Btl of Meiktila

7/31/2019 Btl of Meiktila

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BTL OF MEIKTILA

(22 Feb 28 Mar 1945)

Gen

1. The Btl of Meiktila (22 Feb - 28 Mar 1945) was not a btl fought in isolation. It was

one of the three decisive btls which finally sealed the fate of the Japanese Army inBurma. The other two btls were, Btl of Imphal & Kohima and Btl of Irrawaddy Shore.

Meiktilla was the nodal pt on the rd and rly comm in the cen Burma and was the main

sup base for Japanese forces in northern and cen Burma. As a result, after the btl of

Irrawaddy shore by Gen Slim with his 14th Army, his next plan was to capr Meiktilla and

Mandalay in order to disrupt the L of C system of Japanese forces which could facilitate

his early capr of Rangoon.

Strat Imp

2. Loc. Meiktila is loc about 70 miles south of Mandalay, 12 miles west of Thazi and

320 miles from Rangoon. During WW II it was a small town standing on the margin of a

large natural lake which was div into two parts, the north lake and the south lake.

Because of its loc Meiktila was imp both from strat and tac pt of view.

3. COMCEN. Meiktilawas an imp COMCEN from where rds led dir to Mandalay and

Rangoon. Rail and rd routes from the SE and west converged to Meiktila and again

spread out to the north. The imp rds and rlys were from Meiktila to Mandalay, Thazi,

Rangoon, Nyingyan, Chauk and Pagan.

4. Main Admin Cen. Meiktila was also the main admin cen of the 15 and 33

Japanese Armies in Burma which had main sup base, ammo dump, hosps and depots.

5. Air Fds. There were as many as eight air fds in and around Meiktila. It was

key Japanese air base in cen Burma.

6. Strat Aim. Strat aim of the op in Burma of the Allies was as under:

a. To dev, maint, broader and protect sup line to China.

b. To eliminate the Japanese forces from northern Burma as a prelude to their

total defeat in SE Asia.

Tac Imp

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RESTRICTED7. Tac its def could be well coord with little forces because:

a. On the north and south there were two large lakes which presented

formidable obs for both tks and inf.

b. The apps through west and south were narrow. Those could be easily

covered by arty fire.

c. Natural cover and thick growth all along the apps provided good def locs.

d. The country was gen broken but thickly populated. All passages to Meiktila

passed through build up areas which made depl of armr quite difficult.

e. Pt 835 and 799 were most dominating hill features from where the entire

town, lakes, brs, rds and air fd could be seen and dominated by obsn and F of F.

Backgrd

9. With the Nazi invasion of Soviet Russia in June 1941, Japan was assured of the sy

of her Northern flank against any poss Soviet mov thus the European war created a

power vacuum in South East Asia and the Western Pacific which presented Japan with

great opportunities for conquest.

10. Japan was an industrial island, overcrowded, poor in natural resources and highly

dependent upon the import of overseas raw mats, saw the historic solution to this

problem. The Japan's plan of expansion in 1941 was the seizure of the so called

Southern Region.

11. Early ph of the Burma campaign was only the story of defeat for the Allied. The

new era of British victory in Burma started with offn at Imphal (14 th Army) from Nov

1944. At the beginning of 1945, the Japanese 15th Army was pushed back to the line of

Chindwin.

12. Gen Kimura thought of destroying Allied forces as they X River Irrawaddy in the

Mandalay region. Anticipating Japanese plan, FM Slim made a diversionary Xing of

Irrawaddy on his left flank while the main force mov southwards 100 miles below

Mandalay. Accordingly Slims 14th Army mov fwd to seize Meiktila and Mandalay at thebeginning of 1945.

ORBAT

13. Allied 14th Army (Gen Slim)

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RESTRICTEDa. 4 Corps(Lt Gen F.W. Messervy).

(1) 17 Indian Div ( Maj Gen Kowan).

(a) 48 Bde.

(b) 63 Bde.

(c) 99 Bde.

(2) 255 Tk Bde.

(3) Div Arty.

b. Rft.

(1) 5 Indian Div.

(2) 7 Indian Div.

c. Air. 221 Gp.

14. Japanese Forces (Maj Gen Kimura).

a. A comp force of 12,000 tps composed of all scattered dets for protection of

dumps, instls, air fd etc.

b. About 15,000 admin tps mostly hosp staffs and patients.

c. Bulk of a regt of 49 Div.

Allied Offn Plan

15. The resp to capr Meiktila was given to 4 Corps, with in the overall framewk of the

plan Op Extended Capital. Gen Kowan, GOC 17 Indian Div was made resp to capr

Meiktila. He planned his op for capr of Meiktila in 6 phs. Those were:

a. Exploitation towards east from Nyaungu brH by the two Mech Bde of the

Div and 255 Tk Bde.

b. Conc at Mahlaing.

c. Capr of Thabutkon and subsequently air lifting of 99 Bde at Thabutkon air

fd.

d. Isolating Meiktila by estb rd blocks on all the imp rds and apps.

e. Capr of Meiktila.

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RESTRICTEDf. Capr of Thazi.

16. Gen Kowans Plan to Capr Meiktila. Recce report revealed that gar of

Meiktila was much stronger than aprc earlier. Therefore, Gen Kowan planned to seize

Meiktila to deny the en from rft. He decided:

a. Blocking of the main apps by estb rd block with a view to denying any

Japanese rft in Meiktila.

b. Simultaneous attk from three dir, 48 Bde from north, 63 Bde from west and

255 Tk Bde from the southeast and east.

c. Air lifting of 99 Bde to Thabukton the moment the airstrip was secured.

d. Max use of mob.

e. Surprise was achieved within the overall 14th Armys plan i.e. mov 17 Div

from the north to the south.

Japanese Def Plan

17. Maj Gen Kimura, Comd Meiktila Area had only few days to prep the def. However,

he was quick and org a formidable def with all aval resources. He therefore:

a. He had around 12,000 men who were scattered at various places. He org

them and took perimeter def of about 3 to 4 miles away from the town. He also

collected 15,000 misc tps incl arty men, sigs men, patients from hosp even who

could stand only on one leg with crutches.

b. Two AD bns were closed from the nearby airfd and emp them in grd sp

role.

c. A regt of 49 Div was held back on its way to northern area and emp for the

def of Meiktila.

d. Every house was turned into a strong pt def. Tps were to fight from

rooftops, sitting on rice sacks or from any place they could.

e. He issued auto wpn to all along with ample of ammo.

f. He had an outer perimeter to block and CNZ the en. He held strong pts

inside the town.

Conduct of the Btl

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RESTRICTED18. Adv to Meiktila.

a. 18 21 Feb 45. 17 Div (less 99 Bde) and 255 Tk Bde X Irrawaddy

through the brH at Nyaungu already estb by 7 Div. Adv to Meiktila began on 21

Feb with 48 Bde leading.

b. 22 24 Feb 45. 17 Div less 99 Bde capr Taungtha.

c. 25 Feb 45. Leaving 48 Bde to collect a sup drop, 17 Div cont adv and

capr Mahlaing.

d. 26 Feb 45. 255 Tk Bde capr Thabutkon air strip to fly in 99 Bde from

Palel.

e. 27 Feb 45. 99 Bde started arr by air. 63 Bde cont adv while rest of the

Div halted for resup.

19. The Aslt.

a. 28 Feb 45. 63 Bde adv further to a posn 2 miles south-west of Meiktila

and blocked the road from Chauk. 48 Bde struck northern def. 255 Tk Bde with 2x

Inf Bn and 1x arty Bty blocked the rd to Thazi.

b. 01 Mar 45. 63 Bde attk from west. 48 Bde with some tks attk from the

north and east. 255 Tk Bde with two Inf Bn seized hy def hill near SE corner of

Meiktila.

c. 02 Mar 45. 48 Bde cleared east of Meiktila. Meanwhile 63 Bde in two

strong attks cleared the whole west of Meiktilla with great loss to en.

d. 03 Mar 45. East of the town was finally cleared after a series of attk and

by evening Meiktila was in Gen Kowan's hand.

e. 04 and 05 Mar 45. Wide sweeps with CAS were made to clear all

sides of the town. The main air fd was secured. By 05 Mar 45 Gen Kowan's whole

force was conc in and around Meiktila.

20. Japanese Cattk.

a. Recapr of Taungtha. Gen Kimura pulled out some forces ftg for

Mandalay brH and conc a large force. Lt Gen Honda Cattk and recapr Taungtha

and hills NE of Meiktila by six Bdes with arty and tks and cut off Meiktila from

Nyaungu brH till the end of Mar 45.

b. Allied Rft. Fly in of 9 Bde of 5 Indian Div in sp of 17 Indian Div.

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c. Allied Aslt. To reopen rd to Meiktila 7 Indian Div and 9 Bde of 5 Indian Div

aslt Nyaungu and north of Taungtha.

d. 23 Mar 45. Nyaungu was capr and a few days later Taungtha was recapr.

e. 28 Mar 45. Japanese forces exhausted and hammered unceasingly from

air, started to fall back and Meiktila btl was won by the Allied force.

Cause of Allied Victory and Japanese Defeat

21. Causes of Allied victory and Japanese defeat are as fol:

a. Deception. The deception plan made by the Allied to show the mov of 4

Corps from north toward Mandalay misled the Japanese. It compelled them to

conc their forces in wrong place.

b. Lack of Contingency. Japanese forces cont to believe that the mainthrust will be on Mandalay and accordingly conc his forces. They did not have

enough tps to deal with Nyaungu Xing.

c. Greater Allied Mob. Allied could mov with great speed after Xing and in

subsequent ops because of greater mob. Fly in of 99 Bde as rft was also poss due

to this.

d. Air Superiority. Close and intimate air sp made it easier for Gen Kowan

to liquidate the en. This also helped unopposed air lifting of men and sups.

e. Use of Res. Gen Slim decisively used his res at the most crucial

moment. On the contrary Japanese cont to emp the res force in piecemeal

making it easier for the Allied to beat off.

f. Simultaneous Attk. Plg simultaneous attk with 48 Bde from north, 63

Bde from west and 255 Tk Bde from SE and east which almost sandwiched the en

giving him no respite.

g. Wide Inter Fmn Gap. Allied got opportunities for the Xing because of

large inter fmn gaps in Japanese depl.

h. Protection of Meiktila. Due imp was not given to arrange the def of

Meiktila as it was an imp log base as well as COMCEN.

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RESTRICTEDj. Poor Japanese Int. Due to poor int of Japanese the Allied could easily

deceive the mov of 4 Corps.

Lessons Learnt

23. The lessons learnt form this btl are as fol:

a. Determination and Ldrship. Allied had to fight Xing mighty rivers andthick jungles where snakes, mosquitoes, flies, rain etc were the most common

hindrances. But, the ldrship of Gen Slim and his subord comds proved that

ldrship can guide tps through anything with determination. Gen Slim physically

observed the btl at Pl/ Sec level on 01 Mar 45.

b. Flexibility. Gen Honda was less flexible in diverting his res from the

north towards Meiktila. Thus his rigidity at the initial stage almost left Maj Gen

Kimura to fight an indep btl.

c. Surprise. To implement Op Extended Capital it was imp to make the

en believe that main thrust was to come from the North and East of Mandalay

and for the same reason Xing Irrawaddy at Pokokku and Nyaungu by 4 Corps

was to be kept secret till the Xing was eff. Both these mov greatly surprised the

Japanese and made them off bal.

d. Air Power. Air played a dominant role, which paved the way to achieve

the success:

(1) Timely arr of 99 Bde at Meiktila by air turned the tide in favour ofGen Kowan.

(2) Tn of air borne Bdes of 5 and 17 Div to Meiktila.

(3) Sup by air to 17 Div and 255 Tk Bde.

(4) Complete air superiority helped to maint secrecy of the plan.

e. Mob. Superior grd mob allowed 17 Div to adv 15 miles a day through

en resistance in the thick jungle of Nyaungu region which unnerved the

Japanese and gave them very little time to regp and reorg.

f. Lack of Coord. Although Gen Kimura could master numerically

superior force for the recapr of Meiktila, yet they lacked co-ord and cohesion in

themselves. They could never become a united and compact force. Thus they

were destroyed almost in isolation.

g. Conc of Force. In the theatre Gen Slim had almost equal no of force

but he managed to get the reqr superiority at the selected place of Xing. The

Japanese were at a disadv in that they had to occu the whole river line.7

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h. Use of Armr. 255 Tk Bde which crumbled the def of Meiktila and

subsequently raided incoming Cattk force within 20 miles radius around Meiktila.

j. Admin. This was neglected by Japanese, but the Allies gave great imp

on admin. Proper arrangements were made for speedy evac and treatment of

sick and wounded. It raised the morale of the tps.

k. Commitment of Res. Gen Kimura committed his res prematurely

to stop brH at Mandalay. Thus, he could not rft Meiktila when main attk was

launched by Allied.

l. Denial and Collection of Info. Gen Kimura could not detect such a

massive mov of 4 Crops over 300 miles. Whereas Japanese every move was

detected by Allied air recce, wireless interception and ptl.

Principles of War Fol

22. The principles of war fol were as under:

a. Selection and Maint of Aim.Gen Slims aim was the reconquest of

Burma. To achieve this aim, he planned to destroy Japanese in Shwebo plain.

But Gen Kimura did not play according to Slim's plan. Even at this, Gen Slim

maint his aim by capr Meiktila to destroy en by "Hammer- Anvil" method.

b. Maint of Morale. The victory of Imphal-Kohima btl after a long lull period

enhanced the morale of Allied forces. Secondly, able ldrship of comds at all

level, air superiority, timely CASEVAC by air and reg sup contributed greatly to

maint high morale of Allied forces.

c. Offn Act. After Imphal-Kohima btl the initiative was in the Allied hands.

They kept on hammering their en at places one after another. When Gen Kimura

had wdr his tps to the other bank of Irrawaddy and thus jeopardized Slim's plan

to fight in Shwebo plain, yet Gen Slim cont his adv to destroy the en.

d. Sy. High degree of secrecy was maint by Allied forces by which

Japanese remained totally unaware of Allied Xing places on the river Irrawaddyand particularly about the dir of 4 Crops adv towards Meiktila.

e. Surprise. The sudden and unexpected arrival of 4 Crops at Meiktila

area took Gen Kimura totally by surprise.

f. Economy of Effort. The Allied judiciously used their manpower and

resources to attain the obj. At the same time 4 Crops had sufficient tps to meet

any eventualities.8

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g. Conc of Force. In Meiktila 4 Crops conc superior cbt forces in terms of

men and mat for decisive btl.

h. Mob. Gen Slim very correctly aprc that speed would be the only means

to keep the Japanese on the run. Accordingly, Allied forces kept own tps highly

mob to attain speed and placed the tps at the reqr place at the correct time.

j. Flexibility. Gen Slims plan was also flexible. When Gen Kimura

jeopardized his plan by shifting tps from Shwebo plain, Gen Slim also reacted

swiftly and changed his plan to attk Meiktila and ultimately destroyed the en.

k. Co-op. Good co-op between armd, inf, arty, engrs and air force in

the btl of Meiktila ultimately helped Allied to attain their goal.

l. Admin. The Allied kept no stone unturned to maint smooth and

sufficient admin back up. Their replen and rft by air was of high std.

HAMMER AND ANVIL PLAN

Gen

1. Hammer an Anvil plan was basically a tac concept conveived and exec by Gen

Slim to accomplish the objs of Op Extended Capital. Gen Slim planned to destroy

Japanese in Shwebo plain but Gen Kimura did not play according to Slims plan and

redepl his forces on the southern bank of Irrawaddy. This redepl along with the strat

imp of Meiktila, led Gen Slim for the famous Hammer and Anvil plan, which was

successfully exec to defeat the Japanese forces in Meiktila-Mandalay.

Imp of Meiktila

2. Meiktila and Thazi were the main admin cens of Japanese 15th and 33rd Armies. In

this area there were Japanese main sup bases, ammo dumps, hosps and depots. There

were also few airfds, rd and rail routes from the SE and west converged on Meiktila and

Thazi and again to the north like the fingers of a hand, whose wrist was Meiktila. Thus

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RESTRICTEDthe strat imp of Meiktila was such that if it is capr then the whole structure of the

Japanese def of cen Burma would be vulnerable. Hammer and Anvil plan therefore was

aimed at occu this very imp adv sup base.

Gen Concept

3. The crux of the plan was to crush the Japanese forces by the hammer let loose by

33 Corps from the North (Mandalay) against the anvil estb by 4 Corps at Meiktila.

The Salient Aspects of the Plan

3. The salient aspects of the plan were as fol:

a. Allied aim was to destroy the main Japanese forces in cen Burma between

Mandalay and Meiktila -Thazi.

b. It was based on 33 Corps forcing to X riv Irrawaddy in the north and west of

Mandalay, thus drawing conc of Gen Kimuras army.

c. Arrange all poss cbt indication that Mandalay was the sole obj of 14th Army.

d. 4 Corps was to mov secretly from North to Southern flank through the

Gangaw Valley and X Irrawaddy at Nyaungu which is near to Pakokku. Thereafter,

to strike violently with armr and air borne forces at Meiktila.

e. While 4 corps was to act as anvil from the south at Meiktila, 33 Corps would

attk from the north (Mandalay) as the hammer thereby accomplishing the famous

Hammer and Anvil Plan.

Deception Plan

4. For the success of the Hammer-Anvil Plan, it was essential that the blow that

was to be launched from Pakokku and its str be concealed from the en until the

moment it fell upon them. A scheme (Op Cloak) was prep to persuade Kimura to believe

that 4 Corps was mov in full str into the Shwebo plain on the left of 33 Corps and any

mov in the Gangaw Valley was merely to distract his attn from Allied attk on Mandalay

from the north. To achieve this, fol deceptive measures were taken:

a. A dummy 4 Corps HQ using the same wrls channels was estb at Tamu,

while the real one mov towards South with complete radio silence.

b. 19 Div was transferred from 4 Corps to 33 Corps. All sigs from 33 Corps to

19 Div were passed through the dummy 4 Corps HQ, so that Japanese ident

presence of 4 Corps in the north.

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RESTRICTEDc. 28 East African Bde (newly arr Army res) was leading the adv of 4 Corps to

indicate the presence of 11 East African Div, which was being wdr after its

strenuous monsoon campaign.

d. The real 4 Corps was to maint wrls silence. If it was to be broken, it would

mean the wdr of 28 East African Bde.

e. Sherman tks of 255 Tk Bde were cam to depict the tks of 254 Tk Bde(belonged to 33 Corps) to make the Japanese fell the presence of 33 Corps in the

south.

f. Vol of tfc was made to conform the presence of both the corps conc in the

Shwebo plain.

g. Mov of Lushai Bde (in contact with Japanese for a long time) through

Gangaw valley was to create illusion that only 33 Corps fmns were in the valley,

besides make Japanese feel that it was only a diversionary force to distract their

attn from the north.

h. 2 feint Xing were launched at Chauk and Pagan to confuse the Japanese

forces as to real Xing.

j. Indiscreet conversations between SOs and wrls op were arranged.

k. Inaccurate states were given over radio and newspapers and many

indigenous devices were emp to mislead the Japanese.

l. Wrongly marked maps were dropped.

m. Dummy para landing were made in the east of Chauk.

Concl

5. Gen Kimura though intelligently evaded the trap of ftg in the Shwebo plain but

could not avert his defeat in the Btl of the Irrawaddy Shore. Thus Slims famous

Hammer and Anvil Plan exec to its fullest success in the reconquest of Burma.

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XING MIGHTY RIVER IRRAWADDY

1. Gen. Slims original plan was to fight the main str of Kimuras army on the

Shwebo plain, a dry and flat area between the loops of the Chindwin and Irrawaddy.

Slim intended to conc in the Shwebo plain and using superior mob and air power

destroy the main Japanese forces. The tps then had to abandon the tac of jungle

warfare and prep for btls of mnvr in the flat, open country and low hills of cen Burma.

2. Kimuras Strat. During the later part of Dec 1944 Kimura observed a cont

Allied front estb from India to Chinese border and gradual conc in the Shwebo plain. He

could foresee a trap which his forces would be caught in, if they attempted to stand and

fight in the plain. Showing considerable flexibility and morale courage, he ordered 15

Army to wdr behind the Irrawaddy using 31 Div to cover the wdr. This Div was to estb

itself southwest of Mandalay on both sides of the river. Using the Sagging Hills, it could

eff cover the Xing of the Irrawaddy at Mandalay, be ready for C attk against 14 Armys

app and also observe their mov in the plain. Having made this realistic regp of his

forces, Kimura prep for the btl what he called, The Btl of the Irrawaddy Shore.

3. Gen Slims Plan. An acct of Gen Slims plan of Xing the great riv Irrawaddy is as

under:

a. Gen Kimuras re-gp for a btl along the line of the Irrawaddy naturally forced

Gen Slim to change in his plan. In basic outline, his new plan (Op Extended

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RESTRICTEDCapital) entailed Xing the Irrawaddy and ftg the decisive btl in Feb in and around

Mandalay and the low hills around Meiktila, the key en air and sup base in cen

Burma. This meant the fol:

(1) 14 Army had to X a great riv, which the en was holding in

considerable str throughout its length. Since 14th Army did not possess

enough eqpt to make a strongly-opposed Xing feasible and to avoid a

frontal aslt against str. Slim wanted to make more than one Xing and then

deceive the en as to where the real aslt in str was to be made.

(2) Slim decided that if he makes a sufficiently strong Xing north of

Mandalay, this would draw in Kimuras forces, whilst the main Xing could be

made south of Mandalay, dir straight on the Meiktila base.

b. Slim intended secretly to switch 4 Corps from the left to the right flank of

his army (Op Cloak), mov it down the Gangaw Valley. It would then mt a sudden

over powering aslt over the Irrawaddy at Nyaungu, south of Pakokku with an armr

strike force through to Meiktila and Thazi. The capr of this focal comm area with

its dumps and airfds, would severely damage the lifeline of 15 and 33 Japanese

Armies.

c. Before 4 Corps carr out its main attk on Meiktila. 33 Corps was to capr the

Shwebo area and secure a brH over the Irrawaddy to the north of Mandalay. Slim

expected that Kimura would react strongly to this initial northern Xing; when hehad committed res for the C attks; 33 Corps could then launch its main Xing SW

of Mandalay and about the same time as 4 Corps struck further south at Meiktila.

d. Slim anticipated that their mov would completely unhinge Kimuras front

and disrupt the bal of his forces. He would be compelled to det large forces to

clear his vital COMCEN, only at grave peril of his Irrawaddy line. 14 Army was to

exploit success to the full and to attempt to secure Rangoon before the monsoon.

4. Comment. The plan was, indeed remarkable. Its success relied upon secrecy,

speed and on taking admin risks, which would lead to the destruction of Kimuras Army

in Cen Burma.

5. Causes of Japanese Failures. The causes of Japanese failures to make

use of the great riv obs were:

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RESTRICTEDa. Lack of Rft. Gen Kimura had only 4 under str Divs in 15th Army,

amounting to a total of merely 21,000 tps facing almost 9 Allied Divs with bright

rft prospect.

b. Allied Deception Plan.The Japanese cont to believe that both the Corps

of the 14th Army were op in the Shwebo plain. Gen Kimura, therefore, conc all his

tps opposite to Mandalay. Thus while 4 Corps capr Meiktila, the Japanese were

thrown off bal and defeated in that area.

c. Emp of Res. The Japanese cont to emp the res forces in piecemeal,

which could be easily defeated by the Allied forces.

d. Inter Fmn Gaps. The Japanese left large inter fmn gaps. Those were the

places, where the Allied selected their Xing sites, thus the Allied Xing succeeded

without much opposition.

e. Air Superiority. The Japanese forces did not have any perm alloc of air,

where as the Allied forces enjoyed a complete air superiority.

f. Lack of Int. The Japanese failed to exploit the great riv Irrawaddy as

a formidable obs, because of lack of proper int about Allied adv to the riv.

g. Inferior Tac. The Japanese were inferior in tac handling of tps. They

fought btls with preconceived ideas. The Japanese did not have the flexibility to

conform to the changed tac sit.

h. The Allied Adv. The Allied three pronged adv in Burma; from Arakan, cenBurma and from China front, bewildered the Japanese comds and as such they

could not aprc as to which of these three were the main threat.

j. Seizure of Meiktila. The siezure of Meiktila, the nodal pt of all comm in

cen Burma, dislocated the Japanese admin system that was meant for its forces

in the cen and northern Burma.

6. Concl. Gen Kimura through int evaded the trap of ftg in the Shwebo

plain, but could not avert his defeat in the Btl of the Irrawaddy Shore. He could neither

make use of this great obs, nor could stop Slim from Xing Irrawaddy.

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Btl of Meiktila