UNIVERSITY OF NIGERIA, NSUKKA PHILOSOPHY DEPARTMENT

AUTHORITY IN THOMAS HOBBES AND IGALA POLITICAL THOUGHT: A COMPARATIVE STUDY

A DISSERTATION PROPOSAL DEFENCE PRESENTED TO THE DEPARTMENT

OF PHILOSOPHY, UNIVERSITY OF NIGERIA, NSUKKA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE AWARD OF

MASTER OF ARTS (M.A) DEGREE IN PHILOSOPHY

BY OCHEJE, DAVID UNEKWU

REG. NO: PG/MA/03 /34581

SUPERVISOR: DR. EGBEKE AJA

MARCH, 2006

TABLEOFCONTENTS

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION ... ... Background to the Study ... ... Statement of the Problem(s) ... ...

... ... The Purpose of the Study

The Significance of the Study ... ... The Scope of the Study ... ... Research Methodology ... ... Notes ... ...

CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW AND CLARIFICATION

... OF CONCEPTS ... ... Notes ... ... ... 14

CHAPTER THREE: AUTHORITY IN THOMAS HOBBES ... 15

Hobbes's Concept of Human Nature ... ... ... 15

State of Nature ... ... ... 16

The Social Contact Theory ... ... ... 17

The Basis of Absolute Sovereign Authority ... ... " 17

The Limits of Political Obligation ... ... ... 17

Notes ... ... ... 19

CHAPTER FOUR: AUTHORITY IN IGALA POLITICAL THOUGHT 20

The Political and Social Structure of Igala Kingdom: ... 20

The Central and Supreme authority in Igala Kingdom ... 20

Chieftaincy Institution in Igala Land ... 2 1

Ata-ship: Sources and Legitimacy of authority ... 21

The Ata Igala and the exercise of authority ... 22

Notes ... ... 24

CHAPTER FWl3: COMPARISON OF AUTHORITY IN HOBBES AND IGALA

POLITICAL THOUGHT ... ... 25

Hobbes' Theory on Origin of State and Origin of Igala Kingdom "25

Legitimacy of authority in Hobbes and Igala Kingdom ... 26

Hobbes' absolute sovereignty in relation to the Political Structure in Igala Kingdom ... ... 27

Hobbes on Monarchy by inheritance and Chieftaincy Institution in Igala Land ... ... 28 Concluding Remarks ... ... 28

Notes ... ... 30

Bibliography ... ... 31

CHAPTERONE

INTRODUCTION h

Background to the Study

Hobbes's political philosophy takes, as it's starting point a pessimistic view

of man's nature. For Hobbes, the basic motivation of mankind is "a perpetual

and restless desire of power after power, that ceaseth only in death."' Given the

Universality of this desire for power, life in the state of nature, before the

imposition of civil laws backed by sovereign force, must be a perpetual struggle

for the possessions, supremAcy and glory.

Thus, the outcome of man's productive effort is always uncertain, and life

is "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short."2 To avoid this intolerable situation

conjectured Hobbes, men following the dictates of natural law, seeking peace,

renounced some of their rights or freedoms to a single sovereign authority, by

entering into a social contract or covenant thereby creating an artificial man, that a.

great Leviathan, called a commonwealth or state.

Hobbes's account does not point to any single form of government. But he

does insist, however, that whatever form the sovereign body takes, its authority

must be absolute, unlimited and irrevocable. Hobbes's theory of absolute

sovereignty was presented to u s as a fiat, meant to be a general theory for all

human society, but in Igala political thought, power and authority belong to all.

But by virtue of seniority and ontological status, knowledge, moral and spiritual

qualities, some individuals namely, the Ata Igala, the Onus (chiefs) and elders

exercise greater power, authority and influence than the other of an Igala political

community. The authority of these individuals, like the Ata Igala, is not absolute,

arbitrary or unrestricted, but constitutional and limited. The Ata Igala has to

consult with his council before decisions are taken which must also be in line

with the customs and traditions of the land. This can be summed up in their

political thought which states that "Onu n'oja k'oja n'onu" - which means "the

sovereign authority owns the subjects as the subjects own the sovereign

authority"

The Igala people operate a monarchical system of government. One with a

strong centralized authority. It is a systematic, hierarchical and hereditary

political system. The Ata Igala is the traditional paramount authority of the Igala

kingdom. He is the central and supreme authority because on the Igala

ontological hierarchy of forces, he is nearest to the ancestors (Abegwu). Hence he

is the living intermediary between the living ancestors and the living Igala

indigenes of the land and more so he is believed to be divinely appointed.

The influence exercised by Ata Igala over the people is one supported by

the rules and norms underlined in solid order that is ontologicaI and customary.

Because hc is a t the head of a traditional system, whose legitimacy rests on an

established belief in the sanctity of "imrnemlorial traditions and on thc need to

obey leaders who exercise their authority according to traditions."" type of

authority in consonance with what Max Weber defined as "the authority of the

external yesterday, unimaginable ancient rec~gnition and habitual orien tatiorl to

onf form."^

Statement of the Problem(s)

Thomas Hobbes holds that, in all governments the sovereign power must

be absolute, unlimited and irrevocable, to be able maintain peace and sucurity in

the state. But there was peace and security in t he traditional lgala society. Thc

problem of this research is to ddernonstratc whether this is as a result of an

absolute authority.

The Igala community had a k a been called 'kingdoma- that is a community 'f or political unit that is ruled by a king or monarch. Is IgaIa monarchthe same as

Hobbes's? What type of monarchy is prescnt in Igala political units and why.

How is powcr and authority exerciscd in this mnrlarchicaI community? How is

harmony struck between the individual liberty and his submission to a

monarchial system of the Igala people.

Purpose of the Study

This research makes a critical study of the concept "authurity" in Hobbes's

politicaI phiIosophy and IgaIa political thought. Thc research also stuclies the

theoretical and practical implications of authority within the context of social and

political philosophy. This study of authority in the traditional political system of

Igala people is a contribution to an attempt to show the nature of traditional

Nigerian political systems.

This study makes a comparative study of authority in Hubbes with lgala

political thought within, to investigate whether there is any relationship between

them and therefore deduce lessons for contem iorary Nigeria.

Significance of the Study In spite of Hobbes's belief that his poIiticaI doctrines would resolve

conflicts, his work aroused immediate opposition and has given rise to unending

controversy.

In this work a criticd.contrast has been made between Hobbes and Igala

political thought on the concept of authority to significantly enable u s gain a

more profound understanding of Mobbessian conception of authority in his

political philosophy. It also enables u s gain a firm grasp of some basic political

ideas and beliefs among the Igala people.

Scope of the Study This research is concerned with the philosophical exposition of the

meaning, nature and problems of authority with special reference to Hobbes's

political philosophy and Igala political thought. This work also compares

authority in Hobbes political philosophy with Igala political thought in order to

assertain the extent to which the sovereign can exercise state authority in the

two political systems.

The scope of this study is limited to an analysis of the source, residence

and exercise of authority wiihin the Igala traditional political system and Hobbes

political philosophy.

Research Methodology First we adopt expository method, to lay bare the contributions of some

political philosophers, Hobbes, and Igala political thought to the attempt to

resolve the problems posed by the concept of authority in human social and

political life.

Secondly, our approach in this research is analytical method. We examine

the main concepts, doctrines and issues involved in this study so as to clarify our

understanding and put the study in the right perspective. We also adopt a

historical approach. This enables u s to understand the vital underlying social

and political forces, which influenced Hobbes's conception of authority. This also

enables u s understand authbrity in Igala political thought.

Finally, we adopt a comparative method. This enables u s compare

authority in Hobbes political phiIosophy with IgaIa political thought.

Oral interviews of some traditional chiefs, priest, and elderly men and

woman are also conducted in order to get a t the authentic conception of

authority in Igala political thought. . Recourse has been made to the relevant available literature - books,

journals and periodicals as well as to biographical, historical and traditional

factors for the purpose of clarification and the building of this work.

Notes 1. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, Edited with an Introduction by C. B. Macphenson,

(Great Britain: Bpcc Hazel1 Books, 1985), p. 185.

2. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 186

3. J o h n Plamenatz, Man a n d Society, Political a n d Social Theories from Machiauelli to Marx, (London: Longman, 1992), p. 175.

4. Mill Curtis, The Great Political Theories, Vol. 2, (New York: Avon Books, 1961)) p. 427.

CHAEYTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW AND CLARIFICATION OF CONCEITS

Literature Review The concept of authority has raised perennial questions among political

philosophers. The basic q6estions, which the concept raises, arc; who should

exercise the authority of the state? Under what conditions should authority be

exercised and within what limits?

Plato (428 - 347 BC) in his work, The Republic, believes in the ideal state in which supreme authority resides in the wisdom and virtue of the Philosopher-

king. He therefore formulated a conception of political leadership in which

authority and knowledge are appropriately combined. Plato had concluded that

as in the case of a ship where the Pilot's authority rest upon his knowledge of

navigation, so also the ship of the state should be piloted by one who has

adequate knowledge of the state. For Plato, competence should be the

qualification for authority. The ruler of the state should be the one who has the

peculiar abilities to fulfill the functions of a leader.

Plato recommended a Philosopher-king because he believed that "correct

philosophy affords a vantage point from which we can discern in all cases what is

just for communities and for individuals".l Hence he asserted that the human

race will not be free of evils until either the stock of those who rightly follow

philosophy acquire political authority, or the class who have authority in the

cities be led by some dispensation of providence to become real philosophcrs.

Thus, he says that "until philosophers are king or kings and princesses of the

world have the spirit and power of philosophy ... cities will never have rest from

evil. "2

Aristotle's (384 - 322 BC) contribution in his work, Politics, to the question

of who should have the authority of the state is contemporarily relevant. He

viewed the state as the agency for enabling men to achieve their ultimate goals as

human beings. For him, the highest good for man is perfect development and

activity of all the power t h i t are in him through the association of his fellow

within the state.

Whether a state produces the good life depends upon how its rulers

behave: the good authority governs for the common good of all the people, to

produce good Life for all its citizens. Aristotle opined that supreme authority of a state resides in the law or constitution, and not in any particular person

whatsoever, as advocated by Plato in The Republic. He believes that both the

ruler of the state and individuals in the state are subject to the same law and

morality. Hence rulers should govern the state in accordance with the law. He

vested the sovereignty in the law.

Thomas Aquinas (1225 - 1274) in his book, Summa TheoLogiccl, holds that

the state rules the behaviour of its citizens through the agency of the laws but

the state is itself limited by the requirements of just laws. The state is the source

of human law and each government is faced with the task of fashioning specific

statutes to regulate the behaviours of its citizens under the particular

circumstances of its own time and place. Lawmaking, however must not be an

arbitrary act but must be done under the influence of the natural law, which

according to Aquinas is man's participation in God's eternal law. For Aquinas, any positive human law that violates the natural law loses its

character as law, it is a "perversion of law" and it therefore loses its binding force

in the consciences of men. The lawmaker has his authority to legislate from God,

the source of all authority, and to God he is responsible. If the sovereign decrees

an unjust law by vioIating God's divine law, such a law, says Aquinas, must not

be observed.

The political sovereign has his authority from God, and the purpose of his

authority is never to be used a s an end in itself or for selfish ends. Nor must the

common good be interpreted in such a way that the individual is lost sight of in

the collective whole. That is, the common good must be good of concrete persons.

Thus Aquinas says that "the proper effect of law is to lead its subjects to their

virtue ... to make those to whom it is given goodn.3

The entire scheme of society and its laws is characterized by the rational

eIernent in it. Law itself, says Aquinas, is "an ordinance of reason for the

common good, made by him who has care of the community; and promulgated7'.4

Thus, although the sovereign has authority and power, the law it makes must

not reflect this power in naked sense but as domesticated by reason and aimed a t

the common good.

Aquinas and other Christian theorists argued that the authority of rulers

comes both from God and from the people: from God primarily and from the

people secondarily, in the sense that God grants authority.

Niccolo Machiavelli(l469 - 1527), is the pioneer great political philosopher

of the renaissances. In his book, The Prince, Machiavelli holds that Princes

should retain absolute autfiority or control of their territories and they should

use any means of expediency to accomplish this end, including deceit. According

to him, " a prince, therefore, need not necessarily have all the good qualities.. .but

he should certainly appear to have them7'.5 Machiavelli believes that leader

should use means available to achieve their goal because "the end justify the

means".

Machiavelli construed the state as "work of art", in which decisions were

determined by political and not religious or chivalric criteria. Hence he shifted the

base of political thought away from the moral ground prepared by Thomas

Aquinas' theory of natural law, toward a new secular theory of the state. He

construed the state a s "a single structure closely knit and all-controlling, all of

whose parts respond to the centreY'.6 The state in his view is not coordinated with

the church, it contains within itself, a11 the authority within its territory.

Machiavelli therefore advocated absolute authority for the Prince and absolute

obedience for the subject.

Jean Bodin (1567 - 1603) in his famous work, The Republic, stressed that

the authority of the sovereign is absolute and perpetual. He holds that sovereign

authority is the "highest power over citizens and subjects, unrestricted by lag.7

His authority is perpetual because whoever has it does not lose it, that is because

it is inalienable. It is absolute because whoever has it holds it after God and

accountable only to God.

Though Bodin called sovereign authority absolute, he also said that it is

limited in three ways: by divine and natural law; by the law of succession (the law

in virtue of which sovereignty is acquired by whoever rightly possesses it); and by

the right to private property. Bodin thought of these as somehow limiting the sovereign authority, even though no one could justly use them as an excuse for

actively resisting him.

Bodin did not beliete that subjects are bound to assume that every

command of the sovereign is in keeping with the laws of nature, he forbade only

active resistance to the sovereign authority, and allowed the subjects to disobey

only if he were convinced in conscience that what the sovereign commanded was

contrary to God's law. Hence for Bodin, the authority of the sovereign is legally absolute but not

arbitrary, it should be exercised after proper deliberation. Bodin wanted the

sovereign legally absolute but in practice limited in traditional ways. For him no

authority is absolute in fact as well as in law. Hence, what is required for good

governance is on the one hand, that no one should be in a position to place his

veto on whoever has the highest authority in the state, and on the other hand,

that the obstacles to that authority, should serve to direct it to the common good.

Jean Bodin, like Machiavelli, is a political theorist immersed in history.

Like Machiavelli, Bodin also postulate an absolute sovereignty. But Bodin's

perception of absolute sovereignty differs from Machiavell's perception of it. For

Bodin, sovereign authority #should be legally absolute and a t the same time

limited in practice while Machiavelli holds that sovereign authority should be

completely absolute, both in theory and in practice.

Robert Filrner (1588 - 1652) in his work, Patnarcha, gave an unIimited

power to the Monarch of his time, The Patnarcha was published after the death of

Robert Filrner by people who wanted to show that parliament had no right ta

object to a king, even if he belong to the "wrong" religion.

Filrner the Royalist writer was an absolutist like Hobbes. His arguments,

however, supported the absolute power of the king. Me holds that the world was

established by God, so that legitimate rulers were already in place, and it was our

duty to obey them. Jus t as it is in the family, so it is in political society. A child

born into a family has no say over who its parents are. The child is duty-bound to obey them. According to Filmer, the authority of kings is like the authority of

the father, and can be traced back through history to the original father, Adam.

Filmer is a patriarchal theorist because his theories are based on the rule of the father.

Filrner and Hobbes are both absolutists, believing the sovereign's power is

and should be unlimited. But FiIrner develops patriarchal theory while Hobbes is

a state of nature theorist. Both can be regarded as conservatives.

Baruch Benedict Spinoza (1632 - 1677) in his work, Theologico-PoI$irn!

Treatise? is in agreement with Hobbes that the political orders emerged out of the

pre-political "state of nature". There man had natural right to all things.

Spinoza also believed that men transferred their rights to the sovereign authority

when they instituted the political societies. The aim of political life is peace and

security.

But immediately aftm completing his discussion on the solution to the

problems of political authority, Spinoza proceeds to raise serious doubts regarding its adequacy. He observed that even with all the instruments of

coercions at their disposal, there is a limit to what rulers can demand of their

subjects without provoking a rebellion. The subjects continue to enjoy a latent

power to rebel, which cannot be taken from them. Hence, he averred that every

dominion depends on the faithfulness, virtue and steadfastness of its subjects.

He argued that sovereign power misused is self-destructive. The enlightened

sovereign authoriw will try to promote the interest of all his subjects so as to

unite them solidly and wholeheartedIy behind him. For Spinoza, this is the task

and toil of the Ieader, and the prize is a great one-the absolute authority of which

Hobbes spoke. But it can be gained and kept only by the sovereign's constant

and obvious devotion to the common welfare; and no formal contract on the part

of the subjects can possibly bestow it. It follows that in the mind of Spinoza, the

only satisfactory solution to the problem of political authority is a commpnwealth

that is formed by a free people and that continues to depend on its support.

In his book, Two Treatises of Government, John Locke (1632 - 1704) gave

u s a different picture of authority in society from the one we find in Hobbes.

Hobbes's sovereign authority was absolute, Locke agrees there must be a

"supreme power" but he carefully placed this in the hands of the legislative, for all intents the majority of the people. Locke stressed the importance of the

division of powers chiefly to ensure that those who execute or administer the law

do not also make them, for "they may exempt themselves from obedience to the

laws they make, and suit the law, both its making and execution, to their own

private advantages."8 The executive, that is the sovereign authority is therefore

under the law. Even the legislative is not absolute, although it is supreme, for

legislative power is held as a trust and is therefore only a fiduciary power.

Consequently "there remains in the people a supreme power to remove or alter

the legislative when they act contrary to the trust reposed in them."g

Locke unlike Robert Filmer, Hobbes and Machiavelli, limited the power of

the sovereign authority and placed the sovereignty in the hands of the citizens

thereby giving enough political freedom to the people. In John Locke's political

theory, government authority is answerable to the people, and by limiting

legislative power he has placed absolute sovereignty in the hands of the citizens.

For Locke, the people's liberiy should be protected and not encroached. Whereas,

Hobbes placed the sovcreign under God's judgements, Locke stated that "the

people shall judge7'.

Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712 - 1778) in his book, The Social Contract,

limited the authority of government as he places sovereignty in the hands of the

people. For him it is the exercise of the general will; "I say, that soyereignty, being nothing but the exercise of the general will, can never be alienated and that

the sovereign power, which is only a collective being, can be represented by itself

along". 10

He further maintained that the sovereignty, which is the general will

cannot be divided. To divide it is to reduce it to particular wills and thus no

sovereignty.

The essence of the sooial contract, says Rousseau, is that "each of u s puts

his person and all his power in common under the supreme direction of the

general will, and in our corporate capacity, we receive each members a s an

individual part of a whole."'l This contract tacitly assumes that whoever refuses

to obey the general will shall be compelled to do so by the whole body; in short,

this means that he will be "forced to be free".

The law is the product of the "general will". In turn, the general will is says

Rousseau, the will of the sovereign. For him, the sovereign consists of the total number of citizens of a given society. The general will of the sovereign is

therefore the single will which reflects the sum of the wills of the individual

citizens. I t follows, therefore, that the authority of the sovereign is the servant of

the people in accordance with the laws establishing it. It serves the common

interest or the people's common goocl. Rousseau's view is in contrast to Hobbes'

view, who put the supreme authority in the sovereign of the commonwealth.

The people form a commonwealth that is the supreme power in the society.

Rousseau by his insistence on liberty and desire to show that the change from

the state of nature to that of organized society was not a substitution of slavery

for freedom as Hobbes opined, felt himself compelled to show that in his society a

higher form of liberty is acquired than the one enjoyed in the state of nature.

Rousseau holds that man loses his naturaI liberty on entering civil society,

despite the fact that he was born free, he is now in chains. This contract is an

association where every member voluntarily pledges to place himself and his

possessions under the direction of a sovereign. The sovereign is the body politic.

I t is interpreted to mean that all members of the association constitute the

sovereign. Rousseau argued that the association is guided by the "General will"

which is the absolute norm of conduct for all members. He opined that authority

must be based on a will, which is essentially the wiIl of each of us, that is, the

general will. And he equally asserted that individual liberty is based on

conforming his will to the general will.

From the above, it is clear that Rousseau is of the opinion that both

authority and liberty do go together, and that ominicompetence for the state is

the only way to secure fulI and genuine freedom.

John Staurt Mill (1806 - 1873) in his work, On Liberty, thinks that state

authority should be markedly limited so as to leave as much room as possible for

individual liberty. He believes that there should be certainly some restrictions on

individuals to ensure a viable society. However, he conceives that such

restrictions must be properly limited to enable the individuals attain their

ultimate end. Mill had a deep dislike for totalitarians. When he sets forth the

limits beyond which the government must not go; Mill argued forcefully that a

man must not, except to prevent harm, be subject to the power and authority of

government, and especially his own good, either physical or moral, is not a

sufficient warrant.

Mill's argument for liberty was therefore, an argument for individualism.

Let each individual pursue his happiness in his own way. Even in the realm of

ideas, men must be free to express their thoughts and beliefs, because for Mill,

truth is most quickly discovered when opportunity is given to refute falsehoods.

Benito Mussolini (1883 - 1931) in his work, The Doctrine of Fascisnt, holds

that fascism is the best form of government. This is "the type of government

where the authority of the state is absolute."l2 It does not surrender any portion

of its field to other moral or religious principles, which may interfere with the

individual consciousness. For Mussolini, the state becomes a reality only in the

consciousness of individuals. The state was an idea made actual.

The type of liberty fascism grant is the Iiberty of a whole people freely

accepting the rule of a state, which they had internalized and made the guiding

principle of all their conduct. Mussolini holds that "action is more important

than thought". By action he meant violence. S o fascism was a movement, which

not only accepted violence but also rejoiced in violence. I t had no patience with

parliamentary or democratic methods of changing society.

In the quest for a strong state, Mussolini, advocated fascism, which is a government of state absolutism. And in this strong, vibrant state, where the

sovereign authority is in the hands of one man, the freedom of individuals is

seriously minimized.

H. L. A. Harts (1893 - 1941) in, The Concept of law, construed a leader or

an authority as 4 4 ~ n e ap'pointed and certified according to the rule of

recognition."l3 An authority commands obedience from others simply because the

rules say so. Such obedience owed to the leader is reasoned on the bases of the

fact that the rules recognized and regarded him as having authority.

He has a legal authority and this may be quite independent of the fact

whether or not he is a good person. His utterances present themselves as

authoritative legal reasons for action. So far as he rules according to the rules of

the system, he remains legally correct.

Certainly part of the expectations of citizens is that the leader appointed

under the conditions set by the rules directs accordingly. But who becomes the

ruler where there is no provision for saying who is the leader? Or who becomes

the ruler where rules are silent? This is the problem, which is not clarified by

Hart's model of rules. Whoever the law certifies, through the appropriate means

as legitimate leader, is the leader whether or not he is a good person. Thus in the

absence of stipulated rules by the system, the members of Hart's society will be

in a lot of confusion.

Hannah Arendt, (1906 - 1975) a United State's historian and political

philosopher shared the same view as Hart when she says that governmental

authority is very often authority under rules, to issue instructions to others. She distinguished this from power and particularly from despotic or tyrannical power.

The latter, she says, is subject to no limits, whereas true authority, because it is

always derived from rules, must therefore, be limited and restrained by rules.

This is dubious because the rules may confer as in the case of a sovereign

legislature, an unlimited power on the sovereign authority, even to change the

rules at will. From the above review of the literature of some political philosophers, we

can say that, although philosophers who have addressed the questions raised by

the concept "authority" approached the problems from various background, and

perspective, most political thinkers recognized that individual liberty conflicts

with the state authority and that a balance has to be struck between them and

the value they represent.

Clarification of Concepts It is important to be clear about the key concepts used in this work.

Hence, the following concepts would bc defined and explained for the sake of

clarification. Authority: The concept of authority is complex and difficult, but extremely

important because it cuts to the heart of all human social and political

arrangements. Authority is most often defined in terms of power, and specifically

in terms of having the power to control things or affects outcomes. This means

that authority is the entitlement or right to issue commands and have them

obeyed. D. D. Raphael shared this view when he assert that authority is "a right

to give orders and to have them obeyed, in virtue of an office held within a system

of deliberately framed rules setting out rights and duties."l4 It follows then that

authority is the right to exercise influence as supported by the rules and norms

which underline the social and political order. It is in this sense that authority is

used in this work.

Michaels in Encyclopedia of social sciences, in the same vain concisely

defined authority as "the capacity, innate, or acquired for exercising ascendancy

over a groups."ls He went further to say that power in authority is

institutionalized power.

To have the authority to do something is to have the right to do that thing.

Consequently for one to have a right to do something simply implies that he is

permitted to do it and that his proposed action is not forbidden by any law or

moral rules. This means that he has been licensed to carry out the action. He

has a right for the action.

Apart from having the right for action, he also have the right to receive

something. D. D. Raphael put this succinctly when he asserts that "the authority

to issue commands is not simply a right or permission to do something ..., it is

also a right against those to whom the command are addressed that they should

do what they are commanded to do."16 Therefore in official capacity, the right for

action is followed by the right of percipience, which is obedience. Notably,

wherever authority is effectively exercised, the person in authority possesses the

power or is able to make other people do as he requires. This is the exercise of

authority.

The sovereign authority have the authority to make certain requirements of

his subjects, and they do what he required because they acknowIedge his

authority. His authority and their acceptance of it are what give the power to

make them do what he requires.

However, authority is very different from mere power because authority is

something, which must be accepted voluntarily whereas power can exist without

consent. In other words power is the ability to have one's command carried out.

I t is the ability to impose one's will on another. It implies a capacity for force i.e.

violence while authority is the power to enforce laws, to exact obedience, to

command, to determine, or to judge.

Ata Igala: The Ata Igala is the traditional paramount king of the Igala kingdom.

'Ata' as the name implies, is the father or custodian of the Igala people's culture.

Idah: I s the cultural center or headquarter of the Igala kingdom. This is where

Ata resides and from here he cares for the entire kingdom.

Ojo k'dojale: I s God in heaven for the Igala people, the supreme deity or God.

Okwute: I s the staff of ancestral cult symbol. It is a symbol of authority.

Ata Ayegba Om'Idoko: It is strongly believed that Ayegba Om'Idoko'was the one

that actually won a "political " independence for the Igala kingdom. He is said to

have fought and defeated the Jukun in the war, which ensued in the late

seventeenth century. He could therefore be rightly referred to as the first

sovereign Ata-Igala. The contemporary ruling lineages begin their family tree from

Ayegba Oma-Idoko the founder of Ayegba dynasty.

NOTES

1 Samuel E Stumpf, Philosophy: History and Problems, (New York: McGraw-Hill Inc, 1983)p.70.

2 Plato, The Republic, ~rarislatecl by Benjamin Toweth, (New York: Airmount Publishing Company Inc, 1968), p. 2 19.

3 St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, American Edi t i~n in Three Vols., Trans by Fathers of the English Dominican Province, (New York: Benziger Brothers in, 1947), Vol. 1; p. 90.

4 St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, p. 90.

5 Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince, Translated with an Introduction by George Bull, (England: Penguin Books, 1995), p. 55.

6 John Pl,menatz, Man and Society-Political and Social Theories from Machiavlli to Marx Vol. 1, (London: Longrnan, 19921, p. 51.

8 Jean Bodin, The Republic, Translated by Knolls Richard, (London: Cambridge 1945), p. 140.

9 John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, A Critical Edition with an Introduction and Apparatus Criticus by Peter Laslett, (New York: Mentor Books 1962), p. 47.

10 John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, p. 47.

11. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract, (London: Penguin Classics, 1968), p. 400.

12 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract, p.400.

13 Sills David, ed., International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences, Vol. 3, (New York: Collier-Macmillan Publishers, l972), p. 55 1.

1.1 Webbert L. A. Hart, The, Concept of Law, Great Britain: (Oxford University Press, 1961), p. 90.

15 D. D. Raphael, The Problems of Political Philosophy, (London: The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1979), 6p. 8.

16 Sills David, ed., International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences, Vol. 3, (New York: Collier-Macmillan Publishers, 1972), p. 474.

17 D. D. Raphael, The Problems of Political Philosophy, p. 69.

CHAPTER THREE

AUTHORITY IN THOMAS HOBBES

For Thomas Hobbes (1.588 - 1679) in his masterpiece, The Leviathan, when

a commonwealth is instituted by the common consent of the people, certain

fundamental rules become obvious from the way it is instituted. The prinkiple of

authority and authorization is derived from this common consent and actions.

Authority, for Hobbes, "is right of doing of action through the commission

of another."l It means a type of delcgation of power which hitherto was exercised

by the author himself. The receiver of the authority is a representative of the

authorizer. 'He acts as such. Whatever he does with the authority is the

responsibility of the authors. For Hobbes authority is the responsibility of the

authors. The authority is established through a speech-act and is impossible

without it. Hobbes holds that the authority of the sovereign must absolute.

Hobbes's Concept of Human Nature

Hobbes' concept 'of human nature is fundamental to his conception of

absolute authority. Man for him is the matter as well as the artificer of that

artificial man, the state.

Applying Galileo's new principles of physics, that "everything which exists

consists of particles moving in accordance with deterministic mechanical law"2,

Hobbes conceives that man is a kind of machine whose operations are

determined. A s opposed to the theological view of man held by Aristotle and

Aquinas, Hobbes believes that man has a multiplicity of ends and goals, which

are determined by the motions of the will, appetite, and aversion.

I-Iobbes holds that appetite and aversion are the components of men's

"concupicible" nature, which makes each of u s seek his own good, his own self-

interest and his own self-preservation, in whatever he does. Man's appetite and

desires are directed towards his survival and well being, while man's aversion

drives him away from harmful, dangerous and dreadful things. Good and evil for

Hobbes are terms we apply to things and actions, which correspond to our

appetites and aversion. "But whatsoever is the object of any man's appetite or

desire. he cdleth good and the object of his hate and aversion evil"< Hobbes

averred that these words "are ever used with relation to the person that used

them"4. Thus the rule for distinguishing good and evil depends on the individual

that is on his "voluntary motion", if we consider man as h- ;- ~ n + - n +L

commonwealth or state. But in the commonwealth, howeve:

represents it; that is the sovereign authority, who determi

what is evil.

1 1 ~ 1 0 apax L L I V L L I L L I L

r, it is the person who

nes what is good and

However, Hobbes maintains that man is naturally ail egoist and a

hedonist, and that in pursuit of egoistic satisfi~tion; men perpetually and

restlessly seek for power after power until death. The struggles for powers among

men generate contention, enmity, violence and war, because the way of one

competitor to the Attaining of his desire is to kill, subdue, supplant, or repel the

other. Hobbes also holds that man is by nature rational but that his reason is

just instrumental to the gratification of selfish aggrandizement, without continual

individual competition and conflict.

However, human nature, so conceived, refers in particular to man in the

state of nature, before the institution of proper speech and a. stable political

order. Once established, the artificially created institutions modify in a sense, ,

those natural characteristics of mcm; without however, comp1t:tely eliminating

them.

State of Nature Hobbes's state of nature is not a historic feature but a hypothetical

condition. It contains a number of generalization about the condition of life where

there is no authority to enforce law and order.

For Hobbes, nature is a field of action for all beings. Everyone has a right

to everything. This is right of nature, hence, "migh.1 is right." But it is subjective

right made objective by force and hence open to ckallenge by another subjective

right. In the absence of any agreed standard or form of resolving such conflicts of

subjective claims, no one can be sure of anything; it is totally a situation of

chaos.

This hypothetical state is, therefore, one of absolute freedom, yet it is

freedom of all against all. And as it turns to be, tt is freedom of none against

none, except he who has the might and advantage at each moment. Hobbes in a

famous sentence, paints the picture graphically as follows "in such a condition

there is no place for industry; because the fruit thereof is uncertain, and

consequently no culture of'earth ... no knowledge of the face of the earth, no

account of time; no arts, no letters; no society; and which is worst of all,

continual fear, and danger of violent death; and the life of man Is solitary, poor,

nasty, brutish and shortas.

In general, there is some kind of equality in the state of nature, even if it

means equal vulnerability. On the whole, the conjunction of all these, gives a b

picture of condition of "war of all against all" 6 .

The Social Contract Theory

According to Hobbes, the contract by which men avoid the state of nature

and enter civil society is a n agreement between irtdividuals. At a when it dawn on men their predicament in the state of nature, men recognised that a

constituted authority to regulate and enforce restraint on their activities is

inevitable to avoid the state of war. The agreement results in the social contract

in which each man relinquishes his autonomy "as if every man should say to

every man I authorize and give u p my right of governing myself, to the man or to

the assembly of men, on this condition, that thou give u p thy right to him, and authorize all his actions in like manners" 7.

The absolute authority is a product of a social contract - a contract of every

man with every man and the renouncing of all their previous rights, wills and

judgement and the transferring of the same to a sovereign. Such a sovereign

bears, in his person, the unity of their persons. The covenant is thus a union of

their wills. This done, the multitude so united in one person, is,called a

commonwealth. This is the "generation of the great Leviathan ... to which we owe

our peace and defence."

With the institution of the commonwealth, a new set of significations and

meanings begins to emerge. Law, obligation, morality etc. emerge as new

phenomena, first secured through the formal stipulations for the instituted

political order, and then as new realities of political life.

The Basis of Absolute sov&eign Authority in Hobbes

The choice of an absolute sovereign aut-hority as the best form of

government by Hobbes follows from his conception of human nature, his theory

of the state of nature and the social contract. Hobbes holds that the only form of

government that can effectively sustain the social contract and create the

enabling environment for rational obedience of the laws of nature is-absolute

sovereignty, one with unlimited, indivisible power and authority that can provide

permanent peace and security. The sovereign, says Hobbes, " is the absolute

representative of all the subjects and therefore, no other can be representative of

any part of them, but so far forth as he shall give leave" 9.

Limits of Political Obligation Although Hobbes offered some mild pragmatic grounds for preferring

monarchy to other forms of government, his mam concern was to argue that

effective government - whatever its form must have absolute authority. Its powers

must be neither divided nor limited. The powers of legislation, adjudication,

enforcement, taxation, war-making etc. are connected in such a way that a loss

of one may thwarts effective exercise of the rest. Only a government that

possesses all of what Hobbes termed the "essential rights of sovereignty" can be

effective, since where partial sets of these rights are held by different bodies, that

disagree in their judgements as to what is to be done, paralysis of effective

government or degeneration into a civil war to settle their dispute, may occur.

Similarly, to impose limitations on the authority of the government opined

Hobbes, is to invite irresoluble disputes over whether it has overstepped those

limits. TO refer resolutions of the question of whether government oversteps its

limits, to some further authority, itself also limited and so open to challenge for

overstepping its bounds, would be to initiate a n infinite regress of non- authoritative 'authorities" where the bulk never stop. To avoid the horrible

prospect of governmental collapse and return to the state of nature, people

should treat their sovereign as having absolute authority. - Hobbes does not encourage civil disobedience against the sovereign

authority on whatever ground. He however, ironically maintains that one is

justified to disobey a sovereign authority, if its laws threaten ones existence

because self-preservation is the basis of all laws of nature. Hobbes maintains

that the sovereign must be inviolate even when tyrannical or iniquitous, because

justice means whatever the sovereign's law prescribes and they are not laws

properly so called until therk is a sovereign to enforce them. He has the duty of

maintaining peace and security and is answerable only to God.

NOTES

1 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, in Molesworth, English Works of Hobbes 17.

2 W. T. Jones, Masters of Political Thought. Vol. 11, p.88.

3 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, in Molesworth, English Works of Hobbes 11, p.44.

4 T. U. Nwala, The Structure of th.e Political Philosophy of Thomas Hobbes, Unpublished PhD Thesis, P. 134.

&

5 Thomas Hobbes. Leviathan, E. W. Chap.17

6 T. U. Nwala, The Structure of the Political Philosophy of Thomas Hobbes, Unpublished PhD Thesis, P. 136.

7 Thomas Hobbes. Leviathan, E. W. Chap. 17

8 Thomas Hobbes. Leviathan. Edited with an Introduction by C. B. Macpherson, (Great Britain: BPCC Hazel1 Books, 1985), p. 183.

9 Thomas Hobbes. Leviathan, p. 43.

, CHAPTER FOUR

AUTHORITY IN IGALA POLITICAL THOUGHT

The Political and Social Structure of Igala Kingom The traditional Igala political structure is built on lineage descent and

patrilineal kinship. The units recognized for political purposes are the family, the

extended family, the clan, the village and the town or village group. Ultimately,

all trace their origin to a common ancestor, but by a process of continuous

fission and expansion, the Igala people have spread into semi-autonomous units,

which maintain links of history and interests as their strongest bonds, and

solidarity is preserved at the centre.

The component units are not kept together by force of arms or physical

coercion, but by a rather mythical and forceful pull of shared beliefs, customs

and socio-political functi0n.s. The isolated individual is an anomaly in the

community, because, individual life has a meaning if it lived in society segmented

in kinship units. Fortes and Evans Pritchard rightly commented on the

important and pervading role of kinship when they said that "there is no political

structure as distinct from the kinship structure; that is, there exists no system of

institutions, that serve explicitly and exclusively the purpose of maintaining the

unit as a whol&.'l

The traditional Igala society exercises a lot of internal control. The entire

kingdom is arranged in Units and held together on hierarchy. According to

Francis Odiniya, "matters were routed through the nuclear family head to the

extended family head and from him to the Achokolobia in charge of a

harnlet/village and finally to the Onu" 2, who is the head of the village or village

group. Hence, the family head, the extended family head, the clan head, the

village head, the elders and title men constituted the authority and they were

never violated by their subjects.

The Central and Supreme Authority in the Igala Kingdom The traditional Igala society has a strong centralized political organization

based on kingship system. The system is as old as the kingdom itself. The Igala

evolved a single state, that is, an all-embracing government with the Ata Igala as

the supreme authority. Idah is the traditional, political and cultural headquater

of the kingdom. Ata Igala did not only rule at Idah communities, his influence

was felt in all parts of the Igala land.

The Igda state has a systematic and hierarchical government. It has three

divisions of government: the village, the district and the central government. The

Ata Igala is in charge of the central administration. The district or provincial

administration was introduced by Ata Ayegba Om' Idoko, the founder of the

present ruling dynasty when he was reorganizing his state politically after his

success in the Jukun-Igala war. The village heads relay situation reports in their

villages to the district head;, who in turn, relay the reports in their districts to

the Ata who has the supreme authority in the land. The Ata is the supreme

authority of the Igala state because of his ontological rank in the Igala society. He

is the link between the ancestors (Abegwu) and the living. He is the father, the king of all Igala people.

Chieftaincy Institution in Igala Land The Igda operates a monarchical and hierarchical form of government. The

kingdom has a paramount ruler known as the Ata (father) Igala. He has a semi- independent chief in the position of prime minister (Achadu) who presides over

the selection of candidates for the throne of the Ata. These apart, there are other chiefs (Am'ajofe) who are of the different grades and ranks, with their different

functions in their chiefdoms accordingly.

The traditional hierar'chy of chiefs in Igala political system is pyramidal

with the Ata Igala a t the Apex. Next in this conical gradation are the Achadu and the royal councilors, who have powers but whose powers are less than the Ata's.

Next are the ancient district heads, then the village heads, and last in the line

were the clan or hamlet heads.

Ataship: Sources and Legitimacy of Authority The Igala monarchy is centred on the person and office of the Ata Igala,

who is regarded and treated as the father of all Igala people. The Ata is generally

perceived by the Igala as the spokesman of the people, the most influential figure

in the land, the chief decision maker and the highest supreme authority in the

Igala kingdorn.3 The Ata is a t the centre of the social and the political life of the

peopIe. He is the point around which all the activities gravitated and from which

policies constitutionally and legitimately emanate. He is the chief priest, the

custodian of tradition and customs of the people. He is of course the head of

government and administration. The Ata is not merely exalted to his enviable

position by virtue of old age. But because of his ontological status and rank in

the Igala society. He is nearest to the ancestors of the Igala people, and from here

he derives his authority and legitimacy. Hence, he is the living intermediary

between the ancestors and the living.

The circumstance in which the Ata emerges in the community is also very

important in talking about the legitimacy of his authority. He comes to the throne

in a clearly defined manner. He rules his people according to sacred traditions,

customs and conventions. His person is equally sacred and his death is an event,

which marks the end of an epoch and the beginning of another 4. The unity and

solidarity of his kingdom depend heavily on the type of popular consensus with

which his installation, coronation, inception of office and exercise of power are

accepted.

In Igala land, the Ata is recruited by means of succession through rotation

among the quadrilinear dynasty in the kingdom 5. Every dynasty has a senior

who represents it in the Ata's cabinet and oversees its welfare. He is usually the

candidate for the Ataship. Since there cannot be more than one such figure in

any linage, rotation does not create many problems. A s soon as the ruling Ata dies or joins the ancestors, the eldest male of the next royal family succeeds him.

He must be of age, that is, he must come to a mature age. Personal responsibility

comprises honesty, integrity, a correct sense of values, patience, basic knowledge

of tradition and customs, gravity in bearing and general probity of characters.

The mode of recruitment of the Ata Igala gives the candidate an unassailable power base as a starting point. His seat is removed from public

contest. His person a t once stands on a removed but high pedestal above those

with whom he is going to work. Therefore to a good extent, the configuration of

the political system under him will depend on how he sees himself, views the

community, understands hi's power, and elects to exercise it. The Ata Igala is,

however, conscious of certain constraints. The Ata Igala is seen more as a ruler of

a people rather than a monarch over a territory. His territory derives its meaning

ultimately from those who inhabit it. He personifies those values, which the

community holds so dear and essential to its meaningful existence. If those

values were fatally compromised or trampled upon, the Ata would lose his grip

over his subjects.

In a monarchy, it is only when the king is controlled in the decisive areas

of governmental power and is sufficiently insulated from active politics that

power is distributed and convincingly spread out. It is left to facts to

demonstrate, how the Ata Igala can in spite of his origin, be a monarch but in

fact, an acceptable ruler and not a figure head. He is a product of the system,

which is shaped from its basic units to accommodate a king. Having now

emerged, how does the A t a Igala exercise his authority?

The Ata and the Exercise of Authority The Ata is a ruler but he is by no means an absolute ruler, uninhibited or

insensitive to the feelings of those around him. The Ata is then not a despot. He

is a constitutional ruler who operates with an unwritten but established

constitution founded on traditions and customs, which are older than him and

will outlive him. For the Igala, anything that had existed from the past is highly

esteemed because, they believe it came from the lived experience of the ancestors,

that is from the ancestral "pool" thus "knowledge/wisdom (Uma) and truth

(Ogecha)" as J. Boston would suggest "are radiated with reference to the past

(Igbele)"6. Hence, the Ata is bound under oath to adhere to the stipulations of

that constitution.

In the exercise of his authority, the Ata is far from thundering decisions

arbitrarily; he is a co-ordinator and chairman at meetings where decisions were

taken. At times, the Ata have to defend himself before his council for permitting

some actions to be undertaken in the community. At times like this, he has to be

persuasive rather than commanding his people to co-operate. He tries to

persuade and convince his people. The point here is that, the Ata has control

over a population that is politically alert and participatory. And more so because,

the Ata is conscious of the fact that, for the Igala, "the sovereign authority owns

the subjects as the subjects own the sovereign". This implies that without the

subjects, the A t a is nothing and without the Ata the subjects are lifeless.

Also, the Ata is not above the law but he presides over the legislature and

the court. In other words, he is not above the land or the ancestor. There are

time-honoured customs and traditions of the land which he must keep, and

which at m y rate he has sworn to uphold a t his installation. He is expected also

to maintain some probity of character worthy of his sacred office. He becomes

irregular if he desecrates the institution of kingship or the throne. He is bound

to make reparation a t once so as to remain regular.

Finally, I will say that the Ata Igala is in the centre of a web of

relationships. For legitimacy, he hangs on established institutions that he

represents namely: the Deity, Ancestor's approval. He is also flanked or aided by

his chiefs and he is further rooted in kinship. Hence for the Igala people, the

legitimacy of the authority of the Ata Igala and Igala traditional rulers depend on

the patriarchal theory, Ancestor approval, customs and traditions and the

consent of the people.

NOTES

1. Placide Tempels, Bantu Philosophy, (Paris: Presence Africanine 1969), p.4

2 . Egbeke Aja, Metaphysics: An Introduction, (Enugu: Donze Press 2004), p. 52

3. Ameh Atabo, Respondent and a royal councilor during the reign of Ata Ameh Oboni, the immediate past Ata Igala.

4. Arneh Atabo, Respondent

5. Ameh Atabo, Respondent

6. John S. Boston, The Igala Kingdom. (Ibadan: Oxford University Press. 1968), Pa 6

7. Fidelis E. Egbunu, Chieftaincy Titles Among Igala, (Enugu: Snaap Press Ltd, 2001), p.69.

CHAPTER FIVE

COMPARISON OF AUTHORITY IN HOBBES AND IGALA POLITICAL THOUGHT

Hobbes' Theory on the Origin of State and Origin o f Igala Kingdom Hobbes developed his theory on origin of the state from his hypdthetical

analysis of social contract, men in the state of nature made. In Hobbes' view, the

state of nature is a state of lawlessness marked by contest over supremacy

among men who are self - interested beings or ego - driven beings. To redress

this anomaly, according to Hobbes, men decided to contract among themselves

under a sovereign, for peace and security. This entails, emergence of civil society

that is controlled or ruled by a sovereign whose authority is absolute, undivided

and unlimited.

However, relating Hobbes' theory on origin of state or civil society to the

origin of Igala Kingdom, one would readily agree that Hobbes' view does not hold

either in theory or in practice. This is on the ground that there is a general belief

that Igala Kingdom was founded by one person or that the people "descended

from the same ancestor"1, as the source of their origin. Although thire is no

historical record or evidence to prove this, but this idea came about as a result of

the people sharing the same natural environment, closeness to their families and

blood relations, which are reflected in their philosophical, political and religious

ideas and organizations. This underscores the fact that it is not possible to find a

common source from, which the Igala people originate. There is the possibility of

people coming from elsewhere and settling in Igala land and through the process

of acculturation, in due couise, become assimilated into the broad family.

The vital point here is that Igala Kingdom is not viewed or seen as a mass

of individuals each with his own right and liberties and all held together

contractually to form the Igala Kingdom or state, as Hobbes opined in his theory

of state. Rather, Igala Kingdom is an African society held together by both

biological bond of kinship and blood relationship and the immanent spirit of the

kingdom. The Igala political community, like other African community, is

therefore a "spiritual commonwealth" involving union of the living blood relations

and the dead and the gods of the community.

Although, there is that possibility of gradual concession on the part of the

forbears of Igala kingdom in accepting one person as their ruler, based on his

charismatic prowess as noted by Marx Weber, which is evident in his incredible

exploits in warfare and organizational ability. Thus, marking the establishment

or emergence of Igala kingdom or state. The reason for the Igala people coming together to form a visible and powerful kingdom was to pursue their common

interest, and to ward off aggressors or invaders from attacking them. This is in

consonance with what Rousseau said; "as men cannot create any new forces, but

only combine and direct those that exist, they have no other means of self -

preservation than to form by aggregation" 2.

It is based on this ground that the people did not hesitate in accepting the

authority of a group of persons headed by one person who has distinguished

himself in championing the course of the Igala people. This is obvious in the

establishment of the Ayegba omldoko dynasty owing to his success in the

Jukun-Igala war.

Legitimacy of Authority in Hobbes and Igala Kingdom The Igala state was not created or held together by force but grew out of the

family and held together by kinship bond. The Igala people did not use covenant

or contract to explain what are the functions of government or what makes it

legitimate. For the Igala, a government is legitimate if it is enthroned through the

defined manner. That is if it is in consonance with the established ontological

order of IgaIa ontology. And also, if the ruler rules the people according to scared

traditions, customs, and conventions and for the good of its subjects.

Unlike Hobbes, there is no evidence that the Igala believe that anyone

strong enough to get obedience is for that reason alone entitled to it. But they do

believe that enduring power is probably being exercised for the benefit of the

persons subject to it. Hence, power used capriciously is unlikely to endure

because the people will not long submit to it. Thus, for the Igala, if a ruler has

enduring power, he has a good title to it because he uses it for the common good

and according to traditions. He follows customs, which has become what it is

because it has been found useful. The Igala venerates whatever in the society is

long established and regular in operation, because they believe that it conforms

to men's more permanent needs as determined by their nature, and therefore

also with the will of God (and ancestors) who created that nature. Therefore

whatever is long acceptable fo them is very probable, for their good.

For the Igala people, true wisdom is to study facts objectively and in their

wholeness; to determine their order, which conforms to the general good and to

follow that order in one's theorem and actions. Like Plato, the Igala believe that

lasting authority and wisdom are closely allied, not because those who have

authority are necessarily wise, but because their authority is exercised in

traditional ways, adapted to human nature and to the popular circumstances of

those subject of them.

Finally, we can say that, for the Igala people, authority in the land is

legitimate if it comes to power through the defined manner and is in tune with

the established harmony, that is, Igala ontology which is based on the ontological

hierarchy of forces or the established order of nature.

Hobbes' Absolute Sovereignty in Relation to the Political Structure in Igala Kingdom

Owing to Hobbes' disenchantment with decentralization of power yrith its

attendent dissension capable of ravaging societal bond, and consequently

degeneration of man into th6 state of fear and war, endorsed absolute sovereignty

to guarantee security of lives and properties of the people. It is on this note that

he argued that "the entity so created is the commonwealth and the multitude so

united in one person is the LeviathanJJ 3. This implies that the power of the

sovereign is vast and enormous. Such great power for Hobbes is necessary to

defend men against each other and also against foreign attack. The reason for

this as had already been noted is to avoid the horrible prospect of governmental

collapse and return to the state of nature.

Hence, Hobbes' political theory supports fusion of power in one person

called sovereign. The reason for this according to Hobbes is that sovereignty

cannot be effective where different bodies hold powers a s currently practiced in

democracy.

A closer examination of Hobbes' concept of absolute sovereignty shows that

it has semblance with the political structure in Igala kingdom. But the major

difference is that in traditional Igala community, there are several rulers. Unlike

Hobbes absolute monarchy, there is partial decentralization of power in Igala

Kingdom. The political structure is pyramidal with the Ata Igala at the apex,

followed by the Achadu - the prime minister, district heads and village heads.

This entails that power is not all that configurated on Ata but he is the final

arbiter in any matter as the rest pay allegiance to him as their sovereign head. A s

a matter of fact, the system can be described as monarchical in so far as one of

the rulers - the Ata Igala - is the supreme authority and in control of coercive

sanctions. However, the Hobbesian idea of absolute monarchy does not apply

here. According to Hobbes, a monarch single handedly is in control and has

absolute power in the sovereign. In Igala political system, the chiefs, elders or the

king is not single handedly' in control of everything. He cannot be said to be

independent from the community he derives his authority (that is the living and

the dead), inversely he strengthens his community ontologically.

However, the Ata's power is great or even absolute because of his position

in the ontological hierarchy of forces. The three branches of power - legislative,

judiciary and the executive are held as a unit by the chief or Ata Igala though in

concert with his community. We can argue that this type of political system is as

a result of something more fundamental. The Africans see political from a philosophical point of view, hence we hold that, the ultimate fundamentals of all political authority is ontological. The chief or Ata Igala is an indispensable intermediary between the living and the dead members of his community. He is

seen as a channel for the flow of vital force. This is in consonant with Temples'

view that, "the social order may be founded only on the ontological order, and a

political set-up which conflicted with this principle could never be received as

consonant with the Bantu (Africa) mind "4. This explains why Africans and Igala

people in particuIar resist any attempt to impose an incompetent and/or foreign

leader on them, nothing works under such a leader.

Hobbes on Monarchy by Inheritance and Chieftaincy Institution In Igala Land

Although Hobbes was not explicit or categorical on whether monarch should be by inheritance, that is, the throne becomes the patrimony of one royal family, a close examination of his political theory seems to suggest that it should be hereditary. This can be proved following the fact that Hobbes wrote his treatise as a support for monarchical system of government as practiced then in England. We know that monarch in Great Britain in hereditary, and this underscores this very assumption, that Hobbes supported monarch by inheritance.

Whatever the case m9y be a comparative study of Hobbes monarchical government, which has its root in Filmer's idea of partrichal government, and monarch in Igala kingdom, one will see that there are areas of convergence and divergence on this issue of monarch by inheritance. In the case of Hobbes monarchy as practiced in Great Britain, it is in lineal dynasty, that is, members from a particular royal family succeeds themselves to the throne. But in Igala kingdom, it is quardrilineal. That is ascendancy to the throne rotates among the four royal dynasties in Igala kingdom. In Igala kingdom, kingship i< kept by succession as against election. The succession practice is by male primogeniture, rotated among the four ruling houses.

In all, whether it is lineal as in Hobbes or Great Britain or quardrilineal as

in Igala kingdom, the obvious fact is that any body that is not in the royal

families cannot ascend to the throne.

Concluding Remark In the traditional Igala political system, we saw the form of government,

which is both monarchical and democratic in character. Our analysis has

revealed extensive participation at the different levels of community government

in Igala land. Participation is, to all intents and purpose, democratic with

individuals featuring in the councils of the lower segments and group leaders .

participating articulately on the higher levels of government. In every case

decision is reached by the typically Igala form of consensus with the head of the

group announcing the decision as if it were his own. The democratic trait is also

manifested in the highest in3titution of government, which is in the Ata's council.

In addition, the voice of the people is given more vents in the council of chiefs at

every level. All these show that authority in traditional Igala political society is

not absolute but limited and restricted. Thus in Igala community, political power

resides manifestly in the hierarchical institutions, but the power base is firmly

with the people. It is a curious arrangement, which makes for a harmony of

democracy and monarchy. This is made possible because of the view of life.

On the other hand, Hobbes's absolute theory as has been stressed, was

influenced by historical factors, especially the deterioration of the monarchical

power and the growing instability of the England state of his time. In providing

what he considered the correct ideas to eliminate divided loyalty as well as

ideological disputes, in order to avoid the emergency of any power that can veto

whoever has the highest authority of the state, Hobbes put great constraint on

private conscience and freedom of action of individuals.

What Hobbes provides as a recipe for political stability is presented

to us as a fiat. But social and political problems cannot be dealt with in a

kind of mathematical formula for a reference point. The construction of

society must make for the possibility of generating the structures and

institutions of society through a continuous process of human action and

speech, the bedrock of liberal and democratic culture. Hobbes fails to

recognize that the perfection of man and society is historical development.

NOTES 1. The Oxford, Afn'can Encyclopedia, (London: University press, 1974),

p.209.

2. Calpadia and Navia (ed), Journey Through Philosophy, (New York: Prometheous Books, 1971) p.398.

3. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, (Great Britain: BPCC Hazel1 Books, (967), P. 181.

4- Placide Temples, Bantu Philosophy, (Paris: Presence Africaine, l967), P. 6.

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