Building Pyramids for Capital- The Precarious Role of Foreign Workers in Calgary and Dubai

Running head: BUILDING PYRAMIDS FOR CAPITAL 1

Building Pyramids for Capital: The Precarious Role of Foreign

Workers in Calgary and Dubai

Kelsey Braun, Rahman Ismail, Joel Laforest, Ashley Millar

GEOG 553 Dr. Eliot Tretter

BUILDING PYRAMIDS FOR CAPITAL 2

1.INTRODUCTION:GLOBALIZATIONANDTHELABOURMARKET 3

2.GLOBALIZINGLABOURMARKETSINCALGARY,CANADA 42.1GLOBALLABOURMARKETS:CANADA’SPRACTICE 52.2GLOBALLABOURMARKETS:ALBERTA’SPRACTICE 62.3GLOBALLABOURMARKETS:CALGARY’SPRACTICE 72.4SOCIALCONSEQUENCESOFLABOURMIGRATION:CALGARY 92.4.1TETHERING 92.4.2DEPENDENCEANDSOCIALISOLATION 102.4.3COMMODIFICATION 122.5CALGARY:PARTOFAGLOBALTREND 13

3.GLOBALIZINGLABOURMARKETSINDUBAI,UAE 133.1GLOBALLABOURMARKETS:DUBAI’SPRACTICE 143.1.1SPONSORSHIPPROGRAM 153.2SOCIALCONSEQUENCESOFLABOURMIGRATION:DUBAI 163.2.1POLARIZEDWORKFORCE 163.2.2SPATIALSEGREGATION 183.2.3EXCLUSIVERIGHTSANDINSTITUTIONS 203.2.4PERMANENTIMPERMANENCE1 213.2.5EXCLUSIVESOCIETY 23

4.GLOBALTRENDS:DUBAI,UAEANDCALGARY,CANADA 244.1USEOFFOREIGNWORKERS 254.2FOREIGNWORKERPROGRAMS:KAFALAVS.TFWP 254.3SOCIALCONSEQUENCES 264.3.1IMPERMANENCEANDCOMMODIFICATION 264.3.2TETHERING,DEPENDENCE,ANDEXPLOITATION 274.3.3SPATIALSEGREGATION 28

5.CONCLUSION 29


1. Introduction: Globalization and the Labour Market

Due to both economic and technological advances, global space is becoming increasingly

unified (Held, et. al, 1999). This global unification has been a catalyst for the flow of both people

and capital, which has had profound effects on cities through the creation of a global economy

and a global labour market (Held, et. al, 1999). This globalization, in addition to increased

autonomy of municipal governments, has initiated an inter-urban competition for capital (Knox,

1996). Cities employ various strategies to create conditions that are attractive to investors and

capital. The success of these strategies determines their position in the global hierarchy (Malecki

& Ewers, 2007). Increased productivity through the development and expansion of labour

markets is one of these strategies, as Dicken (2015) suggests that “access to knowledge and

access to labour” are crucial to being a competitive city (p. 113). Malecki & Ewers (2007)

expand on the importance of labour, arguing that cities that base their strategies strictly on

corporate networks will fail to earn their position in the global hierarchy. They argue that labour

markets act as the jumping off point for cities to make their marks (Malecki & Ewers, 2007).

Labour markets “[provide] the skilled and unskilled workers who are central to the (formal and

informal) economies of world cities” (Malecki & Ewers, 2007, p. 468). Globalization and inter-

urban competition, therefore, “have added new dimensions to labour markets and labour

processes”, specifically as local labour pools are reformed to a global scale (Malecki & Ewers,

2007, p. 469).

Globalization has reformed labour markets through flexibilization. As national barriers

are broken down, cities and urban industries are given access a global pool of labour, which

increases the flexibility of supply (Rodriguez, 1986). In particular, cities are provided with a

global range of labour, which varies in terms of “knowledge and skills, wage costs, labour

productivity, and labour controllability” (Dicken, 2015, p. 113-114). Within a more flexible

labour market, cities and firms are able to employ foreign workers of various knowledge levels

and skill-sets, which enables greater specialization of labour, and therefore, increases

productivity (Dicken, 2015). Additionally, countries around the world feature differing wage

rates. Access to international labour markets allows a city to choose from the least expensive

markets available, leading to cost savings (Dicken, 2015). Similarly, the flexibility of a global

labour market increases the ability to discipline and control labour through the use of temporary

contracts (Dicken, 2015). This control is crucial to mitigating labour shortages that may arise


from periods of intense development. The cost savings and control associated with global

flexibilization of labour has given many cities the opportunity to increase productivity, develop

advanced economies, and compete for global capital (Connell & Burgess, 2011).

Despite the economic development that globalization has facilitated, it is important to

recognize the implications the globalizing labour market has had on society (Vora, 2011).

Increasingly, foreign workers are being treated exclusively as commodities rather than as

citizens. Many of these foreign workers are often subjected to poor living and working

conditions, as well as inadequate recognition in society (Scott, 2001). Both Calgary (in Canada),

and Dubai (in the United Arab Emirates (UAE)), epitomize this phenomenon.

While Dubai’s rapid development has depended and capitalized on the flexibility of

foreign labour to sustain an surging construction industry (Connell & Burgess, 2011), Calgary

has similarly used contractual foreign workers to fill local labour shortages related to local

construction, as well as regional industrial projects (De Guerre, 2007). More importantly, both

cities demonstrate how global flexibilization of labour can lead to social consequences, such as

commodification, exploitation, and social isolation.

This essay will use case studies of Calgary, Canada and Dubai, UAE to illustrate how

globalization has led cities to increase their productivity and global economic competitiveness

through labour market strategies. Specifically, the essay will analyze the use of contractual

foreign workers as one of these strategies, and the social implications it has had within the city.

2. Globalizing Labour Markets in Calgary, Canada

Calgary is both a national and global headquarters for the oil and gas industry, which has

facilitated an agglomeration of managerial, technical, and financial services related to the energy

industry. As a result, the service sector is currently the biggest economic sector in the city, with

both finance and administration forecasted to grow and remain dominant into 2017 (“Calgary

Employment Demand Forecast 2007-2017”, 2008). Over 82,200 jobs requiring college education

or apprenticeship training are forecasted to be created by 2017, as well as over 18,250 positions

requiring on-the-job training (“Calgary Employment Demand Forecast 2007-2017”, 2008).

Forecasts predict 1.2% growth in the energy sector and 4.5% growth in professional services

from 2007-2017 (“Calgary Employment Demand Forecast 2007-2017”, 2008). The growth of the

energy sector has spurred Alberta to intensify infrastructure and tourism investment (“Boom and


Bust in Alberta”, 2001). This investment has consequentially intensified the demand for

unskilled labour, especially in the construction and hospitality industries (Fudge et al., 2009). To

satisfy the demands of its growing economy, Calgary has taken advantage of temporary foreign

labour to fill low-skilled service positions and mitigate labour shortages (Ryan, Li, & Langford,

2011). Because of this, Calgary currently features one of the largest proportion of foreign-born

residents for a city of its size, at over 20% of its residents (Price, Benton-Short, 2007).

In order to understand Calgary’s use of foreign labour, it is important to recognize the

role of both Canada and Alberta in controlling the use of contractual foreign workers. For

example, because the Temporary Foreign Worker Program falls under shared federal and

provincial jurisdiction, its implementation in Calgary is a multi-scalar collaboration. As a result,

the city is restricted in its ability to resolve challenges within the program (Nakache & Kinoshita,

2010). In order to understand Calgary’s use of the foreign workers program, a brief background

on Canada’s and Alberta’s roles in the process will first be established.

2.1 Global Labour Markets: Canada’s Practice

The Temporary Foreign Worker Program (TFWP) originated in Canada in the early

1970’s as a response to the shift from permanent immigration to temporary labour migration

(Fudge et al., 2009). While the program became bifurcated into highly-skilled and low-skilled

workers in the 1990s, it has recently been heavily involved with satisfying low-skilled positions,

especially within the energy sector of Alberta (Fudge et al., 2009). The TFWP has effectively

“[lowered] wages and conditions of employment” in the regional labour market (Fudge et al.,

2009, p. 43). As a result, the labour market has become more advantageous to employers because

industries have easier access to cheap and contractual labour, especially in low-technical-skill

occupations, such as construction and hospitality (Smart, 1997).

Although the TFWP reduces wages in the domestic market, many foreign workers

become dependent on these wages, as do their familial relations (through remittances). Workers

from developing countries are often willing to accept the ‘low’ Canadian standard wage because

this wage remains higher than what they might earn in their home country (Smart, 1997). This

economic incentive keeps them coming back, despite the often dismal living and working

conditions (Smart, 1997). As a result, firms throughout Canada are able to increase productivity

while lowering costs, which allows Canada and its cities to participate competitively in a global


economy (Smart, 1997). This cost-saving advantage is compelling for many industries, as is

evident in the 400% jump in the number of TFWP applications from May 2006 to May 2007

(Fudge et al., 2009). Alberta, specifically, has used the program to facilitate economic growth,

with the assistance of its federal and provincial ministries.

2.2 Global Labour Markets: Alberta’s Practice

Overall, laws governing the TFWP are set federally, but specific details are negotiated

provincially. Provincial bodies work in cooperation with Citizenship and Immigration Canada

(CIC) on migration issues in their province (De Guerre, 2007). Alberta cooperates with two

federal ministries to process admissions of temporary foreign workers (TFWs). The first federal

ministry, Human Resources & Skills Development Canada (HRSDC), issues Labour Market

Opinions (LMOs). The HRSDC verifies a labour shortage, through LMOs, to confirm the need

for TFWs and ensure jobs are not taken from Canadians. The second federal ministry,

Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC), works in cooperation with the Alberta provincial

government to issue work permits to TFWs and address other migration issues and (De Guerre,

2007). The CIC allows skilled workers to apply for permanent residency, but restricts unskilled

workers to remaining as TFWs (De Guerre, 2007).

Additionally, there are two provincial ministries that regulate the TFWP in Alberta. The

first provincial ministry, Alberta Advanced Education & Technology, assesses TFWs with

international trade credentials to determine if they meet Alberta Journeymen standards (De

Guerre, 2007). The second provincial ministry, Alberta Employment, Immigration & Industry

(AEII), operates the TFW hotline along with HRSDC & Provincial Nominee Program. This

process is one of the steps that allows TFWs to become permanent citizens. Alberta Premier, Ed

Stelmach, created AEII in 2006 to promote “economic immigration” that would alleviate

pressures on the labour force and continue economic success (De Guerre, 2007, p. 10). Through

the implementation of these strategies, Alberta has been successful in sustaining economic

growth.

The TFWP has helped alleviate labour shortages in Alberta, especially since the province

has experienced tremendous growth throughout the last decade. In 2006, Alberta’s economy

expanded by 6.9% and created over 86,000 jobs, the best performance since 1993 (De Guerre,

2007). Approximately 1 in 6 workers found themselves employed directly or indirectly in the


energy sector (De Guerre, 2007). Alberta’s per capita GDP in 2005 was $66,275, which was

56% greater than the national average and twice as high as it was in 1995 (Ostrovsky et al.,

2008). The employment rate in Alberta reached 70% in 2004, and the province had the lowest

unemployment level in Canada at 3.4%. As a result of this growth, the province faced a labour

shortage of an unprecedented scale in Canada (De Guerre, 2007). Migrant workers responded

more intensely to this economic boom than local Albertans did (Ostrovsky, Statistics Canada, &

Analytical Studies Branch, 2008), especially with the emergence of the TFWP (De Guerre,

2007). Immigration skyrocketed, primarily due to oil and gas exports, accounting for 43% of

Alberta’s recent population growth (Ostrovsky et al., 2008). In terms of foreign workers, over

6,100 TFWs arrived in Alberta between 2006-2010 (Foster & Taylor, 2013). In 1997, the TFW

program involved only 7,473 workers in Alberta; by 2006, this number jumped to 15,172 (De

Guerre, 2007). In order to regulate this influx of workers, the province developed a system that

filters TFW by mediating between the worker and the employer.

The Alberta government has developed profiles on a number of countries to determine

the type of workers available, the level of skill the workforce possesses, and whether or not an

official “reconnaissance” mission is worthwhile (De Guerre, 2007, p. 11). Such profiles have

been conducted for Ukraine, Korea, Philippines and Taiwan. After the provincial government

informs employers when workers are found, the employers attend a hiring fair with the Alberta

government and select their own employees (De Guerre, 2007). This process is beneficial for the

employer because it ensures a higher quality of worker than a recruiter would provide, as well as

a clear understanding of the TFWs’ background. This arrangement also benefits potential TFWs

because the employer-government partnership indicates legality and greater job security (De

Guerre, 2007). Ensuring that the labour market provides an adequate pool of employees

contributes to the ability of Alberta’s major cities, such as Calgary, to flourish economically.

2.3 Global Labour Markets: Calgary’s Practice

In Calgary, the majority of TFWs are unskilled, which disproportionately distributes

them within the city’s workforce. This is especially true for visible minorities, who are “more

likely to be employed in manufacturing, accommodation/food services and other lower-tier

service industries” (CalgaryWorks & Calgary Economic Development, 2006). More than half of

employers in accommodation, food service, and arts and entertainment reported hiring temporary


foreign workers, while higher-technically-skilled occupations (oil and gas, professional,

scientific, technical services, and health care) reported employing no TFWs (Alberta et al.,

2006). Similarly, management consultants, live-in nannies, and farm labourers are in the top 10

positions filled by TFWs. In one interesting contrast, nearly 90% of the management positions

are filled by residents of the United States, while 80% of nannies are from the Philippines

(CalgaryWorks & Calgary Economic Development, 2006). Jobs filled by foreign workers are

typically lower wage, which makes them less appealing to Canadians and more susceptible to

high turnover (Alberta et al., 2006). This phenomenon is significant because it reinforces a

division in the local labour market. This division and deskilling may generate feelings of

demoralization and stress (Wood, McGrath, & Young, 2011). In addition, this division of labour

is hardly necessary in regards to job vacancy and demand, as “only three occupations, [truck

drivers, general farm workers, and labourers in food, beverage, and tobacco industries] were

found in both the top 20 occupations for TFWs and the top 50 occupations by vacancy rates for

Alberta in 2005” (CalgaryWorks & Calgary Economic Development, 2006, p. 38). The

disproportionate distribution of TFWs within low skilled sectors of Calgary’s workforce, as

illustrated in Figure 1 and 2, leads to substantial social consequences.

Figure 2: Coal miners in Northern Alberta. Retrieved from http://www.mining.com/hd-mining-favoured-foreign-workers-over-qualified-canadians-minister-17498/

Figure 1. Foreign Construction worker in Fort McMurray. Retrieved from http://www.fortmcmurraytoday.com/2014/09/23/atb-survey-finds-alberta-business-owners-split-on-tfws


2.4 Social Consequences of Labour Migration: Calgary

Although Calgary offers social capital and economic opportunity for highly skilled

workers, evidence suggests that “it’s taking [low-skilled foreign migrants] much longer to catch

up than the average Canadian” (Ryan et al., 2011, p. 51). For example, Calgary features one of

the biggest income inequalities in Canada. Between 1980 and 2005, the city’s Gini coefficient

experienced the greatest increase in Canada, jumping 81% (Mendleson, 2011). Recent

immigrants who are from a visible minority are strongly associated with low pay, concentrating

them at the bottom of Calgary’s income spectrum (Saunders & Canadian Policy Research

Networks, 2005). Many unskilled TFWs face numerous other challenges as well, such as access

to amenities, seeking cultural and recreational activities, and making social connections because

of cultural and language differences (Foster & Taylor, 2013). However, the three most prominent

issues with the TFWP are the tethering of migrant workers to particular positions/employers,

dependence and the subsequent social isolation, and the commodification of workers.

2.4.1 Tethering

The tethering of migrant workers leads to abuse and vulnerability. Legally tying migrants

to local companies and confining them to a specific location means that a TFW cannot be

promoted, transferred (even within the company), or fired-and-rehired without repeating an over

three-month-long approval process (De Guerre, 2007). Because tethering disables TFW from

leaving their position without losing their job, they become vulnerable to exploitation, dismal

conditions, and abuse. With workers tethered, some employers feel empowered and take

advantage of this vulnerability. Despite these undesirable conditions, many TFWs rely heavily

on these jobs, a fact which discourages them from leaving. Tethering consequently causes TFWs

to become dependent on their employer, which further reinforces the social isolation of workers

from society.


2.4.2 Dependence and Social Isolation

Many TFWs become dependent on their employers, which can be socially isolating,

depending on the context. This dependence includes employer-provided orientation, information

and services (Foster & Taylor, 2013). Similarly, because workers are often housed in isolated

communities, such as the worker camps pictured in Figure 3, they often rely on their employer

for transportation to work (Smart, 1997). Without the ability to drive themselves around the city,

in addition to common language barriers, many TFWs find it difficult to develop social

relationships or integrate into the community (Smart, 1997). According to Foster and Taylor

(2013), the impermanent status of TFWs additionally weakens their connection to the geographic

community and further leads to marginalization. Essentially, TFWs are unable to establish roots

and develop a sense of home or belonging, making it difficult to advance themselves in

Calgary’s society.

It is difficult for foreign workers that enter Canada, especially TFWs, to create a similar

lifestyle to the one that they had in their country of origin (Lamba, 2003). A significant

proportion of refugees, foreign workers, and TFWs in Canada believe that they are of little value

in Canada’s labour market. Four principal variables contribute to this disenchantment with the

Canadian labour market, including former occupations, former education, number of months of

Figure 3: Work camp for workers in Alberta’s oil industry. Retrieved from http://www.cpcml.ca/images2014/Provinces/Alberta/File/110115FortMcMurrayWapasuCampKearlOilSands-JWoodhead-01.jpg


English-language training received in Canada, and number of months of training/education

obtained in Canada (Lamba, 2003). These patterns can be found more specifically in Alberta,

where foreign workers have reported being overqualified for their current job 60% of the time

(Lamba, 2003). This mismatch is most prominent among those trained as managers. While a

background in management made up 39% of the sample, only 7% were able to find employment

that was equal to their former position before their move to Canada. This phenomenon

demonstrates how insecure many foreign workers are upon their arrival to Canada, including

Calgary. Even having credentials and experience does not always help foreign workers’ secure

employment in Calgary.

Lack of professional networking ability also makes occupational advancement difficult

for foreign workers, and the professional networks that do exist might not be sufficient enough to

ensure occupational success (Lamba, 2003). For example, Lamba reports that 86% of immigrants

came with family to Canada, however, only 25% received help with finding employment from

friends, family, and ethnic-group members (Lamba, 2003). Only 3% of interviewed refugees

reported relying on ties from their former job, and only 5% reported being successful in finding

employment when using government aid (Lamba, 2003). These low numbers suggest that either

the TFWs do not have the connections that assist many local Calgarians in job searches, or that

the resources to create or discover these networks are unavailable to most TFWs. Either way,

TFWs are disadvantaged in job searches because they lack the social networks required to give

them an edge in the labour market. Additionally, many TFWs find it difficult to become

permanent Canadian residents, which further isolates them from society.

The emphasis on their temporary status also keeps TFWs from integrating into society in

Calgary. Low-skill TFWs, in particular, have difficulty qualifying for Canadian citizenship.

Alberta Federation of Labour president Gil McGowan has admitted that the "sad truth is that

most of the low-skill TFWs in question will never qualify for permanent residency” because the

government “gives preference to workers with high skills and high levels of education" (CBC

News, 2015). Of the 192,000 temporary foreign workers who entered Canada in 2011, only

29,000 “made the transition to permanent status” (Government of Canada, 2012). This

impermanence of TFWs is a key component in the flexibility of the globalization of labour, and

the ability to mitigate labour shortages created during development spikes. Taking away the

temporary aspect of the program would not offer the same flexibility for firms and industries,


and would diminish cost savings. To preserve this cost saving flexibility, Canada discourages

accepting a large number of TFWs as permanent residents. Because only a small number of

TFWs are permitted to become Canadian citizens, preference is given to those with higher

technical skills. This selection process exemplifies how TFWs are considered exclusively as a

temporary and largely disposable labour pool.

2.4.3 Commodification

While all labour is a commodity, TFWs are treated exclusively as labour and not given

agency or rights as citizens. Because the TFWP was created in response to labour shortages, it

provides foreign workers with little rights (Fudge et al., 2009). This is evident through the fact

that there is no single federal or provincial level of responsibility for enforcing contractual rights

of TFWs (Nakache & Kinoshita, 2010). Provincial union organizations have criticized the

government for expanding the TFWP without implementing controls to protect foreign workers.

As a result, TFWs are easily exploitable. Although employers must prove an insufficient number

of Canadian citizens/permanent residents to perform these jobs, and must pay TFWs the

prevailing wage rate, the enforcement of this is inconsistent (Fudge et al., 2009). Similarly,

Employment Insurance, if received, is often cut off due to the tethering of workers to employers

(Nakache & Kinoshita, 2010). Although TFWs are commonly subject to this exploitation, as well

as dirty, dangerous and difficult jobs, they rarely speak out or challenge this injustice.

Substantial disincentives exist that discourage TFWs from filing complaints about

working conditions. In one study, only 14 out of 4,000 complaints that were investigated were

filed by TFWs (Nakache & Kinoshita, 2010). While rights are extended to TFWs on paper, in

practice these are often ignored. Government reports indicate that 75% of inspected companies in

Alberta that employed TFWs broke provincial employment rules (Nakache & Kinoshita, 2010).

As TFWs are reliant and ‘tethered’ to their employers, TFWs are more likely to suffer the

abusive conditions rather than risk unemployment, especially since they are only entitled to a

single week of termination pay under the Alberta Employment Standards Code (Nakache &

Kinoshita, 2010). Because foreign workers are discouraged to assert their rights, the TFWP

continues to be used as a credulous solution to Canada’s, and especially Calgary’s, labour

shortage.


2.5 Calgary: Part of a Global Trend

The tethering, dependence, and commodification of foreign workers is not a unique

phenomenon to Calgary. Rather, Calgary is part of a growing trend, where foreign labour is

brought in for short-term periods to fill labour-shortages in low-skilled service positions. With

many cities becoming more entrepreneurial in attempt to compete in a global economy, this trend

has become especially popular. Urban development, especially through infrastructure, is adopted

to attract firms and investment. This development leads to a temporarily high demand for

construction labour, and contractual foreign labour has given cities access to the labour supply

necessary to satisfy this demand. As a result, cities have been able to develop much more

rapidly. While Calgary has joined this global trend, the Arab Gulf is an even more prevalent

example of this phenomenon (Gandia, 2011). Gandia (2011) argues that both Alberta and Dubai

are involved in this trend of exploiting foreign workers to enhance cost savings, rather than

promoting permanent immigration and citizenship. Dubai, however, displays a much more

extreme example of this trend.

3. Globalizing Labour Markets in Dubai, UAE

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) was established on December 2, 1971, comprising of

seven emirates — Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ras al Khaimah, Ajman, Umm al-Quwain and

Fujairah (Zachariah, Prakash, & Rajan, 2004).

Since its establishment, Dubai has experienced tremendous urban growth, especially after

the city began aggressively diversifying its economy (Buckley, 2012). Because of this

diversification, as well as a focus on westernized multinational development projects, the city’s

growth has involved substantial construction of lavish hotels and resorts, iconic architecture,

massive malls, and entertainment attractions (Vora, 2011). This growth agenda was funded

heavily through international debt capital (Buckley, 2012). In particular, the country’s huge

petroleum export earnings allowed Dubai to invest in extensive infrastructure and the promotion

of other economic activities, such as tourism and financial services (Zachariah et al., 2004;

Cooper, 2013). With foreign investment pouring in, Dubai developed into a globally competitive

city, capitalizing on a growing consumer culture. Over the span of three decades, the UAE has


transformed its traditional subsistence economy to a highly prosperous modern economy

(Zachariah et al., 2004). This economic transformation was accompanied by a radical change to

the city’s economic structure, especially in regards to migrant labour.

Following this development, Dubai’s employment structure became characterised by a

large tertiary sector, including trade, hospitality, transport, finance, real estate business, personal

services, and government services (Zachariah et al., 2004). This tertiary sector accounted for

roughly 58% of Dubai’s total employment in 1998 (Zachariah et al., 2004). Manufacturing,

water supply, construction etc., accounted for 33%, while agriculture, forestry, mining etc.

accounted for 9% of the workforce (Zachariah et al., 2004). Because these labour intensive

industries, construction and services in particular, are crucial to Dubai’s high end consumption

tourism development vision, the city has required a large supply of labour. However, the scope

of this development overpowered the relatively small national population, forcing Dubai to look

globally to fill this labour shortage (Zachariah et al., 2004).

Dubai’s intense demand for foreign workers has been the primary contributor to its global

presence, unlike many other cities that rely on transnational corporations (Malecki & Ewers,

2007). According to the Government of Dubai Statistics Center, 96% of Dubai’s employed

population are foreign workers (Cooper, 2013, p. 67. Cooper cites the Government of Dubai’s

2011 Bulletin of Labour Force Survey Results).

This exponential amount of immigrants entering the country has led the small national

population to become a minority. In order to preserve the superiority of national Emiratis, the

government has implemented policies to provide and privilege its national citizens (Malecki &

Ewers, 2007). Additionally, the UAE government has imposed strict regulations on foreign

worker to control the social hierarchy within the country of the population and ensure nationals

remain at the top (Malecki & Ewers, 2007). As a result, a clear societal division has developed in

the city, distinguishing the national Emiratis from the foreign-born workers. This division

includes a polarization of public space, the workforce, legal rights, and the social sphere.

3.1 Global Labour Markets: Dubai’s Practice

Dubai relies heavily on a global supply of labour to suit its current needs (Hvidt, 2009).

According to the 2009 Dubai Labour Force Characteristics Survey, national Emiratis made up

only 3.2% of the city’s labour force, while the remaining were foreign workers (Connell &


Burgess, 2011). In terms of the entire population, foreign workers and expatriates account for

more than 90% (Ali, 2010). The impermanence of foreign workers offers extensive flexibility in

both the size and qualifications of the workforce. Furthermore, this flexibility allows Dubai to

make quick strategic changes as new market opportunities or developmental goals arise (Hvidt,

2009). If the federal government wants to establish an airline, or an information-technology

sector, all that is required is to find labourers with relevant experience. This illustrates how

critical globalization has been to the development and maintenance of the city. Without access to

large quantities of labour for low costs, Dubai’s development would have never been completed

with such rapidity and intensity. This flexibility and global labour supply also gives Dubai a

locational advantage, which reinforces the city as a competitor in a global economy (Hvidt,

2009). While access to a global labour supply has allowed Dubai to sustain its booming labour

market despite its low national population, it is argued that workers are similarly dependent on

the employment opportunities that the city offers.

The city proposes to offer foreign workers employment opportunities and a higher quality

of life. For the higher-skilled professional workers, the city provides easier access to amenities

that are considered prestigious in other countries, such as “personal household services” (Ali,

2010, p. 157). Additionally, Dubai is tax-free, which is especially alluring to many workers and

investors (Ali, 2010). While these qualities may intrigue many migrants, this high quality of life

is conditional. Success in Dubai comes exclusively with a certain foundational wealth, which

privileges some migrant workers over others (Ali, 2010). Regardless of this limitation, for many

workers Dubai appears to provide “a freedom and scope for opportunities in their work lives that

[their home country] simply could not match” (Ali, 2010, p. 151). In reality however, this

‘freedom’ of opportunity has limitations due Dubai’s regulations on immigration, which involves

being tethered to a local sponsor.

3.1.1 Sponsorship Program

The UAE governs immigration by a sponsorship-based system of entry, referred to as a

Kafala (Buckley, 2012; Mahdavi, 2011). In order to be legally entitled to work in the country,

every foreign migrant must have a kafeel, or sponsor. This sponsor must be a UAE citizen, and

assume both legal and economic responsibility for the worker throughout the length of the

contract (Buckley, 2012). Along with the legal documents for the migrant, the residential


documents are also regulated by the migrant’s sponsor, which makes the worker even more

dependent on their sponsor (Mahdavi, 2011).

The Kafala system allows the government to dictate the residency of foreign migrants as

temporary (Buckley, 2012). With 90% of UAE residents being foreign-born, the Kafala is an

attempt to mitigate the need for a large number of foreign workers by restricting migrants from

permanently settling in the country (Buckley, 2012; Ali, 2010). In doing so, the UAE maintains

the superiority of nationals by making citizenship exclusive. Being tethered to sponsors also

reinforces the superior status of nationals by enabling the exploitation of workers, keeping them

in an inferior position.

Many sponsors exploit and abuse their workers (Mahdavi, 2011). Although it is illegal,

many kafeels confiscate the passports of their migrant workers, therefore restricting their ability

to pursue other employment or return home (Mahdavi, 2011). With workers trapped, employers

often lower wages and depress conditions without consequence. In addition to this economic

exploitation, foreign workers are susceptible to many social challenges, including social

exclusion and segregation.

3.2 Social Consequences of Labour Migration: Dubai

3.2.1 Polarized Workforce

Dubai’s workforce is divided into three tiers: (1) the national Emirati population; (2)

skilled or professional expatriates from the United States or United Kingdom; and (3) low-skilled

workers, usually from South Asia, that work in the construction and low-skilled service

industries, as illustrated in Figure 4 (Malecki & Ewers, 2007; Connell & Burgess, 2011). Tier

one Emirati nationals are typically entitled to the most favourable jobs and lifestyle conditions,

such as government employees, as evident in Figure 5 (Buckley, 2012; Malecki & Ewers, 2007),

followed by North American and Western European expatriates (Buckley, 2012). Tier three

workers, in contrast, receive the lowest pay and face numerous quality of life challenges

(Connell & Burgess, 2011). This tiered labour force privileges Emirati nationals, while leaving

foreign workers more vulnerable to exploitation.


The labour arrangements that migrant workers face can be compared to slavery or

indentured servitude. Many foreign workers are brought to the city through recruiting services,

which promise them favourable conditions and compensation. However, these deals often do not

hold up upon arrival. Instead, many foreign workers have their passports confiscated and are

degenerated into a contract of significantly lower wages (Connell & Burgess, 2011). The

minimal enforcement and monitoring of recruiter contracts essentially results in forced labour as

a form of human trafficking (Caplan, 2009). Additionally, recruitment fees, which can range

from US$4,000-11,000, combined with low wages, the confiscation of passports, airline tickets,

and identification papers, leave migrants reliant on their employers and forced into work

arrangements (Caplan, 2009). While some are able to repay these fees quickly, impoverished and

lower-skilled migrants often spend years paying off migration debts (Buckley, 2012). Other

practices also contribute to migrant workers’ precarious position, including denial of wages for

the first few months, irregular payments, and wage theft (Cooper, 2013). The slavery that results

from these arrangements is not simply the result of criminal organizations or corrupt businesses,

but due largely to the “corruption and/or ineffectual malaise of the local and state governments in

the region” (Cooper, 2013, p. 65). One journalist describes the phenomenon as a “three-way con,

perpetrated between the recruitment agents, the companies and the UAE government” (Hunt,

2011, p. 24). Through a system of precarious and vulnerable employment, and through non-

Figure 4: Foreign workers in Dubai’s construction industry. Retrieved from http://assets.knowledge.allianz.com/img/dubai_migrants_quer_1_47547.jpg

Figure 5: Emirati nationals often work in government positions, such as in the Police service, which uses expensive supercars. Retrieved from http://trendingnewsroom.com/media/pictures-rich-dubai-4_-_Copy.jpg


enforcement of existing legal protections, migrant labourers are faced with an extremely

exploitative labour system.

Dismal working conditions increase the misery faced by foreign workers. Most foreign

workers put in long hours, extreme heat, and exceedingly lack recognition as members of

society. The World Safety Organization has noted that many workers work 60 hours a week in

extreme temperatures, as high as 120ºF/49ºC (Caplan, 2009). Human Rights Watch has pointed

to abnormally low numbers of reported injuries and fatalities of migrant workers in Dubai, as

well as discrepancies in the health and safety reports (Cooper, 2013). These discrepancies are

argued as a “gross oversight” and possibly a “cover-up” of working conditions (Cooper, 2013, p.

68). One report indicated a staff of 80 government inspectors overseeing 200,000 companies that

employ migrant workers (Fattah, 2006). The gross outnumbering of foreign workers to

inspectors illustrates the negligence of the UAE government to support foreign born migrant

workers. In addition, workers are not given citizenship rights or a "voice in the workplace",

prohibiting the organization of unions or strikes (Connell & Burgess, 2011, p. 25-27; Zachariah

et al., 2004, p. 2233). Without the ability to stand up for themselves, foreign workers become

trapped in precarious positions and brutal conditions. This inferiority is not confined to the

workforce, but is similarly represented in the geography of Dubai itself.

3.2.2 Spatial Segregation

This polarization of labour is echoed through spatial segregation. Buckley (2013) attends

to how this polarization and segregation is a direct result of the state dealing with a social

dilemma under hyper-neoliberal policy and non-democratic rule. He discusses that, while foreign

workers enabled the construction of Dubai, they blemished the state’s high-end vision of the city

(2013). To mitigate the disruption of the ‘undesirable’ workers on this vision, labour camp-like

barracks were constructed to contain their presence (Buckley, 2013, p. 261). Zachariah et al.

(2004) found that 70% of a sample of 361 workers were accommodated by worker camps (p.

2233). These worker camps are segregated from the workplace and the city, located fifteen

kilometers away in Sonapur (Zachariah et al., 2003). The camps reinforce the division of space

within the city by limiting the interactions between migrants and nationals to business and

service, and isolating foreign workers from the public sphere. Foreign workers are excluded from


access to certain public or commercial spaces throughout the city. For example, South Asian

migrants are consistently denied access to bars in Dubai based on their ethnicity (Kanna, 2011).

Living conditions for migrant workers in these work camps are also dire. In roughly 25%

of worker camps, basic necessities like water, electricity, air conditioning, and cooking facilities

are unavailable (Zachariah et al., 2003). Additionally, work camps often suffer from broken

sewage systems, improperly desalinated water (causing sickness), overcrowded camps, and

excessive heat (Cooper, 2013). One journalist reported individuals living under plastic sheets on

rooftops and surviving only on charitable donations (Hunt, 2011). It was also reported that 33%

of the rooms housed four people, while 28% averaged more than eight people per room

(Zachariah, 2004). Figure 6 clearly illustrates these dismal living conditions. Higher skilled

expatriates from the United States or Europe are often placed in more expensive residential areas

outside of the old city center, to lure them to Dubai (Vora, 2008). However, this causes

geographical segregation and the ghettoization of older, more congested parts of town (Vora,

2008).

This spatial segregation enabled some unintentional problems for the government,

however. Because workers were concentrated in certain areas, they were given greater

opportunity to assemble a “shop-floor politics” and contestation plans and uprisings (Buckley,

2013 p. 266). Such contestation is illegal, as civil rights and institutions are similarly polarized,

putting migrant workers at a further disadvantage.

Figure 6: Workers sleeping quarters in Dubai. Retrieved from http://imgarcade.com/1/dubai-workers-living-conditions/


3.2.3 Exclusive Rights and Institutions

Dubai’s institutional structure is highly centralized, and can be thought of as a two-tier

system (Hvidt, 2009). The first tier is involved with the daily functions of the city including, law

enforcement, utilities, infrastructure, etc. The second tier is directed by five individuals who

manage all new developments, such as mega-projects, state-owned companies, investment banks,

among other projects (Hvidt, 2009). Because the economy is controlled by a small minority of

elites, it has developed to cater to particular interests, rather than popular movements. As a

consequence of this exclusive system, and Dubai’s rapid development, there has been little

opportunity to develop civil institutions that are essential to ensuring human rights are protected

(Connell & Burgess, 2011). This lack of regulation makes foreign workers vulnerable to

exploitation. The UAE labour law, developed in 1980, has consistently failed to meet the

standards of Human Rights Watch in regards to worker rights (Connell & Burgess, 2011). For

example, public racial and ethnic discrimination is common, with some newspaper job ads

stating “‘UK/US educated’ or ‘Arabs only’” (Connell & Burgess, 2011, p. 22). Without strict

enforcement of human rights, migrant workers are not protected from discriminatory practices,

and lack the agency and mobility needed to escape from consequential social injustice.

The UAE labour system imposes a number of restrictions on migrants’ labour market

mobility, contract length and workplace conditions (Buckley, 2012). For example, the UAE

continually refuses to implement a minimum wage for foreign workers, as well as any other form

of labour regulations (Buckley, 2013). Following an outbreak of worker protests, many

companies offered to increase wages so they would return to work. The UAE, however, would

not allow it (Buckley, 2013). Additionally, terms for foreign worker visas under the Kafala

system are short. The majority of foreigners working in the UAE typically obtain three-year

renewable visas that entitle workers to be employed only by one specific employer. Workers

remained legally tied for a minimum of two years, and without an official ‘letter of no objection’

from their current employer, workers can not legally change employers (Human Rights Watch,

2006; cited in Buckley 2012 p. 255). Immigration rules stipulated that foreigners could only

legally remain in the country for two months if their work visa expired or was revoked. This rule

increased the workers direct dependence on their sponsors and employers for the right to work


and reside in Dubai. This dependence is compounded for low-skilled workers, whose residency

is also tied to housing and food (Human Rights Watch, 2006; cited in Buckley 2012).

According to UAE immigration rules, it is the responsibility of employers to meet all

recruitment expenses related to the return journeys of the immigrant, including fees for visas and

airfare (Zachariah, 2004). The only cost the foreign worker is expected to bear is the expense for

a medical check up, prior to arriving (Zachariah, 2004). However, the enormous power that the

kafeels have over their contractual workers fosters an environment of rampant abuses, including

wage repression or theft, and extraction of illegal fees (Human Rights Watch, 2006, 2007, Keane

and McGeehan, 2008; Rajan and Prakash, 2009; cited in Buckley, 2012; Zachariah, 2004).

Although the local and federal governments have tried to combat these issues, especially in the

construction sector, it remains a widespread problem (Buckley, 2012). Most workers never

regain these wages, and become further indebted to money lenders back home (Buckley, 2012).

Combined, these conditions undermine the economic security of construction migrants in

several ways (Buckley, 2012). Firstly, they preclude the possibility of a long term employment

contract, as well as severely restricting one’s labour market mobility. Together, these can greatly

reduce workers’ income security while they reside in Dubai (Buckley, 2012). In addition to this

income insecurity, foreign workers face severe civil insecurities such as being unable to escape

from their temporary status.

3.2.4 Permanent Impermanence 1

In addition to few labour rights, foreign contractual workers and expatriates are excluded

from citizenship. In Dubai, foreign workers and expatriates operate on three-year residency

visas, including second generation expatriates despite being born and raised in the city (Ali,

2010). There are only four possible avenues to obtain residency visas in Dubai; (1) from an

employer; (2) as a dependent family member; (3) as a business owner; and (4) as a benefit of

owning freehold property (Vora, 2008). These visas typically range from one to three years.

Furthermore, in order to reside with one’s family in Dubai, a man has to make a minimum of

4,000 dirhams a month, or 3,000 if he lives in company-provided housing. Women are not

allowed to sponsor spouses or children except in certain professions, such as medicine (Vora,

2008).


The use of residency visas, rather than citizenship, exemplifies the dedication the UAE

has to discouraging permanent settlement (Buckley, 2013). Expatriate status is made essentially

permanent and hereditary. Children of foreign parents, regardless of where they are born, retain

the nationality of their parents (Vora, 2008). An individual can be born in Dubai and/or live in

the city for decades and never be granted citizenship (Ali, 2010). Even if a child is “born to a

national woman” but fathered by an expatriate, the child is legally and socially an expatriate (Ali,

2010). While a child born to an expatriate mother but national father is recognized as a national,

if it is a male, it loses this bond to his parents and reverts back to expatriate status (Ali, 2010).

From the time the country was first established in 1971, and the following 26 years, only 50,000

expatriate workers were naturalized, and since then the UAE has developed new policy to reduce

this rate (Ali, 2010). Even if an expatriate is naturalized, this does not guarantee them permanent

citizenship, as their status can be revoked at any time (Ali, 2010). Similarly, naturalization of a

foreign expatriate does not make them social or legal equals to nationals. They continue to be

excluded, including from “government benefits such as free education, land grants, housing,

direct cash payments and other welfare benefits” that national Emiratis are provided with (Ali,

2010, p. 137).

There are extensive qualifications to even be considered for ‘permanent citizenship’,

though they do not guarantee admission. Some of these qualifications include having over thirty

years residence; being Muslim, Arab and an Arabic speaker; and having a clean police record,

‘proper’ academic qualifications and a ‘healthy’ bank balance (Ali, 2010, p. 137). By making

permanent citizenship so difficult for foreign workers to acquire, the UAE government is able to

keep tight control of over expatriates and protect the national population from “cultural

extinction and demographic imbalance” (Ali, 2010, p. 139). An increase in the pool of citizens

would also mean that the country would have to spread welfare rights and privileges to more

people (Ali, 2010). Additionally, the rule has enabled the country to indirectly instil a sense of

acceptance in expatriates that they are guests, and therefore they must behave like so. People, in

fear that they could be deported at any time, behave in more refined ways to ensure they do not

spoil their welcome (Ali, 2010). In further support of this acceptance as guests, foreign workers

must retire at age 60, and therefore, lose their visa eligibility (Ali, 2010). By affirming an

imminent end to their stay, this policy discourages foreign workers from putting down solid roots


and planning on permanent settlement. This also prevents them from developing a feeling of

home, which makes it easier to accept the idea of having to leave (Ali, 2010).

Not only does this reinforce the social exclusion of workers, but illustrates their economic

commodification. Once workers go beyond their use to the economy, they are no longer

welcome. Being seen exclusively as commodities, rather than active citizens, has resulted in a

highly polarized society across Dubai.

3.2.5 Exclusive Society

The exclusiveness of citizenship in Dubai and the UAE inevitably reinforces a polarized

society. While foreign workers are commoditized, national Emiratis are lavished with

commodities. Interaction among the two groups is rare outside of business, especially those

expatriates outside of Arab and European nationality (Ali, 2010). With the proportion of foreign

workers far overwhelming the proportion of Emiratis, the Emirati culture is especially protected

and exclusive (Ali, 2010; Zachariah, 2004). As a way of preserving their suffocating culture, the

majority of nationals “withdraw socially and geographically from expatriates” (Ali, 2012, p.

148). Additionally, Arab Gulf states and their cities have strictly implemented policy to enhance

the presence of Emiratis in society (Malecki & Ewers, 2007).

In response to increased marginalization, the UAE has formulated ‘indigenization’ or

emiratization programs to introduce a greater number of nationals to the workforce (Malecki &

Ewers, 2007). These programs give priority to UAE natives when deciding job placements to

reduce unemployment among UAE nationals (Zachariah et al., 2003). Emirates

Telecommunication Corporation enlisted a new policy that resulted in over half of its workplace

being filled with locals (Zachariah et al., 2003). Other policies include the encouragement of

nationals to work in occupations other than those in the government positions (Zachariah et al.,

2003). In addition, the UAE regulates the high demand for immigration by limiting the inflow of

unskilled labourers, as well as supplying training to aid workers in the changes to technology

(Zachariah et al., 2003). Other measures to reduce migration include rejecting visas for unskilled

workers, deporting illegal and unskilled immigrants, demanding a high school certificate as the

minimum qualification for unskilled workers, replacing foreign labour with local labour, offering

identical benefits to locals working in the labour force and in the government, and stopping the

renewal of labour cards belonging to private sector employees over the age of 60 (Zachariah et


al., 2003; Zachariah et al., 2004). Additionally, in 2000, the ministry of labour and social affairs

of the UAE government introduced several measures to make the recruitment of unskilled

expatriate manpower costlier. Together, these policies strengthen the small national population

and retain their relevance in the economy.

However, this emiratization does not improve the experience of foreign workers, and

only demonstrates concern for the experiences of Emirati nationals. Kanna (2011) has argued

that the biggest contestation that many foreign workers and expatriates have is not social

polarization, but rather the lack of “economic belonging” (p. 183). Their priorities do not lie in

being socially included in the national community, but rather in being given “a fair shake in the

economic sphere” where “economic inclusion should be based on merit and not on other factors,

such as ethnicity or nationality, over which the individual is seen to have less control” (Kanna,

2011, p. 183). Because many workers migrate to Dubai for better economic opportunities, they

desire a full range of potential in these opportunities, and a chance to be involved in Dubai’s

famous consumerism (Kanna, 2011). This lack of complete economic opportunity debilitates the

city’s “neoliberal promise” because opportunity is not equal (Kanna, 2011, p. 183). The

privileges given to nationals for no other reason than being born are especially muddling of this

neoliberal promise, as it contradicts the meritocratic principles of neoliberalism.

4. Global Trends: Dubai, UAE and Calgary, Canada

Both Calgary and Dubai have entered the global race to become economically

competitive cities. In their pursuit of international investment, both cities have experienced

tremendous growth in the past few decades. This growth and development has been enabled by

the flexibilization of the global labour market. As globalization has improved the flow of people,

it has made temporary foreign workers available to cities during periods of intense development,

where there are sudden spikes in demand for low-skilled labour. Because both cities face labour

shortages, this access to foreign labour has become critical to their growth. While it has led to

many benefits for both Calgary and Dubai, the use of contractual foreign labour has been

accompanied by many pitfalls, including controversy over the role of foreign workers vis-a-vis

the local population, as well as humanitarian concerns for the well-being of workers who face

precarious conditions and exploitation.


4.1 Use of Foreign Workers

Both Calgary and Dubai have turned to foreign labour to fill labour shortages that occur

due to spikes in development. In particular, the temporary spike in labour demand due to

increased urban development could not be supported by current populations in either city (De

Guerre, 2007; Zachariah et al., 2004). To satisfy this temporarily high demand for labour, both

cities developed programs that capitalize on globalizing labour markets. The greater supply

available through globalization has increased the flexibility of the labour market, as temporary

labour can be hired virtually on demand.

As a result of this flexibility, foreign workers in both Calgary and Dubai are

disproportionately distributed in the workforce. In particular, expatriates from the United States

and United Kingdom that move to Dubai and Calgary are more likely to work in higher-skilled

positions, such as managerial positions (CalgaryWorks & Calgary Economic Development,

2006; Malecki & Ewers, 2007; Connell & Burgess, 2011). In contrast, many foreign workers

from developing countries, primarily the Philippines and India, are more likely to fill low-skill

service positions, such as live-in nanny positions and construction labour, in both Calgary and

Dubai (CalgaryWorks & Calgary Economic Development, 2006; Malecki & Ewers, 2007;

Connell & Burgess, 2011). By keeping foreign workers in these lower-technically-skilled

positions, they are not taking highly skilled positions from national Canadian or Emirati citizens

that have put resources into developing these skills. In order to regulate and control the

immigration of these workers, both Calgary and Dubai have established government-run

programs, which define the conditions of employment.

4.2 Foreign Worker Programs: Kafala vs. TFWP

As Steger (2009) describes, many countries have made "significant efforts to control

large migratory flows” through “bureaucratic control” (p. 33). Calgary and Dubai are clear

examples, as both have programs that help to implement and regulate the use of contractual

foreign workers. The Kafala program is used in Dubai, while Calgary follows Canada’s TFWP.

Both the Kafala program and the TFWP are sponsorship type systems, which tie each foreign

worker to a local company, or in Dubai’s case, an individual citizen (Buckley, 2012; De Guerre,

2007). As sponsors, employers are legally responsible for their workers (Buckley, 2012; De

Guerre, 2007). Employers provide workers with living and working arrangement, as well as


transportation to and from the work site. The sponsorship-based-system of the Kafala and

TFWP, while it regulates the use of contractual foreign workers, it also increases the

vulnerability of workers. As a result, both Calgary and Dubai have experienced major social

ramifications in reaction to the use of contractual foreign labour, including impermanence,

exclusion from rights, exploitation, commodification, and spatial segregation.

4.3 Social Consequences

4.3.1 Impermanence and Commodification

The use of sponsorship-based programs in both Calgary and Dubai emphasizes the

impermanence of contractual workers (Buckley, 2012; Smart, 1997). Sponsors are legally

responsible for workers, rather than workers being given independent agency (De Guerre, 2007;

Buckley, 2012). Foreign workers in either city are unable to work or remain in the country

without a sponsor (De Guerre, 2007; Buckley, 2012). Furthermore, workers who want to

permanently migrate to Calgary or Dubai and become citizens are often faced with additional

challenges. Both cities seek the advantages of maintaining flexible contractual foreign labour,

and granting citizenship to these workers defeats this flexibility. As a result, very few contractual

foreign workers involved in the Kafala program or the TFWP ever become permanent citizens.

In Calgary, only around 15% of TFWs become Canadian citizens (Government of Canada,

2012). In Dubai this percentage is even smaller (Ali, 2010). Foreign-born migrants can live and

work in the city on three-year residency visas for their entire life and never be granted citizenship

(Ali, 2010). Even their children are not given citizenship rights despite being born and raised in

the UAE. While Dubai takes this impermanence to an extreme, Calgary is also a strong example

of how city governments are capitalizing on the flexibility of contractual foreign workers. While

the flexibility of worker impermanence may benefit the government and economies in Calgary

and Dubai, it often leads to commodification, putting contractual workers at a disadvantage.

Commodification of migrant workers is one of the biggest problems in both Calgary and

Dubai’s use of contractual foreign workers. As foreign workers are hired on temporary labour

contracts, often in construction and low-skilled services, they become objectified strictly as

labour. While any labour is essentially commodity, contractual foreign labour differs in intensity.

Because they are only temporary residents, migrant workers are excluded from citizenship rights,

including the right to vote. This disconnect means that temporary foreign workers in both Dubai


and Calgary are defined exclusively as labourers, and not as citizens in society. In contrast, all

other workers in either city are considered labourers and citizens, giving them greater agency in

society. This absolute commodification limits the rights and agency of Calgary’s and Dubai’s

contractual foreign workers, putting them in precarious positions where they are more vulnerable

to exploitation and exclusion.

4.3.2 Tethering, Dependence, and Exploitation

The legal structure of both the Kafala program and TFWP, where employers are

responsible for their contractual foreign workers, also leads to workers becoming tethered to

their employer. Because much of the foreign workers’ lives are controlled by their employers,

many contractual foreign workers involved in the Kafala program and the TFWP develop a sense

of dependency on their employer as a result. This tethering consequently obstructs the mobility

and agency of workers because they are legally unable to work anywhere else.

As contractual labour, foreign workers involved in the TFWP or Kafala program are

denied the protection of rights, which increases their vulnerability to exploitation. In Calgary,

there is no single federal or provincial body that is responsible for enforcing the rights of TFWs

(Nakache & Kinoshita, 2010). Similarly, in Dubai, the rapid development of the city provided

little opportunity to develop civil institutions that protect human rights (Connell & Burgess,

2011). As a result, the UAE labour law has consistently failed to meet the Human Rights Watch

standards of worker rights (Connell & Burgess, 2011). Without their rights sufficiently protected,

as well as the lack of agency and mobility from tethering, contractual foreign workers in both

Calgary and Dubai are put in precarious positions in society where they are vulnerable to

exploitation. For example, workers in both Calgary and Dubai become vulnerable to wage theft,

forced labour, as well as illegal fees -- though the degree and severity of exploitation differs. In

Dubai, arbitrary and financially punitive costs create an indebted servitude, whereas in Calgary,

TFWs can be subject to unlimited charges for services that are not explicitly defined as

employment agency business services (Harvey & Gelinas, 2015). In both cities temporary

migrant workers often take on significant debts to gain access to the job market. Migrants often

struggle to repay this debt because of low wages, or simply because of the delayed payroll

schedule, which necessitates they take on debt while working in an unpaid or delayed period. In

Dubai, it is a common practice for employers to withhold the first 3 months salary, after which


they are never paid, or spend the wages they are paid repaying debts incurred during the initial

unpaid period. The precarious conditions created by this built-in dependence on employers, as

well as the opportunities for exploitation, manifest themselves in the spatial realm as well.

4.3.3 Spatial Segregation

The contractual foreign worker programs used in both Calgary and Dubai lead to spatial

segregation of the migrant workers from the naturalized population. In Calgary, many TFWs are

housed by their employers in isolated locations, such as in suburban outskirts of the city or work

camps (Figure 7). While they are not segregated in the technical sense, their location is not

conducive to building social relationships. Smart (1997) exemplifies this challenge in his

analysis of Mexican agricultural workers working near Calgary. Although many of the workers

had friends living in the city, it often took hours to travel to socialize with them via public

transportation (Smart, 1997). Additionally, the family-oriented and low density suburbs where

they lived did not provide much opportunity to meet people. As a result, they struggled to

integrate socially into society. Foreign workers in Dubai are more extremely spatially segregated

in worker camps, pictured in Figure 8 (Buckley, 2012). While these worker camps often feature

much more brutal conditions than TFWs in Calgary must endure, it similarly restricts foreign

workers from integrating into society (Zachariah et al., 2003). In light of this restricted

integration, both Calgary and Dubai limit the opportunities for foreign workers to develop social

relationships. These social limitations could be a mechanism for reinforcing the impermanent

contract of the workers, and could prevent them from establishing roots that could be difficult to

leave (Ali, 2010; Foster & Taylor, 2013).


5. Conclusion

While Calgary and Dubai comparably demonstrate both the economic possibilities and

social consequences of globalization, it is important to recognize that there are many dangers in

equating the experiences of two very different cities. While some factors may be similar, there

are many additional and unique factors that lead a city to its particular political, social, and

economic position. Therefore, this essay does not suggest that Calgary is the same as Dubai, or

even demonstrates the phenomenon to the same extent. Rather the comparison of the two cities’

use of contractual foreign labour illustrates how diverse cities from across the world are involved

in the same global trend, though the details of their involvement may differ. Additionally, the

research for this essay was conducted during a time of dramatic reform, or dismantling, of the

TFWP in Calgary and Canada. The country has faced widespread controversy for the

implementation of the program, as local residents believe that it sacrifices Canadians’ jobs for

that of migrants’ - a sentiment that is being used to a political advantage by certain political

actors. This paper does not attend to this controversy or reform in great detail because it has been

an ongoing and evolving situation. Future research might include the analysis of Calgary’s

removal from the global labour trend, and the impact this has on the city’s economy.

A similar shortcoming was the minor difference in the scope of the literature that was

used. Due to a smaller population of TFWs in Calgary, and a wider scope of positions they fill,

Figure 7: Oil Sands Worker Camps in Alberta. Retrieved from http://workabove.com/onthefly/2011/ 07/25/oilsands-camp/

Figure 8: Worker camps in Dubai, UAE. Retrieved from https://dubaization.files.wordpress.com /2011/12/labor-camps-2.jpg


the respective literature tends to focus on the general trends in the TFW experience. The

literature on Dubai, in contrast, tends to focus on specific industries, such as the construction

industry. Dubai’s rapid and extensive development has created an exponentially large

construction industry, compared to Calgary, which has seen more small-scale and gradual

development. The distribution of contractual foreign workers features some discrepancies as a

result of the different industries that dominate each city. In this sense there is a minor scope

difference that may introduce biases into the analysis presented in this essay.

In addition to these shortcomings, this essay also leaves some unanswered questions. One

of these questions relates to how different political structures might affect the contractual foreign

worker programs. Due to the scope of the paper, the political structure of Dubai and Calgary

were mentioned only briefly. However, it should be recognized that the political structures that

cities are embedded within, have strong influences on urban society. Therefore, future research

may seek to uncover how the democratic political structure of Calgary, and the autocratic

political structure of Dubai, may alter the experiences of contractual foreign workers.

Additionally, the essay does not focus as strongly on the economic results or benefits of

using foreign labour. It does not evaluate and compare which migrant labour program is most

successful or effective at increasing competitive ability in the global marketplace. Rather, this

essay focuses on how the use of foreign labour, as a strategy to become more globally

competitive, leads to social consequences. This leaves some unanswered questions in regard to

which city is more economically successful. The essay does not address whether or not the social

costs associated with contractual foreign labour are outweighed by economic benefits.

Dubai has invested more heavily in multiple sectors and has developed more connections

within a wider range of global markets, such as real estate, architecture, tourism, etc. These

connections have facilitated an intensification of Dubai’s global presence. While Dubai is

arguably a more globally prominent city, receiving greater amounts of foreign direct investment

than Calgary, it also demonstrates extreme examples of social exclusion and worker exploitation.

In contrast, Calgary is a relatively small city with its economy more deeply connected to the oil

industry. As a result of this narrow focus on the oil and gas sector, Calgary is limited to

connections between other global cities that are similarly involved in this aspect of the energy

sector. Although it may have less of a punch in the global hierarchy, Calgary is under less


scrutiny for its treatment of foreign workers. A closer analysis of the differing success between

the two cities would provide a deeper comparison in future research.

Although there are many unanswered questions and additional topics that have not been

addressed in this essay, the case studies of Dubai, UAE and Calgary, Canada, effectively

illustrate the profound impacts that globalization has had on urban societies. Globalization, in

particular, the increased mobility of people and capital, has influenced both Calgary and Dubai to

pursue global competitiveness. As a result, both cities have intensified development to attract

capital, which has similarly created labour shortages. While globalization has initiated these

labour shortages, it has also provided a solution through the flexibility of a global labour market.

Specifically, foreign workers are hired on temporary contracts to satisfy fluctuations in demand.

While globalization and the flexibilization of the labour market has enabled many cities to

advance as successful economic centers, it has consequently put immigrants in precarious social

positions.


NOTES 1. “Permanent Impermanence” was used by Syed Ali (2010) to describe the situation of

foreign workers in Dubai.

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