Is Cassirer’s Philosophy ofSymbolic Forms Able to

Overcome the Intellectual CrisisAnalyzed in His Article“‘Geist’ und ‘Leben’”?

JEAN SEIDENGART

rnst Cassirer’s article “‘Geist’ und ‘Leben’ in der Philosophie derGegenwart” was published in 1930 in Die neue Rundschau. De-

spite expectations, this article did not concern that “critical work” thatCassirer had announced at the end of the preface to the third volumeof his Philosophy of Symbolic Forms:

Consequently the critical work with which I originally intended to con-clude this volume will be reserved for a future publication which I hopesoon to bring out under the title Life and The Human Spirit — toward aCritique of Present-Day Philosophy. (Cassirer, Philosophy 3: xvi)1

Rather than offering an account of “present-day philosophy,” “‘Geist’und ‘Leben’” dealt exclusively with Max Scheler’s anthropology as out-lined in his final book, Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos, whichappeared just before his death in 1928.2 Certainly, it is true that Cas-sirer’s article of 1930 bore nearly the same title as the one announcedin The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms. But after the philosopher’sdeath, a manuscript titled Geist und Leben was discovered in a folderlabeled Zur Metaphysik der symbolischen Formen. These papers wereintended to comprise part of a fourth volume of The Philosophy ofSymbolic Forms, because the third volume was already too bulky toinclude several hundred additional pages.

WHAT IS AT STAKE IN CASSIRER’S ARTICLE?

Thanks to an anonymous account of the discussions between Cas-sirer and Heidegger during the International University Course atDavos in 1929, we know that Cassirer gave an important presentationon Geist und Leben in Max Schelers Philosophie at the end of his first

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lecture (Cassirer and Heidegger 27). Indeed, Cassirer drew directly onthe contents of this lecture when writing the article for Die neue Rund-schau in 1930. Cassirer's “‘Geist’ und ‘Leben’” aims to provide a crit-ical account of the type of anthropology outlined in Scheler’s finalwork as part of a broader philosophical movement that he refers to asLebensphilosophie. To be sure, this development offers little in theway of innovation, but rather compiles the ideas of thinkers such asSchopenhauer, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Bergson, Dilthey, Simmel,and, more recently, Martin Heidegger.

Nevertheless, Cassirer clearly expresses his esteem for Scheler asan original philosopher, and he asserts that the metaphysical prob-lems encountered in Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos could beresolved through certain perspectival and conceptual shifts. In short,Cassirer is convinced that adopting the functionalist view of The Phi-losophy of Symbolic Forms could overcome the difficulties posed byScheler’s Lebensphilosophie. Cassirer sets out to improve Scheler’smetaphysics in the terms of his own philosophy. Among Scheler’s fun-damental concepts in need of reconsideration are those of nature, life,spirit, and knowledge.

It is important to note at the outset that Scheler kept his distancefrom German idealism (except at the beginning of his studies at theUniversity of Munich, where he absorbed Kantianism), and in his writ-ings he remains quite critical of any manner of abstract formalismthat might lead to German idealism. His prevailing interest in the val-ues, feelings, and nature of persons and their interrelations likewisedissuaded him from idealism. In his youth, moreover, the Leben-sphilosophie of Nietzsche, Dilthey, and Bergson had a great impacton his thought.

For his part, Cassirer was one of the most brilliant luminaries ofcritical idealism, and he remained faithful to Hermann Cohen’s neo-Kantianism as well as to the universalist rationalism of the Aufk-lärung. Thus, it is hardly surprising that Cassirer would refer toKleist’s celebrated work, Über das Marionettentheater (Cassirer, Geistund Leben 33),3 in order to expose the dualist elements in Scheler’santhropology—and in particular, the opposition between reflection(or knowledge) and spontaneous Life (which is unaware of itself).Cassirer quotes Kleist’s famous statement on this point:

Wir sehen, daß in dem Maße, als in der organischen Welt die Reflexiondunkler und schwacher wird, die Grazie darin immer strahlender undherrschender hervortritt. (Cassirer, Geist und Leben 32)

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While the passage seems lucid and free of illusion, it nonetheless re-mains open to philosophical criticism. One could undermine its funda-mental premise by assuming a Hegelian perspective, according towhich the trajectory of one’s lived experience emerges only through aretrospective conscience. On this view, an event does not actuallybegin at the moment it occurs, but only when it has been understoodand reappropriated at the level of knowledge. Hegel’s Phänomenologiedes Geistes (1807) asserted that it is a distinctive feature of phenome-nal conscience to experience a time-lag with respect to what is givenin pure experience. In Hegelian terms, then, my certitude is not thetruth in itself. According to Kleist, in contrast, this time-lag is consid-ered a tragic deception with no redeeming outcome.

Adopting a different approach, Cassirer deploys the rationalism ofthe Aufklärung in order to emphasize the Romantic aspects of Schel-er’s philosophical anthropology:

Allbekannte Namen und Werke der philosophischen Literatur der Gegen-wart drängen sich hier alsbald zum Vergleich auf. Auch in diesem Zugezeigt sich wieder, wie stark gerade unsere “modernen” und modernstenphilosophischen Gedanken in der Romantik wurzeln und wie sie, bewußtoder unbewußt, von romantischen Vorbildern abhängig sind. Von neuemsteht heute die große Antithese von “Natur” und “Geist,” die Polarität von“Leben” und “Erkenntnis” im Mittelpunkt der philosophischen Betrach-tung. (Cassirer, Geist und Leben 33)

Alluding implicitly to Hegel’s philosophy in this passage, Cassirer un-derlines the serious crisis facing contemporary Lebensphilosophie. Thephilosophers of the Romantic period, however, arrived at metaphysicalsolutions in order to overcome the chasm between Life and Spirit:

Denn die romantische Philosophie hält für diesen Gegensatz, so scharf sieihn herausstellt, auch immer eine bestimmte metaphysische Lösung undVersöhnung bereit. (Cassirer, Geist und Leben 34)

This concept of Versöhnung comes directly from Hegel and concernsAbsolute Knowledge. In Hegel’s philosophy, true Life refers to the lifeof Spirit. Life denotes the development of the Weltgeist. This true Lifeis by no means fixed; rather, it is characterized by differentiation, op-position, contradiction, and reconciliation (Versöhnung; Hegel,Phänomenologie 13–15). Out of reconciliation, moreover, emergesthe final triumph of Geist in Hegel’s absolute idealism.

It is precisely this conception that left Scheler totally opposed toGerman idealism. Scheler’s aim in the Stellung is to determine the po-

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sition of man in a world governed, at a microphysical level, by “thestatistical laws of chance” (Scheler 85). Yet, if the cosmos is subject-ed to blind forces, how is it possible for man to introduce a scale ofvalues in the world? How does one guard against resentment, a feel-ing that neutralizes all preference and undermines all perception of ax-iological difference?

Although Cassirer underlines the deep chasm between Life andSpirit (die Kluft zwischen den beiden Welten; Geist und Leben 34) incontemporary metaphysics (Klages and Scheler), he also claims to beable to bridge these two worlds with the help of his own philosophy.

THE PROBLEM OF SCHELER’S ANTHROPOLOGY ACCORDING TO CASSIRER

In Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos, Scheler attempts to inte-grate all his philosophical works. In keeping with this aim, the workportrays the ways in which the affective intuition of values, the unityof concrete human personality, and intersubjective relationships areall confronted by a purposeless universe governed by blind forces. Ac-cordingly, Scheler’s Stellung seeks to define the place for man in auniverse where he feels abandoned. This brief tract begins by outlin-ing a hierarchy of the principal kinds of living things, which Schelerrefers to as psychophysiological beings: plants, animals, superior an-imals, and finally—with the appearance of Spirit—human beings. Ofcourse, it is on this last level that a harrowing opposition unfolds be-tween Geist and the rest of nature, the latter of which Scheler calls the“forces of the vital sphere”—or, more simply, “Life.” On one hand,there are certain statistical laws governing the chaotic forces thatshape the inorganic world, in addition to other natural laws that gov-ern the organic world of Life. The hierarchical scale of beings is there-fore arranged in ascending order according to a creature’s structuralcomplexity and level of psychic capacity. On the other hand, all vitalforces and all exertion (Drang) in nature remain “blind to all ideas andspiritual values” (“gegenüber allen geistigen Ideen und Werten blind”;Scheler, qtd. in Cassirer, Geist und Leben 40).

As noted above, Cassirer situates this problematic dimension ofScheler’s anthropology in relation to a general trend that stems fromthe work of Romantic philosophers such as Kleist and Schelling and isdeveloped more fully by Ludwig Klages and Scheler himself.4 Howev-er, Cassirer also draws attention to the ways in which Scheler departs

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from this tradition. Cassirer captures Scheler’s innovation with partic-ular clarity in the following passage:

[D]as was den Menschen zum Menschen macht, ist ein allem Leben Über-haupt entgegengesetztes Prinzip, das man als solches überhaupt nicht aufdie “natürliche Lebensevolution” zurückführen kann. (Scheler, qtd. inCassirer, Geist und Leben 35–36; emphasis added)

In other words, if man wants to be fully human, he must disengage fromboth nature and his own impulses, and he must rise above Life by main-taining his distance from it through the workings of his own Spirit. Evenif Cassirer does not concur with Scheler’s dualism between Geist andLeben, the two philosophers are nonetheless in agreement concerningthe principal characteristics of Spirit: (a) it is open to the world; (b) it isable to constitute objects as such; (c) it can construct an objectiveworld; (d) it applies forms not only to the actual, but also to the possi-ble; and (e) it is not bound to the actuality of its immediate environ-ment, but is capable of abstraction and contemplation of the possible(by separating spatiotemporal forms from their contents).

Whereas Scheler considers these faculties of Spirit as purely nega-tive (insofar as they assume an ascetic stance toward Life), Cassirerholds that they refer merely to one pole of spiritual activity. Even so,Cassirer is struck by Scheler’s paradoxical idea, which stipulates thateven if Spirit represents the highest position in the hierarchy of values,it remains completely powerless in the face of vital forces. In a phrase,“Der Geist, wie Scheler ihn faßt, ist demnach ursprünglich schlechthinmachtlos” (Cassirer, Geist und Leben 39). Life and Spirit are in thissense two incommensurable realities. Cassirer emphasizes that forHegel, in contrast, the Idea possesses a “substantial power” (sub-stanzielle Macht; Cassirer, Geist und Leben 39). But according toScheler (and pace Hegel), one may attribute to the Spirit and to thewill of man only the capacity to give direction (Leitung) and guidance(Lenkung) to vital impulses. Cassirer concludes his account with alengthy quotation that perfectly summarizes the argument of Schel-er’s Stellung on this point:

[D]ie gegenseitige Durchdringung des ursprünglich ohnmächtigenGeistes und des ursprünglichdämonischen, d. h. gegenüber allen geisti-gen Ideen und Werten blinden Dranges [. . .] und die gleichzeitige Er-mächtigung, d. h. Verlebendigung des Geistes ist das Ziel und Ende allesendlichen Seins und Geschehens, das der Theismus fälschlicherweise anseinen Ausgangspunkt stellt. (Scheler, qtd. in Cassirer, Geist und Leben39–40; emphasis in original)

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THE INCONSISTENCY OF SCHELER’S DUALISM BETWEENGEIST AND LEBEN

Cassirer limits himself to showing how Scheler’s problem cannot besolved in its original formulation: If there is absolute heterogeneity be-tween Spirit and Life, how can they oppose one another? All conflicts,all oppositions must presuppose the existence of some commonground. This particular problem of dualism, moreover, has hauntedthe Western metaphysical tradition since antiquity.

In Aristotle, the question arises in the relations between God (pureSpirit, noûs—entirely detached from all matter) and the physicalworld. Aristotle’s solution corresponds to his teleological worldview:God moves the world “as the beloved object moves the lover” (qtd. inCassirer, Geist und Leben 42).

In Cartesian dualism, it appears with the problem of the “union[Vereinigung]” of body and soul (Körper und Seele; Cassirer, Geistund Leben 43). Since Descartes established the physical law of con-servation (Erhaltungsgesetz) and the law of constancy of momen-tum in the universe (das Gesetz von der Konstanz der Bewegungs-größe im Weltall; Cassirer, Geist und Leben 43), the only possibilityof the soul in the material world is to change the direction (Rich-tung) of movement. Leibniz objected to Cartesian physics on thegrounds that even a simple shift in direction requires a certain ex-penditure of energy. Leibniz was one of the founders of dynamics,and, according to this view, the law of conservation relates not to theconservation of motion, but to the quantity (for example, speed anddirection) of living forces.

In short, Cassirer establishes a parallel between Leibniz’s critique ofDescartes and Freud’s understanding of the process of inhibition to showthat the latter would be impossible if Spirit were completely powerless.It is absolutely essential, therefore, to correct Scheler’s perspective ifone is to resolve the internal dilemma of his anthropology.

CASSIRER RESORTS TO THE MEDIATION OF “FORMATIVE ENERGY”

Cassirer moves surreptitiously from Cartesian dualism to Leibniziandynamics—and, in particular, to a kind of energeticist perspective inwhich different forces can produce different interactions. This ap-proach requires Cassirer to delve deeply into conceptions of power

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(Macht), energy (Energie), and force (Kraft) in order to escape the im-passe reached in Scheler’s anthropology.

Cassirer begins by making a distinction (which had escaped Schel-er) between efficient energy (Energie des Wirkens) and formative en-ergy (Energie des Bildens; Cassirer, Geist und Leben 45): Efficient en-ergy is directed immediately at man’s environment, whether tocontrol it or to change its course. Formative energy is directed at it-self and moves strictly within the dimension of pure image (desBildes) and not within the dimension of effective reality (Wirk-lichkeit). This distinction allows Cassirer subtly to introduce the per-spective of his own philosophy of symbolic forms:

Der menschliche Geist kehrt sich hier nicht direkt gegen die Dinge, son-dern er spinnt sich in eine eigene Welt, in eine Welt der Zeichen, der Sym-bole, der Bedeutungen ein. (Cassirer, Geist und Leben 45)

Thus, unlike the lower animals, Spirit is deprived of all immediatecontact with the world. At the same time, a world of symbols medi-ates between Spirit and the material world. The influence of Spirit onthe material world and on Life is henceforth comprehensible in termsof its own energy.

To be sure, Cassirer wholly agrees with Scheler that Spirit does notemerge out of “an intensification of Life”—or, in other words, out of ahigher level of complexity in the “psychophysiological hierarchy.”Rather, Spirit marks a change of direction, an abrupt shift (Wandel,Rückkehr, Umkehr) in the course of Life (Cassirer, Geist und Leben46). What Cassirer categorically rejects in Scheler’s anthropology isthe characterization of Spirit as a powerless (kraftlos), inert, and pas-sive entity (Stillsteller)—that is, as an “ascetic of Life” (Asket desLebens; Cassirer, Geist und Leben 46). If Spirit is capable of bringingLife to a standstill (Stillstand), it must already possess in itself thepower (Kraft) necessary to oppose Life. Moreover, Spirit requires acertain detachment from Life in order to understand the meaning ofwhat occurs around it.5 Even if Spirit and Life stand in opposition toeach other, they nonetheless share a common attribute: a pure activ-ity (reine Tätigkeit; actus purus) corresponding to their respectivepurposes. Accordingly, this pure activity is divided into two separateforms: mediated formative energy (mittelbare Tätigkeit des Bildens)and efficient energy (unmittelbaren des Wirkens).

As evidence for this dynamic conception of Spirit, Cassirer cites Spin-oza’s claim in the Ethics that “Ideas are not like silent paintings.”6 Like-

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wise, Cassirer does not restrict mediated formative energy to the purerealm of knowledge. Rather, he stresses that it applies to all creations(Schöpfungen) associated with diverse symbolic forms (language, art,myth, and religion) to argue for the possibility of a new mode of intu-ition (neue Anschauung) pertaining to “objective” reality. The quotationmarks here are meant to imply that objectivity cannot be reduced to thedomain of scientific objectivity (Cassirer, Geist und Leben 46).

Cassirer explains that this formative energy or symbolic formation(Formung, Gestaltung) comprises a double determination (Dop-pelbestimmung; Cassirer, Geist und Leben 47)—namely, a retreatfrom and a return to objective reality. Such a movement is character-istic of Cassirer’s critical idealism, in which Spirit must follow a cir-cuitous route of theorization in order to grasp an object (whatever itmight be). This manner of theorization, moreover, requires that Spiritsuspend the reception of all sense data and introduce between themand the conscious subject a world of symbols—that is, representationsand concepts created by its own activity to actively appropriate themeaning of what is given:

Erst am Ende dieses langen und schwierigen Weges des inneren Gestal-tens tritt die Wirklichkeit wieder in den Blickpunkt des Menschen ein.[. . .] Mehr und mehr lernt der Mensch, sich die Welt zu beseitigen, um dieWelt an sich zu ziehen. (Cassirer, Geist und Leben 47)

Cassirer lays great stress on this “art of the detour,” which even su-perior animals learn only with great difficulty. Moreover, he seeks toaffirm—in a manner reminiscent of Kant’s description of the Coperni-can revolution—that Spirit is always active in its quest to arrive at re-ality. Cassirer expresses the Kantian view in a novel manner:

So ist auch der Aufbau der “objektiven” Erfahrungswelt angewiesen aufdie ursprünglichen bildenden Kräfte des Geistes und auf die Grundgeset-ze, nach denen diese Kräfte tätig sind. (Cassirer, Geist und Leben 48–49)

This quotation makes direct allusion to a famous term from Kant’s Cri-tique of Judgment: “formative powers” (die bildenden Kräfte; empha-sis added). More specifically, Kant held that

Ein organisiertes Wesen ist also nicht bloß Maschine: denn die hat lediglichbewegende Kraft; sondern es besitzt in sich bildende Kraft und zwar einesolche, die es den Materien mitteilt, welche sie nicht haben (sie organ-isiert): also eine sich fortpflanzende bildende Kraft, welche durch das Be-wegungsvermögen allein (den Mechanism) nicht erklärt werden kann.(Kant, Kritik der Urteilskraft sec. 65, AK 5: 374)

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However, Cassirer’s use of this term departs from his predecessor’s insignificant ways. For Kant, it was intended to characterize Life (for ex-ample, the vital powers). For Cassirer, in contrast, bildende Kraftrefers to the activity of Spirit. Thus, Cassirer’s appropriation of Kant’sterminology implies a shift in meaning: mediation no longer stemsfrom Life, but from the concepts of force (Kraft) and form. Not inci-dentally, it was these two concepts that had allowed Leibniz to unifyhis conception of the universe and to reconcile Matter and Spirit, in-sofar as force is the substantial element in every being. Leibniz un-derstood force as a means of passing between the physical and psy-chic realms (Leibniz, sec. 3, GP 4: 479).7

THE MEDIUM OF SYMBOLIC FORMS AS A SOLUTION TO THE IMPASSE IN SCHELER’S ANTHROPOLOGY

Cassirer criticizes Scheler’s anthropology for a deviation in per-spective, characterized by a shift from a descriptive phenomenologi-cal style to a metaphysical style tinged with realism. This changegives rise to an insurmountable ontological opposition between Spirit(which is hostile to Life) and Life (which is blind to Ideas).

This move toward metaphysical realism can be discerned in Schel-er’s religious vocabulary: for instance, he mentions the “power of as-ceticism” (die Kraft der Askese) specific to Spirit (qtd. in Cassirer,Geist und Leben 50) as opposed to the vital sphere. It is necessary torid this metaphysical opposition of its strong absolutist character inorder to avoid the snare of dualism. Therefore, Cassirer reiterates thatthe “power of asceticism” is not an entity in itself, but merely a “basicphenomenon” (Grundphänomen) of Spirit:

Sie ist nicht Abkehr vom Leben schlechthin, sondern sie ist eine innereWandlung und Umkehr, die das Leben in sich selbst erfährt. [. . .] Es sindvielmehr Energien verschiedener Ordnung und gewissermaßen ver-schiedener Dimension. (Cassirer, Geist und Leben 51)

Cassirer accepts Scheler’s idea that the objectification (Objek-tivierung) of things as such in the world originates in Spirit. But forCassirer, this objectification denotes an activity in which Spirit impos-es the medium (zwischenreich) of symbolic forms between itself andthe world:

Die Gesamtheit seiner Bedingungen läßt sich, wie mir scheint, wenn manin das Zwischenreich der “symbolischen Formen” eingeht, wenn man die

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verschiedenartigen Bild-Welten betrachtet, die der Mensch zwischen sichund die Wirklichkeit stellt. [. . .] Die Sprache und die Kunst, der Mythosund die theoretische Erkenntnis. (Cassirer, Geist und Leben 51; empha-sis in original)

Returning to a central theme developed in The Philosophy of Sym-bolic Forms (3: 151–55) and in the Davoser Disputation with Heideg-ger (Cassirer and Heidegger 25–26), Cassirer explains that through theintervention of symbol, Spirit passes from the pragmatic space “ofgrasping and acting” (von dem Greif- und Wirkraum) to “the space ofintuition and thought” (zum Anschauungs- und Denkraum). Cassirerthus attempts to substitute a functional correlation between Spirit andLife for Scheler’s strong metaphysical opposition. The common groundof this correlation is the formative power that reveals itself both on theorganic level in nature and on the intellectual level in the cultural realm:

Der Geist braucht nicht mehr als ein allem Leben fremdes oder feindlich-es Prinzip betrachtet, sonder er kann als eine Wendung und Umkehr desLebens selbst verstanden werden – eine Wandlung, die es in sich selbsterfährt, in dem Maße, als es aus dem Kreise des bloß organischen Bildensund Gestaltens in den Kreis der “Form” der ideellen Gestaltung, eintritt.(Cassirer, Geist und Leben 52–53; emphasis in original)

With this argument, Cassirer claims to have at once solved the diffi-culties in Scheler’s anthropology and to have cleared Hegel of theaccusations made against him by the proponents of Lebensphiloso-phie—namely, that he had sacrificed the concept of Life to a panlogistapproach to philosophy. According to Cassirer, Hegel advanced a newunderstanding of Life that was no longer characterized by its es-trangement (Entfremdung) from Spirit. As evidence of Hegel’s posi-tion, Cassirer cites the following passage from the Phenomenology ofthe Spirit: “Die Kraft des Geistes ist nur so groß als ihre Äußerung,seine Tiefe nur so tief, als er in seiner Auslegung sich auszubreiten undsich zu verlieren getraut” (Hegel, Phänomenologie 9; qtd. in Cassirer,Geist und Leben 53). This quotation provides Cassirer an opportunityto shift Scheler’s problematic argument to the realm of Spirit. Sincethe vital sphere is withdrawn into itself and unable to express itself di-rectly, Spirit alone is capable of saying no to Life:

Das eigentliche Drama spielt sich nicht zwischen Leben und Geist, sondernes spielt sich mitten im Gebiete des Geistes selber, ja in seinem eigentlichenBrennpunkt ab. Denn alles Anklagen ist eine Form des Aussagens; allesVerurteilen ist eine Form des Urteils: Aussagen und Urteilen aber sind dieGrund- und Urfunktionen des Logos selbst. (Cassirer, Geist und Leben 54)

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Although both Cassirer and Scheler agree on this point in general,Cassirer goes further in introducing a dialectical point of view: in say-ing no to Life, Spirit also negates itself. It would seem, then, that Spir-it possesses a paradoxical nature, insofar as it is capable of both self-assertion and self-negation. The latter faculty corresponds to thereflexive form of negation, which Hegel referred to as “negativity,” thatis particular to the Life of Spirit. Moreover, this dialectical oppositiondoes not destroy Spirit, but “makes it truly what it is.” On thesegrounds, Cassirer rejects Scheler’s dilemma as a specious problemthat derives from the projection of an internal drama (which is the re-sult of the dialectical nature of Spirit) onto the external world.

At the same time, Cassirer’s brilliant innovation consists in havingexpressed this immanent dialectic of Spirit in terms that evoke Kant’sjuridical vocabulary: accusation (Anklage), conflict (Widerstreit),court (Gericht), prosecutor (Ankläger), advocate (Sachwalter), wit-ness (Zeuge). Indeed, this paragraph concludes without any referenceto Hegelian terms such as division (Zwiespältigkeit) or contradiction(Widerspruch). Cassirer employs instead the Kantian concept of con-flict (Widerstreit), which requires arbitration before the tribunal of “cri-tique.” As for the internal conflict of Spirit with itself, Kant had alreadyclearly stated in his first Critique that

[d]en Gegner aber müssen wir hier jederzeit in uns selbst suchen. Dennspekulative Vernunft in ihrem transzendentalen Gebrauche ist an sich di-alektisch. Die Einwürfe, die zu fürchten sein möchten, liegen in uns selbst.(Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft AK 3: 507; S. 707)

This shift from Hegel to Kant is not without foundation, since Hegelhimself had commended Kant for having asserted the nonarbitrarynature of the dialectic (Hegel, Wissenschaft 23).8 Nevertheless, in re-verting to Kant’s dialectic, Cassirer reinforces an idealist stance thatwould be unacceptable for a partisan of Lebensphilosophie.

THE DYNAMIC MEDIATION OF LANGUAGE BETWEEN LIFE AND SPIRIT

Moving beyond the field of philosophical controversy, Cassirer endshis article with a discussion of language as a solution to the dualismbetween Geist and Leben. To be sure, language is one symbolic formamong others. Yet, it also constitutes the only means for human beingsto extract themselves from the natural order and gain access to therealm of culture, which in turn provides the conduit from Life to Spirit.

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When Scheler attempts in the Stellung to define “the essential dif-ference between humans and animals,” he focuses not on languagebut on what the Greeks called “Reason” and what he refers to as Spir-it (Geist). In contrast, Cassirer argues that language is not a fixed sub-stantial entity, but rather “lebendige dynamische Funktion” (Cassirer,Geist und Leben 56). In so doing, he claims to have truly overcomethe opposition between Geist and Leben, since language is a living,existing thing, the use (Gebrauch) and handling (Handhabung) ofwhich are the work of Spirit.

For Cassirer, the shift from a substantial to a functional concep-tion of language offers a way out of the impasse encountered inScheler’s anthropology. On this point, Cassirer claims to draw inspi-ration from Wilhelm von Humboldt, for whom language was consid-ered not as an “ergon” (the result of a work), but as an “energeia”—that is, as “a living activity” (Cassirer, Geist und Leben 57). Thus,language no longer appears as a system of rigid rules or prohibitionsthat would be opposed to Life. On the contrary, it functions as “aform-creating power”: “Vielmehr ist es die ursprüngliche Schöpfer-kraft der Sprache, die auch dieser Welt [. . .] immer neue Bewe-gungsimpulse zuführt” (Cassirer, Geist und Leben 57). In this pas-sage, Cassirer draws on his previous explanation of the concept of“active power.” The common root of Life and Spirit is the activity of“formative force.” Human beings apply this force through language,which is the matrix of all the other symbolic forms. Ultimately, lan-guage facilitates an active mediation between Life and Spirit. Moregenerally, it establishes a link (Zusammenhang) between the “par-ticular” and the “universal”: everything is particular in relation toLife, whereas Spirit alone is capable of ascending to the level of theuniversal. In the last resort, then, Cassirer remains close to the uni-versalist ideal of the Aufklärer.

Indeed, in demonstrating that the symbolic function of language ac-tively overcomes the metaphysical dualism between Life and Spirit,Cassirer remains faithful to the critical position he adopted previouslyin Substanzbegriff und Funktionsbegriff. However, he also profits fromthe fruitful gains he made in The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, wherehe argued that

[j]ede echte geistige Grundfunktion hat mit der Erkenntnis den einenentscheidenden Zug gemeinsam, daß ihr eine ursprünglichbildende, nichtbloß eine nachbildende Kraft innewohnt. (Cassirer, Philosophie 1: 9)

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Such evidence points to the conclusion that Cassirer has resolvedthe problem posed by Scheler’s Stellung, but on his own terms. Evenso, it is important to note that Cassirer’s fundamental philosophicaloptions diverged from those of Scheler, whose aim was to describe themodalities of emotional intuition in a realm that was accessible to Life,but not to pure reason.

Université de Paris X–Nanterre

NOTES

1. The original text follows: “So soll der kritische Teil, der anfangs diesenBand abschließen sollte, einer eigenen künftigen Veröffentlichung vorbehaltenwerden, die ich unter dem Titel: “‘Leben’ und ‘Geist’ – zur Kritik der Philoso-phie der Gegenwart” demnächst vorlegen zu können hoffe” (Cassirer, Philoso-phie 3: ix).

2. Max Scheler lived from 1874–1928.3. Heinrich von Kleist (1777–1811), Über das Marionettentheater (1810).

Cassirer also referred to this work in the introduction to book 3 of The Philos-ophy of Symbolic Forms.

4. Nevertheless, Scheler seems to be very critical of Klages (cf. Stellung).5. This is a common theme of the Marburger Schule (Marburg School)

since Hermann Cohen. First, there is the temporal flow of phenomena. To un-derstand this flow, the Spirit must establish some “fixed points,” some invari-ants, and combine them with phenomenal variations. This is the case not onlyin the use of language, with its symbolic function, but also in the perceptionthat distinguishes between “thing and properties,” and finally in the sciences,employing functional equations that combine the relations between invariantsand variables.

6. Cf. Spinoza, Ethica 2: prop. 43, scholium.7. Leibniz: “‘Je trouvai donc que leur nature consiste dans la force et que de

cela s’ensuit quelque chose d’analogique au sentiment et à l’appétit; et qu’ain-si il fallait les concevoir à l’imitation de la notion que nous avons des âmes.’”

8. Hegel: “‘Kant hat die Dialektik höher gestellt – und diese Seite gehörtunter die größten seiner Verdienste –, indem er ihr den Schein von Willkührnahm, den sie nach der gewöhnlichen Vorstellung hatte und sie als einnotwendiges Tun der Vernunft darstellte’” (Wissenschaft 23).

WORKS CITED

Cassirer, Ernst. “‘Geist’ und ‘Leben’ in der Philosophie der Gegenwart.” Dieneue Rundschau 41.1 (1930): 244–64. Rpt. in Geist und Leben. Schriften.Ed. Ernst Wolfgang Orth. 2. Auflage. Leipzig: Reclam, 2003. 32–60.

———. Die Philosophie der symbolischen Formen. Bd. I: Die Sprache. 1923.Darmstadt: Neuausgabe, 1964.

———. The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms. Trans. R. Manheim. Vol. 3. New

CASSIRER’S PHILOSOPHY 305

Haven, CT: Yale UP, 1965. Trans. of Die Philosophie der symbolischen For-men. Bd. 3: Phänomenologie der Erkenntnis. 1929. Darmstadt: Neuaus-gabe, 1964.

———. Substanzbegriff und Funktionsbegriff. Berlin: Bruno Cassirer, 1910.Cassirer, Ernst, and Martin Heidegger. Débat sur le kantisme et la philosophie,

Davos mars 1929. Trans. and ed. Pierre Aubenque et al. Paris: Beauchesne,1972.

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich. Phänomenologie des Geistes. 1807. Ham-burg: Meiner, 1988.

———. Wissenschaft der Logik. 1812. Hamburg: Meiner, 1986.Kant, Immanuel. Kritik der reinen Vernunft. 1781/1787. Hamburg: Meiner,

1990.———. Kritik der Urteilskraft. Berlin: Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1790. Kleist, Heinrich von. Über das Marionettentheater. N.p.: n.p., 1810.Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm. Système nouveau de la nature. 1695. Die

philosophischen Schriften. Bd. 4. Olms und Hildesheim: Neuausgabe,1965.

Scheler, Max. Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos. N.p.: n.p., 1928.Spinoza, Baruch. Ethica. N.p.: n.p., 1677.

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