Bru Zina 1986

Husserl Studies 3:3-29 (1986) 1986 Martinus Niihoff Publishers, Dordrecht. Printed in the Netherlands.

The enworlding (Verweltlichung) of transcendental phenomenological reflection: A study of Eugen Fink's "6th Cartesian Meditation"*

RONALD BRUZINA

University of Kentucky

1. Introduction

There have been philosophers doing phenomenology now for twice forty years, and we are in the third generation of philosophers in the phenomenological movement. For nearly that same length of time we have been acquainted with the thesis, originating with no less a figure than the founding father himself, Edmund Husserl, that phenomenology reaches its proper radicality as transcendental inquiry, indeed as transcendental idealism. We find in Husserl, whose thinking is paradigmatic in its intense insistence on this point, the working out of what is implied by asserting that phenomenology must overcome the natural attitude, i.e., that it must culminate in a kind of inquiry that disallows foundational validity for our attribution of autonomous being and givenness to the ensemble of entities that compose the known universe - including ourselves as living, breathing creatures. Instead phenomenology finds that the origin of all featuring and presence on the part of that ensemble of entities lies in processes of constitution that go on in the absolute of subjective being.

We are, of course, familiar with this thesis, but one aspect of the fact of our familiarity has not received all that much attention; and it

* The study on which this paper is based was done during a year of research made possible by a fellowship from the Alexander von Humboldt Foundat ion in 1977-78. I wish also to express my thanks to Mrs. Susanne Fink for permission to draw quotations from the manuscript of Professor Fink's "6th Cartesian Meditation" and to Professor Samuel IJsseling, Director of the Husserl Archives, and Dr. Guy van Kerckhoven, then of the Husserl Archives staff, for their kind help in correcting the quoted materials in accordance with the final edited version of the respective texts.

introduces us to the issue I wish to pursue here. What we are quite aware of, and yet do not take centrally into focus, is the fact that we know all we do about the growth and development of phenomenology, and particularly of Husserl's transcendental phenomenological idealism, because this whole movement of thought has taken form in a very un- transcendental way, has appeared articulated in lectures, discussions, essays and books that are as much a piece of the ordinary world and its activities as any other nonphenomenological academic productions and activities. Paradoxically, the elaboration, communication, and sharing of the study that as transcendental science consumed Husserl's energies was done in talk and in writing with a mundaness of medium that seems to possess in its native substance none of the supernal qualities that it would be the very purpose of the whole expressive effort to explain and convey. Husserl's idiosyncratic and now hopelessly outdated Gabelsberg shorthand can hardly be considered "transcendental script"! And although typewritten or printed pages are far better, they are hardly non- wordly realities.

But the activities and products of the process of articulative wording are only one, albeit a crucially important, aspect of the paradoxical situation in which Husserl's transcendental phenomenology finds itself. There is in addition the even more massively obvious fact that it is this individual man, Edmund Husserl himself, whose thinking moves into the sphere of the transcendental and comes to assert its own role as in some way, constitutive for the very world within which it itself, as a life of thinking, took form. The place where Husserl draws our attention to this whole paradox in explicit terms is in the Crisis text, 1 for example, in 53, 54, and 72, where he also offers an outline of its resolution. But those passages are a very general discussion of it; they are a distillia- tion, as it were, of the reflections he was pursuing during the thirties (and earlier). One has to see more of these actual ongoing reflections to find pointed examination of the different elements of the paradox, including the matter of language and linguistic productions. In these sec- tions of Crisis Husserl speaks mainly of how the subjective constitution of the world and of phenomena in the world is already working and has already been under way "anonymously ''2 in the life of subjects in the world; but there is another whole new dimension to consider beyond that. For the very reflections of the phenomenologically awakened and practising subject in recognizing the constituting function it itself exer- cises, must in turn be themselves exp'ressed in the form of in-the-world

phenomena, i.e., in the form of language spoken (or written) by that same transcendentally "phenomenologizing" subject as such (and there- upon too as in some way acting in the world). To put it another way: The phenomenological reduction, once fully performed, leads to the recognition that world-constituting functions have already gone on, and that these functions have gone on in and for the subject-agent that is also itself objectified as an entity (as a human being) within that constituted world. But the very recognition of all this, achieved within the stance of the reduction, the phenomenological reflections which achieve this recognition, also take on the form of the performances of a subject-agent who is an entity in the world, who is the psychological self of a human being. The very reflections, by which the "enworlding'" (Verwelttichung) of transcendental constitutive processes is recognized as already having taken place in the life of actual mundane subjective beings, are themselves also "enworlded" as the psychological actions of mundane subjective beings. It is the human individual, Edmund Husserl - or someone like him - who in some way comes to think these transcendentally reflective phenomenological findings.

One working manuscript of Husserl's from late 1931 on this very issue shows in the unusual way it opens how clearly Husserl was aware of this very situation:

I say: "In G~Sttingen I first worked out the phenomenological reduction." Or I say, "Here I sit at my writing table, and I am in the phenomenological attitude, doing my investigations and writing down the results of transcendental phenomenology." ... Thus phenomenological activity becomes the human, psychological activity of the ordinary human I, belongs to the world and is an historical event in the history of philosophy:

... Here we have just this remarkable fact, and problem for us, that, standing on the ground of the world (that is, as a philosoper, taking it up as an experiential theme, as a scientific theme) without more ado I also enworld my transcendental scientific activity and its results, I construe my phenomenological thinking as a human, psychic happening in the soul, and thus take phenomenology as an event in the world, or more particularly as an event in the history of European philosophy. 3

The sentences that follow in this important manuscript are well worth

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reading, and I shall be referring to them later; but it is from another group of writings that I wish mainly to draw in the study to be pursued here. It is a unique group in that it comprises both a series of manuscripts written in the solitude of Husserl's own reflection and, most importantly, a document that records in manuscript form the interplay of thinking between Husserl and the research assistant who shared so intimately the final years of his life, Eugen Fink. ! am referring to the "6th Cartesian Meditation" which Fink wrote for Husserl between August and October of 1932, as part of the assignment Husserl had given him to revise the Cartesian Meditations text as a comprehensive introductory statement of Husserl's transcendental phenomenology. 4 Fink titled his document: "Sechste Meditation: Die Idee einer transzendentalen Methodenlehre." In addition to the many, sometimes quite lengthy marginal and interlinear notations Husserl made on this text, he also wrote a number of manuscripts directly relating to it. s In point of fact a good number of these manuscripts deal specifically with the one section, the longest, of Fink's "6th Meditation" which takes up the full topic within which the issue I am raising here is treated:

1 1. Phenomenologizing as "the action of making into a science" A. The problem of the scientificity of phenomenologizing B. The enworlding of phenomenologizing C. The concept of "science."

2. The topic of phenomenologizing as science

Section 11 with its three subsections addresses the range of considera- tions that have to be covered in inquiring into how the fully self- reflective transcendental realization of phenomenology becomes com- munally possessed and pursued knowledge. Towards the beginning of this section Fink states the problem thus: "The problem of transcendental science is not principally the question of the system and inner architectonic of transcendental knowing that accrues to the phenomenologizing agent in his cognitive life; rather it presents itself first of all as the problem of publicly voicing transcendental acquisitions, thus as the problem of communicating and announcing transcendental knowledge in the worM, in the natural attitude" (adding to this sentence Husserl writes: "with the further purpose of producing a mankind that

forms itself into a community in transcendental research"). 6 A little further, in the first subsection of 11, Fink puts it another way:

In our posing of the question of the "scientificity" of phenomenologizing it is not a matter now of ways in which truths are presup- posed, but of the way in which subjective life-structures are pre- supposed for it to be possible that transcendental phenomenologizing be objectivated into "science" in the first place. It is the basic question whether and how the objectivation of phenomenological cognition into a science that makes its entrance in the world participates in the subjective conditions that hold for every mundane science, whether and how it takes part in the dependence which the insti- tutional organization of worldly science has upon certain basic phenomena of human existence. 7

The issue here, now, is not the question whether and how one gets to the phenomenological stance out of the natural attitude, out of pre- phenomenological naivet6, and therefore the question of reconciling the in-the-world self of a human being with the world-constituting function of a transcendental subjective I. That is indeed a serious and fundamental question, but it is not the one mainly addressed here, although it relates very closely to it. Here the question concerns not primarily the action of subjectivity that constitutes the world, and in doing so also constitutes itself (objectivates itself) in an in-the-world existence directly concerned with the world, but rather the function of a transcendental subje~t-I that in reflection comes to explicit, thematic recognition of this whole constituting action and of the relative status of the world as constituted horizon of all experience. It is a question not of the world-constituting work of transcendental subjectivity, but of the act of taking reflective notice of this whole world-constituting work, the act which, not part of that work, comes to realize what it all is. The topic here is the act of the "unbeteiligte Zuschauer,'" of the transcendental I as 'onlooker' upon and not participant in its own whole own work of the constitution of world and world phenomena; it is the ultimate, apex level of phenomenologizing, the "phenomenology of phenomenology. ''8 This is the subject-matter of the whole document of the "6th Cartesian Meditation" and its attendant writings. The issue now within this larger topic upon which I am focusing here is the way

in which this "phenomenology of phenomenology," as the apex of phenomenological knowing (Wissen), comes itself to take on, and fulfill itself in, the conditions of an in-the-world phenomenon, namely, in the form of a communal project and possession called science (Wissen- schaft). This is the issue raised specifically in 11 of the "6th Medita- tion" and in the Husserlian writings that relate to it.

Now, that phenomenological cognition does indeed take on the form of an in-the-world science is not a matter of dispute. The real question is the how and why of it all, on the one hand, and on the other what this implies for the overall coherence and adequacy of Husserl's transcendental phenomenology as a philosophy.

3. Enworlding (Verweltliehung)

Fink's text is a remarkable synthesis of an array of manuscript studies that Husserl had been working on prior to 1932. Fink's detailed com- mand of the fundamentals of Husserl's thinking is already well known from his 1933 article in Kantstudien, "The Phenomenological Philos- ophy of Edmund Husserl and Contemporary Criticism, ''9 especially in the unqualified approval Husserl gave to it as representing totally his, Husserl's, very own thinking; and as one might expect, given the close- ness in time of the two compositions, many points in common are found in them. 1 It is an open question, of course, how much the "6th Meditation" text represents Husserl's own thinking, and how much - as Fink's work - it represents an extension beyond or a modification of positions Husserl did or would take. Even Husserrs own manuscripts, and his notations on Fink's document cannot be taken as necessarily expressions of definitive positions on his, Husserl's, part. They are reflections in the process of being thought, and the judgment of their adequacy or firmness can only be determined by establishing their coherent (and possibly paradigmatic) place in the continuities that emerge from the materials produced in Husserl's retirement years.

The specific interest of the "6th Meditation" lies in the interplay of Fink's text and Husserl's comments both in the text and in the manuscripts he produced on the occasion of his studying it. This interplay, now, this record of dialogical reflection in process, is what I wish to follow in studying the issue focused on in the present paper, namely, the objectivation of the transcendental reflections of the transcenden-

tal I, of the "unbeteiligte Zuschauer," an objectivation specifically in the form of procedures and products of, the cognitive endeavors of human subjects in the world, in the form of a verbally composed and shared phenomenological science.

To begin with, here are just two texts of Husserl's from the supple- mentary study manuscripts he wrote at the time of his reading of Fink's text that clearly indicate his thinking that transcendental, self- reflective phenomenologizing does indeed objectivate itself as science in-the-world:

Transcendental concrete subjectivity (the absolute universe of being) contains its own science within itself and by it its self- objectification as in truth existent for me as monadic ego and for the co-phenomenologizing others who make themselves known in me. But this too is to be noticed: the "I and we phenomenol- ogists" transcendentally explicated is necessarily enworlded, namely, objectivated into the previously naively constituted world as "we phenomenologizing humans," standing in the historical course of mankind, and using phenomenological science to search into the world and its mankind, its human-historical world, and the positive sciences here. n

While I, the one phenomenologizing, explore the constitution of the world (as being-sense [Seinssinnl of the transcendental ego), I perform thereby a continuing constitution of the world itself, namely, by psychologizing the transcendental lived process which functions as constituting the world. So for every transcendental Other and for monadic communalization. Everything is psycholo- gized, is thereby put into the world, to be ascribed to human souls. Again and again I, the one phenomenologizing, (and we) can place ourselves "back" in the stance toward the world and human- ity and then must find in the world everything transcendental enworlded in souls. 12

These texts, of course, when extracted from their whole context, are not self-explanatory; they need amplification, particularly on the point of why, within Husserl's phenomenological position, such in-the-world "objectivation" of transcendental reflection has to take place. To pro- vide some of this, however, I shall not try to give a comprehensive sum- mary of the various documents, Husserl's as well as Fink's, but rather

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follow the dialogue between Fink and Husserl regarding two specific issues central to the overall Husserlian position in question: (a) how to characterize correctly the relationship of the objectivated situation to the transcendental performance that comes to be therein enworlded in terms of the 'appearance' of the transcendental as the mundane (Sec- tion 4 below); (b) how to characterize the difference between the situation of enworlding (which comprises among other things objectivation) and transcendentality in terms of the concerns of ontology, that is, in terms of how these are kinds of being (Section 5 below).

4. The choice of terms for characterizing Verweltlichung: the question of "appearances"

There can be no doubt that Husserl finds the phenomenologizing of the transcendental non-participant onlooker to be in fact enworlded. This fact of enworlding can, however, be put in a stronger way, namely, as an essential necessity that transcendental phenomenologizing be enworlded in order for its full realization to be achieved. Now, settling the case for this necessity turns precisely on the resolution of the first of the two issues just mentioned, namely, the way in which a transcendental act relates to its 'appearance' in the world; 13 and I shall get to that shortly. First, however, we have to review the analysis on the basis of which a question of necessity regarding enworlding could be relevant in the first place. The reason why it seems appropriate that transcendental phenomenological self-reflection becomes a process occurring in the world in the form of psychic moves in actual human lives derives from the Husserlian analysis of the way reflective solitude is insufficient in itself to give rise to knowledge adequately considered. In order for some instance of rational understanding to become a piece of genuine knowing - i.e., scientific - it has to achieve freedom from the limita- tions of the individual situation and the individual act. Only when the cognitive realization which someone reaches individually becomes inte- grated in an unlimited horizon of continuation and confirmation in investigation does the capability of such cognitive realization, and of particular findings within its exercise, win an autonomy that warrants its being considered genuinely cognitive - i.e., scientific in the broad sense. Gaining integration into an unlimited horizon of continuation and confirmation in a concrete way means not only reaching constancy

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within the temporal flux of one's own individual life of experience, but also acquiring additional dimensions for one's activities, namely, a field of co-cognizers, on the one hand, and the means of communicating with them, on the other. When, then, one's reflections (1) take place within intersubjective relationships, and (2) are formulated and made unreservedly available in language, then cognitive realizations can become genuinely and fully cognitive, i.e., science in the broad sense.

The basics of this Husserlian analysis are well known, for example, from the essay, "On the Origins of Geometry. ''14 Fink's statement of them in his "6th Meditation" - which antedates the writing of that essay - is for the purpose of raising the question of how transcendental phenomenologizing, and not a mundane science such as geometry, would or could be itself a science. The above kind of explication of the complex of conditions for reaching genuine science, however, holds in Husserl's phenomenology primarily for science-in-the-world, for science in a mundane standpoint. The question now is whether a similar set of conditions would hold for transcendental cognition. For if it does, not only does radical transcendental reflection ("phenomenologizing") enworld itself in human activities that will accordingly have the form of science in the broad sense, it must do so. And the way to settle this question of whether similar conditions hold for transcendental cognitive realizations as do for mundane cognitive endeavors, is to settle the question of how transcendental subjectivity is (1) to be distin- guished from, and yet (2) identified with its 'appearance' in mundane subjectivity.

As one might expect, this is an exceedingly difficult question; and the Husserl-Fink dialogue I wish to treat here does not resolve it in all details. But herein lies the specific import of Fink's whole document: it states with a comprehensiveness and precision a set of fundamental theoretical questions, of which this is one, that have to be answered if Husserl's phenomenology is to stand as an adequate philosophical position. Fink tries to organize and synthesize the findings of Husserl's phenomenology in such a way as precisely to define these still open questions and thereby promote their resolution. Finally, the fact is that this proposal never got beyond this stage of preliminary formulation by Fink and detailed comment by Husserl; a final integration of the two in a finished document was never achieved. Husserl turned from his purpose to have his Cartesian Meditations revised as a comprehensive introduction to phenomenology, and threw himself into another project,

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resulting ultimately in the Crisis papers. Even so, much of what is com- prised within the areas covered in the Crisis texts is found as part of the "6th Meditation" topics, specifically the whole issue of "enworlding" in its various levels.

To return to the question at issue in this present paper, now, it is worthwhile pointing out that the larger part of the manuscripts Husserl wrote specifically in reference to Fink's "6th Meditation" deals in one way or another with this issue of the enworlding of transcendental reflection, for example, the text contained in TML 1, Beilage II, which begins: "How does the activity of the transcendental onlooker, now, make itself mundane?"; or the text in Beilage XIII, entitled, "The psychological enworlding of the transcendental which is disclosed from the viewpoint of the phenomenologizing ego. ''is The phenomena of our conscious life in the world as we view them prior to the phenomenological reduction, that is, from within our "entanglement ''I~ in the world, are precisely clues to the transcendental life that is therein to be disclosed. It is of central importance, then, that the connection between the two be made clear, whatever it is; for its explanation would (1) show-how clues can be precisely clues, and, more broadly, (2)would lead to the understanding of such matters central to phenomenology as how one accomplishes the transition to the phenomenological standpoint in the first place, and then what it is one gets to in doing so. 17

In formulating his analysis of what happens in the enworlding of transcendental cognitive realization, Fink uses the word 'Erscheinung'. 'Erscheinung' first occurs in the "6th Meditation" in a narrower context than that of the phenomenological treatment of science, even if it is intimately related to that treatment. Here is one sample from 10:

Since on the one hand phenomenologizing assertions transform the natural sense of words, and on the other can nevertheless only express new transcendental sense with mundane concepts and terms (which are one and all concepts of being [Seinsbegriffe] and not concepts of pre-being [Vorseinsbegriffe] ), phenomenologizing moves in a certain way (seemingly [scheinbar] !!) out of the transcendental attitude; but it does this in such a fashion that in exit- making words its being in and remaining in that attitude are indicated and "outwardly expressed, "' and it speaks of what properly is not existent (eigentlich nicht Seienden) (pre-existent [ Vorseienden] ) in ontic concepts and words. In this

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only apparent (scheinbar) abandoning of the transcendental attitude phenomenology goes over into its "appearance" (Erschei- nung) . Preliminarily we understand than by "appearance" the outward expressional form in which the inner transcendental form of phenomenologizing finds its predicative safekeeping and ob]ectivation. 18

Now in point of fact immediately after this, in a marginal note, Husserl objects to Fink's use of 'Erseheinung'; he says simply that it is an "un- suitable expression." Then in a note following this remark, Husserl discusses the next lines in Fink's text where 'Erscheinung' is defined in terms of "J[usserung' (outward expression), suggesting that he was concerned about an ambiguity that the term might conceal if defined that way, namely, an ambiguity between (1) the way in which outward expression is expression, i.e., is the act of communicating transcendental meaning in transcendental intersubjectivity, and (2) the way in which outward expression is outward, i.e. in the casting of this expressing in in-the-world entitative form. As Fink proceeds, however, particularly when he broadens the context and topic as he moves beyond predica- tion to treat the conditions for scientificity, it becomes clear that this distinction is not at all overlooked; Fink discusses it at great length in terms that Husserl is largely satisfied with. His discontent with the word 'Erscheinung', however, remains, and we have to tease out the implications of that discontent.

To understand Husserl's own thinking and how he confirms and yet alters Fink's representation of his (Husserl's) position, we have to look closely at the way Fink develops the terminology for explicating, on the one hand, the difference between transcendental self-reflective cognitive realization and its mundane appearance-form and, on the other, the essential unity of the two - a paradoxical nexus which is at the very heart of the matter at issue. Fink's way of approaching this is to begin with the observation that phenomenologizing - i.e., the self- reflection of transcendental subjective as transcental - is quite clearly not a performance whose interest and intent are the constitution of a world of object-phenomena. Indeed, the function of transcendental self-reflection goes counter to that performance and does not participate in it, else it would not be a reflective inquiry into that very performance. As a result, phenomenologizing is spoken of as done by the I as non-participant onlooker and not by the I as constituting the world.

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It is, however, the performance of I as world-constituting that specifically accounts for the self-constituting of the same world-intent I as a being-in-the-world, as a human subject. 19 Consequently, if the phenomenological self-reflection takes on a featuring and presence in the world, then this enworlding can only be effected by the I as world-constituting agent, and not as phenomenologizing agent. Fink therefore introduces the distinction between "proper or primary enworlding", 2 namely the "enworlding of the constituting I into man in the world, '':1 and "non-proper or secondary enworlding". 22 This secondary enworlding is not produced by the I as transcendentally reflective, as active in the order that does not participate in the constitution of mundane phenomena; rather this enworlding is effected by virtue of the intimate relationship of the I as transcendentally reflective with the I as taken up with constituting the world of phenomena. Fink says:

Beyond all "antitheses in being" the phenomenologizing I stands in a transcendental unity o f life with the constituting I; in the final analysis the "onlooker" is for all that only an I of reflection that is projected out from the life of constitution ... (as center of the new activity that is, so to speak, turned away from the world). And now this I becomes as it were passively participant in world- constitution insofar as, in a way that is very difficult to analyze, it is encompassed by the self-enworlding of the constituting I, carried off by it and made mundane. 23

As a result, continues Fink, the performances of constitution that achieve authentic enworlding "sweep the 'non-participant' phenomenologically theorizing I along into the mundanization that, for it, becomes a non-proper and seeming (scheinbar) enworlding, for it does not rest upon its own activity. Phenomenologizing becomes "appearance" (Er- scheinung). 24

Now the interesting thing, and the crucial issue, is what Husserl does with these distinctions of Fink's, how he comments on the whole con- ception here, how he rewords it to suit himself or goes on with reflections of his own prompted by it. For not only do we find agreement in the substance of Fink's treatment of this matter, but we find that Husserl's reflection and modifications ratify the point Fink is making about the unity in question here, which is the key to the whole issue.

Let me begin with the first kind of comment Husserl makes, namely,

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a recasting of the way Fink puts it. What we find is that on the matter of how transcendental self-reflection "shows up" in the world, Husserl is not all that fond of 'Erscheinung" as an appropriate term. From time to time, though not always, he writes another expression above the 'Er- scheinung' that Fink uses. Here are some examples:

(1) on MS p. 142 the word Husserl inserts is 'Lokalisierung', in echo of an earlier passage in Fink's manuscript (MS p. 120) where the distinction between "proper" and "non-proper enworlding" was first introduced, and in compliance with Husserrs own usage in manuscripts of the period (e.g., the one from which the long text on p. 5 above is drawn);

(2) on MS p. 157 the inserted term is 'sekundiire Verweltlichung', ob- viously Fink's own terminology;

(3) on MS p. 160 the inserted term is 'weltliche Sichdarstellung'. One can find similarly in both Husserl's extended comments and in the manuscripts he produces on his own that he uses expressions of the sort just illustrated and not the term 'Erscheinung' or its cognates. One naturally wants to know why; and the answer seems to lie in a danger latent in 'Erscheinung' that Husserl wishes strictly to avoid in discussions of the enworlding of the activity of the non-participant onlooker, namely, that any "appearance" of the latter "in the world" might be taken as illusory, as a kind of half-reality or un-reality with no intrinsic place in the life of transcendental subjectivity.

Here we reach the most difficult and yet pivotal issue, the essential unity of the transcendental and the mundane, precisely in their difference. This very issue becomes the focus for some remarkable pages in this 1 1 on science, and the import of Husserl's comments here is decisive; for here he confirms among his own reflections the point Fink is making in the main text. Here is one of those passages. Fink writes:

The determination of phenomenologizing that would be only transcendental in completely turning away from all appearance-truths or their transcendental interpretation does not suffice for exposition of the phenomenological concept of science. For the appearance of phenomenologizing is not a covering up and concealing of it in a way extrinsic to its essence, a concealment which the specific nature of the knowing that is real- ized in phenomenologizing would not later touch upon; but rather this appearance is the result of the transcendental constitution of

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the situation of knowing, of the situation of science, in which situation phenomenologizing starts off, proceeds, and remains. 2s

In a marginal note Husserl explains the first phrase he adds into the text:

It is a sheer abstraction. The continual secondary self-enworlding of the transcendental belongs to the new constitution that is put into action by the transcendental reduction under the presupposi- tion of and with the turning around of the earlier naive constitution. Whether we look at it or not, the higher constitution of transcendentality in being is at the same time referred back to itself in the form of a transcendental localization in the world. 26

We see quite clearly a difference in wording (and in style of phrasing) between Fink and Husserl in making the same point. One speaks of enworlding in terms of 'appearance' (Erscheinung), the other in terms of 'localization,' both ways of speaking of the situation in which transcendental phenomenologizing finds itself in being enworlded, both ways of somehow including the enworlded situation in the transcendental economy of phenomenological self-reflection. The strength of agreement on Husserl's part with Fink's schema - despite the difference in wording - is readily confirmed in the fuller context of the "6th Medita- tion" undertaking. I wish to cite one good example of this before turning to the matter of the difference.

Two manuscripts Husserl wrote on the occasion of reading the "6th Meditation" are those given as Beilagen II and III. In these manuscripts Husserl is investigating the way the cognitive realization achieved by the phenomenological reduction (1) is retained even when one returns to activities of involvement with things in and of the world in an in-the- world way, and (2) how this transcendental cognitive realization is itself carried on in such way as to have the form of an in-the-world performance. For example, on the first point, Husserl explains that the understanding thus reached is not simply annulled by the return to mundane activities; indeed those activities are transformed, but not in their being. 27 They are transformed in their meaning, a meaning the appreciation of which can return to us thematically anytime we repeat the shift to the transcendental phenomenological viewpoint. For these

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activities are no longer naively taken as activities of one entity - my- self - subserviently adjusting itself to a surrounding of other, utterly autonomous objective entities whose properties impose the rules of such adjustment - such being the standpoint of the natural attitude. They are rather understood as activities of an agency which itself conditions the very featuring of its surroundings in accord with which it makes its way among them. They are understood as the activities of an agency that constitutes its world and thus finds itself confronting it. Now in all this the crucial point is that Husserl insists upon a unity between this constituting agency and the reflective action by which that constitution role becomes explicitated, i.e., a unity between transcendental doer and transcendental phenomenologizer. And it is by virtue of the unity of the second with the first that the enworlding of the phenomenologizer as performing transcendental self-reflection takes place. Here is Husserl saying just this in the first of these manuscripts, Beilage II:

If we consider, now, that what was ascertained in the first stage as the thematic, explicated ego is inseparable from the functions which we apprehend under the title, phenomenologizing I, which as anonymous are nonetheless accessible to reflection, then it is clear that, just as the "phenomenologizing I," and hence these anonymous strata of the ego, are also taken into account, they are also immediately included in the thematic transposition into worldliness. That which at first became thematic as transcendental ego changes into the human soul with all that belongs to it of world-constituting functions; and since phenomenologizing functions are inseparably one with this ego, they thus eo ipso also receive their place in the soul, hence in the world of the natural attitude. Here, however, the situation is such that they do not from the outset and in a proper way belong to the soul in the form of psychic possibilities, for they are not the functions in which the soul has already been constituted as correlate of experience. I cannot as man (or as psychologist) come upon functions in which the psychic annuls itself as natural-worldly and stops being able to be in the universal end-theme, world. That, however, does not pre- vent me, in passing over into the natural attitude, from finding enworlded my phenomenological all-inclusive theme, "ego," together with phenomenologizing action.

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The fact remains, however, that Fink and Husserl word differently one of the elements that is to be held in this unity, namely the enworlded state which the transcendentally self-reflecting I finds itself having to be in. And we have to see whether this difference is significant or not.

5. The difference in terms and the question of being

A strong clue to whether this difference is more than mere stylistic preference is in fact given by Husserl himself, when in the course of his comments later in this same 11 he gives further expression to his discomfort at Fink's use of 'appearance' words. At one point Fink enters into a discussion of how general traits found to be true of mundane science would also have to be true of transcendental science, i.e., of the transcendental endeavor of self-reflective phenomenologizing. Indeed, he goes on to point out, if phenomenologizing is to be at all enworlded, it will be so precisely with the appearance of in-the-world science; and this link with the form of in-the-world science, with structural conditions and elements true of in-the-world science, is integral to the full concept of transcendental science. There is here "a synthetic unity of antithetic determinations" that abides exclusively within the transcendental sphere (MS p. 161). So far so good! Husserl says of this point: "That is surely correct"; and he adds: "The enworlding of all transcendental cognition and of things transcendentally existent, e.g., even monads ... is in this sense non-proper enworlding, namely, it yields nothing that is a worldly existent" (Note 499, MS p. 161). (This, by the way, is one more instance of the accord of Fink's terminological devices with Husserl's own thinking.) But in elaborating a bit on the kind of unity this "synthetic unity" is, Fink raises Husserl's hackles by the use of an "appearance-word." Fink writes: "Appearance truth (Erschei- nungswahrheit) does not stand, so to speak, with equal rights alongside transcendental truth, but in the final analysis is a seeming truth (Sehein- wahrheit) which is always 'transparent' for him who philosophizes ..."; and Husserl inserts above Seheinwahrheit what for him is a most vigorous remark: "That rubs me the wrong way! Spatio-temporal localization is no seeming (Sehein), but has a sense that transcends all wordly localization, that of the worldly existent. ''2s

Husserl, clearly, wants to avoid "appearance-words" in trying to arti- culate the relationship between the transcendental and its mundaniza-

19

tion in in-the-world being. He prefers words that have the character of in-the-world descriptive solidity, for such words give a clue to features that yield transcendental meaning if rightly interpreted. In point of fact, 'Erscheinung' has a certain appropriateness, for after all is not phenomenology a matter of turning to things precisely in their appearance? 29 But 'Erscheinung' is not Husserl's term here; it does not convey for him the way in-the-world featuring both remains and is transformed through conversion of one's viewpoint from naive acceptance to transcendental phenomenological grasp. Nor does it convey for him the relationship between the "enworlded" station of transcendental reflection and that reflection itself in its authentic sense.

In attempting to understand Husserl's reaction it is most important to keep in mind one point emphasized in the last brief texts of Husserrs just quoted, viz., that transcendental reflection is not an act character- izable as worldly being. True, one whole stratum of the transcendental as constituting action is to constitute phenomena precisely as in-the- world, a constitution process that in the end comes to cast itself as subjectivity into an in-the-world appearance, in the form of the somato- psychic self who attends to and acts precisely in the world. But this act of constituting is not, as constituting, itself an in-the-world act; and a fortiori the act bY which that constituting process is reflectively recognized is not an in-the-world act. It is not an act with mundane being.

The question then, of course, is what is it? What kind of being or status does it have? This is one of the very issues Fink sketches out as a problem for the transcendental theory of method to address, in 8 of the "6th Meditation," especially MS pp. 91-97. And here we begin to see more clearly strong differences between the direction of Fink's thinking, on the one hand, and of Husserl's, on the other, in his comments on Fink's text.

For Husserl, when constituting subjectivity not yet thematized becomes precisely thematized in transcendental self-reflection, it passes from what Husserl calls anonymity to givenness. 3 In this "anonymity" it is, in some sense, already "there," and has already done its job of constitution; for phenomenological reflection makes its discovery of transcendental constitution precisely by regression from the world of already constituted mundane objects and mundane conscious subjects. There is, however, a genuine sense in which the constituting subject found by reflection "is not yet" until it is actually thematized. For in order to "be" for reflective grasp, in order to be brought to objective

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givenness in its move from anonymity into a thematization in the theoretical experience of transcendental self-reflection, this constituting subject needs to display certain structural characteristics like those proper to in-the-world entities; it needs to have a place within a kind of world-frame that is intersubjective, that is the very intersubjective ensemble in which its own monadic distinctness is lodged, that is a universe of its own precisely in genuine transcendentality. Only then can it be said, in a transcendental sense of the term, 'to be,' 'to exist." Before that it is "not yet" transcendentally in being. Two key texts of Husserl's on this point are found on MS p. 97, one an extensive change in the wording of one of Fink's sentences, the other an extended marginal comment. Here is the first of these:

All the rest of the constitutive structure can become thematic in a productive theme-ensemble, and in the end can even become a thematic universe, by the establishment of which the being of transcendental events as such is first completed in an in itself existent "world" of the transcendental (transcendental inexistence). Only after that does "transcendental experience" as theoretical experience of something existent, of something determined in itself, of something determinable from experience - in this "world" - first have its full sense. 31

The second text, the marginal comment, is only understandable when one sees the sentence of Fink's to which it applies. Fink has written: "In other words, the theoretical experience of the phenomenological onlooker ontifies the "pre-existent" life-processes of transcendental subjectivity and is therefore in a sense - a sense not comparable to any mode of productivity pregiven in a worldly way - 'productive.' Husserl comments:

Thus at the start of the reduction. However, it is not that, as soon as the ontification is under way, immediately the open horizon and universal horizon of that which is transcendentally existent is coproduced. The phenomenon of the world as clue means at once the turn to the universe of world-constituting, constitutive performances in the ego - which is not yet something existent. The production, however, first creates what is existent in the new tran-

21

scendental universe, the all of monads in its monadic community of time, [and] in it everything which is subjectively and empirical- ly constituted. To describe that universally in its essential structures in transcendental evidentness, however, is the task. Adden- dum: In the change of thematic position there arises "o f itself" a thematic horizon as potentiality through transformation. But by the productive forming of existents as always re-experienceable and theoretically determinable for anyone there is constituted the transcendental universe as universe of transcendental existents - the world of the transcendental in which the human world is phenomenon. "An existent" only makes sense as something existent in a world - even that which is transcendentally existent. 32

It is quite clear, now, that Husserl does not hesitate to talk of the 'being' (Sein) (or even the 'existence' [Existenz] ) of the transcendental, even though it is also clear that the sense that transcendental 'being' has cannot at all be that proper to the mundane sphere. A shift or transformation in the sense of 'being' has had to take place, and a profound one at that, in order that "being" may in any genuine sense be said of the transcendental. In point of fact, in the pages in this 8 (MS pp. 91ft.) of the "6th Meditation" immediately prior to the passages just quoted, Fink and Husserl have discussed this very point; and again a clear difference emerges. Husserl sees no difficulty about this transformation in the sense of 'being'. It has to be taken note of, but no special action or additional effort is needed to ensure its effectively taking place. The transformation in the sense of 'being' from that limited to the mundane world as taken in the natural attitude to that appropriate to the transcendental level occurs quite automatically right in and along with the transition that one's thinking achieves in moving from the naive mundane standpoint to the transcendentally reflective.

Husserl makes these points in his alterations and comments on Fink's discussion of the way being must be a theme for the transcendental theory of method. 33 And Fink has presented the issue as one in which, because the idea of being arises and is formed in mundane naivet6, a specific reduction of the idea of being itself is required, if "being- words" have been taken over in and by transcendental thinking. For Fink, "being-words" (or "existence-words") are appropriate really only for in-the-world, constituted phenomena. Consequently the whole dimension of the transcendental, whether in the action of constituting,

22

or in that of reflection upon that action, is more properly spoken of as non- or pre-being. 34 Husserl's position, in contrast, is that no special reduction is needed:

There is no need first for a "reduction" of the supposed taking over. But in reflection on the relationship of natural and new meanings and in the coming forward of the mere analogy, what is needed is to establish the merely "formal" parallel (the mere analogia entis, etc.), to transform transcendental logic as absolute, to make explicitly conscious the constitution of a new concept of being, etc. We are not spellbound by the old concept of being, but we are unclear, in danger of paradox, as long as we have not explicitly carried out [that] reflection. 3s

And Husserl then immediately refers to an earlier comment of his (note 247 to MS p. 93) where he explicitly says, regarding the use of mundane natural-language terms such as "being," and the transformation they undergo in their sense, that the crucial thing is the "inner change" that these activities of thinking "take on 'of themselves' through the reduction."

For Fink, now, this "inner change" by which a new sense of 'being' is determined, namely, the one appropriate to the newly discovered realm, that of constituting subjectivity, this "inner change" by which therefore a new kind of being is present to phenomenological study, is precisely the issue. For if there is a new kind of being, one has to ask how it relates to the old kind of being, especially if the two kinds of being somehow are supposed to integrate and unify precisely in the life of transcendental subjectivity, both as constituting agency - in the case of proper enworlding - and as reflecting onlooker - in the case of non-proper enworlding. 36 And the basic difficulty, of course, is this: Do we have a duality of being, or a unity of being? Unity may be what is desired but, given the way Husserl's thinking tends, duality certainly seems to have been introduced despite the intention, and to have been reinforced.

In the documents under study here (as well in other places) Husserl does not seem to hesitate at all to speak with equal readiness of both the transcendental and the mundane as realms of being. A good example is the manuscript from 1931, written but seven or eight months before Fink composed the "6th Meditation", which is the source of the long passage quoted at the beginning of this paper. At one point Husserl says of "the real world as totality of realities" that it (as well as any ideal world) "is and remains separated from the universe of being (if

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one wishes, the world, the totality of absolute being) that is disclosed by the transcendental reduction. ''~T At the same time, Husserl speaks of the way in which transcendental acts and structures "coincide with" the in-the-world cast they give themselves in Verweltlichung.

Owing to the "coinciding" (Deckung) of the human I and the transcendental I, and also of the psychic in its particularities, its acts, its habitualities, and the transcendental, this results: that everything transcendental has in detail a relationship to man and the humanly psychic. It is a kind of "localization" that unhesitatingly enters in the way of supplementation and gives even the reduction a place in man. 38

Fink, on the other hand, would avoid this duality of usage for "being- words" and reserve them as nearly as possible for the realm of the constituted, questioning their appropriateness for the constituting, or for the action of reflecting on the latter. The only possibility of an appropriateness for the transcendental use of "being-words" that Fink would suggest in the "6th Meditation" is by way of thinking through the relationship between the mundane and the transcendental as one that is analogical: "In the theorizing experience of phenomenological cognition we indeed refer not to something existent (insofar as something is originally [understood as] an existent in the world with the transcendental rank of constitutive result); rather we refer to transcendental world-constitution analogously to the way we refer to an existent. 39 Fink's thinking on analogy here as the way to connect the mundane sense of 'being' with the transcendental culminates in a consideration already touched upon a little earlier. What Fink offers for Husserl's consideration is the idea that the thematization that subjectivity undergoes in order for its transcendental action of constitution to be made explicit, becomes full-fledged presentation of that subjectivity (to itself) when it offers it in the form of a being-"like" given.

Phenomenological experience does not cognize something which is already existent , as what and how it is; it cognizes the sort o f thing which is '?n i tsel f 'not existent, in cognizing it it objectivates it into something that is "existent," it lifts constitutive construction-processes out of the condition o f "pre-being" proper to them and to begin with in

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a certain sense ob]ectivates them . In other words, the theoretical experience of the phenomenological observer ontifies the "pre- existent" life-processes of transcendental subjectivity and is therefore in a sense - a sense not comparable to any mode of productivity pregiven in a worldly way - "productive. ''4

So Fink wants to characterize as analogous 41 the likeness found to hold in essential principle between the mundane and the transcendental; but when that likeness is amplified, beyond mere (analagous, similarity in generic structural traits, to presentation of the transcendental itself as the mundane - the very thing which Verweltlichung achieves especially in its "non-proper" species (which is the focal topic of the present paper) - then the question of the difference in being, analogous or not, becomes acute. How can these come together in a unity that would be genuine?

Husserl's solution is for Fink too simplistic. Simply to assert "coin- cidence" (Deckung) will not do. It does not explicate the unity in being that could overcome the difference - the duality - but in fact high- lights that difference; for both coinciding factors have a kind of being proper to each. What Fink instead attempts to do is to try to explicate the issue of ontological unity in difference by using ontological concepts, rather than purely phenomenological ones. The being of the various roles of the I - mundane psychological self, transcendental self, both as constituting and as reflecting - must be treated in some proper ontological conceptuality that can explicate identity in difference.

We can now, finally, return to the matter of Fink's choice of the term 'Erscheinung' in the attempt to explicate the connection between transcendental subjectivity and its self-presentation in in-the-w0rld status and station. Fink's choice of that term is part of a whole extended attempt to represent that connection precisely in ontological terms, in terms that might overcome a duality of mutually exclusive kinds of being by integrating the difference in a kind of dialectical relationship, by recasting the two hitherto antithetic kinds of being within the embrace of a more comprehensive dynamic unity. To do this he unabashedly uses the supple, rich terminology of none other than Hegel - and draws not one jot of comment from Husserl for attempting it (except in the case of the use of 'Erscheinung" that we have noted). It would require another whole study to follow and analyze Fink's use of

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Hegelian conceptuality and the fuller implication it has for phenomenology. 42 There is no room for doing that here. 43 Nor can we go further into the ontological dimension Fink explicates within phenomenology in the "6th Meditation" text. Our purpose has been to show how it is that Fink has explicitly opened up the ontological dimension, and that therein l ies the reason for the difference between Fink and Husserl on how the Verweltlichung of the transcendental is analyzed and conceptualized specifically as regards the problem of unity and identity on the part of egoic subjectivity against differences in kinds of being. Husserl uses phenomenologically concrete terms to characterize and conceptualize enworlding - thus 'localization,' 'coinciding,' etc. - while Fink wants to use ontologically concrete terms - thus 'Erschei- nung.' It is true that the terms Fink chooses, coming as they do from Hegel, might also be called 'phenomenological'; but as Fink takes Hegel, that sense of 'phenomenologicar is also intrinsically ontological. And it is this ontological character of the terms that Husserl seems not to ad- mit, rejecting 'appearance' as too suggestive of illusoriness or pseudo- reality. 44

There is one final consideration now to be made. Recall Husserl's sharp objection to Fink's use of 'appearance-truth' (above p. 18): "spatio-temporal localization is no seeming, but has a sense that transcends all worldly localization ..."4s Now there are here two points to take note of. First, and most importantly, the approach to an understanding of being has to be by way of the sense being has in human understanding. Being is not a massive bruteness that retains the same cast or value no matter how one turns. 'Being' takes on different senses in different interpretation contexts. 'Being' in its naive mundane sense takes on a different cast when, no longer viewed within the natural attitude, it is seen from the transcendental viewpoint. That is, the 'being' of in-the-world being has a different sense when viewed transcendentally. Its sense is transformed, for now it is seen as the being of the constituted. As Husserl puts it in a remark at one point in Fink's text: "The concepts 'mundane' and 'transcendental' [are] equivocal! (1) Naively mundane - (2) transcendentally mundane. (1) Transcen- dental as any particular action of transcendental constituting. (2) Tran- scendental as the total Absolute. ''46 At the same time, while the mundane sense of 'being' is seen as that of the constituted, and therefore as distinct from that of the action constituting it, it is also inseparable from it, as is the latter from it. The being of the constituted and the

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being of the constituting can, neither one of them, be understood in their sense without reference to each other, nor without reference to the difference between the "end-product" of a constituting action and the constituting action itself. This is what has to be taken into account when the latter comes to "appear as" an entity like the former - comes to be "ontif ied," in Fink's term. For then, while its own native being as transcendental lies in its constituting - or in its self-reflecting, when it is the "non-participant onlooker" - nevertheless in enworlding it comes to present itself with the being of the constituted. Thus it is that, in the question, "Who is doing the phenomenology?", as a central issue for the transcendental theory of method, what has to be investigated is the whole of these two constitutively correlative factors that are so radical- ly different in their respective modes of being. 47 That too is the point of Fink's finally initiating in the latter part of 1 1 a discussion of the meaning of 'the Absolute' in phenomenology. 4s That, however, is matter enough for another whole study. Moreover, it only draws out further implications of the problem that has now been raised, namely, how a unity in being can be explicated for an agency - transcendental subjectivity - which finds itself displayed in two different "modes" of being when phenomenology gains the final reaches of self-reflection and self-criticism. While the lines along which a solution may be envisioned are laid down by Fink in the main text of the "6th Meditation," it is not fully clear what the ultimate conclusion would be. Nor is it clear what Husserl thought of it all in its further elaboration; there is too much silence on his part regarding these final parts of Fink's text. The problem remains a problem, but the issue is at last thematically posed, within Husserl's very own phenomenology.

NOTES

1. Edmund Husserl, The Crisis of European Science and Transcendental Phenomenology, trans. David Cart (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970).

2. Husserl, Cn'sis, 29. 3. B 1 5/156a-156b (November 28 and the beginning of December, 1931). 4. For an account of Fink's work with Husserl on this project, cf. Iso Kern's Einleitung, Hua

XV, pp. LXIlff. 5. The German text of this "6th Meditation," together with all of Husserl's notations and

directly related Forschungsmanuskripte, will be published as Volume I of Eugen Fink- Edmund Husserl, Die Mee einer transzendentalen Methodenlehre, by Martinus Nijhoff in the series Husserliana Dokumente. (Volume II will contain Fink's revision texts of Hus- serfs five "Cartesian Meditations," and a number of other manuscript materials by both

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Fink and Husserl relating closely to those revision texts.) References to this text will here- after be abbreviated as TML 1.

6. TML I, MS p. 122. References will be to the pagination of the original manuscript, which will be carried in the margin of the text when it is finally published. The emphases are all Fink's, except where explicitly stated otherwise.

7. TAIL 1, MS p. 124. The expressions in angle brackets are additions by Husserl. 8. TMLI, MSp. 14. 9. In R.O. Elveton, ed., The Phenomenology of Husserl (Chicago: Quadrangle, 1970), pp. 73-

147. 10. The article in fact drew heavily from the "6th Meditation," having been written by the

middle of the summer (1933) following Fink's drafting of the "6th Meditation" (August- October, 1932). Husserl's reading of this article occasioned another reading of the "6th Meditation" text itself. Husserl in point of fact had in mind to publish Fink's "6th Medita- tion," along with the other five revised "Cartesian Meditations" in a joint publication with Fink.

11. TML L Beilage XV. 12. TML I, Beilage XIII. 13. Fink himself also points this out in TML I, MS p. 163. 14. Husserl, Crisis, pp. 353-378. 15. The text quoted above on p. 9 is taken from this Beilage. 16. 'Befangenheit' is the term Fink prefers over Husserl's original expression, 'natiirliche Ein-

stellung,' as not carrying the undesirable connotation of being a psychological state of mind. Cf. Dorion Cairns, Conversations with Husserl and Fink (The Hague: Martinus Nij- hoff, 1976), Phaenomenologica 66, p. 95.

17. Fink makes this point also in TML I, MS p. 139. 18. TAIL 1, MS pp. 107-108. The emphasis is Fink's, and the words in angle brackets are

Husserl's insertions or marginal comments. Two important longer interventions of his have been left out in the text as given here.

19. In point of fact, in a long marginal note that leads to a whole separate manuscript (note 391 to MS p. 131, and Beilage II), Husserl takes Fink to task for a wording that suggests that self-constitution as man is the work of constituting I on its own. Rather, Husserl points out, this constitution of a subject as human-in-the-world can only be done intersub. ]ectively.

20. "die eigentliche oder prim/ire Verweltlichung," TML 1, MS pp. 120, 13 lff. 21. TML 1, MS p. 131. Husserl adds the self in "~self-~>enworlding '' in this phrase of Fink's. 22. "uneigentliche oder sekund/ire Verweltlichung." TAIL 1, MS pp. 120, 13ff. 23. TML 1, MS p. 131. 24. TML1,MSp. 131. 25. TML I, MS p. 165. The expressions in angle brackets are by Husserl. 26. TML 1, note 510. In a remark on Kant in the Crisis (31) Husserl points out that the kind

of distinction Kant made between transcendental subjectivity and the human soul, by which the former has no place at all in the latter, leaves one with something "incompre- hensibly mythical" (p. 118). This should, however, be read in the context of Crisis 30, where Husserl argues that Kant's "regressive method" opens him to that kind of difficulty.

27. This remark requires qualification. See below, pp. 25-26. 28. TML I, MS p. 161 and note 500. An earlier marginal comment of Husserl's is in the same

vein: "But secondary enworlding is a necessary "localization' of the transcendental in the world and to that extent precisely not seemingly existent in the world and yet, on the other hand, not in the world in the natural sense, thus nonetheless pseudo-mundane." TML 1, note 439 to MS p. 148.

29. Cf. note 46 below.

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30. Cf. also Husserl's alterations to Fink's wording in TML I, MS p. 48, especially in note 117. 31. TML I, note 265. The portion in angle brackets is Husserl's alteration. Fink's original runs

thus: "All the rest of the constitutive structure can become thematic in a mode of experience that only forms an analogy to an experience of what is existent." That in Fink's characteristization of the relationship between mundane and transcendental processes as one of analogy Husserl eliminates the analogy concept and speaks instead of how both are unqualif ied being - one mundane, the other transcendental - is something whose signifi- cance will come out shortly. Careful reading of the whole context here, and of all Husserl's notat ions to it, brings out this contrast more clearly.

32. TML 1, note 268. 33. A close study of the whole sequence, MS pp. 92-96, is needed here to see Husserl's think-

ing in contrast to Fink's. One has to see both the brief but significant changes Husserl makes, and his longer marginal remarks to grasp that contrast. Of special signifidance are notes 247, 252, and 253.

34. TML I, MS pp. 91-92, 95. 35. TML I, note 252 to MS p. 95. 36. Cf. above, pp. 11, 14. 37. B 15/158a. 38. B 1 5/162b. See also Crisis 72 (p. 264) for an even stronger statement. 39. TML [, MS p. 94. The expression in angle brackets is Hussert's insertion. See also note 31

above. The analogy in question here is a recurrent point in 10 and 11 of the "6th Meditation," in every case as an attempt to deal with the issue of the radical difference between mundane being and transcendental being.

40. TML I, MS p. 97. Cf. above, p. 20, where Husserl's extended comment on the last sentence here is given (TML 1, note 265). Once again, Hussert's insertions are in angie brackets.

41. Fink has a specific kind of analogy in mind here: "The 'analogia entis' between mundane and transcendental being is not an "analogia attributionis,' but an 'analogia propositio. nalis'." TML I, MS p. 94.

42. One good expression of the undertaking that seems to have its roots here can be found in Fink's essay from 1951, "Die intentionale Analyse und das Problem des spekulativen Denkens," in Ndhe und Distanz (Freiburg: Karl Alber, 1976). Another good example is the last essay in the same collection, "Reflexionen zu Husserls ph~inomenologischer Re- duktion," (pp. 299-322), written in 1971, where the central difficulty of the issue discussed here is explicitly cited as showing the need for a move to the speculative plane (pp. 318-321).

43. Especially illustrative of this are those pages where Fink begins laying out a program of explication of the term 'absolute' in phenomenology as self-reflective science (MS pp. 170- 189), as well as the fuller text from which the quote on pp. 15-16 above were drawn (MS pp. 162-166). Husserl's notes to these pages ought, of course, to be carefully read. One finds no objection or disagreement regarding what Fink writes there.

44. Cf. above, pp. 14-15 and 18. This perhaps is the place to note that the issue that is raised here by Fink, deep within Husserl's phenomenology at the point where it sets itself the task of explicating itself, the issue, namely, of the being of the transcendental subject as against the being of the subject-in-the-world, is identical with that raised by Heidegger in the exchange of letters between himself and Husserl in connection with the writing of the Encycloplaedia Brittanica article on phenomenology. On this see Walter Biemel's treatment in "Husserl's Encyclopaedia Brittanica Article and Heidegger's Remarks Thereon," in Friederick EUiston and Peter McCormick, eds., HusserI: Expositions and Appraisals (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1977), pp. 286-303. The most pertinent text is that of Heidegger's letter of October 22, 1927, quoted on pp. 299-300. That Fink is in-

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debted to Heidegger for this perspective is prima facie suggested by the chronology. Sup- porting evidence for this in Fink's Nachlass remains yet to be searched and evaluated.

45. TML I, note 500 to MS p. 161. (Emphasis mine.) 46. TML I, note 538 to MS p. 186. Husserl adds this comment in the margin at the end of the

following passage of Fink's: "The thesis: man phenomenologizes, as well as the counter- thesis: the transcendental ego phenomenologizes, are both sublated in the absolute truth that phenomenologizing is in itself a cognitive movement of the Absolute. Just as the Ab- solute when 'in-itself' is the unity of 'being' and (constituting) 'pre-being,' so also the 'becoming-for-itself' of the Absolute is just as much something mundanely existent, human philosophizing, as it is something 'transcendentally existent,' i.e., the cognitive action of the phenomenological onlooker."

Another aspect to the importance of the discussion of 'Erscheinung' is that it touches upon the very point of phenomenology, viz., as the explication of what appears precisely in its appearance. If appearance can be ambivalent, i.e., if the same appearant can be taken in either a mundane or a transcendental sense, and if the change from one to the other is a change in senses and not in "object," then phenomenological Anschauung is intrinsically interpretation. It is a discernment of something other than what is first apparent in that first apparentness. Fink thus speaks of Erseheinung as becoming transparent to transcendental understanding (e.g., TML I, MS pp. 141-142). To put it another way, the question of Erscheinung forces one to consider whether die Sache selbst is indeed givable in the immediacy that would seem to have been originally required for Husserlian phenomenology to work.

47. In Fink's words: "The full-sided subject of phenomenologizing is neither the transcendental I (continuing in its transcendentality), nor 'man' in closure against the transcendental, this closure being what constitutes the naivet~ of the natural attitude; the full-sided subject is rather transcendental subjectivity 'appearing' in the world - by non-proper enworlding. I.e., the 'who' under inquiry is a theorizing subject that must be characterized both as transcendental and as mundane. What is involved here is a 'dialectical unity' between the spheres of the transcendental and the mundane, and that is what comprises the 'concrete' concept of the 'phenomenologizing subject'. '~ TML I, MS pp. 140-141.

48. Cf. the text quoted in note 46 above.

Documents

Bru Zina 1986