or a back-up officer to support the bridge team.

Sole look-out

Under the STCW Code, the OOW may be the sole look-out in daylight conditions.

If sole look-out watchkeeping is to be practiced on any ship, clear guidance should be

given in the shipboard operational procedures manual, supported by Master's standing orders as

appropriate, and covering as a minimum:


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· under what circumstances sole look-out watchkeeping can commence;

· how sole look-out watchkeeping should be supported;

· under what circumstances sole look-out watchkeeping must be suspended.

It is also recommended that before commencing sole look-out watchkeeping the Master

should be satisfied, on each occasion, that:

. the OOW has had sufficient rest prior to commencing watch;

· in the judgement of the OOW, the anticipated workload is well within his capacity to

maintain a proper look-out and remain in full control of the prevailing circumstances;

· back-up assistance to the OOW has been clearly designated;

· the OOW knows who will provide that back-up assistance, in what circumstances back-

up must be called, and how to call it quickly;

· designated back-up personnel are aware of response times, any limitations on their

movements, and are able to hear alarm or communication calls from the bridge;

· all essential equipment and alarms on the bridge are fully functional.

The bridge team

All ship's personnel who have bridge navigational watch duties will be part of the bridge

team. The Master and Pilot(s), as necessary, will support the team, which will comprise the

OOW, a helmsman and look-out(s) as required.

The OOW is in charge of the bridge and the bridge team for that watch, until relieved.

It is important that the bridge team works together closely, both within a particular watch

and across watches, since decisions made on one watch may have an impact on another watch.

The bridge team also has an important role in maintaining communications with the

engine room and other operating areas on the ship.

The bridge team and the Master

It should be clearly established in the company's safety management system that the

Master has the overriding authority and responsibility to make decisions with respect to safety

and pollution prevention. The Master should not be constrained by a shipowner or charterer from

taking any decision which in his professional judgement, is necessary for safe navigation, in

particular in severe weather and in heavy seas.


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The bridge team should have a clear understanding of the information that should be

routinely reported to the Master, of the requirements to keep the Master fully informed, and of

the circumstances under which the Master should be called.

When the Master has arrived on the bridge, his decision to take over control of the bridge

from the OOW must be clear and unambiguous.

Working within the bridge team

Duties should be clearly assigned, limited to those duties that can be performed

effectively, and clearly prioritized.

Team members should be asked to confirm that they understand the tasks and duties

assigned to them.

The positive reporting on events while undertaking tasks and duties. is one way of

monitoring the performance of bridge team members and detecting any deterioration in

watchkeeping performance.

The ability of ship's personnel to co-ordinate activities and communicate effectively with

each other is vital during emergency situations. During routine sea passages or port approaches

the bridge team personnel must also work as an effective team.

A bridge team which has a plan that is understood and is well briefed, with all members

supporting each other, will have good situation awareness. Its members will then be able to

anticipate dangerous situations arising and recognize the development of a chain of errors, thus

enabling them to take action to break the sequence.

All non-essential activity on the bridge should be avoided.

There is a general obligation under the ISM Code and the STCW Convention for ship's

personnel new to a particular ship to receive ship specific familiarization in safety matters.

For those personnel that have a direct involvement in ship operations such as

watchkeeping, a reasonable period of time must be allocated for new personnel to become

acquainted with the equipment that they will be using and any associated ship procedures. This

must be covered in written instructions that the company is required to provide to the master.

A knowledgeable crew member must be assigned to new personnel for one-tone training

in a common language, ideally supported by checklists. Self-teaching manuals, videos or

computer based training programs, are examples of other methods that could be used on board

ship.


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In order to prevent fatigue, the STCW Code stipulates that bridge team members must

take mandatory rest periods. Rest periods of at least 10 hours in any 24hour period are required.

If the rest is taken in two separate periods, one of those periods must be at least 6 hours.

However, the minimum period of 10 hours may be reduced to not less than 6 consecutive hours

provided that any such reduction does not extend beyond two days, and not less than 70 hours '

rest is provided during each seven-day period. Detailed guidance is available in the ISF

publication 'International Shipboard Work Hour Limits'.

The STCW Code also advises governments to prescribe a maximum blood alcohol level

of 0.08% for ship's personnel during watchkeeping and to prohibit alcohol consumption within 4

hours prior to commencing a watch. Port states, flag state administrations and companies may

have more stringent policies.

The STCW Code requires the OOW to have knowledge of written and spoken English

that is adequate to understand charts, nautical publications, meteorological information and

messages concerning the ship's safety and operations, and adequate to communicate with other

ships and coast stations. A handbook on Standard Marine Navigational Vocabulary (SMNV) has

been published, and Standard Marine Communication Phrases (SMCP) are being introduced by

IMO.

Communications within the bridge team need to be understood. Communications

between multilingual team members, and in particular with ratings, should either be in a

language that is common to all relevant bridge team members or in English.

When a Pilot is on board, the same rule should apply. Further, when a Pilot is

communicating to parties external to the ship, such as tugs, the ship should request that the Pilot

always communicate in English or a language that can be understood on the bridge.

Alternatively, the Pilot should always be asked to explain his communications to the bridge

team, so that the ship is aware of the Pilot's intentions at all times.

Navigation policy and company procedures

Every management or shipowning company should have a safety management policy. It

should provide practical guidance concerning safe navigation and include:

• a clear statement that safety of life and safety of the ship take precedence over all

other considerations;

• allocation of bridge watchkeeping duties and responsibilities for navigational

procedures;


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• procedures for voyage planning and execution;

• chart and nautical publication correction procedures;

• procedures to ensure that all essential navigation equipment and main and

auxiliary machinery are available and fully operational;

• advice concerning emergency responses;

• ship position reporting procedures;

• accident and near miss reporting procedures;

• recording of voyage events;

• procedures for familiarization training and handover at crew changes;

• a recognized system for identifying special training needs;

• company contacts, including the designated person under the ISM Code.

Master's standing orders

Shipboard operational procedures manuals supported by standing-instructions based

upon the company's navigation policy should form the basis of command and control on board.

Master's standing orders should be written to reflect the Master's own particular

requirements and circumstances particular to the ship, her trade and the experience of the bridge

team employed at that point in time.

Standing orders and instructions should operate without conflict within the ship's safety

management system.

Standing orders should be read by all officers before the commencement of the voyage

and signed accordingly. A copy of the orders should be available on the bridge for reference.

Bridge order book

In addition to general standing orders, specific instructions may be needed for special

circumstances.

At night the Master should write in the bridge order book what is expected of the OOW.

These orders must be signed by each OOW when going on watch.


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Emergency situations

The OOW should be fully conversant with the emergency checklists and should know

what initial action to take in response to emergency situations.

A collision or grounding or a man overboard are examples of situations that will require

immediate action from the OOW before the Master arrives on the bridge.

SOLAS requires emergency training, drills and mustering exercises to be carried out.

These drills will involve the OOW on those ships where the bridge is the designated emergency

control station. The OOW should be fully conversant with the general emergency alarm signals,

the actions to be taken on hearing or instigating an alarm and the ship's emergency plans.

An illustrated table describing the ship's life saving appliances should also be kept on the

bridge. Ships or persons in distress should use the prescribed signals when communicating with

life-saving stations, maritime rescue units and aircraft engaged in search and rescue operations.

The OOW should be aware that ships have an obligation under SOLAS to broadcast

danger messages to ships in the area and the nearest coast station notifying the following

conditions:

- dangerous ice;

- a dangerous derelict or any other direct danger to navigation;

- a tropical storm;

- sub-freezing air temperatures associated with gale force winds causing severe ice

accretion on superstructures;

- winds of force 10 or above on the Beaufort scale for which no storm warning has been

received.

The safety signal should be used when announcing danger messages.

The OOW should be aware that ships have search and rescue (SAR) obligations under

SOLAS.

Ships that are in a position to provide assistance, on receiving a signal from any source

that persons are in distress at sea, are bound to proceed with all speed to their assistance. Ships

can also be requisitioned to provide assistance.

During SAR operations, ship-to-ship communication should be by VHF or ME Satellite

channels should be kept free for communications with rescue coordination centers.

The OOW of a ship that is likely to be engaged in the transfer of personnel or stores by

helicopter should become familiar with the ICS 'Guide to Helicopter/Ship Operations'.


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The OOW of a ship that is likely to operate in waters that may present a risk of attack by

pirates or armed robbers should be familiar with the ISF publication 'Pirates and Armed Robbers:

A Master's Guide'.


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5. LEADERSHIP – LEADING FOR SAFETY

There is well-established research both in the maritime and other hazardous industries

that confirms the huge impact of leadership on the safety of operations. Whilst the International

Safety Management (ISM) code has been a major step forward in improving safety standards, its

effectiveness depends heavily on how leaders approach its implementation, and this in turn

depends heavily on the skills and qualities of leaders – both at sea, at the ship-shore interface,

and on-shore.

Virtually all maritime leaders want to do their best for safety, this is not in doubt. But

sometimes real life makes things difficult – time pressures, economic constraints and everyday

circumstances sometimes seem to conspire against good safety leadership.

The Ten Core Safety Leadership Qualities

A. Confidence and Authority

1. Instill respect and command authority

2. Lead the team by example

3. Draw on knowledge and experience

4. Remain calm in a crisis

B. Empathy and Understanding

5. Practise ‘tough empathy’

6. Be sensitive to different cultures

7. Recognise the crew’s limitations

C. Motivation and Commitment

8. Motivate and create a sense of community

9. Place the safety of crew and passengers above everything


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D. Openness and Clarity

10. Communicate and listen clearly

Instill respect and command authority

The ability to instill respect from, and command authority over, the crew is probably the

first thing that comes to mind when people think of leadership.

In many ways it happens on its own when you get everything else right.

Leaders get respect and command authority when crews believe that you:

• Are willing to exercise the power vested in your position

• Possess the necessary knowledge and competence

• Understand their situation and care about their welfare

• Are able to communicate clearly

• Are prepared to act confidently and decisively.

Without authority and respect it is difficult for leaders to influence the behaviour of their

crews, including safety-related behaviour. Crews may establish their own individual or group

values, attitudes and behaviours, or else follow other de-facto leaders lower down in the

hierarchy. This can lead to poor compliance with standards and excessive risk-taking.

Research shows that some Masters feel that their authority is being undermined by

increasing governance from shore-based managers under ISM (e.g. through the Designated

Person Ashore requirements). Also, some Masters feel that the increase in the volume of

management standards and procedures is undermining their authority. These areas are important

to address.

Leaders need to tailor leadership style to fit their individual personalities, but there are

some common features:

Things that tend to work

• Have confidence in your decisions and stick to them

• Admit mistakes when you are sure you are wrong

• Demonstrate staff care and respect through everyday actions

• Earn respect through your actions

• Try to achieve better mutual ship-shore management understanding (e.g. through

meetings, informal contacts or job rotation).


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Things that tend not to work

• Demanding respect from subordinates

• Using the power vested in your position as a threat

• Refusing to listen when challenged

• Acting unnecessarily tough when there is no justification

• Ignoring shore-based management

• Blaming shore-based management for the consequences of decisions

• Shore-managers being too prescriptive with Masters.

Lead the team by example

Leading the team by example is the combination of two things: being seen to be

practicing what you preach, and pulling your weight as a key part of the team.

It is well-known that people are less likely to follow any rule or practice if you do not

follow it yourself – this is especially true for safety rules.

Traditionally, Masters may have regarded themselves more as authorities to be obeyed

rather than team players. However, with increasing safety requirements and fluid labour markets,

sometimes with high crew turnover, it is increasingly important to use leadership styles that

demonstrate shared safety values through actions, not just words.


• Always be seen to follow simple, visible safety rules during everyday activities

• Be seen to be playing an active role, not just behind the scenes

• Occasionally be seen to assist in subordinates’ tasks where necessary.


• Applying hard discipline for non-compliance whilst flouting rules yourself

• Avoiding ‘getting your hands dirty’ with subordinates’ tasks.


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Draw on knowledge and experience

It is self-evident that adequate knowledge and experience are prerequisites for effective

leadership. In the context of safety leadership this means in particular:

• Good knowledge of safety-related regulations, codes and standards

• Experience and skills not only in technical and operational issues but also in

people management.

Without factual safety knowledge, leaders cannot convince their crews that they are on

top of safety issues and take it seriously themselves. Without people management skills,

effective implementation of written safety regulations, codes and standards is very difficult.

Research indicates that people management is an area for further improvement in the maritime

industry. There is little dedicated formal training in this area at present.


• Ensure that you are up-to-speed on safety requirements

• Consider your own strengths and weaknesses in people skills such as

communication, motivation, team working, conflict resolution, crisis

management, coaching and appraisal, discipline

• You can’t be an expert in everything – so be prepared to acknowledge your own

knowledge gaps and seek advice when you need to.


• Concentrating only on technical safety knowledge without considering people

skills.


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Remain calm in a crisis

People need strong, clear leadership in a crisis and rely more on their leaders than would

otherwise be the case. Calmness in a crisis situation is a core requirement and will rely on many

of the other leadership qualities described in this booklet including commanding authority and

drawing on knowledge and experience. In particular, it is important to have confidence and trust

in the crew’s abilities and emergency preparedness. Attendance at safety training and at response

drilling is essential for all crew.

Calmness in a crisis is particularly important in view of the additional complications of

different languages and nationalities that make up the crew. These complications tend to be

emphasised during emergencies.


• Develop excellent knowledge of, and confidence in, the crew’s abilities

• Implement a firm policy on compulsory attendance at emergency safety training

and response drills.


• Infrequent or inconsistent emergency drills

• Failure to address language issues in emergency planning.

Practise ‘tough empathy’

‘Empathy’ is all about identification with and understanding of another’s situation,

feelings, and motives. It requires the capacity to put yourself in another’s place, and the

cultivation of good listening skills. Good leaders empathise realistically with employees and care

intensely about the work they do – but this doesn’t mean that they always agree with them or

join in with concerns and grumbles. Instead they practise ‘tough empathy’, which means giving

people what they need, rather than necessarily what they want. Another way of looking at this is

‘care with detachment’. An example is providing staff with safety footwear that is comfortable

and safe, rather than spending more money to provide a more ‘fashionable’ style.

Tough empathy is important in order both to convey to your crew that you understand

their situation, feelings and motives, and to enable you as a leader to take the right courses of

action which take due account of these desires, feelings and concerns whilst focusing on


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achieving appropriate overall objectives. In a safety context, this is especially important for

encouraging compliance with safety rules by the crew.


• Encourage crew to provide feedback on their situation, feelings and motives, both

in everyday situations and formally in prearranged communication sessions

• Be prepared to acknowledge, mirror or summarise feedback to demonstrate

understanding, then to explain your conclusions and intended course of action. If

this is significantly different to what people have said they want, take the time to

explain the case and illustrate why you are adopting this course of action


• Making a point of listening to what people say, but then taking a different

decision without any clear demonstration that you have heard and understood, or

explanation of your rationale

• Over emphasising ‘listening’ at the expense of ‘decision-making’ – this can lead

to loss of respect and authority

Be sensitive to different cultures

Good leaders are sensitive to differences in the social and behavioural norms of national

cultures, yet at the same time value all crew members equally irrespective of their nationality.

They know how to interpret different behavioural signals, and how best to react in order to exert

the strongest influence.

Crews of mixed nationalities are the norm. It has been clearly demonstrated that different

national cultures may have different values and attitudes towards safety – for example in terms

of fatalism, following rules, risk-taking etc. These values and attitudes can certainly be adapted,

but sensitivity is needed to understand how best to proceed.

In some cases, mixed nationalities can lead to splitting into different social groups, often

on the basis of language. This can be a serious barrier towards effective and consistent

implementation of safety-related requirements, and social wellbeing of the crew as a whole. In

emergency situations, language is of course also a potential risk area.


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• Ensure as far as possible that one ‘working language’ is used even in social

situations, and that crew have adequate training in this language

• Try to avoid a large ‘critical mass’ of one nationality developing, where possible

• Learn the key features of typical behavioural signals exhibited by the nationalities

represented on board – training in this is available

• Consciously seek to build trust, familiarity and integration of disparate social

groups through organised or semi-organised social activities on-board.


• Ingrained value judgements about different nationalities

• Overdoing ‘political correctness’ in terms of dealing with different nationalities,

so that relations become forced and unnatural.

Recognise the crew’s limitations

Good leaders have a clear understanding of how operational and other demands can be

realistically met by the crew, and are able to judge whether fatigue levels are such that action

should be taken.

Commercial pressures continue to be intense in the maritime industry.

Minimum manning levels and increased demands for reporting and paperwork mean that

working hours are long and fatigue is a key issue. It has been shown that excessive fatigue and

stress has an adverse effect on safety, and is one of the key causal factors of human error and

poor decision-making.


• Monitor and be aware of the signs of excessive fatigue in crew members

• Ensure that working hours are adequately supervised and recorded

• In the case of recurrent problems, discuss possible solutions with shore

management

• Be able to decide when it is necessary to slow or halt operations temporarily


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• Relying on crew members to tell you if they are suffering from excess fatigue

• Accepting that high levels of fatigue are an acceptable norm

Create motivation and a sense of community

Research has shown that people in work are typically motivated by satisfaction or pride

in completing a good job, and the feeling of being part of a team – not just money. Leaders have

an important role to play in creating the conditions to encourage and maintain these ‘healthy’

motivators. Demonstrating respect for staff is often a key part of this.

Meeting someone’s basic needs is often the key to keeping their motivation high.

Team spirit and pride in one’s work are primary contributors to the morale of a team.

Morale has been shown to have an adverse impact on error and violation rates, hence attention to

these aspects is an important part of safety leadership.


• Involve staff in aspects of management, for example development of detailed

working and operational practices

• Ensure that feedback is always given on staff suggestions or questions

• Demonstrate interest in, and care for, crew welfare issues

• Take part in and encourage social activities involving the staff


• One off staff morale-boosting initiatives or reward schemes that could be

perceived as condescending or trivial

• Involving staff in theory, but in practice taking little note of their inputs


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Place the safety of crew and passengers above everything

It is universally accepted that commitment from the leader is an absolute essential for

good safety. Leaders need to demonstrate this commitment clearly to their staff through their

actions, rather than just through formal declarations or policy statements. In practice this means

showing that the safety of crew and passengers is placed above everything else – ‘nothing we do

is worth getting hurt for’.

The commitment of the Master is vital to ensuring that operational pressures do not

compromise safety. Clear demonstration of commitment is also essential to reinforce the shared

values of the team with regard to safety and to help embed safety issues into everyday actions

rather than being seen as an additional chore.


• Make it clear to both superiors and subordinates that you are empowered to act

according to your own judgement on safety matters, without sanction from others

• Ensure that safety issues are integrated into other everyday operational activities,

including walkabouts, meetings and one to one discussions.


• Declaring that safety is your highest priority, then contradicting this in your

subsequent actions (e.g. by compromising safety in response to operational

pressures).

Communicate and listen clearly

The ability to communicate clearly is important at all levels in an organisation. For a

Master, the key issue is most often how to encourage better two-way rather than one-way

communication, balancing authority and approachability. Being open to criticism is a part of this.

Clear two-way communication and openness is necessary to achieve a ‘just’ culture. A

‘just’ culture is one in which individuals feel free to speak up about problems or mistakes

without being blamed. In a ‘just’ culture, safety incidents are not automatically blamed on

individuals – however for repeated violations there is a transparent and well-defined progressive

discipline policy. Without the openness inherent in this ‘just’ culture, safety incidents and near-

misses may be suppressed and unnecessary risks taken.


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• Hold safety tours and informal discussions with all levels

• Ensure that your listening skills are adequate. If necessary obtain training or

coaching in effective listening

• Implement an ‘open door’ policy for crew members who wish to see you

• Ensure that there are no barriers preventing the open reporting of safety

incidents and near-misses. If necessary consider using a confidential reporting

system

• Give positive feedback on what lessons have been learned through reporting of

incidents and near-misses without apportioning blame, and demonstrate

commitment to addressing root causes

• Cultivate an atmosphere of openness through your own personal management

style and everyday interactions


• Holding safety tours which become primarily an excuse to check up on crew and

chastise them

• Declaring a ‘no-blame’ policy without acknowledging the need for discipline

• Suggestion schemes which are poorly followed up and maintained.


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6. CULTURAL AWARENESS

Cultural differences are the foundation of communication and involve the development

of skills of understanding between different nationalities.

Cultural differences become visible when we interact with people of other nationalities,

which frequently encountered on ships with multinational crews. People see, interpret and

evaluate things around them in different ways.

What is considered appropriate in a culture can be most often poorly in another culture.

Misunderstandings due to cultural differences occur when a person of a certain culture

wants to impose his own view of people belonging to different cultures, with different principles.

Misinterpretation is the main element that appears when we want to induce another

person own concepts.

In the absence of knowledge of the cultural characteristics of another person is preferred

diplomatic approach to certain aspects of their own culture.

Becoming aware of their dynamic culture is a difficult task because it is a hard thing

noticeable. From the moment of birth we are taught to see and do things on a subconscious level.

Own experiences, personal values and cultural foundations lead us to do things in a certain way.

At certain points must, however, out of their own cultural boundaries in order to realize

the impact that other cultures have on us. It is very useful to have feedback from colleagues of

different nationalities and different cultures implicitly, to help us in the development of the

treatment of the surrounding culture.

Even cultural similarities can sometimes create misunderstandings. When you consider

that other people have a similar culture to ours, we take the risk that their actions are not

interpreted properly, which can cause a negative response from others.

It is much safer to assume the existence of major cultural differences, until discovering

cultural similarities.

There are many levels of reference by which we can highlight the perception of cultural

differences, as follows:


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The primary level (parish) - " What I know is best " - at primary level people do not

recognize other way to do different things than personally. At this level they ignore the impacts

of cultural differences.

Secondary Level (ethnocentric) - "I know their opinion, but mine is better" - at the

secondary level , people accept others way of thinking , in addition to its own way, but still

believes that personal style is best. At this level, cultural differences are perceived as a source of

problems and people tend to ignore or minimize the importance of them.

Tertiary level (synergistic) - "My opinion and their opinion" - at this level the person

realizes their own way of thinking and way of thinking of others and choose the best solution for

the situation. At this level people realize that cultural differences can lead to both the problems

and the benefits and are willing to use cultural diversity to create new solutions and alternatives.

The last level (cultural participation) - "Our opinion" - this final stage brings people

from different cultures together to create a culture of shared thinking. People dialogues between

them, create new meanings, new rules that help solve particular situations.

Increase cultural knowledge is to see both the positive and the negative ones that occur

within cultural differences. Cultural diversity can be a source of problems, especially in areas

where cooperation is needed. Diversity increases the level of complexity and confusion and

makes it more difficult to achieve a consensus.

Also, cultural diversity can be an advantage when there are ways to approach and cultural

understanding, particularly for the purpose of development. In this case, diversity leads to

valuable new skills and behaviors.

It is known that the first step to manage cultural differences to overcome them is to try to

recognize and understand, not to be afraid of them.

As long as each is a product of their culture, it is necessary to increase both their own

knowledge and the knowledge side. For this purpose there is a manual to work with cultural

differences, there are written rules to be followed in such cases.

But certainly the right attitude towards cultural differences can help achieve a common

per order shipping.

When cultural awareness, people realize that:

• we are not all the same;

• similarity and differences are equally important;

• there are many ways to achieve the same goals and cohabitation together;

• best solution depends on the circumstance, every situation is different and may

require different solutions.


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The correct approach to cultural differences can be done by taking concepts such as:

• "Accept that you don’t know" Accepting that we are not connoisseurs of all, can assist

in the understanding of the peculiarities of other cultures by discovering the differences between

their own culture and one that has been in contact .

• "Assess before" Gathering as much information as accurate for describing the situation

before making the assessment and its interpretation.

• "Empathize" . In order to understand another person, we must try to put ourselves in his

position. Through empathy we learn how others want to be treated by us.

• "Make sure that you are correctly understands" . Ask your colleagues views and

regularly check instructions to ensure their understanding and possibly find another way to

express them more accessible to others.

• "Become familiar with ambiguity".

• "Accept diversity"


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7. MANAGING RISK ON BOARD SHIP

Understanding risk

The majority of prudent and “professional” seafarers seem to have an innate ability to

understand and assess the risks that job places before them. The fact that they undertake this

“intuitive risk analysis” without formal guidance or training is a credit to seafarers and to their

professionalism. They are highly competent personnel who take their ships to sea and deliver

their cargoes without accident or incident.

It can be seen, therefore, that there is a need for improvement in day-to-day operational

techniques on board ship. In the extremely efficiency-conscious and cost-conscious commercial

climate of the last decades, there is a need to reduce these accidents, incidents and claims, both

by their number and by their monetary value.

To achieve this, the shipping industry needs to follow the lead set by other international

industries, not least the airline and offshore exploration industries, and to move forward utilizing

risk-based management techniques.

One must not lose sight of the fact that 64% of the claims analyzed can be attributed to

“human factor”. Must recognize the role played in all operations by the seafarers and must

provide him with the knowledge, the tools and the skills to allow him to contribute to this desired

improvement.

One must also recognize that there have been significant changes over the last twenty

years or so in the way that ships have been operated. No longer do we see large fleets of ships

belonging to well-established family companies manned by seafarers from country whose ensign

flies proudly over the stern. Instead, ships are frequently managed on behalf of non-seafaring,

multinational, commercial operators who are in the business solely for the profit. Where profit

may be adversely affected by operating costs, the flag on the stern may not be recognized as that

of a traditional seafaring nation. It is quite possible that these ships will be manned by

multinational crews from nations with little seafaring history and, possibly, with little or minimal

seafaring training.


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It is the aim of this chapter to look at how risk management techniques can best be

implemented aboard the ship. In doing so, consideration will be given to the following aspects of

day-to-day shipboard operations:

• Commercial factors;

• Cargo work;

• Navigation;

• On-board maintenance;

• Personal accident prevention;

• Health and safety considerations.

These aspects are not discrete entities in themselves and there will be a degree of

overlap between them. For maximum impact, the techniques are complementary and should be

viewed in that light: without the support and encouragement of “management”, the mariner is

unlikely to achieve the desired changes and improvements in shipboard operations. Similarly,

without the support and encouragement of the mariner, “management” will face an uphill

struggle in the management of change and improvement.

“Risk” and “Risk Management”

As definition, risk management is:

the systematic application of management policies procedures and practices to the

tasks of identifying, analyzing, assessing, treating and monitoring risk.

Where, “risk” has defined as:

the chance of something happening that will have an impact upon objectives. It is

measured in terms of consequence and likelihood.

If consider this definition of risk, the “objectives” of shipboard operations are to

transport cargo from one port to another without damage to the cargo, to the ship, to the ship’s

crew and other personnel or to the environment. If we take adequate steps to eliminate or

minimize any risks that may be involved, that objective will be effectively achieved.

Therefore, it will be necessary to consider the principles and activities laid down in the

definition of risk management to ensure that our shipboard operations allow us to achieve the

objective. Should consider the management policies, if any, that seek to guide the day-to-day

activities, should review the onboard procedures and should examine the working practices in

use on board the ship.


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Legislation. A number of administrations and authorities have seen fit to introduce their

own legislation to cover risk management on board ship. It is difficult in an international

environment to refer to a single piece of legislation as it may not apply to all ships or seafarers.

However, when considering the legal justification for any actions proposed in this chapter,

references has been made to the following publications:

• The International Management Code for the Safe operation of Ships and for

Pollution Prevention (the ‘ISM Code’);

• The International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and

Watchkeeping for Seafarers, 1978, as amended in 1995 and 2010 (STCW

Convention) and Seafarers’ Training, Certification and Watchkeeping Code

(STCW Code).

The definition of ‘objective’ given above is very similar to the objectives of the ISM

Code and it is worthwhile considering the text of the ISM Code when considering how risk

management can be safely and effectively implemented on board ship.

Objectives:

1. The objectives of the Code are to ensure safety at sea, prevention of human

injury or loss of life, avoidance of damage to the environment (in particular

to the marine environment) and the property.

2. Safety management objectives of the company should, inter alia:

a) provide for safe practices in ship operation and a safe working environment.

b) establish safeguards against all identified risks.

c) continuously improve safety management skills

These objectives provide clear guidance to companies for the development of safety

management systems. In broad terms they can be equally applied to the development of a risk

management system.

Shipboard operations. There are so many different types of ships and so many

different types of shipboard operations. It is the aim of this chapter to provide ‘pointers’ and

guidelines as to how the best practices may be considered and how legislation may be interpreted

with the objective of improving risk management on board ship. Inevitably, these pointers and

guidelines will be addressed from the Master’s point of view: he is, after all, the ‘general

manager’ on board the ship and he will carry the ultimate responsibility for the safe and efficient

operation of the ship. It is the intention that these pointers and guidelines can be applied equally


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by all members of a ship’s company: after all, everyone on board that ship has a degree of

personal responsibility for the safety of the ship, its cargo and all persons on board, including

themselves.

It is already considered that the majority of seafarers undertake ‘intuitive risk

assessment’ in most aspects of their day-to-day operation of the ship. It is now necessary to

develop a strategy whereby operations that may seem to be routine are considered from a ‘risk’

point of view.

Priorities. We have already seen from the definition of ‘risk’ given above that risk

needs to be considered in terms of consequence and likelihood. Using these two factors, we can

determine a level of priority for the attentions that we may need to assign to different operations.

If an operation or procedure is considered likely to have the potential for significant

consequences on the overall outcome of the voyage, it must be given a higher level of priority

than one which is unlikely to happen and, even if and when it does, it will not have an adverse

impact on the voyage.

For example, failure to lash deck cargo for a winter passage across the north Pacific

Ocean may have very severe consequences whereas the failure of the GPS receiver aerial can be

overcome by resorting to traditional navigational techniques.

However, risk management is not an individual task. To be effective, risk management

must combine knowledge, experience, and lateral thinking. One man alone cannot achieve all

this and it is incumbent upon the ship’s manager and the Master to ensure that there is a

workable framework in place that encourages teamwork and interaction between the members of

the team and the ship’s manager.

In all seafaring matters there are tendencies towards traditional methods and practices,

but it is now necessary to review the totality of our operations and to recognize that there may be

a better way. With increasing international tendencies towards litigation as a result of the

slightest error, the mariner must be as aware as his counterparts ashore – the ship manager, the

ship owner, the cargo broker, the underwriter – of the desirability for risk-based management

techniques. These techniques will lead to improvements in efficiency, in safety and, inevitably,

in the commercial viability of the whole operation.

Port of loading. In an ideal world, the ship will be securely moored at the best possible

berth, with brand new mooring ropes, in flat calm weather and sea conditions and there will be

no possibility of damage to the ship or shore and no possibility of pollution. All machinery will


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be perfectly maintained and the level of spare parts carried will be more than adequate for any

unforeseen failure of the plant or equipment.

It is difficult to appreciate a finite starting point of the risk management but, shall

assume that it starts when the Notice of Readiness (NOR) is tendered. The NOR is, of course, a

commercial document and may be considered to reflect the commitment of the ship to the ‘risk’

of the voyage. The exact wording of the NOR may vary from one port or charterer to another

but, in all cases, it will state that the vessel is ‘ready in all respects’ to load the cargo nominated.

It is not unusual for the NOR to be tendered at the same time that the pilot boards on

arrival in the loading port or when the first rope is landed ashore. For convenience, these times

are as good as any – the ship may be considered to be an ‘arrived ship’ – but there may be a

number of procedures that will still have to be completed before the vessel can physically start to

load cargo. It may still be necessary to discharge ballast or for tanks or holds to be inspected. In

other words, the vessel may not be ‘ready in all respects’.

The risk, then, is not necessarily physical but it is almost certainly financial: the terms

of the charter party (C/P) will allow for preparation of the vessel to load the nominated cargo

but, if the NOR has been tendered and the vessel is not ready to load, there will be financial

penalties. Whether these penalties will have a significant outcome on the financial viability of

the voyage cannot be determined at this stage – that can only be realized at the end of the

voyage.

There will be other clauses within the C/P that will specify lay time, demurrage,

carriage temperatures, steaming speeds and a whole host of other criteria that will determine the

requirements of the charterer and the possible commercial success of the voyage. To ensure that

the on board management of the risk of the voyage is wholly in keeping with the expectations

and requirements of both the shipowner and the charterer, it is essential that the Master has been

given adequate information regarding the terms of the C/P. he cannot be expected to fulfil his

obligations in ignorance of the terms and conditions of the C/P. where this information is not

available, the Master should take every possible measures to obtain this information.

Charter parties (C/P). it is not unusual for the Master to be given a copy of the C/P but

the clause stating the charter rate has been deleted or blanked out> this is usually done through a

desire of the shipowner or charterer to preserve some degree of commercial confidentiality. It is

quite likely that the C/P will be viewed by a wide variety of people with many different interests

in the ship or its cargo: they do not necessarily need to know the financial aspects of the charter.

The Master, however, does have a need to know this information – he cannot assess the risks to


65

the venture through deviation or breakdown if he is unaware of the financial implications of such

occurrences. If the printed copy has been blanked out, the Master should be told (in confidence)

verbally of the rate.

There are many aspects to cargo operations that need not be considered here in detail,

but the overall operations need to be considered in the light of the ‘risk’. For example, in dry

cargo ships, there is the possibility for structural damage to the ship from loading equipment

while, in tankers, there is the possibility of pollution through overloading a tank.

For the prudent risk manager, it is desirable that he is aware of the intended procedures

for the cargo operation. He should discuss this with the terminal superintendent/stevedore and

the ship’s staff. Each party should be aware of his own responsibilities within the operation and

the procedures for contact with each other in both routine and emergency matters. The

discussions should not be solely restricted to the cargo operation itself but they should also cover

such matters as:

• the weather forecast and its possible impact on cargo operations

• times of high and low water and any draught restrictions, other shipping

movements at the terminal and their effect on mooring or operations

This may seem to be routine and mundane but aim of these discussion ids to minimize

the risk to overall operation.

At some stage, the navigating officer will be preparing the passage plan for the intended

voyage. If properly carried out, this passage plan is a formal risk assessment procedure, even if it

is not recognized as such. The passage plan should allow the vessel to be safely navigated at all

times throughout the voyage, highlighting areas where there are levels of greater risks.

STCW Convention contains specific, broad principles with respect to voyage planning.

Additionally, many shipping companies have their own rules and regulations for the preparation

of passage plans, incorporating safety procedures and requirements that may not be readily

apparent to those on board the ship but which have been identified through the company’s own

risk management procedures.

For example, a VLCC is loading in the Arabian Gulf for Japan, intending to transit the

Singapore Straits. The passage plan should indicate, amongst other things, the desired frequency

of position fixing while still within the Gulf, as well as indicating safe clearing distances from

offshore structures, points of land and so on. Once clear of the Straits of Hurmuz it may be

acceptable to lessen the frequency of position fixing until the vessel approaches the northern end

of the Malacca Straits.


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The passage plan. He may have discussed his intentions and requirements with the

navigating officer on the bridge at the time of making out the plan but the prudent Master will,

however, ensure that these intentions and requirements have been followed through before

committing his vessel to the voyage.

While preparing the passage plan, has the navigating officer ensured that the charts and

publications to be used are fully up-to-date. There is still an unacceptably high incidence of

reports of ships with out of date nautical charts and publications. This may lead, in many ports,

to detention of the vessel or heavy financial penalties until the matter is rectified.

During the port stay it is almost certain that the ship will require to take bunkers for the

intended voyage. It is not unknown for accidents to occur during bunkering operations and the

obvious consequence of these accidents is pollution incident will also attract a financial

consequence.

Section 7 of the ISM Code requires the preparation of plans and instructions for key

shipboard operations concerning the safety of the ship and the prevention of pollution.

Bunkering operations fall very clearly within this category of key shipboard operations. The

prudent risk manager will, therefore, ensure that these plans and instructions are in place and that

the procedures required are strictly followed. He should also ensure that those personnel

designated to carry out this task have a complete understanding of the procedures to be followed

and of their responsibilities. If it is necessary to deviate from these procedures for any reason, the

Master should discuss this with the Chief Engineer and, if need be, with his principals. The

requirement for authorization for deviation from agreed procedures may well be warranted for

bunkering operations.

Bunkers. It may also be worth considering at this point the risk from taking bunkers in

terms of quality as well as quantity. The C/P description of the ship will almost certainly specify

the grade of fuel to be used in both the main engine (s) and in the auxiliary plant. It will also

provide an indication of the expected rate of consumption of fuel, both on passage and in port.

Bunker disputes are frequent and the prudent risk manager will take careful interest in the

provision of bunkers. It is possible that the bunker supplier will be vetted – by the shipowner, by

the charterer or perhaps by one of the classification societies – but this cannot be guaranteed.

Bunker samples should be taken in the presence of a member of the ship’s company, they should

be labeled and retained for analysis if required. Bunker disputes are avoidable, if, not, they are

extremely costly.


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It is also quite likely that maintenance of key plant and machinery will take place while

the ship is in port. Again, this may be considered to be covered by the requirements of section 7

of the ISM Code and detailed procedures will probably be laid down. However, these procedures

may only relate to the work to be carried out. There are other consequences that must be

considered and evaluated.

Do the port regulations allow for the ship to be immobilized? Will the work be

completed in time for the ship to sail when expected? If it cannot, can the ship stay at the current

berth or will it be necessary to be towed to another berth or to an anchorage? Will there be a

long-term effect on the ability of the ship to complete the intended voyage?

This evaluation should not be done only by the Chief Engineer but he must consult with

the Master, the ship’s agent in the port and, probably, with his principals. This consultation must

be open, honest and realistic in its assessment if it is to have the desired effect of minimizing the

impact of any failures to complete the work.

Preparations for departure. Cargo work is nearly completed, the navigating officer

has drawn up the passage plan, the Chief Engineer has reported that all repairs and maintenance

have been completed and we can now concentrate on taking the ship to sea. To many seafarers,

time in port is stressful and unnatural. To get the ship back in open water will come as a great

relief.

In almost all instances the time running up to departure of the ship from any port is one

of rush and bustle, frantic phone calls, last minute checks on this and that and, inevitably,

waiting for the papers to arrive. The Master will not want to take his ship to sea without signing

bills of lading or without knowing the quantity of cargo onboard. The port, on the other hand,

will want to get the ship away as quickly as possible to get the next ship onto the berth. The

weather forecast is bad and the lashing of the cargo is not completed. The second mate only

joined the ship three hours ago after a fourteen-hour flight and is not fully familiar with the ship,

its layout or its operation. The deck crew, too, are also newly arrived on board, although they

joined a little earlier than the second mate.

With so many factors playing a part, there is obvious potential for things to go horribly

wrong unless the seafarers are fully aware of these constraints and have contingency plans to

cope with such situations. These contingency plans do not have to be written down but the

prudent Master will have a good appreciation of the risks associated with this scenario. He will

have taken the opportunity to check with his heads of departments that they, too, are ready for


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sea. As we have already seen, risk management is a team effort and this concept should be

brought into use at every possible opportunity.

Stowaways. Prudent risk management will allow for strict procedures to be in place

while the ship is alongside in port such as a permanent gangway watch, careful vetting of all

persons boarding the ship and so on. However, it is unlikely that any person intending to

stowaway will try to board the ship by ‘conventional’ means. It is essential, therefore, that the

vessel is thoroughly searched prior to departure, paying particular attention to dark and

seemingly inaccessible spaces, even when they appear to have been locked. On container ships,

where possible, empty and unsealed containers should be inspected prior to loading. Once

inspected they should be sealed.

Check lists. Whether the ship has been in port for a few hours or for a few days, the

preparation for taking the ship to sea should follow a structured procedure. In many ships, check

lists are used extensively for many operations. Preparations for port departure is one of the

operations where the check list is followed it will be less significant that the person performing

the checks is not familiar with the procedures. The check list itself is a guide to the procedures.

When the checks provide an answer that is not the expected answer, there must be the

opportunity to report the ‘wrong answer’ to an appropriate person who can take responsibility for

correcting the fault.

In the majority of cases, the Master will not be familiar with the port and the Pilot will

not be familiar with the ship. Much has been written in recent times of the importance of the

Master/Pilot relationship and it has equal relevance in considering the management of risk on

board a ship. Shiphandling in confined waters with the assistance of tugs is a time of high risk

and the operation must carefully thought out and discussed by the Master and the Pilot before it

is carried out in order to minimise that risk. This exchange of information must consider all

aspects of the intended manoeuvres, including the vessel’s characteristics, any limitations on

speed or track imposed by port regulations, other vessel traffic expected in the area, tidal

streams, etc. the risk of the operation cannot be minimized without the fullest exchange of

information and ideas from both the Master and the Pilot. This exchange must clarify exactly

where responsibility lies at every stage.

Regulation VIII/1 of STCW states:

“Each administration shall, for the purpose of preventing fatigue:

.1 Establish and enforce rest periods for watchkeeping personnel; and


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.2 Require that watch systems are so arranged that the efficiency of all watchkeeping

personnel is not impaired by fatigue and that duties are so organized that the first watch at the

commencement of a voyage and subsequent relieving watches are sufficiently rested and

otherwise fit for duty.

On a day-to-day basis, the responsibility of the administration is devolved to the Master.

He must be well aware of the hours that have been worked by his watchkeeping officers and

ratings immediately prior to taking the ship to sea. This does not only apply to the navigation

watch – it has equal relevance to the engineering department and the Master should consult with

the Chief Engineer before departure to ensure that all watchkeepers are suitable rested.

Fatigue. The effect of fatigue on the ability of ship’s staff to perform their duties are of

major concern. In a recent report published by the International Transport Workers Federation

(ITF) – “Seafarer fatigue: Wake up to the dangers” – the following incidents are recorded and

are considered to be a direct result of long hours of work or fatigue:

• failure to appreciate a developing collision situation, failure to account for all

cargo during stability calculations, and an inability to make decisions during an

emergency;

• a helmsman who turned hard to port instead of hard to starboard;

• pumping ballast into a cargo hold loaded with newsprint;

• failure to correctly close hatches;

• numerous incidents of overfilled tanks, spillages of oil, chemicals and

flammable materials, loading and ballasting errors.

These incidents have been selected because they have particular relevance to port

operations and preparing the ship for sea.

From these incidents it can be clearly seen that the effects of fatigue have the potential

to create significant effects on the overall success of the voyage. It is particularly so at the

beginning of the voyage and, in many instances, it is not unknown that the Master will take the

first sea watch to allow the appropriate OOW to gain sufficient rest after particularly long hours

during a port stay.

Other considerations. There are many other factors that must be taken into

consideration before taking the ship to sea. Some will have a significant impact on the outcome

of the voyage, others will not, but they must all be considered. This list is not intended to be

exhaustive or conclusive, but the following should be borne in mind:


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• Stability – is the ship stable before leaving the berth? More importantly, will it

be stable on arrival at the port of discharge?

• ETA at the next port.

• Weather forecast for the next 24 hours.

• Tidal forecast for the next 24 hours, or for however long the ship will be in tidal

waters.

• Local navigation warnings.

• And many others.

And so to sea. In the introduction to this chapter, we listed a number of factors that

need to be considered by the ‘risk manager’. None of them were specific solely to port

operations and they will need to remain under continuing scrutiny now that the ship is at sea. We

also stated that none of these factors was discrete – their interrelation and overlap will continue

throughout the voyage.

The ‘Commercial Factors’ were very important while the ship was in port as we needed

to consider, amongst others, the potential risk to the outcome of the voyage through not being

ready to load cargo, through loading insufficient bunkers, etc. The C/P or the carriage clauses

incorporated into the Bills of Lading (B/L) will not be fulfilled until the ship has arrived and the

cargo has been discharged.

To a degree, have also looked at “Cargo Work”, but is not complete. With the vessel at

sea, we must also consider cargo management, ensuring that throughout the voyage, on arrival

and during time at port of destination, the cargo is in the correct condition for discharge.

Also “Navigation” was listed in the original list. Have already looked at the risk

assessment phase of the passage plan, but the progress of the voyage will need to be monitored.

It may be considered that the safe navigation of the ship has the highest risk potential in terms of

its effect on the outcome of the voyage.

It may be that we are stating the obvious here, but, of course, ‘navigation’ does not

solely refer to the fixing of the ship’s geographical position and an awareness of the ship’s

proximity to physical dangers. Must also consider the navigational watchkeeping with the

intention of avoiding collisions. Collisions giving rise to major claims can occur anywhere.

Almost 1 in 5 occurs in open water, 1 in 3 in coastal waters, 1 in 5 in anchorages and 1 in 7 in

separation zones. It can be seen, therefore, that overall collision claims are as likely to occur in

open water as in locations where there is more obvious risk. Thus unremitting vigilance is

required Masters and officers on watch wherever ships are, and there must be continuing


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adherence to the International Regulation for the Prevention of Collision at Sea. The figures also

remind the mariner that over-reliance on radar and lack of early and clear alterations of course to

avoid a collision situation are two key elements of basic marine safety. Officers should be

encouraged to refresh themselves regularly on the regulations, up-to-date copies of which should

always be readily available to them.

Types and time of collisions. Crossing situations continue to dominate the experience

of collisions, with 2 in 5 claims arising in this way. Nine per cent involve an overtaking scenario,

which indicates rule of the road difficulties: 1 in 4 involves one of the ships being stationary.

Collisions are not evenly distributed throughout the day. Ten per cent occur in one hour

between 05:00 hours and 06:00 hours local time and altogether over 40% occur during the

morning watch. While this may relate to the activities traditionally carried out during that watch,

including entering harbour when there is a full bridge complement including a pilot it is

nevertheless worthy of further study.

The existence of the ‘circadian trough’ – the time at which the body’s natural rhythms

mean that an individual’s ability to perform most tasks is at its lowest ebb – is well documented,

with research showing a peak of accidents between the hours of 04:00 and 06:00.

The old adage that “a collision at sea can ruin your whole day” is undeniably true and,

from the definition of ‘risk’ given above, a collision will certainly have an impact upon the

objective of completing the voyage safely and satisfactorily. From statistical point of view of the

occurrence of collisions and, in terms of ‘consequence’, this will almost certainly be significant.

In the unfortunate event of a collision, there are many procedures and processes that

will come into play, not least of which will be the ship’s emergency procedures. These

procedures are intended to provide an effective method of minimizing loss of damage to the ship

and the cargo, to the persons onboard and to the environment in the event of an emergency,

whether that is a fire, a collision, stranding and so on.

Exercises and drills. The prudent risk manager will ensure that the nature and context

of these exercises and drills is varied so that he will have the opportunity to assess the

capabilities of his crew, as well as assessing the suitability of the accepted procedures to deal

with anticipated situations. He will also ensure that there is a formal review process for each drill

and exercise by ‘debriefing’ at the end of the drill. Those people involved should be given the

opportunity to discuss any mistakes that may have been made, how they may learn from those


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mistakes or to raise any issues that may allow for improvement in the management of an

emergency.

If it becomes necessary to make changes to the agreed emergency procedures on board

the ship, these should be carried out with the full knowledge of all those on board. The owners or

managers should also be informed and consulted. It will also be necessary to inform the flag state

administration for the ship of these changes. The Administration will have approved the existing

emergency procedures and changes cannot be made without their agreement or approval.

Personal safety on board the ship is an individual as well as a collective responsibility.

Every member of the ship’s company and any other person working on board the ship has a

responsibility to ensure that he or she carries out his or her duties safely. In their day-to-day

work and movement about the ship, they must not knowingly put themselves or anybody else

into an unsafe situation. They should also ensure that they bring to the attention of the Master

any unsafe working practices. Much of this responsibility is achieved through common sense. It

can be reinforced by good shipboard practices and training.

Consultation. It can also be reinforced through consultation. There is a requirement on

board different registered ships for the appointment of a safety officer and the election of safety

representatives and safety committee. This section also stipulates the need for consultation with

workers on matters of health and safety. Where on board is not required, the prudent risk

manager should consider the benefits of such a system and aim to introduce this on board his

own ship. This will encourage awareness and discussion of safety related issues.

It will also enhance the team approach to risk to risk management previously suggested.

There is a tendency amongst all seafarers to be aware only of what is happening in their own

department. The safety committee provides a forum where safety representatives can raise

safety-related issues for discussion by all departments. This frequently provides an element of

lateral thinking which may not otherwise have occurred. The safety committee and the safety

officer also provide a point of reference for the other members of the ship’s company. The safety

committee may:

“a) Make representations to the employer on potential hazards and dangerous

occurrences at the workplace which affect, or could affect, workers on the ship.

b) Make representations to the Master and the employer on general matters affecting

the health and safety of workers on the ship …”

Careful management of the safety related issues on board the ship will reap significant

benefits. An increase in personal safety awareness should lead to a reduction in on board


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accidents and injuries. This in turn will lead to improved efficiency on board and a reduction in

the claims against the shipowner’s P&I Club. In the longer term, prudent risk management may

lead to a reduction in the shipowner’s contributions to the P&I Club.

It is interesting to consider the potential cost from a seemingly simple accident, such as

a broken arm. In assessing the total cost of this accident the following factors, amongst others,

will need to be taken into account:

• Seafarer’s nationality

• Cost of hospital treatment

• Cost of repatriation

• Loss of earnings

• Welfare costs

• Legal costs for compensation claims

• Deviation costs to land seafarer

• Agents fees

There is no simple formula by which accidents costs can be evaluated, the prudent risk

manager will take every effort to minimize the risk of the accident occurring in the first place.

Risk assessment. The risk assessment is defined as ‘the process used to determine risk

management priorities by evaluating and comparing the level of risk against predetermined

standards, target risk levels or other criteria.

The risk assessment must address risks to the health and safety of workers.

In reality, our primary aim is to avoid risk. Where this cannot be avoided, we must

evaluate the unavoidable risks and take action to reduce their effect. With respect to day-to-day

shipboard operations, the requirement to assess risk relates only to risks which arise directly

from the work activity being undertaken and which have the potential to harm the person(s)

actually undertaking that work, or who may be directly affected by that work. The risk

assessment is not expected to cover risks which are not reasonably foreseeable.

For example, the main radar aerial unit may have failed and ship’s staff can repair it.

The risk assessment should consider all possible dangers to those carrying out the repair –

electrocution, falling from the radar mast, etc. – but it does not need to consider the potential

costs of the collision with another vessel in fog because the repair had not been completed and

the OOW was unaware of the presence of the other ship. On the other hand, the risk assessment

should have considered when it would be safe and practicable to carry out the repair.


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The assessment of risks must be ‘suitable and sufficient’. The degree of effort required

by the risk assessment should depend on the degree of harm that may occur and whether there

are current control procedures to ensure that the risk is as low as reasonably practicable.

A suitable and efficient risk assessment should:

(a) identify the significant risks arising out of work

(b) enable the employer (…) to identify and prioritise the measures that need to be taken

to comply with the relevant statutory provisions

(c) be appropriate to the nature of the work, and such that it remains valid for a

reasonable period of time.

There are no fixed rules about how risk assessment should be undertaken. It is intended

to be a simple but meaningful exercise to determine, after careful examination of an operation,

what processes may cause harm, what precautions can be taken and whether more could be done

to prevent harm.

The process need to be over-complicated and it may be appropriate to use a simple

proforma to record the findings of the assessment. In carrying out a risk assessment it is

necessary to identify whether a hazard exists in the first place.

It is necessary to be quite clear about the difference between a hazard and a risk.

Hazards. The hazard thus needs to be categorized according to its potential

consequence and according to its likelihood of occurrence. There are also no fixed rules about

who should carry out the risk assessment. According with the in force rules, it is recommends

that it ‘should be carried out by suitably experienced personnel, using specialist advice if

appropriate’.

To ensure that the risk assessment is suitable and sufficient, it would be unreasonable to

expect the cook to carry out the risk assessment for work on a diesel generator but he may be

suitably experienced to assess the risks associated with the repair of, say, the potato peeling

machine in the galley. For work on the diesel generator, the risk assessment should be carried out

by one of the engineers: if they are unfamiliar with a particular part of the generator, it may be

appropriate to seek advice from the engine builder. In many cases, that information may be

available on board in the manufacturers’ maintenance and service manuals.

Once the risk assessment has been carried out, it is essential that it is monitored when

the work is taking place. The procedures and precautions have to be place in a position adequate

for this operation. If they have not, a further risk assessment should be carried out to review the

original assessment and to make further recommendations.


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All risk assessments should be held on file on board the ship. When the task has been

completed it may be possible to ‘close out’ the particular risk assessment but, if the task is

regular or routine, the risk assessment should be kept ‘live’. It should be reviewed at periodic

intervals to ensure that it remains relevant to the task and that the recommended procedures

continue to apply.

A common feature in all these aspects of the risks of day-to-day shipboard operations is

the ‘human factor’.

Human factors. It is an essential part of good management and prudent risk

management, especially – that the manager is well acquainted with his staff. For the Master of

the ship, this implies an understanding of all the ship’s company. In practice, this may not be

realistic but the Master should expect that his heads of departments will know their staff

reasonably well. This does not necessarily require the breakdown of inherent management

structures on board the ship and undue familiarity between crew members – a sense of discipline

remains an essential ingredient in the operation of a ship. However, there needs to be a

willingness to acknowledge that the other crew members are as much as a part of the team as the

head of department. By taking an interest in people, the manager can significantly increase his

response from those people.

When dealing with his personnel the prudent risk manager must take into account their

training - or lack of it.

The IMO has recognized the cultural changes in seafaring in recent years and in the

differing standards of training and certification between different countries. In attempting to raise

the quality and standards of seafarers and, thereby, raising the standard of safety at sea, revised

criteria have been introduced. STCW Convention lays down minimum training and certification

requirements for a wide number of people in the ship’s company. Additionally, the IMO is

proposing to introduce a ‘white list’ of approved training centres and nations whose certificates

and other qualifications are acceptable to the organization.

The prudent risk manager will need to be aware of these differing standards and he

should ensure that, wherever possible, his staff have ‘white list’ qualifications. The selection and

appointment of personnel to ship will, almost certainly, be beyond the control or influence of the

ship and this is an area where cooperation between the ship and the shore management is

essential in good risk management. The manning of a ship may well be undertaken through a

manning agency. There need to be good levels of communication between the ship, the ‘office’

and the agency if standards are to be maintained.


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Good and experienced senior ship’s officers will have an intuitive ability to assess their

staff through observation of their performance, both in their work and in their interaction with

other members of the ship’s company. With an increasing number of ships operating with multi-

nation crews, this intuitive ability becomes increasingly important for prudent risk management.

The senior officer must be able to relate well to all their staff and to be able to recognize their

strengths and their weaknesses.

Training needs. The identification of training needs is particularly valuable if we are to

improve the standards of operation of our ship. Well trained and recently trained staff is a great

asset and they should be valued and treated as such. It is, of course, very difficult to ensure that

ship’s staff are trained on a regular basis. For many of today’s seafarers, their only opportunity

for secure employment is their current contract. The manning agent will only be a ‘middle man’

and he may not be able or willing to send potentially capable staff on training courses. A

shipowner may opt to renew a seafarer’s contract on completion of the current contract but he,

too, may be reluctant to invest in training for that seafarer. It is an unfortunate fact of current

shipping life that, all too often, when there are economies to be made, the training budget (if

there is one) is one of the first items to suffer the accountants ‘red pen’! The prudent risk

manager on board the ship may be powerless in this wider struggle but, if he takes the time to

identify training needs and to pass those on to others who may be able to influence the training

programme, he can, at least, say that he has tried his best.

Training need not only be carried out ashore. It is quite possible that some training can

be effectively undertaken on board the ship. In particular this will apply to ship specific

equipment such as a new radar installation or the provision of an electronic chart display system.

When new equipment is installed on board the ship, the prudent risk manager should ensure that

at least one person who will be actively involved in the operation of the equipment has been

given adequate instruction in its operation. That person can then train his colleagues. Similarly,

where newly appointed staff have not had sufficient time for hand-over from their predecessor or

where they are unfamiliar with different equipment from their last ship, on board training has a

role to play.

Some new equipment will have interactive training methods incorporated within the

package. There are also wide ranges of PC-based interactive training tools available to cover a

wide variety of skills and functions. Training videos are also readily available. The prudent risk

manager will assess their potential value and perhaps recommend them to his principals.


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On board training can also lead to a better understanding of the background to many

day-to-day shipboard operations.

The prudent risk manager will encourage his staff to gain a better understanding of the

day-to-day shipboard operations and he should make every effort to assist them to do so. We

have already seen that risk management is a team effort – by providing the team with the

knowledge and skills required, the individual load becomes lighter but the group result should

become greater.

In addition to raising standards, the revised STCW Convention introduces mandatory

refresher shore-based training in a number of areas. As implementation of this convention

becomes more widespread, port state inspectors will increasingly be looking at the training and

qualifications of ship’s staff. It will be essential that the Master and his heads of departments are

made aware of these standards and requirements and that they are able to monitor them

effectively.

When capable and competent staff are employed, the potential for good risk

management of the ship and its cargo is high. When standards of capability and competency start

to fall, there is the potential for the quality of risk management to fall also.

Maintenance. Throughout the passage there will be a number of routine maintenance

tasks that will need to be completed if the ship is to be maintained at a reasonable operating

level. These tasks will range from regular inspections – e.g. weekly inspections and tests of all

survival craft, rescue boats and launching appliances – to periodic maintenance of machinery and

equipment and, perhaps, fabric maintenance of the ship itself.

Section 10 of the ISM Code requires the company to:

10.1. …establish procedures to ensure that the ship is maintained in conformity with

the provisions of the relevant rules and regulations and with any additional requirements which

may be required by the company.

This section also states:

10.2. In meeting these requirements the company should ensure that:

.1 Inspections are held at appropriate intervals.

.2 Any nonconformity is reported, with its possible cause, if known.

.3 Appropriate corrective action is taken.

.4 Records of these activities are maintained.

As a general rule, it is probably fair to say that the majority of ships will record, in some

form or another, major incidents that occur on board the ship – for example, heavy weather


78

damage to the ship or cargo or serious personal accident. Within the requirements of the ISM

Code also have the duty to ensure that appropriate corrective action is taken. This should also be

viewed as a requirement to take preventative action to reduce the likelihood that the

nonconformity will reoccur.

It is probable that the reporting of lesser incidents and, almost certainly, ‘near misses’

does not occur. A ‘near miss’ (in ‘risk management speak’) is not the near collision that will

immediately spring to mind from this expression but it is defined as: ‘an unplanned event which

does not cause injury or damage but could do so’.

Examples of near misses include items falling from a height near to a worker or a a

short circuit in a piece of electrical equipment.

In an analysis of reported incidents carried out in the United States, the following were

recorded. In the right hand column, they have been assessed on their approximate probability on

an annual basis:

Serious injury 1 Once

Minor injury 10 Monthly

Property damage 30 Weekly

‘Near misses’ 600 Twice daily

An analysis of reported incidents in the USA

We are probably all well aware of the first three groups of incidents and we can readily

appreciate their significance and occurrence. The ‘near miss’ is a concept that is much harder to

appreciate. It may also come as something of a shock to realize the frequency with which they

are considered to occur. We can take positive steps to reducing or removing them from day-to-

day shipboard operations. In doing so we make a positive contribution to reducing risk and

improving safety on board the ship.

Storms. In the present, the meteorological information is of the highest possible

standard. Nonetheless, the forecasting of the movement of severe weather systems is not 100%

accurate. The mariner’s professional education and training has given him an insight into the

probable effects of encountering a tropical cyclone. Recommended avoidance measures are

given in ‘The Mariner’s Handbook’ and other ‘standard’ texts. Warnings of tropical storms are

broadcast and the prudent risk manager will ensure that particular attention is given to these

storm warnings. If the vessel is in vicinity or is likely to be in the vicinity of a storm, it will be


79

prudent to maintain a plot of its broadcast position and its expected track. This plot should be

continuously updated until such time as the vessel is no longer in any danger from the storm.

Pirate attacks. With increasing world prosperity and expanding worldwide trade, it is

highly unlikely that ships will be subject to hostile, military attack but, nonetheless, there are still

areas where attacks on ships by ‘pirates’ are not unknown. They may not fly the ‘skull and

crossbones’ flag or wear a black eye patch but information is available to the mariner to advise

him on where it is safe to trade and where it is not. If he is required to take his ship to an area

where pirates are known to operate, advice is available to the Master from his owner, his flag

state administration, his P&I Club and others that will minimize his exposure to the threat of

attack.

Drug and alcohol issues. STCW Convention provides guidance on prevention of drug

and alcohol abuse. This is not a requirement but it may assist companies in the development of

their own policies concerning the use (or abuse) of alcohol and drugs on board ship. In some

cases this may extend to a total ban on the consumption of alcohol on board ship but, this may

lead to further problems. It will not be unknown for seafarers to try to smuggle illicit alcohol on

board the ship. Secret drinking will then take place and may, in turn, lead to crew members being

unfit for duty through the effects of drink. Also, the absence of drink may lead to increased use

of illicit drugs.

There is no easy answer to this and the prudent risk manager must use his best efforts

and his cleverest tactics to ensure that he is aware of what is happening on board his own ship.

He should be aware of the symptoms to be recognized in cases of both alcohol and drug abuse.

He should also be aware of any national administration policies and limits, which may affect his

ship and its crew when his ship enters port or is in territorial waters.

Port of discharge. After a seemingly uneventful passage, we are approaching the end

and the port of discharge for the cargo. Time at sea should have been relatively routine but now

that routine is about to be broken. Shipping traffic may well increase as we approach the coast,

our navigation skills must become better and more frequently applied. The regularity of

watchkeeping is about to change, with the inherent dangers of fatigue. This may be made worse

by the length of time that individual seafarers have spent on board the ship.


80

It may also be that a number of the ship’s company are about to leave the ship and to go

home. They will naturally be excited at this prospect and their concentration and attention to

their duties may not be at the high levels required for approaching the coast and arrival in port.

The prudent risk manager will be aware of these constraints and, as already discussed,

he should be able to recognize these ‘symptoms’ in his crew.


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ANNEXES


82

SHIP TO SHORE Master/Pilot Exchange SHIP IDENTITY

Name Call sign Flag

Ship's agent

Year built IMO No.

Cargo type Ship type Last port

ADDITIONAL COMMUNICATION INFORMATION

Fax Telex Other

PILOT BOARDING

Date/ETA Freeboard

Boarding station (if there is more than one)

SHIP PARTICULARS

Draught fwd Draught aft Draught amidships (salt water)

Air draught Lenght Beam

Displacement DWT GRT NRT

ANCHORS

Port anchor Starboard

anchor (lenght of cable available)

MANOEUVRING DETAILS AT CURRENT CONDITION

Full speed Half

speed

Slow speed Min. steering speed

Propeller direction of turn Controllable

pitch Numbers of propellers Number of fwd thrusters Number of aft thrusters

MAIN ENGINE DETAILS

Type of engine

Max. number of engine starts Time from full ahead to full astern

EQUIPMENT DEFECTS RELEVANT TO SAFE NAVIGATION

OTHER IMPORTANT DETAILS e.g. berthing restrictions, manoeuvring peculiarities


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Distress alert and the frequencies to use

Terrestrial radio communication

The distress alert may be sent using digital selective calling (DSC) on one or more of the following frequencies, which are dedicated exclusively for the purpose:

VHF Channel 70 MF 2187.5 kHz HF 4207.5 kHz HF 6312.0 kHz HF 8414.5 kHz HF 12577.0 kHz HF 16804.5 kHz

The distress alert should indicate:

• On which frequency the follow-up distress message will be transmitted;

• The mode of transmission (telephony or telex). The frequencies that should be used for the follow-up distress message:

Radio Telephone (R/T) Radio Telex Channel 16 VHF 2182 kHz 2174.5 kHz 4125 kHz 4177.5 kHz

6215 kHz 6268.0 kHz 8291 kHz 8376.5 kHz 12290 kHz 12520.0 kHz 16420 kHz 16695.0 kHz

Satellite radio communication The distress alert by satellite should be transmitted, with absolute priority, to a rescue Co-Ordination Center (RCC).


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Guidance on steering gear test routines

Manual steering positions

After prolonged use of the autopilot, and before entering coastal waters, test the steering gear at all the manual steering positions on the bridge.

Multiple steering gear power units

In coastal waters use more than one steering gear power unit when such units are capable of simultaneous operation.

Before departure from port

Within 12 hours before departure, check and test the steering gear including, as applicable, the operation of the following:

• the main steering gear;

• the auxiliary steering gear;

• the remote steering control systems;

• the main steering position on the bridge;

• the emergency power supply;

• the rudder angle indicators in relation to actual rudder position;

• the remote steering gear control system power failure alarms;

• the steering gear power unit failure alarms;

• automatic isolating arrangements and other automatic equipment.

Check and tests

Check and test should include:

• the full rudder movement according to the required capabilities of the steering gear;

• the timing of rudder movement from hard-over to hard-over to ensure consistency with previous tests;

• a visual inspection of the steering gear and its connecting linkage;

• the operation of the means of communication between the bridge and the steering gear compartment.

Changeover procedures

All officers concerned with the operation or maintenance of the steering gear should acquaint themselves with changeover procedures.

Emergency steering drills

Emergency steering drills should take place at least three months and must include direct control from within the steering gear compartment, the communication procedure with the bridge and, where applicable, the operation of alternative power supplies.

Records

The dates on which these checks and tests are conducted and the date and details of emergency steering drills carried out must be recorded in the logbook.


85

Familiarisation with bridge equipment

Has the operation of the following equipment been studied and fully understood?

� bridge and deck lighting � emergency arrangements in the event of main power failure � navigation and signal lights, including � search lights, signaling lamp, morse light � sound signaling apparatus, including � whistles � fog bell and gong system � safety equipment, including � LSA equipment including pyrotechnics, EPIRB and SART � bridge fire detection panel � general and fire alarm signalling arrangements � emergency pump, ventilation and water-tight door controls � internal ship communication equipment, including � portable radios � emergency "batteryless" phone system � public address system � external communication equipment, including � VHF and GMDSS equipment � alarm system on bridge � echo sounder � electronic navigational position fixing systems � gyro compass / repeaters � magnetic compass � off-course alarm � radar including ARPA � speed / distance recorder � engine and thruster controls � steering gear, including manual, auto-pilot and emergency changeover and testing

arrangements (see annex A7) � automatic track-keeping system, if fitted � ECDIS and electronic charts, if fitted � IBS function, if fitted � Location and operation of ancillary bridge equipment (e.g. binoculars, signalling flags,

meteorological equipment)? � Stowage of chart and hydrographic publications?

Other checks:

� _____________________________________________________________ � _____________________________________________________________ � _____________________________________________________________ � _____________________________________________________________


86

Preparation for sea

� Has a passage plan for the intended voyage been prepared? (see section 2)

Has the following equipment been checked and found ready for use?

� anchors � bridge movement book / course and engine movement recorder � echo sounder � electronic navigational position fixing system � gyro / magnetic compass and repeaters � radar(s) � speed / distance recorder � clocks Has the following equipment been tested, synchronised and found ready for use? � bridge and engine room telegraphs, including � rpm indicators � emergency engine stops � thruster controls and indicators, if fitted � controllable pitch propeler controls and indicators, if fitted � communications facilities, including � bridge to engineroom / mooring station communications � portable radios � VHF radio communications with port authority � navigation and signal lights, including � searchlights, signalling lamp, morse light � sounds signalling apparatus, including � whistles � fog bell and gong system � steering gear, including manual, auto-pilot and emergency changeover

arrangements and rudder indicators (see annex A7) � window wipper / clearview screen arrangements Is the ship secure for sea? � cargo and cargo handling equipment secure � all hull openings secure and watertight � cargo / passenger details available � stability and draught information available � Are all the crew on board and all shore personnel ashore? � Are the pilot disembarkation arrangements in place? (see annex A5) Other checks: � _____________________________________________________________ � _____________________________________________________________ � _____________________________________________________________ � _____________________________________________________________


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Preparation for arrival in port

� In preparing the passage for arrival in port, has a pre-pilotage information exchange taken place

? (see annexes A1 and A2)

� Has the passage plan been updated following receipt of the Shore to Ship Pilot / Master

Exchange form and all latest navigational warnings? � Has a ETA been sent with all relevant information, required by local regulations (e.g. details of

dangerous/hazardous goods carried, etc)? � Is it necessary to rearrange cargo / ballast? Has the following equipment been prepared and checked? � course and engine movement recorders � clock synchronisation � communication with the engine control room and mooring stations � signalling equipment, including flags / lights � deck lighting � mooring winches and lines including heaving lines � pressure on fire main � anchors cleared away � stabilisers and log tubes housed, if fitted � Has the steering gear been tested, and has manual steering been engaged in sufficient time for

the helmsman to become accustomed before manoeuvring? � Have the engines been tested and prepared for manoeuvring? � Has the Pilot Card (see annex A3) been completed and are the pilot embarkation arrangements

(see annex A5) in hand? � Have VHF channels for the various services (e.g. VTS, pilot, tugs, berthing instructions) been

noted and a radio check carried out? � Has the port been made fullt aware of any special berthing requirements that the ship may have? Other checks: � _____________________________________________________________ � _____________________________________________________________ � _____________________________________________________________ � _____________________________________________________________


88

Pilotage

� Immediately on arrival on the bridge, has the pilot been informed of the ship's heading, speed,

engine setting and draught?

� Has the pilot been informed of the location of lifesaving appliances provided on board for his use? Have details of the proposed passage plan been discussed with the pilot and agreed with the master,

including � radio communication and reporting requirements � bridge watch and crew stand-by arrangements � deployment and use of tugs � berthing / anchoring arrangements � expected traffic during transit � pilot change-over arrangements, if any � fender requirements � Has a completed Pilot Card (see annex A3) been handed to the pilot and has the pilot referred to

the Wheelhouse Poster? (see annex A4) � Has the responsibilities within the bridge team for the pilotage been defined and are they clearly

understood? � Has the language to be used on the bridge between the ship, the pilot and the shore been

agreed? � Are the progress of the ship and the execution of orders being monitored by the master and

officer of the watch? � Are the engine room and ship's crew being regularly briefed on the progress of the ship during

the pilotage? � Are the correct lights, flags and shapes being displayed? Other checks: � _____________________________________________________________ � _____________________________________________________________ � _____________________________________________________________ � _____________________________________________________________


89

Passage plan appraisal

Have navigation charts been selected from chart catalogue, including

� large scale charts for coastal waters � small scale charts for ocean passages � planning charts

� routeing, climatic, pilot and load line zone charts Have publications been selected, including

� sailing directions and pilot books � light list � radio signals � guides to port entry � tide tables and tidal stream atlas Have all navigation charts and publications have been corrected up to date, including

� the ordering of new charts / publications, if necessary � notices to mariners � local area warnings � NAVAREA navigational warnings Have the following been considered?

� ship's departure and arrival draufhts � ship's cargo and any special cargo stowage / carriage restrictions � if there are any special ship operational requirements for the passage Have the following been checked?

� planning charts and publications for advice and recommendations on route to be taken � climatological information for weather characteristics of the sea � navigation charts and publications for landfall features � navigation charts and publications for Ship's Routeing Schemes, Ship Reporting Systems and

Vessel Traffic Services (VTS) � Has the weather routeing been considered for passage?

Have the following preparations been made for port arrival?

� navigation charts and publications studied for pilotage requirements � Ship to Shore Master / Pilot Exchange form prepared (see annex A1) � Pilot Card updated (see annex A3) � port guides studied for port information including arrival / berthing restrictions Other checks: � _____________________________________________________________ � _____________________________________________________________ � _____________________________________________________________ � _____________________________________________________________


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Navigation in coastal waters

Have the following factors been taken into condideration in preparing the passage plan?

� advice / recommendations in sailing directions � ship's draught in relation to available water depths � effect of "squat" on underkeel clearance in shallow water

� tides and currents � weather, particularly in areas prone to poor visibility � available navigational aids and their accuracy � position - fixing metods to be used � daylight / night - time passing of dangerous points � traffic likely to be encountered - flow, type, volume � any requirements for traffic separation / routeing schemes � Are local / coastal warning broadcasts being monitored?

� Is participation in area reporting systems recommended including VTS?

� Is the ship's position being fixed at regular intervals?

Have equipment been regular checked / tested, including

� gyro / magnetic compass errors � manual steering before entering coastal waters if automatic steering has been engaged for a

prolonged period � radar performance and radar heading line marker alignment? � echo sounder � Is the OOW prepared to use the engines and call a look-out or a helmsman to the bridge?

� Has meassures been taken to protect the enviroment from pollution by the ship and to comply

with applicable pollution regulation?

Other checks: � _____________________________________________________________ � _____________________________________________________________ � _____________________________________________________________ � _____________________________________________________________


91

Navigation in ocean waters

� Is keeping a look-out being given due priority?

� Are NAVAREA, HYDROLAND and HYDROPAC navigational warning broadcastts and other long

- range weather reports being closely monitored?

� Are the changes to the local weather being monitored and is the barometer regularly observed?

� Is participation in area reporting systems (e.g. AMVER) recommended?

� Is the ship's position being fixed at regular intervals?

� Are celestial navigational techniques being practised?

� Are gyro / magnetic compass errors and radar performance being regularly checked?

� Have raradr techniques been practised (in clear visibility)? � Have preparation been made for landfall? � Have measures been taken to protect type enviroment from pollution by the ship and to comply

with applicable pollution regulations? Other checks: � _____________________________________________________________ � _____________________________________________________________ � _____________________________________________________________ � _____________________________________________________________


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Anchoring and anchor watch

Has an anchoring plan been prepared taking into account

� speed reduction in ample time

� direction / strength of wind and current

� tidal stream when manoeuvring at low speeds

� need for adequate sea room particulary to seaward

� deep of water, type of seabed and the scope of anchor cable required

� Have the engine room and anchor party been informed of the time of "stand-by" for anchoring?

� Are the anchors, lights / shapes and sound signalling apparatus ready for use?

� Has the anchor position of the ship been reported to the port authority?

While at anchor, the OOW should � determine and plot the ship's position on the appropiate chart as soon as practicable

� when circumstances permit, check at sufficient frequent intervals whether the ship is remaining

securely at anchor by taking bearings of fixed navigation marks or readily identifiable shore

objects

� ensure that proper look-out is maintained

� ensure that inspection rounds of the ship are made periodically

� observe meteorological and tidal conditions and the state of the sea

� notify the master and undertake all necessary measures if the ship drags anchor

� ensure that the state of the readiness of the main engines and other machinery is in accordance

with the master's instructions

� if visibility deteriorates, notify the master

� ensure that the ship exhibits the appropiate lights and shapes and the appropiate sound signals

are made in accordance with all applicable regulations

� take measures to protect the enviroment from pollution by the ship and comply with applicable

pollution regulations

Other checks: � _____________________________________________________________ � _____________________________________________________________ � _____________________________________________________________ � _____________________________________________________________


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Navigation in restricted visibility

Has the following equipment been checked to ensure that it is fully operational?

� radar, ARPA or other plotting facilities

� VHF

� fog signalling apparatus

� navigation lights

� echo sounder, if in shallow waters

� watertight doors, if fitted

� Have lookout(s) been posted and is a helmsman on standby?

� Have the master and engine room been informed, and the engines put on standby?

� Are the COLREGS being complied with, particularly with regard to rule 19 and proceeding at a

safe speed?

� Is the ship ready to reduce speed, stop or turn away from danger?

� If the ship's position is in doubt, has the possibility of anchoring been considered?

Other checks: � _____________________________________________________________ � _____________________________________________________________ � _____________________________________________________________ � _____________________________________________________________


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Navigation in heavy weather or in tropical storm areas

� Have the master, engine room and crew been informed of the conditions?

� Have all movable objects been secured above and below decks, particularly in the engine room,

galley and in storerooms?

� Has the ship's accomodation been secured and all ports and deadlights closed?

� Have all weather deck openings been secured?

� Have speed and course been adjusted as necessary?

� Has the crew been warned to avoid upper deck areas made dangerous by the weather?

� Have safety lines / hand ropes been rigged where necessary?

Have instructions been issued on the following matters?

� monitoring weather reports?

� transmitting weather reports to the appropriate authorities or, in case of tropical storms, danger

messages in accordance with SOLAS

Other checks: � _____________________________________________________________ � _____________________________________________________________ � _____________________________________________________________ � _____________________________________________________________


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Navigation in ice

� Have the master, engine room and crew been informed of the ice conditions?

� Have watertight doors been shut, as appropriate?

� Has speed been moderated?

� Has the frequency of sounding tanks and bildges been increased?

Have instructions been issued on the following matters?

� monitoring ice advisory service broadcasts

� transmitting danger messages in accordance with SOLAS

Other checks: � _____________________________________________________________ � _____________________________________________________________ � _____________________________________________________________ � _____________________________________________________________


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Changing over the watch

When changing over the watch relieving officers should personally satisfy themselves regarding the following: � standing orders and other special instructions of the master relating to navigation of the ship

� position, course, speed and draught of the ship

� prevalling and predicted tides, currents, weather, visibility and the effect of these factors upon

course and speed

� Procedures for the use of main engines to manoeuvre when the main engines are on bridge

control and the status of the watchkeeping arrangements in the engine room

Navigational situation, including but not limited to:

� the operational condition of all navigational and safety equipment being used or likely to be used

during the watch

� the errors of gyro and magnetic compasses

� the presence and movements of ships in sight or known to be in vicinity

� the conditions and hazards likely to be encoutered during the watch

� the possible effect of keel, trim, water density and squat on underkeel clerance

� any special deck work in progress

Other points: � _____________________________________________________________ � _____________________________________________________________ � _____________________________________________________________ � _____________________________________________________________


97

Calling the Master

The OOW should notify the master immediately: � if restricted visibility is encountered or expected

� if traffic conditons or the movements of other ships are causing concern

� if difficulties are experienced in maintaining course

� on failure to sight land, a navigation mark or obtain soundings by the exepected time

� if, unexpectedly, land or a navigation mark is sighted or a change in soundings occurs

� on breakdown of the engines, propulsion machinery remote control, steering gear or any

essential navigational equipment, alarm or indicator

� if the radio equipment malfunctions

� in heavy weather, if in any doubt about the possibility of weather damage

� if the ship meets any hazard to navigation, such ice or a derelict

� in any other emergency or if in any doubt

Other points: � _____________________________________________________________ � _____________________________________________________________ � _____________________________________________________________ � _____________________________________________________________


98

Main engine or steering gear failure

Action to be carried out:

� Inform master � Prepare for anchoring if in shallow water � Exhibit "Not Under Command" shapes / lights � Commence sound signalling � Broadcast URGENCY message to ships in the vicinity, if appropriate In case of a STEERING FAILURE: � inform engine room � engage emergency steering � take way off the ship � prepare engines for manoeuvring Other actions: � _____________________________________________________________ � _____________________________________________________________ � _____________________________________________________________ � _____________________________________________________________


99

Collision


� Sound the general emergency alarm � Manoeuvre the ship so as to minimise effects of collision � Close watertight doors and automatic fire doors � Switch on deck lighting at night � Switch VHF to Channel 16 and, if appropriate, to Channel 13 � Muster passengers, if carried, at emergency stations � Make ship's position available to radio room / GMDSS station, satellite terminal and other

automatic distress transmitters and update as necessary � Sound bildges and tanks after collision � Check for fire / damage � Offer assistance to other ship � Broadcast DISTRESS ALERT and MESSAGE if the ship is in grave and imminent

danger and immediate assistance is required, otherwise broadcast an URGENCY message to ships in vicinity

Other actions: � _____________________________________________________________ � _____________________________________________________________ � _____________________________________________________________ � _____________________________________________________________


100

Stranding or grounding


� Stop engines � Soung general emergency alarm � Close watertight doors, if fitted � Maintain a VHF watch on Channel 16 and, if appropriate, on Channel 13 � Exhibit lights / shapes and make any appropriate sound signals � Switch on deck lighting at night � Check hull for damage � Sound bildges and tanks � Vissualy inspect compartments, where possible � Sound around ship � Determine which way deep water lies � Determine the nature of the seabed � Obtain information on local currents and tides, particularly details of the rise and fall of

the tide � Reduce tye draught of the ship � Make ship's position available to radio room / GMDSS station, satellite terminal and other

automatic distress transmitters and up-date as necessary � Broadcast DISTRESS ALERT and MESSAGE if the ship is in grave and imminent


Other actions: � _____________________________________________________________ � _____________________________________________________________ � _____________________________________________________________ � _____________________________________________________________


101

Man overboard


� Release lifebuoy with light and smoke signal on the side the crew member has fallen overboard

� Take immediate avoiding action so as not to run over the man overboard � Sound three prolonged blasts of the ship's whistle and repeat as necessary � Post a lookout with binoculars and instructions to maintain a continuous watch on the

man over board � Hoist signal flag "O" � Commence a recovery manoeuvre, such as a Williamson turn � Engage hand steering, if helmsman available � Note ship's position, wind speed and direction and time � Inform master, if not already on the bridge � Inform engine room � Place engines on stand-by � Muster rescue boat's crew � Prepare rescue boat for possible launching � Distribute portable VHF radios for communication � Rig pilot ladder / nets to assist in the recovery � Make ship's position available to radio room / GMDSS station � Broadcast URGENCY message to ships in vicinity Other actions: � _____________________________________________________________ � _____________________________________________________________ � _____________________________________________________________ � _____________________________________________________________


102

Fire


� Sound the fire alarm � Call master if not already on the bridge and notify engineroom � Muster crew � Establish communications � Check for missing and injured crew members � On locating the fire, notify all on board of that location � If an engine room fire, prepare for engine failure Asses fire and determine: � the class of fire � appropriate extinguishing agent � appropriate method of attack � how to prevent the spread of the fire � the necessary personnel and firefighting methods � Close down ventilation fans, all doors including fire and watertight doors and skylights � Switch on deck lighting at night � Make ship's position available to radio room / GMDSS station, sattelite terminal or other

automatic distress transmitters and update as necessary � Broadcast DISTRESS ALERT and MESSAGE if the ship is in grave and imminent


Other actions: � _____________________________________________________________ � _____________________________________________________________ � _____________________________________________________________ � _____________________________________________________________


103

Flooding


� Sound the general emergency alarm � Close watertight doors, if fitted � Sound bildge and tanks � Identify location of incoming water � Cut off all electrical power running through the area � Shore up area to stem water flow � Check bildge pump for operation � Check auxiliary pumps for back-up operation, as required � Make ship's position available to radio room / GMDSS station, sattelite terminal or other

automatic distress transmitters and update as necessary � Broadcast DISTRESS ALERT and MESSAGE if the ship is in grave and imminent


Other actions: � _____________________________________________________________ � _____________________________________________________________ � _____________________________________________________________ � _____________________________________________________________


104

Search and rescue


� Take bearings of distress message if radio direction finder fitted � Re-transmit distress message � maintain continuous listening watch on all distress frequencies � Consult MERSAR / IAMSAR manuals � Establish communications with all other surface units and SAR aircraft involved in the

SAR operation � Plot position, courses and speeds of other assisting units � Monitor X-band radar for locating survival craft transponder (SART) signal using 6 or 12

nautical mile range scales � Post extra look-outs for sighting flares and other pyrotechnic signals Other actions: � _____________________________________________________________ � _____________________________________________________________ � _____________________________________________________________ � _____________________________________________________________


105

Abandoning ship Action to be carried out:

Broadcast DISTRESS ALERT and MESSAGE on the authority of the master Instruct crew members to put on lifejackets, and wear adequate and warm clothing Instruct crew members to put on immersion suit, if carried, if water temperature is below 16 ºC Order crew members to lifeboat stations Prepare to launch lifeboats / liferafts Ensure that lifeboat sea painters are attached to the ship Embark all crew in the liboats / liferafts and launch Ensure lifeboats / liferafts remain in safe proximity to the ship and in contact with each other


106

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. STCW 95 Convention and Ammendments

2. COLREG 1972 and ammendments

3. IMO Resolution A.601 (15)

4. Trening Programme in Bridge Resource Management – Marine Safety Directorate

Transport Canada

5. AMSA Marine Orders part 28

6. IMO Bridge Team Management

7. Bryant, D.T., The human element in shipping casualities, Report prepared for the

Departament of Transport, Marine Directorate, United Kingdom, 1991

8. Carridis, P. Casualty analysis methodology for maritime operations, National Technical

University of Athens, 1999

9. European Transport Safety Council (ETSC) (2001b) European Union transport accident,

incident and casualty databased: current status and future needs, ETSC, Brussels

10. European Transport Safety Council (ETSC) (2003) Assessing risk and setting targets in

transport safety programmes, ETSC, Brussels

11. International Maritime Organization, Human element vision, principles and goals for the

Organization, Resolution A.850(20), revoked, 1997

12. International Maritime Organization, International Safety Management Code, IMO

Publishing, London, United Kingdom, 2002

13. Rothblum, A.M., Human error and marine safety, Volume 4 in U.S. Coast Guard Risk-Based

Decision-Making Guidelines, U.S. Coast Guard Research and Development Center, 2006

14. Wagenaar, W.A. and Groeneweg, J., Accidents at sea: multiple causes and impossible

consequences, Int. J. Man-Machine Studies, no. 27, 1987

15. Weick, K.E., Organizational culture as a source of high reliability, Calif Management Rev,

1997

www. maib.gov.uk

www.imo.org

www.le-cedre.fr

www.american-club.com

www.ukpandi.com

www.dma.dk

www.mcga.gov.uk

www.ivw.nl


107

CONTENT

I. Errors chain and prevention of human errors

II. Communication on board

III. Ship bridge watchkeeping

IV. Bridge resource management and the bridge team

V. Leadership – leading for safety

VI. Cultural awareness

VII. Managing risk on board ship

Anexes

Bibliography

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Documents

Bridge Team Management - Course Content