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BUILDINGGUDERIANSDUCK:GERMANYSRESPONSETOTHEEASTERNFRONTANTITANK

CRISIS,1941TO1945by

SCOTTM.CHAFIAN,LCDR,USNB.A.,CaliforniaStateUniversity,SanFrancisco,California,

1992

TABLEOFCONTENTS

ContentsTABLEOFCONTENTS

ABSTRACT

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

ACRONYMS

ILLUSTRATIONS

TABLES

CHAPTER1INTRODUCTION

Lithuania,24June1941

PurposeandOrganizationofThesis

Definitions

MeasuresofEffectiveness

Background:GermanAntitankForces,September1939toJune1941

BarbarossatoStalingrad:June1941toFebruary1943

Lessons

CHAPTER2.THEHEERESWAFFENAMTANDGERMANINDUSTRY

OberkommandodasHeeresandSubordinateWeaponsDevelopmentCommands

Heereswaffenamt

TheoreticalTankDevelopmentCycle

GermanTankIndustry,1943

OperationalDynamics

Summary

CHAPTER3.THECRISIS:RUSSIANARMORANDGERMANGUNS

T-34andKV-1

GermanCountermeasures,1941

TowedAntitankGuns

PanzerjgerandSturmgeschtz

Lessons

CHAPTER4.THEDESIGN:THEJAGDPANZERIV

DesignandProduction

Performance

CHAPTER5CONCLUSION

Introduction

DesignAccomplishment

FieldingThreatComparison

Conclusion

GLOSSARY

REQUESTFROMTHEPUBLISHER

APPENDIXAWAPRFORGANIZATION

APPENDIXBKEYPERSONS

APPENDIXCARMOREDVEHICLECHARACTERISTICS

BIBLIOGRAPHY

PrivatePapers

Manuscripts

ForeignMilitaryStudies

PublishedMaterialsOfficial

Books

On-lineMaterials

ABSTRACT

BUILDING GUDERIANS DUCK: GERMANYS RESPONSE TO THEEASTERNFRONTANTITANKCRISIS, 1941TO 1945, byLCDRScottM.Chafian,USN.

The appearance of the T-34 in 1941 caused a crisis for German antitank forces.Existing antitank guns were nearly impotent against the new Russian tank, whileantiaircraft and artillery pieces, though successful when pressed into action, wereinsufficiently mobile to accompany mechanized forces. The German Army OrdnanceOffice,theHeereswaffenamt,wasresponsiblefordevelopmentofnewweaponsandwouldbe responsible for countering the threat ofRussian armor. The Heereswaffenamt wouldneed tonotonlycounter theT-34,butalsodoso inanenvironmentofshiftingpoliticalrelationshipsandwithanincreasinglystressedindustrialsystem.

Utilizing lessons from the bitterly contested battlefields of western Russia, theHeereswaffenamtdevelopedatank-destroyer,theJagdpazerIV,usingtheexistingchassisof the Panzer IV tank, and the guns of both the Panzer IV and Panther tanks. TheJagdpanzerIV,knownbyitscrewsasGuderiansDuck,provedtobeacapabletankkilleragainstboththeT-34threatof1941and1942,aswellastheimprovedversionsof1943and1944.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This project presented a unique opportunity for a Naval Officer to indulge hisinterestinWorldWarIIGermanyunderthetutelageofArmyOfficersandGermanhistoryexperts. Itwould not have been possiblewithout the support of a number of people towhomIamgreatlyindebted.LTCJohnSuprinandMr.BrianAllenbothspentlonghoursreviewingmyworkandgivingguidanceandadviceasmembersofmythesiscommittee.Dr.SamLewis,despitehisheavyworkload,servedasacommitteememberandmentorinthestudyofHistoryingeneral,ensuringIalwaysstrovetodeterminethetruthbehindthestory.

Mychildren:Kayla;Nick;Tori;Katie;andMatthew,eachintheirownspecialway,neverletmeforgetthelittlebutsoveryimportantthingsinlife,beitpushingaswingorplayingcatch.Most importantly,mywifeCindyputupwithlonghourstakingcareofafamily and housewhile I researched andwrote.Without her help, thiswould not havebeenpossible.

Lastly,Ihumblydedicatethistothemillionsofsoldiers,bothGermanandRussian,whohonorablygave their livesfor theircountrymen.Regardlessof ideology, theystoodupforwhattheybelievedin,andpaidtheultimateprice.

ACRONYMS

AP/CRarmor-piercing,compositerigid

BHPbrakehorsepower

FlaKFliegerabwehrkannon(antiaircraftcannon)

FPSfeetpersecond

GWGeschtzwagen(guncarriage)

KwKKampfwagenkannon(tankcannon)

OKHOberkommandodasHeeres(HighCommandoftheGermanArmy)

OKWOberkommandoderWehrmacht(SupremeCommandoftheGermanArmedForces)

PaKPanzerabwehrkannon(antitankcannon)

PzgrPanzergranate(armor-piercinground)

PzJgPanzerJger(tankhunter)

PzKwPanzerkampfwagen(armoredfightingvehicle)

SdKfzSonderkraftfahrzeug(specialpurposesmotorvehicle)

SPWSchtzenPanzerWagen(infantryarmoredvehicle)

StuGSturmgeschutz(assaultgun)

StuKSturmkannon(assaultcannon)

ILLUSTRATIONS

Figure1.HeereswaffenamtOrganization

Figure2.GermanAntitankWeaponPerformance,1941-1943

Figure3.7.62-centimeterPaK(r)aufGw38(t)MarderIII,SdKfz139

Figure4.7.5-centimeterJadgpanzerIV/70PanzerIVlang(V),SdKfz162/1

Figure5.JagdpanzerIVDesignThreatComparison

Figure6.FiringHeight/MaximumRangeComparison

Figure7.EffectofLowerFiringHeight

Figure8.PanzerIVlangFieldingThreatComparison

Figure9.PanzerIVlangFutureThreatComparison

TABLES

Table1.GermanArmoredVehicleManufacturers1943-1944

Table2.T-34andKV-1Comparison1941-1943

Table3.JagdpanzerIVVariants

Table4.RussianArmorComparisonCategories

Table5.FieldingThreat:RussianArmor1943-1944

Table6.FutureThreat:RussianArmor1945

CHAPTER1INTRODUCTION

Lithuania,24June1941

About half-way toRossieniethe only supply route to the bridgeheadwas blocked by a heavy tank of theKVtype.an antitankbatterywith50-mmgunswasordered towork itsway forward anddestroy the tank.The firstround,fromabout600yards,wasadirecthit.Asecondandthirdroundfollowed.Bythetimetheeighthhitwasscored,theRussian tank crew had discovered the position of the firing battery. Taking careful aim, they silenced the entirebatterywithafew76-mmshells.

Sincethe50-mmantitankgunshadfailedtopiercethe3-incharmor,itwasdecidedthatonlythe88-mmflakgunwith itsarmor-piercingshellswouldbeeffective.Wellcamouflagedwithbranchesandconcealedby theburned-outGermantanksliningtheroad,thegunsafelyreachedtheedgeoftheforestandstopped900yardsfromthetank.

JustastheGermancrewwasmaneuveringthegunintoposition,thetankswungitsturretandfired,blastingtheflakgunintoaditch.Everyroundscoredadirecthit,andtheguncrewsufferedheavycasualties.

[Thenextmorning,followinganunsuccessfulattackbycombatengineers],afeintfrontalattackwastobeexecutedbyatankformationwhileanother88-mmgunwastobebroughtup.

TheGermanarmordeployedandattackedwhile the88-mmgun tookupaposition to the rearof the [Russian]tank.Theveryfirstroundwasadirecthitand,asthecrewtriedtoturntheguntotherear,asecondandthirdshellstruckhome.Mortallywounded,thetankremainedmotionless,butdidnotburn.Fourmore88-mmarmor-piercingshellshittheirmark.

TheGermansclosesttothetankfoundthatbuttwoofthe88-mmshellshadpiercedthetankarmor,thefiveothershavingmadeonlydeepdents.Eightbluemarks,madebydirecthitsofthe50-mmantitankguns,werefound.Notraceof the fire from theGerman tanks [conducting the feint] could be found.Suddenly, the gun barrel started tomoveagain,andmostoftheGermansscattered.Quickly,twoengineersdroppedhandgrenadesthroughtheholemadebythehitonthe lowerpartof theturret.Adullexplosionfollowed,andthe turretcoverblewoff.Insidewerethemutilatedbodiesofthecrew.[1]

Account from elements of the 6th Panzer Division, Army Group North, in theopeningdaysofOperationBarbarossa.

PurposeandOrganizationofThesis

Despite developing the tactics and doctrine that would dominate theories ofmechanizedcombatfortherestofthecenturyandcausethetermblitzkriegtobecoined,GermanyenteredtheSecondWorldWarwithanarmythatwasstartlinglyunpreparedtodefend against an armored attack. This void was not seriously challenged and couldtherefore be ignored or glossed over during the campaigns in Poland and the West.GermanysinvasionoftheSovietUnioninJune1941however,broughtGermanyfacetofacewithlargenumbersof tanksmoreheavilyarmedandarmoredthantheirown.Overthe course of the following year, Germany introduced a number of hastily lashed-upantitankvehiclestocounterthethreatofRussianarmor.ByDecember1942,theGermanArmyOrdnanceOffice, theHeereswaffenamt, issued its first requirement for an actualtank destroyer, the Jagdpanzer IV. This thesis will investigate whether or not theHeereswaffenamtdesignedaneffectivetankdestroyertocountertheantitankcrisisoftheEasternFrontin1941-1943.

Thisstudywillbeorganized intofivechapters.Chapter1outlines thestructureofthe thesis,definesmeasuresof effectiveness, andprovidesabackground to theantitankcrisisof1941on theEasternFront. Itwill brieflydiscuss the campaigns inPolandandFrance,GermanantitankorganizationontheeveoftheinvasionofRussia,andprovideasummaryofthecourseofeventsontheEasternFrontfromtheinitialinvasion,OperationBarbarossa, through the battle of Stalingrad. Chapter 2 describes the functions andresponsibilities of theHeereswaffenamt and its subordinate offices, briefly discusses itsrelationship with the Oberkommando das Heeres, the High Command of the GermanArmy,andsummarizestheGermancompaniesinvolvedinarmoredvehicleproduction.

Chapter 3 describes the Russian armor that precipitated the crisis, the relativeeffectivenessofGermanantitankforcesatthetimeoftheinvasion;detailsthevariousadhoc attempts tomotorize and armorGerman antitankweapons between June 1941 andDecember 1942; and summarizes lessons learned from their employment. Chapter 4explores the material options open to the Heereswaffenamt in design of the new tankdestroyer; describes the finalized design, test performance, and production totals of theJagdpanzer IV; and provides examples of Jagdpanzer IV combat experience. Chapter 5concludeswithassessmentoftheHeerewaffenamtseffortindesigningtheJagdpanzerIV.

This thesiswillassess theRussian threats fromJune1941 toDecember1942 thataffectedthedesignoftheJagdpanzerIV.Opposingarmorthatappearedafterthattimewillnotbeconsideredintheassessment,butJagdpanzerIVperformanceagainstthesethreatswill be included to evaluate the consequences of designing a weapons system in adynamic tactical and operational environment.Non-Russian threatswill be excluded asRussian tanks posed a greater threat thanAmerican orBritish; success against Russiandesignsgenerallyensuredsuccessagainstotheralliedtanks.Additionally, thethesiswillnot address economic or industrial consequence or alternatives to Jagdpanzer IVproduction,butwillbelimitedtochoiceofthoseplatformsandweaponsreadilyavailableto theHeereswaffenamt.Similarly, organization and employment, or failings thereof, ofGermanorRussianforceswillnotbeaddressed.

Definitions

Germany produced a wide range of both purpose built and converted armoredfightingvehiclesduringWorldWarTwo,withseveraldifferentsystemsofnomenclature.

For easeof reading,German tanksare referred to asPanzer I,Panzer II,with theexception of latewar tanks,whichwere generally referred to by name (Panther, Tiger,KingTiger).Self-propelledgunswill be referencedbyanabbreviation, (example:StuGforSturmgeschtz or assault gun), unless commonlyknownby a nounname (example:JagdPantherorHetzer).Germanarmoredinfantryhalf-trackswillbereferredtoasSPW,for SchutzenPanzerWagen (infantry armored vehicle). German guns will be referred tousing abbreviations PaK for Panzerabwehrkannon (antitank gun), KwK forKampfwagenkannon(tankgun),andFlaKforFliegerartilleriekannon(antiaircraftgun).

Russianvehicleswillbereferred tousing theiralphanumericdesignator(example:T-34orSU-85)andmodelamplificationwherenecessary(exampleT-34/41).

Anappendixwillbeprovidedsummarizingthenomenclatureandcharacteristicsofallvehiclesandequipmentreferencedinthethesis.

MeasuresofEffectiveness

Effectiveness of the Jagdpanzer IV design will be evaluated in the areas offirepower, protection, and mobility. While data from production tests may seemstraightforward, they do not tell the story of how effective the Jagdpanzer IV was inaction. Both test data and experience from actual engagements will be used forcomparisonofdesigngoals againstbattlefield suitability and indetermining JagdpanzerIVdesignsuccessorfailure.

Firepowerwillbeconsideredin termsofpenetrationofarmoratgivenrangesandwill bemeasured against three categories of threat: design, fielding, and future.DesignthreatisdefinedastheT-34/41andKV-1tanks,bothinRussianserviceduringtheperiodtheJagdpanzerIVwasbeingdesigned.FieldingthreatisdefinedastheT-34/43,T-34/85,andKV-85, all ofwhich saw servicewithin a year of the Jagdpanzer IVs fielding andwerelogicalprogressionsofeachdesign.FuturethreatisdefinedastheJSseriesoftanks,which sawserviceduring theclosingmonthsof thewarand represents anentirelynewgenerationoftanks.

Protection will be considered in terms of survivability against major types ofRussianantitankweapons.Tankcannonwillprovidethreecategoriesanalogoustothoseusedinfirepowerassessment,butwillbesomewhatsimplifiedbythefactthatseveralofthereferencedtanksmountedthesamegun.ThiscategoryincludesRussianself-propelledantitank guns of the SU series. Two additional categorieswill assess protection againstRussianself-propelledassaultgunsoftheSUandJSUseries,andagainstinfantryantitankweapons.Whilesomewhatintangible,theprotectionaffordedtheJagdpanzerIVbyitslowheightwhencomparedtootherGermandesignswillbediscussed.

Mobilitywillbeconsideredinmoresubjectivethanobjectiveterms.Topspeedandrangewillbediscussed,butmaneuverability characteristics as reportedby troops in thefield tell a more complete story. As these are not listed in specifications, issues withdesignswillbedocumentedandassessmentsmadethereon.

Background:GermanAntitankForces,September1939toJune1941

At the start of the war, German infantry were equipped with the 7.92-millimeterPanzerbsch (antitank rifle)38or39, threeof theseweaponsbeingassigned toa sevenmanATsectionwithineach infantrycompany.Antitankartilleryunits employed the37millimeter PaK 36, each German infantry division generally having 60 to 80 of theseguns,evenlydistributedbetweenasingleantitankbattalionandtheantitankcompaniesofthe three infantry regiments. Panzer divisions usually contained only the antitankbattalion.[2]

ItwasbelievedthattheseweaponswouldbesufficienttodefendtheGermanArmyfromtankassault.ThebeliefwouldbeputtothefirsttestwiththeinvasionofPoland.

Onthemorningof1September1939,fiveGermanarmiesthrustintoPoland.Largepartsof thePolish forcesweredestroyed in theDanzigCorridorbetweenGermanyandGerman-controlledEastPrussia.TheGermanFourth,Eighth,andTenthArmiesencircledtheonlyremainingsizeablePolishforcesinthevicinityofPoznan.Rangingfurthereast,theGermanXIXandXXIIPanzerCorps,underGeneralsHeinzGuderianandSigmundListhadmetsouthofBrest-Litovskon17September,envelopingalmostalltheremainingPolishforces.While isolatedfightingwouldcontinueforseveralweeks, thewarwasallbutover.

While thevictoryappeared tobeastunningsuccessofGermanysmobilewarfaredoctrine,thelighteningthrustsofthetwoPanzercorpshaddivertedattentionawayfromthefactthatthevastmajorityofthefightingoccurrednearthePolish-Germanborder,andwas conducted bymarching or horse-drawn infantry,whichmade up 90 percent of theGermanArmy.Additionally, asPolandpossesseda smallnumberofobsolete tanks, theGermansoppositionconsistedalmostexclusivelyof infantryandhorsecavalry.Thetwomechanizedcolumns,consistingoftankssupportedbyinfantryintrucks,hadfacedonlysporadicopposition,ratherthanmajorfighting.[3]

Thoughaspectacularsuccess,theinvasionofPolandhadnotputGermanantitankdefensestothetest.WhilethecampaigninFrancethatwouldsoonfollowsawchangestoGermanoffensivetactics,defensivedoctrinecontinuedunchanged,andreequippingofthePanzerdivisionswithmoremoderntankswasonlypartiallycomplete.OntheeveoftheinvasionofFrance,Germanyhadbarely600PanzerIIIandIVtanks,thebulkoftheforcerelying on 1,000 Panzer II light tanks leavened with approximately 334 Czech Panzer35(t)and38(t)lighttanks,whilemorethan500PanzerIswerestillinservice.[4]

On10May1940,Germanys18thand6thArmies,partofArmyGroupB,launchedattacks into Holland and Belgium. The assault west, anticipated all winter, had begun.WhileFrenchandBritishforcesmovednorthtocountertheperceivedthreat,ArmyGroupA,consistingofthe4th,12th,and16thArmies,includingsevenPanzerdivisions,slippedthrough theArdennesand intoFrance.By13May,Germanspearheadshadcrossed theMeuseRiveratSedan,theAlliesfallingbackindisarrayattheflankattack.By20May,theGermanPanzershadreachedtheEnglishChannelatAbbeville.[5]

ThiscampaignremainstheclassicexampleofBlitzkrieg,withoppositioncrumbling

indisarray,unabletoadjusttothetempoofGermanoperations.On21May,however,thedayafterArmyGroupAsplittheAlliedforces,aBritishcounterattackpointedtothewayofthingstocome.

While the German Panzers were thrusting to the English Channel, they hadbypassed large pockets of Allied resistance.Mustering the available forces in the areaaroundArras,atraditionallogisticshub,theBritish1stTankBrigade,withsupportfromthe 50th Infantry Division launched a two-pronged counterattack against the exposedGerman flank. TheBritish, suffering from organizational inefficiencies compounded bythe general chaos stemming from the speed of the German advance, were unable tocoordinatethecounterattackwithartillerysupport.Intelligencewasnegligible;theBritishbeing unsurewhether theywould encounter the leadingGerman armored formations orlightlyarmedsupplytroops.

Despite its lack of coordination, the British attack hit the flank of Rommels 7thPanzerDivision across an 8-kilometer front at 2:30 in the afternoon. In the rush of theadvance,theGerman25thPanzerRegimenthadsurgedaheadofthe6thand7thInfantryRegiments,nowdefendedonlyby towed37-millimeterPaK36s.TheBritisharmorandinfantryweresoonseparated,bothbyGermanactionandthespeedoftheBritishtanksadvance.Nowdevoidoftheiraccompanyinginfantry,asplannedforinGermandoctrine,the58MkIand16MkIIMatildatanksoftheBritishforcecontinuedonintotheGerman6th Infantry Regiment. As the PaK 36s engaged the British, their projectiles merelyhammeredsmalldentsintothearmoroftheBritishtanks;oneMatildatookfourteenhitswithnoeffect.Despitelosingbothofitstankbattalioncommandersandseveraltankstoincendiaries,mechanical problems, andGermandive-bombers, theBritish counterattackcontinued,overrunningaGermanantitankbattery,destroyingthe6thInfantryRegiment,andcausing theS.S.Totenkopf division tobreakand run.By7:00P.M.with theBritishattackingGerman7thInfantryRegiment,Rommelhadreversedthe25thPanzerRegimentandcommittedittohisowncounterattackagainsttheBritishflank.

The German Panzers, so successful in Poland, now found themselves at adisadvantage.Neitherthe20-millimetercannonofthePanzerII,the37-millimetergunofthe Panzer 38(t), nor the low velocity 75-millimeter gun of the Panzer IVwas able toreliablystoptheBritishMatilda.Conversely,theMatildas2-poundergunwascapableofdefeatingtheheaviestarmorofallthreepanzers.Attheendoftheexchange,theGermanshad lost six Panzer 38(t)s, three Panzer IVs, and four Panzer IIs.[6] British lossesamounted to seven Mk Is, and no Matildas. The panicked retreat of the SS-Totenkopfdivision,havingjustseenlargenumbersofGermantanksknockedoutofactionbyenemyarmor,isperhapsthefirstexampleofGermantroopssufferingfromtankterror.

Sensing the potential for a disaster, Rommel ordered the antiaircraft and artilleryunits in thedivisions rear area to engage theBritishwithdirect fire.Fire from the88-millimeterFlaKgunsand105-millimeterhowitzersfinallypenetratedtheMatildasthickhide,andhaltedtheBritishadvance.[7]TheBattleofArraswasover.

However,thevictoryhadcomeatahighprice.The25thPanzerRegimenthadlostnineofitsscarcePanzer38(t)sandIVs,andthe7thInfantryRegimentwasbadlymauled.

The6thInfantryRegimentwasnearlydestroyed;oneofitsbattalionssufferinginonedaymorecasualtiesthananyotherGermanbattaliondidovertheentirecampaign.[8]Rommelhimself observed, The anti-tank gunsshowed themselves to be far too light to beeffectiveagainsttheheavilyarmouredBritishtanks,andthemajorityofthemwereputoutofactionbygunfire,togetherwiththeircrews,andthenoverrunbytheenemytanks.[9]

The campaigns inPoland andFrance had offered somevaluable lessons, but alsogavefalseimpressions.TheoverwhelmingvictoryinPolandhadraisedthemoraleoftheGermanArmy,buthadbeenfoughtagainstaweakopponent,employingsmallnumbersof1930svintageBritishcavalry tanks.[10]The rapidityofvictoryover theFrenchArmy,ostensibly the most powerful in the world, overshadowed the lessons of Arras, and ofengagementsagainstindividualFrenchCharB1andSOUMAtanks.Bothofthesetanks,aswell as theBritishMatilda,hadprovenamatchagainsteven the latestantitankgunsandPanzers,butthearithmeticblindedboththeGermansandtheAllies.Aforceof2,600Germantankshadovercome4,800FrenchandBritishtankstocutFranceinhalfinlittlemorethanaweek.[11]

Someof the lessonshadbeen taken toheart.The firepowerof thePanzer IIIwasenhancedwiththeinstallationofa50-millimetergun,andantitankartilleryperformancewas improved through the introduction of a new 50-millimeter towed antitank gun, thePaK 38, though in June 1941 the 37-millimeter gun was still prevalent in both roles.Despite these changes, the increase in firepower was negated by the expansion of themechanizedforcebetweenthesurrenderofFranceandtheinvasionofRussia.Inthistime,Panzer divisions had doubled in number from ten to twenty. While this increase wasimpressive on paper, itwas predicated on a decree byHitler that Panzer production beincreasedtoonethousandvehiclesamonth.WhentheHeereswaffenamtinformedHitlerthiswouldbeimpossiblegivenGermanysfiscalandmanpowerconstraints,thenumberoftanksineachdivisionwassimplycutinhalftosupporttheexpansion.Atthesametime,motorizeddivisionshadsimilarlydoubledwithoutacorrespondingincreaseinproduction,requiringalargenumberofcapturedvehiclesbeemployed.Asaresult,thestrengthandmobilityofPanzerandMotorizeddivisionswouldneveragainreachthestandardsofMay1940.[12]

In June 1941, on the eve of the invasion of Russia, confidence was high thatGermanywouldwinaquickvictory.ThebattlesinPolandandFrancehaddonenothingtoshakethefaithintheArmysequipmentandoperations.OppositioninPolandhadbeenfartoo anaemic for valid comparison of antitank defense. In France, the rapidity of theadvance along with the relatively short distances involved combined to produce suchshockamong theFrenchandBritishdefenders that resistanceoften simplycrumbledasmorale failed. As Germany was about to discover, the vast space of Russia and thecharacterofherdefenderswouldmakethebattleunliketheearlyvictories.

BarbarossatoStalingrad:June1941toFebruary1943

On22June1941Germanyunleashedthemostmassiveinvasioninhistoryagainstastunned and ill-equipped Soviet Army. Operation Barbarossa, Hitlers plan for theconquestofRussia,drove151divisionsdividedintoArmyGroupsNorth,Center,andSouth,crashingacrossalinerunningfromtheBaltictotheBlackSea,adistanceofover1,000miles.[13]ThedestructionoftheRussianArmywastotakeplaceasithadbeforeinPolandandFrance;theLuftwaffeconductingapowerfulbombardmentfromtheair,whilePanzers broke through the defenders crust and split enemy forces, the followinginfantryandartillerydestroyingthesurvivors,orcompellingtheirsurrender.[14]

AtfirstitappearedGermanywouldachieveitsgoalsinspectacularspeedandstyle.ExploitingRussianconfusionandtheirownmobility,Germanmechanizedforcescrashedthrough thedefenderswithunprecedented speed.By late July,ArmyGroupsNorth andSouth had each advanced over 100 miles, while Army Group Center had covered anamazing285miles.[15]

By 17 July however, separation of Panzers and supporting forceswere occurringacross the front.As this separation grew and the supply situation grewworse,Germanmomentum began to falter. At this crucial point, indecision and conflict at the highestlevelsoftheGermancommandstructurecauseddelaysfarmorecostlythanthoseoftheRussiandefenders.

FrictionbetweentheOberkommandoderWehrmacht(OKW,SupremeCommandoftheGermanArmedForces)andtheOberkommandodasHeeres(OKH,HighCommandoftheGermanArmy),ledtodelaysinsettingthenextphaseoftheinvasioninmotion.WhileHitlersmid-Septemberdecree that theoperationalgoalshadbeenmet in thenorth andsouth,andthereforethedriveonMoscowcouldcontinuerestoredunityofpurpose,overtwomonthshadbeenlost.

By the end of September,ArmyGroupCenterwas prepared to launchOperationTyphoon, the final drive on Moscow. While initial gains were once again impressive,momentumbegantoflagasGermanunitsfelttheeffectsoffourmonthsnonstopfightingandextendedlogisticstails.Thiswasexacerbatedbytheonsetofwinter,thefirstsnowsfallingon7October.[16]

Onthenightof4December,seventeenSovietArmies,ledbySiberianunitsrecentlytransferredfromtheFarEast,fellupontheGermanflanksnorthandsouthofMoscow.Insub-zerotemperaturesthewinter-equippedSiberiansoverwhelmedtheGermandefenders.

TheRussian counteroffensive, though off to a good start, was hampered by poorcoordination and a lack of operational sophistication. After initially cracking under theunexpected Soviet advance, the Germans regrouped and fought back bitterly, and theRussianadvancegroundtoahaltbyFebruary1942.Despitebeingbetterequippedforthewinter weather, Russias Army lacked the strength to decisively destroy the Germanarmies.Theoffensive,whilesavagingbothsides,resultedinrelativelysmallgainsandlefttheRussiansinatleastasprecariousapositionastheGermans.Itprovedtobeenough,however, to ensure Moscow was never seriously threatened again. With their air of

invincibility shattered, the Germans regrouped, awaiting the spring thaw and renewedoffensives.[17]

By thespringof1942, theGermanArmy,whileonpaperappearingstronger thantheyearbefore,wasactuallynobetteroff.AnincreaseinPanzerdivisionsfromnineteentotwentyfivemeantlittleasfewbattalionswereuptoauthorizedstrengthoftwentytwoPanzerIIIsandIVs.ThePanzerIIIJwiththe50-millimeterL/60gunaswellasthePanzerIVF2 and StuG IIIF, both with the 75-millimeter L/43, began appearing in growingnumbers,aswellasearlyexamplesoftheMarderseriesoftankdestroyers,mountingthecaptured Russian 76.2-millimeter antitank gun; though none of these constituted acomplete solution to the T-34. As a partial counter to this each Panzer division nowincludedafullbattalionof88-millimeterguns.[18]

German plans for 1942would revolve around theCaucuses, though again debatebetweenOKWandOKHledtofataldelays.ArmyGroupSouth,nowthemaineffortintheEast,madeexcellentprogressthroughoutthesummer,untiltheGerman6thArmyreachedtheDon on either side ofVoronezh on 5 July. At this pointHitler sent the 4th PanzerArmy,whichhadbeensupporting the6thArmy,onapointless three-weekdetoursouthtowardstheCaucasusoilfields,onlytoreversehimselfon29July.Whilethefootbound6th Army slogged east, now focused on the Russian industrial city of Stalingrad, themobile4thPanzerArmystruggledtoextricateitselffromtheapproachestotheCaucasus.Simultaneously,Russian reinforcementswerestreaming intoStalingrad.Onceagain, thedelaywas just sufficient to overcomeGerman plans.While the assault on the citywasopened inmid-August, theGermanswerenever able to clear the entire city ofRussiandefenders.

On18and19November,500,000Russiantroopsand900newT-34s,infourtankcorps,threemechanizedcorps,andfourteenindependenttankbrigadesnorthandsouthofStalingrad rolled over the poorly equipped Rumanian divisions protecting the ArmyGroupsflanksandtheirlightGermanreserve.[19]By22November,theRussianpincershadclosedatKalachontheDon,trappingoveraquarterofamillionmen.TheGermansfought desperately, but bymid-January, conditions in the pocketwere almost inhuman,andon1February1943theremainingtroopssurrendered.[20]

Lessons

Whilein1941theGermanssweptacrosstheRussiancountryside,individualSovietunits had put up stubborn defenses.Generally, these pocketswere quickly reduced, butcracks were starting to show in the supposed German juggernaut. When faced withRussianT-34andKV-1tanks,whetherintheadvanceorinandencirclement,theGermansfound themselves outgunned and insufficiently armored. In July of 1941, 6th PanzerRegiment lost21 tanks (over50percentof its strength) toahandfulofT-34s.Onotheroccasions,advancesweresimplyheldupastheGermantankgunsbouncedineffectuallyoff the thickRussian armor.On 8 July theOperations Abteilung Diary of LVII PanzerCorps recorded the appearanceof heavy tanksof a typenot seenbefore.5cmantitankcannotpenetratethem.[21]GermantroopscametobelieveThatyoualwayshadtokillaRussiantwiceover.[22]

PerhapstheonlysolacetheGermanscouldtakeontheinitialappearanceoftheT34andKV-1was that theywere available only in small numbers and piecemealed out insupportofinfantry.[23]

The lessons of 1942were, beneath the initial veneer of summers victories,moreominous. FollowingGerman successwithmixed formations, Russian armored brigadeshadbeenreorganizedintoeffectivecombinedarmsunits.[24]Further,whiletheGermanoffensive was, if anything, even more successful than in 1941, the fighting took on adifferent character.Though large numbers ofSovietmen and equipment still fell to theGerman onslaught, the Russians had, in general, learned to give ground rather than beencircledanddestroyed.AnewscorrespondentfortheVlkischerBeobachtersummedupthesituation.

TheRussian,whoup to this timehad fought stubbornlyovereachkilometre,withdrewwithout firinga shot.Ouradvancewasonlydelayedbydestroyedbridgesandbyaircraft.WhentheSovietrearguardsweretoohard-pressedtheychose a positionwhich enabled them to hold out until night.Itwas quite disquieting to plunge into this vast areawithoutfindingatraceoftheenemy.[25]

When the Soviet counteroffensive around Stalingrad opened, it showed that theRussianshad learned theiroffensive lessonswell.Thecounteroffensiveplans relativelylimited goal of destruction of the 6th Army was diligently adhered to; despite severalopportunities,theSovietsdidnotrepeatthefailuresof1941andoverreachthemselvesinfruitless frontalassaults.[26]Germanycouldno longercountonsalvaging theresultsofoperational indecision through Soviet tactical blunders. Nor could German victory anylonger be won through a single lightening stroke or by exploiting enemy defensiveineptitude.Thestruggleaheadwouldrestonadirectclashofarms.

In 1942, becausemost of the Russian tank production facilities had fallen to theGerman offensive, tank production was limited, and the number of T-34s and KV-1sremained relatively limited. This would change as factories relocated east of the UralMountainsin1942begantoturnoutanimmensewaveofthesetanks,improvedbytwoyearsofbattleexperience,in1943.TheGermanantitankinventory,woefullyinadequatein 1941 and improved only through desperate stopgaps in 1942, would have to bequantitativelyimprovedtomeetthechallenge.

CHAPTER2.THEHEERESWAFFENAMTANDGERMANINDUSTRY

TheHeereswaffenamt(ArmyOrdnanceOffice)wastheorganizationresponsiblefordevelopmentofnewweaponssystemswithintheGermanArmy.WhilethestructureoftheHWA remained essentially unchanged throughout the war, its effectiveness would beseriously challengedby changes in bothorganization andpolitics in theGermanArmy.These changes would set the conditions under which any new weapon would bedeveloped.

OberkommandodasHeeresandSubordinateWeaponsDevelopmentCommands

Before mobilization of the German Army in 1939, the Heereswaffenamt wasdirectly responsible to the Oberkommando das Heeres (OKH, High Command of theGermanArmy).Followingmobilization,thepositionofCommanderoftheReplacementArmywas established inAugust 1939.TheCommanderof theReplacementArmywasresponsibletotheArmyCommanderinChiefandOKHforequippingofthearmyinthefields of personnel, material, and finance; accordingly, the Heereswaffenamt becamesubordinatetotheCommanderoftheReplacementArmy.Inearly1940,theCommanderoftheReplacementArmyreceivedtheadditionaltitleofChiefofArmyEquipment.[27]

The Heereswaffenamt developed new weapons systems after receiving directionfrom, andwith the cooperation of theGeneral ArmyOffices Arms Inspectorates. TheArms Inspectorates were responsible for establishing organization, training, andspecifications for new weapons systems, organized by function; Inspectorate 6 hadresponsibility for armored troops, including tanks, tankguns and self-propelled antitankweapons.[28]

Heereswaffenamt

TheHeereswaffenamtwasdirectlysubordinatetotheChiefofArmyEquipmentandCommander of the Replacement Army and was responsible for, development,procurement,andacceptanceofweapons,ammunition,andequipmentfortheArmyaswell as for the production capacity of the armament industry assigned to him or itsenlargement.[29] Lieutenant General Emil Leeb, Chief of the Heereswaffenamtthroughout the war described it as the, central agency responsible for the technical[design]andmanufacturingofarms,equipmentandammunition.[30]

Insupportofthesetasks,theHeereswaffenamtwasorganizedintogroupsaccordingtoresponsibility.Overalladministrativecontrol,includingorganizationandlegalmatters,wasthejurisdictionoftheZentral-Amtsgruppe(WaZ,CentralGroup).

TheAmtsgruppefrEntwicklungundPrffung(WaPrf,DevelopmentandTestingGroup), receivedrequestsfornewweapons,ammunition,andequipmentfromtheArmsInspectorates, though occasionally recommendations would come direct from the FieldArmyviatheOKH.TheWaPrfwasalsoresponsibleforobservingforeigndevelopmentsand testing captured weapons. Twelve functional branches within the Wa PrfcorrespondedtothedesignationsoftheArmsInspectorates;accordingly,thePanzerundMotorisierungsabteilung(PanzerandMotorizedEquipmentBranch),responsiblefortanksand self-propelled antitank guns, was designated Wa Prf 6. Heereswaffenamtorganization is depicted in figure 1. A full listing ofWa Prf Branches is provided inappendixA.

TheAmtsgruppefrIndustrielleRstungWaffenundGert(WaIJRWuG,Groupfor Weapons and Equipment Manufacture) gave production orders to industry forequipment and spares, excluding ammunition.The Amtsgruppe fr IndustrielleRstung

Munition(WaJRMun,GroupforAmmunitionManufacture)fulfilledthesameroleforammunition. The Amtsgruppe Chefingenieur (Wa Chef Ing, Chief Ordnance EngineerGroup)waschargedwithensuringmanufacturerswereprovidedwiththelatesttechnologyfor design andmass-production, and supervising the use of critical rawmaterials. TheForschungsabteilung(WaF,ResearchGroup)trackedalltheoreticalandappliedresearchinthearmsfield(forexample,developmentofthehollow-charge),bothwithinGermanyand in foreign countries. The Amtsgruppe fr Abnahme (Wa Abn, Acceptance Group)inspected and accepted completed weapons, equipment, and ammunition, or theircomponentparts,at the factory.Thiswasacertification function,anddidnotconstitutetakingpossessionorassemblingcomponentpartsofsystems,whichwastheresponsibilityoftheGeneralArmyOfficesOrdnanceInspectorate.

Uniformed soldiers and civilian engineers constituted the majority of theHeereswaffenamt personnel, augmented by a small number of civilian economists. Themilitary officers with higher engineering degrees generally performed developmentfunctions,whilethosewithoutgenerallyservedasliaisontothefieldforces(viatheArmsInspectorates) within their limited area of expertise. Between six and seven thousandpersonnelwereassignedtotheHeereswaffenamt,thenumberdecreasingasthewardrewon.[31]

TheoreticalTankDevelopmentCycle

Development and procurement of a new weapon system followed a generallystandard cycle from the pre-mobilization period until 1942, when the process wascomplicatedbytheinclusionofthenewlycreatedMinistryforWarProduction.Underthepre-1942 system, (used for simplicity) the request for a new armored fighting vehiclewouldproceedasfollows.

Field forces would forward their request for a new vehicle to the General ArmyOfficesInspectorateforArmoredTroops(Inspectorate6).Inspectorate6thendeterminedthevehiclesdesiredcapabilities,includingrequiredtrainingandorganizationalchangesifnecessary.Coordinationwith the Infantry andSignals Inspectorateswould begin at thispoint for development of the vehicles secondary armament and radio gear. Oncecompleted,thespecificationswouldbeforwardedtotheHeereswaffenamtforaction.

WithintheHeereswaffenamt,WaPrf6(thePanzerandMotorizedBranch)wouldbecometheleadofficefordevelopment,coordinatingwithotherbranchesasrequiredforsupportingequipment(forexample,WaPrf1,theBallisticsandAmmunitionBranch,ifanewmaingunwasrequired).Afterinitialassessment,theHeereswaffenamtwouldassignthedevelopmentprojecttociviliancompanies,eachofwhichwouldthenproduceadesignproposal.

OnceindustryprovidedtheirinitialdesignstotheHeereswafenamt, representativesofallinvolvedWaPrfsandArmsInspectoratesmettoassessthesubmissionsandreachaconsensusonthebestdesignfeaturesandanyrequiredchanges.EachWaPrfwouldthenbegin development of construction details, while the other organizations establishedacceptancestandards,trainingrequirements,andorganizationaldocumentation.

TheHeereswaffenamtnextinstructedtwoormorecompaniestoproduceprototypevehicles, which were delivered to and tested by Wa Prf 6 (with assistance fromassociated branches) to ensure they met design specifications; the vehicles were alsoassessedbyWaAbn(theAcceptanceGroup)todetermineproductionacceptancecriteria.TheprototypeswerethenpassedtotheArmsInspectoratestoensuretacticalrequirementshad been met. The Chiefs of Army Supply and Transportation were also included inassessment, to determine if new ammunition or rail transportation equipmentwould benecessaryforthenewvehicle.

The best design was selected, and orders for pre-production vehicles sent to themanufacturer. If changes to the prototypewere required, theywere incorporated at thistime. Once pre-production vehicles were completed, they were delivered to theHeereswaffenamtfor testing inspecialdemonstrationunits.Uponsuccessfulcompletionof the demonstrations, an initial run of vehicleswas ordered. Thesewere issued to thefieldforcesforcombattrials.Thesequenceofmodificationanddeliverytofieldtestunitswasrepeateduntilafinalizeddesignwasdetermined.Atthattime,mass-productionorderswereplacedwithoneormorecompanies.Throughout,theWaChefIng (ChiefEngineerBranch)wouldensurethattheinvolvedcompanieswereemployingthelatestproductiontechnologies.[32]

GermanTankIndustry,1943

Germany began the rearmament of her tank force in 1933, when theHeereswaffenamt issued development contracts for what would become the Panzer I.WhileGermanstankdesignswouldimproveinthenextsixyears,hercapacityformassproduction of heavy vehicleswas sorely deficient at the outbreak ofwar.Because theywereAmericanowned,Ford andOpel, the two companies inGermanywith significantmassproductionexperience,wereexcludedfrommilitaryvehicledevelopmentcontracts,shifting the burden to Germanys relatively anaemic heavy equipment industry.Nonetheless,severalfirmssuccessfullydevelopedandproducedtanksandself-propelledguns for the German Army, though maximum output was relatively low due toinefficiency. This was somewhatmitigated by the expertise of the German optical andarmament industries, notably Krupp and Rhinemetall-Borsig. Table 1 lists the majorGermanarmoredvehiclemanufacturersandtheirassignedprojectsin1943-1944.

ThePanzerIII,numericallythemostimportantGermantankatthebeginningofthewarintheeast,wasbeingphasedoutofproductionby1943.TheresultingexcesscapacitywasusedtoproducetheStuGIIIandlaterversionsof thePanzerIV,whichbecamethecoreofGermaninfantrysupportandtankforcesfortheremainderofthewar.Henschel,MAN, and MNH were, from late 1942, completely occupied with Panther and Tigerdevelopment and production. BMM, maker of the excellent Panzer 38(t) chassis, wasincapable of producing heavier vehicles at its Czech facilities, and, alongwithMarderproduction, focusedondevelopingan improvedchassis, thePanzer38(t).Productionofnewvehicledesignsfrom1943onwouldhavetocomeattheexpenseofexistingtypes.[33]

OperationalDynamics

WhiletheHeereswaffenamtremainedgenerallyunchangedthroughoutthewar,thesamecouldnotbesaidofthesurroundingorganizations.Personalityconflicts,changesinthe OKH structure, and the unstable character of the entire Third Reich reduced theHeereswaffenamtseffectiveness throughout thecourseof thewar.[34]TheevolutionoftheWaffenamfs situation can be broken down into three periods:Mobilization throughdismissaloftheArmyCommanderinChief(fall1939to19December1941);ChiefoftheReplacementArmysdecreasing influence to theattemptonHitlers life(spring1942to20 July 1944); and loss of Army control to the end of thewar (summer 1944 toMay1945).

When the position of Commander of the Replacement Army was activated inAugust 1939, Lieutenant General Karl von Stlpnagel was assigned to the post inaccordancewiththemobilizationplan.Withindayshowever,hehadfallenfromHitlersfavor, and the position was filled by the then Chief of the General Army Office,Lieutenant General Friedrich Fromm. Fromm held both positions until February 1940,when Major General Friedrich Olbricht was named to be Chief of the General ArmyOffice, Fromm remaining Commander of the Replacement Army. Throughout the firstyear of the war, the Replacement Army was focused on the task of mobilization. Theconsolidationofallequipmentandpersonnelactivitiesunder theunifiedorganizationoftheCommanderoftheReplacementArmygreatlyeasedthisprocess.

Fromms appointment, however, was a source of frustration to the head of theHeereswaffenamt,LieutenantGeneralEmilLeeb.Leeb,beingseniortoFromm,believedhe should be answerable directly to the Army Commander in Chief, rather than theCommander of the Replacement Army. Despite Leebs appeals, the OKH clearlystipulated in late 1939 that the Waffenamt was subordinate to the Commander of theReplacement Army, and assigned the later the additional title of Chief of ArmyEquipment. Additionally, Fromm was promoted to General to reinforce the point.Nonetheless, friction between the two organizations continued to a varying degreethroughoutthewar.[35]

WhiletheearlytumultintheReplacementArmyandWaffenamtchainofcommandwasbeingresolved, theagencies themselveswere takingonthechallengeofarmingthenewlymobilizedGermanArmy.From1934to1939,Germanyhadpreparedtomobilizefortyconventionalinfantrydivisionsandsixteenpanzer,mechanized,andlightdivisions.The relatively suddenmobilization in 1939 added an additional seventy-five divisions,whichcouldnotbeequippedfromexistingstocks;theGermanmilitaryhadbeendirectedto prepare for war in the early to mid-1940s.[36] To some extent, this problem wasalleviatedbytheannexationofCzechoslovakia(withhernotinsignificantarmsindustry)andtheshort,relativelylow-costvictoriesinPoland,andNorway.

Nonetheless, it was increasingly apparent, even after the Polish campaign, thatproduction was not up to the requirements of the conflict. Rather than mobilize theeconomy for war, Hitler chose to create the Ministry for Armaments and Munitions,headedbyFritzTodt,on17March1940.Initially,theMinistrysrolewassolelyoversight

of civilian industry, and theHeereswaffenamtmaintained its role inweapondesign andproduction.[37]

ThequickvictoryinFrancecombinedwiththeapparentsuccessofthecooperationbetween the Replacement Army and the Ministry for Armaments and Munitions gaveHitler a false senseof confidence inGermanys ability to support and supply the army.ThiswasfurtherreinforcedbytheearlysuccessesofOperationBarbarossa.Accordingly,GeneralFrommreceivedaFhrerdirectiveon14July1941directingareductioninarmyequipmentproductioninfavoroftheAirForceandNavy.ThoughrelationsbetweentheMinistryandtheReplacementArmyhadbeengooduptothispoint,TodtactedonHitlersordersbeforeFrommcouldcontestthem,reducingthearmysshareofcivilianindustrialcapacity.[38]

Thiswastohavedevastatingconsequencesinthewinterof1941-1942.Thelossesof the Russianwinter campaign (amplified byHitlers refusal to equip the troopswithwinter clothing for fear of damaging morale) were shattering. Reserves that had beenhusbanded at rear depots made good the losses, but following that surge, Germanproductionwouldbeinatailchasetocatchup.Thissituationwasbadenoughinandofitself, but the appearance of the T-34 had completely upset the design schedule of theHeereswaffenamt.Beforethis,Germanyscampaignshadbeenshortenoughandseparatedintimesufficientlytoallowcombatexperiencetobeanalyzedandincorporatedintonewdesigns.Now interimweaponshad tobe rushed intoproductionwhile lessons from thefrontweredigestedandnewdesignsdeveloped.

Thedifficultsituationwasexacerbatedon19December1941,whenHitlerrelievedGeneral Field Marshal Walther von Brauchitsch as Army Commander in Chief, andassumedthejobhimself.AtthispointtheinfluenceoftheHeereswaffenamt,andinfacttheentirearmy,begantowane.RatherthanhaveGeneralFrommreportdirectlytohim,Hitler appointed the Chief of the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW, SupremeCommand of the German Armed Forces), General Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel, asDeputy Army Commander in Chief. As such, Frommwas obliged to report to Keitel.Keitelsweakpersonality,combinedwiththeabsenceofadedicatedArmyCommanderinChief,putthearmyatadistinctdisadvantagewhencompetingwiththeairforceandnavyfor scarce resources. Inaddition,Hitlersmegalomaniaandparanoiabegan toaffect thearmsindustry.Hisfaithinthearmysallegiancealmostgone,Hitlerbegantotrustmoretoloyalty than expertise, more in himself than his advisors.[39] In the words of GeneralLeeb,

The Commander in Chief of the Wehrmacht [Hitler] displayed increasing distrust and exerted increasing directinfluence on technical matters. To an ever increasing degree the revolutionary element entered into the sphere ofcooperation. Makeshift remedies gradually became the rule, the specialist was being suspected, amateurs wereselectedasleaders.TheinfluenceofthePartywasgrowingconstantly,thesoldier,morethaneverbefore,hadtofightagainsttheencroachmentsoftheParty.[40]

On 8 February 1942, Fritz Todt died in an aircraft crash, and was succeeded byAlbert Speer. With the change in leadership came a change in title; the Ministry forArmaments and Munitions became the Ministry for Armaments and War Production(ArmamentMinistry).WhileSpeersmeasuresfacilitatedmoreefficientmassproduction,

theincreasecameatacost.TheMinistrysrelationshipwiththeHeereswaffenamtandtheChiefofArmyEquipment,strainedeveninthelatterdaysofTodtsleadership,begantocrumble.TheWaffenamfsinfluenceoverdevelopmentandprocurementbegantodiminish,as theSpeersMinistryplacedcivilians (mostly industry representatives) inpositionsofresponsibility.Developmentcontracts,originallygiventotwoormorefirmswereissuedtoonlyone, in the interestof time,witha resulting loss indesignquality.TheChiefofArmyEquipmentwasnolongertheauthorityfordevelopmentandproductionorders;theArmaments Ministry, or more frequently Hitler, directed which equipment should beprocured.ThisledtoreducedproductionofitemsoflittleinteresttoHitler,butcriticaltothe Armys operations; these included equipment as diverse as fire control equipment,field kitchens, and entrenching tools. As the Armys control over production was lost,increasingamountsofrawmaterialandequipmentweresiphonedofftoorganizationsoftheSpeerMinistry,theSS,ortheNaziParty.[41]

Hitlers faith in General Fromm, and consequently the entire Replacement ArmyandArmyEquipmentorganizations,includingtheHeereswaffenamt,waslostcompletelywith Fromms presentation of the Height of Power and Glory memorandum inNovember1942.Whilehekepthisposition,FrommwasneveragaingrantedaccesstotheFhrer,andheeffectivelyexercisednoinfluencefromthatpointon.[42]

Following the 20 July 1944 attempt to assassinate Hitler, Fromm was arrested,thoughlaterreleasedbytheGestapowhentheevidenceboreoutthefactthathehadnotbeeninvolvedintheplot.Nonetheless,Frommwascourt-martialedandsentencedtodeathforcowardiceinfailingtotakesufficientmeasurestopreventtheattemptedcoup.

With Fromms death, Reichsfhrer Heinrich Himmler, head of the SS, wasappointed as Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army.Himmlerappointed SS-Obergruppenfhrer Hans Jttner permanent deputy and de factohead of the organization. Jttners previous position had been as head of the SSMainOperationalDepartmentandOrganizeroftheWaffenSS,andassuch,hehadexperienceinmilitaryorganizationandequipment.HimmlerlargelyleftJttnertooperateashesawfit, thoughHimmlerwoulddemandpreferential issueofequipmentforthefieldunitshenominally commanded in the last year of thewar. Paradoxically, Jttners appointmentreturnedalargeportionoftheauthorityandpowerthatFrommsfallfromfavorhadlost,as Jttnercould takeaction in thenameofHimmlerand theSS.However, the renewedpowerof theChiefofArmyEquipmentandCommanderof theReplacementArmywastoo little too late; as Anglo-American and Russian forces converged in 1945, Germanproductionanddistributionwasincreasinglyhamstrungbyincessantattackuntiltheend.[43]

Summary

Bythetimeoftheantitankcrisisontheeasternfront,theHeereswaffenamtwasinthe midst of a planned cycle of armored vehicle development. This was completelydisrupted by the appearance of the T-34, and designers scrambled to find a response.While General Leeb, as head of theHeereswaffenamt, was a source of friction for hissuperiors, the truechallengecame inovercoming themountingdisfavor inwhichHitlerheld the Chief of Army Equipment, General Fromm. As this tension increased, theappointment of Albert Speer as Minister of Armaments and War Production led todraconian measures to increase production. New designs were judged not only ontechnicalmerit,butalsoontheir impactontheeconomyasawhole.Weaponsthat tookadvantageofexisting toolingandtechnologywerefavoredovernewdesigns,unless theprojecthadHitlerspersonalinterest.Further,untilJuly1944,industryplayedtoolargearole in development decisions, with civilian financial interest interfering in the tacticalneedsofthearmy.TheHeereswaffenamtwouldhavetoanswerthethreatoftheT-34,butsatisfytherepresentativesofGermanindustryandSpeersMinistryatthesametime.

CHAPTER3.THECRISIS:RUSSIANARMORANDGERMANGUNS

The T-34 and KV-1 presented the greatest threat to German armor, and theirdescendants would continue to throughout the war. Despite indications that Russiapossessed a design more advance than their own, the appearance of the T-34 was aprofoundshocktotheGermans.[44]AlmostnothingintheGermaninventorywascapableofdestroyingtheT-34in1941;1942wouldseeahostofnewequipmentcobbledtogethertomeettheSovietarmor.

T-34andKV-1

Low, fast, heavily armed and armored, T-34s in their dark green summer orwhitewash winter camouflage ranged across the battlefields of the Eastern Front inmountingnumbersasthewarwagedon.Firstpresentingisolatedbutstubbornpocketsofresistance to theGerman invader, then stemming the enemys advances at the gates ofMoscow, Stalingrad, and Kursk, before finally carrying the Red Army banner into thestreetsofBerlin,theT-34becameasymbolofRussianarmoredmight.

Buildingon lessons learned incombat inSpain, theFarEast,andFinland,Russiabegandevelopmentofanewmediumtankin1939.DesignatedT-34,thiswasfirstplacedin service in September 1940. The T-34 was an outstanding design, combining theattributesofspeed,protection,andfirepower inavehicle thatwassimplefor theSovietarmsindustrytoproduceinquantity,andwasnotbeyondthefunctionalandmaintenancecapabilities of the average Russian soldier. Until late 1942, the T-34 was capable ofdefeating all German tanks, including the Panzer IVF, which mounted 50 millimeterfrontal armor. Conversely, very few German weapons were able to pierce the T-34ssloped armor. Sloping armor was a relatively new concept that allowed for increasedprotectionbypresentingasurfacethatinduceddeflectionofhorizontalshotandpresentedanincreasedcrosssectioncomparedtothesamethicknessofarmor.

The T-34 suffered from few problems, though key among these was a four-mancrew, which required the commander to serve as gunner as well. Combined with adeficiencyinopticswhencomparedtotheirGermanopponents,thesehamperedtheT-34in long-range engagements. Produced in four main variants, the T-34/76 would be thefront-lineRussianmediumtankuntillate1943,andconstitutedamajorportionoftheRedArmysarmoredstrengththroughouttheremainderofthewar.Over34,000T34/76swereproducedbetween1941and1944.[45]

TheprimarySovietheavytankthroughoutthefirsthalfofthewarwastheKV-1.Atthetimeofitsintroductionin1940,theKV-1wasoneofthemostpowerfultanksintheworld,thoughitwaseclipsedbythesuperlativeperformanceoftheT-34.Whilethetwovehiclessharedsimilararmament,theKV-1waslessmobile,sufferingfromanincrediblypoortransmissionandgreaterweightofarmor.

WhattheKV-1lackedinmobility,itmorethanmadeupforinprotection.Thefronthullarmorwas75millimetersthick,whilethatontheturretwas90millimeters,makingtheKV-1 essentially invulnerable to almost all antitankweapons at anybut point-blankrange.Whilethick,thearmorwasnotslopedasontheT-34,limitingthefuturepotentialof the tank. In time, the increasing lethalityofGermanantitankweaponswould lead toadditional armor, furtherdecreasingKV-1mobility.Amodifiedversion, theKV1S,wasintroducedinlate1942torestoremobilityandalloweasiercooperationwithT-34units.With lighter armor than the standard models the KV-1S proved unpopular, but itsimproved power plant and suspension played an important role in the development ofSoviettanksinthesecondhalfofthewar.[46]Morethan4,000KV-1swerebuiltbeforeproductionceasedin1943.SpecificsoftheT-34/76andKV-1arepresentedintable2.

From the time of Barbarossa through 1943 then, the most significant qualitativethreat to the Panzers were the T-34/41, with asmuch as 70millimeters of well-slopedarmor,andtheKV-1series,armoredwith75-120millimetersofarmor,thoughnotslopedasintheT-34.Bothtanksmountedthe76.2-millimeterL/41.2gun,capableofdefeatingall German Panzers of the time. In the following year, Germany would improvisenumerouscounterstotheRussianthreat,baseduponexistingweapons,bothGermanandcaptured.

GermanCountermeasures,1941

AsGermanforcesstruggledtocounterthethickhidesoftheT-34andKV-1,andtheineffectiveness of the 37-millimeter PaK 36 and 50-millimeter PaK 38 became moreapparent,theGermanArmyturnedtowhateverweaponitcouldtostopthenewRussiantanks. 1942would see a host of improvisations fielded, based on experienceswith thetoolsemployedinthefallandwinterof1941.

TowedAntitankGuns

Germanybeganthewarwiththe37-millimeterL/45PaK36servingastheprimaryantitankweaponatthecompanylevelandabove.[47]AsinFrance,itsperformancewasseverely lacking; appearanceof theT-34 andKV-1only exacerbated theproblem.Newweaponswereobviouslyrequired.[48]

Firstamongthesewasthe50-millimeterL/60PaK38,initiallyemployedinGreeceandNorthAfrica in early 1941.Whilemore powerful than thePaK 36, therewere notenough available and they required the scarce Panzergranate (Pzgr) 40 round to beregularlyeffectiveagainsttheRussiantanks.[49]Therefore,whenlargenumbersofSovietantitankgunswerecaptured,theGermansputthemintoservice.

The major Soviet type used by the Germans in the antitank role was the 76.2millimeterL/54PaK36(r),convertedfromtheRussianmodel296fieldgun.Thegunwasinitiallyusedwithcapturedammunition,andlaterrechamberedforGermanammunition.Performance was excellent; the Pzgr 39 round fired from the PaK 36(r) being able topenetratethearmorofboththeT-34andKV-1,thoughthelatterwouldhavetobeinside400yards.

Success of the captured Russian weapons, and the need to improve upon theperformanceof the50-millimeterPaK38 led theGermans todevelop the75-millimeterL/46PaK40.WhileessentiallyascaledupPaK38,thePaK40wasfarheavierthanthe50-millimeterweaponduetotheshortageofadvancedalloysusedintheearlierweapon.The PaK 40 entered service in late 1942. Performance was very similar to that of thecapturedRussianPaK36(r).[50]

ThemostpowerfulofallGermanantitankguns,theEighty-Eight,ironically,didnotbeginlifeasanantitankweapon.Originallydesignedasananti-aircraftgun,the88-millimeterFlaK 18/36had alreadyproven an exceptionally capableweapon atArras in1940,andwouldbeusedtogreateffectagainstBritisharmorintheWesternDesert.Thisweaponwasdeveloped into the88-millimeterFlaK 41,with a loweroverall height andmodifiedmechanicalarrangementstomakeitmoresuitablefortheantitankrole.Laterinthewar,furthermodifiedsolelyfortheantitankrolethe88-millimeterL/71wouldserveasboth an antitank gun (the PaK 43, towed or self-propelled in the Nashorn andJagdpanther) and as a tank cannon (theKampfwagenkannonen or KwK 43 in theKingTiger)withoutstandingperformance.Inanyform,the88-millimeterseriesofgunswereabletodefeatanytankofthewar.[51]TheperformanceofGermanantitankweaponsin1942and1943issummarizedinfigure2.

PanzerjgerandSturmgeschtz

Given the limitations in up-gunning the existing Panzers and the vast amount ofcapturedwarmaterialinGermanpossession,thelogicalnextstepinproducingamobileantitankgunwouldbetomountahigh-velocitygunonareadilyavailablechassis.

Thefirstoftheseweapons,thePanzerJger(PzJg)I,wasfirstmanufacturedin1939,andwas still in service in June1941.Mounting a capturedCzech47-millimeterL/43.4PaK(t)onthechassisofthePanzerIwithlightfrontandsidearmor,itprovidedtroopsininfantrydivisionswithamorepowerfulandmobilealternativetothe37millimeterPaK36.Somewhatoverloadedandawkwardtomaneuver,lightlyarmedandarmored,andwithanoverallheightof8.5feetratherdifficulttoconceal,thePzJgInonethelessshowedthat,byforegoingaturretandfullarmor,antitankgunscouldbemobilizedontankchassisthatwouldotherwisebeobsolete.[52]

AsGermanyfoughtthesecondyearofthewarintheeast,numerousvehiclesinthismold were developed as interim solutions to the problem of mechanizing antitankweapons of sufficient power to defeat the T-34 andKV-1.While the high-velocity 75-millimeterand88-millimeterweaponsweredemonstratingtheabilitytoreliablyknockoutSoviettanks,neitherwasingreatsupplyatfirst.Further,thelevelofmobilityrequiredtokeepupwiththePanzerdivisionspearheadsrequiredatrackedchassis.Whileguncrewshadalwaysbeenvulnerable tobothsmallarmsandhighexplosives, therelativelysmallsizeofthegunsmadeconcealmentavalidmethodofdefense.Withthegunsnowmountedon vehicles, protection for the crew would have to be provided. The initial solution,

buildingonexperiencewiththePzJgI,wastomountRussianantitankgunsoncapturedorobsolete tank chassis. Several combinations along these lines were produced, themostimportantbeingtheMarderseries.

ThefirstofthesewasproducedinresponsetoaDecember1941Heereswaffenamtorderforaself-propelledantitankvehiclemountingthecapturedRussian76.2-millimetergun. No development orders were issued, production beginning almost immediately inresponsetotheurgencyofneed.Thevehicleswereverybasic,consistingofthecapturedgunmountedwith shield (butminus trails andwheels) on top of the superstructure ofeitheraPanzerIIDorEorPanzer38(t)chassis.Lightarmor,openatthetopandrear,anda high silhouettewere characteristics of both vehicles.Both vehicles entered service inearly1942,designated7.62-centimeterPaK36(r)aufGWIIAusfD(orEasapplicable)SdKfz132MarderII(forthePanzerIIversion)or7.62-centimeterPaK36(r)aufGW38SdKfz139MarderIII(forthePanzer38(t)version).MANandAlkettproduced185earlyMarderIIsandBhmisch-MhrischeMaschinenfabrik(BMM)344earlyMarder IIIs.[53]Figure3showsanearlyMarderIII.

FollowingthefirsthurriedMarders,the75-millimeterPaK40cameintoservice,thefirst German antitank gun capable of reliably defeating the T-34. With this, designsemployingthenewgunwereordered.

On18May1942theMinisterforArmsandArmamentorderedanewself-propelledantitank gun from the Heereswaffenamt (requirement 6772/42g). Developmentresponsibilitieswereassignedasfollows:chassis,MAN;superstructure,Alkett;armamentfitting;Rheinmetall-Borsig.Aftertrialswiththe50-millimeterPaK38indicatedthisgunwas insufficient tomeet theRussian threat, the 75-millimeter PaK 40was selected foremployment.Thenewweaponwasdesignated7.5-centimeterPaK40/2aufGWIIAusfA-

CorFMarderII,SdKfz131, inreflectionof theuseofPanzerIIA,B,C,orFchassis.The gunwas stillmounted in a lightly armored open top superstructure, thoughwith aslightly lower profile than in the previous Marder II. The initial trials vehicles weredeliveredinJune1942,atotalof1216beingproducedthereafter.[54]

The same order that resulted in the late-model Marder II was also answered bymounting the75-millimeterPaK 40on thePanzer38(t) chassis.The firstof thesewereissued in June 1942, and received the designation 7.5-centimeter PaK 40/3 aufGW38MarderIIIH,SdKfz138AusfH.SimilarinconcepttothefirstMarderIII,mountingofthePaK 40 required substantialmodification to thechassis,which resulted ina severe top-heavycondition.ProductioncontinueduntilthedesignwasmodifiedinMarch1943.

TherequirementtomodifythechassistoaccommodatethePaK40stemmedfromemploymentofthePanzer38(t)chassisinitsoriginalform,withtheenginecompartmentat the rear of the vehicle and the fighting compartment in the center. Accordingly, theenginewasrepositionedtothecenterofthevehicleinlaterversions,withthedesignationchanging to 7.5-centimeter PaK 40/3 auf GW 38 Marder IIIM, SdKfz 138 Ausf M.Productionranfrom1943to1944.Thischangeprovidednotonlyalowersilhouette,butalsomoreroomforthecrew,andbetterprotection.Intotal,418AusfHand799AusfMwereproduced,allbyBMM.[55]

While not a perfect solution, the Marders proved successful at improving themobility of medium anti-tank guns. Given the superlative performance of the 88-millimeterseriesofguns,attentionwasnextgiventodevelopingaheavyantitankvehicle.

Thisrequirementculminatedinthe8.8-centimeterPaK43/1aufGWIII/IVNashorn(Rhinoceros)SdKfz164.[56]Asthenameimplies,thiswasaMarder-likemountingofthe88-millimeter PaK 43 on a hybrid Panzer III/IV chassis. This chassis, an attempt atstandardizationoftheArmystwomainbattletanks,usedthehullandrunninggearofthePanzer IV with the engine and transmission of the Panzer III. The engine was movedforward to just behind the transmission, producing a large, uncluttered fightingcompartment at the rear, as in theMarder IIIM. Entering service with HeavyAntitankBattalions inNovember 1942, theNashorn providedmuch-neededmobility for the 88-millimeterPaK43,butthegunsweight(almostfourtimesthatofthe75-millimeterPaK40)limitedtheamountofarmorthatcouldbecarried.473Nashornwereproduced.[57]

Theweapon that showed thegreatestpotential to stem theRussian tidehadneverbeenintendedasanantitankvehicle.TheSturmgeschtz(StuG)III,originallyrequestedin 1936 as a close-support vehicle for the infantry mounting the 75-millimeter L/24Sturmkannon (StuK) 37, employed the Panzer III chassis, but with a fully armoredsuperstructure instead of a turret. The fixed superstructure was necessitated by therequirementforalowsilhouette(sixfeet,fourincheswasachieved),howevertheweightsavings allowed 50 millimeters of frontal armor to be mounted, more than oncontemporaryGerman tanks.While reliable and successful, the appearance of the T-34andKV-1 limited theusefulnessof theStuG IIIwhilearmedwith theL/24gun.On28September 1941, Hitler directed that future StuG variants be armed with the highervelocityL/43weapon, andup-armored.The resultingStuG IIIFwas in service in early

1942, and shortly thereafter was up-gunned with the 75-millimeter PaK 39 L/48. Theultimate version, the StuG IIIG, was introduced in 1943 and carried 80-millimeter ofarmor,aswellashavingaredesignedsuperstructure.Whenarmedwiththehigh-velocity75-millimeterguns,theStuGIIIwasaviablecountertotheT-34andKV-1.The10,000StuGIIIproducedduringthewarwereresponsiblefordestroyingseveraltimestheirownnumber.[58]

Lessons

TheEasternFrontantitankcrisisof1941-1942hadbeenansweredbyimprovisationandadaptation.ThefirstgenerationofGermantankdestroyers,theMardersandNashornhadproveneffective,ifawkward,counterstotheT-34andKV-1,butshortcomingslimitedtheir effectiveness. The lessons learned in areas of firepower, protection, and mobilitywouldserveasabasisforfurtherdevelopment.

OffalltheGermanweaponsavailablein1942,onlythe75-millimeterPaK40andthe88-millimeterPaK/FlaKserieshadbeenfoundtobeadequate todealwith theT-34.The captured Russian weapons, though powerful, would not be available in sufficientnumberstoarmnewtankdestroyermodels.WithimprovedmodelsofboththeT-34andKV-1 appearing every year with heavier armor, it became obvious that only a high-velocityweaponof75-millimetercaliberorgreaterwouldbeappropriate.

Protection of the Marders and Nashorn were inadequate to the role they filled.Weightconsiderationslimitedthearmorthatcouldbemounted;thefrontarmorprovidedprotection against small arms fire, while the side armor only protected against shellfragments.Overheadandrearprotectionwasnon-existent,makingthecrewvulnerabletoartillery and mortar fire. No protection was provided against the very tanks that thePanzerjgersweremeanttoface.EventuallyincreasedfrontalprotectionwasprovidedbyrepositioningtheenginecompartmentinfrontofthefightingcompartmentintheMarderAusfM,butonlywithamajorrestructuringofthechassis.

Mobilitywas,ofcourse, thedriving factorbehind thePanzerjgerconcept.Allofthe designs, based upon existing tank chassis, provided sufficient operational mobility.TacticalmobilitywasincreasedovertowedgunsbyvirtueofallPanzerjgersemployingtracked platforms, but therewas some shortfall in agility.All of theMarders, with theexceptionoftheAusfM,mountedtheirgunsontopofanexistingdesignssuperstructure,whichmade themtop-heavyanddifficult tomaneuver,aswellaspresenting toogreatasilhouette.TheNashornpresentedahighsilhouetteaswell,thoughthisismitigatedbythefirepowerandrangecapabilitiesofthe88-millimeterPaK43.Thegun,however,wastoomuchforthechassisofthehybridPanzerIII/IV,whichlimitedprotection,andagainmadethevehicledifficulttomaneuver.

Incontrasttothesedesigns,theSturmgeschtzprovedsurprisinglysuccessfulinitsunintended role of tank destroyer. The StuG III had demonstrated excellent protection,maneuverability,and,whenarmedwiththe75-millimeterL/43andL/48guns,sufficientfirepower tomeet theArmysneeds.Throughuseofapurpose-designedsuperstructure,the StuG III mounted all-round armor protection, of greater degree than contemporaryGermantanks,andretainedgoodmobility.

As1942drewtoaclose,theHeereswaffenamtbeganevaluationoftheselessonsinordertodesignanewvehiclethatwouldimproveuponthePanzerjgerandsuccessfullyequiptheGermanArmysantitankforcethroughtherestofthewar.

CHAPTER4.THEDESIGN:THEJAGDPANZERIV

DesignandProduction

In light of the lessons learned in 1941-1942, the Heereswaffenamt issued arequirementforavehicledesignedsolelyforantitankwork,usinga75-millimetergun.Inresponse,VogtlandischeMaschinenfabrikAG(Vomag)producedawoodenmodel,whichwasshowntoHitleron14May1943andapprovedforproduction.Thefirstproductionmodelwascompletedon20October1943and,nowgiventhedesignationJagdpanzerIV,enteredserviceinearly1944.Fromthenon,theJagdpanzerIVwouldseeserviceonboththeEastandWestFrontsinanumberofvariants.[59]

Asa tankdestroyer, theprimaryrequisiteof thedesignwasnecessarilyfirepower.Prior experience had shown weapons smaller than 75-millimeter to be ineffective.Accordingly,the75-millimeterL/48PaK39waschosentoarmthenewJagdpanzer.LikeitstowedcounterpartthePaK40,thePaK39wascapableofdefeatingboththeT34andKV-1 using either conventional or tungsten core ammunition. While even greaterperformance would have been possible with the 88-millimeter family of weapons,experiencewiththeNashornhadshownthemtobetooheavyforthehybridPanzerIII/IVchassis,letalonethesmallerPanzer38(t).

ChoiceofthePanzerIVchassiswasdictatedbyseveralfactors.TheCzechPanzer38(t) chassiswasalready inuseas thebasisof theMarder familyofvehicles, andwascapableofcarryingthePaK40;however,Bhmish-MhrischeMaschinenfabrik(BMM),the Czech manufacturer of the Panzer 38(t) was, in 1943, completely committed toproduction of Marder chassis.[60] Despite production by five companies, Panzer IIIchassiswerebeingwhollyemployedforboth thePanzerIII itselfand theStuGIII.TheStuG III, though, especiallywhenarmedwith thePaK39,wasanextremely successfultankdestroyer. In1943, theStuGIIIsuperstructurewasmated to thePanzerIVchassis,producingtheStuGIV.Thenewvehiclemountedthesame75-millimeterL/48behind80-millimeteroffrontalarmor.[61]WiththePantherandTigerdesignsstill indevelopment,and theStuGIVinservice, itwasa relativelysimpledecisionforVomag todevelopanimprovedvariantofthePanzerIVspecificallyfortheantitankrole.

Withthe75-millimeterPaK39andthePanzerIVchassisdecidedupon,itremainedto determine the vehicles protection. Unlike the StuG IV, the Jagdpanzer IV was acompletelynewdesign,which allowed a revised interior and adoptionof sloped armor.ForwardarmoronthefirstproductionJagdpanzerIVswas60millimetersataslopeof45degrees,givingprotectionequivalenttoover80millimetersofverticalarmor.Earlyintheproduction run this was increased to 80millimeters, yielding protection similar to 113millimetersofverticalplate.Armoronthevehiclesotherfacingswasmuchlighter,20-40millimeters, but provided protection against small arms and shrapnel, unlike in thePanzerjgers.TheinitialJagdpanzerIV,fullydesignatedJagdpanzerIVfr7.5-centimeterPaK39,wasproducedbyVomagwithincreasingoutputasitsPanzerIVproductiondrewdown.[62]

InMay1944,Vomag began development of a Jagdpanzer IV armedwith the 75-millimeter L/70 StuK 42. This gun, developed and initially produced in 1942 for thePanthertank,wasabletodefeatanyRussiantankofthewar.Thenewdesign,designatedJagdpanzerIVfr7.5-centimeterStuK42,enteredserviceinAugust1944,Vomagshiftingall production to the L/70 variant throughAugust and September. Thisweapon provedeven more lethal than the earlier Jagdpanzer IV, but the increased weight of the longbarreledgunmadethevehiclenoseheavyandawkwardtomaneuver,especiallyoffroad.Most vehicleswith the StuK 42 were fitted with all steel internally sprung roadwheelsreplacingthefirsttwoconventionalwheelsoneitherside,butthisdidnotfullyeliminatetheproblem.

During1944ithadbecomeincreasinglyapparentthatthePanzerIVdesign,limitedby turret width to the 75-millimeter L/48 gun, would not be able to keep pace withRussiantankdevelopments.Inmid-1944,HitlerdecreedthatproductionofthePanzerIVasabattletankwastoceaseinfavorofusingthechassisforself-propelledguns.Whilethispotentiallydisastrousorderwas,byandlarge,essentiallyignored,AlkettdevelopedaprototypeJagdpanzerIVemployinganunmodifiedPanzerIVchassis.BecausetheAlkettversionwasdesignedwith a view to themost rapidproductionpossible, thePanzer IVchassiswasnotmodifiedfromitsoriginalform,leavingthefueltanksunderthecenterofthe vehicle. As a result, it was necessary to insert a 38 centimeter (15 inch.) verticalextensionaroundthetopofthechassisinordertoraisethemaingunsaxisandprovidefor full elevation; the existing Jagdpanzer IV superstructure was then mounted on theextension. Because of this, the Alkett Jagdpanzer IV provided only half the effectivechassisprotectioncomparedtotheotherJagdpanzerIVs.Theguninthenewvehiclewasdesignated7.5-centimeterL/70KwK42,thoughitwasidenticaltotheStuK42.[63]

WiththeincreasedemphasisHitlerplacedontheJagdpanzerIVandhisdecreethatthe Panzer IV be phased out of production, L/70 versions of the Jagdpanzer IV wereredesignated Panzer IV lang (V) or (A) depending on design; lang meaning long inGerman,beingusedtodifferentiatefromtheL/48versionsofthePanzerIV.[64]Becauseof itsnose-heavycharacteristicsandGeneralGuderiansviewthat theJagdpanzerswereunnecessary,thecrewschristenedthePanzerIV langvariantsGuderiansEnte,meaningGuderiansDuck,orChicken.[65]Over1500JagdpanzerIVandPanzerIVlang(V)wereproduced,alongwithseveralhundredPanzerIVlang(AAPanzerIVlang(V)isdepictedinfigure4.AlistofJagdpanzerIVvariantsispresentedintable3.)[66]

Performance

The Jagdpanzer IVwas designed as a tank destroyer, not a tank. It consequentlydiffered in fundamental concept from tanks inmanyways.Therefore, I have comparedonly thecharacteristicsof firepowerandprotection in thischapter; furtherdiscussionoftheJagdpanzerconceptisincludedinchapterfive.Additionally,thoughnotappearingonthebattlefielduntilearly1944,theJagdpanzerIVhadbeendesignedtocounterthethreatsof1941and1942,specificallythe76.2-millimeterarmedvariantsoftheT-34andKV-1.Anobjectiveassessmentof theJagdpanzer IVsperformancemustbe takenwith this inmind.Accordingly,Russianarmoredthreatshavebeensegregatedintothreecategoriesforcomparison.Thesecategoriesaredescribedintable4.

AllfouroftheDesignThreatstanks,theT-34/41,T-34/42,KV-1BandKV-1S,werearmedwith a 76.2-millimeter gun capable of penetrating 60-78millimeters of armor at500yards,and62-73millimetersat1000yards.ThemaximumarmorontheT-34/42wasequivalentto94millimetersofverticalplate,whiletheKV-1Bmounted120millimeters.[67]

Inbothfirepowerandprotection,theJagdpanzerIVwaseasilysuperiortoeithertheT-34/42 or KV-1B. Neither Russian gun was capable of penetrating the Jagdpanzersfrontalarmorateither500or1000yards.Conversely,bothtankswerevulnerabletothe75-millimeter L/48 at 500 yards, and even theKV-1s armorwas hard pressed at 1000yards. With the L/70 gun there is almost no comparison, both Russian tanks beingdefeatedbythePanzerIVlangatover1,000yards.

ItisnotsurprisingthattheJagdpanzerIVheldsogreatanadvantagetoeithertheT-34 or KV-1; the L/48 and L/70 versions of the 75-millimeter gun had been developedspecifically to counter them. [68]By 1943 it was apparent to the Russians that theirrelative advantage over the Panzers had come to an end. While visiting Factory #112following the Battle of Kursk, Peoples Commissar for Tank Industry V.A. Malyshevstated:

Enemytanksopenedfireonoursatdistancesofupto1,500metres,whileour76-millimetertankgunscoulddestroyTigersandPanthersatdistancesofonly500-600metres.AmorepowerfulgunneedstobeputintotheT-34quickly.[69]

Accordingly, Russia fielded a new wave of tanks and self-propelled guns in late1943, aimed specifically atmaintaining superiority overGerman armor. These vehiclesformtheJagdpanzerIVsFieldingThreat.

Withtheutmostimperativetoincreasefirepower,theRussiandesignersrespondedinmuchthesamewaytheGermanshadin1942,bymodifyingalarge-caliberanti-aircraft

gunintoanantitankweapon.Thisgun,theD-5anditssuccessortheZIS-S53,formedthemainarmamentoftheT-34/85andtheKV-85,aswellasthenewSU-85tankdestroyer.The SU-85, based on the T-34 chassis, was rapidly superceded by the 100-millimeterarmedSU-100.AsimilarconversionusingtheKV-1chassiswiththe152-millimeterML-20cannoncreatedtheSU-152.Latein1943,asmallnumberofnewJS-1(namedforJosefStalin)heavytankswerebuiltanditschassiswasusedasthebasisfortheJSU-152assaultgun.Shortagesof theML-20cannon led to substitutionwith the122-millimeterD-25S,creating the JSU-122. This became the most effective Russian self-propelled antitankweaponofthewar.[70]CharacteristicsoftheFieldingThreatvehiclesaresummarizedintable5.

It can be seen that the Jagdpanzer IV in its initial formwould have been able todefeatallRussian1944armorout to1000yards,withtheexceptionof theSU-100and,possibly, theJS-1(theglacisof theJS-1wasaverysmallfractionof thetanksforwardsilhouette).WhenequippedwiththeL/70gun,theJagdpanzerIVwascapableofdefeatingallRussianFieldingThreatvehicles.Onthedefensive,theJagdpanzerIVsslopedarmornarrowlyprovidedsufficientprotectionagainstthe85-millimeterD-5T,atleastinfrontalattacks, but the 100-millimeterD-10S andparticularly the 122-millimeterD-25Swoulddefeat the Jagdpanzer. While the SU-152 gained an impressive reputation, and wasnicknamed Zvierboy, Animal Killer, for its ability to kill the entire zoo of Germanarmor, thePanther,Tiger,andElefant, itwasneither intendednorfullyequippedfor theantitankrole.[71]

Whilemid-warSovietdesignsweregood,itwassoonapparentthatthelarger100-millimeterand122-millimetergunswouldbe required in tanksaswellasself-propelledguns in order to keep ahead of the German threat. [72]Accordingly, KV-85 and JS-1production was limited while improvements were designed into the next Joseph Stalintank.TheresultingJS-2mountedahigh-velocity122-millimetergunandimprovedupontheJS-1sprotectionbyslopingratherthanaddingarmor.TheJS-2enteredserviceinApril

1944andwasapotentweapon,thoughneverservinginnumbersanywherenearaslargeastheT-34.

Inthelastyearofthewar,analysisandcorrectionoftheJS-2sweaknessesresultedin theJS-3,which introducedan improvedhulldesignknownas thePikeNoseandareshaped frying pan turret, though retaining the JS-2s 122-millimeter gun. It isquestionablewhetherornottheJS-3sawserviceduringthewar,butitisincluded,alongwiththeJS-2,inthecategoryofFutureThreat,inordertoassessJagdpanzerIVcapabilitycompared to Soviet designs following the T-34/KV-1 generation. JS-2 and -3characteristicsareprovidedintable6.[73]

BoththeJS-2and-3presentedformidablechallengestotheJagdpanzerIVintermsofbothfirepowerandprotection.WhiletheJagdpanzerIVhadthepotentialtopenetratethe turret frontofeither tank,both theJS-2and-3 turretshadasubstantialmantle, (theforward housing and armor supporting the main guns barrel and recoil system) thatprovided considerable additional protection. Combined with the turret armor of the JSseries, hits in this area were more likely to damage the gun than knock out the tankentirely.WhileitseemsthatJagdpanzerIVs,andmostotherGermanarmor,wouldbehardpressedtodealwitheitherof tankuntilaflankshotpresenteditself,RussianmetallurgyfailingscreatedanAchillesheelfortheJS-2and-3.AsearlyasMarch1944,Russiantestsindicated that the 76.2-millimeter L/41ZIS-5 (the towed version of theT34/76s F-34)created significant spallingof the JS-2s armor at 600yards.Attempts at tempering thearmor proved too costly, and the JS-2 and -3 continued production with lesser qualityarmor.[74]

Insummary,theJagdpanzerIVwassufficientagainsteitheroftheRussiantanksof1941-1942thatitwasdesignedtodefeat,andwasascapableasanyotherGermanarmorof destroying the Russian threats of 1943-1944.When compared to the Russian heavytanksof1945, theJagdpanzer IVwas limited inboth firepowerandprotection. In largepart, thiswasdue to theJagdpanzer IVs roots ina1930sdesignand the technologicaldevelopments of the Second World War. The last chapter will discuss, given thisperformance,HeereswaffenamtsdegreeofsuccessorfailureindesigningacountertotheRussianarmoredthreatof1941-1942.

CHAPTER5CONCLUSION

Introduction

Germany developed a multitude of vehicles and systems to oppose the threat ofRussianarmorintheSecondWorldWar.TheJagdpanzerIVwasthefirstfightingvehicledesigned specifically as a tank destroyer by theHeereswaffenamt; its success or failuremust be measured primarily in terms of performance against enemy armor, but theexceptional circumstances of procurement in the Third Reich provide a lens throughwhich such judgment must be made. Further, analysis of the design cannot simply bemade against Russian armor, a category so broad as to encompass light vehicles thatwereobsoletebefore thewarbeganthroughheavytanks thatformedthebasisofSoviettankdevelopmentforthemajorityoftheColdWar.Accordingly,theJagdpanzerIVwillbejudgedagainstcriteriaoffeasibility,acceptability,andsuitability.

Feasibility is ameasure ofwhether or not the technology required to support thedesign was available. The chassis, main gun, and armor are the elements that will beassessedforfeasibility.

Acceptability is a determination of the design and its components against theirperceived cost to other areas of production interest. By 1943, the Heereswaffenamtsinfluencehadwanedtothepointthatanydesignproposedwouldhavetomeetthedesiresof not only theArmy, but also other government and civilian agencies aswell. Unlikefeasibilityandsuitability,acceptabilityismostlysubjective.

Suitabilityisamostlyempiricalassessmentofthedesignseffectivenessagainstitsdesigned goals. In the case of the Jagdpanzer IV, this is the RussianDesign Threat of1941-1942.

WhilethisanalysisaloneissufficienttoanswerthequestionofwhetherornottheJagdpanzer IVprovedaneffectivecounter to theantitankcrisisof1942, further lessonscanbedrawnfromitsdevelopmentandfielding.Therefore,anexaminationwillbemadeas to how well the Jagdpanzer IV performed against the Russian Fielding Threat andFuture Threat in order to assess the Heereswaffamts efforts in a dynamic technicalenvironment.

DesignAccomplishment

TheJagdpanzerIVwasfeasiblebythestandardsof1943,theyearofitsdesign.ThePanzerIVchassiswasinwidespreadproduction,wasfamiliartotheentirearmoredforceof the GermanArmy, andmost of all, was an inherently reliable design. Both the 75-millimeterL/48PaK39andL/70StuK42(intheformofthePanthersKwK42)werealsoinproduction.ThePaK 39hadbeen introduced inMarch1942andwould serve, alongwith itsvariants,as theprimaryGerman tankandantitankgun throughout thewar.TheStuK 42, developed from the Panthers KwK 42, had been in production since June of1942.Ammunitionforbothwasinproductionandreadilyavailable.

ArmorprotectionoftheexistingPanzerIVwasrecognizedasbeinginadequate,andtherewaslittleprospectofeitherimprovinguponthemetallurgicalqualityoftheplateorproviding additional thickness without incurring significant weight penalties. TheappearanceoftheT-34in1941hadheraldedarevolutioninarmoreddesign,however.By1943,theconceptofslopingarmortoprovideenhancedprotectionwaswellunderstood,andallowednearlydoubleprotectionwithnoincreaseinactualarmorthicknessbetweenthePanzerIVandJagdpanzerIV.[75]

Giventheconstraintsoftheprocurementprocedureby1943(describedinChapter2),theJagdpanzerIVdesignwasacceptable.TheconvolutednatureofprocurementintheThirdReich required that the design be acceptable to not only theHeereswaffenamt inparticular and the Army in general, but also to the Ministry of Armaments and WarProduction,aswellascivilianindustry.

TheHeereswaffenamtsandGeneralArmyOfficesacceptabilityconcernsrevolvedaroundhowwell thenewvehiclecouldbesustained logistically,andwhetherornot thedesigncouldaccomplishitstacticalgoalsmoreefficientlythroughuseofnewtechniques.[76]Logistic supportwas largelyalready inplace,due to thecommonalitybetween thePanzer IV and Jagdpanzer IV and the use of existing gun types. The tactical goal ofincreasedfirepowerwasachieved throughsubstitutionof therotating turretwitha fixedsuperstructurelargeenoughforinstallationofthepowerfulStuK42.Asdescribedabove,it was impossible to provide better protection for the Panzer IV without incorporatingsloped armor,whichwould have required a productionpause for retooling.Conversely,constructionoftheJagdpanzerIVrequiredfactoriestoretoolbeforebeginningproduction;therewasthereforenodelayinincorporatingthenewarmordesign.Financialconstraintswere not a concern of the Heereswaffenamt in development; however, theMinistry ofArmaments andWar Production did base production decisions upon real and perceivedneedsanddesiresofindustry.

By1943,Germanyhadadesperateneedforarmoredvehiclesofalltypes.Speersprogramofmassproductionandrationalizationwasbeginningtoshowsignsofsuccess,butwithacorrespondingprice;productionhadtocontinueunabated.Therewasnoroomfordelay,sowiththeexceptionofspecialprograms,retoolingformajorindustrialchangewasoutof thequestion.Themajorityofnewdevelopmentandproductioncapacitywastied up in the Panther and Tiger projects. Henschel, MAN, and MNH were all fullyengagedinthiseffort;nochassiswereavailablefortankdestroyerproduction.Evenhad

excessPantherorTigercapacitybeenextant,neitherdesignwasmatureenoughtoserveasabasis fora self-propelledmount. [77]While thePanzer IIIwasbeingphasedoutofproduction, much of the existing Panzer III capability was being shifted to StuG IIIproduction.BMM, inCzechoslovakia,wasat (anartificially limited)maximumcapacityproducingtheMarderIIIseries.[78]WiththeStuGIIIincapableofmountingagunlargerthan the 75-millimeter L/48, the only production capacity available for immediatedevelopmentwasinthePanzerIVprogram.

TheJagdpanzerIVwasaneminentlysuitablevehiclemeasuredagainsttheDesignThreat in the areas of firepower and protection, though somewhat lacking inmaneuverability.Figure5 illustrates the rangesatwhich theJagdpanzer IVandRussiandesignthreatarmor(T-34/76andKV-1)werecapableofpenetratingtheothersarmor.

As can be seen, the Jadgpanzer IV, evenwith the less powerful (compared to theStuK42)PaK 39,was capable of defeatingboth theT-34 andKV-1well before itwasvulnerable to them. It is important to note thatGerman opticswere significantly betterthan those of the Russians; German gunners were able to routinely engage targets atranges over 1000 yards, a feat only themost skilled of their Russian opponents couldduplicate,[79]makingtheJagdpanzerIVsmaximumeffectiverangeessentiallyequal toitsmaximumrange.[80]

Whilemorethanadequateintermsoffirepowerandprotection,theJagdpanzerIVwas somewhatdeficient inmaneuverability.GeneralFranzHalder,OKHChief of Staff,wrote after thewar that an ideal tank-destroyerwould achieve a horsepower toweightratioofatleast14hp/ton;[81]theJagdpanzerIVwasratedatonly11hp/ton.[82]Thiswasexacerbatedby theentirePanzer IVfamilysmaneuverabilityproblems,whichstemmedfromarelativelynarrowtrackcoupledwithincreasinggrossweight[83].Nonetheless,asHalder notes, tanks had gained too great an advantage over towed guns as the formerbecame more mobile, and the Jagdpanzer IV provided a much needed mobile, fullyarmored antitank weapon. Neither Jagdpanzers, nor the Sturmgeschtz that precededthem,were tanks,norwere theyexpectedtoperformlike tanks(thoughtheywereoftenforcedintothatrole).[84]Theabilitytomountalargergunthanatankofcorrespondingsize,andthefactthattheywerenotexpectedtofightwithoutinfantrysupport,madethesacrifice of a turret in the Jagdpanzers and Sturmgeschtz tolerable. Indeed, Halderbelievedvehicleswithoutturrets,beingsubstantiallylowerthanconventionaltanks,wouldthereforebebetterabletoaccompanyinfantryinrestrictedterrain.[85]Thoughnotideal,theJagdpanzerIVwasmoremaneuverablethantheNashornandMarders thatprecededit,andpossessedadequatemaneuverabilitytosupportmechanizedforces.

Inonerespect,however,theJagdpanzerIVslowsilhouetteworkedagainstit.Whileits 1.8 meter height made it readily concealable, the Jagdpanzer IVs main gun wasmounted at a firing height of only 1.4 meters; this made uneven terrain a greaterimpedimenttotheJagdpanzerIVslineoffirethantoalmostanyotherarmoredfightingvehicleofthewar.[86]Thisconceptisillustratedinfigures6and7.

As canbe seen, increased firingheight equates to increased theoreticalmaximumrange.[87]Allofthelistedrangesaregreaterthanthecorrespondingweaponsmaximumeffective range, however. The detrimental effect of lower firing height is illustrated byintroducinganinterveningobstruction,asinfigure7.

Theintroductionofan interveningobstacle,orevensimplyuneventerrain,ofanygivenheighthwill,attheappropriaterange,blocktheJagdpanzerIVslineoffire,butnottheT-34sorPanzerIVs.

ThetacticaleffectofthisshortfallwouldbeminimizedwhentheJagdpanzerIVwasemployed inadeliberatedefensewithsufficient time toselect thebestpossible fightingpositions.However,whenestablishinghastydefensivepositionsorinafluidbattle,astheGermansincreasinglyfacedasthewarprogressed,theJagdpanzerIVslowfiringheightwould become detrimental. Though no specific information is available on theHeereswaffenamtsassessmentoftheJagdpanzerIVsfiringheight,itcanbeassumedthatthedetrimentaleffectoflowfiringheightwasnotforeseeninthedesignprocess.Further,once appreciated, it appears the Heereswaffenamt considered this trait unfavorable asfollowingJagdpanzershadgreaterfiringheightsthantheJagdpanzerIV.[88]

In total analysis, the Jagdpanzer IV was a successful design for countering theRussianarmored threatof1941-1942. Itwas technically feasibleandacceptable toboththe military and civilian industry. Most importantly, it was suitable to the task ofdestroyingtheT-34andKV-1thatplaguedtheGermanArmyafterthestartofBarbarossa.

FieldingThreatComparison

TheHeereswaffenamtseffortsindesigningtheJagdpanzerIVhadnotoccurredinavacuum, however. By the time of the Jagdpanzer IVs introduction in early 1944, theRussianshadintroducedanewgenerationoftanksandself-propelledgunsthatcapitalizedupon lessons learned about both German tanks capabilities and Russian tanksshortcomings.Thisgeneration,theFieldingThreat,ischaracterizedbytheT-34/85andtheSU-100.ThesevehicleswerebothdevelopmentsoftheoriginalT-34thatweredesignedtocounter theGerman Tiger tank,which appeared in late 1942.As such, theywere bothpowerful vehicles, but logical, developments of the T-34, employing new features thatwereevolutionaryratherthanrevolutionaryandshouldhavebeeneasilyforeseenbytheHeereswaffenamt. The SU-100 in fact owed its heritage to the same source as theJagdpanzerIV,thesuccessoftheStuGIIIintheantitankrole.TheJagdpanzerIVwasstillsuccessfulagainsttheRussianFieldingThreat,thoughtheL/48gunwasonlycapableofpenetrating the SU-100 within 500 yards. The Jagdpanzer IV had been designed withfurther development in mind however, and the deficiency against the SU-100 wasovercome with the introduction of the L/70 armed Panzer IV lang variants.[89]Performanceagainst representativevehicles (theT-34/85and theSU-100) isdepicted infigure8.

WhiletheJSU-152,andparticularlytheSU-100reachedparitywiththeJagdpanzerIV, theGermansenjoyednotable technicaladvantages inballisticsandcommunicationsthat