C. B. Macpherson's Conceptual Apparatus

Société québécoise de science politique

C. B. Macpherson's Conceptual ApparatusAuthor(s): Bernard WardSource: Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue canadienne de science politique, Vol. 4,No. 4 (Dec., 1971), pp. 526-540Published by: Canadian Political Science Association and the Société québécoise de science politiqueStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3235537 .

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C. B. Macpherson's Conceptual Apparatus*

BERNARD WAND Carleton University

Although C. B. Macpherson's interpretation of English political theory as vari- ations on the theme of possessive individualism' has been severely and decisively criticized,2 the conceptual apparatus he employs both in his historical and analy- tical work has scarcely received the same attention." Yet it is important that it should, since he has not only remained almost totally immune to the historical criticisms made of him but has pursued his own theme as if failure to grasp it were due to intellectual confusion on the part of others.4

In reading Macpherson one cannot but be impressed by the elegance of his style and the forcefulness of his language. However, the underlying thought is often confused and misleading. Sometimes, as in his consideration of the relation between facts and values, and in his use of the concept of essence, he blurs distinctions which must be made; at other times, as in his analysis of the concept of powers, he distinguishes that which ought not to be distinguished. In either case, the result is intellectual muddle. Moreover, it is not merely that he fails to be clear and precise: the failure leads him to substitute gratuitous rhetoric for genuine moral appraisal and to offer simplistic solutions to perplexing social and political problems. These are grave charges, but that they can be substantiated can be shown by an examination of his treatment of three fundamental concepts which appear persistently in his writings: (i) his use of the concept of deduction in deriving values from facts; (ii) his use of the concept of essence; and (iii) his analysis of the concept of powers. Furthermore, these concepts are intercon- nected, in that in showing how obligation or right can be deduced from certain postulates about human nature Macpherson formulates these postulates in terms of the concept of the essence of human nature and views that essence in terms of distinctively human powers.

Since Macpherson's views are to be found not only in his own contributions to political theory but also in his treatment of previous political philosophers,

*I wish to thank Professor John Leyden for helping me clear up some confusions in thought and expression. Any which remain are solely mine. 1C. B. Macpherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism (1962; reprinted, Ox- ford, 1964). 2See esp. Alan Ryan, "Locke and the Dictatorship of the Bourgeoisie," Political Studies 13 (1965), 219-30; Sir Isaiah Berlin, "Hobbes, Locke and Professor Macpherson," The Polit- ical Quarterly 35 (1964), 464-8; Martin Seliger, The Liberal Politics of John Locke (New York and Washington, 1969). 3But cf. John W. Chapman, "Natural Rights and Justice in Liberalism," in D. D. Raphael, ed., Political Theory and the Rights of Man (London, 1967), 27-42. 4Cf. J. E. Broadbent, "The Importance of Class in the Political Theory of John Stuart Mill," this JOURNAL I, no 3 (1968), 287.

Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue canadienne de science politique, IV, no 4 (December/d6cembre 1971). Printed in Canada/Imprim6 au Canada.



L'appareil conceptuel de C. B. Macpherson

Dans l'exposd de sa philosophie politique et dans ses critiques de celles des autres, C. B. Macpherson utilise le concept de < diduction > pour ddsigner l'6laboration du rapport faits-valeur, celui d'< essence > pour decrire les faits relatifs a la nature humaine et celui de < capacites normatives > par opposition a << capacitis descriptives > comme

caractdrisant les divers ideaux des hommes. Cependant sa terminologie est obscure et prete a confusion. Dans son traitement de

la relation qui existe entre faits et valeur, il ne parvient ni a bien saisir ce qui les distingue dans leur origine ni a bien voir la nature de leur rapport. Son utilisation du concept d'essence est systematiquement ambigiie du fait qu'il s'en sert tantOt pour etablir les conditions empiriques requises pour rdaliser un etat souhaitable, tantot pour pretendre a des jugements de rdalite sur les motivations humaines et postuler une base morale soit aux finalites de l'activit6 humaine soit aux facultis individuelles, tant6t pour formuler une dffinition de l'Homme dont le contenu se veut rdel et non simple- ment nominaliste. Son analyse du concept de capacitis, en tant que descriptives et normatives tout a la fois, oublie que ce concept est neutre tant du point de vue de son detenteur que de celui de l'usage qu'il en fait.

Pis que de brouiller l'acception de ces concepts, Macpherson, par manque de clartd et de precision a cet 6gard, est conduit de la sorte d substituer un beau raisonnement a un viritable jugement moral et c suggirer des solutions simplistes a des problemes sociaux et politiques embarrassants.

particularly Hobbes and Locke, it becomes necessary to examine the latter. However, in so doing, still another exegesis of classical political theory must be avoided. In this context, it is an analysis of his use of these particular concepts in his explication of their political theory which is crucial and not the plausi- bility of his interpretations.

I. The deduction of values from facts

In Macpherson's view, one of the proper tasks of political theory is "to deduce the desirable or right kind and degree of political obligation from the nature of man."5 Indeed, the great and original achievement of Hobbes lies in his "deriv-

ing right and obligation from the fact."6 Prior to Hobbes, those political philosophers who tried to derive values from facts could do so only through "bringing in an extraneous postulate" - one which referred "to the purpose or will of Nature or God."7 Since this additional postulate was required, they cannot be said to have made the deduction although they had no doubt that it could be made. Now Macpherson too believes that the deduction can be made without an additional postulate, provided that one pays attention to the appropriate facts.8

Before examining Macpherson's treatment of this issue it is important to grasp the modernity of the problem - to see how, with the collapse of the medieval world, it became a pressing concern for modern moral and political philosophers. If men have a vision of a divinely ruled cosmic order, including both the

5C. B. Macpherson, "The Deceptive Task of Political Theory," The Cambridge Journal 7 (1954), 563. 6Macpherson, Possessive Individualism, 76. 7Tbid., 82. 8lbid., 83.



528 BERNARD WAND

natural and social order, in which each kind of being has an assigned function and place, then the problem of deriving values from facts simply cannot arise. For the facts themselves are part of a normative order. This is as true of missiles as it is of persons. Given such a vision the problem is rather to discover the hierarchial structure of the order.

Once this vision of a universal order collapses, then the facts become denuded of their normative status and are accepted simply as given, as brute. In the sphere of the social world, the problem is one of creating an acceptable social order, of inventing rules which men will be willing enough to adopt and abide by. In so doing they must provide reasons for these rules and included among these will be certain presumed facts about human nature.

To state the nature of the problem in terms of deducing right and obligation or value is to put it awkwardly. Since Macpherson himself occasionally puts it in terms of a relation between propositions,9 and since the conventional usage of the concept of deduction applies to a relation between propositions, this usage normally will be followed. The problem now can be more accurately stated: it is one of showing how a conclusion which expresses an evaluation is to be deduced from premises which describe the facts of human nature.

Macpherson himself is uncertain both as to the status of the propositions, and of the nature of the inference, which constitute the argument. It is, of course, true that the nature of descriptive and evaluative language, and the relationship between descriptive and evaluative sentences, is a subject of much debate. How- ever, on one point there is fundamental agreement: if the conclusion of the

argument were a sentence of the same type as its premises, there would be no

point in attempting to show how value is derived from fact. Macpherson cer-

tainly recognizes that the distinction is genuine,10 but he also holds that postulates about human nature are both factual and evaluative" and that, indeed, a

postulate of fact may "contain" one of value.12 If the latter two were indeed the case, then the problem of derivation would be spurious, and the deduction would be necessarily analytic and non-informative.

Although Macpherson may recognize that "on the model of formal calculi, moral utterances cannot be entailed in [sic] factual statements"'3 he continually uses the language of deduction. Indeed, in discussing Locke's political theory he holds that Locke's assumptions both "led logically" and "made possible, indeed almost guaranteed" differential rights.'4 There is an obvious gap between

assumptions leading logically to a conclusion and merely making it possible, and it is this gap which must closed. In short, what Macpherson is required to

91bid., 263. lOlbid., 81-2. 11C. B. Macpherson, "Democratic Theory: Ontology and Technology," in David Spitz, ed., Political Theory and Social Change (New York, 1967), 218-19. 12Macpherson, Possessive Individualism, 76. 131bid., 82. One is forced to wonder about the point of Macpherson's reference to "formal calculi." For (a) an actual argument is involved; (b) it is a case of independently recognizing the distinction between moral utterances and factual statements; and (c) the calculus of propositions can be viewed as composed of laws of logic which may function as rules of inference governing particular arguments. It may be that he is cryptically saying that this particular rule of derivation cannot be found in such a calculus. 14C. B. Macpherson, "The Social Bearing of Locke's Political Theory," reprinted in C. B. Martin and D. M. Armstrong, eds., Locke (London, n.d.), 263.



C. B. Macpherson's Conceptual Apparatus 529

do is to show how the deduction, admittedly not one of strict entailment, from

description to evaluation is to be made.

Macpherson is aware of the tenet of most contemporary philosophers that there is no distinctive type of inference which permits such a deduction. None- theless, he contends that it is unwarranted. For the question is: whose logic is to be accepted?

If we choose as as example of this type of argument an historical figure, such as Hobbes, we must, according to Macpherson note that "he may not have had the same notion of logic that we have"'5 and that consequently we should not

impose on "Hobbes logical canons which are post-Hobbesian."'6 The logical canon which we should not impose on him is precisely the point at issue, that

"obligation cannot be deduced from fact."'7 Now if, indeed, this is a "logical canon"'8 it is logically questionable and not "historically questionable."19 A reference to Hobbes' social and historical context is irrelevant to the appropriateness of the inference.

In one sense, which is purely of historical interest, Hobbes' "logic" is not ours: it was one of a variety of seventeenth century attempts to construct a method of investigation into any subject matter which would supplant scholas- ticism. But this is obviously not the sense of logic intended by Macpherson. Appropriate rules of inference are not necessarily related to a given person or

epoch, except in the totally harmless sense that they were discovered by a particular person at a specific historical period. Nor is it a stand off as to which rule, or set of rules, of inference is to be accepted. To give a familiar illustration: on logical grounds having to do with their structure, modern logic interprets universal statements as hypothetical. In so doing it rejects the formerly valid inference of a particular statement from universal ones. It is no plea to argue on behalf of Aristotelian logic that Aristotle's notion of logic is different from ours. For on this point he was as mistaken then as he is now.

Nevertheless, it may be claimed that if we supply an additional premise to an

argument which its proponent had implicitly assumed, the originally incomplete and inadequate argument will now be seen as deductively sound. In fact, Macpherson reads into Hobbes' argument the additional premise that rational men must see themselves as equally subordinate to the laws of the market.20 It is only after this is introduced that Macpherson claims to be able to show how moral obligation is derived from fact. But the rules of inference whereby this is done should be no different from the original ones.

Whether or not the additional premise is required to complete Hobbes'

argument21 or, more pertinently, whether or not Macpherson's formulation of Hobbes' argument is intelligible,22 need not detain us. For it is in the process of developing the argument, of showing the conditions under which the deriva-

15Macpherson, Possessive Individualism, 5.

161bid., 14. 17Ibid., 82. lsCf. W. K. Frankena, "The Naturalistic Fallacy," Mind, Ns, 48 (1948), 467-77. "-Macpherson, Possessive Individualism, 14. 20Ibid., 85. 21Cf. Brian Barry, "Warrender and his Critics," Philosophy, 43 (1968), 135. 2'Berlin, "Hobbes, Locke and Professor Macpherson," 456-8.



530 BERNARD WAND

tion of value from fact can be justifiably made, that Macpherson shows himself as not only indulging in unwarranted assumptions but also unable to grasp the nature of the problem he is supposedly resolving.

The assumptions may be characterized, in different ways, as ideological. Although the model which Hobbes is presumed to have in mind in the formulation of his argument's premises is that of a possessive market economy, it may be characterized as a market society. For "where labour has become a market commodity, market relations so shape and permeate all social relations that [the market economy] may properly be called a market society."23 But there is no evidence that in Hobbes' day the commercial influence was of this order and a good deal of evidence that it was not. This assumption, however, is required to buttress the other, that the type of obligation which the deduction yields is not merely prudential but also moral, since "it is the highest morality of which market men are capable."24 Again this is a question of fact. It scarcely seems probable that men (or is it merely the propertied?) in a market society will be guided in all of their social relations by a notion of moral obligation which is exclusively prudential. At least we have the testimony of most of the British moralists that for them, presumably as market men, the notion of moral obligation is not so reducible. However, these assumptions do involve questions of fact and are not matter for analysis.25

According to Macpherson, moralists have distinguished between prudential and moral obligations on the grounds of their probable effectiveness as con- straints on short-term interests. It is the superior practical effectiveness of moral obligation which characterizes its distinction to prudential obligation. "But [since] this distinction, and the superiority of moral obligation, are created by definition,"26 Macpherson is readily able to show that it is really a question of practice which kind of obligation is the more effective.

It may be held that in analysing the notions of prudential and moral obligation moralists have been engaging in an activity which is that of defining. How- ever, none has ever held that the distinction is "created" by definition. They have not stipulated how these terms should be used but have rather tried to elucidate and justify the distinctive characteristics of each. Moreover, none has made the distinction in terms of presumed effectiveness. With all due respect to Macpherson, they have recognized that this question is indeed relevant to practical conduct and have been divided on the matter. (Contrast Kant with Butler.) Speaking generally, the distinction between the two is made in terms of the reason for the action to be performed. That prudential and moral reasons may be constraining indicated their shared obligatoriness but not the distinctive type of restraint involved.27

23Macpherson, Possessive Individualism, 48. My italics. 24Ibid., 87. 25I do not wish to deny that Macpherson, as social historian, does pay attention to the facts, particularly with respect to the distribution of economic classes, but they are not the sorts of facts relevant to these assumptions. Was the Puritan in his relations with his friends, his family, or his co-religionists, guided by the same atttudes or rules as he was in his market relations? In the market place itself were his relations always prudential? 26Macpherson, Possessive Individualism, 75.

70One begins to have doubts about Macpherson's own interpretation of moral obligation in view of his comment that a conflict between short-term and long-term interest indicates the




The source of Macpherson's confusion lies in his almost automatic response to words like "ought" or "claim." As soon as they occur in the context of an argument he imputes a moral connotation to them. This is notoriously evident in his contention that Hobbes derives "a principle of right or obligation from a statement of observed fact."28 For in terms of the evidence he offers there is no support whatever for his interpretation.

In each of the three passages to which Macpherson refers, and which he cites, Hobbes is providing evidence for the acceptance of his factual claim that, despite appearances, all men are naturally equal in strength and wit.29 In so far as an appeal to rationality is presumed, it is the rationality to be expected from the scientist, not the moralist, which is involved. The rational man here is the man who, as spectator, is willing to look impartially at the evidence in making his empirical judgments about human nature, and to recognize that apparent inequalities between men are to be discounted. For they have been brought about by artificial means. If we observe the canons of correct judgment, then we ought to admit that all men are naturally equal. However, such an admission is no more moral than would be the counter-judgment that men are not equal.

Macpherson himself is ambiguous as to just what it is he claims Hobbes to have shown. On the one hand he holds that in these citations "we find a principle of right or obligation derived from a statement of observed fact";30 on the other hand he claims merely that "[Hobbes] simply assumes [the derivation]"31 Be that as it may, he does neither. Hobbes' use of the term "ought" here is functionally related to his use of the concept of rationality and is justified because rationality is indeed a normative concept. A person who argued differ- ently would be irrational. For, at least in Hobbes' view, he would not be con- sidering the available evidence and hence it would be a conclusion which he ought not to make.

It may be possible to show how statements of value can be derived from those of fact,32 and it may even have been that Hobbes succeeded in so doing, but it can scarcely be expected that Macpherson should show us how it is to be done. For he has neither understood the conditions required for such a deduction, nor grasped the original nature of the distinction between judgments of fact and those of value or obligation which gives rise to the problem.33

In order to deduce an evaluative sentence from descriptive ones an additional premise must indeed be supplied. Nor is it sufficient that this premise refer, as Macpherson claims, to the purpose or will of God.34 For neither God's will, nor Nature's, imply by themselves an evaluative concept. Rather the premise must connect explicitly the description of the facts of human nature with some

presence of a moral obligation. (See Possessive Individualism, 292.) A good dose of Bishop Butler is wanted here! 28Macpherson, Possessive Individualism, 75. 29Ibid., 74-5. It is significant that in giving these quotations Macpherson omits reference to the observed inequalities brought about through civil law. 3Olbid., 75. 3llbid. 32Cf. John R. Searle, "How to Derive 'Ought' from 'Is'," Philosophical Review, 73 (1964), 43-58. 33Cf. Seliger, John Locke, 173, n. 90. 34See above, p. 527.



532 BERNARD WAND

evaluative concept, normally signified by the use of such words as "moral obligation," "right," or "good."

However, it would be a mistake to believe that only an error of logic is involved here. To think that somehow political obligation is deducible from certain facts of human nature, very much as theorems are derived from certain definitions and axioms, is to ignore the contested character of political theory. Even if it were possible for men to agree on these facts, they might still arrive at fundamentally different views of political obligation. They might do so because they could disagree on the relevance these facts have to social and political arrangements; for, even with the supplied premise, it is misleading to think of political obligation as a deduction. The political theorist is engaged in a variety of activities - those of assessment, of judgment, of insight, of imagina- tion - whose outcome is not a conclusion but a recommendation or prescription.

At the same time, it cannot be denied that the facts of human nature are themselves relevant to the sorts of obligation we have and that if our human nature were different some of our obligations, including political obligation, would never have arisen or, at least, might have been different. But here too Macpherson is misleading. For he insists on looking at human nature through the concept of essence.

II. The concept of essence

It is unpardonable for Macpherson to recast the thought of Hobbes and Locke in terms of the language of essence, especially the essence of man as such. It is the language of Aristotle, Spinoza, Hegel, or Marx, but it is entirely foreign to the classical British tradition which expunged it from its vocabulary. Macpher- son himself uses the concept of essence as though it were innocent of any misleading or confusing connotations. Indeed, he seems for the most part to be unwittingly trapped by them. For his deductions and demonstrations depend, in large measure, on the systematic confusion to which the concept gives rise.

If Macpherson's writings are examined several uses of the concept of essence will be found, such that any sentence relevant to human nature containing the words "essence" or "essentially" will express one or more of the following meanings. (a) The empirical conditions required to achieve a desirable state of affairs. Here the concept is being used to formulate an hypothesis about the conditions which are required in order to become human. Thus, in his summary of the "seventeenth century foundations of liberalism," Macpherson informs us that "the human essence is freedom from the will of others."35 However, since he has already maintained that "what makes a man human is freedom from de- pendence on the will of others,"36 his use of the concept of essence, in this context, can only be taken as an abbreviated way of stating the sufficient condition needed to realize one desirable goal of being human, i.e. if men are free from the depend- ence of the will of others, they will achieve their humanity. (b) A factual claim about the motives of men: "... man is essentially an unlimited desirer of utilities, a creature whose nature is to seek satisfaction of unlimited desires both innate and

35Macpherson, Possessive Individualism, 265. 361bid., 263.




acquired."'7 Here, the concept is being used to indicate certain presumed facts about human nature. (c) A moral claim about the goals of conduct: "So in choos-

ing to make the essence of man the striving for possession, we make it impossible to be fully human."38 (d) A moral claim about the attributes of individuals: "The individual is essentially the proprietor of his own person and capacities,""9 i.e. he has the right to his own person and capacities. (e) A real, in contrast to a merely nominal, definition of man: "From Aristotle until the seventeenth century it was more usual to see the essence of man as purposeful activity, as exercise of one's

energies in accordance with some rational purpose, than as the consumption of satisfactions."40

Macpherson is sometimes aware of these distinctions, particularly that between (b) and (c). However, he does not seem to be aware of either their importance or

implications. Indeed, it is safe to say that at least part of the reason for his main-

taining that evaluative sentences can be directly inferred from factual ones is due to his use of the concept of essence to refer to both evaluations and descriptions.

It is fundamental to Macpherson's position that the conditions under which men are to gain their humanity be treated as both necessary and sufficient. Otherwise he cannot sustain his claim that in a market society men can act in one, and only one, way so that they are incapable of other than aggressively acquisitive modes of conduct. Yet he himself treats the relations which seventeenth century men entered into as members of a market society merely as a necessary condition for the realization of their humanity. Thus, the political theory of the Levellers is held to be

logically inadequate on the grounds that although they insisted that "a man is human only as sole proprietor of himself, only insofar as he is free from all but market relations,"4' they also upheld "the Christian social ethic."4" But engaging in market relations is here a necessary, not sufficient, condition for realizing his humanity, i.e. if he does not enter into them, then he will not be human. However, if entering into market relations is only a necessary condition, other conditions may be required to attain his humanity. It may also be a necessary condition that in their market relations men should be fair, decent and humane rather than ruthless, malicious, or inhumane. On this point, the charge of "theoretical weakness" against liberal political theory collapses.

The concept of essence, as Macpherson recognizes, is necessarily related to the concepts of potentiality and actuality. In explaining a change, whether it be in the growth of a tree or in the conduct of men, we may say that the change is one from a state of potentiality to one of actuality. To claim that the seed is potentially a tree is to claim that under certain conditions it will become a tree. Similarly, to claim that men are potentially infinite consumers or appropriators is to claim that under the specific conditions of a market economy they will become infinite consumers

37Macpherson, "Democratic Theory: Ontology and Technology," 209. 38C. B. Macpherson, The Real World of Democracy (Oxford, 1966), 54 and cf. "Demo- cratic Theory: Ontology and Technology," 218-9. The intelligibility of choosing an essence for man is open to question. For what a man is essentially must be obtained not through an act of choice but, if anything, through an act of discovery. 39Macpherson, Possessive Individualism, 263. 40"The Maximization of Democracy," in P. Laslett and W. G. Runciman, eds., Philosophy, Politics and Society, third series (Oxford, 1967), 85. 41Macpherson, Possessive Individualism, 266. 421bid.



534 BERNARD WAND

and appropriators. In each case the claim embodies an empirical hypothesis but makes no reference to the value of the result.

Thus, in Macpherson's judgment, the liberal political theorists, in characterizing the essence of man in a market society as that of an infinite consumer or appropriator, were "factually accurate."43 Macpherson himself holds that the essence of man in a socialist or classless society would be quite different. For, under such conditions, he would cease to be an infinite consumer or appropriator and would become a free creator. Whether or not this change would come about is not to the

point. To talk about essence in this particular way is merely to make factual claims either about trees or about humans. Yet, granted that, with respect to humans, different potentialities will be realized under different economic conditions, the

question as to the desirability of the distinctive mode of conduct which each of them would lead to may still arise. Would we prefer that men be infinite consumers or free creators? And if the questions were answered in terms of the concept of essence, the answer would be expressing a value judgment.

Unfortunately, Macpherson employs the concept of essence in both ways without recognizing that the only characteristic which is common to them is the shared use of the word, "essence." For the concept of man as an infinite consumer is not

only factually accurate but is a desirable way of acting at a particular time in history, viz., the formative period of capitalism.44

Since the goal of infinite consumption or appropriation is today an undesirable one, and since the advance of technology is such that it is no longer required as a

spur to action, Macpherson recommends that we abandon it. However, he experi- ences some theoretical qualms in doing so. He asks: "Can we just play about with these postulates of the essence of man, rejecting one because it does not suit our moral values and setting up another because it does? Do we not have to demon- strate the truth or falsity of the postulates ...?"45 He answers:

But the truth or falsity of the postulate is not in question. For it is not entirely a factual question, however much it may be presented as such. It is an ontological postulate, and as such, a value postulate. Its basic assertion is not that man does behave in a certain way (although it may make this assertion), but that his essence can only be realized by that behaviour. An assertion about man's essence is surely a value assertion. One can agree that man as shaped by market society does behave in a certain way, and even that man in market society necessarily behaves in a certain way, but this tells us nothing about the behaviour of man as such and nothing about man's essence.46

In reading such a passage the wisdom of the classical liberal theorists in rejecting the language of essence can be appreciated. For Macpherson has fallen into almost every trap which it invites. If the postulate - a word which Macpherson uses indis- criminately - of the essence of man is "not entirely a factual postulate" and indeed may make assertions about human behaviour, we are surely entitled to consider its

431bid,, 275; cf. also 13, 71, 73. 44Macpherson, "Democratic Theory: Ontology and Technology," 210, 213, 214, 218. A further complication arises. For, in this view, the concept of man as an infinite consumer cannot be taken as accurately "reflecting" the economic relations of a market society but must be taken as operative ideal required to set these relations in operation - a familiar Marxist quandary. 4~lbid., 218. 461bid., 218-19. Macpherson's italics and parentheses.




truth or falsity in this respect. As we have seen, Macpherson undoubtedly uses it in this way. If he did not, his model for political theory would collapse, and, more importantly, his interpretation of liberal theory as possessive individualism, with its claim to have shown the conditions under which the right of infinite appropriation is derived from the view of man as an infinite consumer, would have to be given up. Of course, it is misleading to use the concept of essence descriptively, but in so far as it is so used it does not have an evaluative function. The trouble arises in thinking that in using it descriptively one can also use it evaluatively. Indeed, this confusion may sometimes be perpetrated intentionally in order to give a descriptive or scientific status to activities which are deemed valuable. This is not to deny that men's actual mode of conduct may coincide with a desirable way of acting. However, to interpret each in terms of the concept of essence is not only to mislead or confuse but to be unable to distinguish between them.

If men are potentially capable of becoming either infinite consumers or free creators, the justification for holding that their essence can be realized only with respect to the latter is indeed a value judgment. But, then, the point of the concept as an attempt to explain change is lost. For all that we are doing now is claiming that one way of acting is desirable while another is not and implying, as Macpher- son does, that the conditions which will permit the desirable activity are at hand.

However, for Macpherson it is obviously not enough that we know how men will behave under certain conditions. For even if we did, we would still know nothing about the "behaviour of man as such," which can only be known by grasping the "essence of man." The behaviour of man as such is obviously not to be learnt by anything as pedestrian as observing the actual behaviour of men. Merely to observe their behaviour is to fail to distinguish between those activities which manifest their real or essential nature and those which do not. Similarly, generalizations about human conduct are open to exception, and the exception cannot be accommodated within the concept of men as such. In short, man's essence, his real nature, must be grasped, as Aristotle recognized, by an act of intellectual intuition which yields certain knowledge of it. Yet between two contrasting intuitions of man's essence no rational decision is possible. The practical danger of this position constitutes a central theme of Popper's The Open Society and Its Enemies. It is not a conse- quence which needs to be imputed to Macpherson: he has avowed it. If human nature cannot be changed in the direction held to be appropriate to its essence, political power, despite its recognized dangers, may be used to bring about "moral regeneration" although the persons so affected do not recognize the need for it.47

The concept of essence is fundamentally a metaphysical one whose use in political theory has had disastrous practical effects. For it has led to the view that once the nature of the human essence has been grasped, all that is required for practice is to make its content explicit. The rules required for political conduct are to be obtained merely by a process of explication. They are not arrived at through choice, or arguments, or indeed even by an appeal to actual experience, but through this unfolding of the essence of man. Furthermore, since it is a matter of explication, the explication will lead to one, and only one, set of rules, or goals, appropriate to

47Macpherson, Real World. 19; cf. Macpherson's judgment in "The Deceptive Task": that in order to have democracy "human nature must be changed by 'the people' under a new sort of leadership, taking things in their own hand," 567.



536 BERNARD WAND

human beings. Possible alternatives will be excluded as incompatible with our human essence, or as merely incidental to human experience and activity. Accom-

panying this position of dogmatic rationalism is the view that not only are such alternatives mistaken, but that they are necessarily mistaken. Moreover, those who fail to elucidate the concept of the human essence in the appropriate manner are somehow morally reprehensible.48

Of course, there are occasions in which not only reform but revolution may be morally justified, and it may even be that a few would wish to have institutions

changed on behalf of the many so that they would at the very least have the opportunity to pursue goals or engage in activities which they cannot do at present. But an appeal to the essence of man can only preclude the rational discourse which alone can elicit the moral backing required to justify reform or revolution in the

given circumstances. Nonetheless, Macpherson could still defend himself on the grounds that these

criticisms of his use of the concept of essence ignore his analysis of the concept of powers in which a defence of man as a creative agent is offered. To this analysis we must now proceed.

IH. The concept of powers

True to the essentialist tradition, Macpherson approaches the concept of human powers through a consideration of the adequacy of the definition of man. Any definition of man must be one such that whatever is essential to his nature as a man, from his bare survival to the exercise of his highest capacities, must be included. Only if it does will the definition be "non-slavish."49 This moral characterization of a definition may strike us as strange until we recall that the language of essence can function as the language of exhortation.

Consequently, if we offer a real definition of man in terms of certain powers but fail to discriminate between them, or omit reference to whether or not they are exercised, or do not consider the appropriateness of the rewards offered for the

products of their exercise, the definition is not merely defective or inadequate but an insult to our humanity. These considerations are undoubtedly of great moral

importance but they cannot be subsumed under the general concept of power if we are to have the logical rigour or intellectual clarity upon which Macpherson himself so continuously insists. Conceptual clarity and moral commitment are not identical, and a commitment which rests on conceptual muddles cannot be characterized as moral.

Despite Macpherson's jaundiced views of life in a market society, it is clear that the powers which, as exercised, would realize the essence of man are powers which at least some men at some time have had even though they have lived in market societies. For although Macpherson talks of a transformation of human nature consequent upon a change of man's essence, the new man is characterized in fairly familiar terms. Macpherson's contention is not merely that economic conditions deprive men from attaining desirable goals or engaging in morally worthy activities, 48Cf. below on this page. 49Macpherson, Real World, 56, and cf. Possessive Individualism, 56, esp. n. 1.




but that somehow a change in the basic structure of human nature is required for them to be "truly human."50

Much of Macpherson's condemnation of the market society rests on his view of the way it defines the concept of powers in contrast to the way in which it ought to be defined. Since this elemental confusion between matters of fact and those of

meaning is so endemic to Macpherson's writings it may be ignored here. However, in order to understand properly the notion of the "powers" of men a preliminary distinction is required. Owing to his blanket use of the concept of potentiality, Macpherson himself is probably prevented from discerning it and is certainly unable to make it.

In contemporary terminology, to speak of a man's powers is to speak of his dispositional properties. He may not always be able to exercise them, but if we observe his acting in a certain way we can normally take him as having the dispositional properties or powers in question. Moreover, the dispositional properties themselves may be acquired and, in fact, in diverse ways most of them are. Ob- viously many persons do not have certain dispositional properties or powers, either because of their native inability to acquire them, or because they have been denied the opportunities to do so. There are some people who do not have the power to play the piano, because no matter how much training they have received they have never acquired the skill. There are others who do not have the power to play the piano because they have never received the training, despite their having the required native endowment.

Individual men and women, in contrast to "man as such" have different native endowments which are relevant to the acquisition of certain powers. But to speak of a man's powers as "his potential for realizing ... essential human attributes"51 is both circular and misleading. For what are realized, under the appropriate conditions, are his powers, i.e. the attributes which can only be taken as his dispositional properties. And whether they are realizable is a function not only of his social environment but also of his original native endowments.

One might have thought that Macpherson would have recognized that skills or

powers are mostly acquired, and that a market society is one which denies opportunities to many of those who could have acquired desirable skills. Of course, there

soMacpherson, Real World, 38. For Macpherson "the truly human activities" are "laughing, playing, loving, learning, creating, arranging our lives in ways that give us aesthetic and emotional satisfaction" and in which work loses its compulsive character. I suspect that even if we were to engage in these activities they would be found flat. If we attend to human experience, rather than to man's essence, it would seem that laughter divorced from tears, love without hate, playing without frustration, and creating minus disappointment, would scarcely yield satisfactory aesthetic and emotional lives. There is no doubt that we occasionally find not only joy but liberation in work, and that too often work serves only as an unwelcome and necessary means to valued satisfactions. But the difficult question here is to envisage how release from the bondage of labour would lead to the universal participation in creative, non-compulsive work. No one would wish to deny that economic obstacles have played havoc with men's lives, not so much in limiting their pursuit of happiness as in pre- venting men from discovering life's possibilities - including its risks, defeats and tragedies. However, it is fatuously optimistic to assume that their removal would lead to paradise, or that the paradise would be worth having. 51Macpherson, "The Maximization of Democracy," 89. Although I borrow this phrase from Macpherson, I have removed its original circularity. The circularity arises from his failure to distinguish between having a given power and exercising it. See below pp. 539-40.



538 BERNARD WAND

is no doubt that he would condemn it on such grounds.52 However, it is his interpretation of the concept of powers which is at issue, not his moral attitude. This distinction between some men having the native endowment to acquire certain skills or powers and others not is missing in his account, as is a clear recognition that what is acquired is a power or dispositional property. His failure to make the distinction is undoubtedly due to his assumption that one can examine the nature of "man as such" and that in such an examination one is seeking a universal, or set of universal, essences or potentialities. For if one uses the concept of potentiality in this fashion, it is impossible to discriminate between those whose native endowments enable them, under the appropriate conditions, to acquire the relevantly important powers and those whose native endowments do not. One is forced to hold the position that, since all have the same potentialities, all may have the same powers. Moreover, in treating powers as potentialities one is forced to interpret powers both as potentialities for the realization of certain dispositional properties and as the dispositional properties themselves.

However, the dominant question for Macpherson is not how capacities or skills are acquired, but what happens to them in our social relations. In this context Mac- pherson distinguishes between descriptive and ethical concepts of powers. De- scriptive powers are those powers which men require in order to satisfy their economic wants. They are the type of powers which, according to Macpherson, the liberal political theorists ascribed to men and which, following Hobbes, they viewed as a man's "present means however acquired to ensure gratification of his appetites."53 Consequently, descriptive powers will include not only a man's own capacities, but also those of the people over whom he has control, and will exclude those he has lost to others. In a market society, where labour is viewed as a commodity and few men have access to the means of labour, there is a net transfer of powers such that although most men suffer a diminution of their powers the concept [sic] itself does not treat it as a loss. For on the descriptive interpretation of powers, the powers a man "has are measured after the diminution has taken place.""54

The ethical concept of powers, in which powers are viewed not as enabling a man to gain satisfaction of his appetites but as realizing his genuine human essence, must include not only his natural capacities but also "his ability to labour, his ability to use his strength and skill."55 This ability is limited when his access to the means of labour is limited and a limitation to this access is a limitation to his ethical powers. Hence, unlike the descriptive concept of powers, the ethical concept of powers does not take a man's present powers as fixed, but considers whether or not he has been deprived of the ability to exercise them. If he has "then his powers are diminished."'56 Furthermore, only the definition of the powers of man in terms 52Cf. Macpherson, Real World, 47, where he claims that equality of opportunity as "an equal right to a fully human life for all who will exert themselves" is denied in a market society. However, there is no indication that what is denied is the opportunity to acquire skills or powers to those potentially capable of acquiring them. Instead, the criticism is made in terms of powers which the persons affected already have. 53Macpherson, "The Maximization of Democracy," 89. 541bid., 90. 55Macpherson, Real World, 43. Macpherson's italics. 56lbid.




of the ethical concept "is consistent with his essential human quality.''57 The

application of the descriptive concept of powers to a human being is inappropriate to his essence. Consequently, whereas the descriptive concept of powers is relevant to a person's capacities to achieve economic satisfaction and their diminution by the activities of others are ignored, the ethical concept of powers is relevant to his

capacities to act in desirable ways and their diminution is always a fundamental consideration. However, Macpherson's distinction between ethical and descriptive powers is unwarranted.

First, the concept of power is ethically neutral. If we are to use it consistently or

meaningfully it should apply as well to a horse as to a man,"5 to economic activities as well as moral activities. If it is used incorrectly in the one context, its same use would be as incorrect in the other. Macpherson connects the concept of descriptive powers to economic activities in that these powers are the skills needed to attain economic satisfactions. But some of these skills are certainly required to engage in scientific, moral or artistic activities. He contends that the power of a horse may be defined as the amount of work it does irrespective of its being put to work or not but, in the case of a human being, we must include access to the means of labour

among his powers. Otherwise he will not be able to use his skills. But surely this is equally true of a horse. A thoroughbred horse capable of running would have his particular "essence" denied, in not being allowed to run, or diminished, in being set out to plough as a work horse. The sorts of activities which are manifested in the exercise of one's powers are irrelevant to the way in which we use the con-

cept of powers. Secondly, the distinction which Macpherson makes between the concept of de-

scriptive powers and that of ethical powers in terms of the diminution in the former case and not in the latter is unintelligible. For any man who has a given power and is denied the ability to use it by the activities of others does not necessarily have that power reduced. A person having the power or capacity to write who, through governmental action (such as incarceration in a hard labour camp), is being denied the ability to write, is not having such power reduced.5' He is being restricted in the exercise of his specific power. To have a specific power is one thing; to be permitted freedom to exercise it is another. The ability this person has to write, in

Macpherson's sense, is not a function of his powers but a function of the activities of others with respect to their exercise. Similarly, in a market society, a person's powers, as marketable commodities, are his although he may be forced to exercise them in undesirable ways. But here we are concerned not with powers but with the nature of the conditions under which they are exercised. Again, the writer, having the power to write and being permitted to exercise it, may produce a work of art which fails to receive its just reward. Failure to reward him properly involves no

lessening of his power, no more than does restricting him in its exercise. Similarly, in a market society, when men are rewarded inadequately for work done, it is a case of injustice and not a diminution of their powers. To call this unfair exchange, in which the product of the exercise of powers is involved, a transfer of powers is totally misleading. 5TIbid. 58The contrast is Macpherson's. See ibid. a5Of course, if his powers are left fallow through disuse he may in time cease to have them.



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Macpherson's concept of ethical powers conceals within its rubric three distinct

possibilities for harm, each of which requires a different practical remedy for redress. For the denial of ethical powers may involve either a denial of opportunity to the use of facilities needed to acquire certain powers, or a refusal to permit their exercise by certain persons, or a failure to reward persons for work done. In each case redress would be morally justified by appealing to a different principle and would be achieved through changes in different types of institutions or social practices. Those whose potentiality would enable them to acquire certain powers would need to have made available to them facilities which so far they have been denied; and the justification would be made normally in terms of the principle of fairness or, perhaps, equity. Those who have the powers but are denied their exercise would

require that social restraints, such as restrictive employment practices, be removed; and the justification could be made in terms of the principle of freedom. Finally, insufficient compensation for work done could be claimed on the basis of the principle of desert. Since obviously distinct practical reforms - the reform or creation of education facilities, the availability of work, the guarantee of appropriate mone-

tary rewards for work done - are involved, the appeal to the concept of ethical

powers turns out to be practically vacuous. For to hold that they are denied, does not inform us in what specific way they are to be realized. Nor should any amount of rhetoric in terms of diminishing a man's power, or robbing him of his essence, of his own humanity, serve as a substitute.

In sum, Macpherson's view of political obligation as a deduction from the

postulates of human nature, framed in terms of the concepts of essence and powers as he himself articulates them, must be rejected. To reject the conceptual apparatus is not to condone the many characteristics of contemporary society which he criticizes. However, their causes are not to be removed by taking up moralistic attitudes, nor to be understood by a simplistic grasp of the essence of man. Any- one who thinks so should not expect his own analysis to stand up.'0

6OSee Macpherson, "Democratic Theory: Ontology and Technology," esp. 219-20.



Documents

C. B. Macpherson's Conceptual Apparatus