Can siitra mahamudra be justified on the basis

of Maitrlpa's Aprati�!hanavada?l

Klaus-Dieter M a thes, Hamburg

General remarks

The term sutra mahamudra is a controversial one, suggesting as it does that the practice and realization of mahamudra is possible outside the Tantras, namely on the basis of the Siitras. Such an approach was propagated by sGam po pa (1079-1153) but criticized by Sa skya Pa1)<;iita (1182-1251), who maintained that there is no conventional expression for mahamudra in the param,ita tradi­tion, and that the wisdom of mahamudra can only be a wisdom arisen from em­powerment. 'Gos Lo tsa ba gZon nu dpal (1392-1481), however, defends sGam po pa's mahan1Udra by pointing out that it has Indian origins, in the persons of Jfianakirti and Maitripa (ca. 1007 - ca. 1085)2 (together with the latter's disciple Sahajavajra, 11th cent.).3 Kon sprul Blo gros mtha' yas (1813-1899) thus distinguishes in his Ses bya kun khyab mdzad (vol. 3, 375f.) besides the generally accepted mantra mahamudra, a sutra mahamudra and an essence maha11'tudra. Mantra mahamudra is transmitted according to the methods taught by the Mantrayana, and this involves Tantric empowerment. Essence mahamudra leads to the sudden or instantaneous realization of one's natural mind (tha mal gyi ses pa). Sutra mahamudra is defined in the following way:

1 The present article was made possible through a research project financed by the German Research Council (DFG). I am grateful to Prof. Harunaga Isaacson for having read this paper before it was published. Improvements to my English by Philip H. Pierce (Nepal Research Centre, Kathmandu) are gratefully acknowledged.

2 Tatz 1994: 65. On the life of MaitrIpa, see Tatz 1987: 695-711.

3 See Mathes in print a.

B. Kellner, H. Krasser, H. Lasic, M.T. Much, H. Tauscher (eds.), Pramiil,lakfrt*. Papers dedi­cated to Ernst Steinkellner on the occasion of his 70th birthday. Part 2. (Wiener Studien zur Tibetologie und Buddhismuskunde 70.2) Wien 2007, pp. 545-566.

546 Klaus-Dieter Mathes

Vis-a-vis the objective part of ni�prapaiica and luminosity, which is in accordance with the Sutra tradition, the subjective part enters into equipoise with the aid of amanasikiira pith-instructions. 4

In other words, not to fabricate anything by "not becoming mentally engaged" (amanasikara) is the only way mind can approach emptiness or reality, which is characterized by "being free from mental fabrications" (ni�prapafica). gZon nu dpal finds this practice described in Sahajavajra's commentary on MaitrIpa's Tattvadasaka and thus characterizes this commentary in his Blue Annals as follows:

In essence it is the piiramitiis, it is in accordance with the [Way of] Mantras, and its name is mahiimudrii.5

In the Tattvadasakatfka, phenomena are not only ascertained as being empty, but also experienced as luminosity in a samadhi which realizes reality as it is (yathabhutasamadhi). The latter is made possible by pith-instructions, and Tattvadasaka 2cd implies that this is supreme Madhyamaka adorned with pith­instructions whose main purpose is to enable a direct experience of emptiness as luminosity on a path that unites samatha with a particular form of vipasyanii.6 It is well known that Maitrlpa favours the Madhyamaka "tenet of not abiding in any phenomena" (Sarvadharmaprati�thanavada) over the inferior Madhyamaka "tenet of non-duality [in the sense of everything being] like an illusion" (Mayopamadvayavada).7 A literal translation of Skt. sarvadhar­maprati�thana would be "not being grounded in all phenomena," which means that phenomena should not be reified in any conceivable way. This is very clear from the Sekanirdesapafijikii of Ramapala (one of the four main disciples of MaitrIpa),8 who glosses aprati�thana as "not to reify [anything]" and "not to become mentally engaged.

,,9 In the corresponding root text, Sekanirdesa,1O

4 Kon sprul Blo gros mtha' yas: Ses bya kun khyab mdzod, vol. 3, 375,18-20: mdo lugs dan mthun pa'i spros bral 'od gsal gyi yul la / yul can yid la mi byed pa'i gdams pas miiam par 'jog pa dan /

5 gZon nu dpal: Deb ther snon po 847, vol. 2, 18-19: no bo pha rol tu phyin pa / snags dan rjes su mthun pa min phyag rgya chen po.

6 For a detailed discussion of the Tattvadasaka see Mathes 2006: 209-223.

7 See Tatz 1994: 67.

8 See Roerich 1949-53: 842.

9 SNPS(C)' fol. 18a4; SNPS(Pe), fol. 15b6-7: sarvasminn ... aprati�thiinaam aamanasikiiro 'niiropa/:t a C omits.

The Tibetan translation (SNPn fol. 334b4) differs slightly: "aprati�thiina [means] not

Can siitra maluimudrii be justified on the basis of MaitrIpa' s Aprati�thiinavada? 547

stanza 29cd, Maitrlpa informs us that mahiimudrii is also known as "[the practice of] not abiding (aprati�?hiina) in anything."ll In other words, the yogin simply refrains from projecting wrong notions (such as an independent existence or characteristic signs) onto anything arisen in dependence, whether skandhas, dhiitus or iiyatanas.12 Philosophically, this amounts to the Prasailgika attitude of not postulating any position of one's own, and in fact, for 'Ba' ra ba rOyal mtshan dpal bzail (1310-1391), the Aprati�thana-Madhyamaka is identical with Prasailgika.13

The practice of not becoming mentally engaged (anwnasikara) is described in such siitras as the liiiinalokalarrikara (see below) and the Nirvikalpapravesa­dhiira1Jf. In the latter, the Bodhisattva abandons all wrong projections onto re­ality by not becoming mentally engaged. For Sahajavajra amanasikiira does not mean that one does not see any objects as a result of having closed one's eyes. It is rather that one does not focus on a putative own-being of entities as a re­sult of analysis or the pith-instructions of one's guru.14 In his Amanasikiiriidha­ra, Maitrlpa gives the following mahiimudrii-interpretation of anwnasikiira:

The letter a stands for luminosity, and lnanasikiira for blessing from within (sviidhi­�thiina)Y It is both a and manasikiira, so we get am.anasikiira.16 Through this, namely by [operating with] the words am.anasikiira and so forth,17 one arrives at the expression "a blessing from within [that is] inconceivable luminosity" [i.e.,] an awareness which is a non-dual continuity in which inseparable emptiness and com­passion are united as a pair.18

to reify [anything], in virtue of not becoming mentally engaged." (rab tu mi gnas pa ni yid la byed pa med pas sgroI' gdags pa med pa' 0 /)

10 Or also Sekanir�wya, as it is referred to in the Tattvaratniivalf(TRAs 21,14).

11 SNs 36,11 (SN 29cd): sarvasminn aprati�thiina1?'l mahiimudreti kfrtyate /

12 SNPs(C), fo1. 18a4; SNPS(Pe)' fo1. 15b6: sarvasl1'linn iti pratftyasamutpaannaaskandha-dhiitviiyataniidau... a Pe omits

13 Mimaki 1982: 34.

14 See Mathes 2005: 15 and 19-20.

15 For the meaning of sviidhi�{hiina in the Tattvadasaka and its {fkii, see Mathes 2006: 212.

16 This means that a-manasikiira is taken here as a karmadhiiraya compound.

17 I.e., luminosity and blessing from within.

18 AMAs 142,17-20: a iti prabhiisvarapada1?'l/ manasikiira iti sviidhi�thiinapadam as eiisau manasikiiras eety amanasikiira/:l/ eteniimanasikiiriidipadair aeintyaprabhiisva­rasviidhi�thiinapada1?'l siinyatiikaru�iibhinnayuganaddhiidvayaviihisa1?'lvedanam iipiidi-

548 Klaus-Dieter Mathes

In other words, the practice of Aprati�thana-Madhyamaka (amanasikara) not only consists of not reifying anything by not focusing on an own-being or the like, but also enables a direct experience of mind's inconceivable luminosity, just as phenomena are said to be experienced as luminosity in the Tattva­dasaka.

Aprati�thana-Madhyamaka in the Tattvaratnlivalr 19

MaitrIpa begins his Tattvaratnavalr by pointing out that there are three yanas

(namely the Sravakayana, Pratyekayana, and Mahayana) and four tenets (namely Vaibha�ika, Sautdintika, Yogacara, and Madhyamaka). The Mahayana is further divided into the Way (naya) of ParamiHis and the Way of Mantras. While the Way of Paramitas can be pursued either on the basis of Sautrantika (sic!), Yogacara, or Madhyamaka, the Way of Mantras is explained in line with the tenets of Yogacara and/or Madhyamaka. The latter is 'further divided into the tenet of Mayopamadvaya and the one of Aprati�thana. 20 It is clear that Aprati�thana-Madhyamaka is considered the highest tenet within the Way of Mantras. The latter is not taken as a yana different from Mahayana, but explained in line with Y ogacara and/or Madhyamaka. It should be noted, however, that Vajrapfu).i, another of the four main disciples of Maitrlpa,21 summarizes this part of the Tattvaratnavalr with the interesting comment that the distinction among three yanas and four tenets is only made for the benefit of gradualists, who are considered inferior:

In order that sentient beings of inferior intellect may realize them, I shall summarize all [tenets on] reality, writing down just a little. [But] first of all, there are two types

tam bhavatfti ... 19 I may refer to Tatz (1994: 65-120), who has already translated (or paraphrased) some of the passages quoted in the present paper. It is only for terminological reasons that I present my own translation. 20 TRAs 14,5-14 (=NGMPP Reel No. B 22/24, fol. 9al-4) tatra trfIJi yanani! srava­kayanarrz / pratyekayanarrz / mahayana,?1- ceti / sthitayas catasraf:t / vaibha�ikasauatran­tikayogacaramadhyamakabhedena / . . . mahayanarrz ca dvividharrz / paramitanayo man­tranayas ceti / tatra yaf:tb paramitanayaf:t smNrantikayogacaramadhyamakasthitya vyakhyayate / mantranayas tu yogacaramadhyamakasthitya vyakhyayate / ... evarrz madhyamiko 'pi mayopamadvayavadisarvadharmaprati�thanavadibhedat dvividhaf:t /

a The ms. reads -srau- instead of -sau-. b The ms. reads ya instead of yaf:t. C The ms. reads sru- instead of sau-.

21 See Roerich 1949-53: 842.

Can sutra mahiilnudrii be justified on the basis of MaitrIpa's Aprati�thanavada? 549

of persons, the monkey-like and the crow-like. The monkey-like realizes [reality] gradually, and the crow-like instantaneously. It is with those who realize [reality] gradually in mind that the three yiinas [are presented] . . . 22

In other words, there is only one reality, and it can be realized instantaneously. Everything else is provisional presentations functioning as steps for those who need a ladder. This passage from VajrapaI.li's commentary provides perfect doctrinal support for KoIi sprul' s essence mahiimudrii. It should be further noted that VajrapaI.li divides Mahayana - all this well within the system for the gradualist - into a causal yiina of defining characteristics and the Vajrayana of fruition. 23

The presentation of Aprati�thana-Madhyamaka in the Tattvaratniivalr starts with an examination (viciira) of this tenet in six stanzas. This is followed by a warning about the possible danger of the related samiidhi (described as adopt­ing the view that nothing exists at all, being in a state of dull nothingness )24 and a presentation of the fruit, namely the three kiiyas. In the following we shall take a closer look at the first three of these six stanzas. The first one is identical with Mahiiyiinavi1?1sikii, stanza 4, the second is similar to Sekanirdesa, stanza 29, and the third is identical with Sekanirdesa, stanza 32.25

The Tibetan commentary on the Tattvaratniivalr (namely the Rin chen phren

ba'i bsad pa, probably by Ti pi 'bum la 'bar)26 starts its elucidation of these six stanzas on Aprati�thana by first explaining the introductory sentence in the Tattvaratniivaif, which is as follows:

22 GPKUT 290b4-6: ... blo dman skye bos rtogs bya'i phyir II de iiid thams cad mdor bsdus nas II Gun zad tsam zig bri bar bya II re zig gmi zag ni gfiis te I spre 'u lta bu dan I khva ta lta bu'o II spre'u lta bu ni rim, gyis 'jug pa'o II khva ta lta bu ni cig car du 'jug pa'o II rim gyis 'jug pa'i dbmi du byas na theg pa ni gsum ste I ....

23 GPKUT 291a3: theg pa chen po la'ali gfiis te I rgyu mtshan IUd kyi theg pa dali I 'bras bu rdo rje theg pa' 0 I

24 TRAs 20,21-22: sarviirthocchedo jacjfbhiivo viia samiidhimala1?1. I; TRAT(p) 129b5: don thams cad chad par lta dali I bem (text: bems) po'i ran bzin du gyur pa ni ti1i ne 'dzin gyi dri ma' 0 I a The edition reads: jacjfbhavab

25 As already pointed out by Tatz (1994: 109, fn. 57).

26 The "Rin chen phren ba'i b§ad pa" is contained in the collection Grub pa sde bdun dali siiin po skor gsum yid la mi byed pa 'i chos skor bzugs so. According to the present Chetsang Rinpoche it was compiled under the direction of the 17th 'Bri gun abbot Kun dga' rin chen (1475-1527). See also 'Bri gun gdan rabs, p. 183.

550 Klaus-Dieter Mathes

What now follows is an examination of the Sarvadharmaprati�lhanavadins.27

The Rin chen phren ba'i b§ad pa explains:

The object of comprehension is the [two] inseparable truth[s]. As for reality, it is all appearances [namely] the mind, and what is simply beyond all mental fabrication. The appearance aspect of it is what is called "apparent [truth]" and the aspect of it that is free from [mental] fabrication is called "ultimate [truth]." And these two are connected to the point of identity just as what is created and what is impermanent are.28

In other words, the main stance of this Madhyamaka tenet is that the apparent and ultimate must be taken as aspects of the same reality, and thus as sharing an identity. Such a shared identity is also maintained by Zva dmar Chos grags ye ses (1453-1524) on the basis of Bodhicittavivaraf}a,29 stanza 68:

... This is because the apparent is explained as emptiness and emptiness alone is the apparent, the one certainly not occurring without the other, as, for example, [two properties] of a vase, namely [its having been] created and, as a consequence of this, [its] impermanence [share] the bond of identity.30

This finds also support in Maitripa' s Aprati�thanapraka§a, stanza 7:

The mere arising of phenomena is inconceivable [even] for original awareness.

This very [arising] is called emptiness without falling into [the extreme of] nihil­ism.31

27 TRAs 20,6 : sarvadharmtiprati�thtinavtidintiY(l tv ayaY(l victira!:t I 28 Rin chen phren ba'i b§ad pa 195b1-2: gial bya ni bden pa dbyer med do II de kho na fiid ni snan ba thams cad sems yin la I sems kyis spros pa thams cad las 'das pa tsam iig ste I snan ba'i cha nas lam rdzob ies bya iin II spros pa dan bral ba'i cha nas don dam ies bya ste I de giiis kyan byas pa dan mi rtag pa ltar bdag Gig pa'i 'brei pa'o II

29 For the role the Bodhicittavivara1Ja plays in the mahtimudrti tradition of the bKa' brgyud pas, see Mathes in print b.

30 Zva dmar Chos grags ye ses: Tshig don gsal ba 104,4-7: kun rdzob de yan ston pa iiid du bsad la I ston iiid de kho na yan kun rdzob yin pas I gcig med na gcig mi 'byun ba nes pa'i phyir I dper na bum pa'i byas pa dan I de rkyen gyi dban du gyur nas mz rtag pa dag bdag gcig pa'i 'brei ba biin no I

31 APPs 80,3-4: utptida eva dharmti1Jtim acintyo nijasaY(lvidti I sa eva siinyatti proktti ntinuacchedtinugtiminl II

a According to the manuscript from the National Archives in Kathmandu (NGMPP,. reel no. B 22/24, fol. 31a2) and the Tibetan (APPT(p) 122b3: chad pa'i rjes su 'gro ma yin no). The Japanese edition has ntinyo-.

Can sutra maham,udra be justified on the basis of MaitrIpa's Aprati�thanavada? 551

The last piida "without falling into [the extreme of] nihilism" excludes the pos­sibility that the arising of phenomena is simply being negated here. Calling it emptiness allows it, rather, to be admitted as dependent arising.32 In other words, the equation of the apparent (i.e., dependent arising) with emptiness is taken as implying that any reification or denial of the members of dependent arising, that is, the mere appearances which are not abandoned in Aprati�thana­vada (see below), result in sal11saric experiences of the apparent (which is the mere arising of phenomena in piida 7a), whereas the absence of reification and denial - or "non-abiding" - reveals dependent arising for what it is, namely emptiness.

Tattvaratniivalf, Aprati�thana section, stanza 1

In the first stanza of the Aprati�thana section Maitrlpa thus denies the four on­tological possibilities of reifying or denying the phenomenal world on the basis of a tetralemma formed with the pair "eternal" (siisvata) and "annihilated" (uc­

chedin):

The manifold [world] is not taken to be eternal or said to be annihilated;

Nor is it a combination of both eternal and annihilated, nor can it be that neither is the case.33 (TRA 1) (= Mahayanavi,!1§ika, stanza 4)

The Rin chen phren ba'i bsad pa does not go into detail, but simply explains that "eternal" does not apply, for nothing is established in its own right (lio bos

gmi yan ma grub pa), whereas annihilation (ucchedin) is ruled out on the ground that the appearances of the apparent truth have not been abandoned.34 The refutation of the third and fourth possibility is not further commented upon, but the third one (i.e., something is existent and non-existent at the same

32 See Mulamadhyamakakarika XXIV.1Sab (MMKs 35,lS): ya(1 pratftyasamutpada(1 §unyatar!l ta'!1 pracak�mahe I

33 TRAs 20,7-S (=MV 74,7�S): na matarrla §a§vatal?1 Vi§Vm?1 na cocchedi samfhitam I §a§vatocchedi no yugmal?lb nanubhaym?l vinobhaymJ'l II

a MVs 74,7: neta,!l (corrected to neda,!l in the Japanese edition). b According to NGMPP, B 22/24, fo1. 12b5-6a1; and MVs 74,S. Shastri reads yug­mymJ1.

34 Rin chen phreli ba'i b§ad pa 195b3: "ucchedin" should not be taken as the mere interruption of existence, but as a synonym of utter non-existence. "Is not said" [means:] the appearances of the apparent have not been abandoned (chad pa ni yod pa rgyun chad pa tsam la mi bya'i II med pa tsam gyi (text: gyis) rnam grmis du bya'o II khas mi len ces pa ni II kun rdzob kyi snmi ba mi spans pa' 0 II).

552 Klaus-Dieter Mathes

time) can be ruled out on the grounds that the combination of two impossible positions is likewise impossible. The fourth extreme, namely a negation of this combination ("nor can it be that neither is the case") must be suspended be­cause the manifold world cannot be posited as something indeterminate,35-namely as something in between the extremes, for this would be a mental fabri­cation, of which type of construction reality is considered to be free. Being a result fabricated by analytical activity, this fourth extreme should not be con­founded with the realization of a reality beyond the four extremes of mental fabrication. This is clear from the Mahiiyiinavi1'!lsikii, in which MaitrIpa intro­duces his Mahayana presentation of the fruit or the union as a pair (yuganad­dha) by repeating the first stanza from the Aprati�thana section of the Tattva­ratniivalf(namely the one on the exclusion of the four extremes). In the stanza which follows in the Mahiiyiinavi1'!lsikii (in piidas 5ab) Maitrlpa adds the fol­lowing explanation:

Knowers of reality know reality which is free from [these] four extremes.36 (MV 5ab)

What this reality precisely relates to, is explained in the three introductory stanzas of the Mahiiyiinavi1'!lsikii. The first two define the goal as the "origi­nal/natural kiiya" (nijakiiya), which is the nature of the three kiiyas (sometimes equated with the sviibhiivikakiiya), and in the third stanza MaitrIpa declares:

The seeing of this [nijakiiya] is deep insight (vipasyanii), given that no [thing] is rei­fied.

This will be explained now in accordance with the Mantrayana.37 (MV 3)

In other words, to see (without reification) the original kiiya is taken in MV 4a-5b as knowing a reality which is beyond the ontological possibilities of the tetralemma. The third introductory stanza is particularly noteworthy, for the only thing Tantric about this general exposition of the Mahayana goal is a vi­

pasyanii practice of seeing without reification, that is realizing the possibility·of working with direct perceptions of reality or one's true nature of mind. This is precisely what Kon sprul's satra mahiimudrii, which is also taken as being in accordance with Mantrayana (see above), is.

35 See Seyfort Ruegg 1981: 39.

36 MVs 74,9: catu�kotivinirmuktarrt tattvarrt tattvavido viduf:z /

37 MVs 74,5-6: darsanarrt ca bhaved asya aniiropiid vipasyanii / mantrayiiniinusiirelJa tad idarrt vak�yate J dhunii / /

Can sutra 111ahii111udrii be justified on the basis of MaitrIpa's Aprati�thanavada? 553

Tattvaratniivalz, Aprati�thana section, stanza 2

The second stanza continues the same line of thought:

The wise [come to] know the reality of things as not abiding in anything.

Now this is not just a thought because a [conceptual] mind does not know the nature of mind.38 (TRA 2)

The Rin chen phren ba'i bsad pa explains: "the wise [come to] know the reality of things which is not grounded in any of these [extremes].

,,39 The reality of

things can only be known by not falling into the extremes of the tetralemma formulated in the preceding stanza, and this is not achieved by only thinking about it. The realization of reality by not abiding in any extreme, rather, recalls Sekanirdesa, stanza 29 (see below), where such a practice (i.e., aprati�!hiina) is called mahiimudrii. This raises the question whether such an approach is then Tantric,40 all the more so since Maitripa introduces l1'tahiimudrii first in its classical Tantric context of the four mudriis in Sekanirdesa, stanza 26:

Having approached a kar111amudrii, one should meditate on the dhannamudrii.

Hereafter [follows] l1whiimudrii, from which the samaya[mudrii] arises.41

In his Sekanirdesa, Maitripa presents Tantric empowerment on the basis of the four moments (i.e., the moments of enjoying manifold appearances, maturation, freedom from defining characteristics, and relaxation) which correspond to the four joys (i.e., joy, supreme joy, co-emergent joy, and Uoy of] no joy). The four

38 TRAs 20,9-10: sarvasminn aprati�thiina17'la vastutattva171 vidur budhiib I athai�ii kalpanii naiva yac cid vetti na cittatiim II

a NGMPP, B 22/24, fol. 12b6, reads sarvasmin prati�thiinal?l with one ak�ara missing in the first piida. Shastri proposes sarvasmin prati�thiine ca, which does not make any sense.

TRAT (DK, 181a2; P, 129bl) reads: I 'di ni thams cad mi gnas pas (DK: pa) II dfws po de iiid mkhas pas rig II de nas (P: des na /) 'di Ita bu'i rnam rtog gis II sems ni sems kyis rig ma yin I. The third rkan pa is not metrical.

39 Rin chen phren ba'i Mad pa 195b4: "The reality which is not grounded in any extreme ... is the experiential object of the knowledge of the wise" (mtha' thams cad· du mi gnas pa 'i de kho na iiid de ... mkhas pa 'i ses pa 'i spyod yul lo /).

40 Sahajavajra thus asks in his Sthitisamuccaya (SS V.7cd): "[One's practice] may be free from investigation, but how can it be free from the tradition of mantras?" (SSs 11 b4: pariimar�a1?l vinaiva syiit katha1?l mantranaYa171 vinii //).

41 SNs 56,5-6: kannamudriil?l samiisiidya dharmamudriil?l vibhiivayet I tasyii urdhva1?l mahiimudrii yasyiib samayasa,!lbhavab II

554 Klaus-Dieter Mathes

moments (and thus the four joys) are also linked with the four mudras in Sekanirdesa, stanza 38, the moment of enjoying manifold apperances (in this context, the sight of a beautiful woman) being related to the karmamudra, the moment of maturation to dharmamudra, the moment of freedom from defining characteristics to mahamudra, and the moment of relaxation to samayamudra.42

It should be noted that MaitrIpa also explains the four moments and joys on the level of each mudra (except mahamudra). Thus the four joys are first en­joyed physically with the help of a karmamudra43 and then on the level of dhar­mamudra, based on the realization that the sights and sounds of the manifold world are one's own mind and so forth. Being the immediate cause of mahamudra and excellent maturation on the path, dharmamudra is also the fruit of maturation.44 Having realized mahamudra, one displays form-kayas (i.e., the samayamudra) for the sake of others. The four joys of the samaya­mudra are explained as the ones of the manifested deities.

Only the third moment (freedom from defining characteristics) and the cor­responding co-emergent joy are considered to be pure.45 Thus mahamudra is not explained in terms of the four joys, it being beyond, and thus independent of, the impurities of the other joYS.46 In other words, Sekanirdesa, stanza 26

means that mahamudra can be cultivated on the basis of a karmamudra and the

42 SNs 60,3-4: vicitra1?'l karmamudraiva dharmamudra vipakaja / vilak�alJa1?'l maha­mudra vimardaJ:z samayo bhavet / /

43 In the commentary on the Caturmudranvaya (CMATT, fol. 267al) karmamudra is defined in the following way: "Karma- is bliss, and mudra the recognition [of this bliss], the very moment [it appears]" (las ni bde ba ste / / phyag rgya ni dus kyi sna rtse tshad du 'dzin pa).

44 SNPS(C)' fol. 16b4-5; SNPS(Pe), fol. 14a9-bl: ... dharmamudra / iya1?'l ca mahamu­drayaJ:z sa1?'lanikr�takarablJatvanb maCrgataya visi�tapakatvad vipakaphala1?'l /

a CPe san- b C illegible, Pe -lJatvana C C ma- inserted by another hand.

45 GPKUT 319a5-6: "Such a mahamudra is the fruit without stains .... It is the co­emergent joy at the moment of freedom from defining characteristics" (de Ita bu'i phyag rgya chen po ni dri ma dan bral ba'i 'bras bu'o / ... mtshan fiid dan bral ba'i skad cig ma la lhan cig skyes pa'i dga' ba'o /).

46 See SN 27ab (SNs 56,7): "The [four] joys can be [maintained] with regard to each of the mudras, except mahamudra" (anandaJ:z pratimudra1?'l syuJ:z mahamudra1?'l vina punaJ:z).

Can sutra mahiimudrii be justified on the basis of MaitrIpa's Aprati�thanavada? 555

dharmamudra, but it does not need to be.47 It is against this background that Maitrlpa maintains in his Sekanirdesa (stanza 29):

Not to abide (aprati�thiina) in anything is known as mahiimudrii.

Because self-awareness [i.e., mahiil11Udrii] is stainless, [the moments of enjoying] manifold [appearances] and so forth do not arise.48

Ramapala comments in his paiijika:

"In anything" means in the dependently arisen skandhas, dhiitus, iiyatanas and so forth. "Not to abide" means not to reify, not to become mentally engaged. This is also stated [in the lfiiiniilokii[a111kiira]:

The mental factors of not becoming mentally engaged are virtuous. Those of be­coming mentally engaged are not virtuous.49

Likewise it has been said [in the liiiiniilok?ila111kiira]:

Homage to You, who is without imagined thoughts, whose intellect is not based [on anything], who is without recollection, who does not become mentally en­gaged, and who is without any cognitive object.5o

... One should not think that this cannot be practised because thanks to the kindness of [one's] venerable guru, mahiimudrii, which has the defining characteristic of being endowed with all supreme qualities, can certainly be made directly manifest. How is it then that [mahiimudrii] does not have the nature of the four moments? [In 29c] it is stated: "Because self-awareness [i.e., mahiimudrii] is stainless." Being stainless, the three stained moments of the manifold and so forth do not occur in it. Therefore the three [impure] joys do not arise in it either.51

47 Oral explanation from Thrangu Rinpoche (Kathmandu, April 2006).

48 SNs 56,11-12: sarvasminn aprati�thiina111 mahiimudreti kfrtyate I vimalatviit svasa1Jl­vitter vicitriider na sa1?lbhava/:l II

49 The same quotation is identified in AMAs 136,10-11 as being from the lfiiiniilokii-1a111kiira: amanasikiirii dharmii/:l kusalii(l I manasikiirii dharmii akusalii(l. In the liiiinii­lokiila1Jlkiira itself I could locate only the following (JAAs 94,14-15): Sa111k�iptena sarve akusalii manaskiirii/:l sa1Jlkletasya hetu/:l I sarve kusaliia manaskiirii/:l (?) vyava­diinasya hetu(l I

a The Japanese edition reads -lii/:l.

50 See J AAs 146,1-2: avikalpiataSa111kalpa aprati�thitamiinasab I asmrty amanasikiirab niriilamba namo stu te II

a The Japanese edition reads -pa-. b The Japanese edition reads -a(l.

51 S PNs(C) , fol. 1 8a4-5 ; SPNs(Pe), fol. 15b6-9: sarvasminn skandhadhiitviiyataniidau ;a aprati�thiinabm abmanasikiiro

iti pratftyasamutpaannaa­'niiropa/:l Ie tad uktam

556 Klaus-Dieter Mathes

The commentary is more than clear here. The mahlimudrli practice of aprati­

sthlina, which does not involve becoming mentally engaged, is not only de­��ribed in . a siitra, namely the Jfilinliloklila1'!lklira, but can be also performed through the kindness of one's guru without the occurrence of the defiled joys and moments of Tantric practice.

Ramapala continues by calling aprati�thlina inconceivable wisdom which does not arise from analysis. This kind of wisdom, rather, is without effort, evolving as it does within its own sphere. 52

Tattvaratniivalf, Aprati�thana section, stanza 3

All reification, whatever there is - all this does not exist in any respect;

In Madhyamaka [everything] is without reification. Where is then denial or the establishing [of anything]?53 (TRA. 3) (= Sekanirdesa, stanza 32)

In his Sekanirdesapafijikli, Ramapala works through the differences between Vijiiaptimatravada and Mayopamadvayavada on the one side and his guru's Aprati�!hana-Madhyamaka on the other:

[Maitrlpa taught the stanza] beginning with "[all reification,] whatever there is" for the following reason: Here in Madhyamaka any reification, i.e., determination, whatever there is - all this does not exist. [Objection:] Such a non-existence of reification is also maintained in the tradition of Vijiiana[vada]. Therefore he said "in any respect." There [i.e., in Vijiianavada] is a trace of reification [by maintaining] the real existence of consciousness. Therefore reification is not entirely absent in

pravacane f amanasiklirtf dharmli/:t kusalli/:t I manasiklirli edharmli akusalli/:te I tathli caf Ig a\likalpitasarrtka1pa aprati�{hitamlinasa I asmrty amanasiklira nirlilamba namo stu te iti II ... hasakylihn�{hlinatli ca naa mantavyli I sadguruplidapraslidenlivasyarrt sarvlikliravaropetalak�a1Jamahlimudrliyli/:t pratyak�fkarturrti sakyatvlit IC nanv atra ka­tharrt na catu/:tk�a1Jariipatli ;C liha ;C vimalatvlit svasa�vitte,;r nirmalatayli f vicitrlide/:t k�a1Jatrayasya samalasya nlitra sambhava/:t ;C tato nlinandatrayasambhava/:t

a Pe omits be omits C Pe II d C -ra- epe dharmli/:t kusalli/:t f C omits g CPe omit h

Pe -desakli- i Pe -kartur j Pe -san- k C -vitti Pe -vitter

52 SPNs(C), fol. 18b3-4; SPNS(Pe), fol. 16a4-5: tac cliprati�{hlinam acintyajiilinarrt na tad

viclirligatarrt Ib Ckirrt tarhiC Id anlibhogarrt svaraslibhyligatarrte Id

a C -arrt b Pe II C Pe kin tu hi d C omits, Pe II e Pe -ta

53 TR.As 20, 11-12 (=SNs 58,6): ylivlina sarvasamliropa/:t sa sarva/:t sarvathli na hi I madhyamlirthe nirliropas tatrlipobhavidhf kuta/:t II

a According to the Sekanirde§apaiijikli (see below). b Shastri reads -ro-. Corrected according to NGMPP, B 22/24, fol. 13al.

Can sutra lnahiil1'ludrii be justified on the basis of Maitrlpa's Aprati�thanavada? 557

[Vijfianavada]. By this [clause "in any respect"] even the tenet of the Mayopam[advayavadin] has been refuted.54

The Rin chen phren ba'i bsad pa provides the additional infonnation that it is the appearance as such which is taken to be free from reification for Maitrlpa and his followers, whereas the proponents of Cittamatra, be they Sakara or Nir­akara, equate reification with the imagined nature.55

The difference to Cittamatra and Mayopamadvayavada is also delineated in Maitrlpa's PaiicatathagatamudravivaralJa, where the five skandhas (equated with the five Tathagatas) are said to be sealed by Ak�obhya in order to make one realize that all skandhas are only mind. Ak�obhya, in turn, is sealed by Vajrasattva in order to exclude the ultimate existence of non-dual mind. Freed from the thorn of ultimate existence, the result, namely Aprati�thana-Madhya­maka, is proclaimed as being superior. MaitrIpa quickly proceeds to rule out the possible objection that this is not Aprati�thana, but Mayopamadvaya awareness still being maintained:

This is not the case, [for it has been said in Yukti�a�tikii, stanza 19]:

What has arisen dependently has not arisen in terms of its own-being.

What has not arisen in terms of its own-being - how can it be called arisen?

Awareness has arisen in dependence; therefore it is not grounded. 56

In other words, awareness may be taken as non-dual (Cittamatra), or even as not existent on the ultimate level (Mayopamadvayavada); in Aprati�thana-Madhya­maka it holds no privileged status at all. Arising in dependence, it is not grounded any more than anything else is.

54 SNPS(Pe), fol. 16b3-6 (missing in SPNs(C): yiiviin ityiidi II yatas tatra madhYaTniirthe yiiviin samiiropo 'dhyavasiiyaJ:t saa sarvo niisti II eval?'lvidhabsamiibropiibhiivo vijiiii­nanaye 'pf�tab lata iiha I sarvathaiveti II tatra hi vijiiiinasya vastusattvasamiiropasyaC padam asti II ato na tatra sarvathii samiiropiibhiiva?'l II etena miiyopamasiddhiinto 'pi pratyukta('l I

a Pe sa b Pe -sasii- C Pe -piisya

55 Rin chen phren ba'i bsad pa 195b5-6: kho bo cag itar na dbu ma'i don ni snan ba sgro btags dan bral ba zig la bya'o II gal te de ita na rnam bcas dan mam med pa'i sems tsam pa dag na re Isgro btags ni kun btags yin pas de med par kho bo cag 'dod ces rtsod pa daTi I ....

56 PTMVs 50,17-51,1: tan nal yat pratftyasamutpannan notpannan tat svabhiivataJ:t1 svabhiivena yan notpannam utpannaT?'l niima tat katham II iti II saT?'lVedanal?'l ca pra­tftyasamutpannam tasmiit samvedanam eviiprati�thitam ....

558 Klaus- Dieter Mathes

The last ptida of the third Aprati�thana stanza in the Tattvaratntivalr ("Where is then denial or the establishing [of anything]?") is consequently taken in the following way:

Appearances not having been abandoned, there is no denial, and given the absence of reification there is no establishing of anything either.57

This raises the question whether such statements are not already reifications on their own, and the answer in the commentary is:

This [state of] intellect which is free from reification must be realized by an incon­ceivable intellect.58

In other words, a mind which does not reify cannot be totally understood by discursive and analytical mind, but only by an inconceivable intellect, or as the fourth stanza of our Aprati�thana section in the Tattvaratntivalr puts it, effort­less wisdom.59

Vajrapal}.i's commentary on Maitrlpa's Aprati�thanavada

In his Guruparampartikramopadesa, Vajrapa1)i introduces his commentary on the first three Aprati�thana stanzas60 in the Tattvaratntivalr by quoting one of the most famous stanzas in Mahayana literature:61

There is nothing to be removed from it62 and nothing to be added.

The real should be seen as real, and seeing the real, one becomes liberated.63

57 Rin chen phren ba'i Mad pa 196a3-4: de ltar na snan ba mi spans pas dgag du med pa la Isgro mi 'dogs pas bsgrubs du yan med do I

58 Rin chen phren ba'i Mad pa 196a4: sgro btags dan bral ba'i blo de bsam gyis mi khyab pa'i bios rtogs par bya ba yin la I

59 TRAs 20,13 (=SNs 58,1): "Effortless wisdom [can] be taken as inconceivable." aniibhogaf!1a hi yadjfiiina1!l tac ciicintyaf!1 pracak�ate I

a NGMPP, B 22/24, fo1. 13a1-2, reads in both texts (Tattvaratniivalf 13a1 and Sekanirde.sa 19a1) aniibhoge.

60 Tatz (1994: 92-3) not only did not recognize the initial quotation as being from the Abhisamayiilaf!1kiira, but also misunderstood bsal bya as "clear light," and translated "There is no clear light here" instead of "There is nothing to be removed." 61 For a list of texts in which it occurs, see Takasaki 1966: 300.

62 Tib. 'di la should be corrected into 'di las on the basis of the Sanskrit.

63 GPKUT 298a2: ' di la bsal bya ci yan med II giag par bya ba gan yan med II yan dag

Can siitra mahamudra be justified on the basis of MaitrIpa's Aprati�thanavada? 559

Based on this, VajrapaQ-i advises readers to neither reify or superimpose exis­tence, nor deny in the sense of claiming non-existence.64 The question is, of course, what it precisely is from which nothing needs to be removed and to what nothing should be added, or rather what it is that should not be reified as existent or denied as non-existent. The standard Madhyamaka answer is "phe­nomena," which are neither reified into something possessing an independent existence nor denied as something that has arisen in dependence on the level of apparent truth. The second answer, representative of the teachings of the third dharmacakra, is "the ultimate reality of a Buddha-element or Buddha-nature," to which no qualities need to be added and from which no adventitious stains (which constitute the phenomenal world) must be removed, for the latter do not impair the Buddha-element. It is these adventitious stains which are not reified here, while the Buddha-element is not denied. In the first case, one would think of Abhisamayiilar!zkiira, stanza V.21, and in the second of Ratnagotravibhiiga, stanza I.154. The Tibetan giag par bya in piida b of Va jrapaQ-i' s quote suggests that the latter took the stanza from the Ratnagotravibhiiga,65 but VajrapaQ-i's commentary is closer to Haribhadra's Abhisamayiila1flkiiravrtti on V.21, which is as follows:

Since, then, liberation is not possible with an obstinate clinging to entities, one should ascertain that fonns and so forth, as things dependently arisen, in fact exist [only] conventionally and that they lack an own-being and so forth. In doing so, one has not, with regard to any phenomenon, either removed or added anything by way of [wrong] denial or reification.66

iiid la yan dag blta II ymi dag lnthOli na mam par grol I

The stanza in the Ratnagotravibhagavyakhya (RGVVs 76,1-2) is as follows: napane­yam ata�1, kil?1cid upaneym?l na ki/?lCana I drao!tavym?l bhiitato bhiita1Jl bhiitadarSf vimucyate II

In the Abhisamayiila1Jlkara (AAs 32,15-16) the reading is as follows: napaneyam ata(1, kiiicit prak�eptavymJ1 na kiiicana I dra�tavymJ1 bhiitato bhiital?l bhiitadarSf vimucyate II

64 GPKUT 298a2-3: "Therefore one abides neither in the reification of the existent nor in the denial of the non-existent" ( ies bya bas I yod pa'i sgro 'dogs pa dmi I med pa'i skur 'debs pa la mi gnas pa ste /).

65 Skt. prako!eptavym?l is nonnally rendered as bsnan par bya in Tibetan; Skt. upaneym?1 as giag par bya. Based on this, it would seem that Vajrapal).i quoted from the Ratna­gotravibhaga.

66 AA V Sphutarthas 72,1-3: yasmad evmJ1 bhavabhiniveSena mukter anupapattir ato apavadasamaropariipam apanayanaprako!epa1J1 kasyacid dharmasyakrtva idam eva pratftyasamutpannm?l sm?lVrtya tathyariipm?1 riipadi nil},svabhaviidiriipato niriipa1Jf­yam I

560 Klaus-Dieter Mathes

In line with this understanding, VajrapaJ).i first takes the manifold appearances of dependent arising and their emptiness as being inseparably connected, just as, the "non-existence of water" and the "appearance of water" in a mirage:

The appearance of water in a mirage has no water; it is empty of water. It is the non-existence of water which appears as water. The appearance of water and its non-existence are not separate.67

Such a presentation harbours the danger of reifying emptiness. VajrapaJ).i warns us that the latter does not subsist independently of the appearance, just as there is no more fire when the fuel has been exhausted:

An appearance and [its] emptiness in terms of an own-being are not separate. When various [logs] of firewood are burning, for example, [they all have] the same nature of fire. Eventually the firewood will be exhausted, but no "fire-ness" will remain. Likewise, when the state of manifold appearances has been established as emptiness by reasoning, [the appearances] are neither established as entities, nor does empti­ness remain.68

Appearances are thus only provisionally called empty. In terms of definitive meaning they even do not abide as this emptiness. VajrapiiJ).i summarizes his analysis of Aprati�thanavada in the following way:

In order to refute the conceptual adherence of [followers of] other [tenets] or [in other words] terminate reification and denial, [appearances] are called empty, with­out arising and non-dual in a provisional sense. But these [attributions] do not re­main in a definitive sense for those who are expert.69

.In his analysis, VajrapaJ).i fails to address the second part of our famous Maha­yana stanza of not adding or removing anything (i.e., the real should be seen as real, and seeing the real, one becomes liberated), but in his explanation of the view (defined as working for the sake of sentient beings after purifying the first five piiramitiis with the help of a prajiiiipiiramitii which is without reification

67 GPKUT 298a5: . . . smig rgyu la chur snan ba fiid la chu med de chus ston la / chu med pa fiid chur snan ste / chur snan ba dan chu med pa giiis tha mi dad pa yin no /

68 GPKUT 298a6-bl: snan ba ran biin med pa'i ston pa iiid ni tha mi dad do / dper na

bud fin du ma mes bsregs na me'i no bor gcig ste / de nas bud fin zad pa dan me iiid mi gnas so / de biin du sna tshogs su snan ba fiid rig pas ston pa iiid du byas na dnos por ma grub pa dan / ston pa iiid kyan mi gnas so /

69 GPKUT 298b2: . .. gian gyi ien pa bzlog pa' am / sgro skur gcad pa' am / dran ba'i don du ston pa dan skye ba med pa giiis su med pa ies brjod kyi / mkhas pas gial pa' am / nes pa'i don du de iiid mi gnas teo /

Can sutra mahiimudrii be justified on the basis of MaitrIpa's Aprati�thanavada? 561

and denial) 70 it is the non-abiding in any reification or denial which is taken as the knowledge of reality:

Given that it is the nature of all phenomena not to have arisen in terms of an own­being, they do not abide in any [extreme of] existence or non-existence. Therefore, not to abide in any reification and denial [by calling them] existent or non-existent is the knowledge of reality.71

VajrapaI,li does not say anything about reality itself. This would be counter­productive in the context of describing a practice which strictly avoids reifica­tion and denial. Still, when Maitripa maintains in Mahiiyiinavi1?lSikii, stanza 3,

that the original nature of the three kiiyas (i.e., the nijakiiya) is seen in vi­pasyanii by avoiding any reification, an interpretation along the lines of the Ratnagotravibhiiga (i.e., the third dharmacakra) is required. The Buddha-ele­ment with its inseparable qualities as reality corresponds to the nijakiiya, and to deny or reify the experience of any of the latter would lead the yogin astray, just as denying or reifying the appearances of the ordinary world would. Vajra­paJ).i does in fact follow such an interpretation when he explains in his pre­sentation of mahiimudrii that the latter is not different from conceptual thought, just as a rope and its wrong appearance as a snake:

As long as one fails to realize that it is a rope, it appears to be a snake, but once one realizes [the truth, it is clear] that its nature of appearing to be a snake is [shared with that of being] a rope. The very rope is the snake. The snake does not need to be removed, nor does anything of the rope need to be added. Likewise, as long as one fails to realize mahiimudrii ... , it appears to be a conceptual variety.72 When it is properly realized, its nature of [appearing to be] a conceptual variety is united as a pair with its nature of [being] the non-conceptual. It is the non-conceptual (i.e., mahiimudrii) which appears to be a conceptual variety. No thought whatsoever needs to be removed here, nor does anything non-conceptual need to be added.73

70 GPKUT 298b4-5: sgro skur med pa dan ien pa med pa'i ses rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pas pha rol tu phyin pa bia mi dmigs pa gsum gyis 'khor gSU111. po Y01is su dag par byas nas / sems can gyi don byed pa ni lta ba' 0 /

71 GPKUT 298b6-299a1: . .. chos thams cad ran biin gyis ma skyes pa 'i no bo iiid kyis . yod med gan yan mi gnas pas / yod med kyi sgro skur gan du' an mi gnas pa ni de kho na iiid kyi ses pa' 0 /

72 I.e., the manifold appearances of the world produced by false imagining.

73 GPKUT 315b5-316a1: . .. thag par ma rtogs nas sbrul du snan gi / rtogs na sbrul du snan ba'i ran biin iiid thag pa yin la / thag pa iiid sbrul lo / sbrul bsal bar bya' am / thag

pa giag par bya ba ci'an med do / de biin du phyag rgya chen po ... ma rtogs nas rtog ,pa sna tshogs su snali ste / yan dag par rtogs na rtog pa sna tshogs kyi ran biin iiid mi

562 Klaus-Dieter Mathes

Mahiimudrii is here taken as the true nature of mind, which is non-conceptual. Until one realizes this original state, it appears as a conceptual variety. In terms of these two categories, our stanza of neither removing nor adding anything can be taken as being in line with the Ratnagotravibhiiga (stanza 1.154), and just as the rope is empty of its mistaken appearance as a snake, or the original mind of the conceptual variety, the Buddha-element is taken to be empty of adventitious stains. This is clear from Ratnagotravibhiiga, stanza 1.155, against the back­ground of which stanza 1.154 must be understood:

The [Buddha]-element is empty of adventitious [stains], which have the defining characteristic of being separable; but it is not empty of unsurpassable qualities, which have the defining characteristic of not being separable.74

The Ratnagotravibhiigavyiikhyii on stanzas 1.154 and 1.155 is as follows:

What is taught by that? There is no characteristic sign of any of the defilements (sa1'[lkle§a) whatsoever to be removed from this naturally pure Buddha-element, for it is naturally devoid of adventitious stains. Nor does anything need to be added to it as the characteristic sign (nimitta) of purification, for it is of the nature to have pure properties which are inseparable [from it] ... , Thus one truly sees that something is empty of that which does not exist in it, and one truly realizes that that which remains in place is present, [and] hence exists there. Having [thus] abandoned the extremes of reification and denial, these two stanzas (RGV 1.154-5)) correctly elucidate the defining characteristic of emptiness.75

Conclusion

It could be shown that the practice of mahiimudrii does not need to be Tantric, but can be performed by not abiding in any extreme of reification or denial.

rtog pa'i ran biin du zun du 'jug pa yin la I mi rtog pa fiid rtog pa sna tshogs su snan ste I 'dir rtog pa bsal bar bya'am I mi rtog pa giag par bya ba ci'an med do I

74 RGVVs 76,3-4 : sanya iigantukair dhiituf:z savinirbhiigalak�a1}aif:z I asanyo 'nuttarair dharmair avinirbhiigalak�a1}aif:z II

75 RGVVs 76,5-11: kim anena paridfpitam I yato na ki1'[lcid apaneyam asty ataf:z pra­krtiparisuddhiit tathiigatadhiitof:z sa1'[lkle§animittam iigantukamalasanyatiiprakrtitviid asya / niipy atra ki1'[lcid upaneyam asti vyavadiinanimittam avinirbhiigasuddhadharma­taaprakrtitviit I . . . eva1'[l yad yatra niisti tat tena sanyam iti samanupasyati I yat punar atriivasi�ta1'[l bhavati tat sad ihiistfti yathiibhata1'[l prajiiniiti I samiiropiipaviidiinta­parivarjaniid aviparfta1'[lb sanyatiilak�a1}am anena slokadvayena paridfpitam I

a See A 19a4 and B 39b3. Johnston omits, probably inadvertently, -tii-. b Corrected according to A (19a4) and B (39b5).

Can sutra mahiilnudrii be justified on the basis of Maimpa's Aprati�thiinavada? 563

This can be achieved by not becoming mentally engaged (amanasikiira). "Non­abiding" or Aprati�thana is the favoured Madhyamaka tenet among Maitripa and his disciples, and can be combined with the Way of Mantras. This means that while it is the favoured view during formal Tantric practice, the simple practice of not abiding by not becoming mentally engaged can likewise lead to initial direct realizations of the true nature of the three kiiyas (nijakiiya), then it is called "in accordance with Mantrayana" for being a yiina of fruition (as

Vajrapar:ti would have it). It should be noted that mahiimudrii explanations on the level of the fruit can be also doctrinally supported by the Ratnagotravibhii­gao In other words, Kon sprul has a good case for advancing his satra mahii­mudrii. In Aprati�thanavada it is, of course, also possible to maintain a sudden enlightenment. Reality is free from mental fabrications, and there is no reason why a fortunate yogin (VajrapliIJ.i's crow-like practitioner) should not experience a total interruption of all reification and denial, and fully awaken to reality in one instant.

Abbreviations and bibliography

General abbreviations

AICSB

DK

NGMPP

P

Annual of the Institute for Comprehensive Studies of Buddhism, Taisho University

'Bri gun bka' brgyud chos mdzod, vol. ka. No place, no date.

Nepal-German Manuscript Preservation Project

Peking Tanjur

Primary sources (Indian)

AAs: Abhisamayiila1'!lkiira Ed. by Ramshankar Tripathi (together with the Abhisamayiila1Jlkiiravrtti/:t Sphutii­rthii) (Bibliotheca Indo-Tibetica Series 2). Sarnath: Central Institute of Higher Tibetan Studies 1993.

AA V Sphutarthas: Abhisamayiilal?lkiiravrttib Sphutiirthii See AAs

·-AMAs: Amanasikiiriidhiira In AdvayavajraSa7?lgraha. Ed. by the Study Group on Sacred Tantric Texts. AICSB 11 (March 1989), pp. 209-202 (=136-143).

564 Klaus-Dieter Mathes

APP s: Aprati�fhiinaprakiisa Ed. by the Study Group on Sacred Tantric Texts. (Mikkyo-seiten kenkyUkai): "The Results of a Joint Study on the Buddhist Tantric Texts: Advayavajrasa:rp.graha - A New Critical Edition with Japanese Translation." AICSB 13 (March 1991), pp. 259-256 (=78-81).

APPr: Aprati�fhiinaprakiisa (Tibetan translation) Rab tu mi gnas pa gsal bar ston pa. Peking Tanjur, rgyud 'grel, vol. mi, fol. 122a-b.

CMAs: Caturmudriinvaya In AdvayavajrasaJ?1graha. Ed. by the Study Group on Sacred Tantric Texts. AICSB 11 (March 1989), pp. 253-238 (=92-107).

CMAT r: CaturmudriinvayatzKii (Tibetan translation) "Phyag rgya bzi'i rgya cher 'grel pa rin po che'i sfiing po". Phyag rgya chen po'i rgya giun, vol. OJ?1, fols. 255a-317a.

CMUr: Caturmudrii-Upadesa (Tibetan translation) "Phyag rgya bzi'i man nag." Phyag rgya chen po'i rgya giwi, vol. hUJ?1, fols. 9a-13b. dPal spmls block print.

GPKUr: Guruparampariikrama- Upadesa (Tibetan translation) "Bla rna brgyud pa'i rim pa'i man nag." Phyag rgya chen po'i rgya giun, vol. hUJ?1, fols. 290b-320b. dPal spuns block print.

J.AAs: JfiiiniilokiilaJ?1kiira Ed. by the Study Group on Buddhist Sanskrit Literature, The Institute for Compre­hensive Studies of Buddhism, Taisho University. Tokyo: Taisho University Press 2004.

MMKs: MuZamadhyamakakiirikii Ed. by lW. de Jong (The Adyar Library Series 109). Madras: The Adyar Library and Research Centre 1977.

MV s: MahiiyiinaviJ?1fikii In AdvayavajrasaJ?1graha. Ed. by the Study Group on Sacred Tantric Texts. AICSB 12 (March 1990), pp. 291-286 (=74-79).

PTMV s: PaficatathiigatamudriivivaralJa In AdvayavajrasaJ?1graha. Ed. by the Study Group on Sacred Tantric Texts. AICSB 10 (March 1988) pp. 189-178 (=44-57).

RGV s: Ratnagotravibhiiga Mahiiyiinottaratantrasiistra Ed. by Edward H. Johnston. Patna: Bihar Research Society 1950. (Includes the Ratnagotravibhiigavyiikhyii)

RGVV s: Ratnagotravibhiigavyiikhyii. See Ratnagotravibhiiga [The manuscripts A and B on which Johnston's edition is based are described in Johnston 1950: vi-vii. See also Bandurski et al. 1994: 12-3].

SNs: Sekanirdda (also: SekanirlJaya) In AdvayavajrasaJ?1graha. Ed. by the Study Group on Sacred Tantric Texts. AICSB 13 (March 1991), pp. 289-271 (=48-66).

Can satra mahamudra be justified on the basis of Maitripa's ApratWhanavada? 565

SNT: Sekanirdefa (Tibetan translation) - "dBan bskur (text: skur) nes par bstan pa." Grub pa sde bdun dan sFiin po skor gSUln yid la mi byed pa'i chos skor biugs so. DK fols. 214b-216b. - dBan bskur ba nes par bstan pa. P rgyud 'grel, vol. mi, fols. 154b-156b.

SNP seC): Sekanirdefapaiijika Sanskrit manuscript from Cambridge, Cambridge University Library, MS Or. 149.

SNPS(Pe): Sekanirdefapaiijika

Sanskrit manuscript from St. Petersburg, Gosvdarstvennaja Publicnaja Biblioteka im. M.E. Saltykova-Sccedrina, MS. 283.

SNPT: Sekanirdefapafijikii (Tibetan translation) "dBan bskur nes par bstan pa'i dka' 'grel biugs so," Phyag rgya chen po'i rgya giun, vol. 0112, fols. 317a-343a, dPal spuns block print.

SSs: Sthitisamuccaya - NGMPP reel nos. B 24/4 and B 25/15. - See also Matsuda 1995.

TRAs: Tattvaratnavalf - In Advayavajrasal?2graha. Ed. by Haraprasad Shastri (Gaekwad's Oriental Series

40), pp. 14-22. Baroda: Oriental Institute, 1927. - See also NGMPP reel no. B 22/24.

TRAT: Tattvaratnavalf (Tibetan translation) - "De kho na fiid rin po che'i phren ba." Grub pa sde bdun dan siiin po skor gsum yid la mi byed pa 'i chos skor biugs so. DK, fols. 178a-182b. - De kho na iiid rin po che 'i phren ba. P rgyud 'grel, vol. mi, fols. 126b-130b.

Primary sources (Tibetan)

Author unknown (Ti pi 'bum la 'bar?) "Rin chen phren ba'i bsad pa." Grub pa sde bdun dali sfiili po skor gsum yid la mi byed pa 'i chos skor biugs so. DK, fols. 182b-199b.

Kon sprul Blo gros mtha' yas Ses bya kun khyab mdzod. 3 vols. Beijing: Mi rigs dpe skrun khan 1982.

'Gos Lo tsa ba gZon nu dpal Deb ther slion po, 2 vols., Si khron mi rigs dpe skrun khan 1984.

bsTan 'dzin padma'i rgyal mtshan (sKyabs mgon Che tshan sku phren bii pa) 'Bri gun gdan rabs: Nes don bstan pa'i siiili po mgon po 'bri gUli pa chen po'i gdan rabs chos kyi byun tshul gser gyi phreli ba ies bya ba biugs so (,Bri gUli bka' brgyud 6). Dehra Dun: Drikung Kagyu Institute 2000.

Zva dmar Chos grags ye ses (The Fourth Zva dmar pa) Tshig don gsal ba: "Byan chub sems 'grel gyi mam par bsad pa tshig don gsal ba zes bya ba bzugs so." Yid biin gyi za ma tog 1, pp. 62-123. Dharamsala: 'Gro mgon gts'ug lag dpe skrun khan 2001.

566

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