Dahomey: The End of a Military RegimeAuthor(s): W. A. E. SkurnikSource: Africa Today, Vol. 15, No. 2, Can the Military Modernize? (Apr. - May, 1968), pp. 21-22Published by: Indiana University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4184889 .

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Dahomey: The End of a Military Regime W. A. E. Skurnik

Last December 17, the Republic of Dahomey experienced its fourth coup d'etat since independ- ence-or its fifth, counting General Soglo's 1966 decision to remain in power rather than return the country to civiliati rule as originally envis- aged. The latest coup, however, was the result more of the generational tensions among the army's officers than of the forces which triggered the previous coups. Like the previous ones, it was sudden and bloodless. But it did not, this time, benefit from popular support generated by trade unions and some intellectuals. The public was, in fact, dumbfounded and irritated.

What happened in December 1967 may be summarized briefly. Following months of social unrest that culminated in a series of widespread strikes, the Soglo government, realizing that bayo- nets are no answer to social discontent, made a number of painful concessions to trade unions. The workers agreed to return to their jobs. The next day, some 60 paratroops led by Major Mau- rice Kouandete and Captain Mathieu Kerekrou surrounded the residence of General Christophe Soglo, President of the Republic, Lt. Col. Alphonse Alley, Armed Forces Chief of Staff, Lt. Col. Philippe Aho, Interior Minister, and Major Benoit Sinzogan, head of the Military Vigilance Commit- tee (MVC). The rebellious military dissolved the government and its advisory body, the MVC, pro- claimed the usual platitudes about the "superior interests of the nation", and promised a quick re- turn to "democracy". Regionalism and Cynicism:

Beneath these surface events lay develop- ments with which they were connected to a great- er or lesser extent. When General Soglo ousted the civilian government headed by Justin Ahoma- degbe in December 1965, he inherited and still has two kinds of major problems. The first is political, and consists of regional fragmentation among the northern and two southern regions, as well as of widespread cynicism toward govern- ment on the part of the masses.

Regional fragmentation centers on attachment to regional leaders: Messrs. Maga in the north, Apithy in the southeast, and Ahomadegbe in the southwest. Regionalism corresponds roughly to ethnic boundaries, but ethnic factors are less im- portant than are ties with the leader. Ethnic dif- ferences manifest themselves sporadically and only when initiated from above. In the past, each of the "big three" have spent more time and energy on efforts to eclipse their rivals than to get along with each other.

The second political problem, widespread in Africa, springs from loss of enthusiasm in the wake of the dying independence euphoria. As a consequence, cynicism develops and affects popu- lar views regarding any government. At the end of 1964, President Apithy complained that he did

not understand "what has happended to the popu- lar enthusiasm which we knew on the morrow of the great revolution of October 1963".1 In August 1967, a Cotonou taxi driver told this writer that "The military have learned that there is sugar cane to be munched at the top."

Decline in Productivity and Rise of Trade Unionism

Dahomey's second major problem is economic, and may be summarized by three general cate- gories. First, agricultural production has declined. By 1965 it had decreased between 10% and 50%o since independence. Moreover, exports cover only some 40%v of imports, and the latter include a large proportion of consumer goods rather than material needed for development. The foreign trade deficit rose five-fold between 1954 and 1965. Second, Dahomey has a "chronic" budgetary deficit caused by the expansion of social services after independence, by a plethoric civil service which absorbs over 50% of the national budget, and by a debt equivalent to one year's total bud- get. Twent-five per cent of that debt is owed to the resident French business community.

The third major economic problem concerns the relationship between trade union demands and government response. Most unions consist of civil servants whose ideas about living standards are European rather than African. Hence they constitute a bourgeoisie, a kind of incipient "new class" which looks askance at any effort to chip away at its newly acquired prosperity. Trade union dissatisfaction was responsible for initiating and carrying through the military coups in 1963 and 1965. Their willingness to accept sacrifices has depended upon their views on the govern- ment's effectiveness, the satisfaction of demands for political participation and, more recently, upon their increasing estimate of their political weight.

As in 1963, Soglo conceived of the army's role in 1965 only as temporary, and encouraged political leaders to form a coalition government by working out a common program to be sub- mitted to the voters. When it became evident, early in 1966, that politicians responded primarily in terms of narrow partisan considerations, Soglo banned all political parties. Placing organized political life under wraps was designed to let time, plus the foreign exile of the "big three", weaken or extirpate the roots of regional frag- mentation. To demonstrate his government's con- cern for the Dahomean people, he inaugurated regular, unrehearsed radio interviews with the "man in the street", and opened the government- sponsored newspaper to lively, high caliber de- bates about fundamental policy questions.

Politics having been shunted aside, the Soglo government concentrated on economic problems. Agricultural production increased in some areas,

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partly as a result of well publicized "human in- vestment" campaigns. Also, the government was successful in convincing France that sound eco- nomic and fiscal policies were its priorities, anrd hence in securing commitments for increased aid and continued budgetary subsidies. New Austerity Measures:

Moreover, Soglo expanded previous govern- ments' austerity measures. In August 1966, he re- duced public and private salaries by 10%, in- creased consumer goods taxes, froze recruitment and promotion in the civil service, and reduced family allowances. A month later, he annuonced an across-the-board 25% national solidarity tax on all salaries to replace the former 10% levy.

But discontent remained widespread. This was due in part to continuing economic distress. The value of exports in 1966 was the lowest since 1960 and for the first time fell below one third of the value of imports. Business showed few signs of recovering from the aftermath of the 1965 political disturbances. Tax revenue remained below expectations. Other reasons for discontent included frictions between disgruntled politicians and the technicians who replaced them in govern- ment posts, resentment by civilian government officials of increasing army control over the decision-making process, behavior of party lead- ers at social functions, and questions among the intellectual elite who believed that the Soglo government was not leading Dahomey anywhere.

Trade unions helped precipitate the most re- cent military coup to the extent that the young Turks in the military turned the union issue into a grievance against their seniors. Faced with a series of strikes in late 1967, in support of de- mands for revising austerity measures, the Soglo government initially remained firm, and explained that austerity was the price of progress if Dahomey wanted to retain independence. As union and government positions sharpened, some union leaders were imprisoned and others de- manded a public accounting of army salaries.

Union determination to press for a revision of the 25% cut and other austerity measures was reinforced when General Soglo and Lt. Col. Alley returned, in November 1967, from a trip to Paris with the news that more French aid was forth- coming. A strike begun in Porto Novo by the effervescent school teachers spread to other unions and cities, then turned into a general strike sup- ported by the three largest union federations. The government backed down, and Alley negotiated an agreement with union leaders to convene ad hoc committees, with union representation, to re- view the austerity program. The general strike thus ended one day before the government fell. Internal Military Rivalry:

The 1967 coup resulted mainly from the split among military leaders which was evident, be- neath the surface, since 1966. The split opposed two "generations" of army officers. The "old guard," including Soglo and Alley, came up through the ranks, fighting wars on three con- tinents, and was incorporated in the new state's forces after independence. Whereas Soglo, 59, is known for his bonhomie and tends toward easy

compromise, Alley, 31, is decisive (though not rigid) and is regarded as tne army's strong man; he became army chief of staff in 1965 and has a following among junior officers.

The younger officers, mostly recent graduates of French military schools who consider them- selves the army's intellectuals, resent their elders' style. Attracted more by a Mobutu than by a Soglo, they resented (along with many civilians) Soglo's remark on his return from Paris, that Dahomeans behave so as to deserve the manna falling from France. More important, they resent- ed their relative obscurity and yearned for a place nearer the official sun.

The young Turks were dissatisfied for a num- ber of reasons. First, they were disappointed at the marginal importance of the MVC, which in April 1967 replaced a joint civilian-military ad- visory body and was created to placate their drive for greater political participation. The MVC, they later complained, was "rapidly muzzled and paralyzed. Its role was confined to that of a roving comptroller . . . who meddles in everything and does nothing".2 Second, they bristled at the government's "soft on unions" policy and viewed unions as unpatriotic, engaged in the selfish pur- suit of narrow material interests. Third, they were impatient with apparent French insistence on con- tinuing economic and financial improvement be- fore turning to political questions. Resioration of Civilian Rule:

Alley, who in 1966 spearheaded a movement to give the army authority to remove President Soglo from office, rejected the young Turks' over- tures that he depose Soglo after the November 1967 Paris visit. It is therefore ironic that, after initially confining Alley to his quarters, they nevertheless had to ask him to head the new government, because they found that no military government was possible without him. Most im- portant, however, is Alley's decision to turn the government over to civilians by June 1968. The schedule calls for a constitutional referendum on March 31, presidential elections in May, and par- liamentary elections in June.

The outstanding lesson from Dahomey is that the attempt to use the armed forces as a tempor- ary stabilizer of the political system appears to have ended in failure. It failed because it could not contain union demands, because of genera- tional tensions among the army officers, because civilian elites are tired of army rule, and because the army itself is tired of governing. The army, notably unenthusiastic about taking over govern- ment reins, mounted an effort to stay in office but quickly ran out of steam.

What has been accomplished remains to be seen. It is significant that the big three, from their Paris residence, welcomed a "return to legality," and that Ahomadegbe immediately sided with the young Turks because they were led by the former chief of his military cabinet, Major Kouandete. The fulture now depends largely on the vitality, devotion, and wisdom of 'civilian elites in working for Dahomey rather than for more parochial ob- jectives.

1. Afrique NouveUle, 963 (Jansuary 20-26, 19;66), p. 5. 2. Africa Research Bulletin, 4:12 (December 1967), p. 927c.

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