Bringing politics back in?

Reaching beyond the assumed neutrality

of Finnish technology decision-making

Paper to be presented at the ECPR Joint Sessions, Nicosia 25 – 30 April 2006

Workshop ” Efficiency versus Democracy? Towards New Syntheses”

chaired by Uwe Jun and Ingolfur Blühdorn

Kaisa Lähteenmäki-Smith, Nordregio and VTT Technology Studies Soile Kuitunen, VTT Technology Studies1

1 Introduction2 Finnish technology decision-making is usually perceived to be a highly technocratic process dominated by experts and public authorities, assessed in terms of clear efficiency standards within a consensual framework of evidence-based decision-making. It is also perceived to be an area imbued by a particularly strong level of consensus, even within the Finnish context (which tends to be consensual in most areas of policy making in any case; e.g. Lähteenmäki-Smith and Kuitunen 2006, Lähteenmäki-Smith, Kutinlahti and Hyytinen 2005). Efficiency in policy delivery and implementation, which has resulted in Finland consistently being ranked among the top countries in most international comparisons on innovation and technology (e.g. Porter et al. 2004, WEF 2005) is thus generally taken as an indication that ’the system works’. As such, democratic concerns are rarely brought to the forefront of the debate, after all, if it ain’t broke, why fix it?” Here the tension between efficiency (in policy-delivery) and democracy (in terms of decision-making in the sense of inclusion and the creation of new arenas for citizen participation etc.,) are however clearly manifest. The questions raised in the call for papers for this workshop are particularly relevant to the topic at hand here.

- Questions relating to how the need for democratic participation will change in future are of direct relevance to the need to transform elite-driven Finnish technology policy decision-making into a more open and inclusive model.

- The level of expectation of the citizens in respect of efficiency and democracy relate to the public discourse on-going around the topic of technology and innovation policy in Finland. While our approach has traditionally centred on the elite-based democracy model, we are also interested in the external pressures and needs emerging from the broader public sphere. How can the different roles of the actors and stakeholders in technology decision-making be taken into account in ways that benefit both efficiency and democracy (e.g. citizen qua consumer qua activist qua voter etc.). This links into the question of how different political actors change their organisational structures and strategies when faced with changes in their decision-making and opportunity structures.

- The question of how governments manage the tension between pressures for efficiency and demands for new forms of direct democracy is of relevance for the administrative and political culture in place. The fact that Finland has relied on a elite-based model of democracy in technology-related issues, while at the same time seeking to develop, and ultimately put in place, new policy instruments and governance methods (e.g. evidence-based policy-making across the board, management by results and the evaluative practice that goes with it, programme-based policy methods on both sides of the question – i.e. in terms of citizen participation and improving policy efficiency).

- What kind of new syntheses between democracy and efficiency are emerging within the context of technology decision-making is a question that we will seek to answer, as seen through the lense of our data on elite-based consensus as a Finnish democracy model.

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In this paper, the motivation for, and the potential implications of, these calls for a broader understanding of ‘technology policy’ and ‘innovation’, in the context of asking what this type of ‘horizontalisation’ process may imply for democracy and inclusion in relation to technology policy will be investigated. It is worth emphasising here that raising new issues and simply having a multitude of voices in the public sphere does not imply a change in power relations within technology decision-making: as such, it may be that the voices are uncoordinated, that they are conflicting, or simply that they do not have any significant impact on decision-making as such. In our view, the fact that Finnish political culture remains under-developed in terms of wider ‘communitarian’ elements (addressing issues such as the mobilisation and emancipation of civil society beyond the narrow confines of the existing power structures of government institutions or the private sphere through the business community) is of relevance to the nature of the democratic system. Moreover, this subject provides an interesting case study in relation to investigating the tensions between efficiency and democracy.

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2 Methodology, research questions and research hypothesis In the research project upon which this paper is based, the aim was to examine decision-making processes concerning technology issues from the democracy viewpoint by paying attention to such factors as the mechanisms used in the delegation of power and the division of responsibilities between the various actors. The theoretical model employed in the study consists of the elaboration of three separate models of democracy, the elite-democratic model, the parliamentary model and the pluralistic model. The study upon which this paper is based addressed the following questions:

1) Who are the main actors in decision-making concerning technology issues, and why? 2) What are the consequences of the different decision-making models for democracy, particularly as regards the responsiveness and legitimacy of decision-making and governance? 3) What are the implications of the norms and characteristics of the

decision-making process used to promote system-openness and inclusiveness?

The debate on the degree (and nature) of democracy within science and technology has been ongoing for quite some time. Researchers have for some time been interested in the factors that potentially contribute to or hamper public participation in technology decision-making, as well as in R&D. Empirical studies have moreover shed light on the participatory mechanisms and ongoing public dialogue within specific politically interesting decision-making processes or potentially ‘sensitive’ sectors (e.g. biotechnology, nuclear power, energy in general). Other studies have concentrated on the methods of participation, such as methods and models for deliberative democracy, though elaborations on the implications of elite-based decision-making are rarely to be seen. What has been the object of less attention thus far however is the rationale and logic(s) upon which methods of participation within technology policy are based. What are the fora involved, what are the roles of actors and organisations, and what are the interests and conflicts that emerge? Are there patterns that relate to these issues that go beyond sector-specific, potentially ‘sensitive’ issues? The question of power and its distribution has not been particularly central to this debate or in the mainstream technology policy debate. This is the reason why, in our study, we have sought to shed light on the nature of decision-making and on the democratic aspects of technology policy in the Finnish case. Our hypothesis is based on the assumption that technology decision-making in the Finnish case has been consensual and expert-based, which has been further reflected in the nature of policy content, as well as in the democratic aspects of decision-making and agenda setting (see for instance Lemola and Honkanen 2004; and, Peterson and Sharp 1998, 55, 60, 63, 219). The nature of policy content may or may not have been affected by this exclusion, or by the reliance on a traditional consensus-based approach. Notwithstanding this however, even within the technology elite itself, as well as beyond its charmed circle, the view is now emerging that Finnish model in this area needs to be more adaptive to, and better prepared for, the likely future changes, both structural and otherwise, connected to the requirements of intensified international competition. As such, the nature of the

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policy requires a change in the model, as well as having implications for democratic governance, if indeed these two issues can be treated discretely. 2.1 “Technology decision-making”: the key concepts The key concepts of our study relate to technology policy and innovation policy in the Finnish context. There are a number of issues that require conceptual delimitation and definition, as technology policy has been interpreted in various ways, both in the Finnish and in the international literatures. Finnish economist and policy researcher Tarmo Lemola has defined technology policy as those public policy interventions that are undertaken in order to influence the direction, speed and impact of technological change. The interventions may have either accelerating or inhibiting effects on technological change, while also potentially benefiting or disadvantaging certain areas of technology. It can also combine policy interventions and activities in ways that influence resource levels in the longer or shorter terms (as in most cases, public interventions are used as an instrument to counter market failure, they tend to have compensatory effects, though they can also be used to influence the direction and form of private investment patterns) (Lemola 1990, 91). It can therefore be argued that the whole range of public interventions from the setting of strategic goals and targets to deciding on individual development projects is part of ‘technology policy’. Policy is not only undertaken on the governmental level, our interest is thus also targeted at those processes, whereby parliamentary and governmental power is steered and impacted by processes and decisions undertaken in the private sphere, i.e. by actors within the business community. A further popular interpretation of technology policy emphasises the role of educational and science policies within technology policy. Indeed, the success rate of the Finnish education system, which is also seen as open and accessible, is viewed as being dependent in part on the broad-based and regionally extensive higher education system. Strategically placed institutional structures have also been developed, with the national science and technology council and the main national technology-funding organisation, TEKES, being cited as examples of a long-term commitment in this area. In the 1970s, the national science council defined national science policy as, those activities which are undertaken in order to (a) define the objectives and targets of R&D; (b) define the means by which these objectives are to be achieved; (c) allocate resources to different disciplines and areas according to the needs emerging from the society; and (d) to promote the utilisation of scientific findings in order to achieve these objectives and meet these needs. Technology policy then is that part of public policy which aims at maintaining the level of technological advancement and capacity by promoting, steering and co-ordinating potentially commercialised and technological R&D. (Ministry of Trade and Industry 1974, 10–11). These definitions reflect our understanding of technology decision-making as an area with an important role for public policy more generally in terms of determining the future direction and investment of technology and innovation. Moreover, we want to emphasise that we are critical of the deterministic tendencies involved in technology policy. Our view is much more constructivist in nature, both in terms of the policy area involved and the impact different actors and their oft-conflicting understandings and interpretations of the issues involved can have. This implies that methodologically we keep the area of study open: part of the object of our study has to do with the different understandings the elites located at the forefront of technology decision-making give to technology decision-making: how do they themselves interpret the decision-making and policy area involved, and what kind of

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contradictions, conflicts and tensions are found here? Technology policy and technology decision-making are thus not taken as a given, and thus part of our study aims at analysing the tensions and contradictions that emerge within the elite groups themselves: is technology decision-making in a state of flux as we have assumed or are the actors located at the core of this policy area seeking to maintain it as a stable and pre-determined sphere of policy? Whose interests are in fact served by the re-definitions taking place within technology decision-making? In addition the question arises, are these academic issues identified above of any political substance, or are there power struggles, conflicts and contradictions within the context of the elite model that should be addressed first in order to develop a more accurate picture of the limitations of the current system before more inclusive models can hope to emerge. 2.2 “Democracy models”: the theoretical starting points of our study Our study is based on the study of three basic democracy models: elite democracy, the pluralistic model of democracy, and the parliamentary model. Needless to say, they are not mutually exclusive, though their relative weight within different policy areas varies. As such, the Finnish political system invariably reflects elements of all three, but for the theme at hand, i.e. for technology decision-making and technology and innovation policy, the elite model seems most relevant. The issue of democracy is most pertinently addressed as the consideration of the degree and nature of public deliberation and support within policy-making and decision-making, i.e. the process by which public policy becomes the object of support, control, and accountability. The main aim of delivering public goods is to deal with market failure and the main aim of public deliberation processes is to ensure that policies reflect the will of the people. Only through the identification and articulation of alternatives in so doing does ‘the political’ emerge: traditionally parties identify and articulate these alternative visions and paths and the electorate chooses between the choices given, with decision-makers thus appointed reflecting the will of the people in the sense of ‘popular sovereignty” (Katz 1997). Popular sovereignty can be based on electoral support and success or on more direct ways of identifying the ‘will of the people’, i.e. referenda or similar. In some policy areas, such as technology policy within the Finnish context, the alternatives are never articulated as clear choices, as the internal sectoral consensus is strong enough to render then either irrelevant or politically infeasible. Accountability is not only ensured through the party apparatus and the system that we associate with electoral democracy. Also the practices of governance are of relevance here, as are the methods for ensuring the efficiency and effectiveness of public policy delivery and utilisation of common resources. Moreover, it is often perceived that the complexity of the issues involved is one of the key issues explaining the norm conflicts in today’s societies (e.g. Olsson 2003, 286-287; Held 1996). Different systems of democratic accountability and governance tend to value and promote different mechanisms and practices for ensuring accountability and this is naturally one of the key issues relating to models of democracy. The key dimensions within which democracy models vary relate to the nature of predominant norms, core actors and the nature of the process. We will address each of these in turn in relation to the model of elite democracy below. The norms that are most often associated with the elite democracy model are those most centrally related to the ideals of scientific enquiry. Thus, issues such as (independent) expertise, (academic) knowledge, and evidence-based decision-

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making are at the core of the normative stance associated with this model. The core actors involved are experts (from the main arenas of science and academia, civil service or the business community). All of the steps in the policy cycle are controlled and influenced by such experts: they are active participants in committees, deliberative organisations and public bodies, while they often also have an active individual role in public debate throughout the media. Within the elite democratic model, ‘independent experts’ retain a role across all of the steps in the decision-making cycle, from agenda setting to policy-delivery and implementation (including decision-making on investments from project to programme-level), as well as the follow-up, evaluation and further policy-assessment. In some systems, their role may be that of official ‘expert’, while in others their roles are less official and in some cases more informally based (e.g. through the role of the actor in question within informal networks and associations). The nature of networks is in fact somewhat paradoxical. In the Finnish cases, the central role of networks within technology decision-making is evident, while the small size of the system and the limited number of actors involved accentuates the complexity and inclusiveness (in terms of how many different organisations and sectors are included). At the same time however, the relative closure and exclusiveness of the networks is emphasised. The programme-based policy and governance style has accentuated this networked nature of governance, as many experts and policy-makers regularly meet in steering and decision-making bodies from project or programme steering groups to thematic working groups etc. The network-based governance model has thus fed the elite-based nature of the model, ensuring that the substantive understandings, interests, discourse, language etc., are not only shared by the members of the networks, but also reproduced and maintained within the networks. (Here also the notion of ‘epistemic communities’ as introduced by Peter Haas et al could be of relevance; Haas 1992.) The shared understandings gradually lead to consensual views on the desired future and the activities required in order to achieve it (e.g. Olsson 2003, 287). In the Finnish case, examples of the programme-based model abound, ranging from the TEKES-led technology programmes to regionally implemented Centre of Expertise programmes or the policy programmes drafted on the governmental level with the specific aim of achieving cross-sector co-ordination (e.g. programmes for Employment, Entrepreneurship Policy Programme, Information Society and Civil Participation; see also http://www.valtioneuvosto.fi/vn/liston/base.lsp?r=40232&k=en). There are however a number of problematic aspects of the elite-based democracy model that have to be addressed. To begin with, it should be asked whether the basic formal criteria for democratic governance are indeed met. The inherent assumption of public support and democratic accountability, to say nothing of the potential for transparent and effective control by the electorate is highly problematic. Technocratic models such as the one described here may be problematic from the point of view of democratic governance, because non-elected officials and actors can influence policy in significant ways and in ways that do not always reflect the preferences of the citizens and the electorate (e.g. Dunn 1999, 297). The traditional control function of the citizens, i.e. through electoral scrutiny is not available, thus rendering extinct the most basic form of democratic control (e.g. Schumpeter 1987). In our study we also tentatively raised the question of whether this is simply a problem for the procedure and process of democratic accountability and legitimacy, or whether it actually also has an impact on the efficiency side, i.e. on the quality and content of policy.

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This is of course not the only interpretation of elite democracy available. There are also those who argue that elite democracy tends to be more flexible and/or less rigid, and that there are a number of criteria in respect of a functioning elite-based democracy that can contribute to the nature and quality of governance. Such criteria include for instance cohesiveness and the degree of consensus, as well as autonomy, and the ability to act independently and effectively. Eisenstadt (1996) amongst others has argued that elite conflict can be compensated for if there is sufficient solidarity and consensus among the elite groups in relation to some basic values, norms and rules. Thus a system can function well as a democracy, if the norms and rules are so deeply engraved in the collective consciousness that the elites necessarily act by them. If this is the case, there may however be cause for concern as the system may suffer from serious lock-in and the inclusion of new alternatives in the public debate may be stifled. If there is such a lack of debate on alternatives and a lack of multi-‘vocality’, this may in turn distance policy-making from the every-day realities of the citizens themselves, thus adding to the potential for confrontation, while potentially also being reflected back into a lack of interest in politics and policy-making, precipitating further questions over the lack of legitimacy, at least in the long term (e.g. Mouffe 2002, cf. Rayner 2003, 163-170). This last point is also relevant for the distinction between politics and policies, which may at times become blurred in the elite-based model. Mouffe for instance (2002) has argued that a well-functioning democracy required the confrontative elements that political disagreement and competition entail. This however brings to the fore broader, more fundamental questions and issues for debate, such as those connected with the question of collective identity. Without (apparent) conflict and confrontation, there is a risk that negotiable conflict will be replaced by non-negotiable moral norms or forms of identification. Too much emphasis on consensus with little or no confrontation can however lead to apathy and to a lack of interest in political issues and in politics more generally (see also Rayner 2003, 163-170). A well-functioning and live democracy needs a constant debate on choices and on the alternative paths open to it. In the Finnish type of elite-based model, with a high degree of inherent consensus this is the major weakness, namely, the lack of debate on alternatives stifles the long-term ability of democratic governance to renew itself, while n the long run also being detrimental to policy efficiency. Notions of collective identity and a sense of belonging are interesting aspects of Mouffe’s work, and are of direct relevance to our interests here. Politics for Mouffe is about finding communality in a context of difference: democratic politics should not try to shy away from debate on “us” vs. “them” – rather it is part and parcel of the debate on identity and democratic community, that should benefit from open deliberation and discussion, in line with the pluralistic model of democracy. The pluralistic model has at its core the centrality and multiplicity of actors, identities, voices, and views. When compared to the elite-democratic model the group of actors is clearly more extensive and varied, with no one actor (or type of actor) being able to control or create a consensus. The issues debated are not necessarily strongly politicised, but the lack of politics can be compensated by the multiplicity of interests and actors. (E.g. Olsson 2003, 287-288; Schumpeter 1987, Held 1997) The implications of this model for democracy are important: as given that some of the actors present in the debate are politically elected, the formal accountability criterion is met. This allows for a higher degree of legitimacy, even if the most powerful actors may often be those that are not formally accountable.

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The third model that we have considered in our study is that of traditional parliamentary democracy, most directly associated with the traditional political science ideal of representative democracy. From the point of view of technology decision-making, the elected representatives and their parties are at the core of the decision-making process on the level of deciding the main investment decisions and broad directions for national policy. National parliaments, as well as regional and local decision-making apparatuses are at the forefront when putting forward initiatives, setting the agenda and influencing interests. Citizens can thus control the ability of actors to continue in their roles in the context of the traditional system of parliamentary accountability. The parliamentary model has of course changed a great deal since its inception, and the connections between elected representatives, their electorates and wider public and private interests and preferences are by no means simple or straightforward. This section provides us with only a very brief introduction to the main models of democracy that we have taken as our starting point in this project. We have also acknowledged that each of the models is necessarily an ideal type: a simplification of a complex form of democratic governance, none of which is able to reflect the ‘whole reality’ of how the democratic system works, and which processes are most central to its success. By accentuating some of the key aspects however we have sought to contribute to the debate on technology decision-making and the renewal of the Finnish model of governance. Below we will discuss some of the findings of our study in more detail. 2.3 Hypothesis on democratisation and politicisation Our study begins from the assumption that decision-making on technology issues has important implications for the nature of democracy and for the quality of democratic accountability and governance, as well as for the efficiency of policy delivery within this increasingly complex and cross-sector issue area. Our hypothesis was that the consensual decision-making model is reflective of the elite-based democracy model, which in turn has both advantages and disadvantages, both from the point of view of policy delivery and efficiency and from that of democratic accountability and renewal. Politicisation and democratisation are multi-faceted issues, where both pros and cons can be identified. These issues were addressed both in the elite survey undertaken in our project and in the in-depth interviews undertaken in order to test the hypothesis and complement the survey materials. The implications of the elite-based model can be identified in a number of dimensions, such as:

- Degree and quality of democratic debate and participation - Degree of inclusion/exclusion in relation to democratic governance - The ability of the system to renew itself, to set long-term goals and to

engage in the long-term strategic goal-setting From the point of view of the structural issues related to the innovation system and its governance, the third points refereed to above is of particular relevance, as it has implications that are not only related to the procedural aspects of governance, but also to the more substantive issues influencing policy content. These implications can be analysed in terms of potential advantages and disadvantages, naturally bearing in mind that these are also dependent on the perspective applied: advantages for someone may entail disadvantage for someone else etc. This may seem like a banal point, but needs to be emphasised taking into consideration the strong consensus underlying the Finnish governance.

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Among the advantages of (assumed) politicisation and democratisation are:

- Debate on policy alternatives and long-term implication of current policies and its options is encouraged

- The number of actors who get their voices heard increases - Due to the new actors and organisations becoming involved in the public

debate, cross-sectoral issues are brought to the fore, thereby diversifying the debate across sector borders

- New relevant issues are brought onto the agenda, thereby also improving the policy options and even, in some cases, the efficiency of policy

- Decision-making across the different stages of the policy cycle becomes more transparent

- The responsiveness of decision-making improves - The legitimacy of the system improves

There are however a number of disadvantages with the process of politicisation and democratisation, such as:

- The group of actors involved is expanded at the expense of the expertise of the participating actors. Debate is promoted, but the quality of debate is not necessarily improved.

- The quality of policy and its efficiency is compromised due to the lack of expertise required.

- Decisions are based on a ‘smallest common denominator’ principle and short-terms gains override long-term ones

- Short-termism dominates at the expense of long-termism, questioning the coherence of policies

- Opportunistic behaviour is not punished - Due to the low rate of success and to the incoherence in the system,

both decision-making initiative and power seep beyond the confines of the formal decision-making arenas, which are seen as inefficient.

Some of the most dramatic changes and pressures for structural and policy reform are emerging because of the increasingly strongly perceived need to promote the ‘horizontalisation’ of technology policy within the innovation policy field. Innovation is increasingly seen as a cross-sectoral, horizontal policy area that is determined by the content of innovation within a range of public policies rather than one predominately technology-based process of innovation. This change is part of the broader shift from ‘government’ to ‘governance’, whereby the process of decision-making, actors’ and organisations’ roles and their interactions become less hierarchical, more complex and interactive. In contrast to government, governance is seen as implying a more inclusive and flexible decision-making system with more open access to various societal actors coming not only from public but also private sectors and civic society. The reasoning for evolution from government towards governance is based mostly on the fact that Western societies are becoming increasingly differentiated, complicating public decision-making and preparation for decision-making (e.g. Stoker 1998; Tiihonen 2004). Governing in such an environment calls for horizontal networks in which the competencies and information sources of multiple actors can be merged and solutions for highly multi-dimensional societal problems sought through open dialogue and collaboration. There are a number of reform processes and pressures within technology decision-making, as well as within innovation policy. The reliance on networks and the degree

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of internationalisation (e.g. through the emergence of ERA), are clearly among the most important issues here. According to Callon (2003, 31-32) for instance, networking and the reliance on network capacity has been particularly important as an element of change within technology decision-making in general and within the re-drawing of boundaries between the role of expertise and that of politics. The whole understanding of the nature of the innovation process is equally under-going major revision and the rationality, objectives, and means of policy are under constant review. At the same time, major changes have been taking place within the sphere of politics, ranging from the decline in political participation (in particular in the form of traditional party-political participation), to the re-articulation of ‘politics’ and ‘participation’, and the understanding of the relevance and impact of technology policy in general and innovation policy in particular on societal development etc. Some of these reform pressures can be identified as international mega trends, while others are more nationally, regionally or locally experienced processes.

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3 Finnish technology decision-making as a consensual elite-driven process We argue that, in Finland, the elite-democratic model prevails, reflecting normative and political choices in relation to the difficult balance between efficiency and democracy. Has the perceived success of this policy model however blinded us to other alternatives, and if so, what are the possible implications for both technology policy and the politics of technology? Citizens may thus be unable to exert their power to hold decision-makers to account by rejecting incumbents who perform poorly, or re-electing those who have performed well. Yet, here also the multi-faceted nature of citizens in their different roles needs to be addressed. Often their role seems to be limited to that of a consumer, while the role of voter, candidate, activist, parent, expert, and entrepreneur etc., may be equally relevant. In this respect our survey data provides interesting material in calling for a more multi-vocal, multi-faceted forum and arena for deliberation on technology policy, while at the same time indicating that there are very few actual concrete proposals as to who should be responsible for providing these new arenas, how the different actors and organisations would be involved, how their views would be expressed or how the ‘multitude of voices’ would find concrete expression. 3.1 Technology decision-making: some universal characteristics Some of the seemingly ‘intrinsic’ characteristics of the Finnish system could however be viewed as simply being reflective of those common to technology decision-making per se. Technology policy is in many cases defined as a policy field that is characterised by the strict distinction between the areas of influence connected to policy vs. politics, as well as to science vs. politics (e.g. Callon 2003, 31-32). The core of technology policy has thus been seen as located in the scientific sphere, therefore in important respects requiring expertise and independence, being more a matter of ‘management’ (guided by the scientific ideal) rather than politics (guided by the notion that science does not provide us with objective, conclusive guidelines, but rather sheds light on a number of alternative, mutually exclusive but not necessarily easily assessed choices, which having been pre-determined, only then become the object of politics). As expertise and the scientific ideal are situated at the core of technology decision-making, the nature of decision-making (within technology policy) has become highly expertise-based, technocratic, and expert-driven (e.g. Peterson and Sharp 1998, 55, 60, 63, 219). The nature of technology decision-making thus has important implications for democracy and for democratic decision-making, particularly in terms of the degree and nature of the public support, acceptance, control, and accountability in this area. In many cases, non-elected experts and public authorities can have an important influence on decision-making in ways that do not always best take into account the interests of the citizens and their preferences (Dunn 1999, 297). Citizens do not always have the chance to influence technology decision-making, as the spheres, arenas and actors, as well as the decision-making processes involved are not necessarily within the publicly accountable and transparent sphere of decision-making. This implies that the control function that we are familiar with from the public policy realm, and from politics more generally, is not available as a viable option: decisions are only partly made within the public sphere and even so the processes are not completely transparent and open to public scrutiny. This is not only a characteristic of the Finnish system, but also simply, a characteristic of technology decision-making internationally.

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The notion of consensus is also a typical characteristic of this area of decision-making. This is partly related to the technocratic nature of the policy area, as well as being an aspect of bargaining that goes with the cross-sectoral nature of technology decision-making. Edler (2003, 99) explains this by highlighting two main factors: firstly, by the heterogeneity of the actors involved in the decision-making processes (i.e. the nature of elites involved, which tend to represent various interests, organisations and policy sectors); and secondly, by the nature of the object of decision-making, which is characterised by uncertainty and complexity. Knowledge and technology are in their nature semi-public goods, which have many externalities that cannot always be planned or accounted for. For Edler, as for many others within technology studies then successful policy requires a high degree of consensus. Consensus is specifically required along two key dimensions: firstly, over what is the desired state of affairs or direction of technology development for society (societal impacts and their future form and content). Secondly, consensus is required in order to determine the required changes in action that the previous point entails. These are highly important issues to bear in mind as in the Finnish case we will argue that consensus is often interpreted more as an argument for non-intervention than as actively working towards a shared strategic and policy agreement on the future direction of, and the required activities, measures and changes needed in respect of a particular project. Consensual decision-making does not entail non-intervention or a hands-off attitude: rather it empowers actors to become involved in policy development in a more active and goal-oriented fashion. 3.2 Some specificities of the Finnish model The explanation for the elite-based nature of the Finnish system may be linked to the broadly perceived success of Finnish technology policy in recent decades. International competitiveness has been taken seriously and the fact that the Nordic countries have made it to the top in international comparative studies on both investing in the R&D sector and in competitiveness more generally has been an issue for debate, if not for self-congratulatory attitudes. (E.g. World Economic Forum 2005 and Porter et al. 2004, Nordic Council of Ministers 2005.) The institutionalisation of this Nordic success discourse has however also be seen by the more perceptive commentators as a (potential) hindrance, and thus as a factor contributing to institutional lock-on, as institutional rigidity is at times referred to as one of the main limitations of the Finnish system. It has thus been argued that the ‘good performance’ indicators have simply further compounded the already complex problem of reaching ”difficult decisions” in a consensus-oriented culture. Is the reason there is such a concern in fact that the results look ”too good”? This is a debate that has been ongoing in relation to the Finish innovation system in recent times, emphasising the need for structural change and new openings when it comes to promoting innovation (e.g. Brunila 2004). Strategic choices made, based on effectiveness and management by results, are emphasized as one of the key elements of this process of strategic steering, as the system of management by results’ is an important part of the knowledge-base upon which choices are made in resource-allocation. Ex post investigations into effects and impacts are one of the main tools available here. The WEF survey on innovation, technology, and creativity is one of the most typical examples cited in relation to the threat of self-congratulatory complacency here. Nordic countries invest more than the European or international average on R&D expenditure, with Sweden usually ‘on top’ with a score of over 4% (2003), though all

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Nordic countries consistently place above the 2 % EU average (Nordic Council of Ministers 2005, 57). The distribution of R&D expenditure between the private and the public sectors is largely in line with the international average, while the steering role of the private sector and the global business players in this sense is also clear. There are however other weaknesses in addition to that of the threat of complacency referred to above. Creativity, support for a dynamic innovation culture and environment and the availability of competent personnel may all be threatened by the homogeneity, low mobility and closed nature of the Nordic systems, and particularly of the Finnish system (Ibid.). The broader societal trends also require external input and dynamism, particularly as ongoing changes in population and employment structures, combined with the extensive public service requirements (and responsibilities), are difficult to solve with the dispersed spatial structure further exacerbating these challenges. Innovation is thus also required in the public sector, specifically in relation to service provision. The ability to attract international experts is increasingly seen as a decisive factor for the future (e.g. Helsinki and Stockholm have in recent years identified this as an important element of future competitiveness). On the other hand, the prevailing management and leadership styles are seen as a strength, with openness, ‘short mental distances’ and trust seen as potential “brand assets” to be taken advantage of (Ibid, 57). Moreover, the fact that rather than attempting to “pick-the–winner” the development of R&D has been based on investing in a broad variety of areas (ibid, 58) is seen as a way of spreading the risks and developing the knowledge society on a broader basis. These institutional aspects would seem to require the generation of particular capabilities from across the whole system to adjust, adapt and to learn. There are however actors and organisational types that seem to have even more relevance when it comes to developing a pro-active ability to adjust to change. One of the types of actors we were particularly interested in during the course of this study were the political decision-makers. This is however somewhat problematic as we shall see below. According to our data (both the survey material and the interviews), political decision-makers tend to shy away from technology-related issues, which are seen as requiring both a high level of technical and professional expertise and a high degree of risk (i.e. not actual vote-winners, rather potentially divisive and ethically sensitive, e.g. the nuclear power debate, biotechnology etc.,). The complexity of the issues involved seems to have delimited the space for political debate further and even the oft-required horizontal or cross-sectoral approach to these issues is difficult to pursue in practice. If there was ever a time when technology decision-making required deep analytical and professional knowledge on one policy sector or area of expertise, this era seems to have passed, with the cross-sectoral nature of such questions and the impregnation of a whole range of issue areas with technology-relevant aspects being part and parcel of what has become known as the “horizontalisation of technology and innovation policy”. Today a lot of lip service is paid to this notion of the ‘horizontalisation’ of innovation and technology policy, but as we shall see, in many cases the reality remains rather different from the discursive practice. This has significant consequences for democracy, in particular in relation to popular support for, and control and accountability of the process and governance. Here also the established understandings and definitions of these key terms and the discursive practices connected to them are of relevance. It is therefore also argued on the basis of our findings that the way in which the key concepts, in particular innovation and innovation capacity and politics and politisation are understood and defined limits the

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potential for new, more inclusive and transparent ways of understanding and utilising the potential for democratisation. As argued above, the perceived and in fact internationally renowned efficiency of Finnish technology and innovation policy may make it difficult to renew the policy from the point of view of political decision-making. As long as the policy is perceived as being both efficient and successful (as indicated by a number of international studies and bench-marking exercises from the OECD and EU to WEF; see also Schienstock et al. 2004), few dare question the need to democratise the policy, or of ‘bringing politics back in’. Yet increasing calls for a more multi-faceted and multi-vocal technology and innovation policy can be heard. What does this imply for the contents of policy and for the potential politicisation of this field? Here the debate on the horizontalisation of innovation policy and the changing nature of technology policy are introduced within the Finnish context of the need for a broader understanding of innovation policy (e.g. Loikkanen and Kutinlahti 2005; Kuitunen & Lähteenmäki-Smith 2006). Theoretically we have mainly relied on two models of democracy: elite democracy and pluralistic democracy. While the Finnish system could of course also be investigated through other theoretical perspectives (e.g. ”consociationalism” à la Lijphart or Urwin, or through the ”communitarism” of Sandel or Macintyre), for the purposes of our study the elite model has been seen as particularly pertinent. Empirical data, as well as previous studies have indicated that the planning, decision-making and implementation of Finnish technology policy in general, and the strategic decisions and major policy choices relating to technology in particular are largely undertaken by a small, cohesive and consensus-oriented group of actors. The system, though coherent, is not particularly inclusive or open. Rather, the actors involved are expected to represent a high degree of expertise in respect of technology issues. This approach to decision-making has effectively kept the politicians at arms length, and thus largely outside the decision-making elite: most politicians do not have expertise in technology, as the Finnish parliament typically recruits a higher than average share of its members from the public sector, while the business and technology sectors continue to be under-represented in both national and local political arenas. While the absence of politicians from technology decision-making, in its current from, is understandable in terms of the professionalism and expertise required this might however have significant consequences for democracy, in particular in relation to popular support for, and the control and accountability of the process and governance.

One of the key questions in relation to technology policy is the delimitation of the research topic itself, as the field of technology policy is not uncontested, nor easy to delineate. In our study we have allowed for an open and explorative interpretation and operationalisation of the concept. Thus the sphere of technology policy is not defined as a closed field; rather it is, in part, the object of the study to delineate the understandings and interpretations that different actors give to it. Here the thematic interviews with political decision-makers and representatives of the ‘technology elite’ are an important source of information, as are the questionnaires sent to a wide sample of decision-makers and key stakeholders across the technology policy field.

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4 The tension between efficiency and democracy: some key findings It is clear form our study that there is indeed an underlying tension between efficiency and democracy in Finnish technology decision-making, though this tension is often hidden from view as efficiency concerns are seen as paramount. There are three key aspects to the Finnish ‘model’ of decision-making: (1) the predominance of a limited group of actors (experts) in the decision-making process; (2) the norms (of consensus and expertise-driven decision-making) and the characteristics of the process (a low degree of politicisation, a high degree of bureaucratisation and professionalisation, a lack of inclusiveness, while power is associated with financial muscle). The respondents support the hypothesis on consensual elite-driven decision-making in technology-related issues. The consensual nature of this issue area is seen as an asset and as an advantage for policy efficiency, though at the same time it is accepted that the implications for democracy may not be so positive. Democratisation is called for, but not in the sense of politicisation. There is a perceived need for the opening up of this policy area to new influences and new actors and for the pursuit of a more ‘multi-vocal’ policy. What explains the consensual nature of Finnish technology decision-making? The respondents see this as being most clearly influenced by two factors: by the dominant role given to expertise and to the high degree of internationalisation. Internationalisation is here perceived in particular as the internationalisation of business life, though it is also influenced by the Europeanisation of policy-making through the impact of EU membership. There was however less support for the argument that power had drifted from the political sphere to the business community. The respondents age was of some relevance also: those respondents that were under 50 years of age tended to be less likely than their older colleagues to think that consensus is determined by the dominance of expertise. They were however somewhat more likely to argue that consensual decision-making was the consequence of diminished parliamentary control. The explanatory factors for the consensus on Finnish technology decision-making (N=118-122). Explanatory factor Those agreeing

with the factor (%) Dominance of expertise 70 Internationalisation of technology policy as a consequence of the internationalisation of companies and their increasing influence

70

Characteristics of Finnish policy-making more generally 61 Internationalisation of technology policy as a consequence of the Europeanisation of science and technology policy

59

The decline of parliamentary control within technology decision-making has been brought about through the shift of decision-making power from the political to the economic realm and is thus beyond the reach of parliamentary control

42

The normative aspects of decision-making were also gauged in the survey. The main principles here are seen to emanate more form the legal than the political realm. This is in line with some of the other studies conducted on the predominance of legality principles in Finnish decision-making when it comes to the central issues of relevance to technology (e.g. energy) (Säynässalo 2005).

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Decision-making principle Very or quite

important principle (share of respondents, %)

Decisions are based on the broadest expertise available 94 Decisions are communicated as openly as possible 90 Experts are in charge of preparing policy 85 Decisions include the consideration of their societal impacts to the greatest extent possible

84

Decisions include the consideration of their environmental impacts to the greatest extent possible

82

Decisions are based on law and regulations 79 Business representatives are involved in the decision-making 78 Those with the best expertise available are in charge of the decisions 76 Decisions are prepared in the public sphere 74 Decisions are not predominately political 57 Decisions take into account the different interest groups 51 Those accountable to the electorate are responsible for decisions 49 Representatives of organised business interests have a strong position in decision-making

48

Decisions are politically justified 40 Decisions emerge as unanimous agreements from negotiations 15 Legality and expertise are the two key ‘ideals’ within technology policy decision-making. 94% of the respondents felt that decisions should be based, primarily, on the highest expertise possible, while 85 % were of the view that the preparation of policy should be in the hands of experts. The principle of parliamentary accountability was seen as considerably less important here: 50% of the respondents felt that decisions should be taken by those that bear a parliamentary responsibility to the electorate. The inclusion of business representatives was seen as considerably more important, with 78% of the respondents stating that this was an important issue. The types of actors that play a role in the consensus-based decision-making process, where expertise and the broad consideration of societal (in particular environmental) impacts is seen as desirable is another interesting and relevant dimension that we approached in the study. We asked the respondents which actors they thought were most central to technology decision-making, and how this situation should develop in the future. Some interesting findings emerged, both in terms of the processes and the sectors perceived as relevant for technology policy. The fact that actors expected to raise new issues and risks to the debate are most often those otherwise perceived to be located in the margins of the Finnish technology decision-making is interesting in itself, but also leaves many of the questions posed as to promoting new perspectives and debate unanswered.

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Actor

Technology decision-making in general

Agenda-setting in technology decision-making

Introducing new issues or approaches on the agenda

Influencing opinions

Communicating and informing abut technology decision-making in the media

Raising risks into the debate

Parliament 67 49 18 45 23 48 Interest associations 71 75 67 85 77 64 Public research institutions

74 84 88 78 73 79

NGOs 20 46 59 74 55 78 Ministry of Trade and Industry

95 90 65 66 70 46

Consumers/citizens 25 19 36 51 22 70 Local politicians/local admin

32 20 12 31 22 20

Ministry of Transport and Communications

79 76 59 57 65 44

Regional and provincial admin

33 26 17 23 19 14

Micro businesses 29 35 64 34 27 34 Ministry of Education and Culture

60 52 44 56 43 31

SMEs 55 52 75 49 46 40 Prime Minister 69 64 31 59 36 24 Sitra (=The Finnish National Fund for Research and Development)

79 85 85 79 77 63

Ministry of Social Affairs and Health

28 26 31 29 27 50

Finnish Academy 76 81 81 58 56 66 Big businesses 93 93 81 89 84 41 Tekes 96 93 91 86 88 63 Ministry of Foreign Affairs

15 15 11 9 14 10

The Science and Technology Policy Council of Finland

80 87 76 65 52 53

Ministry of Finance 77 52 23 26 19 15 Private research institutes

63 66 77 55 55 56

Universities 71 80 87 75 67 77 Ministry of the Environment

52 57 53 52 42 67

The survey brings to the fore a number of interesting aspects that were further elaborated upon in the final interviews and discussions held during the project. One of these issues was the role of the national parliament: its role is seen as proactive at best, and passive at worst. It is seen as being relatively important (67%) in the “general aspects” of decision-making, while it is seen to be of little relevance when it comes to putting new issues onto the agenda or in relation to the public debate of such issues (18%). The problem with parliamentary (as well as other political) involvement seems to be linked to the question of expertise and commitment: very few parliamentarians or politicians either feel, or demonstrate, a genuine commitment to technology issues, even though they are seen as being crucial from a national point of view. Their strategic centrality nationally is further illustrated by the

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fact that the politicians that develop a high profile in technology issues tend to be high profile politicians already: hence Prime Ministers (as in the case of Lipponen and Aho) were referred to as such high profile politicians with a technology-relevant agenda. This is also connected to the professionalisation process linked to politicians more generally. In order to be considered as a ‘serious politician’ MPs in particular need to be seen to have professional expertise in some policy area. The vast majority of MPs are recruited from the public sector and therefore exhibit a range of typical expertise found therein (Helander, Kuitunen & Paltemaa 1996, Kuitunen 2002; Ruostetsaari 2005), rather than representing technology expertise, more often identified within the research or business communities. Some aspects of the parliamentary system (e.g. the existence of forecasting bodies and forum for debate such as the one provided by the parliamentary “committee for the future”, as well as the association for the debate between parliamentarians and researchers) may have potential as additional arenas for open debate on technology-related issues, but in our view they have a lot of untapped potential and the general disinterest and passive attitude of the MPs may be a more fundamental problem than the lack of institutional fora. This seems most connected to the professionalisation debate referred to above. Here it might be interesting to consider the potential for public debate on less technology-based innovations, as for instance the potential for social innovation within the welfare policies, service provision etc. are increasingly debated in relation to the broader on-going societal changes. As the study calls for the development of new arenas and more inclusion within the area of technology decision-making, it is also worth investigating the table above from this perspective: who are the actors that seem to be emerging or introducing new issues into the debate? Here a great deal of faith is clearly put in the research sector, in particular universities and public research institutes, ‘think tanks’ (e.g. SITRA) and the Finnish academy, while NGOs are also seen as central. This is however not necessarily seen as implying any major change in the formal roles and the distribution of responsibility in this area and few new concrete ideas as to new actors or arenas emerged in the discussions. These are also the actors that emerged as central in the interviews conducted throughout the project. There have been a number of attempts to introduce and engage new actors in the technology debate, through consensus seminars and similar exercises, but these are not seen as being particularly successful for the most part. NGOs and social movements are seen as holding out some promise as regards the introduction of new perspectives and more critical voices into the debate, though often from outside the traditional elite’s ‘charmed circle’, and therefore form a disadvantaged standpoint. The actors, who themselves represent the elite generally do see the need for ‘politicisation’ in the sense of bringing these issues more closely into the public domain or in terms of the need to engage new actors, particularly from the media or the NGO/social movements sphere. The potential role of these new actors lies in both assessing and debating the policy alternatives and implications of different choices made in the technology sphere, as well as in debating the risks of, and the implications for democracy of the technology decision-making process itself. Developing better-targeted forms and fora for participatory processes (allowing for the inclusion of non-experts, through Constructive Technology Assessment methods for instance; see Gonçalves 2005 and Genus 2005), as well as putting in place the expertise to produce the methodologies

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and practices for such a debate requires initiative from the technology actors themselves. Thus far however this has been lacking. When we consider the sector- and issue-specific findings, it is worth asking which topics and policy areas are seen as being most central in the re-definition of technology decision-making. Which issues are

currently most central to technology decision-making?

Which issues are likely to become or should become more central in the future?

Science and research issues

83 57

Trade and industry policy 76 54 Education 70 61 Energy 70 63 Environment 65 70 Competition 65 53 Regional development 61 53 Defence 51 34 Security 46 46 Transport 45 59 Finance 37 45 Labour and employment 33 49 Health 40 71 Social issues 16 55 Taxation 13 33 Culture 11 41 These findings support, at least to some extent, the assumptions of broadening the scope of technology policy: there are a number of issues in addition to the most traditional ‘technology as science’ issues that emerge from the survey responses. Currently issues such as trade and industry, energy, regional issues, education, environment and defence emerge as relatively central (over 50%). However the survey data also shows that respondents that see the connections and links between the different issue areas in relation to technology policy as strong are clearly in a minority, and thus in terms of the number of respondents the traditional sector-specific ‘narrow’ technology interpretation still predominates. It is remarkable that many issue areas and sectors where one would assume many issues of direct relevance to technology decision-making to be taking place (e.g. transport, social issues, taxation) are seen as relatively unimportant in the eyes of the technology elites. What does this mean? Yet there are other policy areas where these connections are quite strong, such as regional development, which is perceived as being of relevance to technology decision-making by a 60% share of the respondents (though it is seen as being of decreasing importance into the future). While the core issue areas remain the same (science and research, trade and industry policy, education and energy), some interesting changes do emerge when the interviewees were asked about the core issues of tomorrow: in particular health and the environment. The relevance of culture and labour issues are both rapidly increasing, albeit from very low starting points. Nevertheless, they still do not emerge as key issue areas within technology decision-making.

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5 Conclusions New arenas for deliberation and multiple voices are called for in the Finnish technology decision-making process, which traditionally exhibits a high degree of consensual decision-making and the predominance of elite influence. Yet it is not clear, based on our findings, from where these arenas should emerge, or who should be responsible for introducing them. Much seems to reflect the broader ideals of evidence-based decision-making, where R&D, scientific enquiry and management by results predominate, as well as perhaps an over-reliance on an idealistic view of the self-corrective aspects of such an evidence-based policy model, i.e. reliance on the idea that the system will somehow of its own volition continue to function as well as it has thus far, lessening the acuteness of the need to find new models to replace the current one. The risk of what we have defined as ‘system lock-in’ thus undoubtedly exists. Notwithstanding the assumptions so often referred to in both policy documents and more generally in the public debate, particularly in relation to technology decision-making undergoing a major change due to the ‘horizontalisation’ of innovation activity, technology policy and decision-making seem to remain in most cases on the level of discourse, though sector-specific concerns and the need to address the inter-linkages between policy sectors are now emerging as key challenges for future policy, while some of the institutional aspects discussed above seek to promote the ability to respond to policy challenges in a cross-sectoral fashion (e.g. the role of strategic bodies with cross-sector potential, such as The Science and Technology Policy Council of Finland). Some of the key findings of our study for the three main dimensions identified at the outset (actors, norms and process characteristics) are thus summarised in the table below. Predominant characteristics of

the current system Potential characteristics of a more pluralistic system

Actors Experts (in particular in the area of technology) as representatives of their profession

All relevant actors, in their different roles, as individuals, consumers, political actors…

Norms, value-base (Over?)reliance on science, evidence-based decision-making Efficiency Similarity or “the standard” Debate on democracy and democratic renewal equally impregnated with ”jargon” as technology discourse – few links to concrete experience and everyday life

Evidence-based decision-making, with more attention to system inclusiveness, transparency and accountability Acceptance of difference and difference of opinion as aspects enriching public debate, seeking to address the issues with less specialised and excusive language

Process characteristics Elite and network-based, nature of networks: exclusive, administrative and formal, in some cases hierarchical, sector-based though with the goal of cross-sectoral co-ordination Non-political Power in technology policy equated with ‘financial muscle’ The complexity and ambiguity of technology and innovation discourses, technological determinism

Network-based, with more attention on other than formal, hierarchical and administrative networks Political (in the broader than party-political sense) Power in technology policy increasingly also power on the agenda, re-definition of technology policy Seeking to bring the technology agenda closer to the citizen and by so doing ‘re-politicising’ it

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In this paper we have in the main concentrated on the national perspective, with little attention being given to the internationalisation of technology policy. Yet this does not imply that we see internationalisation as unimportant; rather we see it as being necessary to analyse and understand the national context and specificities before embarking upon an internationally focused analysis. We feel also that the Finnish case can serve as an interesting example of a system, where technology and innovation have been at the heart of the ‘national narrative’ and many decisions have been determined and decided on the basis of this, with less attention been given to the necessity and unavoidability of the need for renewal. This debate has however now begun, and there are three themes that need to be addressed when the policy and politics models are re-considered. These include technology decision-making itself, where internationalisation and inclusion are the main challenges. The second challenge lies in the changing nature of expertise, where cross-sectoral challenges and the complexity of the issues involved require new types of expertise. Technology and technical expertise need increasingly to be accompanied and combined with societal and policy expertise, as well as cultural and social competence. Thirdly, the nature of consensus may also be shifting. While there is significant agreement (should we say consensus?) over the usefulness of consensus-based policy- and decision-making, the future may require the creation of an improved capacity to deal with disagreement and to promote and initiate a multi-vocal and multi-cultural decision-making culture. Here more issues should be politicised: not in the sense of making them ‘pawns’ in party-political negotiation, but rather in the sense of bringing them onto the public agenda and seeking to initiate debate on alternatives, and by extension on their requirements and implications.

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References Brunila, A. (2004): Osaava, avautuva ja uudistuva Suomi. Suomi maailmantaloudessa - selvityksen loppuraportti. Helsinki: Valtioneuvoston kanslia. Raportti saatavissa sähköisessä muodossa osoitteessa: http://www.suomimaailmantaloudessa.fi/data/VNK19_2004.pdf. [Government report from the project ”Finland in the global economy”, working group chaired by Anne Brunila.] CEC (2003): Innovation Tomorrow Innovation policy study, Survey commissioned by DG Enterprise, Innovation Directorate. EUR report n° 17502. Official Publication Office of the EC. Dunn, D.D. (1999). Mixing Elected and Nonelected Officials in Democratic Policy Making: Fundamentals of Accountability and Responibility. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Edler, J. (2003): “Change in European R&D Policy as a Complex Consensus-Building Porcess” in Edler, Kuhlmann and Behrens (eds.) Changing Governance of Research and technology Policy. The European Research Area. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. Genus, A. (2005): Rethinking constructive technology assessment as democratic, reflective discourse, Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 73 (2006), 13-26. Gonçalves, M.E. (2005): Risk and the Governance of Innovation in Europe: An Introduction, Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 73 (2006), 1-12. Haas, P.M. (1992): "Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination" International Organization, 46:1, Winter 1992. Helander, V.; S. Kuitunen & L. Paltemaa (toim.) (1996): Kansalaisesta aktiiviksi, aktiivista edustajaksi. Tutkimus vuoden 1995 eduskuntavaaleista ja niiden ehdokasasetteluista. Turun yliopiston valtio-opin julkaisuja 51. [A Study on the Finnish parliamentary elections of 1995. Published by teh Department of Political Science, University of Turku.] Held, D. (1996): Models of Democracy. Cambridge: Polity Press. Katz, R. (1987) (ed.): Party Governments: European and American Experiences. Berlin: de Gruyter. Kuitunen, S. (2002): Finland: Formalized Procedures with member Predominance. Teoksessa Narud, H.M.; M. N. Pedersen & H. Valen (toim.): Party Sovereignty and Citizen Control. Selecting Candidates for Parliamentary Elections in Denmark, Finland, Iceland and Norway. Odense: University Press of Southern Denmark. Lemola, T. (1990):Teknologiatutkimuksen tuloksia ja näkökulmia. Helsinki: TEKES. [Results and perspectives of technology policy.] Lemola, T. and Honkanen, P. (2004): Innovaatiopolitiikka – keiden hyväksi, keiden enhdoilla? [Innovation policy: who does it benefit, who sets the rules?] Helsinki: Gaudeamus. Loikkanen, T. and Kutinlahti, P. (2005): ”Towards Systemic Future-oriented Innovation Policy Studies – Perspectives of Finnish Knowledge Based Economy”, Paper presented at the “Innovation Systems in the Knowledge-based Society” Conference, LABEIN Tecnalia, Bilbao, 22-23 September 2005. Lähteenmäki-Smith, K. Kutinlahti, P. and Hyytinen, K. (2005): “How to assess the societal impacts of Public research organisations: A (belated) paradigm shift in the making?” Paper presented at ’Crossing Borders, Crossing Boundaries’ Joint CES/AEA Conference, October 24-30, 2005, Toronto, Canada.

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Lähteenmäki-Smith, K. and Kuitunen, S. (2006): Models of Decision-making in Finnish Technology Policy and their Consequences for Democracy. Forthcoming 2006. Ministry of Trade and Industry (1974): Yritysten tutkimus- ja kehitystoiminnan edistäminen: YTK-komitean mietintö. [Committee report form the committee on R&D in businesses.] Helsinki: Ministry of Trade and Industry. Mouffe, Chantal (2002): Politics and Passions. The Stakes of Democracy. CSD Perspectives. Centre for the Study of Democracy. Nordic Council of Ministers (2005): Norden som global vinderregion. Copenhagen: Mandag Morgen. [Norden as a global winner region.] Olsson, J. (2003): Democracy paradoxes in multi-level governance. Journal of European Policy 2 (10), 283-300. Peterson, J. and Sharp, M. (1998): Technology Policy in the European Union. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Porter, M. et al (2004): The Global Competitiveness Report 2005-2006. World Economic Forum / Oxford University Press. Rayner, S. (2003): “Democracy in the age of assessment: Reflections on the role of expertise and democracy in public sector decision-making”, Science & Public Policy, 30, 163-170. Ruostetsaari, I. (2005): ”Paikallisen poliittisen yhdistystoiminnan tila ja merkitys”, Alustus ”Mihin puolueita tarvitaan?” -seminaarissa 5.4.2005 Helsingissä. [”The space and relevance of local political associations”, Keynote address given at the “What doe we need parties for”-seminar in Helsinki, 5th April 2005.] Schienstock, G. et al. (2004): Embracing the knowledge economy: the dynamic transformation of the Finnish innovation system. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. Schumpeter, J.A. (1987): Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. London: Unwin. Stoker, G. (1998): “Governance as theory: five propositions”, International Social Science Journal, 50 (155), 17-28. Säynässalo, E. (2005): ”Between Politics And Law: Explaining the failure of the Greens to prevent the further building of nuclear energy in Finland”, Paper presented at the YHYS Conference ”Issues in green democracy”, Workshop: Revision of the nuclear energy policy? Turku, 24.-25.11.2005 Tiihonen, Seppo (2004): From Governing to Governance. A Process of Change. Tampere: Tampere University Press. World Economic Forum (2005): The Global Competitiveness Report. Palgrave / Macmillan. 1 Contact details: Kaisa Lähteenmäki-Smith, Nordregio, Box 1658, SE-111 86 Stockholm, Tel: +46-8-463 5445, kaisa.lahteenmaki-smith@nordregio.se. 2 The paper is based on a research project undertaken between 1/2004-4/2006 as part of the Research Programme for Advanced Technology Policy (ProACT; for more information on the research programme see: http://proact.ktm.fi/) and financed by the Finnish Ministry of Trade and Industry and the National Technology Agency (Tekes). As its primary data, it relies on an extensive survey of key decision-makers, ranging from politicians to business leaders. In the study as a whole the target group was a select sample of representatives of the Finnish technology elite and key societal interest groups, ranging from businesses and academia to the ‘third’ sector and public sector organisations. Data collection was undertaken in three stages: (1) a limited number of elite in-depth interviews were undertaken in order to draft the questionnaire and specify our research questions. (2) Survey – sent to 982 respondents, with 140

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responses received after a reminder was sent to the respondents and a randomly selected sample of potential respondents from the least active type of respondents, i.e. politicians, was further approached over the phone. Despite the low response rate, the views that emerged were broadly in line with, and supported by, other sources gleaned from previous studies and from the general literature. Therefore the low response rate was in itself seen as further confirmation of the hypothesis that politicians do not feel ‘a sense of belonging’ to the technology decision-making elite, rather they have a passive role in this area and prefer in most cases ‘leave these issue to the experts’. (3) A second round of interviews was undertaken after the survey results had been analysed. This round was used as a means of testing some of the conclusions and as a method of further disseminating its findings.

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