ORIGINAL PAPER

Can Consumers Buy Responsibly? Analysis and Solutionsfor Market Failures

Carmen Valor

Received: 15 November 2007 /Accepted: 20 May 2008 /Published online: 17 June 2008# Springer Science + Business Media, LLC 2008

Abstract This paper analyses one of the business case arguments for social responsibility:that corporate social responsibility plans are rewarded by consumers. This paper exploresthe ability of consumers to buy responsibly, identifies the main obstacles for responsibleconsumption, and suggests conditions for it to work. The review of previous studies leadsus to conclude that consuming responsibly is seen as a time consuming activity,economically disadvantageous, and stressful. The main thesis of this paper is that unlessmarket failures are corrected, consumers will not be able to buy responsibly, and therefore,market incentives for CSR are seriously threatened.

Keywords Corporate social responsibility . Incentives . Responsible consumer behaviour .

Public policies . Ethical consumption . Standards . Labels

Corporate Social Responsibility (hereafter CSR) is currently presented as a tool to involvecorporations in the sustainability agenda. As the European Commission titled acommunication about the issue, CSR is the “corporate contribution to sustainability”(European Commission 2002). CSR is seen as an effective mechanism to raise socialwelfare, especially where regulation has failed or in those countries where either there is anabsence of rules or public authorities are unable to enforce them (for further information seeBlowfield 2005; De la Cuesta and Valor 2004; Jenkins 2005).

It is accepted in the literature that companies will not act responsibly out of benevolence,but because it pays. Although CSR may be justified using economic and moral arguments(Michael 2003), the economic justification, the so-called business case, is frequently used todefend CSR, especially in the political realm (De la Cuesta and Valor 2004; EuropeanCommission 2002, 2006). The business case defends that companies will increaseshareholder value by becoming more appealing to a wide range of stakeholders(Willliamson et al. 2006). As Vogel (2005, p. 5) puts it, “[w]hile profitability may not be

J Consum Policy (2008) 31:315–326DOI 10.1007/s10603-008-9070-9

C. Valor (*)Universidad Pontificia de Comillas–ICADE, Madrid, Spaine-mail: cvalor@cee.upcomillas.es

the only reason corporations will or should behave virtuously, it has become the mostinfluential.”

Although CSR may pay in different ways (e.g., by attracting human capital, increasingefficiency or reducing risk), this paper focuses on consumers’ attraction and retention.Strategists (Crosby and Johnson 2006; Fielding 2007; Lindsey 2007; Parnell 2005; Salzmanand Matathia 2007) posit that companies would obtain a competitive advantage by leveragingtheir CSR efforts in the consumers’ eyes. Therefore, undertaking a CSR programme isjustified in economic terms: being responsibly will help, inter alia, increase corporate sales.

This line of reasoning holds if consumers are willing and able to reward companies withbetter social and environmental performance. But, are we? This is a vital question withinthe business case for CSR. This paper focuses on individual consumers and their ability tooffer economic incentives in business to consumer relationships, so that companies willimprove their social and environmental performance. Many studies have tried to identifywhy, who and how consumers buy responsibly. This paper reviews the studies conductedwithin the marketing and consumer research discipline to critically evaluate whetherconsumers can or cannot buy responsibly.

This analysis leads to conclude that there are several obstacles that prevent consumersfrom buying responsibly. As Vogel (2005) noticed, the very structure of market impedesconsumers to use markets as a site of political activity. The paper concludes by givingsuggestions to policy-makers to correct these market failures.

Obstacles when Buying Responsibly

One of the findings of existing studies on ethical or responsible consumption is that of the“attitude–behaviour gap.” There is a gap between the self-reported intention of buyingresponsibly and the evidences that this intention does not translate into personal behaviourdecisions (Beckmann 2007; Berger and Kanetkar 1995; Carrigan and Attalla 2001; Linke2002; Roberts 1996; Vermeir and Verbeke 2005).

One of the reasons for this gap could be found in the obstacles consumers find to behaveresponsibly. These obstacles can be grouped in three types: motivational obstacles(willingness to make a political statement in the marketplace depends on self-identity andperceived efficacy), to cognitive obstacles (opportunity to get information and ability toprocess, store, and recall information about brands), or behavioural obstacles (opportunityand ability to find a fair brand to purchase).

Motivational Obstacles

Purchasing processes start with the recognition of a need or a problem. In the case ofresponsible consumption, the problem is to find a product that can satisfy individual needsand to advance social welfare at the same time (Hansen and Schrader 1997). Yet, not everyconsumer experiences this need. The recognition of this problem is influenced by personalmoral views (Cooper-Martin and Holbrook 1993; Thøgersen 1999; Vermeir and Verbeke2005), rather than by demographics or other personal factors (Cooper-Martin and Holbrook1993; Laroche et al. 2001; Roberts 1996). These moral views have been called “ethicalobligation” and defined as a concern for others (Shaw and Shiu 2002a, b, 2003).

Through their research, Shaw and colleagues (1999, 2002a, b, 2003) have found that theethical obligation could be so salient for the individual that it becomes a central trait of the

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individual’s self-identity. Valor (2007) has conceptualised this self-identity as citizenship.This trait of self-identity could be defined as a self-accepted notion of rights andresponsibilities towards humankind (Faulks 2000) that leads to a higher civil involvementwith the community (Yoniss et al. 1997). This concept accounts for the transfer ofpolitical/civil citizenship to the marketplace (Hansen and Schrader 1997). As Cogan(2000, p. 4) explains, there is a difference between a good person and a good citizen. “Agood person lives his or her life virtuously (…); a good citizen… not only lives decentlyin his or her private life, but is also committed to participation in public life.” Citizens inthe market place use their purchases as votes to elect the society they want to live in(Brinkmann 2004).

Therefore, although good people, not all consumers are good citizens. Consumers mayfeel an ethical obligation and concern about others’ welfare, but not for all consumers thisbecomes an essential trait of their self-identity, and therefore, not all consumers understandtheir purchases as a political statement. Hence, a self-perception of citizenship triggers theprocess of responsible purchasing, that is, the process of carrying out political action in themarketplace (Hertz 2001a).

In addition, consumers tend to exhibit, at most, “bounded responsibility,” that is,consumers are not equally aware of, or involved with, all social issues (Beckmann 2007;Berger and Kanetkar 1995; Carrigan and Attalla 2001; De Pelsmacker et al. 2005b;Friedman 1999; Garret 1987; Prasad et al. 2004; Shaw and Clarke 1999; Thøgersen 1999;Valor 2007). Some citizens are willing to act to protect the environment whilst others seemmore concerned about human rights abuses. This occurs because consumers conceptualisecorporate responsibilities in different ways, attaching different levels of importance to each“responsibility” (e.g., attaching more importance to environmental effects than to labourrights). These different definitions of corporate responsibility seem to be stronglyinfluenced by their socio-cultural context (Maignan and Ferrel 2003).

Another motivational obstacle is the perception of the efficacy of consumer action.Consumers evaluate if their purchase could contribute to solving the problem. If thisevaluation is positive, it will increase the likelihood of purchasing responsibly. Severalstudies (e.g., Carrigan and Attalla 2001; Garret 1987; Roberts 1996; Sen et al. 2001; Shawand Clarke 1999; Shaw and Shiu 2003; Thøgersen 1999; Tucker et al. 1981; Uusitalo andOksanen 2004; Vermeir and Verbeke 2005) have supported the hypothesised influence ofthe perceived consumer efficacy on responsible consumption. When consumers believe thattheir purchase decision may make a difference, they are more likely to buy responsibly.

The information sources used by consumers have a bearing on the perceived self-efficacy. Mass media information tends to focus more on drama than on solutions. Mediareports focus on the harm inflicted but do not explain clearly the reasons of an issue and theavailable strategies to solve it (McDonagh 2002; Valor 2007). Getting information only viamass media reduces the perceived efficacy to make a change. Consumers getting additionalinformation through formal (e.g., University courses) or informal (e.g., NGOs seminars orcampaigns) education, or through magazines on ethical consumption, are more literate andcognitively and emotionally empowered; therefore, they are more likely to buy responsibly(Shaw and Clarke 1999; Valor 2007).

Another motivational obstacle, related to the perceived efficacy, is the problem of thepublic good and the free riders. The benefits derived from responsible consumption, i.e.,better environmental and social conditions in Northern and Southern countries, should beconsidered public goods, since they accrue to all customers whether or not they buyresponsibly. Given this condition, consumers have incentives not to buy responsibly but tofree ride on other’s contributions. If consumers perceive that other will not act responsibly,

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then their motivation to act responsibly in the marketplace diminishes, since they also seetheir perceived efficacy reduced. It is difficult to measure the magnitude of the free ridingphenomenon in responsible consumption. Surveys and experimental studies have found thatthe number of responsible consumers does not amount to the total consumer base. Despitethe lack of definite evidence (see for instance Auger et al. 2003; Carrigan and Attalla 2001;De Pelsmacker et al. 2005b; Roberts 1996; Sen and Bhattacharya 2001), it is possible toaffirm that a small percentage of the global consumer-base is willing to make a politicalstatement in the marketplace. Yet, we cannot conclude that non-responsible consumers areintentional free riders; there are other obstacles to be taken into account.

Cognitive Obstacles

Consumers can buy responsibly if they have information about corporate impact on socialwelfare. However, consumers report having difficulties in finding this information(Beckmann 2007; CECU 2006; Shaw and Clarke 1999; Uusitalo and Oksanen 2004;Vermeir and Verbeke 2005). Ethical attributes of a product are often a credence attribute(De Pelsmacker et al. 2005b) and therefore cannot be judged before, during, or afterproduct use.

If the ethical obligation has become part of self-identity, there is a higher likelihood thatthe consumer will seek the information. Responsible consumers tend to look for moreinformation, because the perception of citizenship results in a “responsibility for beinginformed” (Hansen and Schrader 1997). This information, in turn, reinforces the perceptionof citizenship and fosters civil involvement. Yet, they also experience the consequences ofinformation overload and difficulties in combining information about companies (Shaw andClarke 1999).

In addition, even consumers motivated to buy responsibly report “cognitive ambiva-lence” (Valor 2007) since they do not make an effort to acquire the information necessary topurchase responsibly across a range of product categories (i.e., they will get information tobuy responsibly coffee but they will not do it for contracting the gas supplier). Someconsumers are aware that the information may exist, although retrieving and processing itdemands a huge investment in time and effort that they are not always willing to make(Carrigan and Attalla 2001; Shaw and Clarke 1999).

There are also two biases in information processing that will affect consumer’s behaviour.The first bias depends on the type of information. Consumers tend to be more sensitive tonegative information than positive, because they consider negative information more“informative” (Folkes and Kamins 1999). This occurs even when negativity is based onomission rather than commission. Omission should be understood as lack of support ratherthan violations or oppositions to a social/environmental issue (Sen and Bhattacharya 2001).

The second bias depends on the involvement with a product or a brand. Consumersstrongly committed to a brand show greater resistance to negative information and havedifficulties remembering ethical attributes (e.g., Auger et al. 2003; Beckmann, 2007;Carrigan and Attalla 2001; Linke 2002; Valor 2007).

Behavioural Obstacles

Assuming that consumers have overcome the previous obstacles, they may not be able tobuy responsibly if they cannot find good performers (Shaw and Clarke 1999). At most,

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consumers have a list of companies to boycott, but they experience problems carrying out“buycotts” (Carrigan and Attalla 2001).

Other behavioural obstacles include the costs associated with responsible purchases.Consumers are aware of, and concerned about, the costs derived from purchasingresponsibly, even when the perception of higher costs could be misguided. These costsinclude, inter alia, paying a premium price, travelling a certain distance to find goodperformers (e.g., organic or fair trade products), or spending too much time locating a brandat the selling point (Beckmann 2007; Berger and Kanetkar 1995; Dickson 2001; Garret1987; Laroche et al. 2001; Sen and Bhattacharya 2001; Sen et al. 2001; Shaw and Clarke1999; Shaw and Shiu 2003; Uusitalo and Oksanen 2004). Previous studies have found thatconsumers are less likely to make a socially responsible decision if they have to make trade-offs between price and other non-economic criteria (Carrigan and Attalla 2001; Iwanow etal. 2005; Vermeir and Verbeke 2005). Studies on boycott participation have reached thesame conclusion (e.g., Garret 1987; Sen et al. 2001).

Lodziak (2002) stresses the importance of budget constraints, by arguing that “the rangeof choices that are practically available to the individual are considerably fewer than therange of goods in the marketplace” (p. 84); moreover, this range is decreasing, because the“survival costs” have increased at a faster rate than increases in incomes (p. 111). Still,consumers may be willing to pay a premium price, but for a limited number of goods (e.g.,for certified fair trade coffee) (De Pelsmacker et al. 2005a, b).

Failures of the Business Case

In the light of the previous discussion, the business case for CSR may not hold. To a largeextent, studies on responsible consumer behaviour cast doubts on the argument that CSRmay give companies a competitive advantage. Actually, the business case implicitlyassumes that consumers can behave responsibly in the marketplace. The previous reviewhas evidenced the obstacles experienced by consumers, thus supporting those scholars whorefute the existence of real “consumer sovereignty” (Smith 1990; Gabriel and Lang 1995;Hansen and Schrader 1997; Lodziak 2002).

Applying Rezabakhsh et al. (2006) framework of consumer power, one can posit thatconsumers lack expert, sanction and legitimate power, because of the existence of marketfailures (Varian 2003). Unless these failures are corrected, consumers will not be able tobuy responsibly. Then the argument that CSR pays cannot be invoked, at least as far asconsumers are concerned. This diminishes the motivation of companies to undertake CSRplans. Therefore, correcting these asymmetries so that consumers gain power in themarketplace is of outmost importance as part of a global strategy towards sustainability.

Expert Power and Information Asymmetries

The first dimension of consumer power is expert power, which depends on the possessionof information (Rezabakhsh et al. 2006). For consumers to choose responsibly a brand, theyhave to know about corporate practices and performance. Yet, this information is not easilyfound, as it is not mandatory. As Stø et al. (2005) remark, environmental information of aproduct or service is rarely mandatory; at most, producers are forced to disclose health andsafety aspects of a product or service. Information on social issues (e.g., respect for humanrights, relations with suppliers or employees, inter alia), is only mandatory for large and

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listed companies in two countries (France and Belgium) (De la Cuesta and Valor 2004).Even there, companies do not have to tag this information to their brands, but to release it inthe form of CSR reports or the so-called bilan social.

There are clear information asymmetries vis-à-vis environmental and social performanceof goods. In this scenario, market agents can resort to two strategies: signaling andscreening (for a review see Rezabakhsh et al. 2006). Information about the social andenvironmental performance of a product or service can be issued by companies alone or bya companies in cooperation with a third party (a signaling strategy) or provided by a thirdparty, through reviews or tests (a screening strategy).

Companies may disclose information at the corporate level through CSR reports or at theproduct level through claims (Stø et al. 2005). Claims are a voluntary statement made by abrand. The main problem for consumers is the lack of reliability, since they have not beenverified by a monitoring party.

As regards CSR reports, although increasingly popular, only a small percentage of totalcompanies are issuing them (Corporate Register and ACCA 2004; Sustainability 2004). Inaddition, content analysis have remarked the poor quality of these reports, either in scope,because companies do not disclose on all issues (e.g., human rights) (Corporate Registerand ACCA 2004; Pleon 2005), or in depth, because the information provided is fragmentedand incomplete (Urminsky 2001; SIRAN 2005). Another problem is that the informationcontained in the reports has not been verified. Only a minority of companies have theirreports verified by an external and independent party (KPMG and University of Amsterdam2005; Context 2006).

Besides, CSR reports, though they intend to address the information needs of allstakeholders, are not the most appropriate vehicle to solve the information needs ofconsumers. Even if companies of all sizes, industries, and countries provide relevant,verified information about their social and environmental performance, it will still beimpossible for consumers to first process and then recall the information at the selling point.Consumers cannot be expected to read all reports, understand the indicators reported, andrecall this information when choosing a brand from the shelf.

Within the signalling strategy, the most efficient vehicle for providing consumers withthis information are labels, since they can be used as an “aide-mémoire” (De Pelsmacker etal. 2005b), transforming credence attributes into search ones (Drichoutis et al. 2006).Although awarded by third parties (Blowfield 1999), labels should be considered part of asignalling strategy: Producers voluntarily decide whether to undertake the process to signtheir brands with these labels.

The potential of labels for controlling corporate behaviour, as they are being currentlyimplemented, have been questioned by several authors (for a discussion see De la Cuestaand Valor 2004; Blowfield 1999). We will focus on the two main limitations of labels toserve as an aide-mémoire for consumers: their “patchiness” and the lack of awareness onthe consumers’ side.

In Europe alone, there are 240 different ethical labels (De Pelsmacker et al. 2005b).However, the existing approach is patchy in the sense that a label may ensure that one ortwo dimensions of CSR have been verified (e.g., environment, with the Ecolabel, or childlabour, with the Rugmark label). Yet, even for the same issue (labour rights) there is morethan one label.

Although this patchy approach seems consistent with consumer preferences for differentsocial issues, there should be a unified label, if the desired outcome of CSR practices is toimprove social welfare, or social issues will compete with each other via labels to gainsupport. This will not help achieve the desired outcomes of the sustainability agenda.

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There is not a comprehensive “responsible” approach to labelling, as there exists forenvironmental issues (ISO voluntary labels). This need for a “responsible label” has beenacknowledged by the ISO (IISD 2004). There have been discussions in the ISO to providesuch a label, but they have not materialised in a standard or label yet.1 The only label thatcovers a good range of issues (sustainable production, sustainable economy, labour rights)is the fair trade mark (Valor 2006).

Apart from the lack of unified labels, lack of awareness and lack of credibility ofexisting labels are two other important limitations (D’Souza et al. 2006; Iwanow et al.2005; Stø and Strandbakken 2005). Given the number of labels, it is not surprising thatconsumers are uncertain about what they mean: consumers report confusion and distrust ofexisting labels (De Pelsmacker et al. 2005b; Stø and Strandbakken 2005), although trustincreases for labels issued by or supported by reputed NGOs or governments (DePelsmacker et al. 2005b). Confusion and lack of understanding of what a label means mayexplain why most of the ethical labelling initiatives often have market shares of less than1% (Vermeir and Verbeke 2005).

As regards the screening strategy, there are a number of sources and formats throughwhich this information is provided: websites (e.g., http://microsucks.com/), web commu-nities (e.g., http://www.mwr.org.uk/action.htm), ad hoc reports about an issue or company,and CSR tests. Tests are produced by third party organisations, frequently consumersassociations and/or responsible consumer associations. Tests are based on informationprovided by companies and reports issued by civil society organisations. The ultimateproduct is presented in “best shopping guides” or ethical ratings of companies and/orbrands (for instance see http://www.ethicalconsumer.org).

CSR tests (especially in the form of shopping guides) are also a useful format ofinformation for consumers, since it reduces the transaction costs associated withinformation search and processing, whilst still allowing them to compare differentalternatives. Yet, it is difficult to retrieve reliable corporate information of all companies,in all industries, about a wide range of issues (inter alia, respect for human rights orbiodiversity protection). The information asymmetries are still present.

Sanction Power and Legitimate Power

This section explores the other two dimensions of consumer power: sanction power andlegitimate power. Sanction power refers to the ability to punish or reward brands; legitimatepower is the ability to influence corporate policies. These two dimensions are also curtailed,due to power asymmetries. These asymmetries are at the roots of the motivational andbehavioural obstacles found by consumers.

Sanction power is limited by several obstacles (Rezabakhsh et al. 2006). Firstly, theability of consumers to find alternatives. This obstacle is even greater for informedconsumers: the more information consumers have, the more difficulties they experiencefinding a “fair” brand to buy (Shaw and Clarke 1999).

Secondly, consumers find it difficult to air publicly their discontent with corporate socialand environmental performance. Because mass media depends on advertising to survive,companies have a better bargaining position that may explain why stories are told the waythey are (e.g., without mentioning specific brands), or why certain issues do not appear at

1 For a review of these discussion and current state of affairs, see http://www.iisd.org/standards/csr.asp andhttp://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/soc-dial/csr/isoreport.pdf (Accessed 30 April 2008).

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all. This corporate capture of the media or corporate censorship, worsened by recentmergers (Klein 2001), has been reported by several authors (Bendell 2004; Goldsmith andManders 2001; Hertz 2001b; Klein 2001; Korten 1996).

To solve this obstacle, consumers can resort to NGOs-dependent media, websites orweb-based communities. Yet the possibilities of exchanging information with otherconsumers are very limited, since a self-selection process occurs: magazines for ethicalconsumers are read by those already “sensitised” (e.g., the case of the British EthicalConsumer) (Hilton 2003).

Legitimate power is also reduced due to a number of obstacles that impede consumersfrom influencing corporate policies. Firstly, because the impact of consumer action on acompany may not be significant. At a micro level, few companies rely on just one productor service. Wide portfolios help companies to resist boycotts (Beckmann and Langer 2002).In addition, vulnerability to sanction power depends on the corporate business model.Companies focusing on reputation building and maintenance render firms vulnerable toconsumer action in the marketplace (Klein 2001). However, this situation is found only incertain industries (e.g., end-use goods such as clothes) and for certain companies in theseindustries (De la Cuesta and Valor 2004; Liubicic 1998). Companies that do not derivevalue from brand image, and therefore, do not need their reputation to attract consumers,employees, or investors, are not vulnerable to consumer action. As a consequence, thesefirms retain their power.

At a macro level, market structures prevent consumers from influencing corporatepractices. One-third of total trade takes place within the same company; another thirdbetween companies; of the final third, governments account for the lion’s share (Held andMcGrew 2002). The conclusion that follows is that the real power of consumers is verylimited, since forces are not balanced in the market; their decisions may have little impacton corporate decisions, not bringing changes into the system. Lodziak (2002) calls thiseffect the “inconsequential choice.”

Besides, corporate communications have a strong impact on the “codes of choosing”(Lodziak 2002), that is, “the rules that tell the individual on what ground the preferencesshould be given to some items rather than others and when to consider the choice as properand when as inappropriate” (p. 82). The influence of companies on these codes of choosingis greater, since they have higher visibility in the media. Civil society organisations find itdifficult to counteract companies’ communication budget (Klein 2001). Therefore, there isno independence between buyers and sellers. Consumers’ preferences are not “given,” butshaped by corporate messages. This affects the self-attributed ethical obligation and thevisibility of certain issues, since ethical concerns may lose visibility amidst corporatemessages.

Conclusions

As it stands, the business case for CSR, when focused on consumers, does not hold;therefore, it cannot be effective to ensure corporate social responsibility. At most, thebusiness case for CSR may hold for certain product categories and for certain brands ineach category. Although, as Valor (2005) pointed out, there cannot be good companies ifthere are not good citizens, the current articulation of the business case entails transferringthe burden of corporate control to consumers. This is an enormous task.

Consumers are not heroes; at most, they are good citizens. Consumers cannot beexpected to gather the necessary information to punish companies, process it, recall it, and

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choose responsibly all kind of products, from salt to travel agencies. Consumers are notfull-time consumers; they have a number of other roles to perform: they are students,friends, brothers, mothers, workers, citizens. At most, consumers use the limited,fragmented, incomplete and sometimes contradictory information they gather aboutcompanies and try to use it at the marketplace. This task is so enormous they createheuristics to simplify. For instance, buying fair trade or environmentally products orchampioning only one social or environmental problem.

In addition, individuals may experience personal and/or social conflicts, sinceperforming the other roles also demand time and effort. Consuming responsibly is seenas a time consuming activity, economically disadvantageous, and stressful. To be coherentwith this perception of citizenship, consumers have to be heroic. Within the business caseapproach, we are asking consumers to be monitors and enforcers of corporateresponsibilities. Both roles demand full-time dedication that clearly consumers cannotprovide. Consumers can cooperate with existing initiatives, align with them, even providefurther incentives. But they cannot be asked to be the cornerstone of the system.

At the root of the problem lie the limitations for exerting power in the marketplace. Asexplained above, the three dimensions of consumer power are restrained. Empoweringconsumers is a requisite for the business case to work. Below there are some suggestionsfor policy-makers to empower consumers. Yet, we want to emphasize the need for furtherresearch to envision the most appropriate policies to trigger market incentives for CSR. Thesubsequent recommendations are based on the premise that corporate responsibilities, suchas labour rights or environmental protection, are public and not private goods (Liubicic1998); hence, as public goods, legal, rather than purely market-based mechanisms would bemore appropriate to enhance them.

Firstly, consumers should be better informed. This is a requisite for them to exertsanction power. Imperfect information is one of the key obstacles for consumer sovereignty(Hansen and Schrader 1997). Therefore, the “information gap” should be solved.

Mandatory reporting is necessary (De la Cuesta and Valor 2004; Joseph 2002; Liubicic1998; OECD 2001; Scherrer and Greven 2001), since it is the way to ensure that allcompanies disclose their social and environmental performance. Reports could be used bythird parties to provide consumers with more suitable information formats (e.g., tests) forguiding their purchasing. Any framework for this mandatory reporting should ensure thatthe information is relevant, reporting what consumers demand; comparable across sectors,companies, and countries; reliable, that is, it must include some form of assurance orindependent verification; and accessible to the public.

Work should be continued toward the creation of a comprehensive social or CSR label.A label tagged to the product simplifies the information search for consumers and mayserve as an aide-mémoire. Governments should also support labelling initiatives, sinceevidence shows that their support increases the visibility and especially credibility of labels.Additionally, regulation should be passed to counteract public relations strategies oncompanies’ side. Legal action should be taken against misleading information, abuse, orfailure to fulfil corporate commitments.

To increase legitimate power, governments should start buying responsibly, byintroducing social or environmental clauses in public procurement requirements. Ifgovernments join individual consumers in the market-place, the influence on corporatepolicies would be greater, since the forces in the market will be more balanced. In addition,policy-makers should help counteract the influence of companies on the codes of choosing,by fostering citizenship through formal and informal education. Ethical or responsibleshopping should be included in the multidimensional concept of citizenship.

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