Can the Military Modernize?Author(s): W. A. E. SkurnikSource: Africa Today, Vol. 15, No. 2, Can the Military Modernize? (Apr. - May, 1968), pp. 5-6Published by: Indiana University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4184885 .

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responsible, irresolute, ignorant or communist- inspired.

If international opinion has had any meaning- ful impact at all it may have influenced the com- mutation of sentences for thirty-five other Afri- cans scheduled to be hung. But this is at best wishful thinking. The commutations may well have been ordered to reaffirm the authority of the illegal regime, to hang, to commute and to pardon as it sees fit.

Whatever the long-term effects of the hangings may be, it must be said that at the moment the rebel regime has once again successfully carried out its own decisions in defiance of world opinion. The UN, the Commonwealth, the OAU and the United Kingdom have responded only on a verbal level. The guerrilla struggle of ZAPU and ZANU is still weak. Perhaps the meeting of East African statesmen in Tanzania scheduled for May, 1968 may find additional resources for strengthening the struggle against minority rule in Rhodesia. The time may have come for calling on "the Red Army in blue berets" which Wilson feared might yet be thrown into the fight.

Davis McGabe, writing in the February, 1967 issue of Africa Report, argues that Rhodesia needs a Mao or a Castro. The recent experience would more eloquently argue for a Lenin with his many- faceted approach of building toward a matured revolutionary situation. Might not African nation-

alists advantageously reassess their tactics? What is the evidence that indiscriminate acts of terror are effective in the fight against the Rhodesian front? Where and when has terror against in- dividuals ever succeeded in bringing down a de- tested regime? Isn't the tactic of terror, in. the last analysis, an abnegation of the far more dif- ficult, tedious and tim-consuming task of orga- nizing a powerful popular movement? If, in the last analysis, the hope for a satisfactory peaceful settlement no longer exists, the alternative is revolution. Revolutions require popular participa- tion and if terror and guerrilla warfare fail to enlist the broadest popular support they will re- main ineffective expedients whose participants will continue to receive the severest punishment.

For about a year now Rhodesia has gone largely unnoticed by American public opinion, by the U. S. press and by Congress. It may well be that the martyrdom of five Africans will provide the impetus for renewed determination by Afri- can states to alter Rhodesia's status quo. This should be a timely occasion for Congress to renew its interest in Southern Africa and review U. S. responsibilities and performance in relation to the vexing Rhodesian issue. Complacent disinter- est now might well find us vitally concerned and involved later when the trend of events are be- yond our capacity to influence them.

Leo Cefkin

Con the Militory Modernize? One can only make a conjecture of the future

role of the military in black Africa. Military rule is a relatively new phenomenon. Observers were caught unprepared: their first reaction was to put aside pre-conceived Western attitudes and to as- sume that the African military are replete with the qualities required for nation-building.

The brief studies which follow attempt to take a second look at some African military regimes in the light of their first steps in an un- familiar endeavor. Our purpose is not to provide final answers, but to raise major unsettled ques- tions. Most observers today tend to evaluate these regimes from the all-encompassing point of view of "political development," and find that the mili- tary have not covered themselves with glory in their new role.

Military men do well as administrators but not as political leaders. They tend to view poli- ticians as egregious upstarts unacquainted with national honor and rectitude. It may be that the armed forces are "modern" institutions, but they must operate in the same context that bedevils civilian governments. They are subject to the same cross-pressures which emanate from the so- cities they seek to govern. It is a measure of the immensity of the task that the most modern in-

stitutions in Africa should have difficulties modernizing their countries.

To assess these military regimes only in terms of what they contribute to political development, however, is like asking them to pass an exami- nation for which they are not prepared. Their sights are considerably lower than the devolp- ment of politics. They regard themselves as care- taker regimes, temporary stabilizers churned up by chronic instability. The motivations which pro- pelled them, sometimes reluctantly, to the top are too limited to accommodate a profound under- standing of the political process. They should, therefore, be evaluated also in terms of their own relatively limited goals.

To return to the primary focus of this issue: Can the military modernize? Keeping in mind that an answer at this time must remain incon- clusive, we see certain trends: with exceptions, the military can provide short-term political stability and economic progress, but not the sort of long-haul modernization effort which Africa requires.

Political stability is easiest with the people at large. They had no connection with military coups, and their subsequent reactions varied from apathy, incredulity, and incomprehension to re-

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joicing in urban areas. However, the average per- son also judges military regimes with the same skepticism he reserves toward any government, colonial or African. There is little practical dif- ference between sacrifices asked or taxes collected in the name of a white man or a black man, civil- ian or military. His willingness to support, or endure, a national government is a function of his belief that things are not getting worse and may even get better. In areas where the economic situation has deteriorated, the military have en- countered stiff resistance; there are many unpub- lished, but confirmed, reports of peasants ambush- ing tax collectors recently.

From the standpoint of elites, stability is more delicate. The military interact with and need support from three kinds of elites: the old politicians, younger "progressives," and interest groups (such as trade unions). There is no doubt that the military have introduced, quite inad- vertently, new tensions into the social system. These tensions result from antagonisms between displaced politicians and the technicians who re- placed them, from the impatience of politicians who see themselves as heroes of national inde- pendence and resent their eclipse, from the mili- tary's oft-expressed disdain for the illogical, dis- tasteful, selfish worlds of political upstarts, from the officer corps' increasing sensitivity to generational cleavages, and to the pull between efficiency and the world of politics. As Dr. Bech- told points out, the efficiency of the military must not be confused with their effectiveness.

The sort of short-term political stability which the military have provided results from a number of factors, most of them on the surface. They benefit from a "show me what you can do" attitude, from the prestige granted to a new team (although that is declining), from hopes for im- provements, from their monopoly-of the means of physical coercion and, a factor often unreported, from continued good personal relations with other members of the elite. Moreover, many military regimes have all but abandoned their early em- phasis on government by technocrats and have seconded prominent civilians, followers of politi- cians, into their circle.

But the time seems near when these advan- tages will be offset by restlessness. Younger, pro- gressive elements are being sidetracked; older politicians are raising questions about their re- turn to the top; and interest groups are increasing their pressure for material rewards on the very military regimes they helped install. If events in the Sudan and Dahomey are any guide, we may expect increasing, rather than decreasing, strains between civilian and military elites. It may well be that the military unwittingly paved the way for greater political pluralism. The officer corps is

just as vulnerable to regional fragmentation as is the rest of the elite. But whether this will favor stability remains to be seen.

The military have re-established a modicum of stability by temporarily removing politicians' quarrels from the official scene. It is too often forgotten that politics invents deceptive issues and creates unnecessary tensions, and thus in- evitably courts instability. Ethnic antagonism, in spite of observers' worries about "tribalism," fre- quently remains dormant until aroused and manip- ulated for political purposes. The civilian leader- ship had reached an impasse, and the military's job was to lead the countries into more stable terrain. One of the military's contributions lies in the shock value of ousting civilians and in forcing them to meditate about fundamental rules of the game. By singling out top civilian leadership's be- havior as one of the major causes of instability, they may have paved the way for a future re- juvenation of the political process.

The economic efforts of the military were di- rected toward implanting cornerstones for further devolopment. They have been successful in im- proving agricultural production, in rationalizing national planning, in securing increased foreign assistance, and in reducing budgetary imbalance. These short-run accomplishments are to their credit.

But what appears questionable is the military's ability to do the kind of things needed for long- term modernization-in which their predecessors, may it be noted, were also something less than successful. It would have been surprising, in fact, if officers trained in military and technical skills had suddenly displayed the qualities required of political leaders. As the essays suggest, the mili- tary are generally not equipped to create institu- tions which can mobilize and maintain popular support, arching across sub-national loyalties and generate a change in attitudes from the "tradi- tional" to the "modern."

This does not exclude the rise of individual officers who combine efficiency with political acumen. An Alphonse Alley, for example, has the imagination, respect, and dedication required- though it is probably too late for him now since Dahomey's military appear to be on the way out.

In theory, the possibility of individual officers rising to the challenge still remains. But given the pressures building up against the military generally, it seems more likely that military rule in black Africa is an interlude whose major pur- pose is to deflect attention away from sterile power struggles. Beyond that, one can only point out that predictions about Africa have a myster- ious way of being proved wrong.

W. A. E. Skurnik

6 AFRICA. TODAY

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