CANADIAN COAST GUARD AUXILIARY - PACIFIC SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM CANADIAN COAST GUARD AUXILIARY - PACIFIC 2008

CANADIAN COAST GUARD AUXILIARY - PACIFIC

SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM


2008


International Safety ManagementCode

as amended 2002


Development of the ISM Code

• A number of very serious accidents which occurred during the late 1980's, were manifestly caused by human errors, with management faults also identified as contributing factors.


Herald of Free Enterprise

• One of these accidents was the capsize of the ferry “Herald of Free Enterprise” on the 6th March 1987, killing 193 passengers and crew.

• The prime reason for the accident was that the bow doors were left open when the ships sailed.

• The water rushed in, made the vessel unstable and she rolled over.



• The crew member who was expected to close the doors was asleep during his break, and the First Officer who was supervising the car deck, was ordered to the bridge for sailing.

• The bow doors could not be seen from the bridge, and there were no indicator lights, so the Captain assumed the doors were closed.





• Lord Justice Sheen in his inquiry into the loss of the Herald of Free Enterprise, famously described the management failures as "the disease of sloppiness” and identified negligence at every level of the corporation's hierarchy.





• At its 16th Assembly in October 1989, IMO adopted resolution A.647(16), Guidelines on Management for the Safe Operation of Ships and for Pollution Prevention.



• The purpose of these Guidelines was to provide those responsible for the operation of vessels with a framework for the proper development, implementation and assessment of safety and pollution prevention management in accordance with good practice.



• The objective was to ensure safety, to prevent human injury or loss of life, and to avoid damage to the marine environment, and to property.



• The Guidelines were based on general principles and objectives so as to promote evolution of sound management and operating practices within the shipping industry as a whole.



• The Guidelines recognized the importance of the existing international instruments as the most important means of preventing maritime casualties and pollution of the sea and included sections on management and the importance of a safety and environmental policy.



• After some experience in the use of the Guidelines, in 1993 IMO adopted the International Management Code for the Safe Operation of Ships and for Pollution Prevention (the ISM Code).



• In 1998, the ISM Code became mandatory, for deep sea vessels.


ISM Code

• The Code establishes safety-management objectives and requires a safety management system (SMS) to be established by "the Company", which is defined as the shipowner or any person, who has assumed responsibility for operating the ship.


ISM Code

• The Company is then required to establish and implement a policy for achieving these objectives. This includes providing the necessary resources and shore-based support.


ISM Code

• Every company is expected "to designate a person or persons ashore having direct access to the highest level of management".

• The procedures required by the Code should be documented and compiled in a Safety Management Manual.


Non Conformances / Observations

• Major Non Conformance – Issues where corrective action must be carried out immediately to meet the ISM Code, failure to do so would result in the withdrawal of the Safety Management Certificate and/or the Company Document of Compliance.



• Non Conformances – Issues where corrective action must be made to meet the ISM Code and/or ensure that the Procedures in the Safety Management System onboard are being followed correctly.

• Time limited.



• Observations – Issues where improvements in the Safety Management System and procedures are recommended.

• These do not have to be complied with, however they should be considered.


Has ISM worked

• It is hard so say precisely whether ISM has worked. However it certainly has contributed to the fact that the number of ships over 100 GRT lost at sea has reduced year on year, and the number of seafarers lives that have been lost annually has dropped since 1996.


The reduction in the number of vessels losses

• Relatively few vessels actually sink at sea. The vast majority of the following "losses" simply refer to ships which are damaged and "written off" by the hull insurers as being beyond economical repair - described by underwriters as "total constructive losses".


The figures below cover the entire global industry and indicate the steady improvement in safety performance since the 1990s.


Lives lost at sea (1995 - 2004)

• As in all transport sectors, lives are sadly lost as a result of accidents. However, the loss of life in shipping is in fact relatively modest, and the overall trend is one of reduction in the number of fatalities, which is all the more impressive in view of the growth in the number of ships in the world fleet.


• The figures below relate to lives lost on cargo vessels and cover the entire international industry, which employs over one and a quarter million people, plus many more employed in coastal trades.


How Does This Affect the CCGA P?


How Does This Affect the CCGA P?

• Whilst the International Safety Management Code only applies to ships on international trade, various ship operators in Canada have voluntarily adopted, either because it is seen as a good idea, or because events in those companies have made it expedient to do so.

• As a result, for example, both the Canadian Coast Guard and BC Ferries have their own Safety Management Systems.


Queen of Oak Bay

Auxiliary

1


Queen of the North


Canadian Coast Guard

• The Fast Rescue Craft "G.R.1", dispatched in response to an urgent SAR call, struck a rock at about 0140 at a speed of approximately 30 knots.

• All three crew were thrown from the boat and projected over the rock, landing in the water on the opposite side. The boat, carried by momentum, flew through the air some 18m and came to rest at the water's edge also on the other side.


Canadian Coast Guard Auxiliary

• The CCGA (P) are not immune from accidents, and recently have had:

– two persons fall overboard.

– one of our vessels went aground due to loss of situational awareness by the entire crew.

– one of our vessels suffered a cockpit window break when stuffing the bow in bad weather, flooding the cockpit


The Safety Management System



• We have been requested by Canadian Coast Guard to put in place a Safety Management System.

• The system documents are to be found on our web site, under Document Library, and Safety Management http://www.ccga-pacific.org/ccga-p/library/?action =category&lcid=15



• The basic requirement for a Safety Management System is “write down what you do, and then do what is written down”.



• The CCGA (P) already had many of the policies, procedures and standing instructions required for a Safety Management System, but just not formalised in one suite of documents.



• The system covers the following subjects

Policy and Procedures

SAR Operations

Human Resources

Training

Contingency Plans

Personal Safety

Environmental Protection

Forms & Checklists

Maintenance CommunicationsPurchasing

Non Conformances & Observations



The biggest changes are:• Use of checklists to minimise errors by

omission, whether during routine operations or during emergencies to own vessel.

• The active encouragement to report accidents, and non conformances to promote continuous improvement.


Accident Reporting

• Accidents to our personnel and vessels can often be caused by mistakes or errors which can reveal omissions or mistakes in operating instructions, training procedures.

• By encouraging stations to report these in a “no blame” environment, we can find those omissions or mistakes and put in place improvements, and promulgate them to reduce the chance of a future re-occurrence.


Record Keeping

• Formalise the keeping of records.• This is a large part achieved by the SAR

Management System, which keep records for:– the training and certification of our

volunteers.– the operation of the vessels


Lessons Learned

• Part of the system is a section online on Lessons Learned.

• This is a summary of accidents that occur, and identifying procedures that could have prevented that accident, including new recommendations that may be necessary.

• Whenever possible the station is not identified, (although the accident report may reveal this) and names are never to be used.


Audits

• Periodic audits of stations, station personnel and vessels by CCGA (P) staff will be required to ensure that the policies, procedures and standing instructions are being followed.

• There will also be audits by an approved external agency.


Results and Benefits


Results and Benefits

• The result and benefits of the proper operation of the system will be:– increased reporting of accidents – detailed investigation of accidents and

publication of lessons learned – reduction of accidents (and insurance?)– improved and formalised record keeping– consistency of operations across the region

Documents

CANADIAN COAST GUARD AUXILIARY - PACIFIC SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM CANADIAN COAST GUARD AUXILIARY - PACIFIC 2008