BURUNDI: BREAKING THE DEADLOCK

The Urgent Need For A NewNegotiating Framework

14 May 2001

Africa Report No. 29Brussels/Nairobi

TABLE OF CONTENTS

MAP OF BURUNDI............................................................................................................ i

OVERVIEW AND RECOMMENDATIONS................................................................. ii

INTRODUCTION.............................................................................................................. 1

A. A CEASE-FIRE REMAINS IMPROBABLE..................................................................... 2

B. THE FDD FROM LIBREVILLE I TO LIBREVILLE II: OUT WEST, NOTHINGMUCH NEW?.............................................................................................................. 31. The initial shock: Laurent Kabila's legacy ..........................................................32. Libreville II, and afterwards? ..............................................................................43. Compensating for the shortcomings of being a mercenary force ........................5

C. AGATHON RWASA IN POWER, UNCERTAIN CHANGE IN THE FNL........................... 71. The origin of the overthrow of Cossan Kabura ...................................................72. Interpreting the attack on Kinama .......................................................................73. The alliance of the ex-FAR and FDD: a poorly-calculated risk..........................9

D. THE HUMANITARIAN CATASTROPHE ..................................................................... 11

II. AN IMPOSSIBLE TRANSITION IN THE CURRENT SITUATION ............... 12

A. THE ATTEMPTED PUTSCH ON APRIL 18, AN ALARM SIGNAL................................. 131. Putsch or farce? .................................................................................................132. Interpretations and consequences ......................................................................14

B. THE BUYOYA-BAMVUGINYUMVIRA OPTION: DANGEROUS MAINTENANCE OFTHE STATUS QUO..................................................................................................... 151. Bururi: power or nothing...................................................................................162. The recycling of the Partnership Agreement.....................................................18

C. THE BAYAGANAKANDI-NDAYIZEYE OPTION: A FALSE ALTERNATIVE, YET AREAL THREAT ......................................................................................................... 211. An attempt to weaken the enemy .....................................................................212. The temptation to prepare for violence .............................................................23

D. A PROCESS WITHOUT CLEAR DIRECTION .............................................................. 251. The Accord implementation and monitoring committee, a costly arena of

interminable debate ...........................................................................................252. Nelson Mandela: an unclear mediation .............................................................26

III. BREAKING THE DEADLOCK ............................................................................. 27

A. REORGANISING RESPONSIBILITIES WITHIN THE FACILITATION PROCESS ANDDEFINING A COHERENT MEDIATION STRATEGY FOR LIBREVILLE ANDPRETORIA ............................................................................................................... 27

B. SOLVING THE TRANSITIONAL LEADERSHIP QUESTION ONCE AND FOR ALL ......... 28

C. CONCLUDING THE NEGOTIATIONS ON POWER SHARING IN A NON-INCLUSIVEAND FINAL MANNER BY DRAFTING A TRANSITIONAL CONSTITUTION ................... 28

D. CEASE-FIRE: CONFIRMING THE REPRESENTATIVENESS OF THE REBEL GROUPSAND OFFERING AN INCENTIVE TO STOP FIGHTING ................................................ 29

E. ELICITING MORE CONSTRUCTIVE INVOLVEMENT OF REGIONAL GOVERNMENTS 30

F. HARMONISING THE TERMS OF THE ARUSHA AND LUSAKA PEACE PROCESSES .... 30

G. RESUMING INTERNATIONAL AID TO ALLEVIATE SUFFERING AND REVIVEECONOMIC PRODUCTION........................................................................................ 31

IV. CONCLUSIONS ....................................................................................................... 31

APPENDICES

A. TABLE 1: MANAGEMENT OF PUBLIC COMPANIES IN BURUNDI............................. 32

B. TABLE 2: REGIONALISM IN THE ARMY: THE LAST BASTION................................. 34

C. GLOSSARY .............................................................................................................. 36

D. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP........................................................ 39

E. ICG REPORTS AND BRIEFING PAPERS.................................................................. 40

F. ICG BOARD MEMBERS.......................................................................................... 44

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DEMOCRATICREPUBLIC

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Map No. 3753 Rev. 2 UNITED NATIONSDecember 1997 (Colour)

The boundaries and names shown on thismap do not imply official endorsement oracceptance by the United Nations.

Department of Public InformationCartographic Section

BURUNDI

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ICG Africa Report No 29 14 May 2001

BURUNDI: BREAKING THE DEADLOCK

THE URGENT NEED FOR A NEW NEGOTIATING FRAMEWORK

OVERVIEW AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The attempted coup detat by a group of youngarmy officers against President Pierre Buyoya on18 April 2001 was a grave warning about the peaceprocess in Burundi. More than eight months afterits signing, in August 2000, the Arusha peaceaccord is at an impasse. Questions that wereunresolved at the time have still not been dealtwith and the conditions for the accord'simplementation have not improved. There is nocease-fire in sight between the army and rebelgroups, and the leadership of transition envisagedat Arusha has still not been chosen. Moreover, theImplementation and Monitoring Committee (IMC)seems to be ineffective and incapable of fulfillingits mission.

Nelson Mandela, in spite of receiving the supportof regional heads of state and the internationalcommunity, has failed persuade the rebel groups torenounce violence and accept the terms of theArusha accord. Far from weakening their position,the death of Laurent Kabila appears to haveconvinced the rebels to go ahead with their long-planned offensive against Burundi, which remainsthe weakest link in the anti-Kinshasa alliance.From a situation of Neither War nor Peace1,Burundi is sliding once again towards widespreadcivil war. Both the army and the rebels are nowpreparing for a major confrontation.

In the mean time, the political drama continues,with neither of the proposed leadership scenariosof the current president/vice president or ex-

1 "Burundi: Neither Peace nor War", ICG Africa ReportN25, 1 December 2000.

interior minister/ex-secretary-general ofFRODEBU permitting an impartial or satisfactoryimplementation of the peace accord. The firstscenario is nothing but a dangerous continuation ofthe status quo, demonstrating the regimesreluctance to relinquish power, while the secondmay reflect a real change of head of state, butwould give legitimacy to another "institutionaldeadlock".

With security deteriorating, a humanitariancatastrophe underway, and political fragmentationin both camps, the limited achievements of theArusha accord are shrivelling to nothing. Althoughpart of the responsibility for the obstruction of thepeace process lies with President Buyoya, he isbecoming the major target of resentment and facesthe real risk of assassination. Such an event wouldundoubtedly provoke a reckoning between politicalleaders, and renewed ethnic violence.

It would be counterproductive to press for theimplementation of an empty accord. However, thestatus quo is just as dangerous and must not beallowed to continue, as the war option becomesmore likely. A radical change in the managementof the peace process is therefore needed.

Nelson Mandela should