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T H I S D O C U M E N T I S T H E P R O P E R T Y O F H I S B R I T A N N I C M A J E S T Y ' S G O V E R N M E N T

Printed for the War Cabinet. June 1942.

S E C R E T . Copy-No. .

W . P . (42) 271. N I June 27, 1942. 1

TO B E K E P T U N D E R L O C K A N D K E Y

I t is requested t h a t special care may be. taken to ensure the secrecy of this document

W A R CABINET.

P O L I C Y TO B E A D O P T E D T O W A R D S M R . G A N D H I .

Memorandum by the Secretary of State for India.

W I T H reference to W a r Cabinet Conclusions of the 15th J u n e , 74 (42), M i n u t e 3, a n d to my Memorandum W . P . (42) 255 of the 16th "June, I c i rculate (Appendix I) for the consideration of the W a r Cabinet a te legram from the Viceroy, g iving his apprec ia t ion of the s i tuat ion.

I also circulate (Appendix I I ) a summary of a repor t of the discussion in the Congress W o r k i n g Committee on Gandhi ' s or ig ina l d r a f t of the Congress W a r Resolution, the text of which wil l be found in W . P . (42) 255. Th i s throws much l ight on the differences of opinion in the Committee.

L. S. A. India Office, June 27, 1942. ,

A P P E N D I X I.

Telegram from Governor-General to Secretary of State for India, dated June 26, 1942.

(Immediate.) 1928-S.

F O L L O W I N G is apprec ia t ion of present posit ion vis-a-vis G a n d h i and Congress :—

2. Cabinet will be fami l ia r w i th recent happenings . Pos i t ion as I see i t is, briefly, t h a t Cr ipps ' s negot ia t ions disclosed (a) a cer ta in readiness on the p a r t of Congress to re t reat , which was danger envisaged by Gandh i and which he did his best to offset; (b) they also involved a much more formal acceptance of the pr inc ip le of Pak i s t an , &c.; (c) when negotiat ions broke down Congress had become involved in them to an extent which considerably weakened their position of en t i re refusal to accept bona fides of H i s Majesty 's Government and of antagonism to retention of Br i t i sh connection wi th this country. Nehru himself was as deeply implicated as anyone; (d) following on collapse of Cr ipps ' s negot iat ions G a n d h i suffered defeat and consequent loss of face in Al lahabad discussions over h is wa r resolution.

This was followed by defection of Rajagopalachar i , who is still r u n n i n g his own opposi t ion campaign, for which he has received a measure of suppor t .

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3. I have always thought tha t two ma t t e r s which weigh wi th Gandh i were, first, his personal vani ty , and, second, his. desire to keep Congress together. S i tua t ion described in the preceding p a r a g r a p h threa tened both. Congress showed signs of d is in tegrat ion, had lost pres t ige and posit ion in the country, and it had been made clear t ha t Gandh i ' s words were no longer ent i rely au thor i ta t ive w i th it. H e was bound in these circumstances ei ther to let process of dis integra­t ion (and paral le l process of increasing loss of face on his own pa r t ) continue, or to endeavour by d rama t i c gesture to reconcentrate a t tent ion on himself and to reconsolidate divided ranks of Congress.

4. The first method of achieving these objects was " Br i t a in ge t t ing out " slogan. To tha t very general (? refrain) he has endeavoured to (? hi tch), firstly,general fears of J apanese wi th suggestion t h a t were we not here I n d i a would have nothing to fear about J apanese aggression; secondly, grievance, minor but obviously far more acutely felt by rank a n d file, which may ar ise in operat ional areas in connection w i th orders to evacuate houses and holdings as result of our denial policy, &c. H e has secured utmost publici ty both here and in Uni ted Sta tes for " Br i t a in ge t t ing out " slogan, and a for tnight ago it looked as though, assuming that tha t slogan were a success, a n d tha t if it was followed by an appea l for mass civil disobedience movement, non-payment of land revenue or other move designed to interfere in our w a r effort, we might have to take on a serious bat t le wi th Congress in immediate future.

5. The last for tnight , however, has , in my judgment , eased the s i tuat ion. Gandhi , somewhat unwisely perhaps , made i t clear t h a t i t was not only the Br i t i sh but the Americans also who must leave the country. The H a r i j a n contained a series of somewhat insu l t ing comments on Amer ican colour policy, t rea tment of negroes, & c , while Amer ican soldiers have been bracketed w i th Br i t i sh as unwelcome. A n d whi le Gandh i has seen a large number of Amer ican press correspondents, the accounts in H a r i j a n show tha t h is ta lks wi th them have a t least on one occasion led to " some exasperat ion " on p a r t of h i s visitor. H e has not, so far as I a m aware , h a d a good Amer ican press, and he is, of course, very sensitive to that . So far as I n d i a is concerned, unreal charac ter of his proposals, failure to accept real i ty of J a p a n e s e menace, & c . , h a s probably been contributory cause of wha t is undoubtedly a fact, tha t he did not get too good a press even in I n d i a n papers which suppor t Congress. There are indicat ions also tha t soundings taken of provinces had not been wholly encouraging from his point of view : and while he has got Nehru and K a l a m Azad on his side, bur informa­t ion suggests t h a t nei ther of them is p repa red to go in for mass civil disobedience. Finally, J i n n a h has now published statement, gist of which you have seen, which shows t h a t he is not p repa red to acquiesce in Gandh i ' s policy, or in any action by H i s Majes ty ' s Government or Gandh i which may prejudice Moslem claims.

6. The M a h a t m a ' s reactions to this position are shown by fact tha t in las t ten days he has spared no oppor tuni ty ' ' to in te rpre t ' ' (and in the process to cloud and befog) his or ig ina l slogan. No metaphysic ian could now d raw any really firm conclusion from or iginal slogan read wi th var iety of r iders which Gandhi has passed upon it. H e is thus, so far as broad policy s tands, in position, which he always tr ies to create, in which he has the opera t ion of a policy not clearly understood by e i ther his followers or world a t large and the definition of which remains ent irely in his own hands .

7. A t the same time, while he may not have had response for which he had hoped, he has wi th s ingular success aga in focussed a t tent ion in this country (and I should have thought also abroad) on himself. By securing suppor t (under whatever l imitations) of Nehru and Azad , he has got the backing of main figuresin Work ing Committee, and the a t tent ion concentrated on Gandh i has still fur ther detracted from significance and activit ies of Ra jagopa lachar i . He has thus secured wi thout any open clash wi th us cer tain of objects which he may be presumed to have had in view in launching his present agi ta t ion , and to tha t extent the need for extreme measures may perhaps be r a the r less from his point of view than i t was a t an earl ier stage. I t is very relevant, too, t h a t Gandhi , so far as I can judge, has lost none of his polit ical astuteness, and I remain of the opinion tha t he is as unlikely as in past , par t icu lar ly at his age and the somewhat shaky condit ion of Congress, to engage in a bat t le in which he does not feel fair ly confident of victory.

8. I see no sign of any pa r t i cu l a r excitement in the country. A s suggested above, I doubt if response to an appea l for mass civil disobedience by Gandh i would be in any sense whole-hearted. Nor do I th ink such an appeal likely.

9. The next s tage is meet ing of the W o r k i n g Committee of Congress on 6th Ju ly . There is a t th is moment no clear indicat ion of wha t proposi t ion Gandh i is likely to p u t before them. I doubt myself if he is really yet clear in his mind. Moreover, he is essentially oppor tunis t . I t may be t h a t the course of L ibyan compaign over the next for tn ight will mater ial ly affect the line which the Work ing Committee and Gandh i wil l take. T h a t we cannot judge .

10. I am, however, advised that , whatever the W o r k i n g Committee decide, i t would be impossible for them to implement it, pa r t i cu la r ly if they have to go for confirmation to A l l - Ind i a Congl'es"s""Committee, w i th in a t least a for tn ight from the da te of the i r meet ing. On tha t assumption, there-is-notra"' 'greaT3eal to be gained a t this s tage by my examining for benefit of the Cabinet a l te rnat ive possibilities. I would prefer, on the whole, therefore, to wa i t un t i l the W o r k i n g Committee has met, and thereaf ter to advise you and the Cabinet in the l ight of the i r conclusion. There need be no delay about tha t , and I should be (? able to) avoid was t ing your t ime by examining a series of hypotheses. Meanwhile, I will, of course, keep you in closest touch wi th any developments t h a t may affect the general s i tuat ion.

11. Bu t I th ink I can proper ly a t th is s tage record the following general proposit ions : (a) Nei ther H i s Majesty 's Government nor I have any desire to take on Congress if we can avoid tha t consistently wi th ma in t a in ing w a r effort and provisions of the law, &c. W e have qui te enough on our hands already, (b) On the other hand, if Congress a t t i t ude forces us to take them on, we must be p repa red to do so and w i t h the utmost vigour. T h a t would be the case whether Congress a t tempted a policy of mass or indiv idual civil disobedience throughout the whole country, or, al ternat ively, to slow down work in connection wi th war effort, or, a l ternat ively (perhaps in some ways as likely as any), issue ins t ruc­t ions to refuse to pay land revenue or to indiv iduals in operat ional areas to get in the way of mi l i t a ry a r rangements for evacuation of areas, occupation of bui ldings, & c , and denial policy, (c) W e might be p repa red to contemplate the a r res t of Gandhi , and, if necessary, of other leaders, if circumstances so dictate . I a t tach, I fear, l i t t le impor tance to other leaders, but Gandh i is a special case. I f we a re forced to a r res t bim, a l ternat ives are to in te rn him outside I n d i a or in I n d i a . I have carefully considered these al ternat ives. In result, I conclude in favour of in t e rn ing him in this country on same line as we had in view previously, viz., in a comfortable house, probably in Bombay Presidency, and giving all due considerat ion to him. H e will, in my judgment , have far less popular appeal if he is in terned here and be far less of a focus. I t h ink effect, too, in Un i t ed States will probably be less un fo r tuna te if he is kept in his own country in comfortable sur roundings than if he is deported to U g a n d a or the like. Final ly, we avoid any risk, of difficulties over food, medical a t tent ion, physical s t r a in on him of a long a i r or sea passage, &c.

12. I would, however, also add following comments :— (a) I f we a r e faced wi th serious trouble here and are (? to come) through it

successfully, I must be assured of complete backing of H i s Majesty 's Government. My Council have made a very s t rong point of this . They complain t h a t when they a r e invited to go all out aga ins t Congress tihey cannot r i sk posit ion being radical ly changed a t a moment 's notice wi thout consulting wi th them by a mission sent such a s C r i p p s ' s from home which concentrates on Congress, and they u rge very strongly tha t if they a re to get on the pla t forms a n d expose the fallacies of Congress policy they should do so w i th a n assurance t h a t they will not be thrown overboard. I recognise t h a t politics being what they a re there cannot be any last word in mat te rs such as these. B u t I should like to be able to assure my Council t ha t in the event of their t ak ing the line (and poli t ical r isks to themselves) involved they would do so wi th complete backing of H i s Majesty 's Government.

(&) H i s Majes ty ' s Government mus t be p repared to p r epa re the way in Uni ted States and a t home, and to do really active p ropaganda for our course

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of action. I thought your telegrams to Home Depar tmen t 10853 and 10854 admirable on those lines, but ground requires very careful p repa ra t ion .

(c) (5 We) mus t be p r epa red to t ake a much more r i g id line as regards news, broadcasts , &c. I am te legraphing separate ly to you about B.B.C., and suggest ing tha t a fa r g rea te r degree of control over I n d i a n mate r i a l p u t out by i t is called for. I can do a good deal myself w i th R e u t e r s ; but I should have to look to you and to H i s Majes ty ' s Government to help so far as they could w i t h Reute r and wi th press generally. I recognise t ha t we cannot prevent people like Sorensen, & c , from ask ing questions in Pa r l i amen t .

A P P E N D I X I I .

Summary of Discussion in Congress Working Committee on the CongressWar Resolution, finally adopted en May 1.

Nehru u rged t h a t G a n d h i ' s d r a f t made the wrong approach. The Br i t i sh could not reasonably w i t h d r a w their t roops even if they recognised independence; w i thd rawa l of t roops and the whole a p p a r a t u s of civil admin i s t ra t ion would create a vacuum which could not be filled immediately. Moreover, the conquest of I n d i a is in the J a p a n e s e p lan . I f the Br i t i sh wi thdrew, the Japanese would insist on cer ta in facil i t ies—aerodromes, occupation of s t ra tegic points, passage for troops to the Midd le East . Acceptance of the policy in G a n d h i ' s d ra f t would make Ind ia a passive pa r tne r of the Ax i s Powers . H e repeatedly emphasised th is last point and said t h a t the J apanese could not be stopped by non-violent non­co-operation, while Congress would get hosti l i ty from every other element outside the A x i s Powers . The whole thought and background of G a n d h i ' s d raf t was one of favour ing J a p a n . I t was G a n d h i ' s feeling t h a t J a p a n and Germany would win. H e thought Congress were agreed (1) on their react ions to Government; (2) on their total inabi l i ty to co-operate w i th Government ; (3) on their policy not to embarrass Government because t h a t would help the invader.

Po in t s made by speakers who suppor ted Nehru were :— Pandit Pant: The language about condemnation of the Cr ipps proposals is

highly e x a g g e r a t e d - i f the proposals were so bad, why did we spend so much t ime over them? W e must do our utmost to defend the country and swallow many th ings . If I c a n ' t co-operate wi th the Br i t i sh i t is because i t is not consistent wi th our d igni ty . Bu t the approach in G a n d h i ' s d ra f t makes every soldier I see my enemy.

Asaf Ali: Te l l ing the Br i t i sh to w i t h d r a w will do nobody any good. Bhulabhai Desai: The resolution is inconsistent w i th our previous stand. W e

have said t h a t if offered an oppor tun i ty we shall side w i th the Allies. Satyamurti: I do not agree w i th the objection to the ent ry of foreign soldiers.

I n d i a may defend herself even w i th the a id of foreign soldiers. Rajagopalachariar also crit icised the or ig ina l d ra f t and i ts amendment by

R a j e n d r a P r a s a d . T h e new in te rpre ta t ion of Congress policy would go terr ibly aga ins t them, and J a p a n would say : " Exce l l en t ! " J a p a n would fill, the vacuum created by the Br i t i sh wi thdrawa l . " Our react ion to the evils of B r i t a i n should not make us lose our sense of perspective. Do not run into the arms of J a p a n , which is wha t the resolution comes t o . "

Bu t in spi te of Neh ru ' s cri t icisms the major i ty of the W o r k i n g Committee suppor ted G a n d h i ' s draf t , as amended by R a j e n d r a P r a s a d .

Kripalani: The resolution will not necessarily lead to the passage of Japanese armies th rough Ind ia . Congress have asked Br i t i sh and Americans to w i t h d r a w thejr armies, and so also they ask others to keep out of thei r frontiers. " I f they do not, we fight."

Patwardhan: If we do no t take decisions Nehru ' s a t t i t ude will lead to abject and uncondi t ional co-operation wi th Br i t i sh machinery which must collapse. Co-operation wi th B r i t a i n is an invi ta t ion to J a p a n . The wa r is an imperia l is t war. Our policy can be tha t we take no sides. I would reconsider the position if the Allies could defeat the Axis . But I see clearly tha t Br i t a in is going towards the deep. W e wan t to create neutra l i ty .

Vallabhai Patel: The Br i t i sh cannot defend Ind ia . W e cannot defend- i t either because they won ' t let us. B u t if they w i t h d r a w there is a chance for us. Congress to-day is reeling under two blows, one Cr ipps and the other Ea j agopa lacha r i a r ' s resolutions. I feel Gandhi is instinctively r igh t in the lead he gives in all cr i t ica l s i tuat ions. I t is t ime the door (to negotiat ions with the Bri t ish Government) was finally closed after the repeated insults heaped on us.

Sarojini Naidu: The d ra f t is good as an expression of our extreme disgust and dislike and ha t r ed of the Br i t i sh Government.

Bishwanath Das: The Cr ipps proposals if accepted would have kept us in permanent bondage. The appeal to B r i t a i n to w i thd raw is very proper .

A. N. Deo: Whatever unrea l i ty there is in I n d i a n politics is due to Br i t i sh rale. Le t i t go and the unreal i ty will disappear . I am not interested in defeat ing Hi t le r i t e Germany.

Maulana Kalam Azad:(jve&t B r i t a i n has made ' i t impossible for us to defend our country. I f I felt t h a t J a p a n was better than Br i t a i n and he r invasion was for the good of I n d i a I would have said so in public. Gandh i ' s prescr ipt ion is the only a l ternat ive , though I doubt i t s effectiveness.

G a n d h i ' s resolution,- as amended by Raj en dr a P ra sad , and an al ternat ive resolution submit ted by Nehru were put to the vote. The former was adopted a t the morn ing session on the 1st May, but the mat ter was reopened a t the afternoon session and N e h r u ' s d r a f t was finally adopted.