BRIEF Ramirez

8/9/2019 BRIEF Ramirez

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INTRODUCTION

This Appeal involves a foreign national with a limited understanding of the English language

who was never properly served with process but against whom a $22,000 judgment of retroactive

child support was assessed because the trial court ignored the four-year limitations period contained

in KRS 406.031.


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STATEMENT OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i

STATEMENT OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii-iii

STATEMENT OF THE CASE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-4

ARGUMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-12

I. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY IMPROPERLYAWARDING MOTHER $22,000 IN RETROACTIVE CHILD SUPPORTPURSUANT TO KRS 406.031 EVEN THOUGH APPELLANT WAS NOTSERVED UNTIL OVER TWO YEARS AFTER THE STATUTE OFLIMITATIONS HAD EXPIRED. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-10

KRS 406.031(1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5, 6, 10

KRS 406.021 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Wiggington v. Commonwealth ex rel. Caldwell,Ky.App., 760 S.W.2d 885 (1988) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5, 6, 10

Fightmaster v. Leffler, Ky.App.,556 S.W.2d 180 (1977) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Chapman v. Bradshaw, Ky., 536 S.W.2d 447 (1976) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Munday v. Mayfair Diagnostic Laboratory, Ky.,831 S.W.2d 912 (1992) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Armstrong v. Logsdon, Ky., 469 S.W.2d 342 (1971) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Saylor v. Hall, Ky., 497 S.W.2d 218 (1973) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Fannin v. Lewis, Ky., 254 S.W.2d 479 (1952) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Civil Rule 3.01 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6, 9

Gibson v. EPI Corp., Ky.App.,940 S.W.2d 912 (1997) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Rucker's Adm'r v. Roadway Express, Inc., Ky.,131 S.W.2d 707 (1939) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Allen v. O.K. Mobile Home Sales, Inc., Ky.App.,570 S.W.2d 660 (1978) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Louisville and N.R. Co. v. Little, Ky.,95 S.W.2d 253 (1936) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7, 10


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Gorin v. Gorin, Ky., 167 S.W.2d 52, 55 (1942) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7, 10

Cornett v. Smith, Ky., 446 S.W.2d 641 (1969) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Jenkins v. City of Lexington, Ky.,528 S.W.2d 729 (1975) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Rosenberg v. Bricken, Ky.,194 S.W.2d 60 (1946) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-8, 10

Nolph v. Scott, Ky., 725 S.W.2d 860 (1987) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8, 9-10

Yox v. Durgan, 298 F.Supp. 1365 (E.D.Tenn. 1969) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

KRS 454.210 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-9

II. JURISDICTION OVER A NON-RESIDENT CAN ONLY RESULT WHERETHERE HAS BEEN SPECIFIC COMPLIANCE WITH KRS 454.210(2). . . 11-12

KRS 454.210(2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 12

Texas Am. Bank v. Sayers, Ky.App.,674 S.W.2d 36 (1984) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 12

KRS 407.010 et seq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

INDEX OF APPENDIX


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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This matter began as an action seeking to establish paternity of the minor child, Christopher

Brooks, who was born out of wedlock to Michelle Brooks on September 12, 1990. TR 1. Acting

on behalf of the child's mother, the Cabinet for Human Resources instituted this action on December

12, 1990. TR 1. Through a litany of procedural errors, the Cabinet failed to properly effectuate

service. In fact, the record herein is totally devoid of any attempt to properly serve the Appellant for

over six (6) years from December 12, 1990 through May, 1997. TR 1-12.

First, the Cabinet named "Juan Ramirez Cortez" as the party-defendant in the action. TR 1.

Next, in May, 1997, the Cabinet unilaterally filed an Amended Complaint, wherein, inter alia, it

asserted that the child had been conceived in Kentucky. The Cabinet then undertook to assert

jurisdiction over the named defendant pursuant to KRS 454.210 by service through the Secretary

of State's Office. In so doing, however, Cabinet failed to follow the statutory mandate for

service through the Secretary of State's Office as set forth in KRS 454.210(3)(b). As a result, there

is no evidence that the service of the summons was sent by the clerk, nor that the clerk sent "by

certified mail two (2) true copies [of the summons] to the secretary of state and ... two (2) attested

copies of the plaintiff's complaint" as required by statute. Furthermore, the reissued Summons and

a copy of the Amended Complaint were mailed from the Kentucky Secretary of State's Office to

Appellant's home in Maryland, addressed to "Cortex, Juan" instead of to the Appellant, Juan

Ramirez. See TR 10; attached hereto as Appendix "C." Once again, however, the official record

is devoid of any return receipt to verify if, when, or how service occurred upon the named defendant,

"Juan Cortez a/k/a Juan Ramirez Cortez" by certified mail as required by statute.

Upon receipt of the summons, Mr. Ramirez, being unfamiliar with American jurisprudence,

promptly complied with the instructions contained in the letter and contacted the Fayette County

Attorney's Office to arrange a blood test. 2/11/98 Hearing Transcript, p. 6. Interestingly enough,


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in drafting the Agreed Order scheduling a blood test to ascertain paternity, Respondent changed the

style of the case to reflect that the named defendant was now "Juan Cortez a/k/a Juan Ramirez"

instead of either the "Juan Ramirez Cortez" or "Juan Cortez a/k/a Juan Ramirez Cortez" named in

the Complaint and Amended Complaint. TR 14. Significantly, the Cabinet never sought nor

obtained leave to amend its Complaint to name Mr. Ramirez as a party-defendant.

Once the results of the blood tests revealed that Mr. Ramirez was, in fact, the child's father,

he immediately agreed to the entry of a Summary Judgment of Paternity. 2/11/98 Hearing

Transcript, p. 3. He also willingly agreed to pay prospective child support in the amount required

by statute. Id. The issue of assessing him with a $22,000 penalty in retroactive child support was

never raised until just before the hearing on the Cabinet's Motion for Summary Judgment. Id.

The District Court, Judge VanMeter presiding, adopted the parties' agreement that Mr.

Ramirez would pay the sum of $58.00 per week for support of the minor child. The court also

granted the Cabinet's request that the support obligation be made retroactive to January 1, 1991, at

the current monthly rate -- without taking into consideration the parties' actual incomes during the

intervening 7-year time period. 2/11/98 Hearing Transcript, p. 33. As a result, Mr. Ramirez

suddenly owed a $22,000 arrearage without ever having received proper notice of the within action.

Mr. Ramirez's Motion to Alter, Vacate and Amend the Order of April 16, 1998, was denied

following a hearing on May 27, 1998. TR 89. At that hearing, Mr. Ramirez testified that he had

made no attempt to avoid service of process; that his Social Security Number was issued to him as

Juan Ramirez in 1987 and had never changed; that he had, in fact, been residing at one of two

addresses in Maryland under the name of Juan Ramirez for over four years, from March, 1994

through May, 1998; and that he had no notice of this pending litigation prior to May, 1997. 5/27/98

Hearing Transcript, pp. 17, 20-21. Even more importantly, however, the Cabinet failed to establish

that it had even half-heartedly attempted to follow the procedural requirements for establishing

jurisdiction over Mr. Ramirez.

The pivotal testimony, however, from both Mr. Ramirez and Ms. Brooks, revealed that the


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parties had engaged in sexual relations while both were living in Florida, and that other persons

could also have fathered this child. 5/27/98 Hearing Transcript, pp. 28, 37-38. Notwithstanding this

testimony, the District Court, Judge Thornton presiding, concluded that Mr. Ramirez had

"constructive" notice that he was indeed the child's father, based solely upon: 1) the parties having

had sexual relations; and 2) that Ms. Brooks told Mr. Ramirez that she was pregnant. Judge

Thornton then concluded that constructive notice was sufficient to allow the assessment of the

$22,000 Judgment for back child support. 5/27/98 Hearing Transcript, pp. 46-50.

An appeal to the Fayette Circuit Court followed. TR 92. Following oral argument, and by

Opinion and Order dated January 13, 1999, the Fayette Circuit Court affirmed the District Court,

holding that Mr. Ramirez had essentially waived any jurisdictional claims by appearing in Kentucky

to contest the Commonwealth's claims. TR 140. A copy of the Fayette District Court Order entered

herein is attached as Appendix "A;" a copy of the Fayette Circuit Court Opinion and Order affirming

the District Court Order is attached as Appendix "B." Appellant's Motion for Discretionary Review

was granted by Order of this Court on May 26, 1999. TR 198.


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ARGUMENT

I. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY IMPROPERLYAWARDING MOTHER $22,000 IN RETROACTIVE CHILD SUPPORTPURSUANT TO KRS 406.031 EVEN THOUGH APPELLANT WAS NOTSERVED UNTIL OVER TWO YEARS AFTER THE STATUTE OF

LIMITATIONS HAD EXPIRED.

This issue was properly preserved in Appellant's Motion to Alter, Vacate and Amend

the decision of the Fayette District Court. TR 39.

Pursuant to Kentucky Revised Statute ["KRS"] 406.031(1), an individual is responsible for

retroactive child support as a result of a paternity determination under KRS 406.021, only ifsaid

action is brought within four (4) years from the date of the infant's birth. The failure of a party to

commence such an action within four years from the date of the child's birth acts as a complete bar

to assessment of retroactive child support.

In Wiggington v. Commonwealth ex rel. Caldwell, Ky.App., 760 S.W.2d 885 (1988), the trial

court awarded to the mother arrearages in the amount of $35 per week since the child's birth, a period

of over fifteen years. In overruling the trial court's improper award as a clear abuse of discretion, this

Court held:

We believe [KRS 406.031], in effect, codifies the common law doctrine of laches,

and we hold that laches can be a valid defense in paternity actions which seek pastsupport.[]

The basis of the doctrine of laches is that neglect or omission to assert one's rightswithin a reasonable period of time where it causes prejudice, injury, disadvantageor a change of position to the other party, will bar enforcement of that claimant'srights. Fightmaster v. Leffler, Ky.App., 556 S.W.2d 180 (1977). The degree oflaches necessary to make it inequitable to enforce the plaintiff's action must bedetermined according to the facts of each particular case. Chapman v. Bradshaw,Ky., 536 S.W.2d 447 (1976).

Id. at 887. (Emphasis added; footnote omitted.)

The legislative mandate of KRS 406.031(1) clearly places an affirmative burden upon

parties seeking to collect retroactive support to assert their rights within a reasonable time or forfeit

any rights they may have to do so. The reasoning espoused in Wiggington is parallel to Munday v.


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Mayfair Diagnostic Laboratory, Ky., 831 S.W.2d 912 (1992), wherein a plaintiff attempted to bring

suit against members of a partnership in a medical malpractice action. Although the dismissal of the

plaintiff's action was overruled on other grounds, the Munday court opined:

The Kentucky General Assembly and this Court have long recognized the value ofstatutes which "bar stale claims arising out of transactions or occurrences whichtook place in the distant past." Armstrong v. Logsdon, Ky., 469 S.W.2d 342, 343(1971). We have upheld the constitutionality of statutes of limitations despite theirarguable conflict with Sections 14, 54, and 241 of the Kentucky Constitution. "TheLegislature's power to enact statutes of limitations governing the time in which acause of action must be asserted by suit is, of course, unquestioned." Saylor v. Hall,Ky., 497 S.W.2d 218, 224 (1973). And we have held that provisions of statute oflimitations should not be lightly evaded. Fannin v. Lewis, Ky., 254 S.W.2d 479,481 (1952).

Id. at 914. (Emphasis added.)

In so holding, the court in Munday clarified that statutes of limitations, like the defense of laches,

are valuable judicial tools for eliminating stagnant or neglected claims, and should not be easily

disregarded.

As stated previously, in order to meet the mandate of KRS 406.031(1), a party must initiate

an action within four (4) years to avoid being barred by the statute of limitations. The initiation of

an action is only effectuated at the time an action is filed andupon the issuance of a summons

coupled with the intent that the summons be served in due course. See, Civil Rule ["CR"] 3.01;

Gibson v. EPI Corp., Ky.App., 940 S.W.2d 912 (1997); Rucker's Adm'r v. Roadway Express, Inc.,

Ky., 131 S.W.2d 707 (1939).

The taking out of summons only establishes a rebuttable presumption that a party intended

to have it served in due course. However, this presumption can be overcome if service of the

summons is made after the right to sue expires. Allen v. O.K. Mobile Home Sales, Inc., Ky.App.,

570 S.W.2d 660 (1978). As the court in Louisville and N.R. Co. v. Little, Ky., 95 S.W.2d 253

(1936), explained:

Of course, though it has been postponed, when a summons is actually served or putin line of service, the mere intention to have it issued is translated into a good-faithintentional action. But if the suspension is not closed before the right to sue ends,it must be regarded that the plaintiff slumbered through the time prescribed. So


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it is in the instant case. The plaintiff either deliberately withheld the actual legalissuance of the summons, or through oversight postponed the starting of thelitigation until after the bell had rung out the hour barring his right of action. Thetrial court, therefore, should have sustained the defendant's plea of limitation anddismissed the petition.

Id. at 255. (Emphasis added.)

Further, a Plaintiff is under an affirmative obligation to make a good faith effort to secure

service. As Kentucky's highest court reaffirmed in Gorin v. Gorin, Ky., 167 S.W.2d 52, 55 (1942):

A litigant may not employ an attorney and then wash his hands of all responsibility.The law demands the exercise of due diligence by the client as well as by his attorneyin the prosecution or defense of litigation.

This need to diligently pursue the prosecution of litigation is so stringent that the failure to properly

and lawfully serve a defendant, or to engage in diligent and good-faith efforts to gain service, is

grounds for dismissal of an action. Cornett v. Smith, Ky., 446 S.W.2d 641 (1969); Jenkins v. City

of Lexington, Ky., 528 S.W.2d 729 (1975). Furthermore, as Kentucky's highest court opined in

Rosenberg v. Bricken, Ky., 194 S.W.2d 60, 62 (1946):

There can be no contention but that the object of purpose of a service of process isto notify of the proceeding, thereby affording an opportunity to appear before and beheard by the court. It must be admitted that mere knowledge of the pendency of anaction is not sufficient to give the court jurisdiction, and, in the absence of anappearance, there must be a service of process.

Id. at 62.

The common law doctrine of laches prevents the burdensome and undue surprise attendant

with an inordinate delay being taken before asserting one's rights. By requiring that litigation be

commenced within four years after birth, the Legislature placed a burden upon the Cabinet and upon

unwed mothers to actively pursue their rights in a timely manner or lose their right to do so. Simply

filing suit within a mandatory statute of limitation time period, however, is not sufficient under

Kentucky law to preserve one's rights.In the present case, it is undisputed that the Commonwealth initiated a paternity action

against "Juan Ramirez Cortez" within the four-year window provided under KRS 406.031, and that

the Commonwealth amended its original complaint in May, 1997, to name "Juan Cortez, a/k/a Juan


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Ramirez Cortez." However, Kentucky law has always placed severe limitations on a party's ability

to amend a Complaint to relate back to the time of the original filing because of the undue burden

that doing so can place upon a party. Under the specific provisions of CR 15.03, an amended

complaint will not be permitted to relate back to the time of the original filing unless the defendant

being named as a party had notice of the suit prior to the expiration of the limitations period. Nolph

v. Scott, Ky., 725 S.W.2d 860 (1987).

Lastly, although service can be accomplished by registered mail, it must comply with statute

in order to be effective. Yox v. Durgan, 298 F.Supp. 1365 (E.D.Tenn. 1969). As set forth in KRS

454.210(3)(b), before proper service of process can occur:

The clerkshallexecute the summons by sending by certified mail two (2) true copies

to the secretary of state and shall also mail with the summons two (2) attested copiesof the plaintiff's complaint. The secretary of stateshall, within seven (7) days ofreceipt thereof in his office, mail a copy of the summons and complaint to thedefendant at the address given in the complaint. The lettershall be posted bycertified mail, return receipt requested, and shallbear the return address of thesecretary of state. The clerkshallmake the usual return to the court, and in additionthe secretary of state shall make a return to the court showing that the actscontemplated by this statute have been performed, andshallattach to his return theregistry receipt, if any. [Emphasis added.]

The language utilized by the legislature evidences the implementation ofmandatory method

for effectuating service of process upon non-resident defendants, as defined in KRS 454.210. The

purpose of this mandatory method is to provide for sufficient and effective notice of pending

litigation to the named party. Without complying with these mandatory provisions of KRS

454.210, a non-resident defendant has absolutely no way of becoming aware of potential liability

resultant from the filing of a claim in another forum.

Appellees failed to follow the mandatory requirements of KRS 454.210(3)(b) and CR 3.01

relative to the time and manner in which service was to be effectuated upon the Appellant. The

record contains no evidence that the Commonwealth or Ms. Brooks actively pursued any attempts

to serve anyone over the first six years. There are no returns from the Sheriff indicating

unsuccessful attempts at service; there are no return receipts indicating unsuccessful attempts by the


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clerk by certified mail; there are no return receipts indicating attempts by the clerk for service

through the Secretary of State. There is absolutely no record of any effort to serve Juan Ramirez

at any time, up and through the present. The only evidence in the record reflects the

Commonwealth's attempt to serve "Juan Cortez" by delivering the notice to Movant, Juan Ramirez,

all of which occurred over six years after the original suit was filed.

In other words, until May, 1997, Mr. Ramirez had no notice of the fact that someone was

attempting to hold him liable for payments retroactive to 1990! Under the holding of Nolph v. Scott,

the Commonwealth's unilateral amendment to the original Complaint cannot relate back to the

original filing date some six years previous. The Commonwealth is simply not entitled to a

retroactive award. To do otherwise would reward the Commonwealth and Ms. Brooks for their

dilatory conduct.

In a rather cursory decision, the trial court found that its decision was conscionable because

Appellant had had "constructive notice" by virtue of having engaged in sexual relations with Ms.

Brooks. Even assuming, arguendo, that Appellant did have "constructive notice" of the Appellee's

pregnancy, such notice would not serve to mitigate Appellees' clear lack of diligence in prosecuting

this action. Gorin, supra. As such, the trial court's decision to assess an arrearage against the

Appellant should not be permitted to stand. In addition, whether the Appellant had "constructive

notice" of Appellee's pregnancy becomes irrelevant, insofar as service of process was never

properly effectuated in the case at bar. As set forth in Rosenberg v. Bricken, supra, "mere

knowledge of the pendency of an action is not sufficient...." Id. at 62.

Contrary to the trial court's conclusion, there can be little argument that Appellees failed to

timely pursue the benefit provided by KRS 406.031. Like the plaintiff in Little, Appellees herein

"slumbered through the time prescribed ... postpon[ing] the starting of the litigation until after thebell had rung out the hour barring [their] right of action." Little, 95 S.W.2d at 255. Furthermore,

this "neglect or omission to assert one's rights within a reasonable period of time" bars enforcement

of the claim, particularly because "it causes prejudice, injury, [or] disadvantage" to Mr. Ramirez.


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Wiggington, 760 S.W.2d at 887.

Since Appellees failed to pursue service with the due diligence required by Kentucky law

within the applicable four (4) year statute of limitations set forth in KRS 406.031, Appellees' claim

for retroactive child support should be dismissed as time-barred, and the decision of the trial court

should be REVERSED.

II. JURISDICTION OVER A NON-RESIDENT CAN ONLY RESULT WHERETHERE HAS BEEN SPECIFIC COMPLIANCE WITH KRS 454.210(2).

Appellant properly preserved this issue for appeal in his Motion to Alter, Vacate, and

Amend the Order of the Fayette District Court. TR 39.

Under the specific provisions of KRS 454.210(2), personal jurisdiction of Kentucky courts

over a nonresident can only occur when the claim arises from one of the eight situations explicitly

identified in the statute itself. Of those eight, only subsection 2(a)(8) can even remotely be held to

bestow personal jurisdiction in the present instance. Subsection 2(a)(8) permits Kentucky courts to

exercise personal jurisdiction only over claims arising out of a person "[c]ommitting sexual

intercourse in this state which intercourse causes the birth of a child ...." [Emphasis added.] In the

present instance, however, both Ms. Brooks and Mr. Ramirez readily acknowledge that the sexual

intercourse which caused the birth of this child occurred in the state of Florida, not Kentucky.

5/27/98 Hearing Transcript, pp. 15, 37.

The purpose of KRS 454.210 is to ensure that Kentucky courts are in compliance with the

federal constitutional boundaries of due process prior to asserting personal jurisdiction over non-

resident defendants. Texas Am. Bank v. Sayers, Ky.App., 674 S.W.2d 36 (1984), cert. denied, 469U.S. 1211 (1985). Without statutorily authorized jurisdiction, service upon Mr. Ramirez, as an out-

of-state resident, through the Secretary of State, is not possible and cannot be used to confer

jurisdiction upon a Kentucky Court.


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In 1997, the Commonwealth could only enforce a child support obligation on an out-of-state

resident who did not satisfy the criteria of KRS 454.210 through implementation of the Uniform

Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act [URESA] as set forth in KRS 407.010 et seq. If the

Circuit Court's Order is allowed to stand, the Commonwealth will have succeeded in creating a new

manner in which to obtain jurisdiction over putative fathers where the conception occurred outside

of the borders of this State. The specific limits set forth in the statute are not random; as illustrated

in Texas Am. Bank, supra, the limits serve a significant purpose in granting the State limited

personal jurisdiction over matters in which the State can claim a vested interest. Accordingly, since

the Commonwealth failed to obtain jurisdiction over the Appellant pursuant to statute, the decision

of the trial court should be REVERSED.


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CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing, the Appellant respectfully requests this Court to REVERSE the

trial court's award of arrearages in the instant case.

Respectfully submitted,

MORRIS & MORRIS, P.S.C.

By: _____________________________________Sharon K. MorrisJames M. MorrisJason V. Reed

217 North Upper StreetP. O. Box 394Lexington, Kentucky 40588-0394

Telephone: (606) 281-6981Fax: (606) 233-7876ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT

M:\Old Files\AppealsOld\RAMIREZ\BRIEF.doc


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INDEX OF APPENDIX

A. Fayette District Court Summary Judgment of Paternity and Order of Support, dated

April 16, 1998.

B. Fayette Circuit Court Opinion and Order, dated January 13, 1999.

C. Letter from Secretary of State, Commonwealth of Kentucky, dated June 9, 1997.

Documents

BRIEF Ramirez