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Printed for the War Cabinet. March 1917.

SECRET

W A R CABINET, 1 0 4 .

Minutes of a Meeting of the War Cabinet held at 1 0 , DowningMonday, March 2 6 , 1 9 1 7 , at 1 P 3 0 A . M .

Street, S.W., on

Presen t : The P R I M E M I N I S T E R (in the Chair).

The Right Hon. the E A R L CTJRZON OF The Right Hon. A. H E N D E R S O N , M.P. K E D L E S T O N , K . G . , G . C . S . I . , G . C . I . E . The R ight Hon. A. B O N A R L A W , M.P.

The Right Hon. the V I S C O U N T M I L N E R , G . C . B . , G . C . M . G .

The following were also present :-The Right Hon. A. J . B A U F O U R , O.M.,

M.P., Secretary of State for Fore ign Affairs.

The Right Hon. the L O R D H A R D I N G E O F P E N S H U R S T , K.G., G.C.B., G.C.S.I., G.C.M.G., G.C.I.E., G.C.V.O., I .S.O., Permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

The Right Hon. the E A R L O F D E R B Y , K.G., G.C.V.O., C .B . , Secretary of State for War .

Major-General F. B . M A U R I C E , C .B . , Director of Mil i tary Operations (for Minutes 1 to 2 0 ) .

Fie ld-Marshal the V I S C O U N T F R E N C H O F Y P R E S , G.C.B., O.M., G.C.V.O.,K.C.M.G., Commander - in - Chief, Home Forces (for Minutes 1 4 and 1 5 ) .

Major-General F. C. S H A W , C.B. , Chief of General Staff, Home Forces (for Minutes 1 4 and 1 5 ) .

The Right Hon. C. A D D I S O N , M.D., M.P., Minister of Munitions (for Minutes 1 5 to 2 0 ) .

The R ight Hon. H. E . D U K E , K.C., M.P., Chief Secretary for Ireland (for Minutes 2 1 and. 2 2 ) .

The R ight Hon. J O H N H O D G E , M.P., Minister for Labour (for Minute 2 3 ) .

Professor W. G. A D A M S (for Minutes 2 1 and 2 2 ) .

Major D A V I D D A V I E S , M.P. (for Minutes 1 6 to 2 0 ) .

The Right Hon. S I R E . C A R S O N , K G , M.P., Firs t Lord of the Admira l ty (for Minutes 1 to 1 5 ) .

Admira l S I R J . R. J E L L I C O E , G.C.B. O.M., G .C .V .O. , First Sea Lord of the Admira l ty (for Minutes 1 to 1 6 . )

The R ight Hon. S I R J . M A C L A Y , Bart. , Shipping Controller (for Minutes 1 6 to 2 0 ) .

S I R W. G U Y G R A N E T , Deputy-Director of Mil i tary Ra i lways (for Minutes 1 6 to 2 0 ) .

Mr. G U Y C A L T H R O P , Board of Trade (for Minutes 1 6 to 2 0 ) .

The Right H o n . ; S I R A. H . S T A N L E Y , M . P . , President of the Board of Trade (for Minutes 1 6 to 2 0 ) .

The R ight Hon. the L O R D D E V O N P O R T ,

Food Controller (for Minutes 2 1 and 2 2 ) . S I R R. H. R E W , K.C.B. , Permanent Secre­

tary to the Food ControRer (for Minutes 2 1 and 2 2 ) .

The Right Hon. R. M U N R O , KG. , M . P . , Secretary for Scotland (for Minutes 2 1 and 2 2 ) .

S I R J A M E S M. D O D D S , K.C.B. , Under-Secretary for Scotland (for Minutes 2 1 and 2 2 ) .

Mr. J . H A R L I N G T U R N E R , Director of Agr icu l tura l Section, National Service Department (for Alinutes 2 1 and 2 2 ) .

The Right Hon. R. E. P R O T H E R O , M.V.O., M.P., President of the Board of Agr i ­cul ture and Fisher ies (for Minutes 2 1 and 2 2 ) .

Mr. A. D. H A L L , F .R.S. , Board of Agr icul ture and Fisher ies (for Minutes 2 1 and 2 2 ) .

Mr. J . R. C A M P B E L L , Assistant Secretary, Department of Agr icul ture for Ireland (for Minutes 2 1 and 2 2 ) .

Lieutenant-Colonel S I R M. P. A. H A N K E Y , K.C.B. , Secretary.Colonel E. D. S W I N T O N , C.B., D.S.O., Assistant Secretary.Fleet Paymaster P. H . Row, R.N., Assistant Secretary.Captain C L E M E N T J O N E S , Assistant Secretary.Mr. T . J O N E S , Assistant Secretary.

Western Eront: The German Withdrawal.

Mesopotamia.

Russia.

The Military Command.

Possibility of a German Concentra­tion on the Riga Eront.

Deputation of Labour Members to. Russia.

Arabia: The Hedjaz Railway.

1 . THE Director of Mi l i tary Operations reported a slowing down in the advance of the Brit ish troops, who had now approximate ly reached the Hindenburg l ine. Southwards, however, where the Hindenburg l ine was further in i*ear of the original German defensive l ine, the French continued to make progress. He stated that the Germans might possibly withdraw their front to the northward of Arras , but there were no immediate indications that this was going to happen. He read a let ter from General Headquarters , France, dated 23rd March, describing the situation on the Western Front.

2. The Director of Mi l i ta ry Operations reported that General Sir Stan ley Maude had reinforced his Diala column, and had sent his cava l ry to join it. W i t h a viewr to combined action, he was endeavouring, by aeroplane and other means, to get into touch with the Russ ians from Kermanshah , but had not so far, been successful. There were indications that the Turks had, withdrawn a division from Salonica, and that its destination was" probably the Mosul district.

Telegram No. 251 , of the 24th March, from the Brit ish Minis ter at Berne, relat ive to the withdrawal of further Turkish divisions oh the Bu lgar i an front, was read, the Secretary of State for W a r stat ing that s imilar reports had been received by the W a r Office.

3. In reference to W a r Cabinet, 99, Minute 9, the Director of Mi l i t a ry Operations reported that our Mi l i t a ry At tache in Petrograd had reported that General Russky had been appointed Commander­in-Chief of the Russ i an armies , and that the Grand Duke Nicholas had placed Ids resignation in the hands of the Government.

4s. Rep ly ing to a question from the Pr ime Minister as to the verac i ty or otherwise of the reports emanat ing from Russ ia re lat ive to a German concentration on the R i g a front, the Director of Mi l i tary Operations stated that there was no evidence of this, that i t was the worst season of the yea r for such an operation, and that he did not think the rumours were correct. He expressed the opinion that they were being c irculated by the Russ ian Provisional Govern­ment with a view to strengthening the moral of the Russ ian troops "during the exist ing cris is .

Telegrams relat ive to Russia , Nos. 397 and 393 of the 25th March , from the Brit ish Ambassador were read by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

5. Mr. Henderson stated that he had received a communication to the effect that representatives of the French Social ist party , who stood for war a outrance, were, with the author i ty and consent of the French Committee of Foreign Affairs, short ly arr iv ing in England en route to Petrograd, where they were going on a Mission to the Russ ian Socialist party , their object being to persuade that par ty to do a l l in its power to bring the war to a satisfactory conclusion. ' .

The W a r Cabinet decided that— Mr. Henderson should use his influence to secure that a

suitably composed Bri t ish Labour Deputation should accompany the French party with the same object.

6. The Director of Mi l i t a ry Operations reported further destruction by the Arabs of the Hedjaz Ra i lway and that our aeroplane flight had been moved from Rabegh to W e j .

Air Raid.

The Baltic Fleet.

The Sinking of the Destroyer " Laforey." Mine-sweeping.

Bombardment of Dunkirk.

Enemy Naval Concentration at Zeebrug^e.

Possible Attack by Sea in Rear of Allied Lines.

Increase of Portuguese Contingent.

7 . The First Sea Lord reported the execution of an a i r raid upon the Berbecke blast furnaces on the 23rd March , and that a l l our machines had returned safely.

8 . The First Sea Lord reported that the Russ ian men-of-war a t Reva l were in the hands of Committees of Seamen, and tha t arrangements had been made, wi th the permission of the Russ ian Minister of Marine , for the t ak ing over of the submarine depdt ship at Reval .

9. The Firs t Sea Lord reported the s inking of the destroyer " Laforey," as the result of s tr ik ing a mine.

The W a r Cabinet discussed with the First Sea Lord the genera l question of mine-sweeping and the provision of mine-sweepers, in view of the enemy's great act iv i ty in mine- lay ing in the v ic in i ty of the South Coast of Ire land and the Engl i sh Channel .

10. The First Sea Lord reported a s l ight and ineffective bombardment of Dunkirk on the n ight of the 25th March .

11 . The W a r Cabinet took note that the enemy had concentrated some thir ty destroyers at Zeebrugge. The Firs t Sea Lord pointed out that such a concentration must be for the purpose of covering a landing on the Be lg i an coast, or raids in the Channel, or to a t tack the Dutch convoys and their escorts. He stated that we had not at present in those waters sufficient forces to counter such a threa t decisively, and reported the dispositions he had made to strengthen our forces in these waters .

12. The Director of Mi l i t a ry Operations, i n reference to W a r Cabinet, 99, Minute 2, read a communicat ion from the Field-Marsha l Commanding the British Expedit ionary Force to the effect­that General Nivel le did not consider, in view of the inte l l igence a t his disposal, tha t an a t tack in roar of the Al l ied Lines in Flanders was probable in the near future, and that after visit ing this region he considered the coast defences, for which the French were responsible, to be adequate.

The Firs t Sea Lord stated tha t he was not in accord wi th the v iew expressed as to the adequacy of the coast defences, and informed the W a r Cabinet that it would take at least s ix hours' before a British Naval Force could be on the spot to interfersVwith any attempt at landing,- and that even then it would be inferior in strength to the covering force.

13. I n reference to W a r Cabinet,, 99, Minu te 16, the W a r Cabinet approved the Report of Lord Derby's Committee (Paper G.T.-210) recommending that , in view of the shipping situation and the reports on the Portuguese Contingent a l ready landed in

be transported should not he agreed to, and that the Portuguese Government should be approached with a view to the R a i l w a y Construction and Labour Battal ions a lready arranged for having priority of shipping.

In view of the sensitiveness "of the Portuguese, the W a r Cabinet invi ted the Secretary of State for War to word his refusal so as to avoid g iv ing any cause of offence to the Portuguese Government and nation.

Invasion. \ 14. The W a r Cabinet had under consideration the Report of a Jo int Admira l ty and W a r Office Conference on the question of Invasion, dated the 17th March, 1917 (War Cabinet, 97, Minu te 3) . (Paper G.T.-217. Appendix I ) .

The Fie ld-Marshal Comnaanding-in-Chief the Home Forces, explained that the main l ine of defence was on the coast, and that,, in the event of the enemy reaching the coast, their first task would be to force this l ine, and tha t 5 divisions, 2 of which were new divisions in a very backward condition, were distr ibuted as reserves to meet such a contingency. He further stated that, in spite of very careful ly worked-out ra i lway arrangements , further reinforce­ments could not be collected on the East Coast wi th in less than 36 -45 hours.

The general view of the experts present at the W a r Cabinet was that, whilst an at tempt at invasion could not be ru led out as absolutely impossible, i t was extremely un l ike ly that the enemy would carry it to a successful conclusion.

Whi ls t concurring general ly in the Jo in t Committee's Report, the War Cabinet decided that—

In view of the fact that the Committee had not heard the views of Admira l of the Fleet Lord Fisher of Kilverstone, a formal invitation should be sent to Lord Fisher to attend a Meet ing of the W a r Cabinet, to g ive them the benefit of his views.

The Secretary was instructed to take action accordingly. In regard to the point raised in the last paragraph of the Joint

Committee's Report, as to the advisabil i ty of the despatch abroad of the one division at Home which could be sent, the Director of Mi l i t a ry Operations stated that the Chief of the Imper ia l General Staff would bring the subject forward for the decision of the W a r Cabinet ear ly in April .

Evacuation of the 15 . I n reference to letters received by the Pr ime Minister from Isle of Thanet. Lord North cliff e and from the Secretary to the Archbishop of

Canterbury on the subject of the recent withdrawal of school children from the Is le of Thanet, the Fie ld-Marshal Commanding­in-Chief the Home Forces reported that he had, on the previous Fr iday , in consequence of information received as to enemy action, ordered a state " Vig i l ance ," which state carried wi th i t the assembling at their W a r Stations of certa in of the Mi l i t a r y Forces in Great Britain. He stated that orders had been g iven that day for the troops to revert to their normal duties.

Overland Route to 16 . In reference to its previous decision (War Cabinet, 102 , Salonica. Minute 4), the W a r Cabinet discussed, in the presence of the

Ra i lway and Shipping experts, the question of the development of the Overland Route through I t a l y to Salonica.

Sir Guy Granet stated that the development of the route presented no difficulty from a technical and constructional point of view.

The Secretary of State for W a r explained, however, that the difficulties arose main ly from the shortage of roll ing-stock for the paramount and indispensable needs of the All ied Armies on the Western Front, which had been accentuated by the increased strain produced by following up the recent German withdrawal , and that the supply of this necessary mater ia l depended mainly on shipping.

The Shipping Controller said that he expected that considerable assistance might be obtained for the shipping position if Amer ica joined the Al l ies , and that there Avas a lways the possibil ity of ( neutra l shipping (some 250 Dutch, Swedish, Danish, and Norwegian vessels) in Brit ish ports being requisit ioned, which would he more pract icable if the United States entered the war.

Sidings, Rest Camps, and Sheds.

Provision of Workmen by M. Venizelos.

Congestion in Ports.

The Shipping Situation.

Possible Intervention of the United States of America.

The Firs t Sea Lord indicated the hope that some 2,000 t rucks , at present employed in the conveyance of coal for the Fleet , might, in the near future, by means of re-organisation of the coaling arrangements , be released.

Sir Guy Granet reported that four goods tra ins and one passenger t ra in per day would carry overland the same amount of supplies as was being shipped from the United Kingdom to Salonica. He outlined two schemes—one for the transport of 1,200 tons a day and another for the transport of 2,000 tons ̂ e x p l a i n i n g tha t in the former case three months' preparatory work would be required for the provision of sidings, & c , before transport could begin, whilst in the la t ter case a longer t ime would be necessary.

The W a r Cabinet approved the instructions a lready given by the W a r Office for the immediate development of the necessary sidings, rest camps, and sheds on the new route, in order that immediate advantage might be taken of the first moment when the necessary roll ing-stock could be set free, either from the Western Front or from this country.

In view of the serious outlook for shipping in the Mediterranean, the W a r Cabinet decided that the War Office, in mak ing their pre l iminary arrangements , should envisage the largest possible development of this route, w i th a view to the transportation of supplies to Egypt as wel l as to Salonica.

The W a r Cabinet took note that the development of the smaller scheme provides for the conveyance as fa r ' as Taranto of an amount equa l to a l l the mater ia l now despatched from this country to Salonica, and more.

17. The W a r Cabinet took note of a letter, dated 19th March , 1917, from M. Gennadius to the Pr ivate Secretary to the Pr ime Minis ter (Paper G.T.-247, Appendix I I ) , on the subject of the provision by him of labour for road construction.

18. The Shipping Controller indicated his intention of pre­senting to the Secretary of State for W a r at an ear ly date a scheme for night and day work in the ports, involving special labour arrangements , with a view to a more rapid turning round of the ships.

19. The Minister of Munitions called attention to the amount of ra i lway mater ia l awai t ing shipping at ports or works, as reported in a Statement submitted by him (Appendix I I I ) .

In view of the accumulat ing evidence that the submar ine blockade and the increasing demands made upon tonnage by our­selves and our Allies were exercising a most serious influence on our shipping position, the Shipping Controller was asked again to review the whole situation. The Shipping Controller explained that he had a lready done this in his Statement on the Mercanti le Mar ine and Shipping Programme, which he had jus t submitted for t h e Meet ing of the Imperia l W a r Cabinet (Paper G.T.-284) .

The question was adjourned for further consideration after discussion at the Imperia l WTar Cabinet.

20, Hav ing regard to the great stress la id by the Shipping Controller on the importance, from a shipping point of view, of the. intervention of the United States of America in the war on the side of the All ies, and also in view of the importance of such intervention from a financial point of view, the W a r Cabinet decided that—

It was desirable that, in the event of the intervention in the W a r by the United States of Amer ica , a special Mission

Agriculture : Corn Production Bill.

Pood: The Food Hoarding Order.

Strike of Engineers at Barrow.

should proceed to the United States for the purpose of notifying the relat ive importance of the various forms in which co-operation could he given. The W a r Cabinet recognised, however, that i t was essential for such a Mission to have at i ts head some individual of the highest consequence and authority , who would carry great weight wi th the United States Government, and that the despatch of this Mission was contingent on the selection of such a leader.

21. The W a r Cabinet had under consideration the Corn Production Bi l l , which had been drafted to give effect to the decisions which had been reached by it on the 2 l s t February (War Cabinet, 76, Minute 8, 10) . The discussion on this subject was adjourned for further study.

22. The W a r Cabinet had before them the draft of " The Food Hoarding Order, 1917," proposed by the Minis t ry of Food (War Cabinet, 99, Minute 19) (Paper G.T.-257, Appendix IV) . The W a r Cabinet decided to approve the issue of the Order, subject to the following changes :—

Clause 3. Reference to Police to be omitted, and " any person special ly authorised by the Food Controller," or words to tha t effect, to be substituted.

Clause 4 (6.). This clause to be re-drafted so as to exempt persons in the habit of baking their own bread or cur ing their own bacon, or otherwise conserving foodstuffs in their own homes.

23, The Minister of Labour raised the question of the strike of engineers at Barrow, where the workmen al leged that Messrs. Vickers have been cutt ing down the t ime-rates of the premium bonus system. The W a r Cabinet approved in principle a draft announcement to be made in the House of Commons on the afternoon of the 26th March, and left i ts exact terms to be arranged by the Pr ime Minister, Mr. Bonar Law, and Mr. Hodge.

2, Whitehall Gardens, S.W., (Ini t ia l led) D. LI. G.

March 26, 1917.

A P P E N D I X I .

G.T.-217.

Note by the Secretary,

IN circulat ing this Report of a jo in t Admira l t y and W a r Office Conference on Invasion, attention is drawn to the fact that the Conference do not appear to have pressed " Lord Eisher to explain fu l l y the grounds on which his apprehensions were based," as suggested by the W a r Cabinet (War Cabinet, 97 ( 3 ) ) .

I t is for consideration whether the W a r Cabinet should not themselves hear what Lord Fisher has to sav on the matter .

(S igned) M . P. A . H A N K E R . 2, Whitehall Gardens, S.W.,

March 20, 1917.

A Conference was held in , the Room of the Secretary of State for War , a t 2-45 P . M . , on the 16th March, 1917.

Present : Secretary of-State for War . First Loi'd of the Admira l ty . First Sea Lord of the Admira l ty . Chief of the Admira l ty W a r Staff. Chief of the Imperia l General Staff. Director of Mi l i ta ry Operations.

- . Fie ld-Marshal Commanding-in-Chief, Home Forces. Chief of the General Staff, Home Forces.

1. The Secretary of S ta te for W a r stated that the conference was held at the request of the W a r Cabinet, in consequence of a communication on the subject of the invasion of Great Br i ta in which the Pr ime Minister had received from Admira l of the Fleet Lord Fisher.

2. The First Sea Lord stated that in view of nava l developments the Admira l t y desired to review the conclusion (ii) of the " Report of a Conference between representatives of the Admira l t y W a r Staff and the General Staff, held to consider the possibil ity of an at tack on the United Kingdom the 9th August , 1916," and to extend the t ime within which the enemy's landing operations could be effectively interrupted from the original estimate of from twenty-four to twenty-e ight hours after the hostile transports were sighted from the shore to from thir ty- two to th i r ty-s ix hours after the hostile transports had been sighted from the shore.

3. The Admira l ty representative stated that the enemy sti l l had sufficient shipping to transport 160,000 men to these shores, and the O.I.G.S. stated that the enemy would still be able to find that number of troops for the purpose of invasion, more especially as he is now increasing the number of his divisions in Belg ium.

4. The Admira l ty representatives further stated that whi le invasion was possible they did not consider that, from a nava l point of view, i t was probable, in view of the grave risks which the enemy must run.

The First Sea Lord stated that, in his opinion, the probabil ity of a beach landing was remote, as the r isks involved were very great, and the C.I.G.S. added tha t the feasibil ity of landing a force of 160,000 men with in th i r ty-s ix hours depended upon the enemy being ab le to use the beaches.

5. The Field-Marshal Commander-in-Chief, Home Forces, 'stated that the mi l i t a ry aspect of the question was that the defences -on the coast were now in a far better condition to meet invasion than they were a year ago, and that in par t icu lar the number of machine-guns avai lable at home, which was an important factor in the question, was much g r e a t e r ; on the other hand, the number of mobile troops immediately at the disposal of the Fie ld-Marshal for Home Defence was, as a resul t of the W a r Cabinet decision of the 22nd J a n u a r y last, about 60,000 below his estimated requirements to meet an invasion by 160,000 men, and the qual i ty of a considerable portion of his Divisions was poor. There was also the question of Ire land to be considered.

6. The Conference, after hearing the above expression of opinion, decided that the question of the number of troops to be maintained in Great Br i ta in to meet invasion was one of ba lancing the advantages of s t rengthening our oversea forces as aga inst the r isk of invasion, and could only he decided by the W a r Cabinet after periodical review of the genera l situation. ,

At the present t ime there is only one Division a t Home which could be sent abroad. I t is now being prepared and wi l l be ready in about a month's t ime. The advisabi l i ty of i t s despatch should then be considered by the W a r Cabinet.

(Ini t ia l led) E. C. D. E. J . R . J . W . R. R.

March 17, 1917.

A P P E N D I X I I . G.T.-247.

S A L O N I C A .

Provision of Workmen by M. Venizelos for Road-building Purposes.

Copy of a Letter from M. J. Gennadius to the Private Secretary to the Prime Minister.

Dear Sir, 14, De Vere Gardens, March 19, 1917. I H A V E received a te legram in which M. Venizelos desires me to convey to the

Pr ime Minister his warm thanks for the courteous manner in which he was so good as to receive M . Diomedes.

M . Venizelos gave his immediate attention to the Pr ime M i n i s t e r s remarks in regard to workmen for road-building. Although, in consequence of the occupation by the I ta l i ans of Northern Epirus and by the Erench of Koritsa, the road to Monast i r is not in territory under the control of the Provisional Government, M. Venizelos offered to General Sarrai l to recruit tbe number of men needed, but the General replied that for the present he was sufficiently supplied with workmen.

M. Venizelos made the same offer to the Brit ish Commander-in-Chief, who stated tha t he needed in his section some 5,000 men. The necessary measures have at once been taken by the Administrat ion under M . Venizelos to supply these workmen.

I request you, in presenting my regards to the Pr ime Minister , to add that I am at his disposal, should he desire to convey to M . Venizelos a n y further message.

Yours sincerely, (Signed) J . GENNADIUS.

J . T. Davies, Esq.

APPENDIX III.

Ministry of Munitions : Railway Materials Branch.

S T A T E M E N T showing Promised Production compared with Actual Suppl ies avai lable as at March 10, 1917.

Total await-Total Granding Shipping TotalDescription of Supply. Quantity Total Remarks.at Ports or Promised.Shipped. Produced.Works.

11.. RailsRails—— 20-lb20-lb.. railrailss

75-lb75-lb.. anandd 80-lb80-lb.. railsrails—— GuesGuestt KeeKeenn India.India... AustraliAustraliaa CanadCanadaa (80-lb.(80-lb.))BritisBritishh railwayrailwayss

Miles. 140

85 68

"so 1U

247

Miles. 278

114 48 50

107 86

405

Miles. 418

149 116 50

137 200

652

MilesMiles.. 353500

373755

PromisPromisee madmadee bbyy MinistrMinistryyiinn letteletterr ooff 5t5thh JanuarJanuaryy ttoo SecretarySecretary,, WaWarr OfficOfficee

AAss arrangementarrangementss werweree madmadee aatt meetingmeeting,,

-- 20/12/120/12/166 witwithh ththee MinisteMinisterr anandd SiSirr EE.. GeddesGeddes..

22.. WaggonsWaggons—— 4-ft4-ft.. 8^-in8^-in.. gauggaugee 60-cm60-cm.. gauggaugee

33.. LocomotivesLocomotives—— 60-c.m60-c.m.. gauggaugee 4-ft4-ft.. 8^-in8^-in.. gauggaugee ordereorderedd

bbyy MinistrMinistryy4-ft4-ft.. 8^-in8^-in.. gauggaugee switcswitchh

typtypee

.No. 7,247

526

298

10

No. 1,222

336

109

40

No. 8,469

862

407

50

NoNo.. 5,235,2333 1,751,7533

242455

5500

StatemenStatementt bbyy SiSirr BB.. !! WW.. MoiMoirr aatt meetinmeetinggjj aatt G.H.Q,G.H.Q,,, FranceFrance,,jj 20/11/1620/11/16.. NonNonee ooff thesthesee araree yeyett duedue..

BaseBasedd oonn contraccontractt dede-­liveriesliveries..

Figures in italics quantities actually shipped. Figures in heavy type = quantities awaiting shipment at port or works.

March 20, 1917.

A P P E N D I X I V . G- .T.-257. -

S T A T U T O R Y R U L E S AND O R D E R S , 1 9 1 7 , No.

Defence of the Realm.

The Pood Hoarding Order, 1 9 1 7 , dated tbe March , 1 9 1 7 , made by the Food Controller under Regu la t ion 2 E of the Defence of the Rea lm Regulat ions.

I N exercise of the powers conferred upon h im by Regulat ion 2 E of the Defence of the Rea lm Regulat ions , and of a l l other powers enabling h im in that behalf, the Food Controller hereby orders as follows :—

Supplies for 14 days only to be Held. 1 . Except under the author i ty of the Food Controller, no person shal l buy or

offer to buy or after the , 1 9 1 7 , have in his possession or under his control any art icle of food in a greater quant i ty than is required for ordinary use and consumption in his household or establishment during a period of fourteen days.

I n any proceedings for a breach of this Art ic le , the burden of showing what quant i ty of any art ic le of food is so required shal l rest upon the person charged.

Aiding and Abetting. 2. No person shall , as sel ler or otherwise, knowing ly aid or abet the commission

of any act forbidden by Art ic le 1 of this Order.

Power of Entry. 3. A n y person authorised by the Pood Controller and any officer of police m a y

enter upon any premises in which he has reason to believe that any art ic le of food is being kept or secreted'in contravention of this Order, and carry out such inspection and examinat ion of the premises as he may th ink necessary.

Exceptions. 4 . This Order shal l not app l y to— (a.) A n y art icle of food required or held in the ordinary course of business by

any producer, dealer, or manufacturer . (b.) Any home-produced or home-made art ic le of food in the possession of the

producer or maker.

(Interpretation.) 5. For the purposes of this Order, the expression " art icle of food" shal l inc lude

every art icle which is used for food by man, or which ordinari ly enters into the composition or preparation of human food, except flavouring matters .

Penalty. 6. If any person acts in contravention of this Order, or aids or abets any other

person in doing anyth ing in contravention of this Order, tha t person is gu i l t y of a summary offence aga inst the Defence of the R e a l m Regulat ions , and if such person is a company, every director and officer of the company is also gu i l t y of a summary offence aga inst those regulat ions, unless he proves that the contravention took place without his knowledge or consent.

Title and Commencement of Order. 7.—(a. This Order may be cited as " The Food Hoarding Order, 1917." (6.) This Order shall come into force on the , 1917.

Food Controller. Ministry of Food, March 1917.