by Dr. S.MARUTHAPPA, Ph D, FIFireE (UK), VICE PRESIDENT Safety Engineers Association of (India) PRESIDENT ; Institution of Fire Engineers (UK) Southern,

by

Dr. S.MARUTHAPPA, Ph D, FIFireE (UK), VICE PRESIDENT Safety Engineers Association of (India) PRESIDENT; Institution of Fire Engineers (UK) Southern , India Chennai

Branch

CASE STUDIES OF MAJOR CHEMICAL DISASTERS –SCENARIO

The case study presented on the one day symposium on

"PREVENTION OF INDUSTRIAL / CHEMICAL DISASTERS PRESENT DAY CHALLENGES,EMERGING TRENDS AND STRATEGIES”

Date : 4th December, 2009 Place : Bangaluru,

Organized by : Department of Factories and Boilers, Govt. of Karnataka.

The various accidents due to these consequences are well The various accidents due to these consequences are well known and gives prominent caution to prepare, practice and known and gives prominent caution to prepare, practice and amend the fire/Toxic Disaster Management plans for each amend the fire/Toxic Disaster Management plans for each and every hazardous process and every hazardous process

As per amended factory Act each chemical industry has to As per amended factory Act each chemical industry has to prepare Disaster Management On site and Off site and prepare Disaster Management On site and Off site and submit plans to chief Inspector of Factories & Boilers for submit plans to chief Inspector of Factories & Boilers for their approval.their approval.

Organizations world wide have learnt the importance Organizations world wide have learnt the importance of applying principles of prevention and protection in of applying principles of prevention and protection in chemical industries in hard way. chemical industries in hard way.

Each chemical industry aims to achieve totally zero Each chemical industry aims to achieve totally zero accident potential. accident potential.

Therefore prevention, protection and suppression Therefore prevention, protection and suppression techniques have been applied to reduce the probability techniques have been applied to reduce the probability of disaster. of disaster.

Some of the worst disaster of toxic gas releases Some of the worst disaster of toxic gas releases have occurred in chemical Industries like MIC, have occurred in chemical Industries like MIC, Ammonia, and Chlorine etc. Ammonia, and Chlorine etc.

Some data’s on past planning in detail which Some data’s on past planning in detail which explains the various stages of Disaster explains the various stages of Disaster Management plan.Management plan.

Bhopal,, 1984Union Carbide had a plant in Bhopal, India, for the production of insecticide Carbaryl. Methyl iso cyanate was an intermediate used in the process

On the night of Dec. 2nd and 3rd, 1984, a Union Carbide plant in Bhopal, India, began leaking.

Due to run-away reactions, temperature and pressure rose and the safety valve lifted to the atmosphere.

25-27 tons of the deadly gas methyl IsoCyanide spread throughout the city of Bhopal. Half a million people were exposed to the gas

protective systems that should have prevented or minimized discharge were out of service.

Refrigeration system to cool the reactor was down. Scrubbing system to absorb the released vapor was not immediately available.

Flare system to burn vapors getting past the scrubber was out of service.

Most killed or injured lived in Shanty town that grew up too close to the plant.

Lessons learned Reduce inventory of hazardous material (MIC) Keep all the safety related equipment in order Keep residential areas away from the plant Proper Management

MIC STORAGE SYSTEM

EVACUATION SYSTEM

FLARE SYSTEM WAS DECOMMISSED DUE TO CORRODE PIPE

FLARE SYSTEM WAS DECOMMISSED DUE TO CORRODE PIPE

Flixborough, UK, 1974 Company’s name: NYPRO Ltd.

– Sudden release of 30 – 50 tonnes of cyclohaxane

– Massive explosion

– Complete plant destruction

– Casualties 28

– Injured 36

– 1821 houses damaged

– 167 shops and factories damaged half mile away

Flixborough, the process

6 reactors in parallel used for cyclohexane oxidation

The reaction was slow and the conversion was kept low to prevent formation of byproducts

Each reactor has a working volume of 20 tonnes of cyclohexane

Flixborough, the process

One of the reactors had minor crack which was detected on time and removed for repair.

In order to keep the operation going, a pipe was installed temporarily in the free space of the removed reactor.

No engineer involved as the site engineer had left NYPRO.

Flixborough, UK, 1974

Cracked reactor


Flixborough, UK, 1974 Dogleg pipe with

bellows on both ends.

No bellows calculation.

No bending moment calculation

Poor scaffold support

Flixborough, UK, 1974Plant operated for about two months

The dogleg pipe exposed to continuous stress and tensions and started to weaken gradually.

Eventually a slight increase in pressure twisted the pipe and broke it at both ends.

Huge volume of reactants and products released and caused a massive explosion


Flixborough, UK, 1974The control room collapsed completely. 18 people died in the control room.

Explosion shattered the windows and caused the roof to collapse

Some died from flying broken window glasses and debris

Some died from roof collapse




CHLORINE PRODUCTION UNITS & CONSUMPTION CENTRES IN INDIA

Chlorine Transportation necessary to cater to widely spread Cl2 Consumers

Production Units (Major Merchant) Consumption Sites (Excl: Captive Consumption)

1 30D

INDIAN CHLORINE INDUSTRY 34 CHLOR-ALKALI UNITS SPREAD ACROSS INDIA

WIDE CAPACITY RANGE : VERY SMALL PLANTS OF 30 TPD TO WORLD SCALE PLANTS OF 750 TPD: -

REGION TOTAL CAPACITY NO. OF CAPACITY CAPACITY DISTRIBUTION PLANTS RANGE

TPD * % TPD *

EAST : 1021 13.0 8 30-365

WEST : 3698 47.2 13 40-750

NORTH : 1171 15.0 4 235-335

SOUTH : 1943 24.8 9 110-375

•Assuming Plant Operational Period of 350 days per year.

INDIAN CHLORINE » CAPACITY : 2.50 mMTPA

(2007-08) » PRODUCTION : 1.95 mMTPA

» CONSUMPTION : 1.95 mMTPA

Chlorine - Overview• Noncombustible, yellow-green

gas with a pungent, irritating odor and strong oxidizing effects

• Slightly soluble in water• Combines with it to form

hypochlorous acid (HClO) and hydrochloric acid (HCl)

• Highly corrosive action causes injury when the gas reacts with moisture in the body

PHYSICO CHEMICAL PROPERTIES OF CHLORINEPHYSICO CHEMICAL PROPERTIES OF CHLORINE

Physical state :Liquid (under pressure)Boiling Point :-34.6CSp.gr :1.56 (Liquid –34.6 C)Vapour density :2.49 kg/m3 Vapour pressure :5.5 kg/cm2gIDLH :25PPM Odour threshold : 0.31 ppmPEL (OSHA) : 1 ppmTLV-STEL (ACGIH) : 3 ppmTLV-TWA (ACGIH) : 0.5 ppmIDLH (NIOSH, MSHA) : 2.5 ppm

HAZARDS FACTORSHAZARDS FACTORS INCIDENTSINCIDENTS %%

Plan site Problems Plan site Problems 1616 3.53.5

Inferior Plant LayoutInferior Plant Layout 0909 2.02.0

Poorly Designed StructuresPoorly Designed Structures 1414 3.03.0

Faulty Material EvaluationFaulty Material Evaluation 9393 20.220.2

Process ProblemProcess Problem 4949 10.610.6

Material Handling ProblemMaterial Handling Problem 2020 4.44.4

Operational FailureOperational Failure 143143 31.131.1

Weak Safety ProgrammeWeak Safety Programme 3737 8.08.0

460460 100.0100.0

Table-1Table-1CHEMICAL PLANT EXPLOSIONS, FIRES, TOXIC CHEMICAL PLANT EXPLOSIONS, FIRES, TOXIC

RELEASE OVER 20 – YEARSRELEASE OVER 20 – YEARS

1.1. RISK EVALUATIONRISK EVALUATION

2.2. NOTIFICATION POCEDURES AND NOTIFICATION POCEDURES AND COMMUNICATIONCOMMUNICATION

3.3. ORGANISATIONAL RESPONSIBILITIESORGANISATIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES

4.4. EMERGENCY RQUIPMENTS AND FACILITIESEMERGENCY RQUIPMENTS AND FACILITIES

5.5. PUBLIC EDUCATION AND INFORMATIONPUBLIC EDUCATION AND INFORMATION

6.6. TRAINING AND PERIODICAL MOCK DRILLSTRAINING AND PERIODICAL MOCK DRILLS

COMMON ELEMENTS OF HAZARDOUS COMMON ELEMENTS OF HAZARDOUS MATERIALS -MATERIALS -

PREVENTION METHOD IMPLEMENT PROCEDURE

Standard Operating

Work Permit Systems

Inspection Schedules

Maintenance

Maintenance Procedures / Schedules

Identification & Periodic Inspection of Critical Equipments

Quality Assurance

Training

How to Report Emergency

Emergency Assembly Point

How to Evacuate

Fire Fighting

Training in civil Defense and Rescue Handling

PREVENTIVE MEASURES

PREVENTION METHOD

IMPLEMENT PROCEDURE

Training

Protective Equipment

Equipment Shut Down

Excavation

Management of

Chance

Process / Procedural Changes

Hazards by Modification

SCENARIO DESCRIPTION

Toxic gas release,Toxic gas release, Fire ,& Explosion, are Fire ,& Explosion, are the major three scenarios which can arise the major three scenarios which can arise and lead to a disaster in chemical and lead to a disaster in chemical industries. industries.

These , release are due to flammable & These , release are due to flammable & toxic gases under abnormal process, and toxic gases under abnormal process, and storage or handling conditions. storage or handling conditions.

The consequences, are flash fire, The consequences, are flash fire, BLEVE , UVCE AND Toxic exposure. BLEVE , UVCE AND Toxic exposure.

Some examples of the toxic gases and its toxicity Some examples of the toxic gases and its toxicity are listed beloware listed below

CHEMICALCHEMICAL THRESHOLD LIMIT VALUE THRESHOLD LIMIT VALUE (PPM)(PPM)

AMMONIAAMMONIA 2525

CHLORINECHLORINE 0101

BENZENEBENZENE 1010

COCO 3535

H2SH2S 1010

CS2CS2 1010

The toxic chemicals like Ammonia, chlorine are The toxic chemicals like Ammonia, chlorine are predominant industrial chemicals used in the fertilizer, predominant industrial chemicals used in the fertilizer, chlor alkali, pesticide, pharmaceutical industries etc. chlor alkali, pesticide, pharmaceutical industries etc.

In general these two chemicals are stored in the In general these two chemicals are stored in the pressurized or refrigerated storage. pressurized or refrigerated storage.

The boiling points of the Ammonia and chlorine are –The boiling points of the Ammonia and chlorine are –33.4C and –344 C respectively. 33.4C and –344 C respectively.

From the past histories, it is well clear that the accident From the past histories, it is well clear that the accident in these storages are more frequent. in these storages are more frequent.

The list of few past accidents involving these The list of few past accidents involving these chemicals are given in the table. The major causes of chemicals are given in the table. The major causes of accident are over pressure, line rupture, refrigeration accident are over pressure, line rupture, refrigeration failure, corrosion, explosion and human error.failure, corrosion, explosion and human error. Unlike other gases Ammonia and chlorine experiences Unlike other gases Ammonia and chlorine experiences different types of dispersion when released to the different types of dispersion when released to the atmosphere and depend on the type of storage. If the atmosphere and depend on the type of storage. If the gas is stored under normal temperature., gas is stored under normal temperature.,

while flashing the gas will disperse as a while flashing the gas will disperse as a heavy gas and slums until the density of heavy gas and slums until the density of the gas equals to the atmosphere. the gas equals to the atmosphere.

This change in phase of the dispersion This change in phase of the dispersion needs special attention in the usage of needs special attention in the usage of dispersion model. dispersion model.

The proper selection and usage of The proper selection and usage of model for a particular scenario is very model for a particular scenario is very important because this mathematical important because this mathematical model suggests the damage distance for model suggests the damage distance for various concentrations.various concentrations.

Based on this damage distance, Based on this damage distance, dispersion direction,dispersion direction,

exposures time in a particular place exposures time in a particular place for a given concentration will be the for a given concentration will be the key areas were the off – site key areas were the off – site emergency crew will concentrate for emergency crew will concentrate for disaster management.disaster management.

In a chloro-alkali plant situated in Durgapur, West Bengal there are four dish-end cylindrical shaped horizontal, thermocool insulated liquid chlorine storage tanks.

The storage vessels are made of mild steel sheet of 21-mm thickness and of overall 12548 mm in length with inside diameter of 2743 mm.

Around 11 pm on 09.06.87 the process controller started degassing of one chlorine tank.

It was first noticed the gas nuisance at 12 O' clock at night on 09.06.87 and presumed a leak at the gland. As no one experienced a bonnet leak before and as light on the spot was not sufficient workers never thought a leak could be there through body seal of the bonnet.

The release of liquid chlorine through the large hole as the valve was thrown out of its position gave rise to huge spillage of liquid chlorine from the tank

The chlorine hydrate so formed will release acidic vapour for a long time even after the leakage was stopped.

It was necessary to neutralize the chlorine hydrate on the floor with lime water or caustic soda solution

Its toxicity irritates the respiratory system. The initial symptom of chlorine exposure is suffocation. Severe exposure to the gas may cause pulmonary edema within 30 to 60 minutes.

Immediate effects

The immediate effects of chlorine gas toxicity include acute inflammation of the conjunctivae, nose, pharynx, larynx, trachea, and bronchi.

Irritation of the airway mucosa leads to local edema secondary to active arterial and capillary hyperemia.

Plasma exudation results in filling the alveoli with edema fluid, resulting in pulmonary congestion.

Take a stick with a cloth bulb at one end.

Soak the cloth bulb with aqua ammonia and hold it close to the area of suspected leak.

A white cloud will indicate if there is any Chlorine leakage and the source thereof.

Detection of Chlorine Leakage Point

The Chlorine Gas Leak at Jamshedpur

On the afternoon of May 27, the people of Jamshedpur were caught unaware

. They were exposed to a dense, pale green, pungent and poisonous gas, Chlorine.

This gas had leaked from an unused cylinder lying in the Tata Motor’s water treatment plant for the past 10 years.

By the next day, around 150 to 200 people had been hospitalised.

about 60 to 70 residents who reported breathing difficulty were admitted to the Tata Motors hospital in Jamshedpur

Other Incidents of Chlorine Leak

Villagers fall ill following chlorine leak

Mumbai Twelve villagers from Kathai, Dhondi and Talodi villages in Bhiwandi were admitted to the Indira Gandhi Memorial Hospital on Thursday afternoon after they complained of burning eyes, breathing difficulty, nausea and vomiting out blood.

“In 1987, a water purification plant was being run by the Maharashtra where Twelve villagers were admitted to the Hospital after they complained of burning eyes, breathing difficulty, nausea and vomiting out blood.

Preliminary investigations have revealed that the above were the effects of a chlorine leak from four abandoned chlorine cylinders, which were used for water purification two decades back.

Other Incidents of Chlorine Leak

Villagers fall ill following chlorine leak

Mumbai Twelve villagers from Kathai, Dhondi and Talodi villages in Bhiwandi were admitted to the Indira Gandhi Memorial Hospital on Thursday afternoon after they complained of burning eyes, breathing difficulty, nausea and vomiting out blood.

“In 1987, a water purification plant was being run by the Maharashtra where Twelve villagers were admitted to the Hospital after they complained of burning eyes, breathing difficulty, nausea and vomiting out blood.

Preliminary investigations have revealed that the above were the effects of a chlorine leak from four abandoned chlorine cylinders, which were used for water purification two decades back.

SPIC ammonia unit shut due to leakage problem SPIC ammonia unit shut due to leakage problem

Southern Petrochemical Industries Corporation (SPIC) at Tuticorin has been shut down due to a leakage in the pipeline. When the repair works were going on, a fatal accident occurred on October 1, company sources told that after the southern grid failure last month, technical problems arose in SPIC's plant, causing a leakage in the pipeline.

While trying to do the repair work, Joint Manager (Operations) slipped and fell. The gas mask he was wearing came off and he died of asphyxiation, it is learnt.

CASE STUDY CASE STUDY

AMMONIA RELEASEAMMONIA RELEASE

On 26 th August 1992 at a Fertilizer Factory On 26 th August 1992 at a Fertilizer Factory Ammonia gas leaked through a faulty value and Ammonia gas leaked through a faulty value and got exploded, got exploded,

killing 11 workers and made another 10 killing 11 workers and made another 10 seriously ill., this accident accrued in the urea seriously ill., this accident accrued in the urea plant while a team of since 25 workers and plant while a team of since 25 workers and officials were working on the maintenance of officials were working on the maintenance of ammonia pump in the plant. ammonia pump in the plant.

The leaked gas immediately engulfed as The leaked gas immediately engulfed as maintenance of an ammonia pump in the plant. maintenance of an ammonia pump in the plant.

Mangalore Chemicals and Fertilizers Limited There was a chemical accident in the Urea Plant at M/s. Mangalore Chemicals and Fertilizers Limited, Panambur, Mangalore on 9.2.2000.

An 8" dia high pressure pipe line housing a weldolet was connected between autoclave (urea reactor) of 108MT capacity and the stripper to carry ammonium carbamate (Urea Solution).

The pressure of pipe line was of the order of 141kg/cm2 and the temperature of 180 C. The Solution had contained 29% of ammonia, 18% carbon di oxide and 32% of urea.

Mangalore Chemicals and Fertilizers Limited There was a chemical accident in the Urea Plant at M/s. Mangalore Chemicals and Fertilizers Limited, Panambur, Mangalore on 9.2.2000.

An 8" dia high pressure pipe line housing a weldolet was connected between autoclave (urea reactor) of 108MT capacity and the stripper to carry ammonium carbamate (Urea Solution).

The pressure of pipe line was of the order of 141kg/cm2 and the temperature of 180 C. The Solution had contained 29% of ammonia, 18% carbon di oxide and 32% of urea.

Chlorine Leakage Management

Take immediate steps to mitigate the situation as soon as there is any indication of presence of Chlorine in the air.

Chlorine leaks always get worse, if not attended promptly.

Since gaseous Chlorine is 2½ times heavier than air, it tends to lie close to the ground.

WATER SHOULD NEVER BE SPRAYED ON A CHLORINE LEAK.

On 9th February 2000, a substantial quantity of ammonium carbamate solution leakage was noticed at the weldolet joint of the pipeline

weld let used in the high pressure pipe line had high carbon content which is not suggested for that kind of a process,

maintenance/repair works was undertaken on line even after noticing the hazardous solution which amounts of non implementation of shutting down procedures envisaged in the on site emergency plan

. Further the high-pressure pipeline was not subjected to hydrostatic test, ultrasonic tests and examinations as required under relevant provisions of law for its soundness.

The personnel who were on the job were not wearing any personal protective equipment in addition to non-adherence to work to permit system.

weld let used in the high pressure pipe line had high carbon content which is not suggested for that kind of a process,

maintenance/repair works was undertaken on line even after noticing the hazardous solution which amounts of non implementation of shutting down procedures envisaged in the on site emergency plan

. Further the high-pressure pipeline was not subjected to hydrostatic test, ultrasonic tests and examinations as required under relevant provisions of law for its soundness.

The personnel who were on the job were not wearing any personal protective equipment in addition to non-adherence to work to permit system.

The leaked gas immediately engulfed as maintenance of an The leaked gas immediately engulfed as maintenance of an ammonia pump in the plant. water was sprayed all over the ammonia pump in the plant. water was sprayed all over the dispersed area. People in the dispersed direction got dispersed area. People in the dispersed direction got evacuated.evacuated.

The leaked gas immediately engulfed as area over 50 m, The leaked gas immediately engulfed as area over 50 m, . Consequent to which, 8 persons were affected amongst them 2 died on the spot and the other two at the hospital amounting to death of 4 persons including the maintenance manager and an engineer.

The plant was immediately shut down.The plant was immediately shut down.

The leaked gas immediately engulfed as maintenance of an The leaked gas immediately engulfed as maintenance of an ammonia pump in the plant. water was sprayed all over the ammonia pump in the plant. water was sprayed all over the dispersed area. People in the dispersed direction got dispersed area. People in the dispersed direction got evacuated.evacuated.

The leaked gas immediately engulfed as area over 50 m, The leaked gas immediately engulfed as area over 50 m, . Consequent to which, 8 persons were affected amongst them 2 died on the spot and the other two at the hospital amounting to death of 4 persons including the maintenance manager and an engineer.

The plant was immediately shut down.The plant was immediately shut down.

IT WAS a routine job of replacing the defective safety valve of the spare ammonia feed pump at the 15-year-old urea plant of the National Fertilisers Limited (NFL) at Panipat.

Around 11.00 am on August 26, eight employees climbed the steps to the open-air ramp, and began to replace the valve when the unthinkable happened.

IT WAS a routine job of replacing the defective safety valve of the spare ammonia feed pump at the 15-year-old urea plant of the National Fertilisers Limited (NFL) at Panipat.

Around 11.00 am on August 26, eight employees climbed the steps to the open-air ramp, and began to replace the valve when the unthinkable happened.

National Fertilisers Limited (NFL) at Panipat.

The bush of the suction valve that stops the gas flow from the mainline, gave way. Liquid ammonia burst out at the high pressure of 23 kg per sq cm, vapourising within seconds to form suffocating clouds of deadly gas.

This hit and choked to death eleven persons and injured ten even as their colleagues sprung into action to diffuse the gas with water sprays.

But just 36 hours after the accident, the plant had begun work again. Clearly, many questions about the disaster remain.

Panipat may have opened up a can of worms about the lack of safety regulators, and even more importantly, preventive maintenance Indian industry continues to suffer.

But just 36 hours after the accident, the plant had begun work again. Clearly, many questions about the disaster remain.

Panipat may have opened up a can of worms about the lack of safety regulators, and even more importantly, preventive maintenance Indian industry continues to suffer.

PHYSICO CHEMICAL PROPERTIES OF AMMONIAPHYSICO CHEMICAL PROPERTIES OF AMMONIA

Physical StatePhysical State : LIQUID (Under Pressure) : LIQUID (Under Pressure) Boiling PointBoiling Point : -33.3 0 C : -33.3 0 C Vapour pressureVapour pressure : 10 bar (at room temp) : 10 bar (at room temp) Vapour DensityVapour Density : 0.6 kg/m3: 0.6 kg/m3 Explosive limitsExplosive limits : 15% - 29% (by volume : 15% - 29% (by volume in air)in air) Threshold Limits Value (TLV) : 25PPMThreshold Limits Value (TLV) : 25PPM

TOXICITY OF AMMONIA AT DIFFERENT TOXICITY OF AMMONIA AT DIFFERENT

CONCENTRATIONSCONCENTRATIONS AMMONIA AMMONIA

(PPM)(PPM)TOXIC EFFECTTOXIC EFFECT EXPLOSUREEXPLOSURE

DURATIONDURATION

2525 Odor detectable by most personsOdor detectable by most persons For eight hours exposureFor eight hours exposure

5050 No adverse effectNo adverse effect For eight hours exposureFor eight hours exposure

100100 No adverse effect for average No adverse effect for average workersworkers

Deliberating exposure for Deliberating exposure for long duration not long duration not advisable.advisable.

400400 Immediate nose and throat Immediate nose and throat irritationirritation

No serious effect for 30 to No serious effect for 30 to 60 mins60 mins

700700 Immediate eye irritationImmediate eye irritation -Do--Do-

17001700 Convulsive coughing severe eye, Convulsive coughing severe eye, nose and throat irritation.nose and throat irritation.

Could be fatal after 30 Could be fatal after 30 minsmins

2000-50002000-5000 Causes burns blister Causes burns blister strangulation asphyxia & ultimate strangulation asphyxia & ultimate deathdeath

Could be fatal after 15 Could be fatal after 15 minsmins

5000-100005000-10000 Respiratory spasm rapid asphyxiaRespiratory spasm rapid asphyxia Fatal within minsFatal within mins

DAMAGE DISTANCEDAMAGE DISTANCE

The damage distance of the Ammonia release has beenThe damage distance of the Ammonia release has beenestimated according to the quantity of the hazard releaseestimated according to the quantity of the hazard releaseand mode of release (Puff or Pluma Type). The dispersionand mode of release (Puff or Pluma Type). The dispersionof the released material depends on the various parametersof the released material depends on the various parameterslike like • Wind directionWind direction• Wind velocityWind velocity• Atmosphere stability conditionsAtmosphere stability conditions• Surface roughnessSurface roughness• Process parameters of the material released likeProcess parameters of the material released like

1.1. PressurePressure2.2. Temperature.Temperature.3.3. DensityDensity

• Reactivity.Reactivity.• HumidityHumidity

Using the above parameters the affected area under IDLN Using the above parameters the affected area under IDLN concentration have to be calculated and interpolating the concentration have to be calculated and interpolating the population density areas will highlight the probability of population density areas will highlight the probability of lethality / toxic exposure of people / animals etc in lethality / toxic exposure of people / animals etc in particular location.particular location.

This will be very useful to the emergency action team to This will be very useful to the emergency action team to evacuate to provide personnel protective appliances and evacuate to provide personnel protective appliances and equipment to take remedial action on the off-site.equipment to take remedial action on the off-site.

Using the above parameters the affected area under IDLN Using the above parameters the affected area under IDLN concentration have to be calculated and interpolating the concentration have to be calculated and interpolating the population density areas will highlight the probability of population density areas will highlight the probability of lethality / toxic exposure of people / animals etc in lethality / toxic exposure of people / animals etc in particular location.particular location.

This will be very useful to the emergency action team to This will be very useful to the emergency action team to evacuate to provide personnel protective appliances and evacuate to provide personnel protective appliances and equipment to take remedial action on the off-site.equipment to take remedial action on the off-site.

SCENE OF DISASTER

Wind - direction

ON SITE

GREEN BELT(500 MTS)

GREEN BELT AREA

4.4. EMERGENCY ACTIONEMERGENCY ACTION

On- site emergency:On- site emergency:

The emergency situation arising with in the plant The emergency situation arising with in the plant premises is called on-site emergency. premises is called on-site emergency.

The effects of the disaster are with the plant and the The effects of the disaster are with the plant and the management of such disaster and its effect are management of such disaster and its effect are called on-site emergency management plan.called on-site emergency management plan.

On – Site Organisation chart

OfficePh.No

Chief Co-ordinatorName

ResidencePh.No

Plant CoordinatorName

Residence Ph.NoOffice Ph.No

Fire & SafetyCoordinator Name


Engineering Coordinator Name


Welfare & MediaCoordinator Name


CommunicationCoordinator Name


MedicalCoordinator Name


Transport & SecurityCoordinator Name


MaterialsCoordinator Name


Residence Ph.No

FinanceCoordinator

NameOffice Ph.No

Chart - 1

On – Site Succession chart Coordinators

OfficePh.No

Chief Co-ordinatorName

ResidencePh.No

Plant CoordinatorName


Fire & SafetyCoordinator Name


Engineering Coordinator Name


Welfare & MediaCoordinator Name


CommunicationCoordinator Name


MedicalCoordinator Name


Transport & SecurityCoordinator Secretary

NameResidence Ph.NoOffice Ph.No

MaterialsCoordinator Name


Residence Ph.No

FinanceCoordinator

NameOffice Ph.No

Chart - 2

Off-site emergency: Off-site emergency:

The emergency situation arising in plant escalates and The emergency situation arising in plant escalates and spreads beyond the compounded wall is called Off-site spreads beyond the compounded wall is called Off-site emergency. emergency.

Disaster, which can effect more then few kilometers like Disaster, which can effect more then few kilometers like toxic dispersion, vapour cloud explosion, flash fire, BLEVE toxic dispersion, vapour cloud explosion, flash fire, BLEVE are the typical examples. are the typical examples.

For off-site and on –site emergency situation are tackled For off-site and on –site emergency situation are tackled buy different organizations with – in and out side the plant. buy different organizations with – in and out side the plant.

Each organization is assigned with specific jobs or Each organization is assigned with specific jobs or responsibilities during emergency situations.responsibilities during emergency situations.

ResidencePh.No

OfficePh.NoCMD

Chief / HomeSecretary

Govt of StatePh.No

DirectorCivil Defence

Ph.No

CONCERNEDMinistry / Occ

New DelhiPh.No

Chief / HomeSecretary

Govt of StatePh.No

State PollutionControl Board

Ph.No

Oil IndustrySafety

DirectoratePh.No

DistrictCollector

Ph.No

Director of Fire Services

Ph.No

Phone numbers of Neighbor Industries1.------------------2.------------------

PS to CMD

Chart - 3

We learn best through our own experiences in different phases of our life.

Mistakes could be catastrophic in a chemical plant, but it is a great opportunity to learn and design a safer plant in the future.

We must learn from previous incidents and develop new procedures, practices and management systems.

These incidents have much learning which reveal many hidden facts about safety and provide efficient tools for prevention of similar incidents in the future.

We learn best through our own experiences in different phases of our life.

Mistakes could be catastrophic in a chemical plant, but it is a great opportunity to learn and design a safer plant in the future.

We must learn from previous incidents and develop new procedures, practices and management systems.

These incidents have much learning which reveal many hidden facts about safety and provide efficient tools for prevention of similar incidents in the future.

CONCLUSIONS

Any Questions ?

Maru Associates

Fire Safety Consultants

Documents

by Dr. S.MARUTHAPPA, Ph D, FIFireE (UK), VICE PRESIDENT Safety Engineers Association of (India) PRESIDENT ; Institution of Fire Engineers (UK) Southern,