THE CONCEPTUAL FOCUS OF SOME PSYCHOLOGICAL SYSTEMS 1)

by

EGON BRUNSWIK (Berkeley)

In the present paper the at tempt is made to order systematically some of the conceptual tools which have been used in dealing with psychological topics. In the opinion of the author, a suitable starting point for such a consideration is furnished by a scheme of the fol- lowing kind (Fig. 1).

The drawing represents an organism within its surroundings as described by an observing physicist in terms of measurement and computation. This observer might be able to distinguish different layers within the whole causal texture with reference to the organ- ism. Some of these which became most outstanding in psychologi- cal discriminations might be designated by the terms (c) remote past, (b) the realm of palpable bodies in the actual environment, (a) stimulus events located on the retina or on other stimulus sur- faces of the organism, (0) intraorganismic events, (A) muscular reactions, or behavior in the narrower sense of the word, (B) ef- fects of these reactions with regard to the relationship between organism and surroundings, as e.g., the reaching of a goal, and finally (C) the more remote consequences and final products of life activities including stabilized mechanical or conceptual tools for further use. For the purpose of further explanation, some of the customary terms not used in this list are included in the chart.

The layers indicated are not supposed to designate singular se- quences in time, but rather to furnish a general scheme for cross- sectional classification and coordination of physical events, or features of the physical world, with reference to their causal rela- tionship to an organism. The scheme possesses a certain symmetry,

1) Paper sent in for the fourth International Congress for the Unity of Science (Cambridge, England, 1938)"

The Conceptual Focus o/ some Psychological Systems 37

LAYERS: c b a 0 A B C

M (

~ - , -o - i

(

^ ^ ~ ~ !___~

longitudinal sequences of events

B o ~ ~ '= - ~ ~ ~ =~

=~" o =

Fig. 1. Scheme of the organism in its surroundings.

b a 0 A B

Fig. 2. Early Psychophysics

b a 0 A B C

Fig. 5. Thing-constancy Research

b a O A S

Fig. 3. Early Behaviorism

Fig. 4. Gestalt Psychology

C c b 0 A B

Fig. 6. Molar Behaviorism

r 1=, a O A

Fig. 7. Introspectionism

38 Egon Brunswik

with layers designated by corresponding letters (a and A, b and B, c and C) conceptually related to each other.

Four main types of interest seem to be possible within this system: (1) emphasis upon events belonging to a certain cross-sectional layer and the internal relations of these events.among each other, (2) em- phasis upon a certain type of causal chains, that is interest in lon- gitudinal sequences, (3) emphasis upon the external relationships of distant cross-sectional layers among each other, (4) emphasis upon the interrelations of discrete longitudinal patterns among each other.

Concepts and laws referring to (1) and (2), that is to single events or to cross-sectional or longitudinal internal relationships, are non-psychological. Roughly speaking, these internal relationships constitute the core of the problems treated in physics proper as far as the left part of the picture and particularly (b) is concerned. They constitute the core of the biological sciences in the narrower sense of the word as far as the middle of the picture is concerned, and the "letters" or "Geisteswissenschaften" as far as the right part is concerned. On this latter side those physical features of the world are represented which still reveal the fact that their causal ancestry is partially built up from causal patterns typical to life activities. For example, a mechanical tool made by man would be considered to belong to this group only by virtue of its particular form in connection with a limited number of certain "relevant" properties regardless of all the other traits.

We are now going to attempt to characterize some of the psy- chological disciplines, or systems, as they grew up historically, in terms of our scheme. In every instance, not the programmatically propounded general frame will be taken as the standard, but rather the conceptual texture of the work actually performed in a suffic- iently detailed fashion. This has to be done, since in an arm-chair sense nearly any of the systems might justly consider itself all- inclusive and able to be considerate in face of every objection without doing violence to its own conceptual frame work. In short, we are going to treat systems not in terms of what they could have in- cluded but what they did include.

Early experimental psychology still was characterized by the ideology typical of the most paradigmatic non-psychological sciences. In particular its interests were, as far as the very begin- nings are concerned, chiefly longitudinal in the sense characterized

The Conceptual Focus o] some Psychological Systems 39

above under (2). The first type of experimental research to win importance in psychology was classical psychophysics. Its interest centered around a rather limited fragment of a kind of longitudinal chain, per se. The initial link was defined in terms of what Koffka has named proximal stimulation, that is, stimulation in terms of the causal chains as they just enter the sense organ. The guiding ideal of the psychology of that time was expressed by the wish to know as much as possible about the functional mechanisms of the sense organ and of nervous conduction, - - in short, about "mediation problems" - - , and thus to be enabled to pursue the causal chains as closely as possible, in a step-by-step fashion, so to speak. There was, however, as we follow the development from the Johannes Miiller to the Fechner era, a noticeable shift of emphasis toward the relationship, per se, of the two end terms of the longitudinal fragment concerned, namely the relationship between "stimulus" and "sensation". At the same time the problems of the causal "me- diations", as such, were losing ground. I t is this becoming more and more interested in a by-and-large causal correlation between discrete layers regardless of the technicalities of their interconnec- tion which brought psychology proper into existence as a discipline distinguishable from physiology.

Fig. 2 gives a schematic picture of early psychophysics using the scheme of Figure 1 as a frame of reference. The focus of concept- formation is located at the layers of proximal stimulation and of internal response as well as at their gross interrelation as indicated b y the arrow. The interest in mediation problems still vital is re- presented by the slope covering the entire ground leading from the one term to the other in longitudinal direction.

The categorical structure and the actual research interest of the early "conditioned reflex" behaviorism as represented by Pavlov or b y Watson is similar, in principle, to that of early psychophysics. The chief conceptual emphasis appears to be shifted, however, from the implicit to the overt response in terms of bodily move- ments, as such. The interest in mediation problems is centered around the motor rather than the sensory processes, as indicated in Figure 3. - - In fact, of course, every psychophysics or intro- spective psychology had to utilize verbal, that is, a particular kind of motor, responses. These responses were supposed to be, how- ever, true representatives of inner states. The aimed-at-focus of concept formation of these disciplines might therefore be con- sidered to lie in the internal life of the individual.

40 Egon BrunsuJik

The further development of psychology as an exact science can be characterized as a progressive extension of the range of considera- tion from the fragmentary or molecular viewpoint to larger units of a "molar" nature. This goes with an increasing emphasis upon gross by-and-large correlations between kinds of events schemati- cally located at a distance from each other, on the one hand, and with an - - on the whole - - more and more subordinate interest ill mediation, per se.

A first important step was Gestalt psychology. Considering the most characteristic core of problems actually treated by Gestalt psychology in the field of perception, the chief difference as com- pared with traditional psychophysics lies in an extension of the notion of the stimulus to that of a stimulus pattern. The response is treated as a response to the sensory configuration as a whole whereby the laws of dynamic interaction within each of the cross- sectional layers of the sensorium are made the central issue. Gestalt psychology, though totalitarian or molar, is, however, still frag- mentary insofar as it is, in its most elaborate parts, a psychology "from the retina inward", so to speak. There is, as in psychophys- ics, a great deal of interest in mediation problems, as can be seen from the numerous attempts to explain physiologically the facts found. All this is represented schematically in Figure 4.

A further extension of the psychology of perception is given by including into the scope of consideration the manipulable solid bodies, located in the farther environment, and their recognition as the specific determiners of the reaction. The beginnings of this line of interest can be traced back to Helmholtz. This trend, how- ever, did not become conscious of its own character until the last few decades and after the earlier stages of Gestalt psychology al- ready had been completed. In this discipline, the stimulus is not any longer defined in proximal terms but in distal ones. The actual research centers around the question to what extent the perceptual system is able to liberate itself from the disturbing variability of the proximal representation of similar distal stimuli and thus to focus the response upon the latter and not upon the former as the determining event. In other words, the question is how far the or- ganism has established mechanisms which are able to extrapolate, with a sufficiently large chance of success, the causal chains from the retina backward and thus, figuratively speaking, to reach out cognitively into the farther surroundings.

The Conceptual Focus o] some Psychological Systems 41

A fairly univocal attachment of a class of reactions to bodily properties, like extension or reflectivity to color, despite changes in the mediating causal pattern is called "thing constancy". We might, then, as well describe these reactions by means of the other term of the external relation in question, or in short, in terms of their "objects attained." The focus of concept formation is thus shifted away from the organism itself into its farther surroundings, or, more precisely, into a relationship of the organism with layer (b). In other words, the organism is characterized by its ability to achieve something with regard to its environment, not by the intrinsic character of its reactions or by the nature of certain physiological forms of mediation.

In the opinion of the author, there is scarcely another discipline which would reveal as clearly as does constancy research the extent to which the organism is able to render irrelevant the particularities of mediation. Let us take a frequently quoted example. Among the chief constituents of the system of cues which enable the organism to extrapolate the sizes of the surrounding bodies from the retinal stimulus pattern, are the so called "distance-cues", as, for instance, binocular disparity or the perspective distortion of right angles. There are numerous kinds of distance cues. Most of them differ radically from each other as long as we consider intrinsic pro- perties or the physiological mechanisms operated by them. They have in common nothing but a higher or lesser probability of being caused by a certain environmental depth-pattern. And yet they are responded to by the central system of the organism in an identical manner, or in short, they are "equipotential". It is this feature of organismic reaction and achievement which forces psychology, as it approaches its genuine molar and relational problems, more and more into a focussing upon the end terms of far-reaching re- lationships. The particular "how" of the mediation processes, on the other hand, necessarily will attract only subordinate in- terest.

In other words, we do not consider it a matter of choice, whether psychology does focus its concepts on one or on another layer or on a correlation of layers among each other. In looking without preconceptions at nature populated by organisms, gross correla- tions of higher or lesser degree between kinds of events rather re- mote from each other in space or time will strike the observer. The network of occurrences participating in such correlations might be

42 Egon Brunswik

conceptually picked out and its constituents labeled as the given foci of life patterns. Psychology has to focus its descriptions on what the organisms have become focussed on, not on events systematically located at the interstices between these loci. Ordo idearum sit idem ac ordo return. There has to be a discipline to deal with these foci and their gross correlations, per se. Otherwise there would remain a white spot on the landmap of possible scientific knowledge. By all of its history, it is psychology which is prede- stined to fill this gap.

In short, molar psychology of achievement is a deliberate "lump"- treatment. This feature seems to be the chief obstacle which stands in the way of its acceptance. Correlations between distant layers never hold to an ideal degree. There are always "exceptions" due to the lack of perfection of the cues and means establishing these correlations. In every instance, there is only a higher or lesser degree of probability for the reaching of the usual end. This feature be- comes especially clear where we have to do with the so called in- stincts. Dealing with instruments of this kind in terms of their achievement leads to an apparent lack of exactitude. It takes a certain courage, a neglect of some of the attitudes sacred to scien- tific tradition, to give up the safety of molecular correlations, cheap as they are, in favor of the equivocalities or "vaguenesses" of molar correlations. But we have to prefer vagueness focussed upon essentials to security and strict univocality focussed upon non-essentials. This holds especially as long as we are lucky enough to find everything prepared to become strictly physicalistic in our "vaguenesses", quantifying them by the means of correlation sta, tistics and other related mathematical tools.

There always remains a certain self-restriction required in order not to become too curious about the mechanisms causing the "ex- ceptions" and dispersions mentioned, before the task of a birds- eye-view-inventory of gross correlations had been completed. Of course, there are various ramifications. Looking for exceptions and their causes might, besides being a mere side track, become a corrective measure which enables us to find still more superordinate correlations. These superordinate correlations, however, should be our ultimate aim. Furthermore, concepts and methods referring to mediation problems will have to come back to psychology proper as soon as the precise limitations of the complex achievements in question are subject to closer examination. These problems are out

The Conceptual Focus o] some Psychological Systems 43

of the scope of psychological consideration only so far as that first phase of research is concerned in which far-reaching gross achie- vements become discovered and examined in first approximation. On the whole, however, psychology should develop "from above", not "from below". It might proceed to sub-foci of a more and more particular kind and ultimately converge towards and merge with its complementary sciences of a genuinely molecular type.

The schematic representation of constancy research (Fig. 5) has to be drawn in the following way: an arrow from a certain type of events in (b) to a certain type of events in (0), representing the primary interest; a slope around the group of sub-foci which con- stitute the "family" of equipotential cue patterns and which circumscribe the extent of variability of the mediational pattern and thus the degree of safeguardedness of the achievement under varying conditions of mediation; and finally a slope around the whole unit of processes involved, including mediation processes. The latter slope has been dotted in order to indicate the subordinate nature of the mediation problems. A further dotted arrow is drawn to connect the event in (0) with an overt response. This is done to indicate that Psychology in Terms of Objects wishes to be, in prin- ciple, strictly behavioristic, i.e. refuses to extrapolate without par- ticular controls from the measurable verbal utterances into the field of their internal "meanings".

A picture symmetrical to that of constancy-research is yielded by a chief part of the research done within the conceptual frame of molar or purposive behaviorism, as represented by Tolman. (Figure 6). The difference is merely a material one, constancy research being concerned with problems of reception and cognition, or the or- ganismic achievement of a backward extrapolation of causal chains, whereas molar behaviorism deals with problems of overt action and its further environmental effects. In molar behaviorism, as contrasted to molecular behaviorism, results are expressed in terms of reaching a certain goal, not in terms of movements made. The comparative irrelevancy of ways and means, that is their equi- potentiality with regard to a certain end, is systematically re- cognized and attempts are made to prove it experimentally. As it was done for the proximal stimulus cues in the extended psycho- physics of perceptual thing constancy, molar behaviorism realizes that the essentials of behavior will become lost in a description fo- cussed on proximal determination. Thus both disciplines are essen-

44 Egon Brunswik

tially environmentalistic, not mediationalistic or physiologistic. In both constancy research and molar behaviorism a certain in-

terrelation of longitudinal causal chains is made one of the central issues, namely their equipotentiality within the larger instrument of a well established farreaching causal couplings. Emphasis is with- drawn, to a certain extent, from a step-by-step determination of these mediating chains of events. Such a restriction is not essential, however, to a molar point of view, as is shown by the type of ap- proach represented by Hull. His general frame of consideration coincides in its most essential features with that of the disciplines mentioned. A still stronger line of interest is focussed, however, on tt~e "family" of mediational patterns, per se. These pattern's are analyzed in an essentially associationistic or conditioned reflex fashion, that is in a molecular longitudinal way. In the opinion of the author, the chief objection to such an attitude is a merely practical one, namely distraction from the gross "first-approxima- tion" treatment of cognitive or behavioral achievement.

The idea of a pure achievement analysis is accomplished, more thoroughly than in any of the other branches mentioned, in the psychology of "tests". At first glance this might seem tobe a strictly cross-sectional affair within events in layer (B), these events being correlated among each other statistically. The correlational analysis implies, however, the reference to organisms performing various combinations of achievement. Mediation problems are usually kept entirely outside of consideration.

It might even be said that correlation statistics as a general scien- tific instrument received a decisive impetus from test psychology (Pearson, Spearman, Thurstone, and others). Starting from rather complex achievements relatively detached from straight sensory or muscular activities, test psychology had the chance to grow up without meeting a resistance comparable to that met by Gestalt psychology or the other molar disciplines mentioned above. The methods developed in test statistics are, therefore, most likely to become paradigmatic to all future molar psychology. As an illustra- tion it might be mentioned that, according to a recent American survey, the term correlation is among the two or three most fre- quently quoted terms to be found in the textbooks used in this country.

In recent times statistical analysis led to a closer reference to a small number of hypothetical "factors" or basic abilities indepen-

The Conceptual Focus o[ some Psychological Systems 45

dent of each other underlying the countless variety of actual per- formances. This is one of the instances where the stage is set for a genuinely psychological physiological psychology, focussed not on layer (0), as such, or on its interrelations with layers (a) or (A), but on the farreaching interrelations between (0), on the one hand, and (B) - - or (b) - - , on the other.

A few words only about disciplines like social psychology, genetic psychology, psychoanalysis. They all seem to be focussed primarily on molar interrelations of the organism in its actuality with some complex features of the remote environment, present or past. They fulfill the requirements of a molar psychology as long as they concentrate upon an a t tempt to segregate abstractively the focal or relevant traits within the patterns they investigate from the actually irrelevant ones.

A certain type of genetic att i tude possesses, however, a close resemblance to molecularism. Considering the systematic descrip- tion of gross achievement or adjustment of the organism to the en- vironment as the primary subject mat ter of psychology, inquiry about the history of such mechanisms in some cases might easily loose contact with the essential features of the achievemental pat- tern actuaUy in question. In such instances, asking "why" becomes comparable to the "how" problems of the mediationalistic type. For example, to be concerned primarily as to whether a certain or- ganismic instrument is due to heredity or to learning, might oc- casionally become just another burden for the investigator of that instrument, coordinate with the claim of the physiologically minded criticist whose first concern is to know as much as possible about all the single steps involved in the mechanism in question. Like mole- cularism, geneticism for its own sake involves the danger of diver- ting psychology into knowing more and more for the price of knowing it about less and less, or about smaller and smaller frag- ments of the units which constitute the task of psychology.

In the common language of science, molecular as well as gerretic descriptions have often been called "explanations". In contrast to that, molar achievemental analysis is "descriptive" in the most restricted sense of the word. As a deliberate " lump" treatment, it refuses to aim at explanation for its own sake. I t is a psychology "in terms of .. ", a terminological affair, a way of registering and conceptually looking at gross correlations in their straight- forward actuality.

46 Egon Brunswik

Up to this point of our considerations psychology has been treated as if it were built up by means of strictly scientific methods, tha t is, in principle, as physics of a certain group of causal correlations. For a large part of psychology this holds true, in principle at least. The events involved are subject to measurement and the interrel- ations to quantitative treatment. Or, as Lewin would put it, "Aristo- telian" concept formation in terms of absolute dichotomies between qualitatively different "principles", as, e.g., the traditional anti- thesis of "insight" versus "learning", has already been largely substituted by a "Galilean", that is by more "diagrammatic" forms of thinking in terms of gradual discriminations.

We do not wish, however, to conclude this paper without glan- cing at some of the forms of psychology which do not or do not fully subscribe to such a methodological ideal.

First of all, there is introspectionism. Common to all introspec- tionism is the tacit assumption of a strict one to one relationship between verbal utterances and "inner events". Only by virtue of such an att i tude is it possible to consider, as is done by introspec- tionism, words or other events located in layer (A) as valid re- presentatives or "symbols" for inner experiences (0). In all objective psychology verbal utterances are taken not as symbols, but merely as "symptoms" the meaning of which is supposed to be accessible only by means of special correlational investigations. In Figure 7, the substitution mentioned is represented by a parenthesis.

Another kind of substitution is, however, much more fundamen- tal in introspectionism. As emphasized especially by the so-called act-psychologists, e.g. Brentano, the essence of consciousness is characterized by its pointing toward, or aiming at, an object. This relationship has been called intentionality. Though it was said that intentional objects should not be confused with the physical en- vironment, it still can be made clear that introspectionism became infiltrated with a conceptual structure taken to a large extent from the layer of palpable bodies (b). Yet there was no chance of a quan- titative treatment on a physicalistic basis, since the relation of (0) to (b) - - or to something formally analogous to (b) - - had been accepted as univocal without experimentation. Furthermore, this relationship was regarded as a qualitative enti ty of its own kind entirely incomparable with the causal relationship, to which it is also supposed to be opposite in direction. This relationship was admitted without further control, from a mere inspection of layer (0). This

The Conceptual Focus o] some Psychological Systems 47

is indicated in Figure 7 by a dashed arrow 0 ~ b which is also point- ing in the opposite direction from the corresponding arrow b -+ 0 in Figure 5. In philosophy, the problems of "dualism" have to a large extent arisen from confusion and uncritical mutual sub- stitution of the two cross-sectional layers structurally similar to each other. This substitution is comparable to that committed by introspectionism. The fallacies of an uncontrolled substitution of layers by each other have recently been emphasized by Heider.

Introspectionism can be subdivided into two main branches. The one is represented by men like Wundt or Titchener, and also by Mach. It is sometimes called "Structuralism". Its chief feature is to look for basic elements out of which all the complex experiences may "consist" (without questioning whether the grammar of the word "consist" permits such an application). Structuralism coincides in time with the early molecular sensory psychology characterized by its emphasis upon mediational features like proximal stimulation and the structure of the sense receptors. It is obvious that in this general att i tude - - sometimes characterised as "glorification of the skin" - - the mosaic-nature of the events at the sensory surface has been directly carried over to the hypothetical structure of inner events (cf. Fig. 7). Thus these came to be understood after the pat- tern of the sense organ. In structuralism, therefore, not only layers (0) and (A) and layers (0) and (b), but also layers (0) and (a) appear in uncontrolled confusion.

The second branch of introspectionism might be called phenome- nalism. It is somewhat related to act psychology, and sometimes the term phenomenology is applied, not quite unmistakably, to it. It is the kind of introspection represented by Gestalt psychology and the Wtirzburg school of psychology of thinking. There was suf- ficient sophistication within phenomenalism about the naive entanglement of structuralism with sensory elementarism, with mediationalism and with functional "explanation". Unbiased "description" of the preanalytically given was aimed at. The struc- turalist's "consist of" was given up in favor of the phenomenalist 's "resembles". Everyday language and even slang was used delibera- tely. Characteristic examples are the description of the phenomenon of the shadow by Hering as a t iny skin of darkness lying upon the surface of the object, the true color of which shines through the former, or the introduction of the term "Aha-Erlebnis" by Bfihler in order to refer to the experience of sudden insight. In this way,

48 Egon Brunswik

phenomenalism grew into a kind of conceptualized and systematized poetry, bringing, in principle, all the various concepts and terms of the common qualitative language into one comprehensive system of resemblances. Since all "qualities" might be regarded as gross reactions of the organism to some features of the environment and thus be systematically located in layer (0), phenomenalism is the strictest expression in existence of an 0-internal system of psy= chological concept formation.

As a system of mutual resemblances, phenomenalism can be re- presented by means of a spatial order. The best example for such a quasi-spatial arrangement of qualities, though limited to a cer- tain modality, is the three-dimensional Hering color pyramid. It is built up on an entirely phenomenalistic basis regardless of the physical relationships of colors among each other. Thus it deals with reactions only, not with stimuli. I t was the first a t tempt to deal with psychological problems on a "topological" basis by as- signing a certain place in a spatial order to each quality. These qualities could then be determined in terms of basic "dimensions" defined by certain outstanding qualities.

On a somewhat different basis, topological considerations have been recently introduced into psychology by Lewin. In his Topolo- gical Psychology, the actual "life space" is represented by a spatial scheme. As is true for phenomenalism, however, not the surround- ings defined in terms of physics are taken as a frame of reference, but rather the environment as it is cognitively or functionally responded to by the organism in the particular instance. In a certain way topological psychology is similar to the "Umweltforschung" of UxktiU. I t deals, deliberately, not with stimuli or stimulus re- lationships, but rather with a pattern of reactions to be schematical- ly located in 0, and from 0 dynamically onward until a new equi- librium is reached. Its chief merit is that it furnished an adequate conceptual tool for a description of this organized pattern of "field" intervening between the stimulating surroundings (c, b, a) on the one hand, and the acted-upon surroundings (A, B, C), on the other. Though quasi-spatial and highly geueralized, topological psychology is not quantitative and not physicalistic in the usual sense. It enters the picture at a systematic locus symmetrical, or complementary, to the psychology of perception. Psychology of perception deals with the relationship of the world as it "is" for the organism in question, and of the world as it "is" for the obser-

The Conceptual Focus o[ some Psychological Systems 49

ving discursified human being. Only the former is represented in topological psychology.

In conclusion: psychological research today presents itself as a pattern of fragments. These fragments tend to crystallize around the program of a gross correlational analysis in terms of achievement, converging "from above" with the disciplines dealing with mole- cular problems. Environmentalism seems to take the lead before mediationalism and molecular geneticism (as, e.g., some of the ques- tions of "explanation").