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A Year of Broken PromisesBig business still put in charge of EU Expert Groups,despite commitment to reform

Alliance for Lobbying Transparency and Ethics Regulation (ALTER-EU)

November 2013


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Table of ContentsA Year of Broken PromisesBig business still put in charge of EU ExpertGroups , despite commitment to reform

Executive Summary 3

I : Reform of Expert Groups or business as usual? 4Methodology 5

C O : Balance no corporate domination ofExpert Groups 9Tax dodgers in charge of tax policies 10Secretariat-General outs its own rules 10DG Enterprise and Industry still driven by big business 10Who gets a say in key DGs? 11More than a few rotten apples? 11Averages can be deceiving 12One year on whats changed? 13Case Study 1 Data Privacy: censoring the debate 14

C T : No lobbyists sitting in a personal capacity(conicts of interest) 16Independent Corporate Interests? 16Worst groups 18Is mislabelling of big business just a technical error? 18Should commercial interests be in Expert Groups at all? 19

One year on whats changed? 20Case Study 2 Tax Dodging: the foxes are in charge of thehenhouse 21

C T : Public calls for applications 23Worst in class 23Among the best in class but TAXUD still far from perfect 24One year on whats changed? 24Case Study 3 Experts on the European debt crisis: noneed to apply, well pick you 25(so long as you agree with the Commission pro-big businesscompetitiveness and growth agenda)

C F : Full transparency 27Corporations in disguise 27Wolves in sheeps clothing? 28Flying in the face of history 28One year on whats changed? 29

C : One Year On Commission commitmentscurrently just hot air 30Commission needs to act fast if it is to live up to its promises 30MEPs must ensure this is the last chance saloon forCommission action on Expert Groups 30

Lead author: Pascoe SabidoEditing: Katharine AingerAdditional data researchers: Yiorgos

Vassalos and Stephan Marsiske.Thanks to: Paul De Clerck, OlivierHoedeman, Kenneth Haar, MartinKonecny, Michael Ebeling.

Cover cartoon: Kostas Grigoriadis.Design: Stijn Vanhandsaeme.

Published by the Alliance for LobbyingTransparency and Ethics Regulationin the European Union (ALTER-EU),

in collaboration with the The AustrianTrade Union Federation (GB) and TheAustrian Federal Chamber of Labour(Arbeiterkammer), November 2013.

The Alliance for Lobbying Transparencyand Ethics Regulation (ALTER-EU) is acoalition of about 200 civil society groups,trade unions, academics and public affairsrms concerned with the increasinginuence exerted by corporate lobbyistson the political agenda in Europe.

The Austrian Trade Union Federation (GB) represents 1.2 million workers basedon voluntary membership in Austria. TheGB Europabro, its Brussels office, is partof the Austrian Permanent Representationto the EU.

The Austrian Federal Chamber of Labour (Arbeiterkammer) represents the interestsof 3.4 million employees and consumers

in Austria. AK EUROPA, its Brusselsoffice, is part of the Austrian PermanentRepresentation to the EU.

ALTER-EU is registered in the EUTransparency Register under number:2694372574-63

ALTER-EUAlliance for Lobbying Transparencyand Ethics RegulationRue dEdimbourg 26, Brussels 1050, [email protected]


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Executive SummaryShould speculators be given privileged access to dominate advice on nancial regulation, beverage companies on

alcohol policy, or fossil fuel companies on climate change? Worryingly for democracy, the European Commissionis doing just that, despite promising it would not. Its Expert Groups, which play an inuential role in advising on

European legislation, continue to be dominated by big business interests, meaning corporate lobbyists and thevested interests they represent play a big role in shaping our laws and regulations. Concerns over the situationled the European Parliament to freeze the budget for Expert Groups in November 201 1. MEPs set four conditionsfor reform: no corporate dominance; no lobbyists sitting in groups in an independent capacity; open calls forparticipation; and full transparency. Parliament released the budget in September 2012 on the understanding thatExpert Groups would signicantly improve based on these conditions and MEPs and the Commission would worktogether through an Informal Dialogue.

This report looks at all new Expert Groups created in the past year to assess whether theCommission is living up to its commitments to reform, showing that to date the Informal Dialogue to

oversee the process has not worked. Across the Commission many of the original problems have notbeen addressed, nor the conditions met, with certain key departments (Directorates-General, or DGs)particularly worrying: in DG Taxation and Customs Union (TAXUD), almost 80% of all stakeholdersappointed in the last year who do not represent governments actually represent corporate interests,with only 3% representing small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and 1% representing tradeunions; in the Secretariat-General (SG) corporate interests represent 64%; in DG Enterprise andIndustry (ENTR), the gure is 62%. Meanwhile in the SG, over 73% of its independent experts areactually directly linked to big business interests. Across all newly created Expert Groups, there aremore corporate representatives than all other stakeholders combined. The implications are par-ticularly troubling, as we show in several case studies, for example where tax dodgers advise on taxreform, giant telecommunications companies dominate the debate on data privacy, or a closed shopof pro-big business experts monopolise advice on tackling the eurocrisis.

At a time when trust in political institutions national and European is at an all-time low,1 the Commissionneeds to ensure that Expert Groups are as democratic, transparent and accountable as possible, and not merelyseen as doing corporations bidding. To ensure improvements materialise,the Commission should impose amoratorium on the creation of any new groups in the worst-performing DGs until existing ones improve andif there is no improvement by the next Parliament, MEPs should full their threat and refreeze all CommissionExpert Group budgets.

1 Eurobarometer, Spring 2013, Standard Eurobarometer 79: Public Opinion in the European Union, First Results, available athttp://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb79/eb79_rst_en.pdf
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb79/eb79_first_en.pdfhttp://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb79/eb79_first_en.pdfhttp://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb79/eb79_first_en.pdfhttp://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb79/eb79_first_en.pdf


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I :Reform of Expert Groups or Business as Usual?

The European Commissions advisory groups, knownas Expert Groups, provide input from stakeholders inareas where the Commission lacks internal expertise.They are found across all Directorates-General (DGs)and play a vital role in shaping Commission thinkingaround new policies and legislation, be it regulation onchemicals or how to tackle tax havens.

However, research by ALTER-EU, a coalition of over200 civil society groups, has shown that many of the

Commissions Expert Groups are consistently domi-nated by big business interests, meaning the voices ofother stakeholders, such as small- and medium-sizedenterprises (SMEs), trade unions, consumer groups orNGOs, are largely unrepresented and unheard.

This type of corporate domination is extremelyproblematic given that the nal reports of ExpertGroups often form the backbone of the Commissionslegislative proposals.

Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) were soconcerned by the Commissions unwillingness to x theproblem of corporate-dominated Expert Groups thatthey twice froze the Groups budget, rst in November2011 and again in March 2012. The European Parliament

nally approved the budget in September 2012 afterthe Secretariat-General, the Commission departmentresponsible for Expert Groups, broadly agreed toimplement four conditions:

3 No corporate domination of Expert Groups. 3 No lobbyists sitting in Expert Groups in a personal

capacity. 3 Open call for public applications for all new

groups. 3 Full transparency of minutes, agendas and

contributions by the Commission.

As the formal review of Expert Group rules wouldnot take place until 2015, MEPs and the Commissionentered into an Informal Dialogue to make sure theyfound de facto ways of implementing the conditionswithout new rules. If the Informal Dialogue did not leadto the conditions being met, MEPs said, the budgetwould be refrozen.2

This report, which looks at Expert Groups created inthe year proceeding the budget release (20 September2012 until 20 September 2013), shows that the Informal

Dialogue has to date not worked: in all four areas forimprovement the Commission has been found wanting.

This report has identied Taxation and CustomsUnion and the Secretariat-General (in charge ofoverseeing Expert Group improvements) as the worstoffenders, although other DGs are shown as alsoregularly breaking the conditions (e.g. DGs Agricultureand Rural Development, Enterprise and Industry,Home Affairs, Internal Market, Mobility and Transport,

2 There was no time limit set by the Secretariat-General,although many DGs did outline timetables in the September2012 Commission State of Play, available at http://www.alter-eu.org/state-of-play-concerning-expert-groups

Expert Groups: Putting thosewho created the nancial

crisis in charge of solving it 1The European Commissions response to the

nancial crisis was guided by the De Larosire ExpertGroup, named after its chair and senior bankingindustry gure, Jaques De Larosire.

Formally known as the High-Level Group onFinancial Supervision in the EU, four of its eightmembers had close links with the same banks mostimplicated in the crisis (Goldman Sachs, Citigroup,Lehman Brothers, BNP Parisbas), while a fth was aknown advocate of deregulation and a sixth worked

for the UK Financial Services Authority, described assystematically failing to predict or avoid the crisis.The resulting Expert Group report claimed it would

improve EU supervision over banks but unsurpris-ingly given the makeup of the group failed toaddress the fundamental question of whether bankscould and should continue to regulate themselves orwhat to do with banks that were too big to fail, bothkey factors in the crash.

1 ALTER-EU (2009) A Captive Commission: the role ofthe nancial industry in shaping EU regulation. Seehttp://www.alter-eu.org/en/system/les/publications/CaptiveCommission.pdf


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Research and Innovation). Across Commission depart-ments, corporate interests continue to dominateExpert Groups, which play a key role in advising onEuropean legislation. This seriously risks our laws andregulations being made in the interest of big businessand not Europes 500 million citizens, despite parts ofthe Commission believing they are one and the samething.

To show it is serious about taking the problemseriously, the Commission should impose a morato-rium on the creation of any new groups within theworst-performing DGs until existing ones improve.Specic improvements on all four conditions will bean important step in restoring public condence thatthe Commission is not merely doing the bidding ofcorporations. MEPs have shown good faith, but thismust be the nal wake-up call. If the situation remainsthe same at the start of the next Parliament, Expert

Group budgets should be refrozen.

Methodology

This report looks at all the Expert Groups created inthe one year since the European Parliament unfroze thebudget3 and assesses whether the four conditions toimprove them have been met. Each condition is takenseparately and forms a section with illustrative data.

3 All groups that were created or had their mandates renewedbetween 20th September 2012 and 20th September 2013.

Interspersed case-studies serve to highlight in moredetail the real-life impact and gravity of the issues atstake; the case-studies do not illustrate the failureto comply with any one single condition for reform,but are usually a complex mixture of a failure to meetseveral conditions.

The information presented in this report is derivedfrom the Commissions own downloadable databaseof its Expert Groups Register.4 Analysis focuses on the38 groups and subgroups created in the year followingthe budget release (20 September 2012) that containmembers who are not representing governmentinterests (referred to as stakeholders in this report).Members, groups and DGs are assessed according tothe four conditions set by MEPs:

3 Categorising group members to assess balance of allstakeholders (see box on categorisation below).5

3 Investigating all individuals appointed in a personal

capacity that do not represent government inter-ests, with a particular focus on potential conicts ofinterest.

3 Searching the on-line Expert Group Register forevidence of calls for applications.

3 The nal condition, full transparency, wouldordinarily focus on whether agendas, minutes and

4 Entries from the extracted groups have been cleaned bycorrecting inconsistencies in organisations and individualsnames and providing them with a classication (seeclassication rationale).

5 This excludes all members appointed by nationaladministrations (when asked by the Commission), as well asany government interests who have applied to join an ExpertGroup and been accepted.

Has the commission kept its promises?

3 No corporate dominance of Expert Groups?Corporate interests continue to dominate new ExpertGroups of key DGs, such as DG Taxation and CustomsUnion (TAXUD, responsible for tackling tax havens),

where almost 80% of all stakeholders appointed sinceSeptember 2012 represent big business interests (64%in the Secretariat-General and 62% in DG Enterprise).Across the Commission, there are more corporaterepresentatives sitting in new Expert Groups (52%)than all other stakeholders combined, with SMEs andTrade Unions accounting for only 3% of seats each.

3 No lobbyists sitting in Expert Groups in a personalcapacity? Of the Commissions newly-appointedindependent experts, more than half are in factrepresenting big business interests, and have more

seats than academics. In TAXUD, 93% of members

in a personal capacity actually represent corporateinterests.

3 Public calls for applications as standard? Almost60% of all new groups failed to put out open calls for

applications. DG Research and Innovation (8) and DGHealth and Consumers (3) did not put out an opencall for any of their newly-created groups.

3 Full Transparency? It was not possible to assessminutes, agendas and publishing of minority opinionsas many Expert Groups are too-recently created,but looking at other measures of transparency, DGsAgriculture and Taxation were the worst culprits fornot identifying organisations within their Groups ascorporate representatives, while DG Internal Markethas not entered any of its group members into the

Expert Group Register.


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members contributions were published in theregister. However, as all the targeted groups havebeen recently created, many have not yet had theirrst meetings and therefore cannot be assessed.Instead transparency will focus on whether corpo-rate interests are labelled as such. This should not,however, reduce the pressure on the Commissionto full its promise of making all such information

readily and easily available through the Register.

Directorates-General (DGs) have been rankedusing percentages, as this allows relative comparisonbetween departments with differing numbers ofnewly-created Expert Groups.

If citizens and policy makers are to understandwhether Expert Groups are improving, rst it isnecessary to reveal which interests are sitting in thosegroups. For example, Business Europe the most

powerful business lobby group in Brussels who sits in55 different Expert Groups has been classied by theCommission on different occasions in the Expert GroupRegister as an NGO, a trade union, an associationand as an international organisation, but only onceas corporate.6 In an attempt to gain a more accuratepicture of who sits in Expert Groups, the key to how wehave categorised different interests is below.

6 By DG Environment in its Informal Green PublicProcurement Advisory Group

Which DG isresponsible for what?

The European Commission is divided into severaldepartments known as Directorates-General (DGs).The following DGs have created new Expert Groupsin the year following the budget approval.

DG ResponsibilityAGRI Agriculture and Rural DevelopmentBEPA Bureau of European Policy Advisors,

linking civil society experts topolicy-makers

CONNECT Communications Networks,Content and Technology

ENTR Enterprise and IndustryECFIN Economic and Financial AffairsHOME Home affairs JUST JusticeMARKT Internal Market and ServicesMOVE Mobility and TransportRTD Research and InnovationSANCO Health and ConsumersSG Secretariat-General oversees

other DGsTAXUD Taxation and Customs


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KEY: how different interests in the ExpertGroups have been categorised

1) Government sector: 3 National ministries in member states, candidate

countries and members of the European economicarea.

3 European Commission and other EU institutionsand intergovernmental organisations.

3 Public agencies funded and appointed bygovernments.

3 Regional and local government.

2) Corporate Interests: 3 Large companies (employing more than 250 people

or with a turnover exceeding 50 million euros7).

3

Trade associations with membership mainly fromlarge companies. 3 Organisations with membership mainly from large

companies. 3 Lobby consultancies, law rms and accountancies

that represent large companies. 3 Agribusiness, including industrial farmers and their

trade associations.

3) Academia & non-protresearch entities.

4) Hybrid organisations: 3 Groups composed of both private and public

sector entities. 3 Standardisation bodies with large corporate

membership. 3 Think tanks and NGOs largely dependent on

corporate funding and closely linked to industrygroups.

3 Research institutes with both public funding andincome from contract work for the private sector.

3 Employer organisations and enterprises which

provide and/or serve public services andprivate companies (e.g. the European Centrefor Employers and Enterprises Providing PublicServices, CEEP).

3 Private-public agencies promoting growth. 3 Multi-stakeholder fora. 3 The European Investment Fund (a joint project

between the European Central Bank and com-mercial banks).

7 European Commission, 2005, The new SME denition,

available at http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/sme/les/sme_denition/sme_user_guide_en.pdf

5) NGOs: 3 Environmental, social and/or consumer groups

(including their standardisation bodies) whose corefunding does not come from corporations.

6) Small and MediumEnterprises (SMEs):

3 Companies employing fewer than 250 people and/or with an annual turnover lower than 50 millioneuros.

3 Trade associations and standardisation bodies ofSMEs.

7) Trade Unions.

8) Professional associations. 3 Architects, geologists, doctors, nurses, pharma-

cists etc. 3 Excluded from this group are professional

associations whose main membership representcorporate interests, e.g. accounting.

9) Farmers excluding agribusiness.

10) Cooperatives: 3 Organisations that are owned and run jointly

by their members, who share the prots and/orbenets.

11) Other: 3 Professions that do not t under other categories,

e.g. independent journalist.

12) Unknown: 3 Not enough information was provided to make a

judgement

When assessing newly-created groups, stakeholderrefers to members who do not represent governmentinterests.


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All new Expert Groups (incl. Subgroups) created between20 September 2012 and 20 September 2013

Agriculture and Rural Development DG Expert Group on agricultural commodity derivatives and spot marketsHigh Level Steering Board for the European Innovation Partnership

SUB: Sherpa Group on the European Innovation PartnershipBureau of European Policy Advisers Science and Technology Advisory CouncilCommunications Networks, Contentand Technology DG

CONNECT Advisory Forum for Research and Innovation in ICTYoung Advisors Expert Group on implementation of the Digital Agenda forEurope

Education and Culture DG National Coordinators for Adult LearningEnterprise and Industry DG CARS 2020 Expert Group

SUB: Clean vehiclesSUB: Economic situation, industrial change and social issuesSUB: Internal MarketSUB: Trade and international harmonisation

Expert Group for Bio-based ProductsHigh Level Group on Business ServicesKETs High Level Commission expert group

SUB: Sherpa GroupEnvironment DG Stakeholder Consultation on EU action on large carnivoresHealth and Consumers DG European Unique Device Identication (UDI) Commission expert group

Expert Group on Online Dispute ResolutionExpert Panel to provide advice on effective ways of investing in health

Home Affairs DG Data Retention Experts GroupExpert Group on the Policy Needs for Data on Crime (Crime Statistics)Illicit trafficking in rearms to safeguard the EUs internal security

Justice DG Commission Expert Group on a European Insurance Contract LawMobility and Transport DG Expert Group on TEN-T FinancingResearch DG EU Bioeconomy Panel

Expert Group on Retail Sector Innovation

Expert group for the evaluation of the overall performance of the EuropeanInnovation Partnership (EIP) concept and approachExpert group on evaluation of research intensive clusters as potential vehiclesfor smart specialisation in the European RegionExpert Group on Intellectual Property ValuationExpert Group on Open Innovation and Knowledge TransferExpert Group on Public Sector InnovationExpert Group on the role of Universities and Research Centres in SmartSpecialisation

Secretariat-General Expert Group on a debt redemption fund and eurobillsHigh Level Group on Administrative Burdens

Taxation and Customs Union DG EU VAT forumPlatform for Tax Good Governance, Aggressive Tax Planning and DoubleTaxationVAT Expert Group


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to have broken its promise, with more membersrepresenting corporate interests in new groups thanall other stakeholders combined. And studying thegures in more detail reveals key DGs are dangerouslyimbalanced.

Looking at the three most corporate-dominated DGs,

Taxation and Customs Union (TAXUD), the Secretariat-General (SG) and DG Enterprise and Industry, there is aserious problem:

Tax dodgers in charge of tax policies

The worst offender is the DG responsible for taxa-tion, DG TAXUD, where almost 80% of Expert Groupstakeholders represent corporate interests. This is incontrast to only 3% from SMEs, the same from inde-

pendent academic backgrounds, and just 1% from tradeunions. Tax is an incredibly important and politicallysensitive issue, particularly in light of the economic andeurozone crisis, which makes TAXUDs insistence onlistening almost exclusively to big business a groupusually bent on keeping tax low incredibly counter-productive. Case study 2 on the Platform for Tax GoodGovernance ( see page 21) shows how TAXUD hasinvited tax dodgers to implement its plans on tacklingtax evasion, a problem which if successfully tackledcould save European Union member-states 1 trillionper year in lost revenues and pay-off the EUs publicdecit in under nine years.11

Secretariat-General outs its own rules

The Secretariat-General (SG), which overseesall other DGs and ensures they run smoothly andtransparently, is the second worst DG when it comesto corporate dominance. This undermines its claim thatit is taking seriously the conditions outlined by MEPs,the de facto new rules,12 and the Informal Dialogue

to achieve them. As the department tasked withoverseeing improvements across the Commission, if itis not implementing the conditions agreed with MEPs

11 Richard Murphy FCA, 2012, Tax Research UK: Closing theTax Gap A report for Group of the Progressive Alliance ofSocialists and Democrats in the European Parliament, http://europeansfornancialreform.org/en/system/les/3842_en_richard_murphy_eu_tax_gap_en_120229.pdf

12 When the budget was unfrozen in September 2012, it was inorder to launch a process to implement the new conditionsfor Expert Groups without having to go through the difficultprocess of legally changing the rules; instead creating defacto new rules until they are systematically reviewed in2015.

itself, then how credible is its commitment to overseereforms in other DGs? Its Expert Group on a DebtRedemption Fund and Eurobills is heavily dominated bycorporate interests, as well as breaking almost all otherconditions outlined by MEPs (see case study 3 on page25). Its High-Level Group on Administrative Burdens(also known as the Stoiber Group, after its chair,

Edmund Stoiber) also has more members represent-ing corporate interests than all other stakeholderscombined (9 out of 16), and has been the subjectof widespread criticism for promoting pro-industryderegulatory agendas and ignoring the public interest.13 It appears that Commission President Barroso usesthe Secretariat-General as his private DG, creatinggroups within it according to his own rules, rather thanfollowing those promoted across the Commission bythe department itself.

DG Enterprise and Industry stilldriven by big business

DG ENTR committed to far-reaching action to endthe dominance of big business within its Expert Groupsfollowing an ALTER-EU report. However, the measureshave clearly not gone far enough, as corporate interestscontinue to occupy over 60% of seats across its fournew groups. DG ENTR also claimed it had rebalancedCARS 21, the Expert Group advising on the futureof the automotive industry, including environmentalimpacts. Packed full of industry representatives,CARS21 helped water down and postpone legislationon tougher CO2 standards which vehicle manufacturerssaw as a threat to prots.14 Yet according to the on-lineExpert Group Register, its new incarnation, CARS2020, still has 10 out of 16 spots lled by corporateinterests and the issue of emissions remains on theagenda.15

13 A recent example was the use of the group by itschair, Edmund Stoiber, to lobby for weaker tobaccoregulation after being contacted by German tobaccomanufacturers, seehttp://www.foeeurope.org/Commission-must-clear-smoke-tobacco-lobbying-170113

14 ALTER-EU, 2012, Whos Driving the agenda at DG Enterprise

and Industry? Seehttp://corporateeurope.org/sites/default/les/dgentr-driving.pdf

15 Four places are taken by NGOs and two by trade unions.
http://europeansforfinancialreform.org/en/system/files/3842_en_richard_murphy_eu_tax_gap_en_120229.pdfhttp://europeansforfinancialreform.org/en/system/files/3842_en_richard_murphy_eu_tax_gap_en_120229.pdfhttp://europeansforfinancialreform.org/en/system/files/3842_en_richard_murphy_eu_tax_gap_en_120229.pdfhttp://www.foeeurope.org/Commission-must-clear-smoke-tobacco-lobbying-170113http://www.foeeurope.org/Commission-must-clear-smoke-tobacco-lobbying-170113http://corporateeurope.org/sites/default/files/dgentr-driving.pdfhttp://corporateeurope.org/sites/default/files/dgentr-driving.pdfhttp://corporateeurope.org/sites/default/files/dgentr-driving.pdfhttp://corporateeurope.org/sites/default/files/dgentr-driving.pdfhttp://www.foeeurope.org/Commission-must-clear-smoke-tobacco-lobbying-170113http://www.foeeurope.org/Commission-must-clear-smoke-tobacco-lobbying-170113http://europeansforfinancialreform.org/en/system/files/3842_en_richard_murphy_eu_tax_gap_en_120229.pdfhttp://europeansforfinancialreform.org/en/system/files/3842_en_richard_murphy_eu_tax_gap_en_120229.pdfhttp://europeansforfinancialreform.org/en/system/files/3842_en_richard_murphy_eu_tax_gap_en_120229.pdf


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Who gets a say in key DGs?

Taking an average of the three most dominated DGs(Taxation, Secretariat-General, Enterprise), the gures

speak for themselves: big business occupies two-thirdsof all seats not given to government representatives(66%), which is six times the number of seats for NGOs(11%), and more than 13 times the number for tradeunions (5%). Despite employing two thirds of theEuropean Unions workforce,16 stakeholders represent-ing Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) make up only2% of overall group membership, with 33 times fewerrepresentatives than corporate interests.

16 EUROSTAT, Structural Business Statistics Overview,October 2012,http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/Structural_business_statistics_overview#Further_Eurostat_information

More than a few rotten apples?

Corporate dominance is also a problem in other DGs,meaning that in areas like emissions standards, tax

collection and how to transition towards a sustainabletransport system, corporations are dominating ExpertGroups and putting their own commercial interestsbefore the public interest.

While many key DGs are problematic, there is alsoconcern with the overall picture, where corporateinterests occupy more than half of all seats within the38 new groups and sub-groups (52%). This is more seatsthan all other stakeholders have combined, and evenmore worrying when viewed in addition to representa-tives of hybrid interests (who also have corporate links),rising to 60% of all places.

SME Trade unionProfessionalAssociation

NGOHybridCorporateinterests

Academia

Combined InterestsAcross Worst 3 Corporate

Dominated DGsWho sits in DG TAXUD, SG

and ENTR Expert Groups?

66%

11%

8%

6%5%

2%1%

Which DGs have given 50% or more of their seats tocorporate interests?

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

Mobility and Transport DGHome Affairs DG

Justice DGEnterprise and Industry DG

Secretariat-GeneralTaxation and Customs Union DG

79%

64% 62%55%

50% 50%
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/Structural_business_statistics_overview#Further_Eurostat_informationhttp://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/Structural_business_statistics_overview#Further_Eurostat_informationhttp://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/Structural_business_statistics_overview#Further_Eurostat_informationhttp://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/Structural_business_statistics_overview#Further_Eurostat_informationhttp://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/Structural_business_statistics_overview#Further_Eurostat_informationhttp://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/Structural_business_statistics_overview#Further_Eurostat_information


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How different DGsconsider balance

Balance is perceived differently across DGs. In theCommissions February 2013 update on the reform ofExpert Groups:17

3 DG TAXUD, when justifying the balance of theEU Joint Transfer Pricing Forum (JTPF), crucial fortackling tax dodging, says there is a balance in therepresentation of the relevant areas of expertise andareas of interest 8 work in consultancy and 8 inmultinational enterprises.

3 DG ENTR says that its European Design LeadershipBoard, has a fairly balanced membership, despitethere being more representatives of industryinterests (8) than all other members combined (7).

However, some DGs recognise that balance refersto not having Expert Groups dominated by onestakeholder category:

3

DG EACs ERASMUS MUNDUS Expert Group is bal-anced because no single interest category (business,union or other) has a majority of the non-governmentand non-EU seats in the group.18

17 European Commission, State of Play February 2013, availablehttp://www.alter-eu.org/sites/default/les/documents/COMMISSION_STATE%20OF%20PLAY%20_%20FEBRUARY%202013%20_%20FINAL_0.pdf

18 Education and Culture, May 2012, Review of Expert

Groups, accessed as a result of a freedom to informationrequest, available athttp://www.asktheeu.org/en/request/review_of_expert_groups#incoming-1328

However, not all DGs have been creating ExpertGroups dominated by big business since September:Rank DG Members with

corporate interests1) Bureau of European Policy

Advisers7%

2) Environment DG 9%3) Education and Culture DG 10%

Averages can be deceiving

Presenting overall levels of corporate dominance ineach DG can only provide a partial picture: within aDG, half of new groups may have no corporate mem-bers while the other half could be completely domi-nated. Looking behind the overall gures at individualgroups gives a clearer picture of which DGs are notimplementing the conditions laid down by MEPs.

While the three worst overall DGs (Taxation,Secretariat-General and Enterprise) have a strong pres-ence, we can also see from the table that Home Affairs(DG HOME), Agriculture (DG AGRI) and Research (DGRTD) all three with an average corporate presenceunder 50% have been ignoring the agreementbetween Parliament and the Commission.

3 DG HOMEs Data Retention Experts Group toucheson the very sensitive issue of data privacy, yetthe group is composed exclusively of membersrepresenting or closely linked to the biggest playersin Europes telecommunications industry (seecase-study 1 on page 14 ). Issues of such public

Trade union Professional

Association

Hybrid

Other Cooperatives Unknown

NGOCorporateinterests

Academia SME

Farmers

Corporate dominationacross the Commission

How are stakeholdersrepresentated across all

new groups?

52%

18%

13%

8%

3%3%

1%2%

0,2%0,5%0,2%
http://www.alter-eu.org/sites/default/files/documents/COMMISSION_STATE%20OF%20PLAY%20_%20FEBRUARY%202013%20_%20FINAL_0.pdfhttp://www.alter-eu.org/sites/default/files/documents/COMMISSION_STATE%20OF%20PLAY%20_%20FEBRUARY%202013%20_%20FINAL_0.pdfhttp://www.alter-eu.org/sites/default/files/documents/COMMISSION_STATE%20OF%20PLAY%20_%20FEBRUARY%202013%20_%20FINAL_0.pdfhttp://www.asktheeu.org/en/request/review_of_expert_groups#incoming-1328http://www.asktheeu.org/en/request/review_of_expert_groups#incoming-1328http://www.asktheeu.org/en/request/review_of_expert_groups#incoming-1328http://www.asktheeu.org/en/request/review_of_expert_groups#incoming-1328http://www.alter-eu.org/sites/default/files/documents/COMMISSION_STATE%20OF%20PLAY%20_%20FEBRUARY%202013%20_%20FINAL_0.pdfhttp://www.alter-eu.org/sites/default/files/documents/COMMISSION_STATE%20OF%20PLAY%20_%20FEBRUARY%202013%20_%20FINAL_0.pdfhttp://www.alter-eu.org/sites/default/files/documents/COMMISSION_STATE%20OF%20PLAY%20_%20FEBRUARY%202013%20_%20FINAL_0.pdf


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importance should not be decided upon bycorporations alone.

3 In DG AGRIs Expert Group on AgriculturalCommodity Derivatives and Spot Markets, 94% ofmembers represent corporate interests includ-ing agribusiness19 and the retail food industry while the other 6% represent farmers. No seatshave gone to NGOs who work on the issue of

food speculation and its devastating effects onfood prices and land grabbing, despite qualiedNGOs applying.20

19 COPA-COGECA, the European Association for Farmersand Agri-cooperatives, has been labelled as a corporateinterest due to the domination of agribusiness in the

positions it takes and the stakeholder views it represents.20 Dutch NGO SOMO and German NGO WEED, who work

on food speculation, both applied and were both rejected.

One year on whats changed?

It is clear that some DGs have no intention oflistening to a broad range of stakeholders, and areinstead continuing in the same pattern as before thebudget freeze was lifted. The Commissions damagingideological belief that what is good for big businessis good for Europes citizens is as robust as ever. The

corporate dominance in many groups created sinceSeptember both undermines the ongoing InformalDialogue between the European Parliament and theCommission to x Expert Groups, and also calls intoquestion the Commissions own commitment to im-prove them. Particularly worrying is the Secretariat-General (SG), who is supposed to be overseeing otherDGs within Commission. If the Parliament and the SGare serious about ending corporate dominated ExpertGroups, then they need to look beyond the InformalDialogue.

New Expert Groups with more than 50% corporate membership

DG Group Name Totalmembers

Corporateinterests

Home Affairs DG Data Retention Experts Group 7 100%Agriculture and RuralDevelopment DG

Expert Group on agricultural commodity derivatives andspot markets

16 94%

Taxation and CustomsUnion DG

VAT Expert Group 42 86%

Research DG Exper t group for the evaluation of the overall per formanceof the European Innovation Partnership (EIP) concept andapproach

5 80%

Research DG Expert Group on Intellectual Property Valuation 10 80%Taxation and CustomsUnion DG

EU VAT forum 15 80%

Enterprise and Industry DG High Level Group on Business Services 19 74%Secretariat-General Expert Group on a debt redemption fund and eurobills 10 70%Health and Consumers DG European Unique Device Identication (UDI) Commission

Expert Group17 65%

Research DG Expert Group on Retail Sector Innovation 11 64%Enterprise and Industry DG CARS 2020 Expert Group (incl subgorups) 80 63%Secretariat-General High Level Group on Administrative Burdens 15 60%Taxation and CustomsUnion DG

Platform for Tax Good Governance, Aggressive Tax Planningand Double Taxation

15 60%

Enterprise and Industry DG KETs High Level Commission exper t group (incl subgroups) 64 59%Research DG Expert Group on Open Innovation and Knowledge Transfer 12 58%Enterprise and Industry DG Expert Group for Bio-based Products 26 58% Justice DG Commission Expert Group on a European Insurance

Contract Law20 55%


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Case Study 1

Data Privacy: censoring the debateWhen whistle-blower Edward Snowden revealed in

June 2013 that the top-secret US PRISM programmewas collecting phone and internet records of European

citizens, the reaction from the Commission wasforceful. The US justied the programme on groundsof security, but Viviane Reding, Vice-President of theCommission as well as EU Commissioner for Justiceat the time, stated that the data protection rights ofEU citizens are non-negotiable.21 However, looking atthe recent Expert Group established by DG HOME onthe topic of data retention, this statement sounds lessconvincing.

What Ms Reding failed to mention was that the

European Commission has had its own highly-controversial Data Retention Directive (DRD) in placesince 2006, a year before PRISM came into being.The Directive equates to blanket and indiscriminateretention of all telecommunications, holding themfor a minimum of six months up to two years, and hasbeen heavily criticised by human rights and privacycampaigners.

According to AK Vorrat, the German WorkingGroup on Data Retention, the DRD is the mostprivacy-invasive instrument and the least popularsurveillance measure ever adopted by the EU, withalmost 70% of EU citizens against it.22 It has alsobeen shown to obstruct a free press as investigative journalists working on sensitive public interest issuesare unable to use condential communication channels(Deutsche Telekom was caught using the privatedata to spy on critical journalists),23 while the safetyof potential whistle-blowers is also greatly reduced.The Commissions justication that it is necessaryto tackle serious organised crime has also beendisproven, as no country to implement the Directive

has seen a statistically signicant impact on crime

21 European Commission, Speech by Viviane Reding14/06/2013, PRISM Scandal: the data protection rights of EUcitizens are non-negotiable, available athttp://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-13-536_en.htm

22 Arbeitskreis Vorratsdatenspeicherung, 2011, Backgroundinformation and facts: Evaluation of the Data RetentionDirective 2006/24/EC, available athttp://www.vorratsdatenspeicherung.de/images/akvorrat_evaluation_backgrounder_2011-04-17.pdf

23 Arbeitskreis Vorratsdatenspeicherung, 2011, There is NoSuch Thing as Secure Data: Refuting the myths of secure ITsystems, available athttp://wiki.vorratsdatenspeicherung.de/images/Heft_-_es_gibt_keine_sicheren_daten_en.pdf

clearance rates.24 Ironically, the Dutch Government hasactually found many of its own telecoms corporationsillegally using the private data for commercial purpos-

es.25 And in fact, the blanket collection and retention ofcitizens personal information has been ruled incompat-ible with the European Convention on Human Rights,with the European Court of Justice expected to annulthe Directive, making a nal ruling at the beginningof July 2014. Discussing PRISM, Commissioner Redingevidently failed to see the contradiction when claimingearlier this year that it is very essential that even if it isa national security issue it cannot be at the expense ofEU citizens.26

Yet despite the Directives controversial scope andits impact on citizens, as well as the currentde facto rules surrounding Expert Groups, the newly createdData Retention Experts Group is dominated by thetelecommunications industry, has individuals represent-ing corporate interests sitting in a personal capacityand has no civil society representatives. Those awareof the groups incredibly controversial predecessor,the Platform for Electronic Data Retention for theInvestigation, Detection and Prosecution of SeriousCrime in which among other problems, all seats notgiven to government interests went to representativesof big business interests, namely the telecommunica-tions industry,27 and attempts to open it up to civilsociety organisations were repeatedly rejected willnot be surprised at the features of its latest incarnation.

Among the seven members not representinggovernment interests, all ve of the organisations(Cable Europe; EuroISPA; European CompetitiveTelecommunications Association, ECTA; EuropeanTelecommunications Network Operators Association,

24 Arbeitskreis Vorratsdatenspeicherung, 2011, Backgroundinformation and facts: Evaluation of the Data RetentionDirective 2006/24/EC, available athttp://www.vorratsdatenspeicherung.de/images/akvorrat_evaluation_backgrounder_2011-04-17.pdf

25 ComputerWorldUK, 15 October 2013, Dutch TelecomsFirms Abused Data Retention Law for Marketing Purposes,available at http://www.computerworlduk.com/news/it-business/3473656/dutch-telecoms-rms-abused-data-retention-law-for-marketing-purposes/

26 European Commission, Speech by Viviane Reding14/06/2013, PRISM Scandal: the data protection rights of EUcitizens are non-negotiable, available athttp://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-13-536_en.htm

27 For full membership of the now-closed group, seehttp://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regexpert/index.cfm?do=groupDetail.groupDetail&groupID=2230
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-13-536_en.htmhttp://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-13-536_en.htmhttp://www.vorratsdatenspeicherung.de/images/akvorrat_evaluation_backgrounder_2011-04-17.pdfhttp://www.vorratsdatenspeicherung.de/images/akvorrat_evaluation_backgrounder_2011-04-17.pdfhttp://www.vorratsdatenspeicherung.de/images/akvorrat_evaluation_backgrounder_2011-04-17.pdfhttp://wiki.vorratsdatenspeicherung.de/images/Heft_-_es_gibt_keine_sicheren_daten_en.pdfhttp://wiki.vorratsdatenspeicherung.de/images/Heft_-_es_gibt_keine_sicheren_daten_en.pdfhttp://www.vorratsdatenspeicherung.de/images/akvorrat_evaluation_backgrounder_2011-04-17.pdfhttp://www.vorratsdatenspeicherung.de/images/akvorrat_evaluation_backgrounder_2011-04-17.pdfhttp://www.vorratsdatenspeicherung.de/images/akvorrat_evaluation_backgrounder_2011-04-17.pdfhttp://www.computerworlduk.com/news/it-business/3473656/dutch-telecoms-firms-abused-data-retention-law-for-marketing-purposes/http://www.computerworlduk.com/news/it-business/3473656/dutch-telecoms-firms-abused-data-retention-law-for-marketing-purposes/http://www.computerworlduk.com/news/it-business/3473656/dutch-telecoms-firms-abused-data-retention-law-for-marketing-purposes/http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-13-536_en.htmhttp://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-13-536_en.htmhttp://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regexpert/index.cfm?do=groupDetail.groupDetail&groupID=2230http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regexpert/index.cfm?do=groupDetail.groupDetail&groupID=2230http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regexpert/index.cfm?do=groupDetail.groupDetail&groupID=2230http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regexpert/index.cfm?do=groupDetail.groupDetail&groupID=2230http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-13-536_en.htmhttp://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-13-536_en.htmhttp://www.computerworlduk.com/news/it-business/3473656/dutch-telecoms-firms-abused-data-retention-law-for-marketing-purposes/http://www.computerworlduk.com/news/it-business/3473656/dutch-telecoms-firms-abused-data-retention-law-for-marketing-purposes/http://www.computerworlduk.com/news/it-business/3473656/dutch-telecoms-firms-abused-data-retention-law-for-marketing-purposes/http://www.vorratsdatenspeicherung.de/images/akvorrat_evaluation_backgrounder_2011-04-17.pdfhttp://www.vorratsdatenspeicherung.de/images/akvorrat_evaluation_backgrounder_2011-04-17.pdfhttp://www.vorratsdatenspeicherung.de/images/akvorrat_evaluation_backgrounder_2011-04-17.pdfhttp://wiki.vorratsdatenspeicherung.de/images/Heft_-_es_gibt_keine_sicheren_daten_en.pdfhttp://wiki.vorratsdatenspeicherung.de/images/Heft_-_es_gibt_keine_sicheren_daten_en.pdfhttp://www.vorratsdatenspeicherung.de/images/akvorrat_evaluation_backgrounder_2011-04-17.pdfhttp://www.vorratsdatenspeicherung.de/images/akvorrat_evaluation_backgrounder_2011-04-17.pdfhttp://www.vorratsdatenspeicherung.de/images/akvorrat_evaluation_backgrounder_2011-04-17.pdfhttp://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-13-536_en.htmhttp://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-13-536_en.htm


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ETNOA; GSM Association) are there on behalf oftelecommunications giants. Gerald McQuaid, the solerepresentative of an interest a category given bythe Commission to members sitting in an individualcapacity but who are not independent is listed in theRegister as Chair of the European TelecommunicationsStandards Institute Lawful Interception and DataRetention Committee, an industry standardisation

body, but it fails to mention he is a senior manager atVodafone. Incidentally, Vodafone is also a member ofEuroISPA (via national associations) and ECTA, andmore worryingly, was also ned 76 million after itsdata retention mechanisms in Greece (i.e. wire taps)were hacked with the phones of the Prime Ministerand many of his cabinet members being bugged.28 Completing the group is Christopher Kuner, SeniorOf Counsel in the Brussels office of corporate lawrm Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati, wrongly listedas there in a personal capacity. As well as advising

corporate clients how to operate around privacylegislation while staying within the letter of the law, heis also the Chairman of the International Chamber ofCommerce Task Force on Privacy and the Protectionof Personal Data not a role that can be consideredindependent.

While big business gets to ensure the Data RetentionDirective is implemented to its liking (in the US, thetelecommunications industry has been handsomelycompensated by the US government for providingdata29), voices of civil society groups have beenpurposefully excluded. This may be explained by thecall for applications: while open (although not in theRegister), it explicitly states that members must havea genuine commitment to efficient and effectiveimplementation of the Data Retention Directive,30 andif selected, help ensure that the Directive continues tofull its intended aims.31 Not only does this underminethe role of Expert Groups in providing diverse stake-holder input and excludes genuine expertise on thetopic, it also ensures those selected will be unable toanswer the groups own mandated question of whether

28 IEEE Spectrum, June 2007, The Athens Affair, available athttp://spectrum.ieee.org/telecom/security/the-athens-affair

29 The Guardian, August 2013, NSA Paid Millions to CoverPrism Compliance Costs for Tech Companies, availableat http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/23/nsa-prism-costs-tech-companies-paid

30 European Commission, April 2013, Commission Decision of18.4.2013 on setting up an experts group on best practicein the implementation of electronic communications dataretention for the investigation, detection and prosecution ofserious crime (the data retention experts group), availableat http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/

policies/police-cooperation/data-retention/docs/20130418_data_retention_expert_group_decision_en.pdf

31 Ibid. p.6

the directive is fullling its intended aims. Theintentionally-narrow and technical focus is being usedto mask the broader political questions still unresolvedby its predecessor.

In light of PRISM, the evidence on DRD and theimportance of data privacy, it appears the Commission DG HOME in particular is using this Expert

Group to censor debate (only listening to industryand not civil society opponents) while providing falselegitimacy through claiming to involve stakeholders.If Commission Vice-President Reding wants us tobelieve, as she claims, that the data protection rightsof EU citizens are non-negotiable, DG HOME needsto open the group, follow the European Parliamentsrecommendations regarding corporate dominance,loosen the conditions for entry and genuinely explorehow DRDs intended aim of tackling serious crime canbe achieved.
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/23/nsa-prism-costs-tech-companies-paidhttp://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/23/nsa-prism-costs-tech-companies-paidhttp://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/police-cooperation/data-retention/docs/20130418_data_retention_expert_group_decision_en.pdfhttp://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/police-cooperation/data-retention/docs/20130418_data_retention_expert_group_decision_en.pdfhttp://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/police-cooperation/data-retention/docs/20130418_data_retention_expert_group_decision_en.pdfhttp://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/police-cooperation/data-retention/docs/20130418_data_retention_expert_group_decision_en.pdfhttp://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/police-cooperation/data-retention/docs/20130418_data_retention_expert_group_decision_en.pdfhttp://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/police-cooperation/data-retention/docs/20130418_data_retention_expert_group_decision_en.pdfhttp://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/23/nsa-prism-costs-tech-companies-paidhttp://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/23/nsa-prism-costs-tech-companies-paid


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C :No lobbyists sitting in a personalcapacity (conicts of interest)

Looking at groups created since September: 3 More than half of all stakeholders sitting in a personal capacity are not independent. 3 There are more corporate representatives sitting in a personal capacity than independent academics. 3 More than 90% of DG Taxation and Customs Unions stakeholders sitting in a personal capacity actually

represent corporate interests.

VERDICT: Lobbyists particularly representing corporate interests are still being labelled as independent in Expert Groups.

The Commission agreed with the EuropeanParliament in September 2012 that no lobbyist wouldsit in Expert Groups in a personal capacity, as it wouldconict with serving the public interest. However,representatives of corporate interests continue to beappointed in a personal capacity. Whether the conictof interest is actively affecting the group membersdecisions or not, the mere fact these affiliations exist isdamaging to the reputation of the Commission whenthese experts are supposed to be independent. This isaside from the question of whether tax dodgers shouldbe advising on tax havens, beverage companies on alco-hol policy, or fossil fuel companies on climate change.Combined with the imbalance in the last chapter, theCommission gives the impression of government bycorporate lobbyists, or a lobbycracy .

The privilege of being in a group in a personal capac-ity should only be for those who are independent, suchas academics or individual experts not linked to a spe-cic stakeholder. However, among the Commissionsnew Expert Groups, there are more corporate interestsin an independent capacity than there are academics,with some DGs particularly bad offenders.

Independent corporate interests?

The domination of corporate interests appearingin a personal capacity within key DGs is particularlyworrying, although not all DGs follow this trend:

3 DG Taxation and Customs Union (TAXUD), incharge of clamping down on tax dodging, is againone of the worst offenders: out of 28 individualsappointed in their personal capacity, only two can

SME OtherNGO CooperativesHybridAcademiaCorporateinterests

Independentcorporate interests?

Who sits in Expert Groups ina 'personal capacity'?

41%

40%

7,5%6%

3,5%

1%0,5%


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17

be classied as independent academics, while theother 26 have potential conicts of interest. Theserange from working directly for a corporation,32 advising them on how to reduce their tax bills,33 being employed by international law rms whosemain clients are corporations,34 or academics whowork closely with big business (either academicallyor as consultants).35

3 In the Secretariat-General, which oversees allDGs and is in charge of transparency across theCommission, 73% of the individuals it has labelledin a personal capacity since September are infact linked to big business. The others representacademia and hybrid interests, such as LithuaniasCentral Bank (see case study 3 on page 25 ).

3 The Bureaus for European Policy Advisors (BEPA),which according to its website, Forges links be-tween the European Commission and think tanks,academia, civil society, churches and communitiesof conviction, has only 7% of its personal capacitymembers representing a corporate interest,36 while

32 For example Christian Brgler of Deloitte and Herman VanKesteren of PwC.

33 For example Andrea Parolini of MDDP Tax Consultancy orKrzysztof Lasinski-Sulecki of Lasinski consultants.

34 For example Elisabeth Ashworth of CMS or Carlos GmezBarrero of Garrigues.

35 For example Julie Kajus. Joachim Englisch and Paolo Arginelliare both academics as well as private tax consultantsspecialising in corporate law.

36 In BEPAs Science and Advisory Council, the only group ishas created since September 2012, Ferdinando Becalli-Falcois the President and CEO of General Electric Europe andSenior Vice-President of General Electric.

over 50% are independent academics. However,40% are hybrid, meaning while not strictly repre-senting corporate interests, they are linked.37

3 Conversely, in DG Health and Consumers (SANCO),over 90% of individuals in a personal capacity comefrom academia, although one individual now worksas a private consultant without disclosing clientnames.38

37 In this case, Alan Atkisson is CEO of the AtKisson Group,whose consultancy works with corporations like Ernst &Young, Nike and Volvo, as well as governments and regions;Susan Gasser is the Director of the Friedrich MiescherInstitute for Biomedical Research at the University ofBasel, affiliated to biotech giant Novartis, as well as beingon the Nestl Nutrition Council; Soren Molin is Directorof the Novo Nordisk Centre for Biosustainability, whichis commercially focused and continuously produces newspin-off companies; Alexandre Tiedtke Quintanilha worksfor the government-funded but commercially-focusedInstitute of Biomedical Research in Oporto; Pat Sandra isFounder and President of the for-prot Research Institutefor Chromatography; Roberta Sessoli is an AssociateProfessor at the University of Florence but since 2007 hasbeen coordinating an industrial collaboration with Italianenergy giant Eni.

38 In theExpert Panel to Provide Advice on Effective Ways ofInvesting in Health, Dr. Dorjan Marui has a distinguishedcareer working in public health but now also works as aprivate consultant, not disclosing who his clients are.

Which independent experts are in our Expert Groups?Corporate vs Academic representation

0

20

40

60

80

100

SANCOBEPACONNECTHOMEAGRI JUSTRTDSGTAXUD

AcademiaCorporate interests

93%

7%

18%

73%

50%41%

33%

67%

20%

80%

11%

89%

8%16%

7%

53%

91%


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18

Worst groups for appointing corporate interests in a personal capacity *

DG Group Name Non-governmentalIndividuals in personalcapacity

Corporate Interests

Taxation and CustomsUnion DG

VAT Expert Group 28 93%

Research DG Expert Group on Intellectual PropertyValuation

10 80%

Research DG Expert group for the evaluation of theoverall performance of the EuropeanInnovation Partnership (EIP) conceptand approach

5 80%

Secretariat-General Expert Group on a debt redemptionfund and eurobills

10 70%

Research DG Expert Group on Retail SectorInnovation

11 64%

Research DG Expert Group on Open Innovation andKnowledge Transfer

12 58%

* The total number of individuals in a personal capacity also includes alternate members

Worst groups

As already stated, it is important to look not just atDGs as a whole but at individual groups in assessingwhether MEPs conditions are being applied.

The VAT Expert Group, under the DG responsible fortax, is dominated by corporate interests: not only is itpacked full of large corporations sitting in the group inan organisational capacity, over 90% of the individualsappointed in a personal capacity also represent corpo-rate interests. Worryingly, some of these independentexperts actually work for the same corporationswho are in there as member-organisations, includingDeloitte (two individuals in a personal capacity), Ernst& Young and KPMG (one individual each),39 greatlyincreasing their inuence over what happens in thegroup.

Looking at individual groups in DG RTD, responsiblefor research and innovation, it is clear that it is one of

the worst offenders for mislabelling corporate interestsin a personal capacity, although this is hidden by anaverage gure of 44% across the DG. A closer lookat the 38 stakeholders across the four worst groupsreveals a lot: there are almost three times as many in-dependent representatives of corporate interests (68%)than academics (24%). A further 5% are also hybrid,

39 All three organisations are members of the group, as wellas being represented in a personal capacity by Jean-ClaudeBouchard (Deloitte), Odile Courjon (Taj Lawrms, a memberof Deloitte), Gwenalle Bernier (Ernst & Young) and StefanMaunz (KPMG).

therefore still linked to corporate interests,40 with oneindividual unclassiable as other. In fact RTD occupiesfour of the top six spots for worst groups.41 Given thatDG RTD is supposed to be leading the Commission onresearch and innovation, including areas of importantpublic interest, it is extremely troubling to see thehow many corporate interests are wrongly labelled asindependent.

Is mislabelling of big business just a technical error?

The European Commission agrees that it is notappropriate for representatives of corporate interestsor any lobbyist for that matter to sit in an ExpertGroup in a personal capacity, i.e. as an independentexpert (for example, as an academic might). It seesthe problem as administrative that interests havebeen labelled wrongly (i.e. in a personal capacity),when in fact they should be labelled as a stakeholder,

i.e. a non-independent representative of an interest.It is true that correctly labelling stakeholders will endthe current dishonest practice and allow the public to

40 Birgitte Andersen is Director of Big Innovation Centre, a notfor prot that brings together some of the worlds leadingcompanies with key institutions from across the policylandscape... It will carry out business-oriented research,taking emerging ideas and backing them with evidencehttp://www.biginnovationcentre.com/Aboutus; Alf Rehnis Chair of Organisation and Management at Abo AkademiUniversity, but also owns Alfrigg AB (consulting/publicspeaking) and Chairman of the Board of advertising agencySatumaa Ltd.

41 DG HOME has been excluded as it only had one individualin a personal capacity although they do represent acorporate interest (see case-study on page 14).
http://www.biginnovationcentre.com/Aboutushttp://www.biginnovationcentre.com/Aboutus


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19

see which interests are actually being represented inExpert Groups. However, this must then lead to groupsbeing rebalanced if it becomes apparent that corporateinterests are dominanating. This is especially relevantgiven that two-thirds of all mislabelled individuals arein fact representatives of corporate interests, with thegure rising to 100% in DG TAXUD.

The Commissions claim that the problem is purelyadministrative also downplays the highly politicalnature of the problem: that the Commission hasbeen accepting supposedly-impartial advice from bigbusiness. How was this allowed to happen where wasthe conict of interest policy that ensured independentexperts were actually independent? It is worryingto see that current conict of interest policies allowrepresentatives of the Big 4 accountancy rms, whospecialise in nding ways for corporations to pay lesstax, to sit in Expert Groups on tax in an independentcapacity. In contrast, DG Agricultures Expert Groupfor Technical Advice on Organic Production putsmembers declarations of interest and CVs on-line,

as well as systematically assessing independence inrelation to links with industry and lobbying on agendaitems. However, the default policy across groups is forindividuals to sign a declaration of independence andthen pro-actively alert the Expert Group chair if theyfeel they have a conict of interest. This voluntaryself-regulation is woefully inadequate and damaging tothe reputation of the Commission, whether the conictof interest is compromising someones decisions or not.

Should commercial interests bein Expert Groups at all?

Even if previously independent stakeholders arerelabelled, this ignores the question of whether theyshould legitimately be in the Expert Group makingpolicy recommendations in the rst place, given theclear conict between commercial interests andpublic interests. In the eld of tobacco regulation,the World Health Organisation (WHO) has drawn upstrict guidelines, Article 5.3 of the WHO FrameworkConvention on Tobacco Control,42 which severely limitthe contact between policy makers and lobbyists andensure any contact is fully disclosed. Its internationallyaccepted that the interests of the tobacco industryare de facto never going to be in the interest of publichealth. This argument is applicable beyond the tobaccoindustry: should the dirty energy industry have a say onclimate policy or risky investment bankers on nancialregulation?

The Commissions reputation is being undermined by

the continued impression that by inviting big businessinto Expert Groups, commercial interests are beingplaced over those of the public and regulation is beingwatered down. One reason this conict of interesthas not been addressed is because the Commissionrelies on external expertise to compensate for its owninternal decit, and therefore claims it must inviteindustry experts. However, the WHOs InternationalAgency for Research on Cancer (IARC) is an effectiveexample of how to balance the need for expertise with

42 World Health Organisation, 2008, Guidelines forimplementation of Article 5.3 of the WHO FrameworkConvention on Tobacco Control, http://www.who.int/fctc/guidelines/article_5_3.pdf

OtherHybridAcademiaCorporate interests

'Independent' corporateinterests dominating DGResearch and Innovation

who is represented across the 4 worst groups?

68%

24%

5%

3%


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20

avoiding potential conicts of interest: it banned allexperts with potential conicts of interest from itsExpert Groups,43 and instead created a new categoryof invited specialists, members who could share theirwisdom but were excluded from drafting text or voting.This ensured political decisions remained in the controlof those representing the public interest, while still

beneting from any external knowledge. Given theimportance of the work conducted by Expert Groupsand the real and apparent conicts of interest of somemembers, such a policy would clearly serve the publicgood.

The impression of a lobbycracy government bylobbyists is a condition that both the Commission andthe US government suffer from, but Washington is tak-ing the problem more seriously. In 2010, US PresidentObama banned all registered lobbyists from sitting in

advisory committees as his Administration is commit-ted to reducing the undue inuence of special intereststhat for too long has shaped the national agenda anddrowned out the voices of ordinary Americans.44 While big business has tried repeatedly to nd waysaround it, Obama has succeeded in removing hundredsof professional lobbyists from White House advisorygroups.45 The Commission would do well to see theunderlying wisdom in Obama and his Administrationsbelief that big business should not receive privilegedaccess to decision makers over other stakeholders, asopposed to the tired and long-disproven mantrathat what is good for big business is automatically goodfor citizens.

43 David Michaels, 2008, Doubt is their Product, OxfordUniversity Press, p. 255-57

44 The White House, June 2010, Presidential Memorandum--Lobbyists on Agency Boards and Commissions, available athttp://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/presidential-memorandum-lobbyists-agency-boards-and-commissions

45 Common Cause, Democracy 21, League of WomenVoters and U.S. PIRG, 2010, A Report Card from ReformGroups on the Obama Administrations Executive BranchLobbying, Ethics and Transparency Reforms in 2009,available athttp://www.democracy21.org/archives/whats-new/a-report-card-from-reform-groups-on-the-obama-administrations-executive-branch-lobbying-ethics-and-transparency-reforms-in-2009/

One year on whats changed?

Despite the European Parliament clearly stating thatno lobbyists should sit in Expert Groups in a personalcapacity some DGs are continuing to appoint corporaterepresentatives with clear conicts of interest inindependent roles (notably TAXUD, RTD and the

Secretariat-General). While the Commission dismissingthis issue as merely one of mislabelling underestimatesthe signicance of the problem, even the rst step ofcorrectly labelling lobbyists is proving impossible forsome. The practice of lobbyists sitting in Expert Groupsin a personal capacity needs to end immediately, butwhile corporate interests should be correctly labelled,the Commission must also ensure they are not in amajority within Expert Groups. Examples from theUS also show that the need for external expertise canbe balanced with avoiding conicts of interest, but it

requires strong political will.
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/presidential-memorandum-lobbyists-agency-boards-and-commissionshttp://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/presidential-memorandum-lobbyists-agency-boards-and-commissionshttp://www.democracy21.org/archives/whats-new/a-report-card-from-reform-groups-on-the-obama-administrations-executive-branch-lobbying-ethics-and-transparency-reforms-in-2009/http://www.democracy21.org/archives/whats-new/a-report-card-from-reform-groups-on-the-obama-administrations-executive-branch-lobbying-ethics-and-transparency-reforms-in-2009/http://www.democracy21.org/archives/whats-new/a-report-card-from-reform-groups-on-the-obama-administrations-executive-branch-lobbying-ethics-and-transparency-reforms-in-2009/http://www.democracy21.org/archives/whats-new/a-report-card-from-reform-groups-on-the-obama-administrations-executive-branch-lobbying-ethics-and-transparency-reforms-in-2009/http://www.democracy21.org/archives/whats-new/a-report-card-from-reform-groups-on-the-obama-administrations-executive-branch-lobbying-ethics-and-transparency-reforms-in-2009/http://www.democracy21.org/archives/whats-new/a-report-card-from-reform-groups-on-the-obama-administrations-executive-branch-lobbying-ethics-and-transparency-reforms-in-2009/http://www.democracy21.org/archives/whats-new/a-report-card-from-reform-groups-on-the-obama-administrations-executive-branch-lobbying-ethics-and-transparency-reforms-in-2009/http://www.democracy21.org/archives/whats-new/a-report-card-from-reform-groups-on-the-obama-administrations-executive-branch-lobbying-ethics-and-transparency-reforms-in-2009/http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/presidential-memorandum-lobbyists-agency-boards-and-commissionshttp://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/presidential-memorandum-lobbyists-agency-boards-and-commissions


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Case Study 2

Tax dodging: the foxes are incharge of the henhouse

Tax dodging by big business and wealthy individuals

costs EU member-states 1 trillion every year, morethan the EUs combined public health care budgets.46 If the money was recouped, it could pay off the EUspublic decit within nine years and end the justicationfor austerity policies which are dismantling publicservices, undermining labour rights and wideninginequality across the continent, throwing millions ofEuropeans into poverty.

TAXUDs Commissioner Algirdas emeta has outlinedtough plans to tackle the problem and assembled an

Expert Group the Platform for Tax Good Governance(the Platform) to help implement them. However, bypacking the Platform with organisations that activelypromote tax dodging as well as those who adviseclients on new ways to get away with it TAXUD isputting the foxes in charge of the henhouse. Given sucha situation, the chances of recouping the 1 trillion andavoiding harsh austerity measures look slim.

The imbalance in the group breaks the rst conditionlaid down by MEPs. Out of 15 positions not given togovernments, nine are taken up by employers federa-tions (5) and corporate tax advisors (4), four by NGOs(CIDSE, Oxfam, Christian Aid, Tax Justice Network),one by academics (European Association of Tax LawProfessors) and one by the European Public ServicesUnion, a trade union.

There is also a clear conict of interest: theemployers associations such as BusinessEurope andthe Federation of German Industries (BDI), haveconsistently argued for lower corporate taxes as a wayof tackling tax evasion,47 while the American Chamber

46 Richard Murphy FCA, 2012, Tax Research UK: Closing theTax Gap A report for Group of the Progressive Alliance ofSocialists and Democrats in the European Parliament, http://europeansfornancialreform.org/en/system/les/3842_en_richard_murphy_eu_tax_gap_en_120229.pdf

47 See for example their recent letter to David Cameron and theG8, which states Pro-growth tax reform that lowers rates,broadens the tax base, simplies the system and ensurescompliance is a priority throughout the G8http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/business/business-news/g8-should-clamp-down-on-tax-avoidance-29286110.htm; while in March2013, President of Business Europe and former President of BDIstated To help reduce overall tax burdens, scal consolidationshould focus primarily on reductions in current public expenditureprotecting investment, not tax rises.http://www.euractiv.com/specialreport-ebs/thumann-EU-must-cut-green-tape-519718

of Commerce successfully lobbied Ireland to weaken

its tax code, allowing royalty payments for intellectualproperty to be funnelled offshore.48

Meanwhile the tax advisers in the Platform allrepresent the Big 4 accountancy rms Deloitte, Ernst& Young, KPMG, PwC who are directly involved inchannelling prots through tax havens,49 and many oftheir senior management previously held or currentlystill hold posts in these rms.50 This makes it unlikelyany of them will be enthusiastic about ending taxevasion and avoidance.

While there was an open call for applications, it wasonly two weeks rather than the usual month or more,which meant less centralised networks or those notacquainted with the Brussels Bubble were unable toapply in time. However, judging by the composition ofthe group, the public call was not a major determinantin what followed:

3 The need to strike a balance between [] the dif-ferent interests represented by stakeholders51 wasignored by appointing ve closely linked employersassociations: the American Chamber of Commerceis a member of the International Chamber ofCommerce, while BusinessEurope is joined by itsGerman and French members, BDI and Medefrespectively. This is despite stating that applyingorganisations must represent an international,preferably European level. Converesely, only onetrade union was appointed despite many applying.

3 Similarly among the associations of private rmsadvising on tax avoidance, Confdration Fiscale

48 http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/ee6c1b64-c1f2-11e2-ab66-00144feab7de.html

49 See Richard Murphy, The Big 4, tax havens andtax avoidance,http://www.taxresearch.org.uk/Blog/2012/12/05/the-big-4-tax-havens-and-tax-avoidance/

50 The Deputy President of Fdration des ExpertsComptables Europensis is a partner in PwC while its ChiefExecutive is a former Director; the Vice-President of theConfdration Fiscale Europenne was a partner of KPMGfrom 1998-2008, while the chairman of its ProfessionalAffairs Committee (one of only two committees) is still a taxlawyer at KPMG.

51 European Commission, 2013, Platform for Tax GoodGovernance, Aggressive Tax Planning and Double TaxationCall for applications for the selection of members,available at http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/resources/documents/taxation/tax_fraud_evasion/platform_call-applications_en.pdf
http://europeansforfinancialreform.org/en/system/files/3842_en_richard_murphy_eu_tax_gap_en_120229.pdfhttp://europeansforfinancialreform.org/en/system/files/3842_en_richard_murphy_eu_tax_gap_en_120229.pdfhttp://europeansforfinancialreform.org/en/system/files/3842_en_richard_murphy_eu_tax_gap_en_120229.pdfhttp://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/business/business-news/g8-should-clamp-down-on-tax-avoidance-29286110.htmlhttp://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/business/business-news/g8-should-clamp-down-on-tax-avoidance-29286110.htmlhttp://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/business/business-news/g8-should-clamp-down-on-tax-avoidance-29286110.htmlhttp://www.euractiv.com/specialreport-ebs/thumann-EU-must-cut-green-tape-519718http://www.euractiv.com/specialreport-ebs/thumann-EU-must-cut-green-tape-519718http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/ee6c1b64-c1f2-11e2-ab66-00144feab7de.htmlhttp://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/ee6c1b64-c1f2-11e2-ab66-00144feab7de.htmlhttp://www.taxresearch.org.uk/Blog/2012/12/05/the-big-4-tax-havens-and-tax-avoidance/http://www.taxresearch.org.uk/Blog/2012/12/05/the-big-4-tax-havens-and-tax-avoidance/http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/resources/documents/taxation/tax_fraud_evasion/platform_call-applications_en.pdfhttp://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/resources/documents/taxation/tax_fraud_evasion/platform_call-applications_en.pdfhttp://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/resources/documents/taxation/tax_fraud_evasion/platform_call-applications_en.pdfhttp://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/resources/documents/taxation/tax_fraud_evasion/platform_call-applications_en.pdfhttp://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/resources/documents/taxation/tax_fraud_evasion/platform_call-applications_en.pdfhttp://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/resources/documents/taxation/tax_fraud_evasion/platform_call-applications_en.pdfhttp://www.taxresearch.org.uk/Blog/2012/12/05/the-big-4-tax-havens-and-tax-avoidance/http://www.taxresearch.org.uk/Blog/2012/12/05/the-big-4-tax-havens-and-tax-avoidance/http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/ee6c1b64-c1f2-11e2-ab66-00144feab7de.htmlhttp://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/ee6c1b64-c1f2-11e2-ab66-00144feab7de.htmlhttp://www.euractiv.com/specialreport-ebs/thumann-EU-must-cut-green-tape-519718http://www.euractiv.com/specialreport-ebs/thumann-EU-must-cut-green-tape-519718http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/business/business-news/g8-should-clamp-down-on-tax-avoidance-29286110.htmlhttp://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/business/business-news/g8-should-clamp-down-on-tax-avoidance-29286110.htmlhttp://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/business/business-news/g8-should-clamp-down-on-tax-avoidance-29286110.htmlhttp://europeansforfinancialreform.org/en/system/files/3842_en_richard_murphy_eu_tax_gap_en_120229.pdfhttp://europeansforfinancialreform.org/en/system/files/3842_en_richard_murphy_eu_tax_gap_en_120229.pdfhttp://europeansforfinancialreform.org/en/system/files/3842_en_richard_murphy_eu_tax_gap_en_120229.pdf


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Europenne (CFE) is joined by its Dutch member,NOB, and Fdration des Experts ComptablesEuropens (FEE) is joined by its UK member ACCA.The close ties between organisations goes further:the chair of CFEs Fiscal Committee is also amember of BusinessEuropes Tax Policy WorkingGroup, while the chair of CFEs Professional AffairsCommittee is also the Chairman of the Formal Law

Section and a member of the Professional AffairsCommittee at NOB.

The group is also failing on transparency, withminutes from the rst meeting in June still not in theRegister on the 20 September,52 and the agenda wasadded only in mid-July, long after the meeting hadtaken place. Even more worrying, according to onemember who was present at the rst meeting therewas also an attempt by one unnamed participant tochange the rules of procedure to ensure no minutes

were recorded, which would have been in clear breachof the condition of transparency. Fortunately it wasnot carried forward. However, the meetings are stillconducted under Chatham House rules, which meansno statements can be attributed to an individual oran organisation. This prevents organisations who areserious about ending tax dodging from blowing thewhistle on those, such as BusinessEurope, who haverepeatedly blocked constructive measures.

52 The Summary Record of the 1st Meeting of the Platformfor Tax Good Governance is now available online, butfails to mention minority opinions, despite report-backsfrom members who were present of highly divergentviews.http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/resources/documents/taxation/tax_fraud_evasion/platform_summary_record.pdf

Several ALTER-EU members, alongside AustrianChamber of Labour (AK) and Austrian Trade UnionFederation (GB), submitted a complaint53 toCommissioner emeta, while several MEPs also tableda Parliamentary question.54 Disappointingly, theresponse ignored all of the claims made and dismissedthe suggestion that there was a problem. However, fol-lowing continued pressure from civil society members

inside the Platform, the Commission has conrmedthere will be a review of the Platforms composition.

Given the publics interest in tackling tax avoidanceand evasion, one would expect TAXUD to takecivil society concerns more seriously and ensure thatmembers with a clear interest in the practice of taxdodging are not shaping the agenda and outcome ofa group intended to tackle the problem. This shouldnot exclude listening to them, and as the Commissionhas reserved the right to invite outside experts to

participate on an ad hoc basis if they have specicexpertise,55 not giving them membership should notprove problematic. Hopefully the membership reviewwill take this into account.

53 Seehttp://corporateeurope.org/news/letter-commissioner-semeta-tax-good-governance-platform

54 The question was tabled by Nessa Childers (S&D), SvenGiegold and Bas Eickhout (Greens), Sylvie Goulard (ALDE)and Monica Macovei (EPP), see full text herehttp://corporateeurope.org/nancial-lobby/2013/06/meps-ask-serious-questions-about-commissions-tax-haven-strategy

55 European Commission, 2013, Platform for Tax GoodGovernance, Aggressive Tax Planning and Double TaxationCall for applications for the selection of members,available at http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/resources/documents/taxation/tax_fraud_evasion/platform_call-applications_en.pdf
http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/resources/documents/taxation/tax_fraud_evasion/platform_summary_record.pdfhttp://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/resources/documents/taxation/tax_fraud_evasion/platform_summary_record.pdfhttp://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/resources/documents/taxation/tax_fraud_evasion/platform_summary_record.pdfhttp://corporateeurope.org/news/letter-commissioner-semeta-tax-good-governance-platformhttp://corporateeurope.org/news/letter-commissioner-semeta-tax-good-governance-platformhttp://corporateeurope.org/financial-lobby/2013/06/meps-ask-serious-questions-about-commissions-tax-haven-strategyhttp://corporateeurope.org/financial-lobby/2013/06/meps-ask-serious-questions-about-commissions-tax-haven-strategyhttp://corporateeurope.org/financial-lobby/2013/06/meps-ask-serious-questions-about-commissions-tax-haven-strategyhttp://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/resources/documents/taxation/tax_fraud_evasion/platform_call-applications_en.pdfhttp://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/resources/documents/taxation/tax_fraud_evasion/platform_call-applications_en.pdfhttp://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/resources/documents/taxation/tax_fraud_evasion/platform_call-applications_en.pdfhttp://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/resources/documents/taxation/tax_fraud_evasion/platform_call-applications_en.pdfhttp://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/resources/documents/taxation/tax_fraud_evasion/platform_call-applications_en.pdfhttp://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/resources/documents/taxation/tax_fraud_evasion/platform_call-applications_en.pdfhttp://corporateeurope.org/financial-lobby/2013/06/meps-ask-serious-questions-about-commissions-tax-haven-strategyhttp://corporateeurope.org/financial-lobby/2013/06/meps-ask-serious-questions-about-commissions-tax-haven-strategyhttp://corporateeurope.org/financial-lobby/2013/06/meps-ask-serious-questions-about-commissions-tax-haven-strategyhttp://corporateeurope.org/news/letter-commissioner-semeta-tax-good-governance-platformhttp://corporateeurope.org/news/letter-commissioner-semeta-tax-good-governance-platformhttp://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/resources/documents/taxation/tax_fraud_evasion/platform_summary_record.pdfhttp://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/resources/documents/taxation/tax_fraud_evasion/platform_summary_record.pdfhttp://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/resources/documents/taxation/tax_fraud_evasion/platform_summary_record.pdf


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23

C :Public calls for applications

3 Across all new groups, almost 60% failed to put out open calls for applications. 3 DG Research and Innovation (8) and DG Health and Consumers (3) did not put out an open call for any of

their groups.

VERDICT: Only a minority are complying with MEP conditions.

Expert Groups were traditionally chosen by theresponsible DG, meaning only those close to the DG orknown to its staff would be invited. This created closedgroups with limited stakeholders and perspectives andmeant policy recommendations that would affect allparts of society were made without representativevoices.

However, in 2012 the Commission agreed to opencalls for applications although with the caveat thatthey would be used as far as reasonably practicable.56 As with other conditions, the picture is mixed acrossall DGs, with some seeing the benet of open calls forapplications and others continuing not to. Across the32 new groups (as subgroups are created by the ExpertGroup), only 41% had open calls for applications.

56 European Commission, September 2012, State of PlayConcerning the Conditions Set by the European Parliamentto Lift the Reserve in the 2012 Budget With Regard ToGroups of Experts (EUR 2 Million)

Worst in class

3 DG RTD, which focuses on research and innovation,is a serial offender, not issuing a call for any of itseight new groups and instead appointing them fromits list of registered experts. This limits those whocan be in the group to those who are already awareof its register. Despite having clear selection criteria

in their Register entry, in the case of the ExpertGroup on Retail Sector Innovation where theentry calls for representation from SMEs and thoseaware of consumer needs no consumer nor SMErepresentative is in the group. With open calls forapplications, DG RTD would be more likely to meetits own selection criteria.

3 DG SANCO, responsible for health and consumers,did not issue a public call for any of its three newgroups, , worrying given the publicly importantscope of its groups, advising on issues like medicaldevices and health spending. DG BEPA (whichis supposed to connect policy-makers withcivil society), EAC (education and culture), ENVI

Which DGs have put out open calls for applications?

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

Open call not made Open call made

Taxation and Customs Union DG Justice DG

Home Affairs DGCommunications Networks, Content and Technology DG

Secretariat-GeneralEnterprise and Industry DG

Agriculture and Rural Development DGResearch DG

Mobility and Transport DGHealth and Consumers DG

Environment DGEducation and Culture DG

Bureau of European Policy Advisers


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24

(environment) and MOVE (transport) failed to issuecalls for any of their new groups, instead makingpolitical appointments.

DGs who put out no calls No. of groupsResearch DG 8Health and Consumers DG 3Bureau of European PolicyAdvisers

1

Education and Culture DG 1Environment DG 1Mobility and Transport DG 1

3 DG AGRI, responsible for the EUs agriculturalpolicy, failed to make a public call for its HighLevel Steering Board for the European InnovationPartnership, which

Documents

Broken Promises- UE reports on corruption legislation