BUNCEFIELD

Tenth Year Anniversary Where are we now?

Outline

Background – Incident description – Containment failures – Overall consequences

Major Incident Investigation Board (MIIB) Process Safety Leadership Group (PSLG) Have we learned the lessons? Summary

Background

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Hemel Hempstead, England – Three operating sites with a consent to store 194.000

tones of hydrocarbon fuels

http://www.buncefieldinvestigation.gov.uk/images/index.htm

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7 pm, Dec 10

• Tank 912 started receiving unleaded motor fuel from the pipeline

3 am, Dec 11

• The level gauge for Tank 912 recorded an unchanged reading. Filling of the tank continued

05:20 am

• Tank 912 was completely full and started to overflow. Protection systems did not work

5:38 am • Vapor from the escaping fuel is first visible

5:46 am

• Vapor cloud reached a height of about 2 m and was flowing out in all directions

6:01 am

• First explosion occurred, followed by more explosions and a fire that engulfed over 20 storage tanks. Fire continued until Dec 15

Timeline

Overfilling of Tank 912 resulted in the flow from the breather holes at the top of the tank

The flow was very efficiently fragmented, and created relatively small droplets falling freely through air around the tank

The free fall of fuel droplets through the air also leads to entrainment of air and mixing between the air and fuel vapor

5 http://www.buncefieldinvestigation.gov.uk/images/index.htm

Background – Vapor Cloud Generation

Background – Vapor Cloud Dispersion and Ignition

Vapor dispersion Vapor can move with wind, and mix with air

further – The vapor concentration reached the point where it

could support an explosion

Possible ignition sources Fire pump house Emergency generator Car engine

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Background – Containment Failures

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Two sets of alarm system: 1. Automatic tank gauging (ATG) system 2. Independent ultimate high level switch ATG system was showing a static level reading after 3 AM No ultimate high level alarm was received

Primary containment failed

http://www.buncefieldinvestigation.gov.uk/images/index.htm

Background – Containment Failures

Pipe penetrations

Bund joints (crack formation)

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Secondary containment failed

http://www.hse.gov.uk/comah/buncefield/buncefield-10-years-on.pdf

Background – Containment Failures

Tertiary containment – Ensures that liquids could not

be released outside the containment region

– Pollutants from fuel and firefighting liquids leaked from the bund, flowed off site and entered the groundwater

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Tertiary containment failed

http://www.hse.gov.uk/comah/buncefield/buncefield-10-years-on.pdf

Background – Overall Consequences

Overall financial impact likely to exceed £5Billion

No fatalities

43 people injured in the incident, none seriously

10 http://www.buncefieldinvestigation.gov.uk/images/index.htm

Major Incident Investigation Board (MIIB)

Identified areas for improvement and gave several recommendations in the following areas: – Design and operation of fuel storage sites – Emergency preparedness for, response to and recovery

from incidents – The explosion mechanism advisory group report – Land use planning and the control of societal risk

around major hazard sites

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Control of Major Accident Hazards (COMAH) Competent Authority (CA) Developed a guidance in response to MIIB

recommendations: – CA guidance on emergency planning arrangements for

COMAH establishments CA designated emergency response arrangements

as a priority topic for inspection and developed further guidance to assist its inspectors in ensuring all COMAH businesses meet the requirements

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Process Safety Leadership Group (PSLG)

Created in September, 2007 Addressed specific topics related to the MIIB

recommendations – In 2009 the PSLG published the Safety and

Environmental Standards for Fuel Storage Sites • Key improvements required by PSLG:

– A review of the risks associated with filling large petrol storage tanks

– Ensuring large petrol storage tanks do not lose containment

– Ensuring effective leadership and an understanding of the risks associated with the management of sites that store petrol

– A review of how emergency services and industry respond to major incidents

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Progress Against the PSLG Recommendations

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Systematic Assessment of Safety Integrity Level Requirements

Risk assessment done by operators to re-evaluate the risks associated with overfilling a petrol storage tank

Better understanding of automatic protection systems

Document the risk assessments to demonstrate the Competent Authority (CA) how the operator manages the major accident hazard risks

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Protecting Against Loss of Primary Containment

Primary objective: Level detection in the tank

Operators have to assess their tank capacities and ensure that normal operating level, overfill level and alarm systems are appropriate

Test the protection systems In 2008, the industry

committed to install automatic overfill protection systems

16 http://www.hse.gov.uk/comah/buncefield/buncefield-10-years-on.pdf

Engineering Against Escalation of Loss of Primary Containment

Understanding of where an explosive atmosphere might occur

Ensure that emergency equipment is reachable and effective

Emergency plans and arrangements have also been reviewed and updated – Synergy between emergency services, relevant agencies and

bodies • Understanding of their role and responsibilities

For new sites – Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) – Gas detection of flammable vapor clouds

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Engineering Against Escalation of Loss of Secondary and Tertiary Containment

Immediate improvements have been implemented – Gaps sealing around pipework that enters the bund – Assessing and improving the integrity of concrete bund

wall joints • Fire proof steel plates where appropriate

Learn the hazards of chemicals and treat them in the right way – “Environmental Risk Tolerability for COMAH

Establishments” was developed by a joint industry/regulator group

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Operating With High Reliability Organizations

Personnel must be involved at all levels within the organization

Existing operating and management procedures have been reviewed and are maintained to reflect current good practices, i.e.: – Communication between fuel storage terminals and site, – Control room design – Alarm management – Shift working arrangements – MOC

Adoption of leading and lagging indicators to assess how effectively risks are being controlled

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Delivering High Performance Through Culture and Leadership

The CA, industry and unions developed a package of standards and training courses for all levels of staff in both COMAH and non COMAH businesses – Oriented towards all the organizational structure of the

company – Help leaders to develop appropriate competence in

process safety and to establish a proactive process safety culture

• Many companies who operate fuel distribution terminals and refineries have put their staff through this training

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Have we learned the lessons?

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Similar Incidents as Buncefield in the US

Sunoco Leak – October 17, 2006 ExxonMobil, Billings, MT – October 16, 2007 Silver Eagle oil Refinery – January 12, 2009 Caribbean Petroleum, Puerto Rico – October 23,

2009

Sunoco Leak – October 17, 2006

An estimated 220,000 gallons of crude oil spilled onto the ground at Sunoco’s oil refinery in South Philadelphia, PA

The oil spill occurred at a storage tank on the Sunoco tank farm, and remained on site, within a containment area surrounding the tank

Reinforced the importance of providing secondary containment for bulk storage

containers as required by the Oil Spill Prevention regulations

Caribbean Petroleum, Puerto Rico, US – October 23, 2009

The liquid level in the tank could not be determined because the facility's computerized monitoring system was not fully operational

The operators used a mechanical gauge on the tank's exterior wall to monitor the fuel level in the tank, and the employees in the facility's control room were not aware of the situation

A 5-million gallon Aboveground Storage Tank (AST) overflowed into a secondary containment dike

The gasoline spray aerosolized, forming a large vapor cloud, which was subsequently ignited in the wastewater treatment (WWT) area of the facility. The CSB announced that a malfunctioning tank fuel gauge led to the explosion

The outcome of this incident resulted in significant damage to 17 of the 48 petroleum storage tanks and other equipment onsite and in neighborhoods and businesses offsite

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What Have we Learnt From Buncefield?

Many changes have been done to learn from the past and prevent incidents; although, there have been similar incidents after Buncefield

Learn the hazards of chemicals and treat them in the right way – Gasoline can explode

Explosion mechanisms Facility siting studies should account for possible

detonation scenarios – Are we currently accounting for what is outside of our

facilities? e.g., tree lines in Buncefield acted as a detonation tube

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What Have we Learnt From Buncefield?

Emergency preparedness and response has been a key factor to minimize the consequences of an incident

Installation of redundant instrumentation, tank fail-safe controls

Information sharing between local government, emergency response services and local communities

Land-use planning

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References

COMAH Strategic Forum, The Buncefield Major Incident, 11 December 2005.

COMAH, Buncefield: Why did it happen? The underlying causes of the explosion and fire at the Buncefield oil storage depot, Hemel Hempstead, Hertfordshire on 11 December 2005, 2011.

Health and Safety Executive. Prosecution resulting from Buncefield explosion. Available from: http://www.hse.gov.uk/news/buncefield/

COMAH, Competent authority guidance for inspectors on emergency arrangements for COMAH establishments. 2012.

Health and Safety Executive. Chemical and Downstream Oil Industries Forum. Available from: http://www.hse.gov.uk/aboutus/meetings/committees/cif/resources.htm.

Chemical Safety Board and Hazard Investigation Board, Final investigation report. Caribbean petroleum tank terminal explosion and multiple tank fires. 2009.

National wildlife federation. Assault on America: A decade of petroleum company disaster, pollution and profit. Available from: http://www.motherjones.com/files/NWF_OilSpillsExplosions_pages.pdf.

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Acknowledgements

Dr. Mannan MKOPSC Steering Committee

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