Bridging the Gap

An Arab-European Dialogue

on the Basics of Liberalism

Editor

Dr. Ronald Meinardus

Bridging the Gap 2

Title of the Book

Bridging the Gap

An Arab-European Dialogue on the Basics of Liberalism

Editor

Dr. Ronald Meinardus

Editorial Assistant

Dirk Kunze

Publisher

Al-Mahrosa for Publishing, Press Services, and Information

Block 7399, Street 28 branching from Street 9, Mukkattam

Cairo, Egypt

Tel/Fax: 02-25075917

E-mail:mahrosa@mahrosa.com

Chairman: Farid Zahran

Serial Number:

ISBN:

This book was published by the European Liberal Forum asbl with

the support of Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Liberty and Forum

for Greece. Funded by the European Parliament. The European

Parliament is not responsible for the content of the publication. The

views expressed in this publication are those of the authors alone. They

do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Liberal Forum

asbl, Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Liberty or Forum for Greece.

Bridging the Gap 3

European Liberal Forum (ELF) Founded in the fall of 2007, the European Liberal Forum is the non-profit European political foundation of the liberal family. ELF brings together liberal think tanks, political foundations and institutes from around Europe to observe, analyse and contribute to the debate on European public policy issues and the process of European integration, through education, training, research and the promotion of active citizenship within the EU.

Forum for Greece The “Forum for Greece” is a non-profit organization with liberal, democratic and reformist ideas, wishing to contribute to open and democratic developments in the European Union. The “Forum for Greece” has been registered under the Greek Law as a non for profit organization with headquarters in Athens and a branch in Thessaloniki, at North Greece. The “Forum for Greece” is aiming to work in the liberal-thinking sector in Greece helping to form a critical mass of citizens aiming at a liberal reform of Greek society.

Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Liberty (FNF) Established in 1958 by the first president of the Federal Republic of Germany, Theodor Heuss, and a group of committed Liberals – is an independent, non-profit, non-governmental organization that is committed to promoting liberal policy and politics in Germany, Europe and worldwide. Based in Potsdam, Germany, the Foundation has seven offices in Germany and more than 40 projects worldwide through which it promotes its core concepts such as the protection of human rights, civil society, market economy, free trade and rule of law. Over the last 51 years the activities of the Foundation have expanded beyond their original civic educational task in the young Federal Republic of Germany. A scholarship program, a think tank (the Liberal Institute), a press and media department was established and the engagement in international politics became an important part of the Foundation’s assignments.

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Table of Content Page

Ronald Meinardus Introduction 7

Giulio Ercolessi Preface: The Basics of Liberalism 11

Hala Mostafa Freedom, human rights and the individual in

Arab and Western experiences

15

Aristides N. Hatzis Rule of law, individual rights and the free

market in the liberal tradition: The case of

Greece

27

Asteris Huliaras Liberalism and conspiracy theories: Greece

and Egypt

45

Yusuf Mansur Arab renaissance and economic freedom 57

Andrzej Kondratowicz Economic freedom and institutional change:

European experiences and Arab realities

75

Mohammed Tamaldou The role of religion in Arab politics and

society

93

Sven Speer The role of religion in society and politics in

Europe, or: three myths of secularity in

Europe

109

Alexandra Thein Blueprints for the future of liberalism in the

Arab world

121

Mounir Rached A liberal program for the future: Guidelines

for Arab and European countries

135

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Bridging the Gap 7

Introduction

Dr. Ronald Meinardus

Arabs and Europeans are neighbors — they always have been

and always will be. In terms of geography, Arabs and Europeans

are very close. In terms of politics and culture, however, the

distance at times seems vast.

In Europe and the European Union there exists a consensus

that good neighborly relations are of existential importance. In

exemplary fashion, the EU has redefined its relations with the

Eastern neighborhood after the successful peoples’ revolutions in

that part of the world. Now, after the historic changes in the Arab

world, it is high time for Europe to redefine in earnest its

relationship with the Southern neighborhood.

For two days in May 2013, Cairo became the center of liberal

debate and attention, as politicians and academics from Algeria,

Belgium, Egypt, Germany, Greece, Italy, Jordan, Lebanon,

Libya, Morocco, the Netherlands, Palestine, Poland, Tunisia and

Syria assembled for the first Arab-European dialogue forum on

the basics of liberalism. We assumed there would be major

ideological and programmatic divergence between the delegates

and we therefore gave the conference the title, “Bridging the

Gap.”

The political and cultural environments are very different in

these parts of the world. This has a big effect also on the role of

liberalism in respective societies. In the Arab world, sadly, the

perception prevails with many that liberal principles stand against

local mores and traditions. Some groups, be it out of ignorance or

out of spite, continue to propagate that liberalism and religious

freedom are not compatible. Yes, they hatefully spread the lie that

the great idea of personal freedom is against Islam, thereby

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willingly pushing all Muslim liberals into the world of the non-

believer.

In this regard, the situation in Europe is very different: here,

liberal principles have become the mainstream and have found

their way into constitutions and legislation. All major political

forces, also socialists, conservatives and democratic religious

parties, have adopted basic liberal values.

In the following pages we gather the main presentations of

the Cairo conference as a reference point for future debates. In

the sessions, differences and differentiations concerning the

central issue of the role of religion in society became apparent.

Little separated the Arabs and Europeans in regards to the basic

liberal principles of the freedom of the individual, equality in

opportunity for all men and women, and the rule of law.

Importantly, these liberal principles have also been the

drivers of the peoples’ uprisings in the Arab world. Some three

years later, much of the enthusiasm has vanished — also among

Arab liberals who find themselves politically marginalized. How

to get out of this marginalization and become a key player is the

most important challenge of the liberal movement in the Arab

world.

It is essential to remember — a point highlighted at the

conference by speakers from both sides — that elections alone

are no guarantee for a democracy that protects the rights of all its

citizens. Recent history is awash with examples of so-called

illiberal democracies. These are political regimes that come to

power in democratic elections and then do little if anything at all

to protect the freedom of all citizens and guarantee equality of

opportunity in the fields of politics, society and economy.

Neither this conference nor the book you are holding in your

hands would have been possible without the generous support of

the European Liberal Forum (ELF), an European institute

dedicated to the promotion of dialogue and cooperation of

liberals in Europe. The Regional Office of the Friedrich Naumann

Bridging the Gap 9

Foundation for Liberty in the Middle East and North Africa

(MENA) is gratified and thrilled to cooperate with our European

partners in an endeavor to strengthen the understanding between

liberals on both sides of the Mediterranean.

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Preface: The Basics of Liberalism

Giulio Ercolessi

All political speech is not only inherently difficult to translate

but also per se polysemic: it needs elucidation even within similar

political and cultural milieus. What are we talking about when we

discuss “the basics of liberalism”?

There cannot be a prescriptive definition, but here is a possible

proposal. Liberalism is a theory of the ends and a theory of the

means: maximizing individual freedom and self-determination,

mainly through the instrument of the legal limitation of all powers.

If we accept this definition, liberalism is a perpetual work in

progress.

First, because since the beginning it was the outcome of a fight,

ever more comprehensive and ever more consistent, against

authoritarian traditions and beliefs, and because of the natural

inclination of every political, traditional, bureaucratic, social and

economical power to confront and overrun its imposed limits.

Second, because it was by no means a steady triumphal march.

The preconditions for the development of liberalism were first

provided by the birth of the modern idea of the individual in the late

Middle Ages, especially in Central and Northern Italy and in the

Ancient Low Countries, and much later by the hard-won achievement

of a limited freedom of conscience, first in restricted areas of Europe

and in the religious domain alone. Further later, individual freedom

expanded to other domains, through hard and often bloody

confrontations, step by step leading to political freedom, freedom of

the markets, democracy, the system of constitutional checks and

balances, the independence of the judiciary, equal rights and equal

social dignity and protection from discrimination on the basis of

religion, political opinions, gender, race, nationality, ethnic origins,

age, disability, sexual orientation, etc.

Bridging the Gap 02

Not even within what we call today “the Western civilization”

was it a secure process. On the contrary, we learned from our

mistakes: freedom of conscience arose from persecutions and

religious wars; freedom of the markets from limitations to

development during the Ancien Régime and even later.

And European integration and the EU were finally established

as a consequence of two world wars (mostly fought among

Europeans and among Westerners). After two consecutive attempted

suicides, the main commitment of Western Europeans consisted of a

will of change, not of continuity: «Never again, nie wieder, jamais

plus ça, mai più, nunca más».

Third, liberalism was not the common result of an equal

progression of identical historical developments in all the Western

nations. It was a basically Dutch, English, American and French

product, that proved capable of partially or entirely successful

importations, transplants, imitations, adaptations, improvements, to

ever larger parts of the world.

This historical expansion of liberalism beyond its original

boundaries can be seen today as a promising precedent for regions

where new totalitarian or fundamentalist threats seem to be on the

rise.

Past successes easily led to the idea that the values and

principles of what we now call “Western civilization” are — and

must be — universally valid.

Dilemmas are obvious. In some countries, former colonial

powers appear to “impose” their values and principles on the rest of

the world. This was not the concern of the eminent scholars and

representatives of liberal and democratic Arab organizations that

took part in the Cairo conference whose proceedings are gathered in

this volume. We are no longer able to impose anything on anybody.

But it is our duty to bring to others what we think are the most

successful parts of our political civilization, as tools in “bridging the

gap.” The precious and passionate work of the Friedrich Naumann

Stiftung in Cairo should be an example for all of us.

Bridging the Gap 03

We must be conscious that history carries a weight, but does not

inflict on us an inescapable and inexorable destiny, resulting in

ascribed identities of peoples or civilizations that are given once and

for all.

And when we discuss the anthropological individualism of the

West, we have to remind ourselves that it is not the Arab world, nor

the Muslim world, nor Asia, that represent exceptions: the exception

is the West itself, and this was not given from the beginning; it was

the product of history, and history is also made of opportunities,

possibilities, choices.

Religious beliefs do have the capacity to influence and

condition popular behaviour and mentalities more than rationalistic

or philosophical thinking. Yet one must remember that Christianity,

and, most of all, Catholicism, with its hierarchical and authoritarian

structure, had been the strongest enemy of freedom of conscience in

the West, until it was forced to come to terms with pluralism,

liberalism, with the Enlightenment, and the modern scientific

thinking — with new exegetic tools provided by modern linguistics

and the social sciences, that were initially embraced only by

enlightened minorities.

Traditional views were indeed strongly challenged also from

within Christianity, but in principle freedom of conscience was

anathema to the official teaching of the Catholic Church well into

the second half of the 20th century, actually until the Second

Vatican Council.

Elsewhere, a solid “wall of separation” (Thomas Jefferson,

1802) between political power and religious faith had already

proved to be the best recipe to grant at the same time full religious

freedom to believers and freedom from impositions to religious

minorities and non-believers.

We liberals always held that all powers, even the democratic

power of the majority, must be limited whenever they try to coerce

individual conscience, individual freedom and self-determination.

Bridging the Gap 04

At the very dawn of Western liberalism, John Locke set a

principle: “Every man has a property in his own person” (Second

Treatise of Government, 1690).

Today, this sentence could seem related to the most advanced

present frontier of the ethical and political dilemmas of individual

self-determination.

Locke obviously could not think of that in 1690. He provided a

consistent framework to explain the historical developments arising

from almost a century of English political turmoil. But the principles

set at that time produced the basic political guidelines that we think

proved most fruitful in the three following centuries - and beyond.

Bridging the Gap 05

Freedom, human rights and the

individual in Arab and Western

experiences

Hala Mostafa

Human rights are defined as the package of rights and freedoms

to which everyone is inherently entitled, simply because she or he is

a human being. They encompass and address fundamental needs,

demands and rights that must be indiscriminately provided to all

human beings, because they touch the very nature of the individual,

such as the right of life, freedom, or equality, or any other right

essential to human nature. In other words, there exist a number of

natural rights enjoyed by man, and they are inherent to human

nature. Such rights exist even if they have not been recognized, or

moreover, even if they have been infringed upon by religious or

political authority. The United Nations has defined human rights as

legal and universal guarantees to protect both the individual and the

group from the actions of governments that may jeopardize

fundamental freedoms and human dignity. The Universal

Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the United Nations, binds

governments with certain obligations, while banning practices that

infringe upon human rights. That is, the international organization

views human rights as inherent to the nature of mankind.

On the other hand, human rights are understood as an

expression of the accumulation of philosophical schools, doctrines,

and religions throughout history. Human rights represent universal

human values that are extended to the human being wherever he or

she may exist. Laws and legislation in most countries protect human

rights, and yet prevailing regimes — more often than not — fail to

comply with the principles such laws embody because they are

incapable of providing guarantees of them, or because, at the outset,

they are against them for cultural or political reasons.

Bridging the Gap 06

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted in 1948

addresses four fundamental dimensions of human rights: first, the

individual and personal rights; second, the relation between the

individual and society or the state; third, public freedoms and

fundamental rights; and fourth, social and economic rights.

The Universal Declaration has been signed by most states and,

moreover, has inspired in many national constitutions provisions

governing citizens’ rights. However, the degree of compliance

varies among states and its legal mandate is still subject of debate,

particularly in non-Western states and non-democratic states.

Liberalism and human rights

Principles of human rights have evolved — historically and

ideologically — in the light of liberal philosophy, which fosters the

values of freedom and individualism simultaneously, since

individualism implies the protection of one’s physical and abstract

rights and freedoms, and embraces freedoms of thought, movement,

creativity, and other freedoms important to a social context.

Liberalism views the individual as the main concern of human

rights, the core of the philosophy of life, and the source of all values

that align thought and behavior altogether. Man steps into life an

individual, free, enjoying rights to live, to think, to believe, and to

exercise conscience; only then can he have the right to choose.

Freedom and choice are, subsequently, the cornerstones of liberal

philosophy.

Liberalism has developed over centuries, and is believed to be

the fruit of the European Renaissance, which emerged in Italy and

spread all over Europe between the 14th and 19th centuries, after the

religious wars of the Middle Ages. The period witnessed major

human revolutions, such as the French and American revolutions,

preceded by The Magna Carta of England, in the 13th century,

which is considered the first human rights document to include the

civic rights of individuals from different social strata, starting with

nobles through the middle class, to the rights of laborers and

Bridging the Gap 07

women. Furthermore, it was the individuals’ variant contributions in

the arts, painting, poetry, philosophy, and science — amongst other

fields of creativity — that played the leading role in modeling the

Renaissance and stabilizing the basic principles of freedom against

despotism and the abuse of power practiced by political and

religious authorities. It is widely believed that such contributions,

alongside the principles of the great revolutions, laid the ground for

the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to be formulated after

the end of World War II.

That said, liberalism as a school of thought, beyond mere

individuals, played its role in curbing authoritarian power.

Liberalism regarded the consent of subjects as a prerequisite for the

exercise of power, and as the source of its legitimacy. Liberalism in

this context builds upon the philosophy of the social contract, as

formulated by founders Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Jean Jacques

Rousseau and Immanuel Kant, with its core concept that a contract

exists between the ruler and the ruled, and that the contractual terms

requires the individual to waive part of her or his freedoms for the

state to exercise power. Yet the continuance of this contract is reliant

on how the state exercises its powers — in particular that it must do

so in a manner that does not violate the fundamental and natural

freedoms of the individual.

Liberalism, as well, has evolved politically and socio-

economically; that is, it is concerned with combating poverty and

supporting the growth of the middle class — for example, following

the industrial revolution and the Great Depression in the 1930s. At

that time, the theory of Keynesianism emerged, advocating a limited

role for government in support of social services programs, or the

so-called welfare state. Keynesian theory was formulated to counter

the economic crisis of the capital system.

Eventually, democracy — as a governing system — became

linked with liberalism, and by that, democracy has acquired further

dimensions than its mere procedural aspects (i.e., elections and the

rotation of power) to become principally concerned with public and

individual freedoms as well as the rule of law, the separation of

Bridging the Gap 08

powers, and civic-oriented constitutions that guarantee equality

without discrimination in a manner that crystalizes the modern

concept of “citizenship.”

Liberalism in the Western and Arab experiences

The Western experience of liberalism cannot be considered

apart from Western heritage, especially the history of the

Renaissance and the evolution of liberal philosophy in Europe, and

eventually the spread of the values of freedom and human rights and

individualism, and the adoption of liberal values in politics and

economy. Europe also stabilized “the national state,” which runs

deeper than social gaps and is built on the basis of citizenship, equal

rights and equal responsibilities, rule of law, and the supremacy of a

civic constitution to frame these values and principles. Thereby,

liberal values were reflected in institutions, and democracy was

introduced to mirror such ideas. In other words, the axioms upon

which Western experience was built became a reality, cementing a

national consensus.

The Arab-Islamic experience is the complete opposite of the

Western one. This part of the world has known “modernization” far

later than Europe. The Arab “Renaissance” started in the late-19th

century, passing through the 1930s and 1940s. At that time, the

concept of the national state was first introduced in Egypt (1805,

after independence from the Ottoman Empire and under the rule of

Mohammad Ali). Following that, communication opened up with

European civilization on all aspects, such as political, cultural and

religious reform, amid a revival of circles of literature, philosophy,

poetry, and the arts.

It is worth noting, in this regard, two main points. The first is

that the Arab-Islamic renaissance, with the spread of principles of

freedom and liberty, is very much the outcome of individual

contributions, which is why when that era — known as the “first

liberal era” — is mentioned, certain names pop up in one’s mind:

such as Rifa’a Al-Tahtawi, Sheikh Mohammad Abdou, Ali Abdur-

Bridging the Gap 09

Razik, Ahmad Lotfi As-Sayyed, Mohammad Hussein Heikal, and

Qassem Amin, and — more recently — Naguib Mahfouz, Tawfiq

Al-Hakim, and others. Dozens of such figures played a pivotal role

in spreading the values of liberalism. Yet such contributions never

turned into institutionalized values due to incompetent institutional

practices in Arab societies and the incomplete structure of the

national state — let alone affecting the traditional nature of the

dominant culture. Therefore, such contributions remained limited to

elites, with no deep impact on the lower classes of society,

particularly with the deterioration of education and the spread of

illiteracy, and failure to achieve economic or societal developments.

The second point is relevant to attitudes towards Western

civilization. The primary contributions made towards reform emerged

from a genuine desire to communicate with Western civilization,

rather than stand in conflict with it. This was crucial in determining

the direction of the aspired to reform. The result was a distinguished

pluralist constitutional and liberal experience in the first half of the

20th century, embodied in the first liberal and civic Arab constitution

in Egypt, in 1923. That constitution openly adopted human rights

principles among its provisions, with a special focus on individual

rights and freedoms, and guaranteed such rights and freedoms without

discrimination on grounds of sex, race, color or creed.

Liberalism run aground: The 1952 Revolution

The 1952 July Revolution was a significant turning point. With

the adoption of an opposing political agenda, involving a central role

for the state in economy and politics, and a clear orientation towards

socialism and the rule of a single political organization, Egypt’s first

liberal experience came to an end. On the other hand, the 1952

Revolution did lead to the emergence of Arab national liberation

movements and challenged the imperial and colonial powers of the

time. That was reason for the political and cultural rupture with the

West in general. “Mass” culture replaced “individual” culture,

which concerns with the rights and freedoms of the individual. The

Bridging the Gap 21

move beyond the individual is embodied in the rise of Arab

nationalism — an ideology that not only goes beyond the individual,

but also beyond national boundaries.

Though Egypt returned to political and partisan plurality, and

turned its back on socialism and adopted a policy of “economic

openness,” even relinquishing key parts of the Arab nationalism

doctrine, the change remained limited and curbed. The core concept

of the central state and its practices did not change; which means —

in brief — a lack of a liberal aspect in the turn towards pluralism,

democracy and free economy.

Furthermore, that time witnessed the rise of political Islamist

groups — both the so-called “moderates” (referring to those that

were known to be non-violent), and others believed to be fanatical or

extremist (known to have, or used to have, militias). In both cases,

the groups of political Islam have their own ideologies and schools

of thought that counter liberal thought on individual and civic rights.

Such groups did engage in an open conflict with the authorities. But

that conflict did not stop them from bargaining political deals. Such

deals, in principle, were tailored for the authorities to allow political

Islamist groups to work in the social and cultural domains, in

addition to Islamic preaching, and to achieve some electoral and

political gains, especially within the trade and student unions and

syndicates, all in return for keeping their hands off the presidency

and national rule. The regime, moreover, adopted some Islamic

ideas, mirrored in the constitution by establishing Islamic Sharia as a

main source of legislation (1981), or giving up important gains

related to freedoms and women’s rights and minorities. This was

known as “political Islamization.” During the 1980s, it was much

the same. Things changed only with the 25 January Revolution,

followed by Islamists winning the presidency, and ruling.

The Arab Spring

The “Arab Spring” revolutions, headed by the Egyptian

revolution, brought Islamist forces to the fore of the political scene.

Bridging the Gap 20

The Muslim Brothers were in the lead, with their fellow Islamists —

such as the Salafists and the Jihadists, who started to openly practice

politics — close behind. For the first time, Islamist groups had an

opportunity to come out from the shadows of secret work and join

recognized parties. That is, undoubtedly, a dramatic change in the

Egyptian and Arab political map. But while Islamists may accept to

engage in the democratic process in a procedural sense, adopting its

known tools (especially the electoral process), the values and liberal

principles of democracy are a different matter. Islamist views on

civic (both private and public) liberties are far different from those

upheld in liberal democratic systems. Such differences apply, as

well, to the values of plurality, tolerance, equality and non-

discrimination, and attitudes towards women and minorities, among

others. Also, the relationship between religion and politics — or

religion and the state — is still matter of debate, putting in question

the civil, or modern national state.

The reality of such conflicting views on individual and civil

freedoms was clearly illustrated in the 2012 Constitution (voted on

last December). All articles and provisions pertaining to civic and

individual freedoms were left open to interpretation by ruling

Islamic powers, the phrasing ambiguous and hard to legally or

constitutionally enforce. Freedoms were explicitly limited by

provisions on the so-called “protection of ethics.” Examples are not

limited to Article 81, which binds the enjoyment of rights and

freedoms to non-conflict with the “principles pertaining to state and

society,” without mention of what such principles are. Articles 10

and 11 stipulate that the state shall “preserve the genuine character

of the Egyptian family, and its ethics and moral values.” Such

provisions left the door open for the state — or even non-state

groups emerging on the pretext of protecting morals (such as groups

for promotion of virtue and prevention of vice) — to interfere in the

private freedoms of citizens and to evaluate their behavior according

to ideological standards.

Similarly, Article 33 — the fundamental article meant to

guarantee rights of “citizenship” — only referred to “equality

Bridging the Gap 22

between citizens in rights and duties without discrimination.” The

full article from the 1971 Constitution (Article 41) had been cut,

omitting the phrase that stipulates, “No discrimination shall take

place because of sex or race or language or religion or belief.”

The 2012 Constitution in general had shades of sectarianism,

especially in its newly created articles. For instance, Article 2 stated

that “Principles of Islamic Sharia are the principle source of

legislation.” To interpret this, a new article was added, Article 219.

With the phrase, “Credible sources accepted by Sunni doctrines,”

and with established disagreements among Islamic schools of

thoughts and jurisprudence, and their variance in extremism and

moderation, the article put the legislator and the court in grave

confusion. Moreover, for the first time Article 4 set a blunt political

role for the institution of Al-Azhar — the formal religious institution

in Egypt — through its board of senior scholars, stipulating that,

“The Senior Scholars shall be consulted in any matter pertaining to

Islamic Sharia.” This, practically, means that Al-Azhar would be

engaged in all political conflicts and disputes, and that its

distinguished moderate advocacy role would be jeopardized.

Particularly that the board of senior scholars is a rotating board, and

depending on its current members could be characterized by either

moderation, or by extremism.

Finally, considering Article 3, which stipulates that “Egyptian

Christians and Jews shall resort to their canon principles as their

own source of legislation,” versus Article 2 that stipulates that

“Islamic Sharia is the principle source of legislation,” one finds

different sources of legislation based upon different religious

references, all far from the core concept of the democratic civil state

that should be built upon the rule of positive law that applies to all

citizens without discrimination, and upon a unified concept for

citizenship.

Even Turkey is different in this regard. While ruled by Islamists

(the Justice and Development Party), debate over the nature of the

state came to an end following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire

and the establishment of the Turkish secular state in 1924. Turkey’s

Bridging the Gap 23

1924 Constitution clearly states that Turkey is “a democratic secular

republic.”

Failure in modernization and development

The “independence” of Arab states emerged in apparent

contradiction with the West, due to the fight against colonialism that

swept the Arab region in the 1940s and 1950s. Soon after, the

political contradiction turned into a cultural one. There has always

been fear of so-called “neo-colonialism” or Western hegemony

through economic instruments and multinational companies, as well

as dominance via international organizations and agencies such as

the World Bank and the United Nations. Values and principles of

both political and economic liberalism, including human rights

charters, have always been regarded as an extension of Western

hegemony — particularly that of the United States and Europe.

All Western-leaning forces and currents have been either

marginalized or completely excluded from decision-making circles,

including liberal economic and political thinking. Accordingly, a

sort of harmony existed between the state and socialist, leftist and

Arab nationalist currents, with the symbols of these currents allowed

to participate — to varying degrees, and with limits — in political

life. That was the situation until the end of the Cold War and the

change of the international system with the victory of the Western

capitalists. That change was accompanied by the pressures of

cultural, political and economic globalization, which put the

“national state” on a defensive footing, at risk of losing its central

powers and classical pillars.

The following decades witnessed a different form of harmony,

between the state and conservative powers — particularly Islamic

ones — despite the recurrent struggle over power. That harmony

aimed at standing up against foreign pressures, such as capitalist

expansion and the spread of democracy and values of freedom (also

known as “the Western model”). The common ground with

Islamists was only about propagating the slogans of “cultural

Bridging the Gap 24

privacy.” It is worth mentioning that the Egyptian state’s signature

on international charters for human rights — including women’s

rights, and freedoms of belief and religion — has always been

conditional, backed with reservations.

What is also important is the state’s failure in implementing any

modernization and development plans, which led to the deterioration

of education and maintaining already high ratios of illiteracy,

poverty and unemployment. Traditional society remained as was,

and the social and cultural environment did not change, despite the

emergence of a new generation and social strata of a more open

culture. The changes occurring to the strata are a result of

globalization and the spread of technology and social media,

channels that the state failed to completely suppress or control.

A critical result of the failure of modernization and development

plans is about the surfacing of sectarianism and polarized belonging

in traditional society, be it religious or tribal or in belief. Such

polarization could very likely jeopardize political and social

homogeneity. It could also sectarianize any electoral process, which

raises questions on its integrity and compliance to established

democratic norms, which should be reliant purely on free political

choice. Polarization also helps explain the ongoing debates on the

identity of the state and its reference points, taking the focus away

from the genuine foundations of the modern civil state.

The fragility of liberal parties

Ongoing exclusion and marginalization of liberal currents by

the authorities — throughout the Arab experience, except for the

first liberal era — had an undeniable impact on the presence of

liberal powers and their ability to spread the culture of freedom

within the layers of a traditional society, a good environment

otherwise for conservative currents and groups, especially those who

combine religious slogans with political action.

In this context, the re-emergence of liberal parties after the

adoption of political plurality was tainted. For instance, Al-Waft

Bridging the Gap 25

Party — the biggest and most popular liberal party in Egypt before

1952 — turned into a hardline rightist party. Many of the recently

founded liberal parties, in turn, failed to live up to expectations, such

as the Democratic Front, the Free Egyptians, Tomorrow of the

Revolution (Ghadd As-Sawra), and the Constitution Party. None

have established a clear liberal agenda, even in cultural and

ideological aspects, and especially regarding civic freedoms,

religious freedoms, minority rights and even women’s rights.

None have prominent women leaders, including the National

Salvation Front. The abovementioned parties avoid controversial

debates, probably in fear of accusations of non-religiousness. In

addition, they are minor and divided, struggling from within over

their leaderships and hence failing to emerge as an influential bloc.

Even worse, they all have more or less the same program. The

reality of these so-called liberal parties has negatively impacted on

perceptions of liberalism in general, let alone their ability to embrace

the new generations within the political arena. The new generations

prefer to work in non-partisan forms, as protest movements, such as

Kefaya and the 6 April Movement, or the Rebel Campaign

(Tamarod) that appeared lately in Egypt.

It appears that the liberal parties have no potential for change in

the near future, especially with their announcement that they are not

going to run in the upcoming parliamentary elections, which opens

the door again to radical rightist groups (including the Salafists and

jihadists) to emerge as the main opposition. This is clearly

happening now in Egypt and Tunisia, the pioneering states of the

Arab Spring.

Bridging the Gap 26

Bridging the Gap 27

Rule of law, individual rights and the

free market in the liberal tradition: The

case of Greece

Aristides N. Hatzis1

I am a liberal because liberalism

does not compel me to think in a

certain manner or seek to forcefully

convince me of a certain idea with the

threat that if I do not embrace it I will

no longer be a liberal.

— Mariam Murad ‘Ali (2010)2

There are many versions of liberalism today. There is modern

liberalism with egalitarian tendencies (egalitarian liberalism; see

Rawls, 1971) and there is libertarianism (Nozick, 1974;

Narveson, 1988), there are liberal conservatives who have

difficulty in accepting a libertarian version of personal freedom,

and social democrats attracted to liberalism without being able to

digest easily economic freedom (Conway, 1995, Ashford and

Davies, 1991). From the center right to the center left people are

1 I wish to thank Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Liberty (FNF) and

particularly Dr. Wolf-Dieter Zumpfort, Hans H. Stein, Dr. Ronald

Meinardus and Markus Kaiser for the kind invitations to present my ideas

at FNF events in Athens and Cairo, as well as Yulie Foka-Kavalieraki and

Dimitris Katsoudas for comments to both preliminary and final texts. I

dedicate this paper to our Egyptian friends, Heba Mahmoud and Islam

Atef. Comments are welcome: ahatzis@phs.uoa.gr 2 Excerpt from the award-winning essay written by Egyptian student Mariam

Murad ‘Ali, “He Who Differs From Me is Not Against Me,” published in

Meinardus and Nagui (2010), p. 115.

Bridging the Gap 28

attracted to liberalism for different and sometimes contradictory

reasons (Kelly, 2005). At the same time, liberal political thinking

is still under development. Almost every month something

interesting and very often original (Huemer, 2013) is published

from liberal intellectuals and scholars, including debates about

the fundamentals of liberal political philosophy (Tomasi, 2012)

or intellectual histories (Powell, 2000; Doherty, 2007). A great

number of these writings can be found online.1 This state of flux

is not only desirable; it is also vital for a political way of thinking.

So don’t expect me to present in this short paper a

mainstream liberal view. There is no mainstream and we

shouldn’t look for one (Barry, 1987; Boaz, 1997; Murray, 1997;

Fried, 2007; Hamowy, 2008; Miron, 2010; Brennan, 2012). I am

going to present my own version, or rather my own perception of

what constitutes the basics of a liberal approach to politics,

society, institutions and the economy.

The democratic and liberal principles

For me, there are two overarching ideas connected with the

liberal approach: the priority of personal freedom and the priority

of economic freedom. These two freedoms are prioritized over

collective decisions. They are not absolutes; there is a

presumption of liberty not a dogmatic adherence to principles.

Let me explain.

In democratic societies, decisions are made collectively. The

best way to decide collectively is the democratic way: the majority

wins. When there is a disagreement — and in a democracy there is

always disagreement — decision by a majority ensures

legitimatization, and at the same time is the decision-making process

most compatible with freedom. This is called the democratic

principle, and as is well known, it was devised in ancient Athens

(Schmidtz and Brennan, 2010, pp. 44-50).

1 See e.g. http://bleedingheartlibertarians.com or http://econlog.econlib.org

Bridging the Gap 29

Is it politically desirable for the majority to decide every case

of disagreement? Is the role of majority to decide on everything?

No. There is an area where individuals should be free to decide

for themselves even when their decisions have an impact on

society. This area is protected by rights — the most important

political tools for every liberal (Dworkin, 1978). Rights define

the area of personal freedom where society, the majority, and the

government cannot intervene. What is the extent of this area?

This is still under discussion. John Stuart Mill defined this area

better than anyone else:

[T]he sole end for which mankind are warranted,

individually or collectively, in interfering with the

liberty of action of any of their number, is self-

protection. That the only purpose for which power can

be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized

community, against his will, is to prevent harm to

others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not

sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully be compelled to

do or forbear because it will be better for him to do so,

because it will make him happier, because, in the

opinion of others, to do so would be wise, or even right.

These are good reasons for remonstrating with him, or

reasoning with him, or persuading him, or entreating

him, but not for compelling him, or visiting him with

any evil in case he do otherwise. To justify that, the

conduct from which it is desired to deter him, must be

calculated to produce evil to some one else. The only

part of the conduct of any one, for which he is

amenable to society, is that which concerns others. In

the part which merely concerns himself, his

independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over

his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign.

(Mill, 1859, Ch. 1)

Bridging the Gap 31

As you can see, Mill not only defines the area of permissible

government interference with private choices (the harm principle)

but he also takes for granted that there must be a presumption of

personal freedom. Decisions by societies, majorities and

governments are residual — not the rule but the exception. There is

of course a rich literature that tries to interpret harm (Stephen, 1873;

Hart, 1963; Devlin, 1968; Feinberg, 1984-1988; Wertheimer, 2002).

Does this include extreme offence? Does it include negative

externalities (Trebilcock, 1993; Hatzis, 2013)? Could we add

collective action problems to the cases where the government should

limit liberty? Is this view compatible with social contract theories?

Independently of the answers to these questions we should

emphasize the essence of this argument: there is a presumption of

personal freedom; the proof of the necessity for restrictions to

personal freedom always lies with the government.

In a liberal democracy there is a personal domain protected by

negative rights. This domain should be shielded not only from an

authoritarian government but also from a democratic majority

(Danford, 2000, pp. 159-172). This domain should be under the

protection of the rule of law and its most powerful institutional

weapon: the constitution. Let’s call this the liberal principle. The

liberal principle was devised and introduced by James Madison1 in

the U.S. Constitution of 1787 and the U.S. Bill of Rights of 1789.2

The controversial3 ninth amendment is illustrative of Madison’s

1 “Wherever the real power in a Government lies, there is the danger of

oppression. In our Governments, the real power lies in the majority of the

Community, and the invasion of private rights is chiefly to be apprehended,

not from the acts of Government contrary to the sense of its constituents,

but from acts in which the Government is the mere instrument of the major

number of the constituents.” (James Madison, “Letter to Thomas

Jefferson,” 17 October 1788). 2 The distinction between the “ancient” conception of liberty (emphasizing

political participation) and the “modern” conception of liberty

(emphasizing rights and the rule of law) was made for the first time by

Benjamin Constant in 1816 (for more see: Holmes, 1984). 3 See Barnett (1993). According to Barnett, the ninth amendment establishes

a “presumption of liberty” (implementing the ninth amendment challenges

Bridging the Gap 30

philosophy for the protection of the domain of personal freedom

from the power of the majority:

The enumeration in the Constitution, of

certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or

disparage others retained by the people.

The most interesting question today is that about the balance

between these two principles: the democratic principle and the

liberal principle. They are apparently contradicting, but at the same

time they complement each other. Make no mistake. There can be

no liberalism without democracy. It’s an oxymoron. On the other

hand, an illiberal democracy is possible and also quite common.

Illiberal is a democracy where there are regular elections, the

majority is supposedly free to pick the winning party, the democratic

principle is generally respected, but not the liberal principle

(Zakaria, 2004). In an illiberal democracy individual rights are not

respected or adequately protected, the institutions of the rule of law

are undermined or underdeveloped, and the constitution is not a

shield against majority excesses but a legal weapon establishing

majority power and stifling minority voices. Civil society is

notoriously absent, and often individual behavior is restrained by

religion and/or conventional morality. These societies are always

characterized by an authoritarian combination of legal paternalism

and legal moralism.

Thus, balance between these two principles is essential for the

quality of a liberal democracy. The better the balance the better the

quality of a democracy.

A society where people are regularly called upon to express

their values, preferences and choices through voting, and where an

extended area of personal liberty is safeguarded by the rule of law, is

us to protect un-enumerated rights without determining a final list of such

rights, and without lending credence to illegitimate claims of right).

Bridging the Gap 32

a liberal society. Individuals in this society are in charge of their

lives — they are personally autonomous.

In such a society, well-being is linked to individual preferences.

It is not determined by society, by a majority or by a committee of

experts. Well-being is achieved by the satisfaction of preferences

through choices and contracts. This is only possible if the choice is

free and contracts are protected and encouraged, provided there is

mutual consent (Foka-Kavalieraki and Hatzis, 2009).

These values (choice, consent and contract) can be compatible

only with a free market. If the market is not free, people are not able

to choose freely; their consent does not matter and their contracts are

not enforced. It is apparent that a free market is a necessary

condition for personal autonomy and freedom. However, a free

market is also indispensable for well-being.

I belong to a liberal current called liberal utilitarianism, which is

closely connected with the work of John Stuart Mill in the 19th

century and the Chicago School of Economics in the 20th century. I

emphasize the instrumental value of the market as the creator of

wealth and the guarantor of well-being, but without dismissing its

moral value. I don’t share the view that the free market is always

self-correcting and efficient. I believe that government intervention

is sometimes necessary to solve the problem of collective action, to

correct market failures and provide an institutional framework that is

essential for a well-functioning market (Foka-Kavalieraki and

Hatzis, 2009). I also believe that a liberal cannot be indifferent to the

fate of a fellow individual in a society, especially where his or her

fate is not the result of choices made but of the natural lottery

(Rawls, 1971). A truly liberal society does its best to ensure equality

of opportunity and to provide a safety net for the less advantaged

(Tomasi, 2012).

Liberalism, thus, doesn’t preclude government intervention. It is

suspicious of it and alert for government failures. It is an exception

worth having if the benefit for liberty and well-being is far greater

than the cost.

Bridging the Gap 33

If we look at the world map of political freedom and compare it

with the world map of economic freedom we will realize there is a

correlation. If we study more closely this correlation we will

discover that there is a two-way causal relationship: political

freedom leads to economic freedom; economic freedom leads

eventually to political freedom. Less political freedom leads to less

economic freedom; less economic freedom leads to less political

freedom (Wu and Davis, 2004; Thies, 2007). What about China?

China is not economically free. It is very lowly ranked on indices of

economic freedom. However, it is freer than North Korea. If China

continues to liberalize its economy the political repercussions are

inevitable. A road towards more economic freedom is a road

towards more political freedom, more political participation, and

more democracy.

I hope that from the above discussion it has become obvious

that if we are trying to find a consensus among liberals we should

base it on these two presumptions: the priority of personal freedom

and the priority of economic freedom.

A liberal society is a democratic society with an emphasis on

rule of law, rights and personal autonomy. The free market is the

only kind of economic organization that is compatible with this

society.

The Greek experience

What about Greece? Greece follows the above recipe for liberty.

It is a liberal democracy with a free market. However, there are so

many black spots in this picture that the picture itself seems black,

especially if you look at it from a near distance.

Unfortunately, liberal thinking is underdeveloped today in

Greece and as a result liberal policies are unpopular, discredited or

unknown. This is the result of many factors, most of all of the

absence of a strong liberal intellectual tradition in Greece during the

20th century. This was not so in the 19th century when Greece had

its national but also democratic and liberal revolution. You could

Bridging the Gap 34

have found then genuine liberal essays, like “Greek Rule of Law”

(Ελληνική Νομαρχία) by an anonymous Greek intellectual declaring

that:

He who ignores Liberty, also ignores the essence of his

existence because Liberty is more essential for man than his

own existence. Liberty makes life pleasant, it produces

guardians for our Motherland, lawmakers, virtuous and wise

people. Only Liberty honors humankind.

You could have found genuine liberal intellectuals like

Adamantios Korais and others who had regular correspondence with

Thomas Jefferson, Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill (Horton,

1976; Rosen, 1992).

When Greece was liberated from the Ottoman Empire in 1821,

the first Greek constitutions were both democratic and liberal (see:

Clogg, 2002; Koliopoulos and Veremis, 2010). The short-lived

Greek constitution of 1827 was the most democratic and liberal of

its era; it was more progressive in many respects than the U.S. or the

French constitutions. Rule of law was established in Greece as early

as 1822 and the rights of life, liberty, property, safety, the freedom

of religion, speech, expression and the press were safeguarded.

Torture was prohibited and slavery was abolished as well as nobility

titles. According to the constitution of 1827, the only source of

political authority is the Greek people. Every political power

originates from the people and exists only to serve the people.

In 1844, Greece becomes the first country in the world with

universal male suffrage. Nine out of 10 Greek adult citizens had the

right to vote in an era where in Great Britain only one out of 12, and

in France one out of 200, had the same right.

Greece, despite political strife had a consistent democratic

political life with broad political participation from the early 19th

century to 1974, with only two relatively short periods of

Bridging the Gap 35

dictatorship, from 1936 to 1940 and from 1967 to 1974. However,

there were several periods where Greece was an illiberal democracy,

the most recent one was the period from 1949 to 1967 when

following a civil war the Communist Party was outlawed and left-

wingers were persecuted and repressed.

For the past 40 years, after the fall of the military junta in 1974,

Greece has become one of the most democratic countries in the

world. Nevertheless, I wouldn’t characterize it a model of liberalism

for several reasons. One is that the Greek economy is not as free as it

should be. Another reason is that the protection of individual rights

is not ideal. A third reason is that despite the prevalence of liberal

ideas in 19th century Greece, the absence of leading liberal

intellectuals in the 20th century was depressing. Only after 1974 and

the return to democracy did a number of scholars, intellectuals,

journalists and politicians come back to Greece, bringing with them

the ideas of what was erroneously called “neo-liberalism.”

These intellectuals had to fight prejudice, ignorance and

political short sightedness. They managed to survive and to inspire

the emergence of a small community of liberal-minded citizens. The

progress since 1974 is more than significant. Nevertheless, it is less

than expected and hoped. This is obvious today. Despite the

bankruptcy of the illiberal policies of the past 40 years and the

degeneration of the Greek political system, the presence of liberals

in Greek political life is marginal. There is a paradox in this

phenomenon. The liberal view is adequately expressed in the

traditional media: a number of liberal-minded columnists are very

popular and influential, and in almost every newspaper — including

traditional left-wing newspapers — you can find every day articles

that are very friendly to liberal ideas and causes. This is

unprecedented. At the same time liberal thinking is everywhere to be

found in the new social media, with the added effect of making

possible the creation of strong liberal online communities.

Unfortunately this dynamic is not expressed politically. The results

in the last two election polls were disheartening. One should wonder

Bridging the Gap 36

if this is the result of a lively minority creating too much noise and

little political substance.

But let’s examine the blind spots in Greece’s liberal façade

more closely.

Greece’s ranking on economic freedom is deplorable. In the

latest Index of Economic Freedom, Greece is characterized as

mostly unfree (117th out of 177). You will find similar results if you

look in other indices, like the Economic Freedom of the World

index. According to the annual survey of the World Bank (Doing

Business) for 2013, Greece comes in 78th out of 185 countries

around the world in terms of the overall ease of doing business. It is,

of course, the worst place in both the European Union and the

OECD. This sounds more than outrageous. Greece, a European

Union member for the past 30 years, a member of the Eurozone for

the past 10 years and formerly one of the 25 richest countries on the

planet, ranks far below Kazakhstan, Rwanda, Ghana and Mongolia.

Also below much poorer neighbors like Bulgaria, Turkey and

Romania. This is so because the Greek economy has been for years

hostile to entrepreneurship and the free market in general. You

should also take into consideration that this position is much better

than the one Greece had two to three years ago.

The Greek government during the past three years attempted to

open closed professions and to limit the entitlements of public sector

unions. The result was always — with few notable exceptions — a

crushing defeat for the government by powerful pressure groups

who are determined to continue preying on Greece’s finances,

indifferent for the common good. They manage to wipe out any

vestiges of a free market system, transforming Greece into a model

of corporatism, statism and cronyism.

The institutional deficit

It’s not difficult to imagine what a liberal agenda would look

like in a situation like this:

Bridging the Gap 37

Open markets

Abolish closed professions

Repeal regulations

Make the tax system efficient and just

Reform the welfare system. Transform it from a spoil for

powerful groups to a real safety net

Fight corruption

Fight pressure groups, cartels, and government sustained

businesses

Construct an institutional framework appropriate for

economic development

Liberals, quite often, are so much preoccupied with economic

liberty they forget political liberty, individual rights and the rule of

law.

Greece’s deficit is not only financial. As we have already seen it

is first and foremost an institutional deficit. This institutional deficit

includes deficient protection of individual rights. Economic freedom

is not the only freedom with insufficient protection.

Let us discuss briefly some leading issues where this deficit is

more than obvious. I believe that a liberal policy should address all

these issues:

1. Violence. Greek intellectuals, academics, authors, journalists

are afraid of expressing their opinions in several

circumstances. I don’t mean that there is no freedom of

expression in Greece. However, a lot of people in Greece are

afraid to express themselves, fearing violent retaliation by

extremists of left and right. A liberal agenda should

emphasize protection of every opinion and punishment for

violent acts, especially hate acts.

Bridging the Gap 38

2. Police brutality and torture. There are too many depressing

reports issued by international human rights organizations

and stories published by international newspapers revealing

widespread abuses of fundamental rights and affronts to

human dignity. It’s a disgrace for a civil society.

3. Freedom of expression. There are numerous incidences of

infringement of the rights of free speech by the government,

the courts and independent agencies like the Greek National

Council for Radio and Television. Sometimes these

infringements are outrageous and are almost always

ridiculous, as the banning by a court of a communist student

club in a small provincial town because its activity could

endanger the relations of Greece with its allies!

4. Freedom of the Press. The press is free in Greece and

sometimes not even constrained by a code of ethics.

However, there is a web of laws and regulations creating

obstacles and disincentives for journalists seeking to unravel

the truth. Powerful persons and groups are using this web to

deter journalists quite successfully.

5. Freedom of conscience. The Greek state is an officially Greek

Orthodox state. Greece is in many respects a theocratic

country. The separation of church and state should be one of

the leading causes in any liberal agenda. Athens is still the

only capital in Europe without a mosque!

6. Right of self-determination. Greece has been condemned by

the European Court of Justice numerous times for not

allowing ethnic and religious minorities to express

themselves. The self-proclaimed Turks or Macedonians

should have the right to express their perceived identity

freely. A liberal agenda should give to these minorities the

right (not a collective right, an individual right) to self-

determination.

7. Right to self-ownership. The army in Greece is still

mandatory. A liberal agenda should ask for an abolition of

Bridging the Gap 39

conscription. The decriminalization of drug use is also

crucial if we want to call our society liberal.

8. Political and legal equality. A liberal agenda should also give

priority to political and legal equality. A crucial issue is the

problem of marriage equality. In Greece, gay people cannot

even form civil unions. I believe that a liberal agenda should

include this extremely important right for a civil society.

9. Protection of immigrants and vulnerable minorities. The

Greek state has been embarrassed several times by the

negative reports of international organizations on

immigrants and vulnerable minorities, like Roma. A liberal

agenda should be protective of minorities and immigrants.

10. Academic freedom. In Greece, private universities are

prohibited by the constitution — even non-profit ones.

Article 16 of the Greek constitution is a disgrace for every

liberty-loving person. It should have been amended a decade

ago. At the same time, Greek public universities should be

liberated from the forces of the dark; from professional

occupiers who ensure low quality studies, restrict freedom of

speech, and promote a mafia-style system of corruption and

decadence.

Towards a liberal education

For me the most important mission for liberal intellectuals today

in Greece — but also in Egypt and the Arab world — is education:

education for liberalism. There is no other way to make liberal ideas

popular and liberal policies feasible. Especially young people should

be acquainted with these ideas. I am more than confident that the

encounter with these ideas will make young people appreciate them,

or at least will give them a chance.

Friedrich Naumann (1909), more than a century ago, had the

same insight for Germany: “Education for liberalism is in no way

merely the education of members of parliament; at a much higher

Bridging the Gap 41

level, it is about educating the people for liberal thinking and

action.”

I know how romantic and unrealistic many of these ideas may

sound. These cannot be achieved in a day, in a year or sometimes

not even in a lifetime. It takes a transformation of society for these

goals to be achieved. It takes a liberal education.

Bridging the Gap 40

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Bridging the Gap 44

Bridging the Gap 45

Liberalism and conspiracy theories:

Greece and Egypt

Asteris Huliaras

Public views in Greece and Egypt are sometimes strikingly

similar. In both countries conspiracy theories are à la mode.

Conflict, instability, foreign intervention and the redrawing of

international boundaries in their respective regions (the Balkans and

the Middle East/Africa) have created feelings of insecurity.

Economic crisis and political transition made uncertainty and fear

widespread. Semi-dormant conspiracy theories came to forefront,

undermining rational debate and political accountability.

Conspiratorial explanations of political events or economic

developments are based on the belief that behind the scenes there is

a deliberate plan, formulated in secret by powerful foreign actors.

For conspiracy theorists, the truth is “out there” and is systematically

concealed by powerful enemies. Conspiracy theories are based on

mistrust and suspicion.

Conspiracy theories are not new. It is believed that Emperor

Nero concocted an elaborate tale to shift the blame to the Christians

for the burning of Rome. But most analysts argue that in their

modern form, conspiracy theories emerged during the French

Revolution of 1789. Then, the enemies of the revolution (royalists,

etc.) promoted the view that the revolution was a machination of

Freemasons, Jewish traders and the Illuminati to “control” France.1

The Tsarist regime in Russia and the Nazis gave a great boost to

conspiratorial thinking. McCarthyism in the United States showed

1 See, for example, Tackett, Timothy, “Conspiracy Obsession in a Time of

Revolution: French Elites and the Origins of the Terror, 1789-1792,” The

American Historical Review, Vol. 105: June (2000), pp. 691-714.

Bridging the Gap 46

that conspiracy theories are a worldwide phenomenon, irrelevant of

space and time, regime type or level of economic development.

There is a wide literature on the causes of conspiracy

theorizing.1 Philosophical approaches focus on information: it is the

low quantity and quality of evidence that drives belief in conspiracy

theories. The claim of this school is that people adhere to

conspiratorial thought because they do not have accurate and

authoritative information. Psychological approaches argue that

conspiracy theories are mental shortcuts. They note that conspiracy

theories meet a basic human need: to balance the magnitude of any

given effect by the magnitude of the cause behind it. After all, a

world in which tiny causes can have huge consequences is scary and

unreliable. Therefore, a grand disaster like a war or a large-scale

terrorist attack, like 11 September 2001, needs a grand conspiracy

behind it. Sociological approaches argue that culture is key in

understanding conspiracy theorizing. The way groups view

themselves in relation to others helps determine how likely they are

to view events as conspiracy-related. By this logic, culture is a filter

that screens out unflattering information and favors complimentary

narratives. Finally, political explanations of conspiracy thinking

focus on power and interests. Political scientists believe that certain

groups benefit from conspiracy theories and, thus, have a real

interest in promoting them. Most political scientists claim that

conspiratorial thought operates symmetrically on both ends of the

political spectrum. People on the right and the left are equally prone

to having less faith in democracy, are equally prone to cynical and

suspicious views, and equally prone to believing that politicians

conceal their true aims and make decisions in secret.

In Greece, the typical conspiracy theory is “the foreign finger”

(xenos daktylos) and in the Arab world “the hidden hand.” On both

shores of the Mediterranean large groups of people tend to adhere to

1 For a brief review see: Uscinski, Joseph E., Joseph M. Parent and Bethany

Torres, “Conspiracy Theories are for Losers,” Unpublished paper presented

at the 2011 American Political Science Association annual conference,

Seattle.

Bridging the Gap 47

conspiracy theories. And these groups of people do not necessarily

consist of the non-educated, the economically marginal or the

politically excluded. For example, a recent study on Greek junior

army officers’ political perceptions found they see Greece as a

“puppet” in the hands of “great powers.” Junior army officers in

Greece support conspiracy theories that present Greece and its rival,

Turkey, as non-sovereign countries whose policies are dictated by

more powerful states and interests, always with a hidden agenda.

Their view is that Greece will never go to war with Turkey unless

the Americans wish it so.1

It has been argued that conspiratorial explanations tend to

flourish in response to unusual, unexpected or traumatic events. In

particular, conspiracy theories gain ground when the population of a

country feels insecure or persecuted.

Indeed, conspiracy theories are rarely created de novo, but

rather draw on a tradition of conspiratorial accounts.2 Sutton claims

that viewing the “foreign finger” as decisive in Greek political and

diplomatic calculations is not “an exception but the consistent

pattern in Greece’s relationship with the West.”3

Greece: Fear and paranoia

In the last three to four years, Greek politicians, intellectuals and

the general public argued that the economic crisis was a plot by dark

foreign forces to subdue proud, independent nations. Political parties

of both left and right promoted several conspiracy theories: the

1 Kirtsoglou, Elisabeth, “Phantom Menace: What Junior Greek Army

Officers Have to Say About Turks and Turkey,” South European Society

and Politics, Vol. 11, No. 1 (2006), p. 169. 2 Lipset, Seymour Martin and Earl Raab, The Politics of Unreason: Right-

wing Extremism in America,

1790-1977 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978). 3 Sutton, David, “Poked by the ‘Foreign Finger’ in Greece: Conspiracy

Theory or the Hermeneutics of Suspicion?” in Keith S. Brown and Yannis

Hamilakis (Eds.), The Usable Past: Greek Metahistories (Lanham, MD:

Lexington Books, 2003), p. 197.

Bridging the Gap 48

“West” is trying to destroy Greece because it is jealous of its past

glories; “foreign interests” have their eyes on the “rich” oil and gas

deposits in the Aegean; and that the relationship with the European

Union is a poker game and the northern Europeans are simply

bluffing.

Of course it is very convenient to blame others for your own

misery or mistakes. Politicians have an interest in pointing to some

outside enemy, real or imagined. This practice enables them to

divert attention from ineffective and inefficient administration. For

example, even the Western-educated, moderate and low profile

former Greek Prime Minister George Papandreou, speaking at the

World Economic Forum in Davos, said in 2010:

This is an attack on the Eurozone by certain other

interests, political or financial, and often countries are

being used as the weak link, if you like, of the

Eurozone. We are being targeted, particularly with an

ulterior motive or agenda, and of course there is

speculation in the world markets.1

Mikis Theodorakis, Greece’s most famous composer, expressed

the visceral reaction of many Greeks when he said the crisis was

probably a plot by dark forces in America and other capitalist

countries to subdue proud, independent nations. In an open letter to

the “international community” he claimed:

There is an international conspiracy whose target is

the complete destruction of my country. They began in

1974 aiming at modern Greek civilization, continued

with the distortion of our modern history and our national

identity and they are now trying to eliminate us

1 Cited in Charlemagne, “Just Who Are These Dark Forces Attacking

Greece?” The Economist, 29 January 2010, p. 55.

Bridging the Gap 49

biologically as well through unemployment, hunger and

impoverishment. If Greek people don’t rise as one in

order to prevent them, the danger of Greece becoming

extinct is evident. I place it within the next 10 years …

Indeed, many such perceptions are based on past experiences:

U.S. support for the Greek junta and especially U.S. inaction on the

Turkish invasion of Cyprus that, for many Greeks, was

masterminded by Henry Kissinger. A few years ago, a Greek left-

wing periodical claimed to uncover the secret plan to tame the

Greeks by publishing an alleged statement by Kissinger:

The Greek people are anarchic and difficult to tame.

For this reason we must strike deep into their cultural

roots. Perhaps then we can force them to conform. I

mean, of course, to strike at their language, their religion,

their cultural and historical reserves, so that we can

neutralize their ability to develop, to distinguish

themselves, or to prevail; thereby removing them as an

obstacle to our strategically vital plans in the Balkans, the

Mediterranean, and the Middle East.

It doesn’t appear to matter that Kissinger denies he ever said

that. The paragraph has been reproduced in newspapers, blogs, and

online forums. It is proof of an international conspiracy, according

to an argument constantly repeated, until today. The idea is always

the same: “the foreigners want to destroy us.”

The countless magazines on extra-terrestrial life, the mysteries

of life, etc., confirm the thirst of the Greeks for conspiracies. TV

shows such as those of Mr. Tragas, Mr. Hardavelas (not on any

longer) and Mr. Liakopoulos are proof that conspiracy theories are

widely popular in the country, though hard data on public opinion

Bridging the Gap 51

support for conspiracy theories is largely unavailable. Pollsters,

however, believe it is widespread.

Moreover, sometimes the belief in conspiracy theories becomes

totally paranoiac. Some (though marginal) Greek media claim that

the “masterminds of the world” have decided to control Greeks with

chemicals that they inject in the water supply. They also argue that

fruit and vegetables are “poisoned” with pesticides that limit Greek

citizens’ intelligence and make them easy targets for a bombardment

of propaganda. They even argue that airplanes are spraying the

country with chemicals (to prove their accusations the reproduce

photographs that show planes leaving long lines in the sky — so-

called chem-trails).

Egypt: The Arab Spring conspiracy

In Egypt and other Muslim countries, the Arab Spring was

presented as a “foreign plot” aimed at weakening Arab armies.

Many Arab politicians, activists and journalists argued that the Arab

Spring was an American plan to divide the Middle East into smaller

rival nations, and to plunder their wealth. Recent events in Egypt,

Libya, Yemen and Syria have been explained as a calculated plot to

destroy Arab countries and wipe out their rich heritage and history.

Many of those who believe the Arab Spring is part of a conspiracy

theory have linked their views to the remarks, articles and literature

of non-Arab intellectuals, like Bernard Lewis.

The U.S. military intervention in the Gulf in 1991 gave a great

boost to conspiracy theories. To some conspiracy theorists, Saddam

Hussein was deliberately drawn into a trap of invading Kuwait,

“whether to start a war that would destroy or weaken his military, or

for the West to gain greater access to Iraq’s oil, or to protect Israel

from a perceived threat from an idle Iraqi military.”1 Saddam

himself made similar claims.

1 Gray, Matthew, “Explaining Conspiracy Theories in Modern Arab Middle

Eastern Political Discourse: Some Problems and Limitations of the

Bridging the Gap 50

Terms like the “New Middle East,” coined and promoted by

U.S. officials in relation to the invasion of Iraq in 2003, gave more

credence to conspiratorial explanations. In 2004, the Bush

administration adopted the “Greater Middle East Project” with the

goal of encouraging political, economic and social reforms in the

Arab world and the wider region. Despite that the project did not

bear any fruit and was in several respects a complete fiasco, it

helped to create or strengthen a perception that the United States

was behind the overthrow of Ben Ali in Tunisia and Mubarak in

Egypt — and also the civil war in Syria.

The view that the Arab Spring is a Western plot was also

promoted by several Arab regimes. Gaddafi in Libya and Al-Assad

in Syria made similar allegations. The truth is that the upheavals in

the Arab world came as a surprise to many Western foreign

ministries. France’s minister of defense offered help with police

training to Ben Ali’s Tunisia at the same time that demonstrations

were gathering momentum. Also, Washington initially signaled

support for Hosni Mubarak during the rallies against him. Hillary

Clinton said she was sure that the Mubarak regime was “stable.”

The U.S. was also reluctant to lose an ally against Al-Qaeda in

Yemen such as Ali Abdullah Saleh. The United States was likewise

unhappy with the uprising in Bahrain. And Obama was very

reluctant to get involved in the French-inspired military intervention

in Libya. The truth is that the uprisings were spontaneous,

indigenous, centered on dissatisfied youth, and there is a lot of

evidence that they took great Western powers completely by

surprise.

A crucial similarity between Greece and Egypt is that there are a

lot of state-sponsored conspiracy theories. It is obvious that

conspiracy theories help divert attention away from the state’s

political or developmental failures and towards a constructed enemy.

As in the French Revolution, the ancien régime fought back.

Literature,” Critique: Critical Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 17, No. 2

(2008), p. 156.

Bridging the Gap 52

A history of real conspiracies

Very few notions nowadays generate as much academic

resistance and hostility as the belief in the historical importance of

political conspiracies. As Jeffrey M. Bale argues,

the idea that particular groups of people meet

together secretly or in private to plan various courses of

action, and that some of these plans actually exert a

significant influence on particular historical

developments, is typically rejected out of hand and

assumed to be the figment of a paranoid imagination.1

However, the academic literature on negotiations, coup d’état,

espionage, covert action, political corruption, organized crime,

terrorism and revolutionary warfare have analyzed in detail

clandestine and covert political activities on a more or less regular

basis.2

In the recent history of the Balkans and the Middle East, several

real conspiracies have taken place, and great powers have for long

periods manipulated local politics by buying off politicians,

sponsoring political parties, organizing or supporting coups and

propping up minority communities. The Sykes-Picot Agreement of

1916, the overthrow of Mohammad Mosaddeq in 1953, the Levon

affair of 1954, the Suez crisis of 1956 and the Iran-Contra affair of

1985-6 are blatant examples of great power secret interventions in

the Middle East. These incidents provide a fertile ground for Middle

Eastern conspiracy theories. In Greece, perceptions of a “foreign

finger” are also warranted. Experiences of betrayal by the West tend

to provide justification for current conspiracy theories. Protagonists

1 Bale, Jeffrey M., “Political Paranoia v. Political Realism: On

Distinguishing Between Bogus

Conspiracy Theories and Genuine Conspiratorial Politics,” Patterns of

Prejudice, Vol. 41, No. 1 (2007), p. 47. 2 Ibid, p. 49.

Bridging the Gap 53

in Greece’s internal quarrels have long invoked external assistance,

while furiously denouncing any foreign help given to their rivals.

During the right-left civil war of 1946-49, each side reserved

particular loathing for its foe’s foreign backers, American or Soviet.

The idea of a manipulating “foreign finger” has in fact dominated

modern Greek history.

Several studies have shown that conspiratorial accounts have a

long history in the Balkans and Middle Eastern countries.1 Recent

developments in the wider region — conflict, foreign intervention

and redrawing of international boundaries — helped to promote

conspiratorial explanations. During the 1999 NATO bombings of

Yugoslavia, the country’s establishment (politicians, official media

and intellectuals) adopted conspiracy theories referring to the secret

plans of the Bilderberg Group, the Council on Foreign Relations and

the Trilateral Commission that were supposedly conspiring to

destroy Serbia.2 Similar views emerged in Greece. The international

intervention was portrayed as an extension of the long history of

Western colonialism. Greeks wove stories of poorly concealed

hidden interests to control the region’s natural resources and

conquer independent-minded nations.3 For many Greeks, the break-

up of Yugoslavia and the redrawing of international boundaries was

a German plot with the support of the Vatican. Similar views

emerged in Egypt. According to Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood,

South Sudan’s independence “was the fruition of a century-old

Western ecclesiastical plot to close Islam’s gateway into Africa, and

the start of a plan to break other Arab countries into feeble statelets

1 Daniel Pipes, The Hidden Hand: Middle East Fears of Conspiracy

(Basingstoke: Macmillan

1996). 2 Byford, Jovan and Michael Billig, “The Emergence of Anti-Semitic

Conspiracy Theories in Yugoslavia During the War with NATO,”

Sociologija, Vol. XLVII, No. 4 (2005), pp. 307-322. 3 Brown, Keith and Demetrios Theodossopoulos, “Rearranging Solidarity:

Conspiracy and World Order in Greek and Macedonian Commentaries on

Kosovo,” Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans, Vol. 5, No. 3

(2003), p. 333.

Bridging the Gap 54

so as to grab their riches.”1 Indeed, there is some truth in both

accounts. Germany pressured its EU partners to recognize the

independence of Slovenia and Croatia. And the US and Israel

strongly supported the independence of South Sudan. For many

years Egypt sought to impede South Sudan’s quest for independence

ostensibly because of fears over the White Nile’s headwaters. Greek

foreign policy-makers shared with Egyptians counterparts the view

that the redrawing of international boundaries would create a

dangerous precedent. Greece favored the status quo in the Balkans,

fearing the disruption of the trade route to Western Europe — its

own Nile. In both countries, war, instability and the changes in

international boundaries in their wider regions created a lot of

uncertainty and promoted conspiracy theories.

However, there are fundamental differences between

“conspiracy theories” and actual covert and clandestine politics,

differences that must be taken into account if one wishes to avoid

serious errors of historical interpretation. It’s one thing to believe

that there are clandestine actions and another to embrace the idea

that everything that is truly significant happens behind the scenes.

We can conclude that conspiracy theories tend to flourish in the

Eastern Mediterranean partly because the region has a long history

of real conspiracies and interventions by great powers. Instability in

the wider region (violent conflict, foreign intervention, redrawing of

international boundaries) is also responsible for feelings of

uncertainty since in both the Balkans and the Middle East national

sovereignty is a “sacred” concept. Finally, political transition (in

Egypt) and economic crisis (in Greece) strengthened conspiracy

thinking as old and new elites searched for legitimacy.

1 “South Sudan and the Arab World: A Plot to do down Islam,” The

Economist, 13 January 2011.

Bridging the Gap 55

Figure 1. Causes of conspiracy theorizing

Greece Egypt

A modern history full of

real conspiracies.

▲ ▲

Conflict in the wider

periphery.

New international

boundaries

▲ ▲

Political and economic

instability

▲ ▲

Epilogue: Say No to international conspiracies

There is nothing in Greek and Egyptian political cultures that

make them more susceptible to conspiracy theories. Conspiracy

theories are present all over the world. Even in the richest Western

countries, belief in conspiracy theories is widespread. In August

2004, a poll by Zogby International showed that 49 percent of New

York City residents, with a margin of error of 3.5 percent, believed

that officials of the U.S. government “knew in advance that attacks

were planned on or around 11 September 2001, and that they

consciously failed to act.”1 In a Scripps-Howard Poll in 2006, with

an error margin of four percent, some 36 percent of respondents

assented to the claim that “federal officials either participated in the

attacks on the World Trade Center or took no action to stop them.”2

However, no conspiracy theory offers a way out of the mess. In

fact, conspiracy theories impede clear thinking and allow political

elites to escape responsibility for their actions. Conspiracies

undermine democratization and economic reform. They lead

citizens to inaction. Their real message is that since a foreign

1 Cited in Sunstein, Cass R. and Adrian Vermeule, “Conspiracy Theories,”

Journal of Political Philosophy, Vol. 17, No. 2 (2009), p. 202. 2 Ibid.

Bridging the Gap 56

“Other” is responsible for your problems, you can do nothing to

change your condition.

Only by taking responsibility for ourselves, we the Greeks and

the Egyptians can overcome the current turmoil. In fact, conspiracies

are the enemies of liberalism. If we want to strengthen

representative institutions, promote good governance and empower

the people we have to abandon the belief in international

conspiracies — even if they sometimes prove true.

Bridging the Gap 57

Arab renaissance

and economic freedom

Yusuf Mansur

While there is no single definition for economic freedom,1 the

majority believes the concept to include free markets, free

trade and private property.2 Further, as stated in the Economic

Freedom of the World 2007 Annual Report, the key ingredients of

economic freedom can be understood to include: personal choice,

voluntary exchange coordinated by markets, freedom to enter and

compete in markets, and protection of persons and their property

from aggression by others. An economy is considered free when it

provides secure protection for one’s property (physical and

intellectual), even-handed enforcement of contracts, a stable

monetary environment, low taxes, little to no barriers to market

entry, and rely more on markets than political decisions and

processes in the allocation of resources.

Indeed, the concept of political freedom underpins economic

freedom. In Economic Freedom of the World 2007, we find the

proposition that: “Personal ownership of self is an underlying

postulate of economic freedom. Because of this self-ownership,

individuals have a right to choose — to decide how they will use

their time and talents. On the other hand, they do not have a right to

the time, talents and resources of others. Thus, they do not have a

1 See Bronfenbrenner, Martin, “Two Concepts of Economic

Freedom,” Ethics, Vol. 65, No. 3 (1955), pp. 157-170, and Sen,

Amartya, Rationality and Freedom (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,

2004), p. 9. 2 Friedman, Rose D. and Milton Friedman, Two Lucky People: Memoirs

(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008), p. 605.

Bridging the Gap 58

right to take things from others or demand that others provide things

for them.” And even if a country were democratic (i.e., people can

vote and elect their own government), if political restrictions inhibit

voluntary actions and personal choice, then political institutions

would be in conflict with economic freedom.1

The most important component of “human well-being,”

according to John Stuart Mill, freedom is to be able to pursue one’s

own good in one’s own way; thus, happiness would accrue only to

“someone who was capable of choosing an independent path and

who had the public sphere available in which to exercise that

capacity.”2 In Capitalism and Freedom (1962), Milton Friedman

argued that economic freedom was a necessary condition for

political freedom,3 and that property rights is the most basic human

right. Friedrich von Hayek added that the certainty of law

contributed to the prosperity of the West more than any other single

aspect.4

Amartya Sen has called for understanding freedom in terms of

capabilities to pursue a range of goals; thus, it is not only freedom of

opportunities, but also of capabilities.5 Sen explains that furthering

human development consists of “advancing the richness of human

life, rather than the richness of the economy in which human beings

live, which is only a part of it.” That is, human development is not

only about improving living standards, but also improving security,

community and prosperity.6

1 Economic Freedom of the World 2007 Annual Report. Accessed at:

http://www.freetheworld.com/release_2007.html 2 http://www.arab-hdr.org/publications/contents/2004/part2s1ch1-e.pdf

3 Friedman, Milton, Capitalism and Freedom (Chicago: University of

Chicago, 2002), pp. 8-213. 4 Harper, David A., Foundations of Entrepreneurship and Economic

Development (London: Taylor & Francis, 2007), pp. 66-71. 5 Sen, Amartya K., “Markets and Freedoms: Achievements and Limitations

of the Market Mechanism in Promoting Individual Freedoms,” Oxford

Economic Papers, Vol. 45, No. 4 (1993), pp. 519-541. 6 Sen, Amartya K., Development as Freedom (Oxford: Oxford University

Press, 1999).

Bridging the Gap 59

In Why Nations Fail, Acemoglu and Robinson argue that a

nation’s institutions, not geography or resources, are the most

important element in development. The thesis is that political

freedom is far more important than resources, climate, geography or

culture. Inclusive regimes enable innovation and prosperity by

allowing for and encouraging competing interests under the rule of

law and secure property rights. Thus, inclusive democratic states

that have independent judiciary systems thrive. Despotic,

exclusionary, non-democratic regimes thwart development. Such

extractive, totalitarian states put countries in a vicious cycle

of plutocracy, suppression of innovation, and denial of economic

and personal freedom.1

Such regimes, alas, describe the majority of states in the Arab

world where for decades only Lebanon was considered a democratic

state with an elected government and a thriving parliamentary

opposition. Interestingly, the confessional basis of the ruling

democracy, which is based on exclusion and extraction, has

prohibited Lebanon from becoming the most advanced in the Arab

world. Notwithstanding, because of its democracy and the freedoms

enjoyed therein, and in spite of a weak government and the dearth of

natural resources, Lebanon is considered among the best

destinations for work and investment in the region. Iraq, after the

U.S. invasion, can claim an elected government as well, and is thus

another democracy. Sectarian violence and informal institutions,

departure from rentierism to a merit based system, requires more

than a decade, hence Iraq suffers today from the pains of growing

into democracy.

Economic freedom and other factors

Based on the above, democracy, fighting corruption and

freedom of the press are important elements for not only stability,

but also the development of a country. The table below is a

1 Acemoglu, Daron and James A. Robinson, Why Nations Fail: The Origins

of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty (New York: Crown Business, 2012).

Bridging the Gap 61

combination of the Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index,

Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index, and

Freedom House’s Freedom of the Press Index as presented in The

Economist magazine at the outset of the so-called Arab Spring.

Added to the table in the last column is the Economic Freedom of

the World (EFW) rank in 2012 based on 2010 figures and data. Not

all Arab countries were ranked by the EFW index. The democracy

score ranking is out of 167 countries while the corruption ranking is

out of 178.

Table 1. Population, GDP per capita at PPP, democracy,

corruption, freedom

Country Population

(millions)

Population

under 25

GDP/capita,

1000 at PPP

Democracy Corruption Freedom of

Press

Instability

Index

EFW rank

Algeria 35.9 47.5% 8.2 125 105 141 49.7 137

Bahrain 1.2 43.9% 24 122 48 153 36.5 7

Djibouti 0.9 57.2% 2.3 126 91 159 NA

Egypt 84.6 52.3% 5.9 138 98 130 65.7 99

Iraq 31.4 60.6% 4 111 175 144 65.7

Jordan 6.4 54.3% 5.2 117 50 140 48.7 23

Kuwait 3.5 37.7% 40.6 114 54 115 21.7 19

Lebanon 4.3 42.7% 13.4 86 127 115 30.7

Libya 6.5 47.4% 18.7 158 146 192 71

Mauritania 3.4 59.3% 1.9 115 143 118 57.4

Morocco 32.4 47.7% 4.7 116 85 146 46.8 102

Oman 3.3 51.5% 23.3 143 41 153 58.4 20

Palestine 4.1 64.4% 2.9 93 NA 181 NA

Qatar 1.7 33.8% 66.9 137 19 146 20.7

KSA 27.1 50.8% 22.9 160 50 178 52.5

Somalia 10.1 63.5% 0.6 NA 178 181 NA

Sudan 43.2 59% 2.3 151 172 165 NA

Bridging the Gap 60

Country Population

(millions)

Population

under 25

GDP/capita,

1000 at PPP

Democracy Corruption Freedom of

Press

Instability

Index

EFW rank

Syria 22.5 55.3% 4.7 152 127 178 67.3 119

Tunisia 10.4 42.1% 8.6 144 59 186 49.4 80

UAE 6.7 31% 27.2 148 28 153 24.3 11

Yemen 24.3 65.4% 2.9 146 146 173 86.6

Source: Economist Intelligence Unit, Democracy Index; Transparency

International, Corruption Perceptions Index; Freedom House, Freedom of

the Press; Economic Freedom of the World, Annual Report 2012 (the lower

the rank, the freer the economy); the Instability Index is compiled by The

Economist, with a value of 100 indicating the most unstable.

Note that most of the Arab countries are young in terms of their

youth population. Interestingly, when queried about economic

integration, the majority of youth was for greater or complete Arab

economic integration and cited that rulers fear such integration as an

infringement on their absolutist authority within their respective

countries.1 As far as democracy is concerned, the Arab countries’

performance is dismal and among the worst in the world — if not

the worst. Concomitantly, freedom of the press and lack of

transparency are other areas of a dreary standing.

Clearly there is a positive correlation between the country’s

corruption, lack of democracy and freedom of the press, and lack of

economic freedom as measured by the EFW index. The strongest

correlation (0.91) exists between corruption and the EFW followed

by the stability index (0.62), which is a composite index. Even

though the points of data are few, and thus this is hardly robust,

corruption that derails the whole system of exchange in an economy

is the single most important contributor to lack of economic

freedom. Corruption, however, is in itself a product of the

1 The Arab Opinion Project: “The Arab Opinion Index”:

http://english.dohainstitute.org/release/5083cf8e-38f8-4e4a-8bc5-

fc91660608b0

Bridging the Gap 62

institutions that espouse and feed it, which also supports the view

expressed in Why Nations Fail.

The link is not apparent in some countries, as some — endowed

with an abundance of natural resources — can compensate for

inefficiency and mediocrity with rent. For instance, Algeria, being

an oil exporter, can compensate for other deficits or ameliorate

hardships through oil revenue. The same can be said for the oil

economies of the Arab Gulf. Non-oil economies, if not aided by

benevolent neighbors and friends from within and outside the

region, could suffer tremendously and be subject to upheavals. The

so-called “oil curse,” while harmful to development according to the

views of some, proved a boon for some regimes as they were able to

nip the Arab Spring in the bud before full bloom, literally with

massive financial bequeaths.

Enter the “Arab Spring Renaissance”1

At the outset it may be of interest to note that while many refer

to the Arab Renaissance as the “Arab Spring,” few know that the

expression was around much earlier. In fact, the expression was not

born with the uprising in Tunisia — it was originally coined after the

U.S. led invasion of Iraq in 2003 to represent and the “blossoming”

of democracy in Iraq and the Arab world upon the toppling of the

Saddam Hussein regime.2 The following is a brief review of Arab

Renaissance reactions in Arab states. The material presented in this

section is collected from various news sources, including

newspapers, media outlets and blogs.

1 This section draws heavily from previous research by the author: Did the

Arab Spring Benefit Economic Freedom in Jordan? Friedrich Naumann

Foundation (forthcoming). 2 http://www.visualthesaurus.com/cm/wordroutes/the-arab-spring-has-

sprung/

Bridging the Gap 63

Tunisia

The events referred to as the “Arab Spring” were ignited by the

frustrations of a Tunisian man, Mohammed Bouazizi, who was

prevented from running a vegetable stand and reportedly humiliated

by a police officer when he requested a permit to operate his stand.1

On 17 December 2010, he self-immolated in dismay at the lack of

economic freedom afforded to him by the Tunisian bureaucracy.

Social networks such as Facebook and Twitter, and satellite TV

stations, which were better trusted than official sources, spread the

image throughout the region of the man burning — an image that

ignited the fervor of Tunisians.

Demonstrations against President Zine El-Abidine Ben Ali

erupted on 18 December 2010 and lasted until he relinquished

power on 14 January 2011. The success of the wave of resistance in

Tunisia inspired others throughout the MENA region to march

against corrupt Arab governments.

Egypt

The first demonstrations took place on 25 January 2011,

beginning first with labor strikes and acts of civil disobedience.

Soon President Hosni Mubarak faced millions of protestors from a

variety of socio-economic and religious backgrounds united under

the common goal to overthrow his government. Under pressure

from continued domestic unrest and international scrutiny, Mubarak

resigned as president 11 February 2011, leaving Egypt to be

governed by a military council until a legitimate government could

be established. A 30-year presidency was terminated and the stage

set for democratic reform to take place.2

Mohamed Morsi was elected in July 2012 by a tight margin and

amidst controversy that his contender Ahmed Shafiq had actually

1 http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,2044723,00.html

2 http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/interactive/2011/mar/22/middle-east-

protest-interactive-timeline

Bridging the Gap 64

won the elections. Reform remains pressing and needs to be taken

forward.

Libya

On 16 February 2011, Libyan protestors clashed with police in

Benghazi after a human rights activist was arrested. From there, the

country plunged into a civil war between rebels and Muammar

Gaddafi’s military. Gaddafi used his stockpile of weapons against

the Libyan population, leading to death tolls in the thousands. On 17

March, UN Security Council Resolution 1973 was passed, creating a

no-fly zone over Libya. Two days later a coalition force of France,

the United Kingdom, and the United States began a bombing

campaign against pro-Gaddafi forces. By late August 2011, with

international support, rebel forces stormed Tripoli forcing Gaddafi

to flee. Rebel forces found him soon after, and on 20 October 2011

killed Gaddafi. Libya now has a new government.1

Syria

Gaddafi’s armed response to protests was similar to that of

Syria’s president, Bashar Al-Assad. Protests in Syria first began 26

January 2011 when a police officer assaulted a man in Old

Damascus. However, massive resistance did not begin until 6 March

when Syrian security forces arrested 15 children for writing slogans

against the Baathist regime. Thousands of protestors took to the

streets all over Syria and soon the regime began to take measures to

control the protestors, arresting thousands.

By 31 July 2011, Syrian army tanks were being deployed

against the armed Syrian opposition known as the Free Syrian Army

(FSA). The fighting still continues and in the opinion of the UN,

Syria has entered a period of civil war. As of February 2013, the UN

estimated that 70,000 people had already been killed, many more

1 Ibid.

Bridging the Gap 65

injured, and hundreds of thousands displaced or have become

refugees. Jordan alone hosts over one million Syrians, including

close to 500,000 refugees. The situation continues to look grave for

Syrians as new developments unfold daily.

Yemen

In Yemen, President Ali Abdullah Saleh also faced a large-scale

popular uprising. As unrest was increasing in the spring of 2011, the

Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) drafted a plan for Saleh to cede

power in exchange for immunity from any legal action. On 3 June

2011, Saleh was badly injured in an assassination attempt and taken

to Saudi Arabia for immediate medical attention while his vice

president, Abd Al-Rab Mansur Al-Hadi, continued Saleh’s response

against demonstrating Yemenis. After returning to Yemen in

September 2011, Saleh signed the GCC initiative, due to

international and domestic pressure, transferring power in

November to his vice-president. Limited presidential elections were

held 21 February 2012, in which Al-Hadi took 99.8 percent of the

vote as the only running candidate. On 27 February, Saleh officially

transferred power to Al-Hadi ending his 33-year reign over the

country.1

Bahrain2

Bahrain was another country where the fervor of the Arab

Spring made itself apparent among the populace. Protests began 14

February 2011 and were meant to achieve greater political freedom

while creating awareness about human rights violations. These

protests were not originally intended to threaten the monarch, until

1 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-17111755

2 All material on GCC countries is obtained from: Abdullah, Abdulkhaleq,

“Repercussions of the Arab Spring on the GCC States,” Doha Institute, 17

May 2012. http://english.dohainstitute.org/release/050a254b-e013-4060-

9aab-32238f34cf47

Bridging the Gap 66

17 February when a police raid killed four protestors. The next day

army forces opened fire on protestors and the demonstrators soon

sought an end to the monarchy.

Saudi-led GCC forces were sent to Bahrain to quell the

protestors as numbers were reaching 100,000 at Pearl Square in

Manama. On 15 March 2011, King Hamad bin Isa Al-Khalifa issued

a three-month state of emergency and turned to the military to

reassert control over the country. The state of emergency was lifted

in June; however, both protests and human rights violations

continued. Although major demonstrations have ceased, the

government refuses entry to international human rights groups or

news organizations.

Oman

Peaceful demonstrations erupted 17 January 2011 in several

Omani cities. They eventually stopped in May 2011. The

government responded by changing a third of the cabinet, hiring

50,000 young unemployed Omanis, forming a constitutional

committee, and pledging to address unemployment and corruption.

Saudi Arabia

Although several calls for protests were made, Saudi Arabia

avoided mass protests mainly due to several government decisions

made in response to regional and internal demands for reform. Swift

royal decrees costing an estimated $130 billion were issued 18

February 2011 including: an increase in pay in the public sector, a

grant equaling a two-month salary for all civil, military and state

employees, monthly salary disbursements for the unemployed, two-

month salary bonus for all students in public education,

establishment of a minimum wage for the public sector, increasing

the housing loans limit to $130,000, building 500,000 new housing

units across the country, and 60,000 new positions created in the

Ministry of Interior.

Bridging the Gap 67

Kuwait

Although considered to be the most democratic of GCC

countries, several protests took place in Kuwait calling for the

overthrow of the government and demanding a constitutional

monarchy. The government responded by disbursing a grant of

$3,400 to every citizen as well as a food subsidy for all families in

Kuwait for one year. Despite these efforts, the cabinet was forced to

resign in November 2011 and new elections were held that led to a

majority win for the former opposition.

Qatar

Qatar is considered to have gained tremendously from the Arab

Spring. It became a regional political power in the last two years by

increasing its influence across the region through its sovereign

wealth and media. The Doha-based Al-Jazeera news network was

seen by many as the de facto network of the Arab Spring, taking the

side of many revolutions occurring across the region.

United Arab Emirates

The sole reform demand in the UAE came in the form of a

polite letter, signed by 133 national figures, asking the president of

the union to expand the authorities of the appointed National Federal

Council, which has moderate consultative attributions. The UAE

benefited from the onset of the Arab Spring as the Emirates were

viewed as safe havens for corporations and businesses operating in

the region. The Emirate of Dubai’s financial position improved

tremendously in the wake of the Arab Spring, after it was

detrimentally affected by the international financial crisis of

2008/09.

Bridging the Gap 68

Morocco1

Morocco faced its first demonstration on 20 February 2011, in

which between 150,000-200,000 took part. This demonstration was

organized through the social network Facebook by a youth group

calling itself “February 20th.” Many of those partaking in the

demonstrations were young, urban middle class and educated;

interestingly, many of the political parties refrained from

participating. Demonstrations continued for months but began to

wane in strength and numbers after a constitutional referendum was

introduced and parliamentary elections were expedited. The king

vowed to give up powers to appoint government cabinets, but kept

control of the army and security forces.

Jordan

Jordanians, having witnessed the change in Tunisia and Egypt,

desired democratic political reform as well, and so took to the streets

14 January 2011, demanding the removal of Prime Minister Samir

Rifai.2 On 1 February 2011, King Abdullah II announced the

dismissal of Rifai and replaced him with Marouf Al-Bakhit, a

former prime minister and army general.3 The king in 2011 also

announced a $500 million package of price cuts in fuel and

necessary goods and gave civil servants and military employees a

salary increase.4 In June 2011, commemorating 12 years on the

throne, the king said he would relinquish his right to appoint prime

ministers and cabinets and would leave it to the elected

parliamentary majority to form future governments. He also

announced that there would be more reform in the future, including

new election and political party laws.

1 Barany, Zoltan, “The ‘Arab Spring’ in the Kingdoms,” Arab Center for

Research and Policy Studies, September 2012. 2 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-12257894

3 Index of Economic Freedom, 2012.

http://www.heritage.org/index/country/jordan. 4 Zoltan, “The ‘Arab Spring’ in the Kingdoms.”

Bridging the Gap 69

On 24 October 2011, the king appointed Awn Khasawneh to

head his new government and introduced 30 new cabinet members

that were considered moderates, tribal politicians, and technocrats.

Demonstrations remained constant. The slow pace of reform by the

Khasawneh government was viewed as the cause for popular

criticism. On 26 April 2012, Khasawneh submitted his resignation,

after only six months in office. The king announced Fayez

Tarawneh as the new premier, the fourth prime minister since the

beginning of 2011. Aid from countries like Saudi Arabia (amounting

to $1.4 billion in 2011), which helped to alleviate the budget deficit,

was not offered again in 2012.1

On 10 October 2012, Tarawneh resigned and Abdullah Nsour

was appointed as prime minister. Jordan conducted national

elections on 23 January 2013, under a new elections law that

allowed voters two votes: one vote for the local district and the other

at a national level, given to a list/party.2 Only 36 percent of all

eligible voters participated.3

Economic freedom and the Arab Spring

Table 2 below summarizes Arab countries rankings in economic

freedom and reactions to the Arab Renaissance. “Nothing” indicates

that very little happened within the country; “High” means regime

change.

1 http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/05/20/jordan-budget-austerity-

idUSL5E8GK03120120520 2 Al Ra’i newspaper, 1518 candidates for elections 2013, 25 December 2013.

http://www.alrai.com/article/559277.html 3 Alarab Alyawm newspaper, national team’s report on the course of the

2013 parliamentary elections.

http://alarabalyawm.net/Public_News/NewsDetails.aspx?NewsID=61640&

Lang=1&Site_ID=2

Bridging the Gap 71

Table 2. Economic freedom: Arab world ranking

Country 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Reaction

Bahrain 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Medium-High

Egypt 13 13 11 10 10 10 10 12 12 High

Jordan 7 7 7 5 5 4 3 8 3 Medium

Kuwait 3 3 3 3 3 2 3 3 4 Medium

Morocco 10 11 10 11 12 12 15 14 14 Mild

Oman 4 3 3 6 3 7 3 4 5 Nothing

Syria 14 14 14 15 15 14 16 16 15 High

Tunisia 10 11 13 11 10 11 10 10 10 High

UAE 4 3 5 3 2 3 2 2 1 Nothing

Algeria 15 14 15 14 14 15 17 17 17 Nothing

Lebanon 6 6 5 7 7 4 7 6 5 Med

Qatar 2 1 1 1 5 4 3 4 7 Nothing

Saudi

Arabia 8 8 8 8 9 9 7 8 8

Mild

Yemen 9 8 9 8 7 8 7 6 9 High

Source: Economic Freedom of the Arab World, Annual Report 2012 (Note:

the lower the number, the more free).

Note that ranking alone does not provide a strong correlation to

the impact of the Arab Renaissance on a given country. Several other

factors come into play, such as natural resource endowments and

whether the country borders Israel or not (which highly affects how

the international community perceives the turmoil), among others.

Consequences

It is too early to determine whether the Arab Renaissance

brought with it economic freedom or not. However, empirically,

several indicative observations can be made.

Bridging the Gap 70

1. One can easily observe that in the case of the oil rich

countries, the response was greater spending by the government

with extremely mild overtures towards better governance. In such a

case, one could argue that increasing the size of government in itself

is indication that economic freedom was being derogated.

In non-oil economies, such as Jordan, aid poured in. In 2012,

with a GDP of $30 billion, Jordan received $3 billion in aid. Still,

the aid helped calm the situation and averted turmoil.

2. There is a sharing of power with the Muslim Brotherhood in

some cases. Many Arab countries are facing a combination of output

contractions, severe fiscal constraints and almost collapsed monetary

systems. Iraq is witnessing rising sectarian strife and, together with

Yemen, possible state disintegration. In Libya, the south is lawless,

and Syria remains a winless bloody match that could culminate in

state dismantlement. In Jordan, fear of neighbor-like violence and

instability has quelled outcries for reform, but this is only temporary.

And Bahrain is still fragile as social demands are recognized to have

been only temporarily suppressed.1

3. There are short-term pains everywhere, some due to

adjustments that are thrust upon systems with weak institutional set

ups, and some because exiting from rentierism into merit-based, free

market systems will require time. The majority of Arab states are

classified as rentier states, where the rent seeker extracts value from

the labor and activities of others not necessarily for being the best or

most competent at what he or she does, or provides, but because of a

certain status or privilege such as birthright (clan, tribe, place of

birth, family name, title, etc.), affiliation with an autocratic ruler or

government (cronyism), or having access to resources (such as

1 Obaid, Nawaf, “The Long Hot Arab Summer: Viability of the Nation-State

System in the Arab World,” Harvard Kennedy School, Belfer Center,

March 2013.

http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/The%20Long%20Hot%20Arab%2

0Summer.pdf

Bridging the Gap 72

permits and licenses) that otherwise could not normally be achieved

or acquired due to limitations or controls.1

Note that a rentier state does not need to be endowed with

natural resources but instead leverages political or positional rights

to seek rent from other states or institutions.2 Thus rentier states, like

individuals, need not be holders of oil resources to be labeled as rent

seekers. They can trade certain location-associated advantages or

political positions for aid and external resources, which become their

rent. Rentier states, in their search for rent, become dependent on aid

and can barter certain privileges and rights for aid, just as the

resource-rich sell the wealth of the land for external rent.

4. Arab countries that are heavily dependent on aid are rentier

states.3 Such rentierism enables the state to hinder or disregard the

development of civil society and democracy; not because it is

necessarily opposed to such developmental processes, but simply

because it does not require such aspects to survive. This is due to

government deficits being supplemented by donors. In turn, this

leads to such states ignoring issues such as competitiveness, or

working wholeheartedly to achieve competitiveness, simply because

it is not necessary.

It is possible that such states — dependent on external flows

that emerge not from what they do but because of who or where

they are — seek foreign direct investment (FDI) as another source of

rentierism. Yet rentier economies are vulnerable as they are

dependent on foreign aid, which could decrease or be disrupted.

However, not all FDI will benefit such states: some FDI inflows will

increase income disparities and create in a rent seeking economy

even greater income and wealth inequity, which may lead to an

increase in the risk of civil strife. Hence, states must ensure that FDI

and aid inflows are equitably distributed. However, it is doubtful

1 Beblawi, Hazem, “The Rentier State in the Arab World,” in Giacomo

Luciani (Ed.) The Arab State (Berkeley: University of California Press,

1990). 2 Ibid.

3 Ibid.

Bridging the Gap 73

that given the nature of governance found throughout the region

equity will ever be achieved.

Finally, it took Europe several centuries from the day of the

Magna Carta in 1215 to emerge in its present form. Exiting present

doldrums and entering into a new democratic Arab world will be

painful and not without peril; borders may be redrawn, and states

may collapse.1 It seems that with some rulers holding unto their

fiefdoms with all their military might, the road will be travelled at

full cost.

1 http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/the-road-to-arab-

democracy#RqlJsd8Zeg7qaCJT.99

Bridging the Gap 74

Bridging the Gap 75

Economic freedom and institutional

change: European experiences and

Arab realities

Andrzej Kondratowicz

In this article I will concentrate on some basic ideas and

concepts related to economic freedom, rather than on measures and

resulting international rankings. Measures are important. In

explaining the importance of economic freedom it is crucial to be

able to use quantitative evidence on top of qualitative analysis. As

we know, measures of economic freedom exist. They were created

after a series of academic conferences organized by the Fraser

Institute of Vancouver, Canada, in the second part of the 1980s. As a

result of academic discussions among several top world scholars,

including contributions from Nobel Prize winners in economics

Milton Friedman, James Buchanan, Douglass North and Gary

Becker, an aggregate measure of economic freedom was developed.

Today, after over 30 years, this measure — known as the

Economic Freedom Index — is widely used by academics and

laymen alike. Actually, we have now two somewhat competing

measures: one is published by the Fraser Institute, the other by the

Heritage Foundation. Due to some methodological arguments, the

academic world generally prefers the former, while the media and

laymen often stick to the latter. The resulting rankings do not differ

much. Nevertheless, our research shows that there is a statistically

significant difference between the two sets of data. This becomes

important if one conducts more sophisticated formal econometric

studies, using the indices as inputs, and this is why I lean towards

using the Fraser Institute dataset.

Bridging the Gap 76

The Economic Freedom Index: What it really

measures

It is good to know the data. Much of it is included in Yusuf

Mansur’s paper, published in this volume. Therefore, here, we will

offer only a brief look at the overall levels of economic freedom in

Arab countries over the past 25 years, as well as an outlook for the

next 10 years (see below). For an easy comparison we will also

present Economic Freedom Index (EFI) values for some other

countries and their groupings, as they stand now.

But before we turn to the numbers, it is important to clearly

explain what they really measure. EFI is a generalized index of

characteristics of the institutional matrix, as Douglass North, the

father of the New Institutional Economics, puts it.1 In simple terms,

economic freedom reflects the institutional setup of an economy.

Changes in EFI values reflect institutional changes — those that are

slow, spontaneous and evolutionary in character, and those that can

be described as “man made” or designed reforms. In a word, EFI

rankings are not just “beauty contests” in which countries want to

gain the highest possible position; they are a much more serious

matter, telling us how robust the institutional skeleton of the

economy is. As we know from modern economic literature,

institutions are one of the principal factors accounting for

differences in economic growth and prosperity among the nations.

1 North defines institutions as “rules, enforcement characteristics of rules,

and norms of behavior that structure repeated human interaction” (1990).

Although there are many other definitions around, this one seems to be the

most popular. Its appeal also lies in its compactness.

Bridging the Gap 77

Table 1. EFI (Fraser), unadjusted summary index values for

selected countries or country groupings in 2010*

* EU27 = European Union (without Croatia); EU15 = “old Union,” pre-2004 East-

European accessions; exCE14 = 14 ex-Communist European countries without

Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro and Serbia;

A11 = Arab countries without Mauretania, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan — omissions

due to lack of reliable data. Shaded area gives ranks and percentiles of a suppository

country with the EFI value equal to the group’s average.

Source: Author’s calculations based on Gwartney, Hall and Lawson (2012).

As you can see from Table 1, the Arab countries average (A11)

in 2010 was equal to the world’s average and was not much lower

than the ex-Communist Europe average. Nevertheless, the A11

average is highly influenced by high scores of the Arab Gulf

countries — positions of the other Arab countries are much lower.

Egypt’s scoring of 6.49 was in the 99th position (31 percent percent

of countries had a lower or equal score). It is worth observing that

old Europe (EU15), which is frequently accused of being overly-

bureaucratic and statist, still has a EFI score higher than the ex-

Communist countries, although some of the latter are catching up

(e.g., Poland’s score).

Country/group of countries EFI

value Rank (of 144) Percentile

Hong Kong (world’s leader) 8.90 1 100%

United States 7.69 18 88%

G7 average 7.52 31 79%

Old EU average (EU15) 7.42 35 76%

European Union average (EU27) 7.38 40 73%

Poland 7.31 48 67%

Ex-Communist Europe average (ex-CE14) 7.10 62 57%

Arab countries average (A11) 6.84 79 45%

World’s average (W144) 6.82 80 45%

Egypt 6.49 99 31%

Bridging the Gap 78

Table 2 and Graph 1 depict dynamics of the EFI1 for the period

1985-2010. Generally, the historical trends have been somewhat

encouraging, but it should be remembered that on average economic

freedom was on the rise in the whole world, as well. Also added is a

10-year forecast. As is known, forecasting macroeconomic parameters

is a tricky business — in this case it is even more so, since we are trying

to foresee changes in the institutional setup of economies that in other

forecasts is frequently held constant. Our forecasts are purely data-

driven and do not model any exogenous shocks to institutions —

especially abrupt political ones, like the Arab Spring upheavals. It will

be interesting to verify these forecasts in due time. This subject brings

us to the point where we should look more thoroughly at the changes in

institutional setup, be they revolutionary or evolutionary.

Table 2. EFI (Fraser), chained summary index values for 11 Arab

countries, 1985-2010 (Data: D) and 2015-2020 (Forecasts: F).

Countries ordered from left to right by their 2010 EFI values

(shaded).

Year Om

an

Bah

rain

Kuw

ait

UA

E

Jord

an

Egypt

Moro

cco

Tunis

ia

Chad

Syri

a

Alg

eria

1985 D 6 .78 6 .92 6 .85 6 .83 5 .71 4 .86 5 .20 4 .60 5 .00 3 .07 3 .60

1990 D 6 .34 6 .91 5 .46 7 .20 5 .81 4 .60 5 .18 5 .32 5 .00 3 .53 3 .43

1995 D 6 .99 7 .21 6 .93 6 .95 6 .45 5 .99 6 .28 5 .73 4 .96 4 .23 4 .06

2000 D 7 .53 7 .74 7 .07 7 .28 7 .40 6 .81 6 .14 6 .08 5 .40 4 .92 4 .66

2005 D 7 .39 7 .39 7 .46 7 .50 7 .61 6 .59 6 .37 6 .02 5 .30 5 .46 5 .25

2010 D 8 .00 7 .89 7 .75 7 .61 7 .61 6 .78 6 .36 6 .21 5 .64 5 .53 4 .88

2015 F 8 .46 7 .96 7 .81 7 .64 7 .44 6 .91 6 .41 6 .10 5 .76 5 .68 4 .90

2020 F 8 .63 7 .96 7 .82 7 .67 7 .44 6 .95 6 .44 6 .06 5 .76 5 .78 4 .90

Source: Data from the Fraser Institute Economic Freedom database

(www.freetheworld.com); forecasts calculated by the author using EFI data and

applying an exponential smoothing model with a damped trend, without

seasonality, with a 10-year perspective.

1 Here we use the so-called chained index, which is why the EFI values for

2010 for Egypt differ from the values given in Table 2 (unadjusted). The latter is used for static cross-sectional comparisons; the former for time-series analysis. Values may differ, though they do not have to.

Bridging the Gap 79

Graph 1. EFI (Fraser), chained summary index values for 11 Arab

countries, 1985-2010 (Data\: D) and 2015-2020 (Forecasts: F) on a <0;

10> continuous scale. The legend shows countries in descending order

by their 2010 EFI values.

Source: Table 2.

Spontaneous, incremental change versus fast,

designed reform

Spontaneous changes in human institutions were the center of

attention of Friedrich von Hayek and Milton Friedman. Today,

many economists and game theorists follow that path — e.g.,

Masahiko Aoki or Samuel Bowles. On the other hand, the “reform-

by-design” approach may be to a large extent attributed to the

German economist Walter Eucken, the father of the Ordoliberal

School. Although we cherish the Hayek-Friedman approach very

much, Eucken’s approach has a lot of appeal as well. Why? Because

in social and political reality sometimes we cannot wait long and we

Bridging the Gap 81

have to design reforms — and institutions — quickly. This is

exactly the present day reality of Egypt and many other Arab

countries.

It must be added that the realities and exigencies of the East and

Central European countries were the same when the communist

system started to collapse — first in Poland in 1989 and soon after

in other countries of the region, including the Soviet Union itself.

The old system and its institutions were ceasing to function and new

ones had to designed and quickly implemented. In Poland, they took

the shape of the so-called Balcerowicz Plan — a comprehensive

package of bold economic reforms named after the then-deputy

prime minister who was a leading force behind the plan. Not

everybody at that time agreed that the changes should be so deep

and quick. Many preferred a gradual reform approach. History

proved that the hard Polish landing — though risky — was a good

choice.

Incidentally, two things must be mentioned in the context of the

East European experience in the 1990s. First, the successful peaceful

transition of power in 1989 between the communists and the

Solidarity movement in Poland was not the first attempt to change

the oppressive regime in Poland. But for the first time it was

complete. Poles rebelled against the government before: in 1956,

1968, 1970-71, 1976 and in 1981 (when martial law was introduced

and Solidarity crashed). So did some other nations in the region

under Soviet domination. Many of those previous rebellions ended

with bloodshed. Thus, the success of 1989 may be seen as a result of

cumulative historical changes, and it was the ultimate fruit of a long

struggle. As much as it may sound pessimistic, not always is “once

enough” to change the face of an oppressive regime, a country, its

society and its economy.

Second, as the British historian Timothy Garton-Ash has

pointed out, the changes in Eastern Europe were “refolutions” rather

than “revolutions” modeled after the French one (1789). A

“refolution” is a reform plus evolution and, most often, includes an

element of peaceful transfer of power between the ancien régime

Bridging the Gap 80

and the new one. But, as we have already observed, in Poland and

some other countries the changes were quick rather than

evolutionary. So was Garton-Ash right? And also: Is it possible to

have a “refolution” in Arab countries? In Syria, as we see, not.

Perhaps in Egypt?

Formal and informal institutions: societal

values and religion

This brings us to the point of differentiating between so-called

formal and informal institutions. The former are rules and

enforcement mechanisms of rules in North’s definition. The latter

are norms — the ways we do things because of tradition, religion

and culture. There is a tension between the two kinds of institutions;

sometimes they are competing, sometimes complementary,

accommodating or substitutive.1 Most scholars are of the opinion

that informal institutions are slow to change and they lag behind

reform or spontaneous changes of formal ones. This is not always

true. At times informal institutions change fast, as well. This is a

point of crucial importance. If informal institutions are not catching

up with reform, then social tensions grow and reforms become

endangered. Were informal institutions in Poland and other East

European countries changing fast? How was it possible? Is it

possible in Egypt and in other Arab countries now?

As I explained above, informal institutions are a reflection of the

culture and social values predominant in society. What are the

popularly supported values in Europe and in the Arab world? Are

they conducive to economic development through markets? Are

they supportive of capitalist institutions? How was it possible that

Polish society embraced market-oriented, pro-capitalist reforms after

almost half a century of the collectivist state with its anti-market

institutions and communist propaganda? Are the cultural, social and

religious values and norms the same in the whole of Europe?

1 Those four types of relations between formal and informal institutions are

thoroughly analyzed by Helmke and Levitsky (2004, p. 728).

Bridging the Gap 82

Let us begin with the differences in values underlying informal

institutions. These values are the subject of a broad-based study

called the World Values Survey (WVS), conducted since 1981 in

cooperation with the European Values Study (EVS) and supported

by an international network of research institutes. All in all, they

have encompassed 97 countries and 88 percent of the world’s

population. WVS and EVS measure societal values in 10 areas:

religion, gender, work motivation, democracy, governance, social

capital, political participation, tolerance vis-à-vis others,

environmental protection, and subjectively felt well-being.

Many of these traits turn out to be pairwise correlated, thus it is

possible to collapse them into two dimensions — 1)

traditional/secular-rational; and 2) survival/self-expression — and to

portray them on one two-dimensional graph. It has been done by the

two leading researchers of the WVS: the product is called — from

their names — the Inglehart-Welzel cultural map of the world (see

Graph 2 below). The first dimension gives us the contrast between

societies where religion is very important and those in which it is

not. The second one reflects the contrast between survival and self-

expression values, which becomes profound when industrial

societies transform into post-industrial ones. In these societies,

priorities shift from emphasis on economic and physical security

towards an increasing emphasis on subjective well-being, self-

expression and quality of life.1

Societal values (informal institutions) drift over time, as showed

on two maps characterizing the years 1994-2004 and 2005-2008.

They are to a large extent self-explanatory, thus a very short note

will suffice. On the first panel, the ex-communist countries are

showed as a group — they were coming out of the same Soviet-

dominated past, but the official collectivist values were not shared

by society (informal institutions did not conform with them). As a

result, shortly after the old regime collapse not much was left of this

seeming commonality, and on the second panel the authors do not

1 Description based on Inglehart and Welzel (2010), where you can find

more details.

Bridging the Gap 83

even show it: a much deeper historical heritage came back to the

surface. Often it means that deeply embedded religious

fundamentals become a visible determinant of the country’s position

on the map. On the second panel, the authors show two new

“continents”: Islam (25 percent of the world’s population) and

Eastern-Orthodox Christianity. Somewhat paradoxically,

modernization and economic progress generate two divergent

outcomes: higher living standards decrease religiosity, while

increasing cultural diversity and societies’ openness increases it.

The Arab countries are located in the left bottom corner of the

map; interestingly, Poland is also very traditional in terms of values.

It is culturally close to India, Malaysia and Turkey, and not that far

from the Arab countries. Yet the Polish economy is a symbol of a

successful transition and lasting success in recent years. Thus,

traditional values are not in opposition to economic growth. The

Irish and the U.S. societies are strongly traditional, too. If you

consider Protestant societies, their present position is in the northeast

corner of the map, but when they were growing the most — during

the industrial revolution and after — they were at times extremely

traditional. Sadly, tolerance and cultural openness often come late

on the historical journey to prosperity. And it does not come easily

and by itself. The Europeans know it well.

Bridging the Gap 84

Graph 2. Inglehart-Welzel cultural map of the world: 1999-2004 (left-

hand panel); 2005-2008 (right-hand panel).

Source: Inglehart and Welzel (2005), p. 63; (2010) p. 554.

Bridging the Gap 85

Let us also note that religion-based traditional values may differ.

After all, different religions and their sub-varieties may have varying

influence on the economic and social behavior of the faithful. Let us

look at the European Christian tradition. Indeed, it has long been

noticed and recognized — especially since the seminal work of

German sociologist Max Weber (1904/5) — that the “Protestant

ethic” is conducive to economic growth under capitalism. Catholic

tradition less, and Eastern Orthodox much less. Delving deeper into

this subject would go beyond the limits of this paper, thus I will give

only one example.

Analyzing various causes of success of the early phases of post-

communist transformation in some countries of Eastern Europe, and

the defeats in others, the Polish economist Jan Winiecki (Winiecki,

Benacek and Laki, 2004, pp. 39-77) pointed to the role of newly

created small and medium-sized private enterprises (SMEs). In

those countries where there was a massive wave of start-ups, the

transition from so-called transformational recession to

transformation recovery was rather fast. The necessary (though not

sufficient) condition for that was the widespread presence of an

entrepreneurial spirit in society. It was more often encountered in the

Baltic States, Poland, the Czech and Slovak republics, Hungary and

Slovenia than in Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Bulgaria, Romania,

Moldova or Serbia. But this divide coincides with the historical

divide between the Western and Eastern Christendom. Graph 3

shows a map of this division in the 16th century, but many would

argue it could be traced back to the 6th century as well. Winiecki

argues that these divisions are still reflected in today’s

entrepreneurial spirit and work ethics, thus they influence economic

outcomes. In the context of the Arab world, the question is to what

extent Islam and its particular schools and branches are conducive to

— or at least compatible with — exigencies of modern economic

organization and international cooperation in the era of

globalization? This is a question to be considered by other papers in

the volume.

Bridging the Gap 86

Graph 3. East-Central Europe: Countries embarking on economic

transformation in the 1990s and the continental division into Western

and Eastern Christendom in the 16the century (maps show

contemporary national boundaries).

Source: Winiecki, Benacek and Laki (2004), pp. 66-67.

Bridging the Gap 87

The above may be considered bad news for those economies

where predominant religion is not conducive to hard work ethics and

discipline, along with entrepreneurial behavior. The good news is,

though, that societies learn from others and adopt new ways of

behavior — which may speed up the process of social change

substantially.

Apart from that, there are two other mechanisms that may

substantially speed up the process of adopting new (economic)

institutions. One is when a powerful shock is hitting society and its

source is internal. It may take a form of a revolution or a

“refolution” — like those in Eastern Europe in the 1990s or in the

Arab world nowadays. The old rules are abolished and since society

cannot live in an institutional vacuum, new laws are quickly drawn

up. Thus, new formal institutions are designed and implemented.

Two paramount questions are: What will these new institutions be?

And will society at large accept them as being in accord with

prevailing values?

Here we return to the Polish example: after the collapse of the

communist regime, society quickly adopted new pro-market (in

essence capitalist) economic institutions. The reforms were fast and

deep. By adopting them, Poles were coming back to their old values

that remained dormant during the long communist night. But these

values were there. And although many Poles later on became

disenchanted with capitalism and its not always easy ways, at the

moment of change, and immediately thereafter, support for pro-

market reforms and the willingness to incur short and medium run

sacrifices was predominant. And the Church was supporting it, as

well.

In terms of the formal-informal institutions connection, all this

means that informal institutions were by-and-large in accord with

new formal institutions. This was crucial to get things rolling in the

direction of economic growth and prosperity. There were countries,

though, where the reforms stopped short of achieving this critical

mass and momentum. Russia itself, Ukraine, Belarus and a score of

former Asian Soviet republics. Their new institutions turned into

Bridging the Gap 88

Olsonian redistributive coalitions (Olson, 1982), and state

institutions were captured by interest groups. There is always a

threat of that.

There is another possibility that I will mention only briefly. An

external force is imposing new sets of political and economic

institutions on a nation. This happens after wars or foreign military

interventions. To some extent, it happened in the aftermath of World

War II in Bizonia (West Germany) and Japan. It repeated in South

Korea. It did not repeat in Iraq. There are other, less known

examples of both successes and failures of this mechanism of

institutional change. Generally it seems that successes are coupled

ether with unchaining old and dormant societal values or with so-

called “tipping-over” mechanism. An informal institution continues

to exist, but the way people perceive it undergoes a slow change.

The change of attitude towards this informal institution remains

latent until some particular fact or phenomenon — not necessarily

powerful in itself — tips the equilibrium over. As a result a new

informal institution gains a dominant position and quickly replaces

the old one. But this, again, is based on “new” values that a society

is ready to accept.

This brings us back to the cultural values of particular societies.

What to do when society is split on core values ?

All the above arguments implicitly assume that values may

differ among societies, but that each society is internally

homogenous. One society, one set of coherent values — at least in

crucial moments of history, when the future fate of the nation is

decided upon. But what if a society is split on the issue of values to

adhere to? Different segments of society may have different

internalized sets of values and — as a consequence — differing

views on the institutional order that should be implemented.

One unpleasant possibility is a growing social conflict with all

the known negative consequences, including overall economic

decline. Another is an effort at mitigating conflict by negotiations.

Bridging the Gap 89

What could be the basis for negotiations if values are different? An

interesting proposal comes from a not widely known American

political scientist, legal scholar and philosopher, Bruce Ackerman

(1980). He argues that social and political discourse cannot be based

on values and sentiments. If the parties start negotiations from

positions of being the only depositories of truth, and exponents of

the only genuine values in society (especially if based on religious

beliefs), then there is no room for compromise. Thus, the parties

should start from agreeing on procedural rules. These rules should

be based on the adoption of the principles of rationalism and

neutralism in discussion. This pertains to parliamentary debates and

to any other political forums.

We can only add that this all remains within the tradition of

Western liberal democracy, in which rights of minorities — in terms

of any of the values mentioned in the context of the Inglehart-

Welzel cultural map of the world — are recognized and protected.

One can only hope that this is the path that will be chosen in Egypt

and other Arab nations. Otherwise these countries may fall into the

trap named by some political scientists as an “anocratic” political

regime, or just anocracy.1 This is a regime that exhibits mixed

features of democracy and autocracy — a combination that makes it

virtually impossible to “run’ the country efficiently, both in political

and economic terms.

Democracies have their problems, but some of their features

may be highly relevant to solving important problems that may arise

in Egypt and other Arab countries in the short and medium run. For

lack of space, I will just briefly enumerate them.

Democracy as a reasonable insurance against a malevolent

despot possibility.

1 This is the term used in the POLITY IV Project measuring democratic and

autocratic features of countries. See: Marshall and Cole (2011) and

Marshall, Jaggers and Gurr (2011). Dimitrios Katsoudas indicated to me

the inappropriateness of the term: it should be acracy (Greek akratia).

Bridging the Gap 91

Democracies are never at war with one another (for evidence,

see: Weart, 2000)

Democracies provide mechanisms of limiting violence, and for

internal conflict resolution, within society.

North, Wallis and Weingast (2009) talk in this context about so-

called open versus limited access societies. In limited access

societies, privileged groups act as violence limiting agents, but at the

same time they hinder economic and political development. Like in

Egypt under Mubarak, or in Libya under Gaddafi. Open access

societies create popular access to institutions/organizations that

control violence and at the same time foster economic and political

development. The relevance to the Arab world is obvious.

One final question: Can economic freedom contribute to

adopting such liberal-democratic and political freedom-oriented

solutions? There is a lot of evidence to support an affirmative

answer. This is what is known as the Hayek-Friedman Hypothesis.

In light of the above on the relevance of Eucken’s Ordoliberal

thinking on issues of institutional change, I would suggest calling it

the Eucken-Hayek-Friedman Hypothesis. It states that in the long

run economic freedom enhances political freedom. That is why it is

worth studying, and measuring as well.

Bridging the Gap 90

References

- Ackerman, Bruce, Social Justice in the Liberal State (New Haven:

Yale University Press, 1980).

- Aoki, Masahiko, “Endogenizing Institutions and Institutional

Changes,” Journal of Institutional Economics, Vol. 3, No. 1

(2007), pp. 1-31. Accessed 3 March 2013:

http://www.stanford.edu/~aoki/papers/JOIE(Final).pdf

- Bowles, Samuel, Microeconomics: Behavior, Institutions and

Evolution (New York and Princeton: Russell Sage Foundation and

Princeton University Press, 2004).

- Eucken, Walter, Die Grundlagen der Nationalökonomie (Jena:

Gustav Fischer, 1940). [English translation: Eucken, Walter, The

Foundations of Economics: History and Theory in the Analysis of

Economic Reality (London: William Hodge & Company, 1950)]

- Friedman, Milton, Capitalism and Freedom (Chicago: University

of Chicago Press, 1962).

- Garton Ash, Timothy, The Magic Lantern: The Revolution of ‘89

witnessed in Warsaw, Budapest, Berlin, and Prague (New York:

Vintage Books/Random House, 1993).

- Garton Ash, Timothy, “Velvet Revolution: The Prospects,” The

New York Review of Books, 3 December 2009. Accessed 9 June

2012:

http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2009/dec/03/velvet-

revolution-the-prospects/?pagination=false.

- Gwartney, James, Robert Lawson and Joshua Hall, Economic

Freedom of the World: 2012 Annual Report (Vancouver: Fraser

Institute, 2012).

- Hayek, Friedrich von, Law, Legislation and Liberty, Volume II:

The Mirage of Social Justice (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul,

1976).

- Helmke, Gretchen and Steven Levitsky, “Informal Institutions and

Comparative Politics: A Research Agenda,” Perspectives on

Politics, Vol. 2, No. 4 (2004), pp. 725-740.

Bridging the Gap 92

- Inglehart, Ronald and Christian Welzel, Modernization, Cultural

Change and Democracy (New York: Cambridge University Press,

2005).

- Inglehart, Ronald and Christian Welzel, “Changing Mass Priorities:

The Link Between Modernization and Democracy,” Perspectives

on Politics, Vol. 8, No. 2 (2010).

- Marshall, Monty and Benjamin Cole, Global Report 2011:

Conflict, Governance, and State Fragility (Vienna, US: Center for

Systemic Peace, 2011).

- Marshall, Monty, Keith Jaggers and Ted Gurr, “POLITY IV

Project. Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions 1800-

2010. Dataset Users’ Manual,” (Vienna, US: Center for Systemic

Peace, 2011). Accessed 22 October 2012:

http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/p4manualv2010.pdf

- North, Douglass, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic

Performance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

- North, Douglass, John Wallis and Barry Weingast, Violence and

Social Orders: A Conceptual Framework for Understanding

Recorded Human History (Cambridge: Cambridge University

Press, 2009).

- Olson, Mancur, The Rise and Decline of Nations (New Haven:

Yale University Press, 1982).

- Weart, Spencer, Never at War: Why Democracies Will Not Fight

One Another (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000).

- Weber, Max, Die protestantische Ethik und der „Geist“ des

Kapitalismus, Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik, 20:

1-54 and 21 (1904/05), pp. 1-110. [English translation: Weber,

Max, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (London:

Routledge Classics, 1930, 2001)]

- Winiecki, Jan, Vladimir Benacek and Mihaly Laki, The Private

Sector After Communism: New Entrepreneurial Firms in

Transition Economies (London and New York: Routledge, 2004).

Bridging the Gap 93

The role of religion in Arab politics

and society

Mohammed Tamaldou

In order to effectively address the role of religion in politics and

society in Arab countries it is necessary to clarify some concepts and

clear up some confusion at the outset.

Religion in the Arab world is Islam. Though there are number

of other religions in the Arab world, with varying degrees of

importance, all share a belonging to the Arab world — and

sometimes to Islamic civilization — along with an Islamic

component. All share in the political and social repercussions

resulting from the nature of the relationship between Islam and

politics, and between Islam and society, in addition to the

relationship between Muslims and religious minorities. While

questions on the rights of religious minorities have been raised, and

solutions recommended so minorities are not governed by the

religion of the majority, it is worth noting that the religious rights of

non-Muslims have been always preserved. The Islamic state, for

example, has recognized the rights of Jews, or the Sabians. Yet in

trying to explain the concept of religion in the Arab world and the

relationship between Islam and politics and Islam and society (and

within this article there will not be enough room to discuss all

aspects, despite the deep impact of religion-related concepts and

visions on behavioral conduct), dilemmas remain.

Among such dilemmas, one is the relationship between the

religion of the majority and freedom of belief; another is raised

when trying to formulate unified concepts of secularism and

citizenship as two concepts that do not fundamentally encounter the

tolerant values of Islam, besides being cornerstones for the

comprehensive establishment of democracy. Add to that side

Bridging the Gap 94

dilemmas emerging from polarized mentalities, which can only

interpret secularism as elimination of religion, citizenship as a threat

to religious values, and liberalism as non-believing and moral decay

— let alone regarding anything that belongs to the West in an

antagonizing manner, as the Arab’s archenemy. Finally, we also

have the dilemma of extremism and fundamentalism and conflicting

Islamic currents — a dilemma that impacts the destiny and being of

the Arab and Islamic world, and greatly influences life inside Arab

societies, given the highly respected status of the religious institution

and the considerable role afforded to the religious jurist (or Fakih),

the Guide, and the Imam of the mosque.

Therefore, the struggle of today seems not only centered on the

duality of modernism versus conservatism, but rather goes beyond

this, including the struggle within and between Islamic currents —

whether moderates, radicals, jihadists, Salafists, or Sharia advocates

— in order to maintain their predominance in both the social and

political scenes. It is no surprise that the question of credibility in

handling democracy arises, particularly with groups that emerged

recently as new players in this part of the world after the Arab

Spring uprisings, and amid demands for dignity, democracy and

freedom.

The complex nested structure of Arab society

In discussing Arab society, other, non-Arab components are

necessarily involved, along with all the interactions related to their

different and diverse belongings, be it belonging to ethnic or

religious affiliations, or any other minority, and the relationship

between such belongings and ensuring full rights for all Arab

citizens. Indeed, the Arab world comprises a complex structure,

where elements are nested, components overlapping, and ethnicities,

sects and races are interwoven. Arab society is a dispersed entity, as

if it emerged from a vast historical and demographic explosion,

scattered in its parts everywhere. Tribes and clans are widespread

throughout the whole Arab space, religious sects and groups pitted

Bridging the Gap 95

here and there, and ethnicities are everywhere — whether Amazigh

or Kurds or others. It is also unfortunate to face the utter lack of

interest, whether by intellectuals and social analysts, or by

politicians, in this exceptional structure of Arab society that can be

regarded as an obstacle in the path to a modernized society unless

the phenomenon is addressed and citizenship becomes the wider

space that encompasses all particular belongings.

Debates today are ongoing and heated on the civic state, or as

some prefer to call it, the national democratic state. Again, one

encounters political Islam and the necessity of understanding its

meaning and functionality, and the degree of closeness or otherwise

to universal human values — the links between Islam as a divine

message, and earthly matters of individuals enjoying free choices,

and how far guarantees exist that engagement with establishing a

modern state within the boundaries of the Arab world can comply

with the principles of democracy, freedom and rotation of power

amid attempts to Islamize the concepts and terms of modernism in

general. Such attempts can be seen and understood as a part of a

protectionist atmosphere that is no different in its results from

economic protectionism. It is no surprise, then, that the Arab world

is unique in its affiliation with its Arab origins or the Islamic

religion, in comparison to the other worlds (especially the West) that

define their affiliation to a greater extent geographically. Such

affiliation on the part of the Arab world is not haphazard. It is

structural, and it is a defensive, protectionist reaction that needs to

be psychologically analyzed in depth in order to reveal its

underlying causes.

Islam, politics and society: Are they inseparable ?

A question poses itself: Are Islam and politics and society

necessarily inseparable elements? Considering politics the

mechanism that regulates the relationship between the ruler and the

ruled, according to agreed-upon positive (or man made) norms that

help individuals to crystalize their own form of society as they wish

Bridging the Gap 96

it to be, and prefer to live within, and to contribute to its growth,

what exactly is the role of Islam? Why is the Islamic world living in

such polarization? And what is the reason for the insistence on

making inseparable the relationship between religion and politics?

At the outset, it is worth mentioning that the duality of religion and

politics was registered as a phenomenon since the early times of the

civilized experience of Islam. Politics, or power, has always tried to

derive legitimacy from religion. Interpretation played the biggest

role in this regard, with each group trying to manipulate the

interpretation of religious text to find proper justifications for their

political tendencies, and to enhance their own legitimacy.

Islam, however, never legitimized, imposed or even

recommended any particular form of governance or a certain

regime, throughout the successive forms of governance known

during the rule of the orthodox Caliphs after the death of the Prophet

Mohammad (peace be upon him). Islamic society has always been

preparing — through the sequence of events — to become an

exemplary in coexistence and conformity with the updates of life

and requirements of reality. Abu Bakr As-Seddiq received the

pledge of allegiance after a long intense dispute at Saqifat Beni

Sa’eida. The dispute ended with an agreement on two main

principles: the first was weighing a balance of powers among the

factions and tribes of society; the other was prioritizing the public

interest. These two principles are part and parcel of the modern

culture of democracy. Omar Ibn Al-Khattab was appointed through

a different method, coming to power after a consultation made by

the Caliph — then Abu Bakr — resulted in agreement to appoint

Omar as Caliph. Omar, in turn, chose a different path when he

decided to name six candidates from whom one would be picked as

his successor. Thus, we have three models and three cases for

coming to power and rotation of power, each of which adopts — in

one way or another — the principle of consultation or Shura.

Something different happened during the Caliphate of Othman

Ibn Affan, which followed Omar Ibn Al-Khattab. This time witnessed

the events of “The Great Rebellion,” regarded as the first political

Bridging the Gap 97

uprising in the history of Islamic rule. Caliph Othman — who was

advanced in age — failed to respond to his people’s demands for

reform. His hands were tied by a lobby that manipulated and directed

him to fulfill their own interests. When people realized that Othman’s

kin had full control over their money, they demanded they be

replaced, but Othman refused to respond. The agitation soared and the

people demanded Othman step down. He refused and was murdered.

At that time, there was no document or contract between the ruler and

the ruled to define the term of the Caliph in office, the responsibilities

of the Caliph, and the mechanisms for a transfer of power. Muslims

recognized this problem early in the Islamic regime, yet they failed to

anticipate its impact.

This brief review of historical events suggests at least one

conclusion: any attempt to bind religion and state, or religion and

politics, or religion and governance in an inseparable duality should

not — by any means — go beyond “Islamic ethics.” This term, as

defined by the intellectual Mohammad Abed Al-Jabri in his book

Religion, The State, and the Enforcement of Sharia, can be

interpreted in three elements: consultation, or Shura, responsibility,

and a third element that can be read in the Prophet Mohammad’s

saying, “You know better about your earthly matters.” This Hadith

provides that a space must exist between earthly matters and

heavenly matters, or between the religion that governs the

relationship between man and his or her God, and the earthly affairs

that govern relations among people. Therefore, it is clear that

earthly, civic and societal matters should be managed according to

intellectual convictions and ethical tendencies. Management of such

manners should also take place according to the priorities set by

institutions and through representatives elected by the people to

manage their public affairs, with legally binding terms and

mechanisms that should produce representative and executive

institutions through democracy and freedom of choice.

This, simply, is the conclusion of all successive experiences in

Arab countries’ governing systems since the death of the Prophet

Mohammad (peace be upon him).

Bridging the Gap 98

The question remains: Why did the Arab Islamic state not find

ways to achieve a modern renaissance in a way that guarantees

conditions for sustainability and stability?

In search of an Arab renaissance

Has the Arab Islamic state ever undergone renaissance? Has it

ever followed the modernism curve, at any given time? To answer

the question, two principle points should be made. The first pertains

to the meaning of “the Arab Islamic state,” and whether it applies to

country borderlines, as defined by the classical definition of the

state, or to imperial expansion, as was the case of the Ottoman

Empire, for example. If applying the limited country concept, a very

limited number underwent comprehensive and integrated

renaissance. But applying the concept of imperial expansion, a

genuine renaissance can be found in the history of Andalusia during

the Abbasid Era, more exactly between the 9th and 13th centuries.

At that time, the state expanded to reach the East Mediterranean,

Africa, and central Asia. The economy boomed, trade flourished,

and fleets grounded at all maritime ports. Simultaneously,

enlightening intellectual movements emerged, based on individual

initiative and creativity in general. Science evolved, philosophy

flourished, dialectic theology appeared.

The full creative, intellectual and scientific wealth produced by

Arab minds during this short period has not, until even now, been

properly recorded or evaluated. It calls for a second reading, to

ascertain the points of connection to modern human thought in

general, and liberal thought in particular. It is enough, in this

context, to mention some of the many names who have enlightened

free Arab thought: Alpharabius (Al-Farabi), Averroes (Ibn Rushd)

and Al-Jahiz. The last is worth a short pause, as he believed —

centuries prior to Descartes — in the power of the mind, and said: “I

swear to my life, eyes make mistakes, the senses lie; true judgment

can only be attained through the mind.” Al-Jahiz is among the

pioneering founders of what is now understood as critical thinking

Bridging the Gap 99

— the use of reason to acquire truth — and laid the ground for the

skepticism, or methodological doubt, later advocated by Descartes.

The second point is that a renaissance can only flourish in an

environment that is suitable for freedom and protective of human

dignity. Such freedom and human dignity have been achieved —

relatively speaking — only when the grip of central power loosened

in the Arab empires. This loosening resulted in a genuine desire in

the Arab individual to promote his or her reality and, subsequently,

to revive movements of creativity and innovation, and to get in

touch with other cultures through translating works in foreign

languages — particularly Greek, Syriac, Persian and Hebrew into

Arabic. That created an enabling environment, also, for a boom in

science and the arts, and improved the quality of living quality. This

leap often took place through pure individual initiatives, diverse and

various, flourishing only because the dominant eye of the state

blinked and looked to other matters. Arab Islamic society at that

time was close to modernist society, if compared to prior and post

periods. Moreover, Arab society could achieve religious

enlightenment, which helped in the reform and purification of belief

systems and religious behavior. The religious enlightenment also led

to intellectual, cultural and philosophical enlightenment, which

contributed to the expansion of the space of the rational. This

religious-intellectual enlightenment duality had been curbed by

despotism and authoritarianism sheltering behind armies; an

overestimation of physical powers along with an underestimation of

the power of intellect.

Apparently, the expansion of reason and influence of intellect

started to annoy existing rulers, especially when intellectual

braveness replaced classical, physical or military braveness. Rulers

could feel the threat to the pillars of their empires, and their decision

was to quash the elements of the renaissance. A campaign was

launched to persecute free thinkers in general, and mu’tazilah

(religious rationalists) in particular. Books were burned and sources

of freedoms and intellectual plurality dried up altogether. Even the

door to diligence (or ijtihad) was closed to jurists and scholars,

Bridging the Gap 011

accelerating the plunge of the Arab and Islamic world into the dark

ages. This paved the way to the Wahhabi movement, succeeded

much later by the Muslim Brotherhood and other radical Islamist

currents. Grounds were laid for the stabilization of despotism in the

Arab world, enabling rulers to control people’s lives and livelihoods.

As a result, the Arab individual stopped all attempts to move

forward and became preoccupied with immediate concerns. The

conservative tendency deepened, promoting backwardness and

satisfaction with less, and a reluctance to aspire for another kind of

life. This is the reality in the Arab world — a disabling reality

nonetheless enabling for radical movements. Thus continued the

Arab world until the Arab Spring revolutions, by which time

conservative, political Islamist movements had become widespread.

Political Islam in the Arab world today

A deep conflict is unfolding at present between aspirations for

the establishment of a modern secular civic state and another

tendency towards the establishment of an Islamic state. That was

clearly apparent after the first electoral results in some Arab Spring

countries. As a matter of fact, both tendencies are still immature in

their visions and understandings, let alone the ulterior agenda of

reviving the Islamic Caliphate state, which is not bluntly

pronounced, yet is widely-believed to be the ultimate goal for all

currents of political Islam. Although that model was never achieved

—whatsoever, at any given time — and remained a pure utopian

aspiration, it is important to reflect on concept of the Islamic state

within the reality of political Islam in the Arab world today.

In his book, Concept of State, Abdellah Laroui says that the

concept of the Islamic state remains incomplete,

... unless we realize the raw material of politics,

namely the psychology of the individual and his or her

ideas about the state and rule. All of which are results

of education — neither exclusively nor mostly

Bridging the Gap 010

conducted by the state. Education that is mainly the

responsibility of parents at home, the Imam at the

mosque, or sheikh at praying corners, who are all

influenced by Sharia writings and … what we call

Islamic utopia.

Hence, the battle around modernism in the Arab and Islamic

worlds centers on the human being. The “gains” made by political

Islamic movements in the Arab world will never distract such

movements from their preoccupation with man — the raw material

for the desired model and classical mentality. The role of religion in

general, and Islam in particular, is undeniable — especially in

establishing values and ethics, and regulating relationships. It is true

that absorption of religious values in general, and Islamic tolerant

values in particular, should result in an Arab society raised on norms

of justice, mercy, truthfulness, coexistence, and peace. However,

such a relationship between religion and society needs to be based

upon the principle of respect for human personality and individual

freedom, rather than upon superiority and guardianship over

individuals and the whole society.

Such superiority and guardianship are exercised in order and

only to gain recognition that the source of legislation and power is

heavenly and sacred, instead of man made, revisable and

challengeable. In this way, the function of state is understood as

coercive, socially and doctrinally, and does not tolerate free choice

or independent opinion, or even a rotation of power, still less a

purely rotating and social function responsible for fulfilling the Arab

individual’s need for security, stability, education, healthcare,

dignity, welfare, and other common interests that should be

established by consensus. In a religious state, there is no room for

negotiations or bargaining with religion or its consequences.

The real struggle in the Arab world now is purely educational

and cultural. It is not limited to direct political practice, but rather

extends to the entire social arena — particularly education. Political

change cannot be successful unless solidly based on religious reform

Bridging the Gap 012

first, then cultural and philosophical reform. Islamists understand

that approach, and have dedicated their full capacities to fulfilling

their desired outcomes. At-Tarbiyyah, or education, is in the

literature of the Muslim Brotherhood the core of doctrine. The

Muslim Brothers developed certain steps and stages for their work

on education, starting with advocacy, then preparing supporters and

soldiers, and then implementing their vision in practical work. Their

main objective in that educational approach is to separate

themselves from the non-Muslim society — as they like to call it —

in order to make a radical change in the general society and politics.

A change that would take place through religion, and by hands of

the “rightly elected group.”

It is unfortunate indeed that a counter-strategy does not exist.

Neither at level of reforming religion and developing a better

understanding of Sharia, nor at level of improving formal

educational curricula in the Arab world. Instead, cultural and

societal structures in Arab world are still governed by traditional and

classical tendencies. Educational curricula are still full of

superstition, instead of educating enlightened generations to fight

superstition.

Dilemmas of tradition and religion

To anticipate what it might be like if traditional education,

which dictates obedience and submissiveness and discourages

critical reasoning and free opinion, continues to prevail, here are

some statistical results from studies conducted by specialized think

tanks on levels of adherence to religion within certain peoples. In

May 2013, a survey was conducted by the Pew Research Center —

an American think tank — of 39 countries around the world,

showing that considerable percentages of Muslims support

enforcement of Sharia as their local law. Furthermore, the survey

showed that Muslims differ on how they interpret Sharia, even

among highly educated elites. The study indicated that outspoken

adherence to religion by the vast majority does not negate the fact

Bridging the Gap 013

that huge disparities exists when it comes to understanding religion

and how it should be practiced. Moreover, the study referred to signs

of silent conflict inside society between inherited traditions and

modernist values.

It is unnecessary here to elaborate on these dilemmas, such as

combining majority adherence to religion with variant

understandings of the practice of the same religion. It is also

unnecessary to recall the eras of Western colonization in the Arab

world, when adherence to Arabism and Islam were matters of

survival, with the identity, religion, civilization, and history of Arab

society a focus of colonial concern. Ultimately, interaction among

human societies obliged the Arab world to follow different patterns

of intellectual and societal development. Women, in particular, and

the family in general, played the biggest role in accelerating that

development. Changes related to the family, its components,

relations among its members, the status of women, the way it deals

with both inherited and modern values, the decrease in the size of

Arab families in some countries (from seven or more, to lower

averages), and the spread and development of education, alongside

broadening of spaces of communication in all its forms — all these

elements contributed to opening the way for practicing democracy

and freedom, and questioning old ideas.

Arab families have become more of a club, where discussion,

debate and an exchange of views occurs in a frank and open manner,

compared to past times when norms and customs imposed a

separation of boys and girls, even inside the family, and banned

children from expressing their opinions before their parents or older

relatives. Furthermore, the engagement of women in ever more

aspects of life is a crucial turning point in terms of the great Arab

societal revolution. Now, one can confidently say that the more

liberal women are in an Arab society, the more qualified this society

should be to move towards modernism and to greater universal

values. Where women’s issues are recognized and addressed in

Arab societies, traditional sets of values are increasingly questioned.

Bridging the Gap 014

Liberal approaches and the Arab world

Modernizing the Arab Islamic world is becoming, today, a more

urgent need than ever, in order to empower this part of the world to

benefit from the innovations of mankind and the development of

human civilization. One may say that the trigger of modernization

has already been pulled across the Arab world. In some parts of the

Arab world, modernization is still fresh; while in other parts it is

reaching a peak. In all cases, modernization has been unleashed. It

is, then, our duty as Arab liberal forces to set proper strategies to

accelerate it, and to put into our consideration that concerted efforts

on both sides of the Mediterranean are needed to achieve positive

outcomes.

Bertrand Badie writes: “Thinking that other cultures could fully

accept Western values is pure fantasy.” He also believes that the

“project for the globalization of Western values will always be hit

by the truth that these values have been tailored by one history: the

history of the Western people.” In this regard, he is mistaken. The

West is not homogenous in its thinking. Neither are Western peoples

unique and different from others. The human being is the same

everywhere, regardless of the contexts and conditions he is subject

to. Similar to the current situation in Arab societies, Western

societies had — as well — experience of religious rigidity and

corruption within Christianity. The reform revolution finally started

under the leadership of Martin Luther, who succeeded in renewing

and changing Christianity to match the developing era where

printing was promising in spreading knowledge, which in turn was

an incentive to accelerate religious reform.

The events of the Arab Spring witnessed unprecedented

participation by all segments of Arab society, and proved Badie

mistaken, rather revealing that such sentiments were simply being

used by despotic rulers as a pretext to block change. The history of

universal values is a history shared by human groups both East and

West, because man is very much the same whether Arab or

otherwise. However, I do agree with Badie that, “not all values can

be generalized, unless established equally by everyone.” Indeed. We

Bridging the Gap 015

have seen the Arab masses uprising in Egypt, Tunisia and Libya to

establish values of freedoms, human dignity and democracy, and

this process is still ongoing and will be stamped by their trademark:

“Made in Arab countries.”

A common mistake occurs when researchers and specialists in

Arab and Islamic affairs address these affairs with a preset vision of

a geographically limited Arab and Islamic world. The reality is that

it goes even further than its real borders, up to the furthest point of

the Western world itself. The Arab and Islamic world is even very

likely to further penetrate the Western world, thanks to the values

we advocate as liberals — such as freedom of movement for people

and goods and thoughts. It is certain that such penetration, when it

happens, will carry negative qualities along with positive ones. We

need, therefore, to launch a joint program for mutual understanding

of our common reality in the Arab and Western worlds, and to start

developing common solutions for the issues emerging from that

reality.

The Western world did try, through a number of intellectuals, to

reflect deeply on Islamic affairs and social and cultural phenomena

experienced in this part of the world. Orientalists, who flourished as

a movement in a certain time, produced important works that helped

in better understanding Islam and the psychological and ethical

components of Arab societies. However, some dishonest approaches

destroyed the trust others had built up, replacing it with question

marks as to the real intentions of the producers of knowledge.

Liberals today need to work on reviving noble and genuine

Orientalist practices, such as the dialogue of civilizations and

cultures, and must encourage common and regular intellectual

exchange on the means to give root to modernist thought and liberal

values, giving ground for that genuine dialogue of civilizations.

Bridging the Gap 016

Rebuilding Arab foundations: Islam, citizenship

and development

It is evident that religious reform can lead to enlightening

cultural reform, and subsequently to political reform. For us, the

gateway to comprehensive reform in Arab states depends on

updating Islamic jurisprudence and modifying Sharia to become

more enabling and harmonious with the times, and therefore more

applicable. That requires internal corrective movements to work on

reconsidering Islamic jurisprudence and Sharia. It also necessitates

better utilization of contemporary concepts, and this can only be

achieved if those who are open and capable of diligence start

renewing existing thinking in all fields according to the necessities

of the time. This should link religious reform to intellectual

enlightenment, and should pave the way for developing

contemporary knowledge and methodologies.

The Arab world suffers a mass schizophrenia. If one asks an

Arab citizen, “Who are you?” the same citizen gets confused.

Should he say Arab, non-Arab, Kurd, Amazigh, Druze? Or should

he say Muslim, non-Muslim, Arab Copt, Arab Christian, or even

Shia Muslim, or Sunni Muslim — let alone his clan, or tribe, or

other sect. Add to that plurality of belonging a lack in the sense of

citizenship, which should encompass all these belongings and return

them in the form of rights and duties, the rule of law and equal

opportunities. Arab societies need also to revisit understandings on

more institutionalized liberal principles, including the right of

ownership. Ownership is generated from acknowledgement of Arab

citizen’s right to own his or herself in whatever variances of that

self, starting with a gender approach. Women in our Arab world are

still in urgent need of having their rights of full ownership

acknowledged and recognized, in order to fully enjoy other rights.

Moreover, the Arab citizen needs to completely get rid of the

“privacy” complex, and to get engaged in added human value. Arab

societies also need to move forward towards levels of full respect for

the unique character of Arab citizens, which should be interpreted as

the faculties enjoyed by every person if equal opportunity, freedom

Bridging the Gap 017

and dignity safeguards are provided. In such a case, the Arab citizen

would be, indeed, an added value to the development of his or her

society. Only such a citizen is capable of making a new modernist

society.

It is strange that all the successes achieved by the liberal model

in economics, based on market economy and economic freedoms,

failed to translate to adequate studies of the poor, or to properly

promote successful liberal models and experiences in eradicating

poverty all over the world. The Arab world is in dire need of that.

Studies such as those of Professor Hernando De Soto may prove

useful. He analyzes the obstacles that may hinder the poor in

benefiting from the market economy and economic freedoms, in

addition to enjoying full rights of ownership. The Arab world needs

a serious and humane approach to help the Arab citizen get out of

the vicious cycle of need and poverty — a cycle many try to sustain

because their narrow electoral interests lie in its continuance. This is

a point of difference between a liberal and a non-liberal: the liberal

seeks to build the citizen, so he or she is able to make free choices,

independently and freely, with no ulterior considerations.

Poverty alleviation is another field for potential cooperation

between Arab liberals and their Western friends, where all may

share in its study, to come up with better recommendations.

Bridging the Gap 018

Bridging the Gap 019

The role of religion in society and

politics in Europe, or: three myths of

secularity in Europe

Sven Speer

Nine out of 10 people will mention secularity as a defining

characteristic of contemporary societies when asked about the

relationship between religion, society and politics in European

countries. Only few will note that the notion of a secular Europe has

been from the very beginning a case of abstract normative theorizing

rather than a state of lived political reality. The myth of secularism

has been told as follows: economy, science and state would be

increasingly separated and independent from religious influence;

this would result in the privatization of religion, its removal from the

public sphere and in the most extreme vision, in the disappearance

of religion as known thus far (Casanova, 2004, pp. 19-39).

During my time at the Cluster of Excellence “Religion and

Politics” at the University of Münster, a colleague of mine — a

philosopher — once gave a presentation on Jürgen Habermas’s

concept of the secular state. I was next in giving a presentation that

discussed the relationship between the state and religion in

Germany. My colleague was the first to raise his hand and asked:

“Sven, has there never been a secular state in Germany?” My

response was straightforward: “No, there hasn’t — at least not in

Western Germany.” The philosopher was puzzled. Indeed, the

majority of people in Europe adhere to what I refer to as the three

myths of secularity. In this paper I would like to disprove: 1) the

myth of secular societies in Europe; 2) the myth of secular states in

Europe, and; 3) the myth of the superiority of secular states. Finally,

as a political activist, I would like to introduce an alternative to the

secular state, namely my vision of “Open Religious Policy.”

Bridging the Gap 001

The myth of secular societies in Europe

To what extent are European societies secular in reality? In

2010, Eurobarometer conducted a representative study that included

27,000 participants from across Europe (this amounts to

approximately 1,000 participants from each of the 27 member

states). The participants were asked whether they believe in God, in

some sort of spirit or life force, or in neither of the given options.

Only 20 percent of Europeans do not believe that there is a sort of

spirit, God or life force; 26 percent believe in some sort of spirit or

life force, and 51 percent believe in God. Although supposed to be

secular, a thin majority of European citizens believe in God. When

evaluating the results from individual countries the responses are

more complex. Religious beliefs differ starkly amongst European

societies. In Cyprus and Romania, more than 90 percent believe in

God, whereas in the Czech Republic and in Sweden less than 20

percent do. But as a rule, in countries where believe in God is weak,

believe in some sort of spirit or life force is stronger than disbelief.

Only in France are the “strict nonbelievers” the largest of the three

groups, with 40 percent of the population (TNS Opinion & Social,

2010).

Nonetheless, European societies are becoming more secular

(Norris and Inglehart, 2011, pp. 85-89). However, this trend does

not result in homogenous but in increasingly pluralistic societies.

Many European societies are home to strong secular minorities and

it cannot be taken for granted anymore that European citizens

belong to the Christian faith. In many societies, affiliation to

traditional churches has become but one option amongst many (Roy,

2011, p. 43). Not despite but precisely because religious

participation rates are declining among Europeans, religious

differences are becoming more important and more disputed (Roy,

2011, pp. 275-277). One major impact on the religious landscapes of

European societies is the immigration of Muslims. However, one

would be mistaken to overemphasize the impact of immigration.

Many of today’s immigrants and their descendants are agnostics or

atheists; at the same time Europeans without any past ties to Islam

Bridging the Gap 000

have become Muslims. Religious diversity in Europe cannot and

must not be reduced to mere cultural diversity. We are not observing

a clash of civilizations but a new dimension of individual religious

choice. The same is true for societies around the globe. In former

Confucian South Korea, the majority of the population is Christian

now; there are growing numbers of atheists in the United States,

atheistic Russians re-discover their Orthodox tradition, Pentecostal

Christians proselytize successfully in Arab states, and Europeans

convert to Islam.

To sum up: European societies are not secular. They may

become more secular but more importantly, there is a trend towards

a new diversity.

The myth of secular states in Europe

The continental European branches of liberalism and socialism

relentlessly criticize the entanglement of state and religion in their

own countries. To the outside world they continue to promote the

model of the secular state as a European invention and reality.

However, the United Kingdom, Malta, Greece and most of

Scandinavia have state churches — Finland has even two. With the

Vatican State, Europe is de facto home to a theocracy. The heads of

state in the United Kingdom, Denmark and Norway are

simultaneously the leaders of state churches (Fox, 2008, pp. 111-

118). In continental Europe, parties of religious defense, such as

Christian Democratic parties, have gained about 30 percent of votes

in national elections and held government positions for an average

of 43.5 years in the time from 1945 to 1999 (Manow, 2008, p. 69).

One can even trace the differences between European welfare states

back to religious differences: the Social Democratic welfare state is

predominant in Northern Europe with its tradition of Lutheran state

churches; the corporatist approach dominates Catholic countries,

and the liberal welfare state characterizes those countries where

Calvinism and other free Protestant churches have been strong

(Manow, 2008, pp. 11-31).

Bridging the Gap 002

Today, state churches and the impact of religion on society may

be seen as historic relics of the past. However, even the present

European states are strongly intertwined with at least some of their

respective churches. In Finland, Greece, Luxembourg, Portugal and

the United Kingdom some members of the clergy are appointed by

state officials. In most European countries optional religious

education is offered at public schools, and schools run by religious

entities are state funded. In many of them, the state funds religious

charities as well. The state collects church taxes in Austria, Belgium,

Germany, Italy and others. In at least every second European state,

religious entities have to register with the state to gain some form of

privileges. Some states maintain a strict “sect monitoring” policy

against new religious movements (Fox, 2008, pp. 112-113, pp. 144-

145). Even the officially laicistic France that has banned

headscarves from schools — even pupils are prohibited from

wearing them — has no strict separation of state and religion. The

state funds religious schools (mainly Catholic) up to 80 percent;

these are attended by every fifth French pupil. Catholic, Protestant,

Jewish and Muslim chaplains serve in the military. Some areas of

France are characterized by an even stronger entanglement between

state and religion. In Alsace-Moselle, the laicistic laws have never

been applied as the area was part of Germany at the time of their

commencement. Today, there is four officially recognized religions

in Alsace-Moselle: Catholicism, Lutheranism, Calvinism and

Judaism. The salaries of their clergy stems in part from public funds,

there are crucifixes and mandatory religious education in public

schools, and the University of Strasbourg hosts a theology

department (Kuru, 2009, pp. 109-111).

In the whole of Europe, state and religion are far from

separated; instead they are intertwined in various different ways.

Even France, the ideal of laicism in theory lacks a strict separation in

practice.

Bridging the Gap 003

The myth of the superiority of the secular state

For many continental European liberals (and socialists), a

secular state, strictly separated from religious influence, embodies

the perfection of neutrality. However, there is no factual evidence to

prove such claims — quite the contrary, throughout history secular

states have been far from neutral. Revolutionary France in the 1790s

was one of the first secular states. The French Republic confiscated

church property, dissolved ecclesiastic orders and congregations,

removed iconography from places of worship, destroyed crosses and

bells, introduced a non-Christian Cult of Reason and killed reluctant

clergy. Antireligious regimes in the former Soviet Union and other

socialist states attempted something similar.

The theoretical foundations of secularism are found in streams

of liberal thought that emerged predominately in countries with

overly powerful religious institutions, such as France and Turkey.

Non-liberal statesmen like Aristide Briand (1862-1932) and Mustafa

Kemal Atatürk (1881-1938) proponed the idea of a popular

supremacy against the real or fictional supremacy of the church or

religion. The means of the state were thereby exploited, and

marginalized religious influence (Kuru, 2009, pp. 14). Instead of

confining the expanding state, liberals supported state expansion at

the cost of religion. This had a negative impact of public freedom in

general (Raico, 1999, p. 37).

Today the bloody wars of secularizing the state are over.

Paradoxically, it is the secularization of European societies that

undermines the neutrality of the secular state. As the number of

European citizens who adhere to secular ideas becomes greater,

these citizens seize the opportunity to advocate and lobby for

policies that maintain and/or support the secular state. This is a fairly

recent development — at no point in the “religious past” has the

secular state had a “party” made up of its stakeholders in society

(Willems, 2001, p. 231). This is even more problematic in

combination with the expansion of the state into areas dominated by

religion in the past, especially education and welfare. When a state

only provides or funds secular supplies in these areas, it

Bridging the Gap 004

marginalizes its religious citizens (Monsma and Soper, 1998, pp.

5-7). While governments supported specific religious traditions in

the past — and many still do — the expansion of the secular state

often equals a hostile takeover of religious activities (Reuter, 2007,

p. 184).

A strictly secular state with no attachments to religion is not

neutral as it has its own stakeholder party among citizens. The more

extensive the secular state is, the more it interferes with the personal

belief and non-belief of its citizens.

The alternative to the secular state: Open

Religious Policy

There are alternative approaches other than secularism that

allow the liberal state to organize diverse societies. Such approaches

are found within the liberal thought of John Stuart Mill and Isaiah

Berlin. Both authors warned against the monopolization of state

policy by one group or another – even when such measures are

considered to enhance “the good of all” (Mill, 2010, p. 29, p. 24).

Berlin measured the freedom of a society by the number of choices

it allows its members. In order to guarantee a variety of choices, the

power of the state has to be limited (Berlin, 2006, p. 249). However,

this does not imply a reduction or even an abolition of the state. As

Mill stated, the critique against public education is not that there is

public education, but that the state is the executive of public

education (Mill, 2010, p. 151, p. 153). The state has no right to

influence its citizens to become adherents of religious traditions, nor

has it the right to influence them in such ways that may result in an

abolition of religious practices. But it has the right, and I would

argue the duty, to guarantee the availability of services to all of its

citizens. This entails that the state must provide the policy

framework and the funding for such services.

These arguments are central to the development of what I have

termed “Open Religious Policy.” The concept of Open Religious

Policy aims to establish a relationship between the state and religion

Bridging the Gap 005

that provides all religious and secular entities with the same access

to the public sphere and state funding, whilst safeguarding the right

of religious choice for the individual citizen. I thereby define Open

Religious Policy through four core principles: 1) the unbiased state;

2) public expression; 3) guaranteed individual freedom; 4) free

choice. Allow me to introduce these principles briefly.

1. The unbiased state

If we accept that every person is a freely thinking and acting

being, the state must not shape its citizens according to the ideas of

others (Berlin, 2006, pp. 245-255). The state has to respect the free

choice of its citizens when it comes to religious matters. It must

neither privilege nor proselytize individual religions, religion in

general or non-belief. Open Religious Policy does not homogenize

citizens; instead it fosters the practice of tolerance so that the

acceptance of diversity is socialized (Willems, 2003, pp. 107-108).

This process is as challenging for individual citizens as it is for the

societies they form. Nonetheless, citizens have to learn that there

must be a difference between legitimate public indignation and

illegitimate interference of the state (Mill, 2010, pp. 16-17).

2. Public expression

While the state must be impartial in the religious sphere, citizens

are free to express their belief or non-belief in public (Willems,

2003, p. 108). Religion is a private matter, but at the same time,

citizens have the right to show their faith in public life. Neither the

public nor the state are reserved primarily for one group of religious

or secular beliefs (Willems, 2003, p. 106). However, the public

sphere must not be a place of state-imposed harmony. The state

must allow for conflicting views to be expressed publicly (Mill,

2010, p. 109, p. 121). Different opinions of religious traditions and

nonreligious systems can therefore be articulated peacefully as the

public visibility of differences is the only way to learn to deal with

them.

Bridging the Gap 006

3. Guaranteed individual freedom

The state must respect the freedom of choice of each individual

citizen. But the same is true for religious and secular congregations.

The right to freedom of each individual citizen is unalienable: no

individual can permanently relinquish his or her freedom in favor of

a congregation. There is no right not to be free (Mill, 2010, p. 147).

The individual citizen, therefore, has the right to leave his or her

congregation, but also has to live with the consequences that stem

from this decision, such as termination of contact by the former

community. Nonetheless, the state has to prohibit physical harm by

the former community against the breakaway by all means.

4. Free choice

The state has to provide access to public funds for services and

initiatives of all groups in society, be they faith-based, secular or

indifferent. Any such services, whether organized by the state or

groups, are equivalent in what they offer the members of society and

therefore equally worthy of funding. Every group has the right to

receive state funding to provide healthcare, childcare, care for the

elderly, shelter for the homeless and so on, according to their belief.

Precisely because the services of the state cannot be neutral, the state

has to make funding available for private initiatives (Monsma and

Soper, 1998, p. 1). This, however, does not mean that the state gives

up its coordinating function. For example, the state sets the amount

of funding allocated to certain services. It cannot decide, however,

how and by whom services should be provided. To guarantee the

freedom of choice for everyone and to avoid monopolies of

individual faith groups in the provision of certain services, the state

has to provide its own services that should accommodate all

traditions and try to be as neutral as possible.

Bridging the Gap 007

Conclusion

In this paper I have attempted to disprove the perception of

European secularity. Large sections of European societies remain

religious. Part secularization has resulted in an even greater diversity

in society. The secular state is dominant in European thought, but

not in practice. As I have argued, in times of religious diversity it is

not even preferable to organize society through secularism. A better

approach to guarantee individual freedom regardless of religious

belief or non-belief may be found through what I have termed

“Open Religious Policy.” Crucially, this concept requires the state to

be open to all religions and secular traditions.

In essence, Open Religious Policy is based upon four key ideas:

1) the state must be unbiased towards religious and secular ideas; 2)

citizens have the right to practice their religious and secular ideas in

the private as well as public sphere; 3) the state guarantees the rights

of its citizens to leave their congregations; and 4) the state has to

fund faith-based services in education and welfare besides providing

its own.

Bridging the Gap 008

References

- Berlin, Isaiah, Freiheit: Vier Versuche (Frankfurt: Fischer-

Taschenbuch-Verlag, 2006).

- Casanova, José, Public Religions in the Modern World (Chicago:

University of Chicago Press, 2004).

- Fox, Jonathan, A World Survey of Religion and the State

(Cambridge Studies in Social Theory, Religion, and Politics),

(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

- Kuru, Ahmet T., Secularism and State Policies Toward Religion.

The United States, France, and Turkey (Cambridge Studies in

Social Theory, Religion, and Politics), (Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press, 2009).

- Manow, Philip, Religion und Sozialstaat: Die konfessionellen

Grundlagen europäischer Wohlfahrtsstaatsregime (Frankfurt:

Campus-Verlag, 2008).

- Mill, John Stuart, Über die Freiheit (Stuttgart: Reclams Universal-

Bibliothek, Band 3491, 2010).

- Monsma, Stephen V. and J. Christopher Soper, “Introduction,” in

Monsma, Stephen V. and J. Christopher Soper, (Eds.), Equal

Treatment of Religion in a Pluralistic Society (Grand Rapids,

Michigan: Eerdmans Pub Co, 1998), pp. 1-8.

- Norris, Pippa and Ronald Inglehart, Sacred and Secular: Religion

and Politics Worldwide (Cambridge Studies in Social Theory,

Religion and Politics) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,

2011).

- Raico, Ralph, Die Partei der Freiheit: Studien zur Geschichte des

deutschen Liberalismus (Stuttgart: Schriften zur Wirtschaftspolitik,

Band 7, 1999).

- Reuter, Astrid, “Säkularität und Religionsfreiheit — ein doppeltes

Dilemma,” Leviathan Vol. 35, No. 2 (2007), pp. 178-192.

- Roy, Olivier, Heilige Einfalt: Über die politischen Gefahren

entwurzelter Religionen (München: Siedler Verlag, 2011).

- TNS Opinion & Social, “Biotechnology,” Eurobarometer 73:1

(Brussels: European Commission, 2010).

Bridging the Gap 009

- Willems, Ulrich, “Säkularisierung des Politischen oder

politikwissenschaftlicher Säkularismus? Zum disziplinären

Perzeptionsmuster des Verhältnisses von Religion und Politik in

gegenwärtigen Gesellschaften,” in Hildebrandt, Mathias, Manfred

Brocker and Harmut Behr (Eds.), Säkularisierung und

Resakralisierung in westlichen Gesellschaften: Ideengeschichtliche

und theoretische Perspektiven (Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag,

2001), pp. 215-240.

- Willems, Ulrich, “Religion als Privatsache? Eine kritische

Auseinandersetzung mit dem liberalen Prinzip einer strikten

Trennung von Politik und Religion,” in Minkenberg, Michael and

Ulrich Willems (Eds.), Politik und Religion (Wiesbaden: VS

Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2003), pp. 88-112.

Bridging the Gap 021

Bridging the Gap 020

Blueprints for the future of liberalism in

the Arab world

Alexandra Thein

In case this has ever been in doubt, there is a future for

liberalism in the Arab world. Revolutions in the Middle East and

North Africa (MENA) region have created a “point of no return” for

democratic institutions in post-revolutionary countries of the region,

creating a similar “point of no return” for liberalism. There are risks,

however, that a more fundamental entrenchment of liberalism in the

Arab world may not follow. The process of promoting liberalism in

the Arab world requires acceptance of past mistakes and disregard

of short-term interests, a hurdle that will be difficult to surmount for

actors on both sides of the Mediterranean, to ensure that the

revolutions will not merely remain a transitory process down the

path of future authoritarianism. The European Union (EU),1

including the European Parliament (EP),2 and the Alliance of

Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE)3 group in the EP, can

play a crucial role in this transition process.

1 For reasons of simplicity, the EU’s main institutions — the European

Parliament, the EU Commission and the Council of the European Union —

are referred to in this article as the EU. Where relevant, note will be made

of the institution in question. 2 The European Parliament currently has 754 members, elected through EU-

wide elections in all 27 — soon to be 28 — Member States of the EU for a

period of five years. The current mandate runs from 2009-2014. 3 The liberal Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe is the third

largest group in the European Parliament with 86 members. There are six

other groups in the EP.

Bridging the Gap 022

Contemporary context in the framework of past

experiences

Clarifying the concept of liberalism, and especially liberal

values, is a necessary first step in order to ascertain the future of

liberalism in the Arab world, and how liberal parties in Europe can

facilitate this process. Fundamental liberal values encompass

individual and civic rights, respect and implementation of the rule of

law, equal rights for all, including minorities, political and cultural

pluralism, free economic enterprise and democracy based on these

liberal principles. A further aspect, which bears particular relevance

in the Middle East, is the notion of individual responsibility, which

is currently incompatible with the structure of Middle Eastern

societies and families. In Europe and the Middle East, liberalism

developed along very different historical lines. However, there are

striking similarities between the two regions and their interpretation

of liberalism, and this has proven to be one key building block upon

which to encourage a process of dialogue, mutual assistance and

common strategies.

Despite the revolutions of the Arab Spring, which in themselves

were an expression of the popular demand for democracy based on

the respect of the rule of law, and human and individual rights,

liberal parties in the Arab world have not enjoyed electoral success,

except and for its own individual reasons in the recent elections in

Libya. There are several reasons for this, both domestic and

international. The scope of this article does not include a detailed

analysis of these reasons, but rather focuses on the EU and EU

member states’ roles in this electoral reality and what steps can be

undertaken by both international and national actors to overcome

this problem in the future.

In the past, the EU and its member states engaged with the

region on the basis of interest-based policymaking. The bilateral

Association Agreements laid out paths to reform in the political —

including human rights — economic and social sectors, but

engagement has largely focused on energy, security and

immigration policies. In some regards, the EU did pursue reform in

Bridging the Gap 023

the three mentioned policy areas, but its member states individually

pursued different strategies, in some cases even contrary to the EU’s

stated policy goals, particularly in the advancement of human rights.

Instead, violations of human rights were, and still are, widespread,

the principle of rule of law is not universally applied, and individual

rights have not been achieved. Despite this, European countries have

not been consequential in their approach to the region, continuing to

pursue deep economic, political and security ties with countries that

in some cases violate these principles. This begs the question as to

what can be done to reverse this trend and how liberalism can

reclaim lost ground in a region of vast potential.

The future of liberalism in the Arab world

These patterns of engagement explain some of the current

problems for liberal reform in the region. There are distinct

approaches that can help alleviate these issues and further steps

would not only mitigate the challenges liberalism faces in the

region, but also lay the foundation upon which to build institutions

that would enable the growth of liberalism as a defining ideological

force in the region. The EU and the relevant actors in the region —

including politicians, activists, NGOs and other stakeholders —

need to rethink their strategies for the region if liberalism is to

succeed. These measures are very different in their scope but are of

equal importance and all of these processes and reforms must go

hand-in-hand if they are to fully succeed. These measures range

from policymaking, political campaigning and dialogue, institutional

reform to boosting economic entrepreneurship.

The EU, comprising several actors and stakeholders in itself,

must also take certain paths to achieve this aim. It is necessary to

note, however, that due to the different historical contexts within

which liberalism developed in the Middle East and Europe, Europe

cannot not export its own form of liberalism as a blueprint for

liberalism in the Arab world. Despite this slightly disparate

development, the EU, and more specifically liberal parties, activists

Bridging the Gap 024

and other stakeholders, can use past experiences with the Eastern

neighborhood and policymaking in the Middle East to assist the

liberal reform process in the Arab world. These steps, briefly

outlined below, would give the necessary impetus for long-term

establishment of liberalism in the Arab world. The steps must be

applied at different levels and involve different actors on the local,

national and international levels.

An entrepreneurial middle class

and economic reform

The driving force of liberalism in Europe is and has been the

entrepreneurial middle class, not only in terms of economic growth

and progress, but also as a bulwark against extremism. A strong

middle class has always been a guarantor of liberal democracy. In

the Arab world, this entrepreneurial middle class plays a slightly

different role with regard to the European entrepreneurial middle

class in terms of the societal, political and economic structure within

which it operates. The role of the middle class within countries of

the Arab world had thus far been mitigated and limited by the

bureaucratic structure of the state within an authoritarian political

system. This middle class has to develop and grow beyond the limits

of the previously existent authoritarian bureaucratic apparatus, to

drive economic growth forward, thereby strengthening and

solidifying itself and playing a similar role to that which its

counterpart played in Europe.

The development of strong economic and institutional

foundations is necessary for the solidification of liberal democracy

in the states in question. However, it is equally important to

ascertain that economic reform and rapid privatization to encourage

free enterprise in itself is not the answer to entrenching liberalism in

countries in transition — rather the opposite. In states in transition,

especially where institutions were and continue to be weak, rapid

economic liberalization will not entrench liberalism in a lasting

manner. The case of Iraq is an example worthy of note. The current

Bridging the Gap 025

political and economic instability stem from the implementation of

the idea that unfettered economic liberalization will inevitably lead

to economic growth, which in turn will lead to the development of a

free society, respect for the rule of law, and individual rights for all.

The case of Iraq provides a particularly useful example because the

political conditions in the country before the fall of an authoritarian

regime and after the establishment of a weak political system in a

state in transition bears some resemblance to the conditions existent

in other now post-revolutionary countries of the region. This one-

sided policy approach will, by virtue of the fact that in the Arab

context this will most likely fail to achieve the stated goals, only

serve to deepen mistrust towards European and more generally

Western ideals, thus achieving the opposite effect of the stated goals,

leading to the alienation of the region’s peoples from liberalism as a

set of values. Hence, economic development for a sound and

politically educated middle class must include a particular role for

the state and state institutions.

Role of the state and its institutions

One of the fundamental requirements for the further

development and entrenchment of liberalism in the Arab world

concerns the role of the state and its institutions. Despite one of the

fundamental liberal ideals espousing a reduced role of the state, a

facilitating actor or vehicle is nevertheless required in the initial

phases of the reform process in post-revolutionary political contexts.

Setting up effective, functioning and facilitating institutions in turn

requires a sound, efficient and functioning bureaucracy able to

contribute to the societal, infrastructural and economic development

of the country — all necessities for the further development of an

entrepreneurial middle class, the core building block of a liberal

democracy. This would necessarily need to include a democratic

system of checks and balances to ensure no one institution has more

power than another. Paradoxically, the current problems observed in

Egypt, Iraq and Lebanon highlight the need for a functioning

Bridging the Gap 026

institutional structure in order to develop the necessary framework

for liberalism to thrive.

The forces and actors of the old regimes cannot be excluded in

this process of reform. Lasting and thorough reform of political and

institutional systems consists of inclusionary approaches.

Disenfranchisement and exclusion are potent forces that lead to

elements of former regimes becoming alienated, leading to

instability and in some cases prolonged violence, either on behalf of

one group towards another or versus the state. This can severely

damage the potential for reform. Previous experiences highlight this,

with the current crisis in Iraq serving as the starkest example.

Consequentially, institution-building mechanisms must be at the

forefront of the EU’s engagement in the region, which encompass

reform of the administration, judiciary and other institutions that

make up a liberal democracy. Separately, police and security forces

must also be reformed to uphold the rule of law, whilst respecting

human and individual rights. Once the relevant infrastructural,

institutional and political structures are in place, the bureaucratic

structures would provide a slender and efficient structure ensuring

economic growth based on an entrepreneurial middle class whilst

preserving individual and human rights, respect for the rule of law,

and equal rights for all.

The role of liberal political parties

Currently, in some MENA countries, liberal political parties

remain fragmented. This is especially true in Egypt. To some

degree, this is the result of the prevailing system of political

tribalism, but other factors also play a role. Liberalism cannot thrive

and develop in a context of intense personal political rivalry,

especially if these parties are linked with a particular personality,

rather than a party program. Further, infighting within a party’s

leadership and between parties severely dents public opinion of the

party or parties in question. Credibility can be restored if the

leadership of an individual party stands united and fights for a

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common goal. Liberal parties in the Arab world must find a way to

work together on a common platform and must unite if they are to

succeed. Fragmentation in most cases translates to electoral defeat.

In order to avoid this, sacrifices and difficult choices must be made,

as facing elections in unison bears more chances of success.

Additionally, it remains paramount that liberal parties

continuously engage with other stakeholders and actors. Complete

boycott of political proceedings may not always be the answer to a

situation in which liberal parties are in the opposition. Especially in

a state in transition, influencing the policymaking process is of vital

importance.

Placing liberal values and a liberal programmatic platform at the

center of its political work is a further necessity for continuous

success of liberal parties in the Arab region. Connecting political

ideals with the work of political parties not only serves to ensure

continuity, but also generates trust in a party. In this sense, parties

need be founded on a solid base of membership from which its

leaders emerge, as opposed to individual politicians creating parties

from a set of followers. This process must be accompanied by

cooperation and dialogue between liberal parties; otherwise the

dismal election results in Egypt will repeat themselves not only in

Egypt, but also in other Arab countries. In essence, liberal political

parties face a painful choice: succumb alone or thrive together.

Liberal parties and liberal politicians in the Arab world can

achieve this by reengaging with the street and with common voters.

In a context where several liberal parties exist on the political

landscape, this is particularly important. Liberal European political

parties also need this fundamental, long-term reengagement with the

street in a context of shifting party landscapes with swing voters.

Political campaigning and programing

Political campaigning and party programs is a factor that is

closely related, yet distinct from political parties. The fundamental

method to engage with voters is direct contact on the street, in

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educational establishments, and in public space in general. Most

recently, this was forcefully brought forward in the ALDE council

meeting in Pula, Croatia, in May 2013, especially for those

European liberal parties struggling on the national level.

This process of political campaigning needs to be decoupled

from electoral cycles. Campaigning outside electoral cycles

increases credibility and inspires more trust from voters in the

electoral program, as well as increasing their exposure to liberal

values in general. Over time, the rewards of this type of direct

engagement serve to establish liberalism as a particular brand of

values and ideals distinct from other parties.

Shared experiences and best practices are but two ways that

European liberal parties, specifically through the ALDE group in the

EP and the ALDE party, can assist Arab liberal parties, and vice

versa. Political campaigning is an activity that needs to be tailored to

specific circumstances, but techniques and methods could be

developed together. Established links, constant dialogue and

cooperation between parties on both sides of the Mediterranean can

help to create this culture of direct engagement by fostering long-

term partnerships, which could serve as an exchange mechanism to

share best practices and lessons learnt. Even if the electorate is

slightly different, electoral techniques are similar. Additionally, this

would provide a potent means to break the hindrance to liberalism

— and especially individual rights and responsibility — in the Arab

world: political tribalism. Cooperation through regional liberal

networks is one method of achieving this, as well as the liberal

ALDE group’s active engagement with regional actors.

Facilitating actors — such as liberal foundations — that also

have vast experience in dealing with countries in transition play a

crucial role as facilitators, connectors and communicators. A

successful model for engagement would thus consist of liberal

parties on both sides of the Mediterranean being connected through

organizational vehicles such as the Friedrich Naumann Foundation

for Freedom, using this vehicle to further expand and grow in their

respective political space.

Bridging the Gap 029

Demography: including the entire populace

Institutional reform, as mentioned earlier, together with political

campaigning, plays a central role in other relevant reform processes.

Demographic realities in Europe and the Arab world vary to a large

degree, yet measures and steps that need to be undertaken are very

similar for both regions, bearing more relevance in the MENA

region, as the demographic structure shows a younger population on

average.

The vast majority of the MENA region’s population is under the

age of 30. This demographic context provides for an immense

opportunity for liberal political parties to engage with the age group

that will define the region’s future for the coming decades. This

engagement needs to be of a continuous nature as opposed to being

sporadic and linked to electoral cycles, as already mentioned,

comprising youth in all geographic areas, both urban and the youth

in rural areas. This requires work with and through youth

movements and youth wings of liberal political parties in an

organized and coherent manner. Concrete strategies are required that

set out work plans that take into account geographic specificities,

and link these youth organizations together on a national level

through regular intra-party dialogue and exchange. A sense of

togetherness, cooperation and the notion of working for a common,

attainable future are strong motivational factors for young people to

join national liberal political movements.

Youth wings and youth organizations are feeder organizations

for national political parties, and are imperative for generational

change to occur, whilst ensuring generational continuity for political

parties. At the same time, this will guarantee that within the

framework of generational change, liberal values are entrenched in

the political and social landscape. Especially after decades of

authoritarianism, planting the seeds of liberalism in a region fraught

with turmoil is a key factor in ensuring the success of liberalism in a

context where the social and political make up has been dominated

by tribal structures.

Bridging the Gap 031

Lastly, the role of women in public and political life must be

supported. Through our dialogue with parties and activists in the

region we see alarming signs concerning the deterioration of

women’s rights. Having initially played a fundamental role in the

revolutionary processes, in some countries their rights are being

systematically violated. Especially in Europe, women have proven

to play a key role in positive societal change, and incorporating

women in the Arab world in this process is essential in instilling

liberal values in the region. Since women face certain restrictions in

daily life in most societies, they could prove to be more receptive to

the ideals of freedom. The same holds true for minorities — their

rights must be respected and they must be included.

The EU and liberal European actors

The EU, in particular the European External Action Service

(EEAS), knows of the historic opportunity in the MENA region.

They are equally aware of — and in part bound by — the different

geopolitical interests of member states, other allies in the region,

such as the US, and financially important players such as the Arab

Gulf countries. The latter play a key financial and cultural role in the

region in terms of exporting their brand of Sunni Islam, supporting

state budgets, such as the Palestinian Authority’s budget, as well as

financing some of the rebel groups in Syria and other organizations

in the region, to name a select few. The long-standing influence of

some Arab Gulf countries in spreading conservative interpretations

of Sunni Islam has further expanded through regional revolutions

that have swept to power conservative governments, consequentially

increasing their influence even further.

In this setting, the EU finds itself competing with other external

players in each MENA country, thus impeding its ability to

manoeuver. As much as the EU should remain coherent with regard

to the values it is seeks to uphold, the measures it applies and the

value system it seeks to export, the institutional set up of the Union

can also play a hindering role. In part, the arising problem of policy

Bridging the Gap 030

consistency is related to the institutional structure of the EU. The

distribution of decision-making powers in the field of foreign policy

hinders the development of a unified and common approach in

response to the Arab Spring. In this respect, it must also be

mentioned that the EU’s engagement is also negatively affected by

the ongoing financial crisis of the Eurozone, which shifts resources

and attention away from the Arab world.

Therefore, increasing calls have been made for the use of

conditionality1 as a tool to achieve greater coherence in EU

policymaking in the region, as has been mentioned on numerous

occasions in plenary discussions of the EP, especially in the context

of discussions on the situation in Egypt. This is a particularly

sensitive matter, with some EU stakeholders fearing that the use of

conditionality will have an exclusionary effect for the EU as an actor

in the Arab world. The reasoning follows the idea that placing

conditionality on governments in a region where a plethora of

international actors are actively involved, the EU will risk excluding

itself and thus losing influence in its immediate neighborhood. Yet,

clear red lines should be established in order for the EU to be able to

continue to influence the reform process through policy initiatives,

such as the support of individual NGOs, whilst retaining its

credibility within the region. Losing credibility will have a negative

effect on the EU’s ability to project its values, not only in the Arab

world but towards all external actors it engages with. For reasons

mentioned above, the EEAS remains slightly reluctant to apply

1 To explain this concept, the definition used by Rosa Balfour will be

applied: “Conditionality refers to a complex set of issues including the

ability to attach strings to demands, the linkages between political demands

and economic incentives, the attraction and credibility of these incentives

for them to be effective, the ability of the EU system, including its member

states, to coordinate and deliver such incentives, and the relation between

establishing general principles to govern conditionality and the need to

devise tailor-made policies towards individual countries.” Rosa Balfour,

“EU Conditionality after the Arab Spring,” Papers Euromesco (2012) 16,

IEMed. Retrieved on 5 June 2013 from:

http://www.iemed.org/publicacions/historic-de-publicacions/papersiemed-

euromesco/16.-eu-conditionality-after-the-arab-spring/

Bridging the Gap 032

conditionality to its assistance programs, instead preferring to

additionally address these issues and promoting peace, stability and

the rule of law through the EU’s special representatives for the

Southern Mediterranean region and for human rights.1

The EU can also retain influence through its use of other soft

power tools. The projects supported through human rights

instruments, such as the European Instrument for Democracy and

Human Rights (EIDHR) and funding to civil society actors, are tools

that can serve to promote its value system as it has done over several

years. Continued engagement between civil society and state and

non-state actors is useful in cementing liberal values. Success

remains limited, however, precisely because of the competing

policymaking between the EU, on the one hand, and member states

on the other.

The EP can continue to play a role by continuing to set up

political linkages through regular dialogue via inter-parliamentary

meetings that the European Parliament’s Delegations2 hold twice

annually, as well as through other channels. As the EU’s only

democratically elected body, the EP can also hold other institutions

to account through particular legislative measures regarding the

EU’s budget, debates with the EEAS in the plenary of the EP on

matters of current importance, questions to individual institutions,

1 See: http://eeas.europa.eu/policies/eu-special-representatives/index_en.htm

for more information on the EU’s special representatives. The EU special

representative for the Southern Mediterranean region is Bernardino León.

The EU special representative for human rights is Stavros Lambrinidis (as

of June 2013). 2 The European Parliament upholds its bilateral and regional relations with

countries through its so-called Delegations. Delegations meet once per

month in the European Parliament to discuss current affairs in the country

or region in question. Twice annually it holds inter-parliamentary meetings

with parliamentarians and other stakeholders, such as NGO representatives

and members of the government, to continue bilateral dialogue and to

address issues of mutual concern. I am personally member of the

Delegation for relations with Mashreq countries — Egypt, Jordan, Syria

and Lebanon — and Iraq, the Palestinian Legislative Council and Israel.

Bridging the Gap 033

adoption of resolutions by the plenary, and pushing for democratic

accountability regarding the work of other EU institutions.

Furthermore, the ALDE group in the EP has also promoted

liberal values through dialogue with liberal political parties,

engaging with NGOs and political activists, as well as regularly

hosting liberal leaders in the EP to facilitate an exchange of

information between MEP’s and liberal stakeholders in the region.

Conclusion

This article sought to address current problems facing liberalism

in the Arab world in a post-revolutionary context in order to explore

ways to further promote liberalism through the vehicle of liberal

political parties and actors in the region.

The measures outlined above provide a solid basis upon which

to promote liberalism in the Arab world, through creating

functioning and efficient institutions to establish a basis for the

development of an entrepreneurial middle class, which in turn will

provide a solid anchor for the development of liberalism under the

right conditions. However, the political reform process must include

reform based on the respect of all liberal values, not only of

economic liberalism. Further, political engagement with voters on

all levels through active campaigning and with a clear electoral

program ensures necessary exposure, which will serve to establish

liberal party programs in the political arena.

This political activity must particularly include engagement

with the youth in light of the demographic realities in the region,

which will be crucial for the entrenchment of liberalism in the Arab

world. Liberal parties in the region must unite and work towards a

common goal, otherwise they will continue to be sidelined in

political processes and risk complete political marginalization.

Lessons learnt by European liberal parties can serve as useful

experiences in moving forward. The EU itself must find a coherent

method of engagement with the region, and the EP and the ALDE

Bridging the Gap 034

group in particular can and must keep up its active engagement

through the help of local liberal facilitators.

If these steps are undertaken, then success in the promotion of

liberalism in the Arab world lies firmly in our hands.

Bridging the Gap 035

A liberal program for the future:

Guidelines for Arab and European

countries

Mounir Rached

The concept of economic freedom was propagated as early as

the mid-1800s, and in particular by economist and liberal thinker

John Stuart Mill in his famous book, The Principles of Political

Economy. There, he clearly stated that aside from internal and

external security and law and justice, governments have failed in

any other function. Then, he was calling for limiting the size of

governments. In the Middle East, many voices have similarly called

for economic freedom and limiting state intervention in economic

activity, including as early as 1912, when well-known liberal thinker

Ahmad Lutfi Alsayed defined the role of government and limited it

to three basic functions. These liberal thinkers were not well heard

by their respective governments.

In the Middle East as well as in many other parts of the world,

economic freedom has not — and until now — been very well

comprehended. Freedom is not anarchy, and for freedom to be

effective and real, it needs to be constituted. Government — or

“civil government,” to use John Locke’s phrase — is necessary.

There is no real freedom without the state. The question then is:

How much state, and how is it to be organized?

Middle Eastern countries in particular have regressed over the

years since independence. We have seen massive government

economic intervention and takeovers that swept many countries,

particularly Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Libya, and nearly full

ownership of natural resources in oil rich Arab countries. Although

state intervention in ownership and pricing proved ineffective and

deleterious in all cases, reform was partial, and in many ways acted

Bridging the Gap 036

as a placebo in order to convince not only their own public but

donor countries (in the case of some) that reform is ongoing.

In addition, governments feared the social implications of

reform. In most cases, this was a hoax, as there was only damage

from the unwarranted interference of such governments in every

aspect of economic activity, including state monopolies in power

production, transportation, strategic industries, banking and credit,

capital flows, and labor movement. Larger government gave upper

civil service echelons more power and wealth.

Misconceptions about the role of the public sector have

rendered the population in Middle Eastern countries passive. Even

today, after the uprisings in many Middle East countries, the benefits

of economic freedom are not well understood. The uprising was

driven by tyranny, a quest for freedom, dire economic conditions,

high unemployment among the youth, but didn’t help define a new

economic agenda.

The Middle Eastern countries score very low on global freedom

in almost all the five key indexes: size of government, legal

framework, access to sound money, freedom to trade internationally,

and regulation (FNF, 2012).

These classifications, following the Fraser Institute, have been

studied carefully and proven to provide a good measure of

unnecessary government intervention. Without delving into the

detail, I would like to provide some interpretation of these concepts,

as they are extremely important and not well understood by both the

public and governments in the region.

Middle East misconceptions

Often we hear that the public is exerting demands on the

government in many areas, such as health, education, transportation,

jobs, etc., with a strong belief that it is the government’s obligation

to provide such services. This perception has become a deflector as

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governments created dependence on them through mismanagement

that inhibited growth development and employment.

The interventionist policies of governments have been

excessively damaging, which is why the Middle East draws wealth

mainly from its natural resources. A typical quotation often heard

from critics is that the exports of Singapore alone exceed those of

the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region combined, with

oil exports excluded.

With regard to the size of government, in all Middle Eastern

countries, public enterprises are numerous, even in countries that are

considered to enjoy relatively more freedom. For instance, public

enterprises provide 22 percent of state revenues and at the same time

absorb 20 percent of expenditure in Lebanon. In order to allow the

public sector to operate in a non-competitive market almost all state

enterprises in the Middle East are granted monopolies.

It is believed that state enterprises can produce at a lower cost

and a lower price since they are not profit motivated. To the

contrary, nearly all of them operate at a higher cost. And in the case

they charge lower prices than average costs, they eventually end up

dependent on subsidies that are covered by taxes or government

borrowing. Therefore, instead of the higher price, consumers pay

taxes to cover the subsidy emerging from the higher operating cost

of public enterprises, or pay in the form of higher inflation created

by liquidity generated through borrowing.

The critical issue is whether governments can use income in a

better way than the private sector? Often it’s the private sector that

can make the right decision to maximize its utility function.

Taxes as well pose another serious problem. How much taxes

should governments collect and in what form? Often Middle Eastern

countries rely on regressive taxes that are applied to consumer

products and imports. Such taxes deprive governments from using

tax policies in order to attain better income distribution. What even

more serious is that such taxes raise prices directly almost by the

magnitude of the tax (depending on the elasticity of demand for the

Bridging the Gap 038

product), which in turn reduces real incomes and renders the

economy less competitive in other products and services.

Until today, we have governments calling for protection of

domestic industry in order to preserve employment, but such

policies breed inefficiencies in production and result in a dis-benefit

for millions of consumers in order, supposedly, to protect a limited

number of producers.

Other misconceptions prevail, in particular towards the role of

the banking system. Subsidizing credit creates several distortions; in

particular, it creates a distribution issue of credit, it artificially

reduces interest rates and instead of promoting investment — as is

generally believed — to the contrary it suppresses investment as low

interest rates don’t encourage savings, thus creating a shortage of

capital that is needed for investment. A suppressed credit market,

therefore, achieves opposite results from those that are originally

intended. Subsidized credit also distorts production and encourages

allocation of resources to uncompetitive products, and creates a

mismatch between demand and supply.

Some governments in the region have been promulgating

Islamic banking as a solution. Islamic banking is different from

conventional banking and is being guided by Islamic principles,

prohibiting interest charges that are perceived as usury. In Islamic

banking, a depositor becomes a shareholder without a predetermined

rate of return as in conventional banking.

An Islamic bank also lends money, but it is a business

agreement between the bank and the borrower. The borrower will

run the business while the profit of that business will be shared

between the bank and the borrower in a prefixed rate, documented in

the original agreement. Islamic banks also provide services and

charge money. Therefore, when agents deposit money in an Islamic

bank, they become shareholders of the bank’s overall business.

Islamic banking can coexist with traditional banking, but each plays

a different role — never mind that businesses should not be guided

by religious principles. Without having a clear distinction between

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risk and return, capital markets become less efficient and banks’

global integration becomes constricted.

Allowing competition in the banking sector is key to advancing

intermediation. This includes countries opening their doors to

foreign banking and to liberalize ownership of banks. Laws

regarding proper auditing and misuse of funds that apply to

corporations shouldn’t be different from those that apply to banks.

Banking is a service industry that matches savers with investors and

with each bearing his own risk.

Governments in the Middle East, meanwhile, have failed to

provide full protection for property rights. Security of property

rights protected by law is an unwaverable right. Enforcement of

contracts by a properly running legal system is indispensable for the

promotion of a liberal economic system.

Another cornerstone of economic freedom is the freedom to

trade internationally. Freedom of exchange across boundaries is a

key ingredient of economic freedom. High tariffs, exchange rate

distortions and capital controls inhibit trade and growth. The

reasoning supporting free trade is very simple. As domestic trade

and internal specialization promotes wealth and standards of living,

so does international trade. If each household produces all its needs

(which is impossible, given all the skills needed), the standard of

living will remain low. It’s not true that countries need to protect

their markets from those foreign markets that have cheap labor.

India has cheap labor but it is a net importer country, whereas

Germany has one of the highest average wages in the world and it’s

the largest net exporter in the world, exceeding that of China.

A common misconception is that capital controls preserve

capital from being taken abroad to benefit other countries. This is a

fallacy, as when a country institutes controls on capital outflow,

foreign capital will not flow in as well. It limits inflow of capital.

Such a policy deprives a country of much needed capital (that

normally is accompanied with advanced knowhow) otherwise not

available in the country.

Bridging the Gap 041

Most countries that have restrictive labor regulations suffer from

high unemployment. Minimum wage regulation is such an example

of regulatory restraint that limits freedom in the labor market. It

raises labor costs, renders an economy less competitive, and creates

unemployment. Many types of labor market regulations infringe

upon the economic freedom of both employers and employees.

Employers should have the freedom to employ whomever they

want, and have the freedom to agree on a wage with the employee.

Rigidity in working hours and dismissal regulations and costs has

hampered business initiatives and growth (Ben Nasser Al Ismaily et

al., 2012).

Governments should be concerned only with the production of

public goods and provide government services related to law and

order, and protecting property rights and providing security. These

services and goods, in turn, determine public expenditure levels.

Governments can have social protection programs; however, not at

the expense of the performance of the economy and by suppressing

job creation opportunities. Social programs should be targeted and

not based on broad-based subsidies.

The outcome of existing misconceptions

These prevailing impediments in the Middle East have had a

visible impact on the growth of private investment, with the region

less successful in attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) than

other regions, except in the hydrocarbon sector. This by itself signals

the lack of opportunities for foreigners to invest, the unattractiveness

of local business, ineffective bureaucracy, and the perception of

higher risk. And most FDI outside the energy sector has been

directed to non-tradables: typically tourism, telecommunications,

and real estate, with a little to export-oriented manufacturing. Even

domestic investment has flowed predominantly into non-traded

sectors (World Bank, 2009).

These trends weakened growth and employment opportunities,

especially for the educated youth. They also suggest that the

Bridging the Gap 040

region’s countries may be suffering from “Dutch” disease, with

investment flowing to non-tradables due to low and declining

competitiveness of tradable manufacturing sectors. Among all

indicators, weak exports are a strong reflection of the potential of the

Middle East countries’ private sectors to sustain economic growth.

Based on research, it is beyond doubt that diversified exports

were evidence of sustained and strong growth in fast growing

economies. Nearly every episode of long-term sustained growth has

had exports as a prime driver. Middle East countries don’t show yet

strong signs of non-oil export growth and diversification that

increases competitiveness in global markets. Even in Middle East

countries that improved their exports, the technological structure of

their exports weighed towards resource-based and low technology

products.

This unfavorable performance is a reflection of the following

key factors embedded in economic freedom indicators:

The macroeconomic environment: inflation, interest

rates, and terms of trade

The degree of market openness: trade openness, the

regulatory barriers to entry and exit of firms from the

market

The protection of property rights: the judiciary and the

enforcement of court decisions

The nature of factor markets: labor markets and skills,

capital, land, infrastructure and information

These factors affect a firm’s performance and behavior through

different channels. They affect the cost of doing business, the

uncertainty investors face, and the competition and the market

structure firms face.

Bridging the Gap 042

Guidelines for a corrective blueprint

A principal indicator of freedom is freedom from government.

A reform plan to liberalize an economy should have a clear vision of

the size of government. If the function of government is not well

defined and understood, then a liberal reform program can’t be

designed and achieved. As stated previously, government function

should be limited to the provision of the following: law and order,

property rights, and public goods, and external security.

The government should make enough room for the private

sector to use its resources effectively, both capital and labor,

dependent on freely operating markets for the distribution and

allocation of goods and services. Evidence supporting the benefits of

this approach is outline in nearly in all relevant research; numerous

studies that have proven the effectiveness of free markets. Once the

role of government is well defined, along with what public goods

should be produced, the share of government in economic activity

can be easily determined. This means that the consumption share of

government can be quantified. A country can draw on many cases in

order to be able to define the size of its activities. For instance, what

is the optimal size of the police force per, say, 1,000 residents?

Similarly, the size of the court system can be determined. Recent

economic research on the size of governments has not taken fully

into account the concept of optimality.

The concept of government size has to determine the size of

governments’ current spending/consumption of goods and services.

In most Middle Eastern countries, public consumption constitutes a

larger than optimal magnitude and its effective level is often

concealed through suppressed wages and salaries, or controlled

prices.

Another expenditure item, transfers and subsidies, is not well

managed in almost all countries in the region, both in terms of its

size and allocation. Subsidies have been used in two forms and both

are equally harmful. Price subsidies, especially in utilities (power

and water) and transportation, are widespread. Their negative

implications have been researched and compared to their relative

Bridging the Gap 043

benefits. In many countries, Lebanon for instance, subsidies to

electricity are 18 percent of the budget; yet Lebanon’s consumer

cost of power production, and capital spending, is one of the highest

in the world. The other form of subsidy consists of direct transfers

that often has not been well managed and has been applied in a

discretionary manner, in providing health services, in aiding certain

industries and farm products, etc. Substantial savings can be realized

by targeting subsidies and cutting spending in general.

Most governments don’t have a proper wage policy and public

sector wages are not linked to market indicators. Focus should be on

effectiveness and efficient return versus cost. Governments should

weigh the cost-benefit of fewer civil servants with higher wages

compared to the current situation where most governments have an

excess of employment combined with significantly lower salaries

than the private sector.

Countries should develop their social programs, such as

pensions and health insurance. These protective instruments should

be self-financed rather than being a burden on the budget.

Employees should carry most of the cost of these security schemes,

instead of employers. Wage compensation should be transparent and

fully monetized (International Labour Organisation, 2012).

Once the role and size of government is properly determined, a

government then has a guideline that allows it to determine the size

of taxes to be collected to cover spending. The tax issue will then

have two components to be determined: size and composition. The

latter implies how best to collect taxes and from what bases. Should

it be income based or consumption based? Each type of tax has its

advantages and disadvantages. Income taxes can be progressive and

aid a government in reducing inequality among its citizens, while

consumption based taxes are regressive but more effective in

collection.

The decision process and optimal taxation has been researched

extensively and governments can be aided by these principles to

determine how best to collect taxes and which tax is more efficient,

including cost of collection relative to total revenues. In principal,

Bridging the Gap 044

taxes should be balanced and few, based on broad tax bases. Today,

most governments, including many European countries, have

numerous and overlapping taxes with extensive exemptions.

Property rights and a modern efficient legal system are an

indispensable component for an economy to move forward and to

attract foreign investment. These are not difficult to design and

apply.

Free trade has proven to benefit all countries, and as we realize

that domestic trade provides efficiency in the use and allocation of

resources, so does international trade. The classical economist David

Ricardo introduced the theory of comparative advantage over two

centuries ago, concluding that a country can benefit from trade even

if it has an absolute advantage (relative to other countries) in the

production of all of its goods. He refuted Mercantilist thinking that a

country should export more and import less.

A country can easily reform its trade (and trade taxes) policies;

China, Asia, and Latin American are moving on a fast track with

open trade being the main ingredient in their modern policies.

Ricardo had another important theoretical contribution to add,

which is referred to as the “Ricardian equivalence” — which is

inter-temporal optimization by taxpayers. If deficits are financed by

borrowing, taxes are expected to rise, to pay for debt. Governments

have to have sound monetary policies, as debt can be monetized and

reduces a country’s competitiveness and hinders trade and growth.

Finally, an effective regulatory system in financial (credit)

markets, labor and capital markets, as well as an effective system of

business regulations, are highly essential to move forward.

Monopolies are created by governments and don’t evolve on their

own; the minimum needed is:

Credit should be available without discrimination

Interest rates should be market-determined only

Wages and prices have to be market-determined

Apply nondiscretionary licensing

Bridging the Gap 045

Reform is not an impossible task. Eastern Europe dismantled a

complex controlled economy and today it is moving forward in just

less than two decades. In the Middle East region, we have countries

hold to bad polices year after year (like bread subsidies in Egypt),

and still believe it’s optimal.

What is needed is full comprehension of reform, determination,

and a transition mechanism that may take many forms. Countries

should seriously consider smooth transmission processes. The

alternative, through revolution, may be very costly and will take

much longer to bear fruit.

Eliminating discretionary practices

Rules, policies and regulations and the way they are applied and

enforced by the relevant public institutions matter for investors, and

subsequently for growth. Expectations about the future and the

credibility of governments in reforming the rules and implementing

them are also taken into consideration. It is not surprising that many

growth acceleration measures followed changes in the political

regime, such as in the case of Eastern Europe.

In Middle Eastern countries, as well as in other countries, it may

not necessarily be the rules and regulations that only matter, but also

how they are applied. For many of the region’s countries (and

according to the World Bank), the diagnostic evidence points to a

gap between the rules and how they are implemented, which in turn

has made the private sector reluctant to respond positively to

reforms that were considered as promoting private sector growth.

Private investment, for instance, has been less responsive to reforms

in the Middle East than elsewhere. Symptoms show that the

business environment is not the same for all investors and firms.

Barriers to competition are advantageous to older firms and more

seasoned businesses in general. The business sector and the business

environment have not improved to a degree commensurate with the

reforms measures taken during the past two decades.

Bridging the Gap 046

In many countries, a central problem is the unpredictability of

laws and regulations affecting enterprise investment, operations and

employment. Improved policies may not overcome inept or

discretionary application of reforms. There are countless examples

in many if not all Middle Eastern countries of administrative

weaknesses, ranging from inconsistent to unpredictable

interpretation of rules and regulations. For instance, in Algeria,

Morocco and Lebanon, more than 50 percent of investors complain

that the regulations are interpreted inconsistently or unpredictably.

Unequal implementation of policies has taken place in all areas of

the business environment, including: trade, entry and exit,

regulations, product market regulations, and factor and labor

markets.

Therefore, what is needed is good policies and good

implementation. A prelude to that is full comprehension of the

relevant economic factors and how they operate, and strong

determination in order to be able to institute transition.

Bridging the Gap 047

References

- Ben Nasser Al Ismaily, Salem, Azzan Al-Busaidi, Miguel

Cervantes and Fred McMahon, Economic Freedom of the Arab

World: 2012 Annual Report (Cairo: Fraser Institute, 2012).

- The World Bank, “From Privilege to Competition: Unlocking

Private-Led Growth in the Middle East and North Africa,”

(Washington, DC: World Bank, 2009).

- International Labour Organization, “Rethinking Economic Growth:

Towards Productive and Inclusive Arab Societies,” (Beirut: ILO

Regional Office for the Arab States, 2012).

Bridging the Gap 048

Bridging the Gap 049

Giulio Ercolessi

Giulio Ercolessi is a member of the Board of Directors

of the European Liberal Forum and the author of the

book L’Europa verso il suicidio? Senza Unione federale il destino degli europei è segnato (Europe

towards Suicide? Without a Federal Union the Fate of

Europeans is Inescapable) and other published essays. As a member of the board of LibMov (a newly-born

organization aimed at reassembling Italian liberals), he

is one of the initiators of italialaica.it and represents the major umbrella organization of Italian advocates of

separation of state and religion in the board of the

European Humanist Federation.

Dr. Hala Mostafa

Hala Mostafa is a liberal political commentator with the

Al-Ahram Foundation and the former Editor-in Chief of Al-Ahram’s (Egypt’s largest newspaper) political

quarterly Democracy Review, issued from 2000 to the

present. In her professional career, Dr. Mostafa has held many positions, including director of the Political

Department at the Al-Ahram Center for Political and

Strategic Studies. She is a Member of Casa Arab (under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Madrid, Spain),

the Arab Thought Forum (Amman, Jordan), and the

Advisory Board of Al-Ahram International Political Journal Relations. She is the author of many books,

policy papers and articles and received her academic

honors including a PhD in comparative politics from Cairo University.

Prof. Dr. Aristides N. Hatzis

Aristides Hatzis is professor at the University of Athens and the National School of Judges and is a renowned

expert in the fields of law and economics. Professor

Hatzis has taught in excellent institutions, among them Chicago University, Yale and Witten/Herdecke

University in Germany. He established “The Greek

Crisis Blog” and is a member of the Scientific Advisory Board of the Hellenic Foundation for

European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP) and of the

Advisory Board of the Society of European Contract Law. He is a fellow of the European Law Institute in

Vienna and a member of the Steering Committee of the

European Network for Better Regulation. Additionally, he is a practicing attorney in Greece.

Bridging the Gap 051

Prof. Dr. Asteris Huliars

Asteris Huliaras is professor of comparative politics and international relations at the Department of

Political Science and International Relations of the

University of the Peloponnese, Greece. He specializes in North-South relations, international development

assistance, African politics and foreign policy analysis.

His research agenda is interdisciplinary, combining politics, international relations and development

economics, and focuses on Africa and Southeast

Europe. His work on these issues can be found in several peer-reviewed publications (books, articles,

research reports and conference papers). He has a

record of advising the Greek government and other major institutions (NATO, Human Security Network)

on public policy and other subjects. He is the editor of

the Hellenic Political Science Review and vice president of the Governing Board of the Hellenic

Political Science Association.

Dr. Yusuf Mansur

Yusuf Mansur is an advisory committee member at AIESEC and the CEO of EnConsult in Amman,

Jordan. He is specialized in economic consulting in the

areas of policy, trade, antitrust, competitiveness and strategy. In his career, he worked as a CEO for the

Jordan Agency for Economic Development and the

Jordan Investment Board. Within the Jordan Upgrading and Modernization Program, Dr. Mansur worked as an

international industrial upgrading adviser. He has also

engaged with the UNDP where he supervised and coordinated all UNDP activities in Kuwait, and held

the position of DR with the Jordan Telecom Regulatory

Commission. Dr. Mansur received his MBA with honors from the United States International University

and his PhD from the University of Oklahoma.

Prof. Dr. Andrzej Kondratowicz

Andrzej Kondratowicz holds a Ph.D in economics from Warsaw University and an M.A. from State University

of New York. Currently he teaches economics at the

SWPS University of Social Sciences and Humanities in Warsaw and is a member of the Forecasting Committee

of the Polish Academy of Sciences. He sits on the

boards of the Society of Polish Economists and the

Adam Smith Research Centre in Warsaw. He is a

Polish representative to the World Economic Freedom

Network. His recent research concentrates on theory and measurement of economic freedom, selected

aspects of institutional economics and the public sector,

including good governance, and the SME sector.

Bridging the Gap 050

Mohamed Tamaldou

Mohamed Tamaldou is a member of the Union Constitutionelle from Morocco and a founding member

and former president of the Arab Alliance for Freedom

and Democracy (AAFD, formerly “Network of Arab Liberals”), which comprises of Arab liberal parties and

organizations. Mr. Tamaldou currently serves as vice

president of Liberal International and treasurer of the Arab Center for Scientific Research and Human

Studies in Morocco. He is author of several studies on

the Arab world and has translated a variety of books from French to Arabic.

Sven Speer

Sven Speer is the founding chairman of the Forum Open Religious Policy, an advocacy network

campaigning for the opening of the state to all religions

and secular outlooks. He is a scientific staff member at the German Bundestag focusing on integration and

Islam. He has worked at the Institute for Migration

Research and Intercultural Studies at the University of Osnabrück and the Cluster of Excellence ‘Religion and

Politics’ at the University of Münster. He was a fellow

with the Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Liberty and with the German Marshall Fund of the United

States in Washington, D.C.

Alexandra Thein, MEP

Alexandra Thein is a German politician and member of

the European Parliament with the Free Democratic

Party of Germany, and a member of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe parliamentary

faction. She entered politics with her first run for public

office in 2009, when she was elected to the European Parliament. She sits on the European Parliament's

Committee on Legal Affairs as a member, and in the

Committee on Constitutional Affairs as a substitute member. She is a member of the Delegations for

relations with the Palestinian Legislative Council and

with Iraq, and a substitute member of the Delegation for relations with Afghanistan.

Bridging the Gap 052

Dr. Mounir Rached

Mounir Rached is the vice president and a founding member of the Lebanese Economic Association (LEA)

since 2007. Recently he was an economic advisor to

the Ministry of Finance of Lebanon and worked primarily on budgeting and tax evaluation. At LEA he

worked on several projects, including evaluation of the

Paris III reform plan, tax reform, debt management, pension reform, privatization and public sector reform,

trade agreements (WTO in particular). He is a

consultant to several financial institutions as well as regional and international organizations, primarily in

public financial management, policy evaluation, and

financial programming. Between 1983 and 2007, he served at the International Monetary Fund (IMF) where

he focused on the Middle East, Africa and the

Caribbean. He was primarily engaged in country economic analysis, policy evaluation and design of

IMF conditionality. He spent several years at the IMF

Institute for Capacity Building where he was engaged in training and designing training programs in

economic and financial analysis. He also served as IMF

resident representative for Africa and the Caribbean.