CAMPBELL_Self-Mastery and Stoic Ethics

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Self-Mastery and Stoic Ethics

Keith Campbell

Philosophy, Vol. 60, No. 233. (Jul., 1985), pp. 327-340.

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Self mastery and Stoic EthicsK E I T H CAIPIPBELL

Self mastery in the Moral Life

For the Stoic hero, the man or woman of virtue, the conduct of lifepresents no serious problems. T h e life of the sage comprises a consis-tent and effortless flow of actions, all conforming to virtue and allundertaken for the sake of their place in a virtuous life. The Stoic sagehas advanced to a point where a life of courage and wisdom, justice andtemperance comes easily and naturally, without struggle and withoutrepinings.This stage of serene, single-minded goodness is an ideal, an idealrarely, if ever, achieved. For us, virtue is not yet attained. Neverthe-less, it is our business to make progress in that direction. Preciselybecause we are not sages this is not easy, for it requires struggle withtendencies contrary to virtue. We find alternatives to virtue attractive,and often our first impulse is to act out of one of these alternatives;cowardice, greed, sloth, or pride, for example.That the life of virtue does not arise automatically, but is to be wononly by painful effort, is no news, but a moralist s commonplace. T heidea is expressed in calls for mastery of self, control of the passions, orvictory over one s disgraceful side. These are all images of strife orwarfare in the personality, a struggle whose successful outcome isdescribed as a victory over or conquest of self.

The Stoic DilemmaStoics are not ascetics. By this mean that unlike the fiercer sort ofCalvinist they do not regard desires and appetites as themselvesinherently evil. Consequently they do not consider self-mastery as anintrinsic moral good but as a means only. Self-mastery is somethingwhich, as things in fact stand with us, is essential for the attainment ofvirtue, since, as a contingent matter, we have a wayward and disorderlyconstitution.Because self-mastery is involved in the growth of virtue, even if onlyas a means, there must be a place for it in any adequate account ofhuman personality and human action. Here a difficulty arises: in theStoic philosophy of man the personality is a single, unified, reality.Philosophy 6 985


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Keith ampbell

T he re is just one personal cent re , the higemonikon, th e self f rom w hichbehav iour a r ise s. T h e hee m on iko n i s the ra tiona l govern ing pr inc ip le .I t a lone , unchal lengeable , de ter m ines every ac tion. Th e re are not twoor more compet ing fac tors , reason and the passions, for example , orconscience and desire , whose f luctuat ing fortunes in a perennial c ivi lwar make u p the sou l s b iography . I f , how ever , t he re a re no t twoopp osing forces, how can th ere be ro om for mastery of self as a diff icul tcondi t ion to a t t a in?

ViThere you r higem oniko n is in good s ha pe it judges rightly as to th egood , an d th is judgm ent f lows smoothly in to honiz?, or impu lse , and soin to ac tion . 170u are a sage, a nd the re is no call for self-mastery.

W he re, as is m ore prob able, you r hEgernonikon canno t be relied up onto judge r ight ly as to wha t is to be do ne , i t is likely to favour imp rope rlyyour ow n temp orar y and par tia l advantage . I n th is case a lso yourjudgment , e r roneous as i t i s , carr ies your assent in to impulse andact ion. T h e re are no mea ns, no forces , by which your judgment couldbe ove r th rown. There i s no th ing wi th in you by which your e r ran thegemonikon could be mastered. So in this case self-mastery isimpossible .

Here then i s the di lemma: on a Stoic , uni ta ry concept ion of theperson, the se l f -mastery which mora l exper ience shows to be bothpossible an d needfu l emerge s as e i ther impossible or unnece ssary .

I n w ha t fol lows I at te m pt three tasks: to show tha t the division of th em ind in to host ile cam ps i s unte nab le , to account for mora l confl ic t an dmoral develop men t o n a uni ta ry theory of th e personal ity , an d todefend such a uni ta ry theory against contemporary plura l i s t icaccounts .

The Metaphor of Internecine StrifeAn y acc oun t of t he so ul w hich divides i t into dist inct factions providesan at t rac t ive model of self-mastery as the t r iu m ph of o ne fact ion over allo the rs . G ro w th in v i r tue can be dep ic ted a s the s t ead ie r , more com -ple te , a nd m ore pe rm ane nt t r ium ph of th e higher or the highest selfove r the enemy wi th in .T h e s truc ture of the mode l is the same whe ther the protagonis ts a rePlato s reason, spi r i t , a nd passions, o r S t Paul s spi r i t an d f lesh, orFre ud s psychic dra m at is pers ona e . .And for our purposes a ll accountsof t he m atte r in term s of civil war a re ope n to the same object io ns.T he re can not b e , l ite ra l ly , a c ivil war w i thin the se l f. Any confl ic tbetween wa rring fact ions mu st be given a metaphorical gloss, for the recannot be m any ent i t ies of the requi red type w i thin a s ingle personali ty .


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Kei th Cam pbe l l

Mora l Conf l ic t o n the Sto ic M ode l : Making u p One s MindA uni tary personali ty can be subjec t to conf l ic t ing appeals . T h e self cans imul t aneous ly endorse , o r a lmos t endorse , lekta propos ing incompa t i -ble courses of ac t ion. I n s uch cases we hesi ta te and are in d ou bt overw hat t o d o. M oral confl ict is a special case of this , usua l ly, a case whe reduty conf lic ts wi th ou r ow n pleasure , or ease , or ga in .T h e process of making u p one s m ind w ha t to do cor responds fo rprac tica l reason to theore t ica l reason s d i lemm a in mak ing u p one sm ind w hat is the case. \\:e can simultaneously e nd ors e, or almostendorse , incom pat ible propos i t ions , in s i tua t ions wh ere there i s con-f l ic t ing evidence . Fo r bo th prac tica l and theore tica l reason the re canbe , s imul taneous ly , con sidera t ions in favour of incom pat ible a l te rna-t ives . \Ye use the s am e m etap hor , of inc l ina t ion, in bo th cases . ly e areincl ined towards both courses of act ion, and incl ined to bel ieve bothhypotheses . W hen the oppos i t e a t t rac t ions a re approx ima te ly equa l , welean equal ly in opp osi te direct ions . Th a t is, i t can be a difficult m atterto se t tle which i s the be t te r s ide to end orse .W here th e q ues t ion i s one co ncerning ourse lves , coming to a judg-ment can be pa inful as well as d i f f icul t, mark ing a fur ther correspon-dence be tween the theore tica l and th e pract ica l cases . T h e pain an ddi f f icul ty need not depend only on approximate ly equal s t rength ofevidence on ei ther side-think of the qu est ion : W as my beloved fatherreal ly a protect ion racketeer and purveyor of contaminated foods forpr ofi t ? H er e the diff icul ty l ies in accepting the evidence, not in balanc-ing i t , IVe have mot ives to accept or re jec t evidence , o ther than i t sre levance to the q uest ion a t h an d. Simi lar ly , we have mot ives to assentto courses of act ion oth er tha n their relat ion to vir tue.T h e process of mak ing u p one s m ind has never , in the theore tica lcase, been th ou gh t to cal l for a division of t he personal i ty into two o rmo re separa te seats of reason a nd jud gm en t. Ev en wh ere the process ofdeciding i s d if f icul t an d pa infu l , th is is because the one Reason con-fro nts several equal ly comp ell ing al ternat ives, an d recognizes thec la ims of each. A m ong the considera t ions for or aga inst var ious lek taare fac tors o ther th an logical weight , such as desi re , pre judice , p r ide ,f e ar , a n d p a r t i p r i s . W h e n t he se be c om e de te r m in i ng f ac to rs , wha t weare dea l ing wi th are in te l lec tual tempta t ions , and c orru pt ion s of theinte l lec t , which are to be res is ted .Corruption and temptation are factors having a distorting effect on theprocesses of think ing. T he y can be present a nd effective in thinking on eithertheoretical or practical ques tions. W here they are effective, they issue in assentto the wrong lek ta I n th e moral sphere, th e conflict between virtue and desireis, in literal terms , t he impu lse to assent to incompatible lekta on the basis ofdifferent sorts of favourable consideration .


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Self mastery and Stoic Ethics

The considerations which appeal to us fall into reasonably stableclusters, and our assenting responses take on recognizable patterns.These are our dispositions and habits, tendencies and cast of character.So that it is not just isolated events of conflict between differentinclinations, but rather stable incompatibilities with which we mustdeal. Whole stable chunks of our personalities are at odds with oneanother. T his is what gives the civil war model much of its appeal: theincompatible inclinations to assent to different lekta are not isolatedand fleeting elements which could be thought of as external to the self,but must be included within the self s boundaries. Their stability andcomplexity encourages us to conceptualize them as quasi-personalitiesin their own right.We are of course conscious of the incompatibilities involved and canassess the sorts of action to which various sorts of consideration giverise. If some sorts are judged preferable to others, those aspects of theself which issue in the preferred sorts of action will be looked on withmost favour. Thus arises the tendency to identify one s true self withthe favoured aspects, excluding the rest as alien. The tendency isnatural, and may sometimes be a salutary way of repudiating and soeliminating springs of vicious action, but it is, in strictness of language,an error. If the considerations which lead to assent to a non-virtuouscourse of behaviour did not belong to me, or the true me, the true mewould not be moved by them.That it is habits and dispositions with which we have to deal, as wellas particular episodes, is true no less of theoretical reason and itsvicissitudes than it is of practical reason and the carrying through of thewell-lived life.The Stoics can appeal to the correspondences between theoreticaland practical reason in their claim that the right conduct of life consistsin the right management of the practical lekta, giving assent to, andhence acting in accordance with, the appropriate ones only. Thisaccount of the matter admits the possibility of struggle and difficulty,yet retains the unitary h.Zgernonikon.The Stoic notion that for the life of virtue, what is both necessary andsufficient is that we make u p our mimds to it , is a noble and salutaryone. T o the problems with assent in this doctrine will return.If moral temptation and conflict proves to be one species of difficultyin making up one s mind, what of moral growth? How is that possible ifthe self is an undivided unity?


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Keith ampbell

Moral Improvement and the Unitary PersonWe are bo th imper fec t and im provab le because we a re complex . Th a ti s , we are ap t to g ive our assent to many di f ferent , often incom pat iblecourses of act ion. And we give assent for many reasons, of unequalwor th . Not a l l t he hqqernonikon s spo nta neo us acts of assent are inconformit w ith vir tu e; it is in this tha t imp erfect io n consists. Plainlyimp rov em ent consis ts in assent ing in a way w hich devia tes f rom v i r tueless an d less.

T h e f irs t s te p in im pro vem ent i s to recognize the need for i t . Asra tional agents we can judge, am ong other th ings, the ht?gemo?zikon sspontaneo us ac ts . Th a t requi res tha t we pass under review, and assess ,e lements in our own charac ter and behaviour , surveying s t re tches oft ime and referr ing ac tua l cases to idea l s tandards . These are notableaccom pl ishmen ts , bu t no more myster ious when what is judged formspart of o ur ow n lives rath er tha n som ebo dy else 's .N or d oes self-assessment , that is , cr i t ique of w hat we have don e orhave bee n, wil l do or will be , req uire a self w ith m ult iple elem ents of thecivil war k ind. In self-assessment , the objects of jud gm ent are notdis t inc t comple te agents , quasi -persons wi thin the se l f , but ac tua l orproposed a c t i ~ i t yan d the sort of person al i ty fro m which such activitycould arise . Paradox looms if self-assessment is wrongly thought toinc lude this ren pr -e se nt uct of self nssrssi z~jl~dgwzer~tSelf-assessmentis not so impossibly com prehensive as to inc lude i t s own presen t se l f ,thou gh ear lie r se l f-assessments can becom e the sub jec t of sub seq uen tones.T h e self can be s ingle , tha t i s , one cent re of dec is ion, ac t ion, and sorespons ib il i ty , wi thou t be ing s imple . T o be s imple i s to be w i thou tcom pone nt s . T h e theory of a s ing le hegemonikon does not ru le out acom plexi ty of senses and kinds of inpu t in to the h6gemonikon s decisionprocesses. R ecognit ion of disha rm ony an d imperfect ion requ ires a selfwhich can be single al though not simple. I t is a lso possible to give anaccount of a m end m ent in these t e rms . Am endm ent p roceeds th roughassent . We can give or wi thhold assent , and wi thout assent , ac t ioncannot fol low. T o improve in vi r tue , we need only s top giving assent tosu ch false lek ta as : I t is bes t tha t I should r un away f rom th i s conf ron ta -t ion, or shirk th is disagreeable task, or whatever course of act ion it maybe which, a l though incom pat ible wi th vi r tu e , is current ly so appeal ing.Persons of imperfec t v i r tue have been assent ing to the w rong lek tnbecause the i r assent has been de termined by egocent r ic , par t ia l , orsho r t - te r m c ons i der a ti ons. T he se unwo r t hy de t e r m i na n t s ca n c om e t oweigh less . They can give way gradual ly , progressive ly , to de termi-nan ts wh ich conform to vi r tue . As mora l is t s pu t i t , habi t can be foughtby hab i t .


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Over time, the considerations which up till now have yielded onepattern of assents can cease to be decisive. When this occurs, the life inquestion takes on a new pattern. The new7 pattern can be one morenearly in conformity with virtue. So growth in virtue is possible. But ifalteration in assent is all that is required, and assent is within our power,why should such a process be in any way slow, painful, or difficult?Where is the difficulty? Why is effort required?

The Difficulty of Moral GrowthEpictetus, that most uncompromising of Stoic thinkers, deals with thematter thus: assent is within our power, always and absolutely. Ourresponsibility for assent is total, so everything we genuinely do, ratherthan suffer, is ours, and ours alone. Assent is the one thing needful. Inreality, there is nothing harder about living with courage and temp-erance, justice and wisdom, than with their contraries. Those, forexample, who in cowardly fashion shun pain and death, do so becausethey mistakenly think that pain and death are evils. I n truth, since painand death lie outside the sphere of what it is ours to determine, they arematters indifferent. Cowards need only to be enlightened on thismatter.Epictetus leaves the impression that enlightening people on thisquestion of the indifference of pain and death will be like telling themthat the horse they favour is in reality a broken winded cripple. Thisnews will alter the pattern of their assents. The l kton Let me wager onthis horse will lose assent naturally, automatically, painlessly.Now a11 we know of Epictetus tells us he was a man of serene anddauntless courage, able to treat the prospects of pain and death with thesublime indifference his position seems to require. But lesser mortalsare different. For them changing the pattern of assent in the direction ofvirtue is neither automatic nor easy. Not even effort is guaranteed to beavailing. So the problem of how growth in virtue is difficult remains.

The Model of the Soul in TrainingAs everyone knows, in golf the swing is very important. As everyonewho has tried it knows, mankind is in a state of original sin when itcomes to the golf swing. Left to ourselves, we do it badly. Our framesgive assent to a l kton whose content specifies how to swing, but thespecification proves to be inaccurate. We require modification. Wemust learn new habits, at first difficult, painful, against the grain.Eventually, so I m told, comfortable, natural and satisfying.


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Keith Campbell

T o mprove o ur go l f , we pu t ourse lves to school. We go in to t ra in ing ,we seek advice, we follow e xp erts , we pract ise . W e st ick at it thro ug hdishear tening episodes. Perhaps s lowly and wi th di f f icul ty , wei m pr ove .Here , in many ways, i s a model for s t r iv ing af te r v i r tue . Perhapsbecause ne i ther P la to nor S t Paul p layed gol f , we do no t inher i t anaccount of this matter which contrasts the f leshly passions of hook,sl ice, an d com plete m iss with th e rat ional spir i tuali ty of low ered headand smo othly c i rc l ing arm s. T h e very same age nt , the se l f, i s goingwron g, recogniz ing th is , an d taking s teps to ame nd.A m en dm en t , in the case of gol f , requi res rearrangemen t of the ord erof im porta nce of the var ious fac tors which com bine in de term ining theoutc om e. As these fac tors a re emb edd ed in ou r habi tua l sense of bod i lywel l -be ing when we swing, rearranging them does not come di rec t lyand easi ly f rom recogniz ing and assent ing to the need forrearrangement .I n the case of v i r tue , re -order ing the fac tors de term ining assent i sa lso requi r ed. Egoce nt r ic i ty , s lo th , the o ver-emp hasis which averagesensual man gives to pleasure and pa in , resul t in assents in imica l tovi r tue . T h es e fac tors impo se a d is tor t ion on the process of dec idingwha t t o do , a nd contra Ep ic te tus , th is d is tor t ion does not evaporate themin ute it i s recognized. But there is no cont radic t ion in the view tha tassent i s both di f ficult and a lso in our pow er . O ne becomes vi r tuousthrough pe r forming v i r tuous ac ts , sa id Chrys ippus , fol lowing *h i s t -ot le . G olf coaches give the correspond ing advice on imp roving one sgam e. Prac t ice an d perseverance can modify not jus t the m ore sup er-ficial m atte r of ackn ow ledging th at a propo sed c ours e of act ion wou ldbe an imp rove m ent , b u t even assent in i t s fu ll de pth , the assent whichdetermines how we ac t .

The Model of the Soul s HealthOne image for the soul in diff icul t ies over vir tue is that of want ofinst ruc t ion and disc ipl ine , as wi th spor ts and the need for t ra ining.An othe r image i s tha t of w ant of hea l th an d s t reng th . 4 personal i ty ingood condi t ion , ro bus t and hea l thy , would be an Epic te tus , f ind ing nodiff icul ty in giving effective assent where assent is du e. B ut m ost of ushave souls in an unheal thy s ta te , hggemonika in which appropr ia teassent is not always smoothly effectual . For such selves, the task ofr ight ly pa t te rning assent i s burdensome.W e mu st he re avoid the image of d isease; that is a mod el involving aninvasion, in w hich passion o r v ice are thou gh t of as a lien in t ru ders o nthe t rue se lf . W hat i s requ i red, r a ther , i s the concept of convalescence


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T h e convalescent is not in the grip of any foreign pow er. But he lacksthe v igour , endurance, toughness, and st rength to carry out the fu llrou nd of hu m an activities. H e is, in each of these various ways, weak.W eakness is one way in which assent can be rende red of no effect.W ith bodily weakness, there is no philosophical pro blem . T h e con-valescent merely dramatize s ou r normal condition of limited pow er. I nsi tuat ions where w hat we have und ertake n is beyond our pow er, i t canbe the l i teral and u nprob lem atic t ru th that we real ly want to do X , reallygive our assent to th e lekto~z I t is best that I d o X , and yet canno t , andso do not , d o i t . T h is is particularly plain w here we only discover in theat tempt that the under taking is indeed beyond us.But what a bout moral weakness (th e problem of akrasia ?In the caseof bodily weakness, t he lim bs are effector organ s with the ir own limit-ations, of w hich convalescence remi nds us. But in the moral case, wh atis d if ficul t is not m anaging to do X , b ut ra ther m aking u p m y mind to doi t (or , perhaps more commonly , making up my mind not to do i t ) .W hen th e quest ion is one of embezzling the fund s or adulterat ing thefoodstuffs there is no bodily im pedim ent. If my m ind is made u p oneway or th e othe r, th e effect will indeed follow. N o forces stronge r thanmy own mu scles drive m e on i nto acts of injustice or folly. If I act inways involving in just ice or folly, it is because I have failed to decide notto . T h e acts d id have my assent , despi te anthing I may protest abo utnot really wantin g to do such things. So it seems that the model of th einvalid is not an a pprop riate one for the person finding virtue d ifficult .But let us look into it a l i t t le further. In convalescence, we areenfeebled not just in l imb and w ind, b ut in determ ination too. I n goodhealth , we have some resources enabling us to make repeated at tem ptsat some thing difficul t or d em andin g. I n convalescence, these are part lytaken from us. W e give up . W e give in . Th is is not a mat ter of failure ineffector organs. It is a failure at the level of giving assent, namely,acquiescence. We acquiesce in I do not bring about X , that is, weassent to it , but with reluctance, since we would prefer that X be thecase. Since we are al l , whatever our condit ion, constantly in thissi tuat ion, pe rhaps convalescence is not su ch an unsu itable model afterall.M uch acquiescence is inevitable, and m uc h m ore is blameless. Butwh at of one wh o acquiesces in I rema in an addict or hly work isslovenly al thou gh he recognizes the meri t in the lekta I stop takingheroin or I get up earl ier ? Can he real ly plead that assent to the lat ter isbeyond hi m ? Is he l iteral ly unable to assent as he prefers? T h e Stoicanswer at this point is: provided you are in good shape , you can alwaysassent as virtue req uire s. But you may be in a feeble conditio n, vitiatedby poor upb ringin g or deleterious habits. In which case your business isto get back into shap e.


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Keith Campbell

This may require exercises, extensive but less severe demands oncapacities for constancy and self-denial, to build up strength andhabituate the convalescent to what are, at first, the difficult paths ofvirtue. T he purpose of such a regime is to reduce the extent of acquies-cence, to make the preference for the difficult alternative more con-stantly effective. T he regime is well directed if the pattern of activity itpromotes is in fact a closer approach to virtue. ( I t is quite possible, ofcourse, to go into training in the interests of vice.)Exercise, practice, habit, graduated progress, are thus elementswhich emerge from both the image o the soul in training and themetaphor of convalescence. These models of moral progress prove tocoincide.

Habitual Virtue Assent and Self-monitoringMoral conflict and effort are conditions which make life a matter ofdeliberate and conscious choice among competing alternative coursesof action. Th e account of this in terms of the h gemonikon determiningby its assent which, among various attractions, will be pursued, canleave the impression that conscious, deliberate activity is the only kind.In Stoic authors there is often the suggestion that this is at least somesort of ideal; the sage is always fully aware of what he or she is doing,and why, for that is an element in the full rationality towards whichhuman beings strive.But much of life is not conducted on this basis at all. Indeed it couldnot be, for deliberation and decision are too time-consuming. It is byestablishing routines and habits that we get some efficiency into our useof t ime. Patterns of activity which are, at least usually, satisfactory, arerepeated without further deliberation. The consideration of alterna-tives is suppressed. We dress, get breakfast, take one of many routes towork, and, on a higher level, set up patterns of steadiness and energy, orthe reverse, not by making a choice on every occasion, but just becausethis is our established way of doing things. What is done habitually isnot only efficient, it is undertaken without the need for effort. Habitualvirtue is a large component in the sage s effortlessly virtuous life.Acting out of habit is sometimes described as doing things withoutthinking , which is accurate where this means without deliberating .But it does not imply that we do not realize what we are doing. Habitualactivity is not sleep-walking.In these cases it is still possible to speak of assent as an essentialcomponent in the determinants of action. For we realize what we aredoing, and do not object. We are set along a given line, and aremonitoring ourselves to ensure that we pursue that line. This self-


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monitoring provides continual opportunities to change direction. Solong as we do not change, the path we pursue is one to which we assent.What is done out of habit is something for which we are held respon-sible, and rightly, for it was something to which we assented. One in thegrip of what he himself considers to be a bad habit is in a state ofrepeated acquiescence, i.e. more or less reluctant assent, and recog-nizes the need to form other habits. Recognizing a habit as bad is, ofcourse, often itself an important piece of progress.The Stoic thesis of a single unitary self, distinguished by reason,consciously managing disparate motivational forces, is not invalidatedby the existence of habitual patterns of behaviour any more than by theexistence of inconsistent purposes and desires.

Acquiescence and lf masteryMoral progress consists in progress towards a shapely pattern ofassents, that is, a pattern of choices and habits conforming to virtue.Th at this requires sustained efforts should be no surprise. Ther e is noreason to expect that achieving a shapely pattern of assents will be anyeasier than attainments of other worthwhile kinds. As with any achieve-ment which calls for effort, we are entitled to declare that virtue isbeyond us only after a serious attempt to attain it.The test of seriousness is willingness to undertake the hardshipsinvolved. One who declares his desire to play Chopin s Polonaises, buttakes none of the appropriate preliminary steps, is not serious. He is notentitled to claim that Chopin is beyond him. The reason for his inabilityto play Chopin lies not in his incapacity but in his unwillingness toundergo the requisite rigours.Similarly, people who have not worked appropriately at attainingvirtue are not entitled to excuse themselves with claims of incapacity.Virtue is too hard for them because they have not got their hegemonikoninto a healthy condition, capable of a shapely pattern of assents. Andcapable, in particular, of appropriate refusal, and so of a shapely, ratherthan overblown, pattern of acquiescence.Apart from inertia, the factors at work in misplaced acquiescence areegocentricity, desire, and fear. Where these carry excessive weight theyexact assent despite the person s calm judgment. In such cases the selflacks self-command. Where these factors exert no more than theirproper influence, self-mastery is achieved.


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Keith ampbell

Unity of the MindT h e course of the discussion so far has been t h is : the Stoic concept ionof the hFgemonikon as sole de term ina nt of act ion is incom patible withthe civil st ri fe mod el of mo ral st rugg le an d mo ral progress. Bu t the civilstr i fe mode l is itself to be rejected, an d the con ceptio ns of m aking u pone s m in d, a nd str iv ing for a shapely pat tern of acqu iescence, yield anaccount of mora l d i f f icul ty an d mora l grow th com pat ible wi th the Stoictheory of the personal i ty.

However , the doct r ine of the uni ty of the mind, so prominent inStoic tho ug ht , i s presently un de r chal lenge in phi losophical psychol -ogy. Funct ional i sm divides the mind in to components . Art i f ic ia lin te l ligence models dea l in su b-ro ut ine s an d inform at ion exchanges.Spl i t -bra in exper iment and specula t ion conceives of the mind as aplural i ty of interact in g ent i t ies. T h e more theoret ical branch es ofpsychology proper, such as personal i ty theory, a lso general ly deal inmo re o r less in tegra ted gr oup s of d iverse e lements .

T h e bra in has in te r re la t ed pa r ts . S o one would expec t the m ind tohave parts also. And some of these, one ant icipates, wil l be modernversions of th e passions, drive s, or inst incts wh ich ap pear in earl ier civilwar mo dels of the d isharmon ious soul .F u r th er , there i s no prosp ect whatever of f inding any explanations

for the hu m an capacity for complex fea ts of thou gh t an d dec is ion exceptby appeal ing to a mult i tude of processes, most of them inevitablyuncon scious, wh ich a re combined and synthesized in the workings ofa n a du l t m i n d .Bu t these kinds of comp lexity are not really at od ds with the S toicconception of the hFgemonikon I n S toic ja rgon, there can be ma nycontributors, of various sorts, to the process of get t ing an at t ract ivelekton before the min d . T h e S to ic concep tion does no t ru le ou t , bu trather actual ly cal ls for , a variety of stru ctu res in the self a ll tendi ng toissue in behaviour. For unless there are several of these, thephe nom eno n of d i lem m a, of b e ing in dou bt or d if f icul ty as to what oneshould th ink o r shou ld do , cou ld no t a r ise .T h e min d o r pe rson can an d does have sub-sys tems . LThat oneperson c ann ot , an d do es no t , have are a p lura l ity of systems each in tur ncapable of captu r ing our e f fec tor mec hanism s ( l imbs, tongues, a nd soforth) and using them in ful l consciousness, del iberately, voluntari ly,purposeful ly , wi th assent and se l f -moni tor ing. Our effec tor mecha-nisms can be taken over by reflex, overcome by d rug s, or manipula tedby hy pnot is t s , bu t in su ch cases we cease to be agents .


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Th er e is also a middle state between deliberate decision and action onthe one hand, and reflex or manipulation on the other. Th is is the realmof habit so ingrained as to be automatic. Alanipulative skills, thoseinvolved in driving or playing a musical instrument, for example, canbe like this. The driver can be giving her mind to conversation, ornavigation, or the traffic, the musician can be concentrating entirely oninterpretation, and yet in either case manipulation of the controls neednot falter. Performances calling for more sophisticated responses toinformation can also go, as it were, on to auto-pilot and be left in thehands of centres lower on the mind s functional hierarchy than the fullyconscious pinnacle. T he cook can be simultaneously planning the orderin which the meal is to be prepared, and executing a part of the plan-peeling the potatoes-which can be done on auto-pilot even though itneeds to make use of vision, memory, judgment, and dexterity.Performances which can be relegated to auto-pilot are performancesof the one self for all that. For in the normal case they are at any timeopen to being taken over by consciously exercised agency. Theh gemonikon in a properly functioning adult person keeps the sub-systems under review. Driver, musician, and cook should be aware, atevery stage, of how far through the automatic performance they havegot. Unexpected developments should at once return the performanceto conscious control.We have many auto-pilots at many levels in our mental organization.They increase efficiency and flexibility, but they are not rival selves.Schizophrenia is an altogether different matter. So is the state of mind(or minds?) produced by separating the hemispheres of the brain. In anormal person there is one central final determiner of action, just onegenuine agent.Tha t there s only one centre of agency in a person follows from theunity of remembered, planned, and acknowledged action. There is, inthe normal case, just one on-going life being led, one conductor of thatlife, which is responsible for, and takes responsibility for, all theperson s agency. This is done full-heartedly where the agent isuntroubled over the action; but responsibility is also accepted for thoseactions where acquiescence has been somehow wrung from the agent,and which are therefore done in bad conscience , as we say. Suchactions are actions of the same agent as the acts of which the agent isproud.The concept of a human person is the concept of a single, continuingagent, responsible for all the past actions and future projects centringon a given human organism. The concept of a person is essentially theconcept of a complex of elements dicharging mental functions andorganized into an integrated hierarchy. There is a chief taskmaster ormaster programme, which censors, sets priorities, distributes


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Keith ampbell

re sources, and con t ro ls s t ruc tu res un der i t . T he re is only one p innac leto the hierarchy. How comple te ly the pinnacle de termines the opera-t ions of sub -sys tem s can vary. I t increases as people m ature , dec l ines inthe decay of age . I t can be shocked or t raumat ized in to malfunct ion.Person is to th is degree a norm at ive con cep t , in tha t i t s ignif ies a fu llyfunct ioning in tegra ted agent . \There th e integrat ion is lacking what wehave i s no t one hu m an pe rson .Now of course no phi losop hy, Stoica l or o therwise , can guaranteetha t the in tegra t ion of thou ghts , ideas , mem ories and so for th in to onecoherent agent ~v i l l e a t ta ined or susta ined. Bu t where i t is not yeta t ta ined, or w here d is in tegra t ion has occur red, wha t we have is not ahum a n pe r son , bu t so m e t h i ng l es s.I conclude tha t contem porary men ta l p lura li sm is not incom pat iblewi th the thesis of the human h?,genzonikon. Tha t thes i s , i n tu rn , i srequired to val idate the essent ial conceptions of moral phi losophy:agency, aspi ra t ion, and v i r tue .

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CAMPBELL_Self-Mastery and Stoic Ethics