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Image Courtesy: mynation.com
Tanvir Jaikishen
Member, Chennai Centre for China Studies (C3S)
S e p t e m b e r 1 9 2 0 1 9
C3S Issue Map IV
Building a Viable Indian Defense viz. China:
An Analysis of the Integrated Theatre
Commands
What is an Issue Map?
C3S has launched its Issue Map initiative. The reports under this series analyse the status and developments of current scenarios in detail. They attempt to aid the reader to get a more comprehensive idea of the issue being addressed through a detailed illustration in the form of images, data and facts
Issue Maps are available for download as PDFs.
About C3S
The Chennai Centre for China Studies (C3S), registered under the Tamil Nadu Societies Registration Act 1975 (83/2008 dated 4th April 2008), is a non-profit public policy think tank. We carry out in depth studies of developments relating to China with priority to issues of interest to India such as geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics of India- China relations, Chinas internal dynamics, border issues, Chinas relations with South Asian countries, prospects of trade, the evolution of Chinese politics and its impact on India and the world, ASEAN and SAARC relations, cultural links, etc. C3S attempts to provide a forum for dialogue with China scholars in India and abroad and give space for the expression of alternate opinions on China related topics. We also provide a database for research on China with special attention to information available in Chinese language. Additionally, events, lecture discussions and seminars are organised on topics of current interest.
About the Author
Tanvir Jaikishen is a consultant and entrepreneur. He holds a master's degree from the London School of Economics and Political Science in International Health Policy. His passions include the study of International Relations, Geopolitics, Defense and Greco- Roman history. He is Member, C3S.
Introduction
On the 15th of August, 2019, the Prime Minister of India, Narendra Modi announced the
creation of a Chief of Defense Staff (CDS) position [1]. The role of the CDS will be primarily
to coordinate between the three armed services - the Indian Army, Indian Navy and Indian
Air Force in order to ensure better synergy between the forces, streamlined procurement
and planning and improved operational readiness in case of future conflict. The
recommendation for the creation of the post of CDS has been made as early as 2001, by the
Group of Ministers (GoM) and its creation underscores a genuine desire to improve the
overall fighting capability of India’s armed forces *2+.
Over the last two decades, there has been increasing clamour towards re-organizing India’s
armed forces into Integrated Theatre Commands (ITCs) with each theatre command
responsible for a particular threat. Bureaucrats and defense personnel, both serving and
retired and defense analysts, among others have long called for the creation of ITCs, each
headed by a Commander who will be responsible ultimately to the CDS. This would enhance
the lethality and the agility of the Indian armed forces, enabling it to better fight both
localised conflicts as well as full-scale war on more than one front if needed.
There are several advantages in reorganizing the Indian Armed Forces into ITCs. Some of
these include
Better training of forces: ITCs can train forces based on the specific nature of the
threat and type of terrain
Streamlined Procurement and Budget Allocation: ITCs can request budgets after a
careful assessment of the type of equipment required basis the nature of threat and
type of terrain. ITCs can also be made responsible for their own procurements,
thereby shortening the acquisition and induction process of latest platforms.
Better synergy between platforms: A case can be made that in the modern military
context, terms like the “Army”, “Navy” and “Air Force” are outdated and any
attempt to wage war in a silo is impractical. An ITC would ensure integration of land,
naval and air assets under a unified command structure, enabling greater
interoperability between different land, sea and air platforms, thus improving the
odds of a favorable military outcome.
The question that remains is not whether the Indian armed forces must shift to ITCs but
how quickly and in what manor. Conventional wisdom would dictate that it would be
prudent to model the ITCs on similar lines as other western militaries, with accommodation
made for unique theatre specific requirements in the Indian context. However, the author
argues, that the Indian armed forces are currently not in a position to reorganize to ITCs, at
least in the conventional sense.
The Current Indian Armed Forces Command Structure: A Snapshot
The Indian Army has seven Commands, the Indian Navy has three Commands and the Indian
Air Force has seven Commands. The tables below list out the various Command locations
and headquarters.
Indian Army Commands[3]
Western Command Chandimandir
Northern Command Udhampur
South Western Command Jaipur
Central Command Lucknow
Eastern Command Kolkata
Army Training Command Shimla
Southern Command Pune
Indian Naval Commands[4]
Western Naval Command Mumbai
Eastern Naval Command Visakhapatnam
Southern Naval Command Cochin
Tri Service Command Port Blair
Indian Air Force Commands[5]
Western Air Command Delhi
South Western Air Command Gandhinagar
Central Air Command Allahabad
Eastern Air Command Shillong
Training Command Bengaluru
Southern Air Command Thiruvananthapuram
Maintenance Command Nagpur
Other[6]
Strategic Forces Command Commissioned in 2003
The responsibility for managing a conflict with China lies with the Northern, Central and
Eastern Army Commands. The Indian Air Force’s Central and Eastern Commands would
likewise assume responsibility for conflict with China. Should there be an outbreak of full-
scale war, the primary challenge will be to ensure coordination between the leadership of
the three army commands and two air force commands. A secondary challenge lies in the
fact that the Northern Command, located in Jammu & Kashmir holds a dual responsibility
for managing a conflict with Pakistan in the region. The Northern Command in Udhampur is
separated from the Eastern Command by a distance of over 2600 kilometers[7]. The warfare
of today is far more dynamic than the wars fought in the past and will require real time data
gathering, processing, analysis and action. In today’s battlefield environment, victory can
only be achieved through the ability to use large volumes of battlefield data in order to
make decisions in real time and execute battle plans accordingly. In such a scenario, having
three different Army commands, each with full autonomy and limited coordination will
render any advantage offered by data completely redundant.
India has fought four wars with Pakistan since her independence. Indian and Pakistani
troops continue to exchange fire across the Line of Control and as a result India has spent
the last 70 years developing the war plans against Pakistan which can be executed given
military preparedness and political will. The Pakistani military is conventionally weaker
when compared to the Indian military and hence it is entirely possible to manage a conflict
with Pakistan under existing command structures. India and China, have fought only one
war (1962) resulting in a military defeat for India, followed by a few skirmishes. China, which
has a larger military budget than India has a military force that is both qualitatively and
quantitatively superior. In 2019, India’s defense budget stands at United States Dollars USD
62 billion[8+ while China’s is estimated to be around USD 175 billion*9+. China has spent the
last three decades building the required infrastructure that will enable it to build up rapidly
and launch a large scale invasion of India in a short amount of time.
The PLA, despite having not fought a war since the Sino - Vietnam conflict of 1979, has
evolved into a modern fighting force that is capable of holding its own and arguably
prevailing against most Western militaries, including the United States. The PLA leadership
has constantly strived to restructure the armed forces to deal with evolving threats in line
with China’s growing geopolitical ambitions. The most dramatic change came about in 2016,
when the PLA restructured from 7 military regions to 5 Integrated Theatre Commands, with
each command being assigned a particular region or threat [10]. The next section will briefly
look at the five Chinese theatre commands in order to provide the reader with an
understanding of the current PLA military structure.
The People's Liberation Army Command Structure: A Snapshot
Image Courtesy: DW
The People’s Liberation Army of the People’s Republic of China is divided into five Theatre
Commands. The table below lists out the five commands and areas of responsibility by
Command.
Eastern Theatre Command[11] Headquartered in Nanjing and encompasses the areas of Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Anhui, Fujian, Jiangxi and the East Sea Fleet
Southern Theatre Command[12] Headquartered in Guangzhou and encompasses the areas of Guangdong, Guangxi, Hunan, Hong Kong and Macau
Western Theatre Command[13] Headquartered in Chengdu and encompasses the areas of Sichuan, Tibet, Giansu, Ningxia, Qinghai, Xinjiang and Chongqing
Northern Theatre Command[14] Headquartered in Shenyang and encompasses areas of Heilongjiang, Jilin, Liaoning, Shandong and Inner Mongolia
Central Theatre Command[15] Headquartered in Beijing and ecompases the areas of Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Shaanxi, Henan and Hubei
These five theatre commands or PLA Battle Zones have replaced the former seven military
area commands in Beijing, Nanjing, Chengdu, Ji'nan, Shenyang, Lanzhou and Guangzhou
from the 1st of February 2016. According to Defense Ministry spokesman Yang Yujun the
shift from MAC’s to Theatre Commands was made with a view to “improving the joint
operational commanding institutions, forming the joint operational system, better
safeguarding national sovereignty, security and development interests, and maintaining
regional stability and world peace.”[10]
The goal of each Theatre Command is to prepare for conflict in the respective areas of
responsibility. The Western Theatre Command has been set up to deal with future conflict
with India and as such merits a closer view in terms of manpower, platforms, equipment
and resources that have been allocated.
The Western Theatre Command comprises of the 76th Group Army, the 77th Group Army,
the Xinjiang Military District (Urumqi), The Xizang Military District (Tibet) and the Air
Forces.[16]
The 76th Group Army located in Xining comprises of the following forces
1 Special Operations Brigade
4 Armored Brigades
2 Infantry Brigades
1 Artillery Brigade
Engineering/NBC Brigade
1 Support Brigade
1 Helicopter Brigade
1 Air Defense Brigade
The 77th Group Army, located in Chongqing comprises of the following forces
1 Special Operations Brigade
2 Armored Brigades
4 Infantry Brigades
1 Artillery Brigade
1 Engineering/ Nuclear, Biological, Chemical (NBC) brigade
1 Support Brigade
1 Helicopter Brigade
1 Air Defense Brigade
The Xinjiang Military District comprises of the following forces
1 Special Operations Brigade
1 High Altitude Mechanised Division
3 High Altitude Motorized Divisions
1 Artillery Brigade
1 Air Defense Brigade
1 Engineering Regiment
1 Electronics Warfare Regiment
1 Helicopter Brigade
Xizang Military District comprises of the following forces
1 Special Operations Brigade
1 High Altitude Mechanised Infantry Brigade
2 Mountain Infantry Brigade
1 Artillery Regiment
1 Air Defense Brigade
1 Engineering Brigade
1 Electronics Warfare Regiment
The Air Forces of the Western Theatre Command comprise of the following divisions and
their corresponding platforms
4th Transport Division
1 Transport Regiment with Y-8/Y-9 aircraft
1 Transport Regiment with Y-7 aircraft
1 Transport Regiment with Y-7/ Y20 aircraft and Mi-17v5 Helicopters
6th and 33rd Fighter Divisions
2 Bomber Regiments with H-6K aircraft
1 Bomber Regiment with H-6H aircraft
Lanzhou Base
2 Fighter Brigades with J-11 aircraft
Urumqi Base
1 Fighter Brigade with J-8H aircraft
1 Fighter Brigade with J-11B aircraft
1 Attack Brigade with JH-7a aircraft
Xian Training Academy
Five training brigades with JL-8, Y-7 and Z-9 aircraft
Others
1 Survey Regiment with Y-8HI aircraft
1 Mixed Surface to Air Missile (SAM)/ Air Defense Artillery (ADA) Division
1 Mixed SAM/ADA Brigade
1 SAM Brigade
4 Independent SAM Regiments[16]
It is important to note here that China’s Western Theatre Command has been structured
and equipped based on the theatre specific requirement. In a future war with India, the
structuring and the resources allocated to the Western Theatre Command will enable it to
effectively manage the conflict without the need to seek resources and men from other
Commands. China’s military modernization and defense spending has allowed the country
to produce defense equipment of good quality as well as in large quantities to ensure that
each Theatre Command is self-sufficient.
The Indian Armed Forces currently lacks the manpower and the equipment (both
qualitatively and quantitatively) to create Integrated Theatre Commands that are self
sufficient. The next section will touch upon the proposed ITC structure for the Indian Armed
Forces and the fundamental roadblocks that prevent such a restructuring.
Independent Theatre Commands in the Indian Context
It has been opined that the 17 commands of the Indian Armed Forces be brought together
under three ITCs
The Northern Command that will assume overall responsibility for conflict with China
The Western Command that will assume overall responsibility for conflict with
Pakistan
The Southern Command that will assume responsibility for India’s maritime interests
While the integration into ITCs along the above lines is prudent from a certain standpoint,
the author argues that such a restructuring at least in the short term is unviable. Taking the
examples of the militaries of the United States of America and the People’s Republic of
China, currently the most powerful militaries in the world, the ability to successfully divide
their armed forces into ITCs is contingent on the availability of sufficient manpower,
equipment, platforms and a robust research and development base.
The Indian Armed Forces suffer from chronic manpower, equipment, platform, and funding
shortages across the three services. Current Research & Development (R&D) is still found
wanting and has resulted in India becoming the world’s second largest arms importer *17+.
The Indian Army currently faces a shortage of armor, artillery, armored personnel carriers,
night fighting capabilities, modern rifles, bulletproof jackets and ammunition among other
resources. The Indian Army unlike its western and Chinese counterparts remains a
manpower centric force as opposed to a platform centric force, thus placing a huge strain
on budgets which are typically allocated towards providing sustenance for, training of and
billeting troops instead of towards capital acquisitions.
The Indian Air Force has a sanctioned strength of 42 fighter squadrons which is considered
the minimum requirement in the event of an all out two front war. Currently the IAF possess
around 31 squadrons and is only expected to reach the sanctioned strength of 42 by
2035[18]. The Air Force is made up of primarily vintage fighter aircraft notably the MiG-21,
Mirage - 2000, Jaguar, and Mig-27 aircraft. Plans for a fifth generation fighter aircraft remain
on the drawing board for the immediate future and induction of large numbers of fourth
generation fighter aircraft is expected to take around a decade.
Rafale Fighter Jet
Image Courtesy: defensenew.com
Latest generation platforms like the Rafale fighter aircraft and the Apache AH-64E attack
helicopters currently being inducted are being placed in equal numbers in air bases near
China and Pakistan. While this allocation may be prudent during peacetime, should future
conflicts arise with either one or both of India’s neighbours, it is likely that air assets may be
moved to different air bases in another theatre of conflict, based on the severity of threat
and given the lack of significant numbers of fighter aircraft to sustain a single theatre
without the need for additional support.
The Indian Navy which has made significant strides towards indigenisation of platforms and
their respective components aims to possess 200 modern ships by 2027.[19] The Naval Air
Arm, boosted by the recent acquisitions of MiG-29s and Poseidon surveillance aircraft, still
lacks modern multi-role helicopters and anti submarine warfare helicopters. The Indian
Navy’s submarine fleet remains depleted due to poor planning, delayed production
timelines.
The Indian Armed Forces currently does not possess the bandwidth to allocate limited air
and naval platforms to one particular theatre of conflict. In the event of a localised conflict
on one front, it is possible to allocate dedicated air and naval platforms to ensure a decisive
victory, but in the case of an all out war situation in one or both fronts, resources will need
to be allocated based on area of requirement and urgency of need. An argument can also be
made that air and naval platforms need to remain theatre agnostic in order to ensure
judicious usage. For example, an Israeli made Phalcon airborne early warning and control
system (AEW&C) can be equally effective in conducting surveillance on both the Pakistani
and Chinese borders without necessarily being allocated to one specific theatre. Likewise
fighter and bomber aircraft can be equipped with countermeasures and weapons systems
that enable them to carry out offensive operations in both Chinese and Pakistani theatres.
Naval warships are developed keeping in mind the latest offensive, defensive, stealth and
propulsion technologies are not made with a view towards engaging Pakistani or Chinese
naval vessels only.
The same logic can be applied to punitive strike weapons like missiles and unmanned
combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs). These platforms must remain theatre agnostic with
deployment based in locations that will enable them to survive a first strike while ensuring
maximum lethality when launched. An example of such platforms includes BRAHMOS cruise
missiles. There are variants of this supersonic cruise missile and the deployment of each
variant is rightly based on functionality of variant type. While the Indian Army has already
inducted Block I and Block II BRAHMOS regiments, it is now in the process of inducting the
Block III “steep-dive” variant which can destroy targets behind mountain ranges.[20] The
army plans to base this regiment in the north-east of India, to counter China, but the same
missiles can also be placed in other theatres of operation that require steep dive capability.
A case can however be made for theatre specific planning and equipment/platform
procurement for the Indian Army. For example, a war with Pakistan would require adequate
numbers of artillery, T-90/T-72/Arjun tanks and weapons that can fire in over 50 degrees
Celsius of heat in Rajasthan to minus 50 degrees Celsius in Siachen. A war with Pakistan
would assume an offensive character and as such would require equipment and platforms
that support offensive action across the Line of Control and the International Border. A
conflict with Pakistan would require equipment that is suited to the deserts of Rajasthan,
the plains of Punjab and the high-altitude terrain of Kashmir. In contrast, a war with China
would be of a defensive nature and would require that soldiers be trained and acclimated to
high altitude warfare and equipped with gear that allows them to function in sub-zero
temperatures. Tanks and artillery has to be light and portable in order to be transported by
land or air to battle zones at high altitudes. There is also a need to ensure border road
construction projects are completed on time in order to ensure faster supply lines. The
overall goal of a conflict with China would be to ensure India’s territorial sovereignty is
maintained by repulsing Chinese assaults to behind the Line of Actual Control and the
International Border.
It is thus prudent to conclude that the creating ITCs along the lines of their western or even
Chinese counterparts is not practical given India’s unique threat assessments, geography,
and strategic requirements. What is also clear is that the current command structure and
structuring of forces is not optimal to fight a modern war. The next section will look at
current changes being made to the force structures of the Indian Army and how the
command structure of Indian Army can evolve in order to prevail decisively in a future
conflict.
Countering China: Creating New Command Structures to suit the Indian Context
The Indian Army seeks to move away from a Corps based structure towards Integrated
Battle Groups (IBGs). Each corps typically has three divisions and each division has three
brigades. IBGs are essentially brigade sized elements which comprises of infantry, armored,
artillery and air defense units.[24] IBGs will take only 12 to 48 hours to mobilize as opposed
to mobilization of an entire corps which can take days if not weeks based on existing
logistics. IBGs are constituted and equipped based on the three T’s which are threat, terrain
and task and thus each IBG will require different equipment, weapons, and platforms. IBGs
will also be offensive and defensive in nature with equipment, weapons and platforms being
once again different for offensive and defensive IBGs respectively. [21]
The current command structure must also evolve to make effective use of these new force
structures. A good case study is the Indian Navy’s Information Management and Analysis
Centre (IMAC) inaugurated in Gurgaon in 2014. The role of the IMAC is to collate and
process data from naval and coast guard stations, ships as well as merchant ships (through
automatic identification systems) in order to create a real-time live image of the 7500-
kilometer Indian coastline. [22]. While the army currently possesses the capability of real
time battlefield imaging, the author proposes that the Indian army create two Unified
Theatre Commands – one for managing conflict with China, the and the other with Pakistan.
Each of these Unified Commands will be responsible for collecting and processing data
specific to its theatre of conflict in order to create a real-time battlefield image. This will
allow more streamlined and efficient decision making in order to ensure a decisive victory in
a short span of time. This is important given that China has worked diligently to improve
mobilization time for the PLA through a network of roads near the border and development
of robust supply lines.
The author proposes that each of these Unified Theatre Commands be further divided into
sectors with a sub-command assigned to each sector. Currently, the ultimate responsibility
for managing conflict with China lies with the Northern, Central and Eastern Army
Commands. The author proposes these three existing commands be designated sector
commands with the following functions
- Capture, collate and transmit real time battlefield data to the Unified Theatre Command
- Work with newly formed IBGs to draw up battle plans and conduct exercises to validate
these plans
- Assess the evolving threat in each sector in order to ensure optimal availability of
manpower, equipment, platforms and weapons
The author does not call for the decentralization of command structures. Modern warfare
cannot be waged by top-heavy centralized decision making alone. The role of the Unified
Theatre Command will be to define the overall “war doctrine” at a strategic level, while
delegating actual tactical battle planning and execution to the various sector commands.
The wars of the present and the future are “information wars” and it is important to collate
all the data across multiple sectors in order to create a real-time image of the war across the
entire battlefront. Thus the role of the Unified Theatre Command will be to
- Create a real-time image in order to visualize the war across the entire battlefront
- This will enable military leadership to transfer manpower, weapons and resources to
from one sector to another in real time, or deploy reserve forces to a particular sector
based on the outcomes of individual battles
- Create a strategic roadmap for a possible future conflict with China, thus allowing for
smarter defense procurements and allocation of manpower
- Identify, develop, test and validate future weapons and technologies in electronic
warfare, cyberspace and artificial intelligence domains in order to prevent the PLA from
crippling civilian and military infrastructure prior to battle.
An argument can be made that a war with China will very likely be a two-front war or a two
and half front war, with Pakistan and various insurgent groups acting to destabilize the
country from within. In this two-front war scenario, it is opined that Pakistan and China can
be looked at, not in terms of two separate theatres of conflict but as one large theatre.
Given the fact that China supplies Pakistan with large quantities of defense equipment, and
that interoperability between the two armed forces is improving over time, the use of newly
raised IBGs under existing Indian command structures is more than adequate, given the
sector specific nature of each Indian Army and Air Force command. The author is however
of the view that both China and Pakistan while sharing some common goals, have different
political and military objectives. A war with China would likely create a second front with
Pakistan, who will seek to annex Jammu and Kashmir. A war with China could be fought for
a variety of reasons that range from China’s desire to assert regional dominance through
limited conflict to an all-out war to annex Arunachal Pradesh. The author strongly believes
that irrespective of a one front or a two-front war, Unified Theatre Commands are still
essential to fighting future information wars.
Creating a Robust Army Air Arm
During the Kargil War, one of the key takeaways was the lack of agreement between the
Indian Army and Air Force in terms of air support. The army requested use of helicopter
gunships, only to be refused by Air Force which was in favor of precision air strikes. While
this did not ultimately impact the outcome of the war in a significant war, in a broader
conflict, disagreements of this nature can be the difference between victory and defeat.[23]
The author proposes that the Army Air wing be allocated the primary use of close infantry
support air assets such as rotary wing helicopters, drones and other weapons platforms.
Take for example the current procurement of attack helicopters. India has ordered 22 AH-
64E Apache helicopters of which at the time of writing eight have been delivered. Ten are to
be sanctioned towards airbases facing Pakistan, the other ten being sanctioned to bases
facing China with the last two kept in reserve [24]. After a prolonged turf battle between the
Indian Army and IAF, the Ministry of Defense sided in favor of the IAF in terms of ultimate
operational ownership of these Apache helicopters. As a result, the Indian Army now seeks
to place an order for a paltry 6 Apache helicopters for its Air Wing [25]. Likewise, when
observing the induction pattern of the Light Combat Helicopter indigenously developed by
Hindustan Aeronautics Limited, it is noted that both the Army and Air Force have placed
orders resulting in duplication of platforms [26].
The author agrees that the Indian Army and the Indian Air Force has every right to procure
the same platforms citing specific threats and mission requirements unique to each service.
However, duplication of procurements as a consequence of “turf battles” between the
Indian Army and Air Force is counterproductive in the long run. Thus, the author is of the
opinion if the newly created IBGs are to be have the necessary firepower to prevail against a
conventionally superior Chinese military, the Army’s Air Arm must be given ultimate
ownership of rotary wing air assets and other close quarters infantry support air platforms.
Countering China at Sea: The Naval Dimension It is fallacious to assume that Indian Navy’s Western and Eastern Commands are theatre
centric. While, from an administrative point of view, it is convenient to assume that the
Western Naval Command is responsible for managing conflict with Pakistan and its Eastern
counterpart is responsible for managing conflict for China, this structuring is outdated given
the threat assessment of today. China has established a naval presence in ports at
Chittagong, Hambantota, Gawdar and Djibouti among others. It is not essential to physically
place the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) warships in each of these ports to
constitute a threat. The use of these ports as listening posts and fuelling stations coupled
with China’s increased naval activity in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) will require that all of
the Indian Navy’s Commands work in close cohesion with each other in order to remain
vigilant towards China’s increasingly assertive naval posture in the region.
In the aftermath of 26/11, the Indian Navy was put in charge of ensuring net security of
India’s maritime boundaries. This was done as the Coast Guard at the time lacked the
requisite manpower and equipment to perform the task on its own. This resulted in the
Navy pivoting away from a key goal of becoming a “blue water force” towards a more
coastal defense type role. In the last few years, the Navy and the Coast Guard alike have
made huge strides towards improving capabilities in order to protect India’s coastlines. This
has allowed the Navy to re-focus on the overall goal of winning future naval conflicts in
wartime, while protecting India’s naval interests and vital maritime trade routes in
peacetime.
The PLAN currently has around 300 warship hulls. This includes 23 destroyers, 59 frigates,
and 37 corvettes and 76 submarines, including ballistic missile submarines armed with long
range nuclear missiles, nuclear-powered attack submarines, and diesel electric attack
submarines. The PLAN currently has more warships than the United States Navy which is
estimated to have around 287 warship hulls[27]. In comparison, India has only around 140
warships and around 220 aircraft with another 56 ships on order.[28] This numerical
disparity may seem alarming to a casual observer but quality of warships play a far more
decisive role than quantity. China lacks the major power projection platforms required to
carry our long-range, expeditionary operations. China currently has only one carrier, and no
amphibious assault ships. It has no cruisers, or a surface ship larger than a destroyer and no
principle ships to protect carriers and other platforms from missile attacks. The Jingdao-
class Type 056 Corvette and the Jiangkai-II-class Type 054A frigate ship types currently make
up around 2/3s of the Chinese naval fleet. he Jingdao-class Type 056 Corvette are small
lightly armed ships and can only perform submarine hunting missions off the Chinese coast
while the Jiangkai-II-class Type 054A frigate lacks the ability to defend aircraft carriers[27].
In contrast, while the US Navy has only 287 warship hulls, it possesses 11 carrier groups and
numerous surface combatants that can carry out long range expeditionary missions at short
notice. The PLAN is rapidly making strides to address these qualitative gaps by building a
second Type 002 carrier as well as simultaneously constructing two Type 003 carriers. China
is also constructing one Type 075 amphibious assault ship and at least four Renhai-class
Type 055 warships, which can be classified as guided missile cruisers.[27]
The Jingdao-class Type 056 Corvette
Image Courtesy: Navy Recognition
China currently has maritime disputes with Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines,
Taiwan, and Vietnam in the South China Sea, and also with Japan and South Korea. China’s
increasing militarization of the South China Sea has resulted in the need for the PLAN to
maintain a continuous and robust presence in the area. As such, in a future conflict with
India, it is unlikely that the PLAN will dispatch all of its surface and underwater combatants
against the Indian Navy. The Indian Navy must focus on competing qualitatively instead of
trying to match the PLAN in numbers. In order to decisively dominate an adversary in any
future conflict, the PLA and the PLAN have developed robust Anti Access/Area Denial
(AA/AD) platforms that can be used to deter intervention by both Asian and Western navies.
The University of Sydney’s United States Study Center has warned in a study that the PLA
has developed long range missiles in sufficient numbers in order to overwhelm Western and
Asian military bases in the Western Pacific in a matter of hours.[29]While the contents of
this study can be debated, what is clear is that in the absence of strong naval platforms, the
PLA has focused on AA/AD capabilities to protect against future naval conflicts.
There is no strategic or tactical rationale in combining the Eastern Naval Command into an
ITC with the army and air force. Instead the Eastern, Western and Southern Naval
Commands need to work with greater synergy in concert with the Southern Air Command to
develop AA/AD platforms that will deter a PLAN invasion of the Indian Ocean in any future
conflict. The naval commands must be given the overall responsibility and the autonomy to
purchase surface to ship missiles, coastal batteries, and naval air assets that include multi-
role helicopters, fighter jets and anti-submarine helicopters to create a robust AA/AD
infrastructure. The building of surface combatants and submarines is important, but
adequate resources, funding and planning must be given towards creating sufficient AA/AD
capabilities. To assign technologically superior air assets such as Rafale and Suhkoi jets only
to airbases responsible for China and Pakistan while deploying Light Combat Aircraft (LCA)
Tejas jets to southern air bases is counterproductive given the nature of the current PLAN
force capabilities. To de-prioritize India’s maritime defense in favor of trying to win a land
war could lead to catastrophic consequences for India.
Conclusion India needs to take a pragmatic look at her current state of defense preparedness when
planning for any future conflict. It is important not to be haunted by the ghosts of the past,
but at the same time learn from errors of the past. It is discouraging to note that more than
five decades after the 1962 war, not all the lessons have been learnt and for the ones that
have been learnt, steps taken to prevent against making the same blunders have not been
fully implemented. There still remains a great divide between political aspirations and
military realities and the level of dialogue between the political decision making class and
military leadership needs to be more frequent. Any attempt to create an ITC that mirrors
Western equivalents simply as a show of strength domestically and internationally can have
disastrous consequences in any future conflict that may arise.
There is a need to develop defensive and offensive capabilities taking into account India’s
political goals, willingness to spend on defense and a clear, fact based threat assessment of
the future. India is not a country with designs of hegemony over the sovereignty of other
nations. India seeks only to maintain the territorial integrity of her borders while providing
security and stability to the region. It is along these lines that the Indian Armed Forces of
tomorrow need to be shaped and prepared and not in a one-size-fit-all solution.
References
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[6] “Indian air force official to head Strategic Forces Command”; Aviation Week; January 21 2003.https://aviationweek.com/awin/indian-air-force-official-head-strategic-forces- command [7] Google Maps https://www.google.com/search?q=udhampur+to+shillonh&oq=udhampur+to+shillonh&aq s=chrome..69i57j33l2.4492j0j7&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8 [8] “India’s Defence Budget 2019-20” Institute of Defense Studies and Analysis; July 8th 2019 https://idsa.in/issuebrief/indias-defence-budget-2019-20-lkbehera-080719 [9] “China’s defence spending: a question of perspective?” International Institute of Strategic Studies Military Balance Blog; 24 May 2019 https://www.iiss.org/blogs/military- balance/2019/05/china-defence-spending [10] “Spokesperson: PLA's theater commands adjustment & establishment accomplished” China Military Online, 2nd February 2016 http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/view/2016- 02/02/content_7160702.htm [11] China’s Ministry of Defense - Eastern Theatre Command http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/armed-forces/eastern-theatre-command.htm [12] China’s Ministry of Defense - Southern Theatre Command http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/armed-forces/southern-theatre-command.htm [13] China’s Ministry of Defense - Western Theatre Command http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/armed-forces/western-theatre-command.htm [14] China’s Ministry of Defense - Northern Theatre Command http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/armed-forces/northern-theatre-command.htm [15] China’s Ministry of Defense - Central Theatre Command http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/armed-forces/central-theatre-command%20.htm [16] The Military Balance 2018; International Institute of Strategic Studies; Pages 228, 257; Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group [17] “India is world’s second-largest arms importer”, The Hindu, March 12th 2019 https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/india-is-worlds-second-largest-arms- importer/article26502417.ece [18] “How the IAF compares with the PAF”, The Hindu Businessline,March 1st 2019 https://www.thehindubusinessline.com/opinion/how-the-iaf-compares-with-the- paf/article26411688.ece [19] “Indian Navy aiming at 200-ship fleet by 2027” The Economic Times, July 14th 2018; https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/indian-navy-aiming-at-200-ship-fleet- by-2027/articleshow/48072917.cms?from=mdr [20] “Army to get steep-dive BrahMos missle regiment for China front” Economic Times, July 14th 2018; https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/army-to-get-steep-dive-brahmos-
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[22] “Defence minister inaugurates Information Management and Analysis Centre (IMAC) Gurgaon”Current Affairs, November 4th, 2014; https://currentaffairs.gktoday.in/defence-minister-inaugurates-information [23]“Kargil Controversy: An IAF Response” Volume 25,January - March 2010; Published online, June 23 2018 http://www.indiandefencereview.com/spotlights/kargil-controversy-an-iaf-response/ [24]“First four IAF Apache helicopters arrive in India” Jane’s 360, July 28 2019; https://www.janes.com/article/90130/first-four-iaf-apache-helicopters-arrive-in-india
[25]”Apache attack helicopters to be inducted into IAF at Pathankot on September 3” The Times of India, August 30 2019 https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/apache-attack-helicopters-to-be-inducted-into-iaf-at-pathankot-on-september 3/articleshow/70912753.cms [26]“ India’s Light Combat Helicopter Completes Weapons Trials” The Diplomat; January 23 2019 https://thediplomat.com/2019/01/indias-light-combat-helicopter-completes-weapons- trials/ [27]“China Now Has More Warships Than the U.S.”Popular Mechanics; May 20 2019 https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/navy-ships/a27532437/china-now-has-more- warships-than-the-us/ [28]“India is beefing up its navy to counter China's increasingly powerful fleet”Business Insider; December 6 2018 https://www.businessinsider.com/india-is-beefing-up-its-navy-to-counter-chinas-powerful- fleet-2018-12?IR=T [29]“China Missiles Could Overwhelm U.S. Military in Asia in ‘Hours’, Says Think Tank” Bloomberg; August19, 2019 https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-08-19/china-could-crush-some-u-s- military-assets-in-hours
Glossary of Terms
AA/AD - Anti Access/Area Denial ADA - Air Defense Artillery AEW&C - Airborne Early Warning and Control System CDS - Chief of Defense Staff GoM - Group of Ministers MAC - Military Area Command IAF - Indian Air Force IBG – Integrated Battle Groups IMAC – Information Management and Analysis Center IOR - Indian Ocean Region ITC - Integrated Theatre Command LCA - Light Combat Aircraft PLA - People’s Liberation Army PLAN - People’s Liberation Army Navy PRC - People’s Republic of China R&D - Research & Development SAM - Surface to Air Missile UCAV – Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle USD - United States Dollars